Chapter 7 - Social Influence

THIS CHAPTER WILL DISCUSS: 
1. How group decisions often tend to be more extreme than individual decisions. 
2. How proposals relating to social influence explain this tendency. 
3. How group discussion can promote or discourage members' acceptance of proposals. 

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we shift attention from the issues of conformity and deviance, which concern group structure, and focus on the process of social influence, which occurs when group interaction causes members to conform. 
We partially discussed social influence in Chapter 6. In many experiments that we have examined so far, however, group interaction was artificial. For instance, in some of the studies by Asch and by Sherif, interaction was limited to the expression of choices. In other experiments, also by Asch and by Moscovici and Schachter, interaction was artificial because the "choices" of confederates were not subject to group influence. These contrived circumstances hide insights about the process of social influence. Here, we look at studies that examine more natural group interaction. We can learn more about social influence by studying these naturally interacting groups. 
We will look at decisions that naturally interacting groups make and then turn to proposals that account for this behavior. All these proposals relate to the process of social influence. 

Natural Group Situations Versus Contrived Situations
We have stated that test groups can interact artificially or naturally. This distinction influences our ability to study the concept of social influence. 
When groups are contrived, as in the experiment of Asch that we discussed earlier, interaction is not natural. One reason why Asch's groups were artificial was that social influence could occur in only one direction. The majority could, and often did, influence the deviant. The deviant, however, could never influence the majority because the majority was made up of confederates who had predetermined wrong judgments of the lines. They never changed their opinions. The deviant was the only real participant in the experiment. 
In such situations, confederates lead the group discussion. Such artificial groups can tell us something about how social influence works, but they cannot tell us all. 
Instead, we must turn to experiments that examine more natural, as opposed to contrived, group discussion. As we shall see, natural interaction reveals a great deal about the process of social influence in groups. 

Effects of Social Influence

To prepare for our discussion, let us consider the effects of social influence. How might social influence affect the decisions of a group? 
Imagine that someone asks a group of four people to make a decision. The group members can choose from among a number of options, and they each know all these options. Every member also has an opinion as to which option is best. Under these circumstances, group members are likely to have differences of opinion. During the meeting, the members state their opinions. They examine the options and discuss the reasons for their preferences. At the end of the meeting the group must decide which option is best. 
Scientists interested in the process of social influence have studied this type of situation. In it, all individual opinions somehow become "transformed" into one group decision. How does this "transformation" take place? What is the process? Scientists have been trying to answer these questions. 
Through their research, most scientists have come to believe that social influence is part of the "transformational" process. As we know, social influence is the process by which group members influence one another's opinions. Researchers feel that the process of social influence is part of the overall process that a group uses to "formulate" a decision based on the members' opinions. 
Each proposal in the following pages is an attempt to explain the "transformational" process, moving a group from a tangle of individual opinions to one group decision. All proposals look at social influence. They each differ, however, in their hypotheses concerning the role of social influence in the "transformational" process. 

THE GROUP POLARIZATION EFFECT

Before we look at these proposals, we need to examine what researchers found when they looked at "natural" groups. How did scientists approach this research, and what did they find? What types of decisions did "natural" groups make? 
Scientists looking at such groups found an overall phenomenon they called the "group polarization effect." To understand this effect, we need to examine the research that led to its discovery. Its discovery, in turn, led to the proposals regarding social influence that follow. 

A "Choice Dilemma"

Imagine that someone asked the four-member group we described in our introduction to make the following decision: 

Mr. Jones is a married man with two children. He has a steady job that pays him about $40,000 a year. He can easily afford the necessities of life, but few of the luxuries. Mr. Jones' father died recently. He carried a $25,000 life insurance policy. Mr. Jones would like to invest this inheritance in stocks. He is well aware of the secure "blue chip" stocks and bonds. They would pay approximately six percent on his investment. On the other hand, Mr. Jones has heard that the stock of a relatively unknown company, Company X, might double its present value. This could happen if the buying public favorably receives a new product which is currently in production. However, if the public does not like the new product, the stock would decline in value and Mr. Jones would lose his investment. 

Imagine that you are advising Mr. Jones. You must choose the lowest probability that you consider acceptable before you would advise Mr. Jones to invest in Company X. For example, do you think that Mr. Jones should not invest in Company X under any circumstance? Do you think that Mr. Jones should invest in Company X only if the odds are 9 in 10 that the stock will double in value? Or will you accept odds of 5 in 10? 1 in 10? What odds would you be willing to accept? 

As you can see, the four members of the group face a number of different probabilities that Company X will succeed, and they must choose from among them. Each member has an opinion about the lowest probability of success that he or she would accept before advising Mr. Jones to invest in Company X. The members will probably disagree about the lowest acceptable probability. Some might think that even if the odds are only 3 in 10 that the stock will do well, the opportunity is too good to pass up. They would consider it a good gamble. Others will find these odds too chancy. They might want odds of 7 in 10. During the meeting, the group members state their opinions and the reasons behind them. By the end of the meeting they must come to a decision concerning the lowest probability that the group would accept before advising Mr. Jones to invest in Company X. 
Scientists interested in social influence have studied this exact situation. Researchers have come to call this type of problem a "choice dilemma." Faced with choice dilemmas, groups must choose between two options. One option has an attractive outcome but only some probability of success. The other option has a less attractive outcome but will definitely succeed. For example, a group must choose between traveling a long way to a stadium in hopes of getting tickets to a popular baseball game or staying at home and watching the game on television. If they travel to the stadium, they may miss the game entirely. Staying at home, however, is not as much fun. The choice dilemma involves an attractive, risky plan and a safe plan. They need to examine the odds that they will be able to get tickets and then decide what to do. 
Now let us go back to the choice dilemma facing the group that needs to advise Mr. Jones. In that dilemma, Company X is the more attractive but chancier proposition. Investing in Company X is an attractive idea, but it is an unsure choice. The other option, investing in blue-chip stocks and bonds, is less attractive but safer. It is an assured option. Mr. Jones would know exactly what he was getting if he bought stocks and bonds. 
The group must decide the odds for success that they would require from the more attractive but chancier option, Company X, before they recommend it. 

Definition of "Risky" and "Cautious" Decisions

Before we look at how a "natural" group might deal with a choice dilemma, let us define some terms. 
Imagine that the group decides to advise Mr. Jones to invest in Company X as long as the odds are 2 in 10. This means that the group is willing to allow Mr. Jones to take a chance with Company X even though the company is unlikely to succeed. The group has made a "risky" choice. 
In contrast, the group advises Mr. Jones to invest in Company X only if the odds of success are 8 in 10. In this case, the group is willing to recommend Company X only if the company is highly likely to succeed. The group has made a "cautious" decision. 
In general, a group is risky if it recommends the more attractive but unsure option at odds of success that are less than 5 in 10. In other words, if the choice has a less than 50-50 chance for success and the group still recommends it, the group is being risky. A group is being cautious, however, if it decides to recommend the more attractive but chancier proposition at odds of success that are more than 5 in 10. 

Possible Decisions

What would a "natural" group do with a choice dilemma? We can think of several possible scenarios. Let us hypothesize about some of them. 
In the first scenario, all members of the group have the same opinion. The group will almost always decide on that opinion. Thus, if all four members of our example group wanted the odds to be at least 6 in 10, the group decision would be 6 in 10. 
In the second scenario, some group members tend toward risk and some tend toward caution. The group decision will probably be a compromise. We could estimate that compromise by figuring the arithmetic average of each member's individual opinion. For instance, two members of our group want odds of 7 in 10, a cautious choice, and the other two want odds of 3 in 10, a risky choice. The arithmetic average is the probability of 5 in 10. Hence, we would expect the group to compromise and agree that they could recommend Company X if the probability is 5 in 10. 
In a third scenario, all group members are on one side, either risk or caution. They disagree, however, about the exact probability they would need to choose the more attractive but unsure option. Once again, we can use math to predict the group's compromise. For example, two members want the probability to be 4 in 10, and two want it to be 2 in 10. They clearly all agree on a risky option but disagree on the acceptable level of risk. By averaging their opinions, we would predict that the group would most likely agree to a 3 in 10 probability of success. 

Actual Decisions

What decisions did the "natural" groups actually make with choice dilemmas? Were the three scenarios we hypothesized correct? 
Researchers have experimented to see what actually occurs when groups make decisions about choice dilemmas. Many of these studies applied a particular experimental method. It was first used in a study of choice dilemmas by Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1962). 
In their study method, a number of participants first worked alone and chose acceptable odds for each of a series of 12 choice dilemmas including the one about Mr. Jones and his investments. We will label each participant's first decision the "prediscussional opinion." 
Next, the researchers placed the participants in groups, and each group made a decision about acceptable odds. Finally, each participant made one last individual decision about which odds would be acceptable, again working alone. We will label the participants' last choice the "postdiscussional opinion." 
What did the researchers find? One significant finding related to the third scenario above. As you will recall, in that scenario all group members are on the same side, either risk or caution. They disagree, however, about the probability they need to recommend the more attractive, but hazardous, option. We hypothesized that we could mathematically average the opinions of the group members and that this average would indicate what they would eventually agree upon. 
The research findings, however, showed this idea to be false. What we expected did not happen. 
For example, we are looking at the results of a group of four people in the experiment. The prediscussional opinions of two members leaned toward risk, but not too much risk. They would advise Mr. Jones to invest only if the odds were at least 4 in 10 that Company X will succeed. The other two members of the group were rather bold and would advise Mr. Jones to invest if the odds were only 2 in 10 for success. 
What happened when these four people came together in a group? Earlier, we hypothesized that the group would compromise. In this case, we might expect the members to decide on the mathematic average of their prediscussional opinions. This would work out to the odds of 3 in 10. 
In the Wallach, Kogan, and Bem experiment, however, this did not happen. 

Risky Shift
In 10 out of the 12 choice dilemmas that the group examined, the eventual decision was riskier than the mathematical average would predict. For example, the group that we imagined above might decide that Mr. Jones should buy the stock at lower odds than the mathematic average of 3 in 10. They might decide on the lower, more daring odds of only 2.5 in 10. 
Researchers have called this phenomenon the "risky shift." 
In addition, researchers found that the group meetings appeared to have a lasting influence on members. The participants' postdiscussional opinions were riskier than their prediscussional ideas. Further, these postdiscussional opinions approximated the group decision. Researchers found this true both immediately after the group meeting and several weeks later when they again asked the participants for their postdiscussional opinions. Such a result is evidence that members did not merely comply with their groups. Instead, an actual opinion change took place. 
The study also examined control groups, consisting of people who voiced only two individual opinions, with no intervening group discussion. In this situation, no shift took place. Thus, the research showed that members need some experience of group discussion before risky shifts can take place. 

Explanations for the Risky Shift 

Diffusion of responsibility. A truism of science is that researchers are dissatisfied with experimental results unless they can explain them. Two years after this experiment, Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1964) proposed an explanation for the risky shift phenomenon. They believed that diffusion of responsibility causes the shift; in other words, group membership, in itself, is sufficient to cause the phenomenon. They postulated that the experience of being in a group creates emotional bonds among members that decrease anxieties members might have about choices. Groups do not worry about the possible negative consequences of risky decisions as much as individuals do because the group can diffuse responsibility for the decision. The decision comes from the group as a whole, not from each person. 

Familiarization. Other researchers did not agree and proposed alternative reasons for the shift. Bateson (1966) created the familiarization hypothesis, in which people become familiar with a choice dilemma as they work on it. They become comfortable with it. As a result, their anxiety about the possible consequences of a risky decision decreases. This process leads to a risky shift. 

Leadership theories. Other explanations for the shift include leadership theories, which examine how specific members influence their groups. These theories include the idea that high-risk takers are usually particularly persuasive. Researchers have offered two explanations for this. Collins and Guetzkow (1964) proposed that such persons are more confident in their views. Kelley and Thibaut (1969) hypothesized that daring people use more vivid language in their arguments than that of other group members. 

Value theory. Brown (1965) further proposed the value theory to explain the risky shift. He maintained that risk is a social ideal. Individuals want to appear at least as daring as other group members and, therefore, take more chances in the presence of others than they would take alone. 

Inadequacies of the Risky Shift Theories 

As you can see, scientists proposed a number of hypotheses to explain the risky shift phenomenon. How can scientists learn which are viable? By carefully looking over experimental results. They usually find that certain theories cannot account for some data but that others can. Using this process, scientists can refine theories and weed out those that are not valid. 
We can use an experiment that we have already described to demonstrate the shortcomings of one approach to risky shift. As you will recall, the familiarization hypothesis predicts that people take higher risks as they become familiar with something. According to this idea, participants will be more daring the second time they face a choice dilemma than they were the first time. This should happen even without group discussion because the participants are more familiar with the dilemma the second time around. The results from control groups in the Wallach et al. study showed, however, that this prediction is false. Without group discussion, no shift took place. Thus, the familiarization theory is not valid. 
Various research data has shown that the other three approaches to risky shift are also flawed. None can account for all the results. Scientists soon realized that they had to do further thinking before they could adequately explain risky shifts. 

Cautious Shift
As scientists explored these risky shift theories, a new wrinkle appeared--a "cautious shift." This was the most important finding to come out of the research. 
The cautious shift occurs, as its name implies, when groups make more cautious decisions than individuals. For example, two members of a four-person group individually decide to advise Mr. Jones to make the risky investment at odds of 6 in 10. The other two members decide to advise him to make the investment at odds of 8 in 10. When the group meets, its decision is more cautious than the average of their individual opinions. Perhaps the group decides on the odds of 7.5 in 10. It took a few years for the results of the cautious shift to become evident to researchers. 
Remember that only 2 of the 12 choice dilemmas in the Wallach et al. study failed to result in risky shifts. The experimenters considered these outcomes flukes. Subsequent research, however, found these results genuine. Further studies used the 12 choice dilemmas from the Wallach experiment and found that the same two items consistently led to cautiousness. Why would this happen? Certain themes ran through these two dilemmas that caused participants to be careful. Scientists took this knowledge and soon learned how to write choice dilemmas that would lead to either risky or cautious behavior. For example, experimenters learned that they could create a cautious shift if they described the hardships that would befall the protagonists' dependents if the risky option should fail (Rabow et al., 1966). 
Group Polarization

Researchers also learned that risky shifts occur when group members make daring choices from the start. Cautious shifts occur when members are initially rather careful. These two results come together in the overall finding of the group polarization effect. This effect takes place when groups have members who lean toward one direction, either risk or caution, but do not agree on the same odds. Such groups tend to make decisions in the direction that the members favor. Group decisions, however, are usually more extreme than the individual members' prediscussion judgments. 
Groups with members who lean toward the risky direction make decisions that are more daring than the individual members would make. People who are initially cautious make extremely careful judgments when they are in groups. 
For example, four students have a group project for a class. They must decide between two projects. One is sure to succeed, and they are guaranteed a grade of C. This project is not very imaginative, however, so the highest grade they could get would be a B. The other project might fail, in which case they would receive a D. This project is very imaginative, however, and if it worked out, they would get an A. 
According to the group polarization effect, if at the beginning of their discussion the group members leaned toward the guaranteed but unimaginative project, by the end of the meeting they would be strongly in favor of it. This would be a cautious shift. If instead they began the discussion slightly in favor of the chancy but imaginative project, afterward they should be enthusiastic about it. This would be a risky shift. In both cases, the students' opinions after the discussion were in the same direction, but more extreme than they were before the discussion. 
The group polarization effect was an exciting and surprising discovery for the researchers who looked at choice dilemmas. Scientists subsequently have performed hundreds of studies exploring it. 

Group Polarization and Social Influence 
The size of this work, however, is not due strictly to the surprise effect of polarization. Another reason experimenters have devoted a great deal of time to the polarization phenomenon is that they hope it will help them understand a larger topic. Theorists feel that polarization is a "window" into the larger world of social influence and how it affects group decision making. The hope is that the study of polarization can lead to a general theory of social influence in groups. 
We have centered our discussion on the choice dilemma. Polarization effects also occur in tasks other than those associated with risk. For instance, polarization occurs when groups deal with attitude extremity, when they guess light "movement" in autokinetic research, when they are involved in gambling, and when they need to decide how difficult a problem can get before they are no longer willing to tackle it. Thus, the research regarding polarization has been very extensive, and experiments have involved many tasks. 

Possible Theories 

Weaknesses of risky shift theories. None of the risky shift theories that we have described can account for the cautious shift. Because they do not deal with shifts toward both risk and caution, we cannot consider any of them an explanation for the group polarization effect. This does not mean that the four risky shift theories are totally invalid. Diffusion of responsibility, persuasion by risky leaders, and the other predicted processes do take place in groups and can also cause risky shifts. Scientists, however, want the most general explanations for phenomena. None of these theories falls into that category. 

General social influence theories. In the past two decades, scientists have proposed many theories regarding the group polarization effect. Further, scholars believe that these proposals go beyond choice dilemmas and relate to all types of group decisions. 
Why would they think this? As we know, scientists first discovered the group polarization effect when they studied choice dilemmas. After examining group polarization, scholars came to believe that it is a window into the larger process of social influence. Hence, by looking at group polarization, they could discover more about how social influence affects all kinds of group decision-making tasks. To look at group polarization, however, scholars still used choice dilemmas as a basis for research and proposals. In essence, choice dilemmas help scholars examine and theorize about group polarization, and group polarization helps them look at social influence. 
For all these reasons, proposals that relate to choice dilemmas also relate to all types of group decisions. 

General proposals. In the following sections of this chapter, we will discuss five general "positions": 
1. Group decisions without social influence 
2. Social influence from opinion expression 
3. Social influence from new information 
4. Social influence from both opinion expression and new information 
5. Social influence from group discussion 

Scientists have taken these positions with regard to the role that social influence plays when groups "transform" their members' individual opinions into group decisions. All these positions are relevant to the group polarization effect. Specific theories about the group polarization effect are consistent with each position, and studies are relevant to each theory. 
Thus, we will discuss each general position and the relevant group polarization theories and research. We will also show how studies in other areas of social influence relate to these five positions. The areas include many of those discussed in the previous chapter, such as conformity, deviance, and minority influence. 

POSITION 1: GROUP DECISIONS WITHOUT SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Position 1 is uniquely relevant to social influence processes in group decision making: It assumes that social influence is not important in group decision making. 
Position 1 claims that members come into a group with preformed opinions. Each person has already decided on the best option. Groups come to their decisions by combining these prediscussional opinions. That individuals change their opinions during the discussion is not important. Individual changes do not influence the final group decision because the final decision is based on each member's original opinion. 
For example, each member of a four-person group has a prediscussional opinion about the odds that he or she would require before recommending a more attractive, but unsure, option. During their meeting, the people talk about their opinions. What does this first position then hypothesize? It holds that the only important role of communication in group decision making is to acquaint each group member with the other members' prediscussional opinions. Communication is only a way to share information. Social influence, therefore, is not critical to the decision-making process. In other words, whether or not members change their opinions during group discussion has no impact on the final group decision. 
This first position hypothesizes that groups form their decisions by combining the members' prediscussional opinions. The group gives each member's prediscussional opinion a "weight," which corresponds to how much the opinion contributes to the final group decision. This happens because the group may consider some members' opinions more important than those of others. In this case, the "more important" members' ideas will make up a larger part of the final decision than will those of the "less important" members. 
Position 1 may seem difficult to understand. We used it, however, when we discussed the decisions that groups might make. As you can recall, we listed several scenarios that could take place when groups make decisions about choice dilemmas. 
For example, recall the situation in which half the members of a group tend toward a risky decision and the other half lean toward a cautious one. We hypothesized that we could estimate the group decision by computing the arithmetic average of each member's individual opinion. Let us say that two members of this group want odds of 7 in 10 before recommending an option; the other two need odds of only 3 in 10. We would expect the group to accept odds of 5 in 10 because that is the mathematical average. Our reasoning does not assume that the group members have changed their opinions about the choice dilemma. Instead, we base our conclusion solely on an arithmetic average. 

Social Decision Schemes
In Chapter 2 we described "social decision schemes." Social decision schemes are rules that groups use to combine individual members' decisions into a group decision. For example, if the odds that a group chooses a particular option are based on whether more than half of the members support it, then the social decision scheme the group is using is a "majority model." On other words, a particular option will be chosen if a majority of the group favors it. If instead the probability that a group chooses an option is based on the proportion of members that favor it, the group is applying a "proportionality model." For example, if three-quarters of the members of a group like a particular option, the odds that the group will choose that option is three-quarters. Social decision scheme theorists then propose mathematical equations to represent these and other models. They then see which equation best predicts group decisions. As we discussed in Chapter 2, research using mock juries shows that the "majority model" equations are normally the best predictors of jury verdicts. This finding implies that a "majority wins" rule is likely at work in this situation. 

Predicting Group Polarization 
Researchers have applied this approach to predict the group polarization effect. Davis, Kerr, Sussman, and Rissman (1974) used social decision schemes to examine what happens when a group polarizes around either a risky or a cautious option. 

The majority model. Specifically, they wanted to see which social decision scheme was best able to predict group polarization. Their findings were similar to what Davis discovered when he looked at juries. Again, the majority model was the best predictor. The group is likely to polarize around the option that the majority prefers. 
For example, in a four person group all members lean toward caution but differ in their prediscussional opinions. Two members want odds of 8 in 10, another member wants odds of 7 in 10, the other, the least cautious, wants 6 in 10. The average of these odds is 7.25 in 10. The majority model, on the other hand, predicts that the group's decision will be for the odds of 8 in 10. 
If the majority model is correct, the group's decision will be more extreme, in the direction of either risk or caution, than the mathematical average of the members' prediscussional opinions. In essence, in this circumstance, the majority model predicts a polarization effect. 
This is exactly what happened in the Davis et al. study for both cautious and risky shifts. 

Limits of the majority model. These findings alone, however, do not indicate that the majority model will always predict the group polarization effect. It is easy to think of circumstances in which the majority model does not do so. In our example, the majority opinion was also the most polarized. The two people who agreed on the odds of 8 in 10 made up the majority, and their opinion was also the most extreme, or polarized. In this case, the majority model predicted group polarization correctly. If the majority opinion was not also the most polarized, however, difficulties arise. In these circumstances, the majority model would not predict group polarization. 
In an alternative group, two members want odds of 6 in 10. They make up the majority opinion. One other member wants odds of 7 in 10, and the last wants even more cautious odds of 8 in 10. All members are on the side of caution; however, the members in the majority are the least cautious. In this case, the arithmetic average is 6.75 in 10. The majority model, on the other hand, predicts a group decision for the odds of 6 in 10. Hence, the majority model does not predict group polarization, but a decision that reflects the opinions of the least cautious members. 
Therefore, the majority model predicts that polarization will take place only if the group majority includes the most polarized members. This happened in the Davis et al. study. The group majorities included the most polarized members. That was why the majority model was a successful predictor of group polarization in their study. 

Conclusions. Social decision schemes fall within the realm of Position l, which holds that social influence does not affect the decisions of groups. Accordingly, social decision schemes do not make any claims about whether social influence has any effect on group members' opinions. Davis does not deny that social influence occurs during group discussion. The predictions that his schemes make, however, are based solely on prediscussion opinions. They do not account for changes in opinion that result from group discussion. 
As we have discussed earlier, group members do change their opinions as a result of group discussion. We do not mean to say by this that social decision schemes are invalid. The schemes are still often able to predict group decisions. What we know, however, does make it unlikely that Position 1 is a good explanation of the process by which groups make decisions. We need to find something that will account for the changes that members make during discussion. 
Figure 7.1 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of social decision scheme theory. 

FIGURE 7.1 

INDIVIDUAL PREDISCUSSIONAL------> OPINIONS	SOCIAL 
DECISION------------------> 
SCHEMES	

GROUP 
DECISION	

POSITION 2: SOCIAL INFLUENCE FROM OPINION EXPRESSION

Let us now turn to the second type of theory that is relevant to how social influence processes affect group decision making. Position 2 accepts the idea that social influence is important to the decision-making process and that social influence happens when group members listen to one another express opinions about the available options. 
As does Position 1, Position 2 claims that members come into a group with prediscussional opinions. During their meeting, members share opinions. Through this process, each person learns the other members' preferences. Position 2 then hypothesizes that members are likely to adopt the option of the majority. In essence, social influence occurs because people want to agree with the majority. In the end, the group chooses the majority viewpoint. 
An important aspect of Position 2 is that learning about other people's opinions is enough to bring about social influence. Group members need not hear arguments from one another about the strengths and weaknesses of the options. For example, Tom hears that others in his group like Option A but dislike Option X. Position 2 would hypothesize that this alone is enough to cause Tom to favor Option A. Tom does not need to hear arguments for Option A or against Option X before changing his opinion. Social influence can occur even when group members do not hear arguments about the strengths and the weaknesses of the options they are considering. 

Research in Support of Position 2
We have already run across several examples of social influence in which theories consistent with Position 2 seem best able to explain them. 
In Chapter 5, for instance, we discussed research related to expectation states theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). Participants who believed that they were lower than others in an imaginary skill performed phony tasks. The skill might be something like "contrast sensitivity." The phony task supposedly related to the imaginary skill. Researchers showed these participants answers that supposedly came from people who were allegedly more skilled at the task than the participants were. When these answers disagreed with the participants' decisions, the participants were likely to change their minds and agree with the answers they saw. In other words, merely learning the other opinions could influence a participant's decision. Thus, the results of expectation states research are consistent with Position 2. 
Much of the research we discussed in Chapter 6 also seems to support Position 2. For example, Asch's (1956) study of conformity found that participants agreed with the majority opinion even when that opinion was wrong. As you can recall, participants looked at the lengths of lines, and 33 participants conformed with the confederates' wrong answers in at least two-thirds of the trials. In interviews after the experiment, about half these conformists claimed that they saw the line correctly but that they decided their own perceptions must have been wrong when they heard the majority choice. They went along with the majority judgment even though it was wrong. 
In Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux's (1969) study of minority influence, researchers saw that a minority opinion can also affect group members. Confederates, who were in the minority, claimed that a series of blue slides were green. These statements influenced participants when they later had to judge a second series of slides, which were of a color they could easily call either blue or green. 
Further research that relates to Position 2 is Sherif's (1935) study of how people judged imaginary "movements" of a stationary point of light. Participants formed standards for judgment about the range of the light's "movements." When two or three participants made judgments in the presence of one another, their standards converged over time. 
In all three cases, participants heard only the judgments that other people made, not arguments about those judgments. The mere act of hearing the opinions influenced them, a finding consistent with Position 2. 

Jury Decision Models

We have seen mathematical models of jury decision making that are based on social decision schemes and that are in accordance with Position 1. Scientists have proposed other mathematical models of juries that do not use social decision schemes. These models are in accordance with Position 2. 
These models assume that jury deliberation is important. During deliberation, jurors can be persuaded to change their initial opinions. Scientists have attempted to represent this deliberation process mathematically. 
In addition to showing that the majority tends to persuade the minority most of the time in a jury, research has revealed a "momentum effect": When members of the minority start to join the majority, other minority members begin to agree with the majority at an ever-faster rate. The momentum slows for the last one or two people in the minority, however. They are usually more sure of their opinions, and persuading them to change their minds is more difficult (Penrod & Hastie, 1980). 
These models are consistent with Position 2 because of the way they hypothesize that social influence works. The models assume that social influence occurs when jurors hear one another's opinions. They do not need to hear arguments. The scientists who proposed these models claimed that, in truth, at least part of the persuasive process happens when jurors discuss evidence. Their models, however, did not account for this. The models contain no variables that correspond to a discussion of evidence. Instead, the models concerned the number of jurors originally on each side of an issue. They estimate the probability that jurors will change their minds and how quickly that will happen, given the number of jurors on each side. The models implicitly assume that to predict changes in jurors' minds they need look only at the opinions the jurors expressed to one another. 
The Social Comparison Approach to Group Polarization
Social comparison theory has been applied to the study of group polarization. It is consistent with Position 2. 
We discussed social comparison theory in Chapter 6 as an explanation for conformity. In that theory, Festinger distinguished between "beliefs about abilities" and "opinions." He stated that beliefs about abilities have a good/bad dimension. People can rank them on a scale. They can move toward the good end of the scale and away from the bad. In contrast, Festinger believed that opinions have no analogous good/bad dimension. Instead, people must choose another person as a norm to follow and shift toward that norm if they want to change their opinion. 

Baron et al. Version of Social Comparison Theory 
Baron, Roper, and Baron (1974) proposed a newer version of social comparison theory to explain the group polarization effect. They discarded the distinction that Festinger had made between "beliefs about abilities" and "opinions" by giving a good/bad dimension to opinions also. They stated that opinions, as well as beliefs about abilities, can be ranked on a scale running from good to bad. 
The new idea is that any situation involves opinions that people in our culture consider good and opinions that we consider bad, including opinions that have to do with risk and caution. In some situations we believe that being cautious is good; in others, we believe that being risky is good. 
Scientists have found that how they write choice dilemmas influences whether risk or caution is the "good" opinion. For example, we can write the dilemma of Mr. Jones in two ways. One version might imply good risky values, emphasizing the courage and determination that risk would involve. Another version could emphasize the hardships that Mr. Jones's children would suffer in case of failure. This would imply good cautious values, such as thriftiness and security for Mr. Jones's family. In both versions, the implied values serve as ideals. Group members use these ideals to reach their prediscussional opinions. They want to make the ideally "good" choice when they consider whether Mr. Jones should be daring or careful. 
During group discussion, members express their opinions to one another about the good option. For example, in a group of people all from the same culture, members have learned from their culture when being risky is good and when being cautious is good. For this reason, most people in this group will probably react to a choice dilemma in the same way. In other words, group members are likely to agree when risk or caution is the "good" choice. 
Members are also likely to disagree on particulars. Members will probably require different actual odds for success before they will accept the more risky, but attractive, option. Some members will be more extreme in the "good" direction than others, whether that direction is toward caution or risk. As they talk, members hear everyone's prediscussional opinions. They all learn where they stand on the good/bad dimension in relation to others in the group. The theory hypothesizes that once members have this knowledge they can see if they are as far in the "good" direction as other members. If they find they don't have as "good" an opinion as other members do, they will shift their opinion so that it is closer to the extreme. They want to have as good an opinion as they can in the group, whether it is a risky opinion or a cautious one. At the end of the discussion, the group bases its decision on the members' more polarized opinions. As a result, the group decision will be more polarized than the average of its members' prediscussional opinions. 

Example of Social Comparison Approach 
Consider, for example, our four-person group discussing Mr. Jones's investment. Let us assume that researchers have written the dilemma to emphasize thriftiness and security. As a result, our group members all believe that being cautious is good in this circumstance. They do not agree, however, on the degree of caution. 
Their prediscussional opinions are that one member needs the odds for success to be at least 8 in 10, two members are slightly less cautious and want odds of 7 in 10, the last member is the least cautious and requires odds of only 6 in 10. The mathematic average is 7 in 10. 
When they learn one another's prediscussional opinions, however, the less extreme members wish to "improve" their choices. They want to become more extreme to agree more with the most cautious member. Hence, the two members who wanted odds of 7 in 10 change their minds and decide to require odds of 8 in 10. Similarly, the person who needed odds of only 6 in 10 decides that 7 in 10 is better. The average is now 7.75 in 10. Their group decision will probably approximate these odds. Thus, polarization has occurred. 
If the researchers had written the dilemma so that risky values were "good," the same process would have led to group polarization in the direction of risk. 
Research into the Theory 
The social comparison approach to group polarization is consistent with Position 2. Hence, the theory assumes that all that is necessary for social influence to occur in a group is that members express their opinions. Group members need not hear arguments about the advantages or disadvantages of either risk or caution to change their opinions toward the "good" extreme. All that they need to hear is the prediscussional opinions of the other members. Each person can then decide whether his or her opinion is "good enough." This implies that group polarization will still occur in groups in which the members cannot argue for a particular option. 
Scientists can artificially constrain group discussion so that members can voice only their prediscussional opinions. They cannot discuss arguments for or against either risk or caution. Teger and Pruitt (1967) placed these artificial constraints on groups and found that group polarization did occur under these circumstances. The amount of polarization, however, was not as great as in "normal" discussion groups. 
Teger and Pruitt's results imply that social comparison may partly account for the group polarization effect. Social comparison is not the entire reason, however, because polarization was smaller than usual in their constrained groups. In the same vein, Isenberg (1986) reviewed relevant studies and found that social comparison had a consistent but only moderate effect on group polarization in those studies. 
As we know, to understand social influence completely, we need to understand why the group polarization effect occurs. We have seen how the research comes close to supporting the social comparison approach to group polarization. Therefore, Position 2 appears to be viable but incomplete. 
Figure 7.2 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of social comparison theory. The process is divided into input, process, and output stages. These stages are equivalent to the stages in the input-process-output model we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. In this and subsequent diagrams in this chapter. the input steps occur before group discussion begins, the process steps occur during discussion, and the output steps are the results of discussion. 
FIGURE 7.2 
Input	Process	Output	
CULTURAL VALUES INDICATING 
"CORRECT"--> SIDE OF ISSUE	

INDIVIDUAL 
PREDISCUS-SIONAL-------> 
OPINIONS	EXCHANGE 
OF 
PREDISCUS- 
SIONAL-------> 
OPINIONS	

INDIVIDUAL 
POSTDISCUS- 
SIONAL-------> 
OPINIONS	

GROUP 
DECISION	

POSITION 3: SOCIAL INFLUENCE FROM NEW INFORMATION

As did Position 2, Position 3 also accepts the idea that social influence is important in the decision-making process. The main contention of Position 3, however, is that social influence occurs when group members learn new information about the available options. The arguments that members present, not their opinions, are key. 
As did Positions 1 and 2, Position 3 claims that members come into a group with prediscussional opinions. Position 3, however, hypothesizes that the group members talk about their opinions during the meeting. Their discussion centers on the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Through this type of discussion, each member learns more about the options. This new information often causes members to change their opinions. The group then uses the members' new opinions to help it decide on the best option. 
In Contrast with Position 3

Comparing Positions 2 and 3 helps to understand Position 3. As you can recall, Position 2 assumed that social influence occurs when people learn the opinions of others and, as a result, change their minds to agree more with them. Proponents of Position 2 do not focus on what happens when a group discusses the strengths and weaknesses of options. They do not think this is significant in the social influence process. 
Supporters of Position 3, on the other hand, look carefully at what happens when group members argue about the strengths and weaknesses of their options. They believe that this discussion is responsible for social influence and do not feel that group members will change their minds merely because they learn other members' opinions. They believe that group members need to have new information before social influence can occur. 

Research in Support of Position 3

Thus far we have not discussed theories and research consistent with Position 3. We can, however, relate a lot of research to this position. We find many examples in the work that scientists have done in the area of persuasion. Scientists have performed a number of studies to determine whether communicative messages that include evidence as part of a persuasive appeal are more successful in changing opinions than messages that do not contain such arguments. 
For example, a communicator is trying to persuade you to brush your teeth every day. One of her claims is that, if you don't do this, your teeth will rot and fall out. In essence, the person has expressed an opinion. If you don't brush daily, your teeth will fall out. Will this opinion be more likely to persuade you if evidence backs it up? This is the question that interests scientists. They want to know if the communicator will be more likely to persuade you to brush your teeth every day if she presents evidence supporting the claim that unbrushed teeth rot and fall out than if she does not present such evidence. Reinard (1988) has reviewed many such studies, which indicate that evidence does increase the persuasive power of messages. These findings are consistent with Position 3. They show that a person wanting to change opinions effectively, needs to present arguments for an opinion. Simply expressing that opinion is not enough. 
Now let us examine how this idea relates to the group polarization effect. 
The Persuasive Arguments Approach to Group Polarization

Burnstein and Vinokur (1973) proposed the persuasive arguments approach, which claims that, when group members must choose from among a number of options, they all know something about each option. Every person has bits of knowledge that can be viewed as arguments either for or against each option. Members base their prediscussional opinions on these arguments. 
During group discussion, members talk over the familiar arguments. They support or criticize each option, hearing arguments they had not heard before. They learn new information that gives them reasons to polarize their opinions further. At the end of the discussion, the group bases its decision on the members' further-polarized opinions. Consequently, the group decision will be more polarized than an average of its members' prediscussional opinions. 

Example of Process 
Let us illustrate this process. Sandra and Harvey face a choice dilemma individually. Sandra thinks of three reasons (A, B, and C) to be risky. She can think of only two reasons (M and N) to be cautious. Therefore, Sandra chooses to be slightly daring and selects the slightly risky odds of 4 in 10. Harvey also leans toward risk but sees other reasons for his choice. He finds reasons A, B, and D for daring behavior and finds reasons N and O to be cautious. He therefore also chooses the slightly risky odds of 4 in 10. 
When these two meet in a group, they learn from each other new reasons to be risky. Sandra hears Harvey's reason D, and Harvey hears Sandra's reason C. Thus, they both have four reasons to be daring--A, B, C, and D. Each now has more cause to be risky. Their personal opinions polarize. Perhaps they now favor riskier odds of 3 in 10. Their group decision will then be riskier than their prediscussional opinions. 

Research into Proposal 
The persuasive arguments approach to the group polarization effect is a Position 3 theory. It assumes that the single factor of members learning new information about the group's options can cause social influence. Burnstein and Vinokur did not see a sharing of opinions as part of the process that changes group members' opinions. They believed that new information is sufficient to cause social influence. 
There has been a great deal of research examining the persuasive arguments theory. In general, the results of this research have been supportive. Isenberg (1986) reviewed many of these studies and found a strong relationship between the effects of persuasive arguments and group polarization. Most theorists now believe that a good theory about both group polarization in specific and social influence in general must include some aspects of persuasive arguments. 

Limits of the Proposal 
However, persuasive arguments theory has problems accounting for certain research data. These problems come from one underlying assumption of the persuasive arguments approach. The approach presumes that the arguments that are voiced during discussion are representative of the arguments with which the members of the group are familiar. As a consequence, the proportion of arguments on either side of the issue that come up during discussion equal the proportion of arguments that members know on both sides. In our example, sixty percent of the arguments that both Sandra and Harvey are familiar with are in favor of risk and forty percent are for caution. The persuasive arguments approach implies that sixty percent of the arguments that come up during their discussion will also be for risk, and forty percent of the arguments will favor caution. 
However, there is strong evidence suggesting that this assumption is wrong. 

Bias in discussion. As just mentioned, persuasive arguments theory presumes that the proportion of arguments that are brought up during discussion on either side of the issue is about the same as the proportion of arguments on either side with which members of the group are familiar. If so, then discussion should also include arguments new to each member on the disfavored side of the issue. Sandra will voice reason M to be cautious some time during the discussion, and Harvey will voice reason O. As a result, both will learn new arguments in favor of caution along with new arguments in favor of risk. These new arguments on either side of the issue will approximately cancel one another out, leaving Harvey and Sandra's opinions unchanged. Therefore, group polarization will not occur. In fact, group polarization could only occur if the assumption of equal proportions of arguments is wrong and arguments are biased in favor of the side that the members originally favor. 
There are studies that suggest that discussion in biased in this manner. One of them was performed by one of us (Pavitt, 1994). For three choice dilemmas, some of the participants were asked to write down the arguments they knew on both sides of the issue. Then they made a decision about each dilemma in three- or four-member groups. A content analysis was performed in order to determine the proportion of arguments on both sides of the issue in both the written lists and the discussion. The discussion was consistently more polarized than the written lists. When participants leaned toward risk, 57 percent of their written arguments but 86 percent of their voiced arguments favored risk. When participants leaned toward caution, 60 percent of their written arguments but 83 percent of their voiced arguments favored caution. This finding implies that the discussion is biased in favor of prediscussional opinions. 
Why do group members seem to talk so much about ideas that favor the group opinion? Why don't they instead reveal more of their personal arguments on the disfavored side? The persuasive arguments theory cannot answer these questions. It does not account for the disproportion between personal opinion arguments and group decision arguments. 

The hidden profile effect. Suppose that Jeff and Betsy are discussing a choice dilemma. Jeff has thought of four cautious arguments (W, X, Y, and Z). On the other hand, he has been able to think of only three risky arguments, (A, B, and C). He therefore leans toward caution in his prediscussional opinion. He wants an option with low odds of failure. 
Betsy has also come up with four cautious arguments (V, X, Y, and Z). Like Jeff, she could think of only three risky arguments (D, E, and F). Thus, she also prefers a cautious option. 
As you can see, Jeff and Betsy had thought of many of the same cautious arguments. If they combined all of them, they would have a total of only five arguments for caution: V, W, X, Y, and Z. On the other hand, they thought of completely different arguments for risk. Together they have a total of six such arguments: A, B, C, D, E, and F. Because together they have more risky arguments than cautious ones, will they both change their minds after they talk to each other? Will they reach a risky decision? Yes, according to persuasive arguments theory. This theory hypothesizes that Betsy and Jeff would talk openly with each other and learn all about the arguments for risk that they both knew. In turn, this would cause them to change their preferences from caution to risk. 
Does this really happen in groups? Stasser and Titus (1985) examined circumstances such as this. They found that groups such as Betsy and Jeff did tend to polarize around the option the members originally liked best. This was true even though, together, the members had thought of more arguments for the opposite option. Thus Betsy and Jeff would become more polarized toward caution, in contrast with the persuasive arguments prediction. 
Stasser and Titus's finding makes sense if the members of groups such as Betsy and Jeff only discuss the arguments on the side of the issue that each member originally favored. Thus Betsy and Jeff would have discussed cautious arguments V through Z. Risky arguments A through F, which could have changed their minds, were never mentioned. Thus the risky arguments remained hidden from their consideration. Because of this, Stasser and Titus called this phenomenon the hidden profile effect. 
Conclusion 
It seems that the persuasive arguments proposal can account for some outcomes but not all. It does explain the effect of arguments during group discussion. It cannot reveal, however, why the group tends to verbalize only those arguments that favor the original group option. Therefore, it cannot account for the hidden profile effect. 
Figure 7.3 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of persuasive arguments theory. 
FIGURE 7.3
Input	Process	Output	
INDIVIDUAL 
PROPORTION 
OF PREDISCUS--> 
SIONAL 
OPINIONS	

INDIVIDUAL 
PREDISCUS-SIONAL-------> 
OPINIONS	

DISCUSSION 
OF 
ARGUMENTS	

INDIVIDUAL 
POSTDISCUS- 
SIONAL-------> 
OPINIONS	

GROUP 
DECISION	

POSITION 4: SOCIAL INFLUENCE FROM BOTH OPINION EXPRESSION
AND NEW INFORMATION
Position 4 combines parts of positions 2 and 3. 
We have seen in Position 2, how theorists hypothesized that opinion expression was the key to social influence in groups. In Position 3, scientists theorized that new information caused group members to change their minds. Now, in Position 4, researchers claim that both opinion expression and new information are important; both can affect the opinions of group members. 
Scientists variously combine Positions 2 and 3 to come up with theories consistent with Position 4. In this section, however, we propose only one combination. It is the proposal we tested in our earlier study of group polarization (Pavitt, 1994). 

Hypotheses of Proposal

The main argument of our version of Position 4 is that social influence is a result of two aspects of group interaction: (1) a social comparison process that leads to biased group discussion and (2) the new, but often biased, information that group members learn from one another when they discuss the options. 
As did Position 2, Position 4 claims that we can rank opinions on a good/bad scale (a version of social comparison theory). Our proposal, however, does not strictly adhere to social comparison theory. It does not assert that people use cultural beliefs to help them decide what is "good" and "bad" in a situation. Instead, people decide what is a "good" opinion based on the arguments they can think of in favor of different options. The more arguments they can come up with in favor of an option, the "better" that option becomes to them. 
As did Position 3, Position 4 argues that group discussion leads to members learning new arguments relevant to their decision. However, unlike persuasive arguments theory, we do not presume that the arguments that come up during discussion are representative of all the arguments known by group members. Instead, members only bring up arguments that are consistent with what they think is the "good" option. Therefore, group discussion is biased in favor of that option. As a result, group members only learn more about that option that the members originally favored. Therefore their opinions become more extreme, and group polarization occurs. 
A Model of the Proposal
To understand this proposal, think of it in terms of an input-process-output model of group discussion. 
The input section contains members' prediscussion opinions. The process section consists of the arguments for and against the options that members make during group discussion. The "output" section includes the members' postdiscussional opinions and their group decision. 
This proposal combines two theories, social comparison and persuasive arguments. Where do these theories fit in the model? Social comparison explains the first link, that between input and process. It states that, to support "good" opinions, group members present only arguments that support their opinion. 
Persuasive arguments theory accounts for the link between process and output. During discussion, members tend to hear new arguments that affect their opinions and the output of the group. Because the arguments are biased in favor of the "good" choice, the members learn more about that choice and become more polarized in its favor. 

The Proposal and Group Polarization

Let us see how this proposal would explain the group polarization effect. 
As you can recall, in a previous example, Sandra and Harvey face a choice dilemma. Sandra thinks of three reasons (A, B, and C) to be risky. She can think of only two reasons (M and N) to be cautious. She decides to select the slightly risky odds for success of only 4 in 10. Harvey also thinks of three reasons to be risky. Two (A and B) are the same as Sandra's, but the third (D) is different. He comes up with two reasons (N and O) to be cautious. He also decides to accept the slightly risky odds of 4 in 10. According to persuasive arguments theory, when Sandra talks with Harvey, she learns another argument for risk, D. Harvey also learns another argument for risk from Sandra, C. Together they both now have four reasons to be risky--A, B, C, and D. Because they both now have more reason to be risky, their opinions polarize toward more risk. 
Persuasive arguments theory alone, however, cannot explain why Sandra and Harvey do not also talk about their other arguments, which support caution. If they were to talk about these, Sandra would learn a new cautious argument (O) from Harvey, and Harvey would learn a new cautious argument (M) from Sandra. Together they would now have three reasons to be cautious: M, N, and O. These cautious arguments would counteract the persuasive effect of the new risky arguments they learned from each other. Therefore, their opinions would not polarize. 
What then accounts for the polarization? Social comparison theory can combine with persuasive arguments theory to tell us. 
According to social comparison theory, both Sandra and Harvey would only discuss the arguments that support the option they prefer. They want to argue for the "good" option. They have each decided that risk is that option. Thus, they never mention the arguments for caution. In this way, our proposal accounts for the group polarization effect. By combining social comparison theory with the persuasive arguments approach, we show how group polarization can occur. 

Research in Support of the Proposal
This proposal, which combines the social comparison and persuasive arguments theories, can explain the results of the two studies we described earlier that revealed problems with persuasive arguments theory. 

Bias in discussion. As we mentioned earlier, we performed a study (Pavitt, 1994) in which three- or four-member groups discussed and made a decision about three choice dilemmas. Before the discussion, some of the participants were asked to write down the arguments they knew on both sides of the issue. As we discussed, the arguments that occurred in their discussion were more polarized than these lists. This is evidence that persuasive arguments theory cannot explain. 
Before their discussion, we asked other participants to write down "the reasons for" their choice. In these cases, the arguments that occurred during discussion were not more polarized than the arguments on the list. In fact, they were less polarized. When participants leaned toward risk, 99 percent of their written arguments but 83 percent of their voiced arguments favored risk. When participants leaned toward caution, 99 percent of their written arguments but 87 percent of their voiced arguments favored caution. 
What do these findings suggest? The results for participants that wrote down arguments on both sides of the issue show that group members' prediscussional opinions reflect the proportion of arguments with which they are familiar on both sides of the issue. The results for participants who wrote down their "reasons for" the prediscussional opinions shows that discussion reflects group members' "reasons for" these opinions, not their entire set of known arguments. 
In fact, the findings for the "reasons for" participants leads to another question. Why were participants' discussion arguments not as polarized as their "reasons for?" Why did they ever argue against their favored choice? A further analysis implies a possible reason. In every case in which participants stated an argument for the side to which they were opposed, their group included members on either side of the issue. In other words, when there was conflict between group members for risk and group members for caution, participants appear to have been acknowledging the validity of arguments supporting the other side. Such an acknowledgment is a good strategy for conflict management. In contrast, when all members were on the same side, there was no conflict and thus no need to acknowledge opposed arguments. In these groups, there were no instances in which group members voiced opposing arguments. 

The hidden profile effect. As you recall, the "hidden profile" effect" occurs when each member of a group knows more arguments on one side of the issue but the group as a whole knows more arguments on the other side. In our example from earlier, Jeff has thought of four cautious arguments (W, X, Y, and Z) and three risky arguments, (A, B, and C). Betsy has also come up with four cautious arguments (V, X, Y, and Z) and three risky arguments (D, E, and F). Thus, both prefer a cautious option. However, between the two of them there are six risky arguments (A, B, C, D, E, and F) and five cautious arguments (V, W, X, Y, and Z). According to persuasive arguments theory, discussion should lead Betsy and Jeff to change their minds and support risk. Instead, Stasser and Titus (1985) found polarization for caution to occur. 
Our proposal accounts for the hidden profile effect. Betsy and Jeff would limit their arguments to those favoring their prediscussional choice, caution. Each would learn new arguments in favor of caution and polarize. Arguments for risk would not occur during their discussion. 

Conclusions
Clearly, there is good evidence in support of our proposal. Research shows that combining social comparison and persuasive arguments theories can explain the group polarization effect. This, in turn, means that we may be able to explain social influence in general. 
This combined theory, however, is not the last approach that scientists have proposed to account for social influence. 
Figure 7.4 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of the combined social comparison/persuasive arguments proposal. 

FIGURE 7.4 

Input		
INDIVIDUAL 
PROPORTION OF 
OF PREDISCUS--> 
SIONAL OPINIONS	

INDIVIDUAL 
PREDISCUSSION-> 
AL OPINIONS	

DECISION ON 
"CORRECT" ------> 
SIDE OF ISSUE		
Process	Output	
EXCHANGE OF 
PREDISCUSSION-> 
AL OPINIONS	

DISCUSSION OF--> 
ARGUMENTS	INDIVIDUAL 
POSTDISCUS------> 
SIONAL OPINIONS	

GROUP DECISION	

POSITION 5: SOCIAL INFLUENCE FROM GROUP DISCUSSION
Position 5 gives group discussion itself a large role in the influence process and a bigger role than do any of the other four positions. Poole, Seibold, and McPhee (1985) formulated this position, and researchers have come to call it structurational theory. 
Description of the Theory

As do the other four positions, structurational theory hypothesizes that when people come to groups they already have opinions about what they like best. As you can recall, Positions 3 and 4 claim that people base these prediscussional opinions on all the arguments they can think of before the group meeting. The arguments are both for and against all of the options. Position 5 hypothesizes this also. 
After this initial similarity, however, Position 5 starts to differ. Structurational theory claims that what happens during group discussion is of utmost importance. As members talk, the group creates a new base of information, as it were, which it uses to make its decision. If arguments do not appear during group discussion, they fall by the wayside. In a sense, they disappear from the equation. 
How then do the members' prediscussional opinions and the individual arguments that helped them reach those opinions affect the group decision? They affect the decision only to the extent that members talk about them during group discussion. As we have said, the opinions and arguments that members voice during discussion create a unique body of information for the group, which members use when they form their postdiscussional opinions. As do the other theories, structurational theory hypothesizes that a group's decision is based on the members' postdiscussional opinions. Structurational theory, however, claims that these final opinions come directly from the new base of information that group discussion creates. 
Members cease to focus on their own arguments and turn to the arguments that the group has discussed. Thus, members' initial opinions may relate only slightly to their final opinions. Prediscussional and postdiscussional opinions may have no similarities, and the members' early ideas may have little in common with the final group decision. 
Approaches to Predicting a Group's Decision
Comparing Positions 3 and 4 with Position 5 helps explain the structurational viewpoint. 
As you can recall, Position 3 involved the persuasive arguments theory. Position 4, in contrast, combined the social comparison and persuasive arguments proposals. In both positions, to look at what members think before group discussion is important. Scientists hypothesize that by looking at these early opinions and arguments, they can predict a group's decision. 
To see how Position 5 differs from Positions 3 and 4, we will look at the way in which Positions 3 and 4 would predict a group decision. For example, Jack and Martha are discussing the choice dilemma of whether their town should quickly start recycling plastic garbage or wait a year. Various odds indicate whether the plan would succeed financially, but the idea of starting soon is attractive. 

Comparison with Position 3 
Persuasive arguments theory, from Position 3, predicts that Jack and Martha will openly discuss the arguments they know. It does not matter if the arguments are for or against the option they prefer. If they have thought of it, they will say it. Therefore, discussion will faithfully represent all of Jack's and Martha's arguments. At the end of discussion, Jack and Martha will have shared the arguments that have come into their minds. Jack will know everything that Martha thought about, and vice versa. 
According to persuasive arguments theory, a scientist could interview Jack and Martha before their discussion and use the information to predict their decision. Through such an interview, the researcher would know Jack's and Martha's arguments. In essence, he or she would know beforehand what Jack and Martha would eventually know. The scientist could see that, for example, Jack and Martha together have more arguments for caution than for risk. Therefore, the scientist could predict a cautious decision. If together they had more risky arguments than cautious ones, the scientist could predict a risky decision. 

Comparison to Position 4 
As you can recall, Position 4 combines the social comparison and persuasive arguments theories. It does not hypothesize that Jack and Martha would tell all the arguments they think of to each other. Instead, it predicts that Jack and Martha will focus on the arguments that support their favorite option. In this way, discussion becomes biased. Jack and Martha's discussion will not include all the information they know. Hence, at the end of their meeting, they will know only the arguments that have come up in discussion. 
Let us again say that a scientist has interviewed Jack and Martha before their meeting. If this scientist works under the Position 4 proposal, will he or she be able to predict Jack's and Martha's final decision? Yes. The proposal assumes that this early knowledge can help predict a decision, although doing so will be a little more difficult than it would for someone working only with the persuasive arguments theory. 
Hence, under both Positions 3 and 4, a scientist should be able to predict what Jack and Martha will decide by finding out what they are thinking before they talk with each other. 

Position 5 
Structurational theorists do not look at Jack's and Martha's prediscussional ideas to predict their decision. Do they feel such ideas have no effect on the discussion content and final decision? No. They say that Jack's and Martha's prediscussional arguments and opinions do have an effect, but they view this effect in their own way. 
Previously we saw the idea that discussion comprises the arguments that Jack and Martha have thought of before they talk with each other. Position 3 claimed that the discussion faithfully includes the ideas; Position 4 hypothesized that the inclusion was biased. Nevertheless, both theories saw discussion as a way to compile ideas. Structurational theorists do not believe this. They see group discussion as a strategic process. Jack and Martha use communication strategies to support some viewpoints and dismiss others. They use tactics that either reinforce or refute arguments about plastic recycling. 
Before Jack and Martha discuss their choice dilemma, a scientist could measure the arguments that both of them can make about their group's options. The scientist could not, however, use the same method to measure the argumentative strategies that Jack and Martha use when they talk together. Therefore, a structurational theorist who wants to predict Jack's and Martha's decision will not focus on their prediscussional ideas but on the content of their discussion. 
Research into Structurational Theory
How do the structurational and persuasive arguments approaches compare? Meyers (1989a, 1989b) expressly designed research to examine these two approaches to group polarization. In her study, participants initially made individual decisions about three choice dilemmas. They then wrote down all the arguments they could think of in support of both risky and cautious answers to each dilemma. Next, the participants met in groups, discussed the dilemmas, and came to group decisions. Finally, each person made one last, individual decision about each dilemma. 
How did the two approaches compare? Which was the most effective at predicting the outcomes? 
Effectiveness of Persuasive Arguments Approach 
Meyers found several results that were inconsistent with persuasive arguments theory. First, this theory would hypothesize that participants' arguments during group discussion were similar to the ones they had written on their lists. This was not what Meyers actually found, however. She discovered that many arguments from the participants' lists were omitted from group discussion and that group discussion included many new arguments. 
Second, persuasive arguments theory would hypothesize that a researcher could have used the participants' lists of prediscussional arguments to predict how much each group would polarize after discussing the choice dilemmas. This was not the case, however. Last, the theory would predict that the arguments that persuaded each participant most during group discussion were the ones that were new to that participant. The hypothesis is that "novel" arguments are persuasive. Meyers measured the novelty of an argument by counting the number of times participants wrote it on their lists. Through her calculations, Meyers found this hypothesis false. Arguments tended to be slightly more persuasive if they were less novel. 

Effectiveness of Structurational Theory 
How well can structurational theory explain Meyers's findings? It can account for some, but not all, of her results. There are inconsistencies. For instance, structurational theory would predict that many arguments from the participants' lists would not show up in group discussions. The theory cannot explain, however, any better than persuasive arguments theory, why the participants brought up new arguments. 
Another inconsistency that Meyers found relates to the way structurational theory predicts a group's decision. As you can recall, the theory makes certain claims about how someone could predict the amount a group will polarize after it discusses a choice dilemma. It asserts that a scientist can predict this amount by looking at the number of arguments the group discusses, both for and against risk and caution. Meyers found evidence to support this idea in some tests, but not in all. 

Overall Results 
The results of Meyers's research imply that persuasive arguments theory alone cannot account for the group polarization effect. Of course, we have already shown this. We discussed the problems and failures of persuasive arguments theory earlier in this chapter. 
As Meyers herself said (1989a, p. 376; 1989b, p. 129), however, neither do her findings clearly support the structurational view. Thus, it is unclear whether we need a theory such as the structurational approach to explain the group polarization effect. We may not require an explanation that gives group discussion such a large role in the social influence process. 

Conclusions

We have looked at Meyers's results in terms of the persuasive arguments theory and structurational theory. We have seen that neither completely explained her findings. What about our combined proposal from Position 4? How well can it explain Meyers's results? Can it explain the findings that persuasive arguments theory alone cannot? 
For example, Position 4 can explain why some arguments in participants' lists did not come up during discussion. These arguments were not "reasons for" the participants' prdiscussional choice. Position 4 cannot explain why some arguments occurred during discussion that were not on the participants' lists, but neither can any of the other positions we have discussed. 
In addition, researchers have performed some studies on how group members "utilize" information during discussion. This work can provide an explanation of why novel arguments are less persuasive that is consistent with Position 4. We will be discussing this research in Chapter 12, "Decision Theory." 
What is clear is that we know of no single theory about group polarization that is absolutely successful. No one theory explains everything about how social influence works when groups discuss choice dilemmas. 
Figure 7.5 diagrams the social influence process from the standpoint of structurational theory. 

FIGURE 7.5 
Input		
INDIVIDUAL 
PROPORTION OF 
OF PREDISCUS--> 
SIONAL OPINIONS	

INDIVIDUAL 
PREDISCUSSION-> 
AL OPINIONS	

DECISION ON 
"CORRECT" ------> 
SIDE OF ISSUE		
Process	Output	
EXCHANGE OF 
PREDISCUSSION-> 
AL OPINIONS	

DISCUSSION OF--> 
ARGUMENTS	INDIVIDUAL 
POSTDISCUS------> 
SIONAL OPINIONS	

GROUP DECISION	

Table 7.1 summarizes the five positions we have proposed to explain social influence. It also includes a list of the theories relevant to the group polarization effect and indicates the position each exemplifies. 

Table 7.1	Summary of the positions toward social influence	
Position	Summary	Relevant Theory	
1	No social influence. Group decisions combine individual prediscussional opinions.	Social decision schemes	
2	Prediscussional opinion is influenced by exposure to other member's opinions.	Social comparison	
3	Prediscussional opinion is influenced by arguments raised during discussion.	Persuasive arguments	
4	Prediscussional opinion is influenced by both arguments and exposure to opinions.	Persuasive arguments/ Social comparison combination	
5	Postdiscussional opinion is formed through group discussion. Pre- and postdiscussional opinions may be unrelated.	Structurational	

THE VALENCE MODEL

Universal Theory of Social Influence
We have covered many theories and research studies that apply to a specific type of decision, the choice dilemma. As we have shown, the group polarization effect was an exciting and surprising discovery for researchers who looked at choice dilemmas. We have revealed part of the large volume of work that now surrounds the topic. 
Scientists also, however, have moved beyond polarization itself. They have attempted to extend the theories we have discussed to completely different group phenomena. Researchers wish to apply these proposals to more general phenomena as they attempt to find a universal theory of social influence in groups. One example of a theory to explain social influence in general is the valence model. 
Description of the Model

Hoffman (1979) proposed the valence model. It attempts to account for all group decision-making behavior and is based on Lewin's conception of forces in a "life-space" (discussed in Chapter 3). The concept is that forces propel a group either away from or toward alternative courses of action, which exist within the group's life-space. Each course of action has a valence, which can be either negative or positive. If an alternative generates a negative valence, it repels the group from its region of the life-space. If it sends out a positive valence, it attracts the group toward it. 
A group will choose the course of action that has the greatest positive valence. This means that the choice has a high level of group acceptability. This will occur, however, only as long as the alternative has surpassed a minimum threshold of group acceptability. If no course of action reaches this threshold, the group will fail to reach a decision. If two or more alternatives meet the group's standards, two results could occur. The group could find the solution with the greatest valence most attractive, or the group could progress into conflict concerning the different choices. 

The Structural Perspective

Hoffman and his associates held viewpoints that were consistent with the structural perspective. They believed that group discussion can (1) create valences and (2) reflect the relative amounts of valences. First, discussion can create the valences of the courses of actions. For example, Harry belongs to a fishing group. The group comes together and does not really have an opinion about morning fishing or evening fishing. The members begin to talk, and soon the alternative of evening fishing becomes less attractive. They convince one another that morning expeditions are better. Thus, the group has given the alternative of evening fishing a negative valence, and it has given morning fishing a positive valence. 
Second, group discussion reflects the relative amounts of valence among alternative courses of action. How did Harry and his group reach their decision? It may be that evening fishing had a negative valence for some members before they came to the group. Perhaps they had poor fishing results in the evening. For whatever reason, the negative valence of evening expeditions may have influenced the group as the members talked about when they would fish. 

Analyzing Valence in Groups

Hoffman believed that he could measure valence by coding communicative acts in a group according to which alternatives they describe and whether the communication supports or rejects the alternative. For example, a group is deciding the sports activity for which they should get tickets. Mary says that she wants to go to a baseball game. Jerry replies that he thinks baseball is boring. Cindy says she likes basketball. Three communicative acts have occurred in this group. We can code Act 1 as being about the alternative of seeing a baseball game and that it supports the alternative. Act 2 also refers to baseball and rejects it. Act 3 describes the alternative of basketball and supports it. 
Hoffman and his co-workers performed a series of studies to investigate their ideas. They analyzed decision-making group interaction and used this analysis to evaluate their model. 

Studies of the Model
Hoffman's first experiment consisted of 19 groups that considered alternative courses of action. The researchers analyzed the group discussion to discover the valences of the options. They measured the valences by subtracting the number of statements opposing the courses of action from the number of statements supporting them. For example, in the group described above, suppose Cindy also says that she does not want to go to a baseball game. In that case, the baseball game would have a valence of -1. Mary's statement supported it, but both Cindy's and Jerry's statements opposed it. One positive statement minus two negative ones equals a valence of -1. 
The researchers found that the valences ranged from -20 to +96. They further discovered that the groups did not accept alternatives that had valences of less than 15. Thus, the experimenters tentatively accepted 15 as the adoption threshold value. Other results supported this conclusion. In 6 of the 19 groups, only one alternative reached this threshold level, and the group adopted it. In 11 of the remaining groups, two or more courses of action reached threshold. How did these groups choose which option to adopt? Ten of the 11 chose the alternative with the most valence. The eleventh combined features of two alternatives that achieved threshold. The remaining 2 groups of the 19 behaved contrary to prediction. 
In this and later studies, Hoffman divided group discussion into sections to analyze how alternatives gained and lost valence over time. Hoffman concluded that group discussion involves a three-stage process. In the first stage, the group weeds out alternatives that are clearly unacceptable and forgets them. Groups spend little time on these unacceptable courses of action. They usually ignore alternatives after their valence drops below -8. Thus, Hoffman accepted -8 as the rejection threshold value. 
This first stage ends when one alternative reaches threshold. During the second stage, the group compares the alternative that reached the threshold with the other courses of action. Members are usually favorable toward the alternative, which typically causes the valence of that option to rise sharply at about this time. In Hoffman's groups, the first alternative to reach threshold became the group's choice 80 percent of the time. 
In the last stage, the group appears to decide in favor of this threshold alternative and continues to speak favorably about it, which further increases its valence. In contrast, the group ignores the other alternatives. This continued discussion seems to function in two ways. First, it helps to increase the attractiveness of the choice and is thus a cause of the group's commitment to the action. Second, the discussion expresses this commitment. (Refer to B. A. Fisher's model of group interaction in Chapter 8, "Group Process," for a parallel conception.) 

Criticisms of the Model

The structurational theorists (McPhee, Poole, and Seibold, 1981) accepted Hoffman's basic premise that group decision making relates to interaction in two ways. Interaction helps accomplish group decisions, and interaction reflects those decisions. However, McPhee et al. criticized the valence model on two points. 

A New Threshold Level 

First, they pointed out that Hoffman's choice of a threshold level was arbitrary. They concluded that the best way to discover the threshold was to find the exact valence that best differentiated the alternatives the group chose versus those it rejected. In other words, the threshold should be set at a point where the probability is greatest that the group will choose an alternative with that or greater valence. At the same time, the probability should also be greatest that the group will reject an alternative if it has a valence below the threshold mark. 
The research of McPhee et al. revealed that Hoffman had overestimated the proper threshold. They studied ten groups, whose members discussed a total of 110 alternative courses of action. McPhee et al. measured the valences of each option. The groups gave 10 options valences close to +6 but just below that value. The groups eventually chose only one of those 10. The groups also, however, gave 10 alternatives valence values close to +6 but just above that mark. Of these 10, the groups chose 7. Thus, +6 is the best estimate of the threshold level for valences, not Hoffman's estimate of 15. 

A New Method of Measurement 
Second, McPhee and his associates objected to Hoffman's claim concerning how best to measure a valence. Hoffman measured valences by calculating the difference between the number of positive and negative statements that groups made about a course of action. Hoffman performed his measurements by looking at the statements that came from the group as a whole. This implies that he looked at all statements, no matter who said them. 
McPhee et al. questioned this methodology on the grounds that one group member might make many positive comments about a course of action and that all other members might each make only one negative statement about the same alternative. For example, Mary might make five positive statements about baseball, and Cindy and Jerry give only one negative opinion each. Would the group then go to a baseball game simply because Mary made more comments? Probably not. The group still contained a majority that did not want to go to a baseball game. 
McPhee et al. decided that there was a better way to predict group decisions. They believed a model should account for the distribution of valence among group members. In other words, the group should choose the option that the greatest number of members have positive valence for. In our example, Mary's comments indicated positive valence for baseball, but Cindy's and Jerry's implied negative valence. The valence distribution for baseball is, then, negative, and baseball is unlikely to be the group's choice. If in contrast Cindy and Jerry had made mostly positive comments for basketball whereas Mary had mostly spoken negatively, then basketball would have a positive valence distribution. 
There is a problem with the valence distribution approach. Let us imagine that two out of the members had spoken positively for both basketball and soccer. Which one would be the group's choice? McPhee et al. decided that the option with the largest total valence would be the group's choice. 

McPhee et al. compared their model, consisting of valence distributions across members, along with total valence as a "tie-breaker" as just described, with Hoffman's model, which was based on total valence alone. Based on an analysis of their ten groups, they found their model to predict group decisions more accurately than Hoffman's. Several implications flow from this finding. One is that one member cannot sway an indifferent majority. One person may strenuously support an alternative, but if he or she faces an indifferent majority, the group is not likely to choose that course of action. A second implication is that the group tries to follow unanimous decisions. If almost everyone in a group supports an alternative but one person rejects it, the group is less likely to choose that course of action than an alternative that the group unanimously accepts. 

Hoffman and Kleinman's Response 
Hoffman and Kleinman (1994) responded with two criticisms of McPhee et al.'s work. First, Hoffman and Kleinman did not accept McPhee et al.'s combination of individual valence as the main part of their model along with total valence as a tie-breaker. They felt that mixing individual and total valence in the same model was inconsistent, like mixing apples and oranges. They felt that the McPhee et al. model should only included those groups without ties. Based on the discussion of 42 groups, Hoffman and Kleinman found the original Hoffman model was a better predictor of group decisions than a valence distribution model without ties. 
Further, Hoffman and Kleinman continued to argue for +15 as the adoption threshold valence. This is because none of the 143 proposals made by their groups that had valences of less than +15 were chosen. However, some of their own data is inconsistent with their conclusion. Of the 20 proposals made by their groups that had valences of +15 to +29, only 7 were chosen. In contrast, of the 47 proposals with valences of +30 or higher, 37 were chosen. It is obvious that the adoption threshold in the Hoffman and Kleinman groups was considerably higher than +15. 
Looking at all the research, it seems that the adoption threshold differs substantially for different types of groups. Perhaps there are some input variables that determine a group's adoption threshold. One direction that valence theorists can take is to try to determine what those input factors may be. 

The Valence Model and the Five Positions

Structurational theorists primarily tried to refine the valence model because they believed that it fit the way they looked at group discussion (Poole, Seibold, & McPhee, 1985). As you can recall, structurational theory claims that group members formulate their postdiscussional opinions during group discussion. This means that scientists can predict these final opinions by looking only at the content of the discussion. Looking at prediscussional opinions is not helpful. 
Valence theory appears to agree. It also attempts to predict a group's final decision by examining the content of its discussion. Thus, on the surface, it seems to agree with structurational theory and Position 5. 
Valence theory, however, makes no claims about how social influence actually works; therefore, we cannot state that it totally agrees with Position 5. When we look at the five positions toward social influence, it is not actually clear under which position valence theory would fit best. We can be sure that it does not fit under Position 1 because Position 1 does not seriously consider the role of group discussion in social influence. For this reason, the valence model clearly does not belong there. When we look at the other four positions, however, we can interpret the model in ways that make it fit any one of them. 
For example, let us interpret the finding that groups usually choose the option that members discuss in the most positive light. We could assume that conformity processes explain this finding. Group members decide to support the option that they discuss in the most favorable terms simply because it receives the most vocal support. In this case, we can interpret the valence model as a theory that fits Position 2. 
We could instead assume that groups choose the option they discuss most positively for another reason. Suppose that members hear a great deal of evidence in support of this option during group discussion. The weight of this evidence could sway the members. If that weight of evidence corresponds to arguments that group members would have made even before discussion, the valence model is consistent with persuasive arguments theory and thus fits under Position 3. 
Finally, we can interpret our finding in another light. If it shows that both conformity and persuasive arguments processes occur simultaneously, we must see the valence model as a type of Position 4 theory. As is clear, placing valence theory under only one social influence position is difficult. 

SOCIAL INFLUENCE CONCLUSIONS

In the last sections, we have shown how scientists have gathered knowledge and data regarding the ways in which social influence works in group decision making. We have also seen how theorists have attempted to account for these data findings. What are we to conclude? 

Two Important Propositions

Generally, we need to conclude that a valid theory regarding group decision making must account for two propositions. 
First, data has supported the proposition that group decisions are primarily a result of the opinions of group members. It is true that members wish to meet group or individual standards about how they "should" choose, but this desire is only a secondary cause of group decisions. Individual opinions are more important. 
Second, individual opinions can and do change as a result of group discussion because members learn from one another the implications of each alternative. 

Limits of Present Theories

We have reviewed theories that attempt to account for social influence. It appears that viable theories of social influence must be consistent with these two important propositions. At this time, however, it is not clear which, if any, of these theories can truly explain how social influence operates in decision-making groups. 

SUMMARY

In Chapter 6 we described how scientists have generally studied conformity by using experiments that limit social interaction and make it artificial. In this chapter, we looked at studies that allowed interaction to proceed naturally. These experiments have led to further insights into social influence processes. 
One insight that we have gained from more "natural" experiments involves what happens when group members work on a choice dilemma. Scientists have found a group polarization effect. This takes place when group members are initially in general but not exact agreement on one side of an issue involving potential risk. In this situation, the group's final decision tends to be on the same side as their initial judgments, but it is more extreme. 
Five general positions concern how social influence affects group decisions. Each leads to a specific theory about how group polarization works. 
Position 1 proposes that group members come to a decision by "combining" their prediscussional opinions and that social influence is not important. "Social decision scheme" research suggests that groups polarize because the majority of their members have an extreme opinion and the group adopts that majority opinion. We know, however, that social influence does affect decision-making groups. For this reason, social decision schemes cannot explain the decision process. 
Position 2 claims that the opinions that members express influence the group. Social comparison theory, which is consistent with this position, examines the members' opinions to explain group polarization. The theory claims that group members polarize their opinions to agree with the member who has the "best" opinion. 
Position 3 proposes that arguments influence group members. When members hear arguments for or against options, they incorporate them into their thinking. Persuasive arguments theory is consistent with this position. It attempts to explain group polarization by looking at arguments. The theory claims that, when group members hear arguments that are consistent with their prediscussional views, they further polarize their opinions. 
Research suggests that social comparison theory and persuasive arguments theory may be partial and complementary explanations of group polarization. Accordingly, Position 4 attempts to combine these two theories. 
Position 5 is the structurational view, which claims that members' using argumentation strategically during group discussion brings groups to their decisions. As a result, a group's decision will reflect the content of its discussion. The decision may not be related at all to the members' prediscussional opinions. Research that has attempted to test this view has led to mixed findings. 
A final insight from "natural" studies concerns the manner in which group discussion functions. According to the "valence model," all proposals in groups have levels of acceptability, which group discussion both governs and reflects. It appears that proposals must reach certain thresholds of acceptability. Scientists can discover the acceptability level of an idea by examining the number of times the group evaluates the idea positively or negatively. The group will reject a proposal that does not reach the necessary threshold of acceptability. Alternatively, members will seriously consider ideas that are close to the proper acceptability level, and they will usually choose the proposals that meet that threshold standard. 
Our discussion on how social influence may affect group decision making is only a first stab at describing the many-sided nature of the decision process. In the next two chapters, we approach the topic of decision making from two angles: (1) the study of group process and (2) group structure.