University of Kentucky Department of Philosophy
10th Annual Graduate Student Conference
“Persons and Selves:
Philosophical Perspectives”
March 31st 2007
8am-5pm
William T. Young Auditorium and Gallery
Free and Open to the Public
Sponsored By: Department of Philosophy, Social Theory Program, Women and Gender Studies, Cognitive Science Program, and the Graduate School.
Keynote Address:
3:30pm, W.T. Young Auditorium
Marilyn Frye
Michigan State University
“What Kinds of Kinds Are We?
Some Thoughts on the Ontology of Social Categories”
Graduate Presenters:
9:30am – 10:25am: Kienhow Goh, Syracuse University. “God’s Omnipotence and Descartes’ Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness.”
Comments: Matthew Mullins, University of Kentucky.
Abstract:
It has so far been taken for granted that Descartes’ Sixth Meditation argument for Mind-Body distinctness is aimed at proving that the mind is numerically distinct from the body. On this interpretation, God’s role is merely to secure the truth of what Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives by the end of the Second Meditation, i.e., he is numerically distinct from his body. In this paper, I argue that God’s role in the argument is more important than this. By appealing specifically to God’s omnipotence (rather than His goodness), Descartes is concerned to secure not only the mind’s numerical distinctness, but also its actual separability from the body. I do so by appealing to Descartes’ official textbook definition of “real distinction” and “substance” in the Principles, where the real distinction of two substances require, not only that one does not inhere in the other, but also that one is not causally independent of the other.
10:30am – 11:25am: Joanne Lau, Western Michigan University. “Reid, Testimony and Personal Identity.”
Comments: Erin Vallicelli, University of Kentucky.
Abstract:
Reid has raised several objections to the theory of personal identity proposed by Locke. One relevant problem is that in considering the memory of the individual as the criterion for identity, Locke fails to account for the fact that there are other methods by which we can at least infer an ongoing existence, such as through physical evidence and the testimony of others. While Reid does not directly address this, it is possible to reconstruct an argument based on his theory of common sense to reflect the realities of social interaction. I also draw on cases from Cartesian skepticism and more recent theories of personal identity such as the Parfitian concept of Q-memory to support my argument.
1:00pm – 1:55pm: Chris Gallagher, University of Toledo. “A Position to Know: Second Persons and Skepticism.”
Comments: Elisia Taylor, University of Kentucky.
Abstract:
In her essay, Second-Person Scepticism, Susan Feldman argues that Lorraine Code's "second-person" model of knowledge is no less vulnerable to radical skepticism than the individualistic, autonomy-based models Code rejects. Feldman believes that the social world is epistemically unreliable even in normal circumstances. Positing the existence of a "social nightmare" world, she attempts to demonstrate how second-person knowing fails to safeguard us against radical skepticism. After considering two variations of Simulation Theory, a mainstream philosophical approach to knowing other minds, I examine Vrinda Dalmiya's model of knowing people, called the Method of Care. Using Dalmiya’s model, I show that Feldman's analysis is based on a mis-understanding of second-person knowing on two important points: the applicability of the "S knows that p" claim, and the intersubjective nature of the process itself, and that Feldman's argument, therefore, misses the point of second-person knowing.
2:00pm – 2:55pm: Tuomas Manninen, University of Iowa. “An Artifactual Model of Personhood.”
Comments: Christa Hodapp, University of Kentucky.
Abstract:
Once we acknowledge that there is a distinction between ‘human being’ in the biological sense and ‘human being’ in the socio-psychological sense, we face some formidable philosophical questions. For one, is membership in the species Homo sapiens a sufficient condition for being a person? On one view, Eric Olson has argued that the answer should be given in the affirmative: personhood is non-relational, so the socio-psychological aspects are reducible to biological facts about human animals. In this essay, I contest Olson’s argument by showing that his view (which may or may not be successful against the psychological considerations) does not do justice to the social aspect of personhood. As an alternative, I propose and defend a view that the concept of personhood could be modeled after artifacts.
For further questions or information, please contact Christa Hodapp, Conference Chair, at christa.hodapp@uky.edu
Conference Schedule
Flyer (Word Format)
Flyer (PDF Format)