

Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice

E. Ashby Plant and Patricia G. Devine
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Empirical evidence is presented from 7 samples regarding the factor structure; reliability; and convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity of separate measures of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. The scales reliably measure largely independent constructs and have good convergent and discriminant validity. Examination of the qualitatively distinct affective reactions to violations of own- and other-based standards as a function of motivation to respond without prejudice provides evidence for the predictive validity of the scales. The final study demonstrated that reported stereotype endorsement varies as a function of motivation and whether reports are made in private or publicly. Results are discussed in terms of their support for the internal–external distinction and the significance of this distinction for identifying factors that may either promote or thwart prejudice reduction.

During the past 50 years, in conjunction with many legislative changes promoting the rights of Black Americans, there have been dramatic changes in Whites' self-reported attitudes toward Blacks. Specifically, several large-scale survey studies suggest that self-reported racial attitudes have become considerably more positive (Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). One of the persistent challenges for prejudice researchers is to understand the motivations underlying such nonprejudiced responses. Do they reflect sincere changes in personal attitudes or are they motivated by social pressure created by changes in the social milieu? In the 1990s, these changes in self-reported attitudes have culminated in a rather pervasive social norm discouraging prejudice toward Blacks in the United States (see Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deaneen, & Tooman, 1996). This norm, embodied, for example, in "politically correct" (PC) standards, mandates proper speech and behavior and thereby creates social pressure to respond without prejudice (e.g., Adler et al., 1990; D'Souza, 1991). When people fail to comply with these standards, they risk disapproval and, in many cases, sanctions from others.

What then are we to make of self-reported attitudes or behaviors that appear to be nonprejudiced? The presence of the rather pervasive external social pressure to respond without prejudice has created enduring dilemmas for both social perceivers and social scientists as they try to discern the motivation(s) underlying (generally socially acceptable) nonprejudiced responses.

Preparation of this article was partially supported by a University of Wisconsin Romnes Faculty Fellowship. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Paige Brazy, Rachel Rock, Kris Stolte, Laura Brief, Shuli Ben-Poorat, Becky Braberam, Jesse Deering, Marnie Hamilton, Melissa Henze, and Anna Liska in collecting and entering the data for the various samples reported in this article. We also thank Kenn Barron, Russ Fazio, Thomas M. Piasecki, Kristen Vance, Sarah Pressly, and Kristen Vasquez for their thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either E. Ashby Plant or Patricia G. Devine, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. Electronic mail may be sent to eplant@students.wisc.edu or pgdevine@facstaff.wisc.edu.

How people respond to prevailing norms that discourage overt expressions of prejudice forms the cornerstone of several contemporary theories of racial attitudes (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Kinder, 1985). These theories suggest that, primarily in response to changes in the social milieu, most White Americans have learned to conceal overt expressions of prejudice and instead express prejudice in indirect, subtle, or covert ways (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Kinder, 1985). Because compelling normative or external reasons to refrain from expressing prejudice exist, internal reasons (e.g., internalized nonprejudiced beliefs) are often discounted (e.g., Crosby et al., 1980; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). Furthermore, it is often assumed that in the absence of external pressure, people will be free to express their truly felt prejudices. In short, according to this approach, changes in self-reported attitudes are solely intended to create a socially desirable impression in the eyes of others (e.g., Crosby et al., 1980) and, in some cases, in one's own eyes (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986).

We believe discounting the role of internal motivation simply because external motivation may exist in many situations belies the complexity of contemporary conflicts associated with motivations to respond without prejudice. Indeed, it is our position that both sources of motivation, internal and external, exist and affect people's prejudice-related reactions, though to varying degrees for different people. In this article, we develop the theoretical rationale for examining both internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. We then provide empirical evidence concerning scale development and validation of measures of both forms of motivation to respond without prejudice. The evidence suggests that both sources of motivation can be reliably assessed and that the scales have good convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, we present two sources of evidence regarding the predictive validity of the scales.

SOURCES OF MOTIVATION TO RESPOND WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Self-reported attitudes toward Blacks have come under close scrutiny in the past 30 years. The oft-observed inconsistency

between people's self-reported nonprejudiced attitudes and responses to unobtrusive and indirect measures of prejudice has impugned the trustworthiness of the easily controlled verbal reports (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Crosby et al., 1980; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Fueling such suspicions, reports of people's racial attitudes appear in some cases to be strategic (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Jones & Sigall, 1971). For example, Fazio and his colleagues found that some, but not all, participants who filled out the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) administered by a Black experimenter—who would be privy to their responses—supplied less prejudiced responses than in a previous assessment that encouraged anonymity (e.g., mass testing). This finding suggests that when expressing their level of racial prejudice, some individuals are more strongly affected by features of the social context than are others. Who are these individuals? And what does the adjustment in their attitudinal responses imply about their underlying motivations? Several theorists have concluded from such findings that people's self-reported nonprejudiced attitudes do not reflect their true attitudes but instead reflect compliance with, rather than internalization of, society's nonprejudiced values (Crosby et al., 1980; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Jones & Sigall, 1971).

Because the overt outcomes of internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice may be similar (e.g., a nonprejudiced response), disentangling their influences is complex. Despite the difficulties, we believe that discounting one source of motivation or the other may be misleading with regard to why people will put effort into responding without prejudice. Isolating the effects of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice first requires developing valid and reliable measures of each source of motivation. Only then can the impact of these alternative sources of motivation be explored. To date, few efforts have been made to assess these conceptually distinct sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. One important exception is recent work reported by Dunton and Fazio (1997), the goal of which was to develop and validate a self-report measure of Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR) toward Blacks. In creating their scale, Dunton and Fazio generated items that they believed would distinguish between internal and external motivation to control prejudice. The internal motivation items, for example, focused on the implications of appearing prejudiced to oneself (e.g., "I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced"). In contrast, the external motivation items focused on the implications of appearing prejudiced to others (e.g., "It is important to me that other people not think I'm prejudiced").

Dunton and Fazio's (1997) factor analysis of their scale items, however, failed to reveal separate internal and external factors underlying the motivation to control prejudice. That is, their internal and external items loaded on the same factor, which was identified as a Concern With Acting Prejudiced factor.¹ Dunton and Fazio offered two possible explanations for their failure to distinguish between internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. First, they suggested that it is possible that these alternative sources of motivation to control prejudice may be inherently linked, such that those who are strongly motivated for internal reasons are also motivated

for external reasons. It seems reasonable, after all, that those who internalize nonprejudiced standards would not want to appear prejudiced to others.

Alternatively, Dunton and Fazio (1997) suggested that their scale items "may not have been sufficiently focused and distinct to isolate and separate internal versus external concerns" (p. 324). Consistent with the latter possibility, some of Dunton and Fazio's items are ambiguous with regard to the underlying motivation. For example, some items did not clearly identify either source of motivation and, thus, could reflect either internal or external reasons depending on the individual (e.g., "It's never acceptable to express one's prejudices" and "I would never tell jokes that might offend others"). Moreover, their internal items focused on the affective consequences of responding with prejudice (e.g., "I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced"²; cf. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991) but did not isolate reasons underlying the motivation. Thus, their items did not precisely identify why people are motivated to respond without prejudice (e.g., "I respond without prejudice because it is important to my self-concept"). Dunton and Fazio argued, and we agree, that a more focused effort to disentangle these alternative sources of motivation to control prejudice may identify people who are primarily motivated by personal concerns to respond without prejudice (i.e., internally motivated) and those who are primarily motivated by concerns over how they might appear in the eyes of others (i.e., externally motivated). That is, items that explicitly assess the origin of the reason for responding without prejudice may isolate the underlying motivation more sensitively.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH

Developing and validating more focused measures of internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice is the primary goal of the present research.³ This research was

¹ Dunton and Fazio (1997) found a second factor in their MCPR, which they labeled Restraint to Avoid Dispute. This factor assesses a general tendency to refrain from expressing thoughts, feelings, and opinions that might offend others or instigate conflict. We will address this factor in a later section of the article focusing on issues of convergent and discriminant validity of our new measures. For now, we focus on issues relating specifically to distinguishing between internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice.

² Even this item is somewhat ambiguous with regard to the underlying motivation. That is, the phrasing "might be considered prejudiced" makes the evaluative audience of concern unclear. Is the concern over whether one appears prejudiced to oneself or others? For example, one could be angry with oneself for ineffectively masking one's prejudice in the eyes of others. Similarly, an item such as "It is important to me that other people not think I'm prejudiced" could reflect internal as well as external motivation to control prejudice. The ambiguity of the items used in Dunton and Fazio's (1997) study may have obscured real differences between internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice.

³ At this point, we should note that most of our work in developing and validating our internal and external motivation scales was completed before Dunton and Fazio's (1997) article was published. Our goal was not, therefore, to compare our scales with their scale directly, but rather to explore the possibility and utility of distinguishing between internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. We did, however, have the opportunity to administer both Dunton and Fazio's and our own measures along with a self-report measure of prejudice to

conducted in three separate phases. In the first phase (scale construction), items were created to assess internal motivation to respond without prejudice toward Blacks based on self-imposed nonprejudiced standards. Other items were created to assess external motivation to respond without prejudice based on standards imposed on one by significant others. The final scales were developed using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses and reliability analyses. In the second phase (scale validation), the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales was examined by exploring the relationships of the internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale (IMS) and external motivation to respond without prejudice scale (EMS) with a variety of other self-report measures. Given the differing conceptualizations of these constructs, the IMS and EMS should be differentially related to measures of prejudice, self-presentation, and reactions to social evaluation. The third phase of the research focused on the important goal of demonstrating the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS. If the scales are to be useful, they should be associated with distinct, theoretically meaningful outcomes that result from possessing the alternative sources of motivation. To this end, we pursued two different strategies. First, we examined the nature of the affective consequences of failures to respond consistently with standards for appropriate conduct prescribed by oneself (cf. Devine et al., 1991; Higgins, 1987) or by significant others (cf. Higgins, 1987) for people of varying levels of motivation to respond without prejudice. The logic for this strategy, more fully developed later in the article, is based on the expectation that qualitatively distinct forms of affective distress are expected to be associated with discrepancies from own and others' standards depending on one's source of motivation to respond without prejudice. Second, we examined the extent to which people of varying motivations to respond without prejudice report differing levels of endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks as a function of whether reports are made privately (i.e., anonymously) or publicly (i.e., to the experimenter).

PHASE 1: SCALE DEVELOPMENT

We conceive of internal motivation to respond without prejudice as resulting from internalized and personally important nonprejudiced standards. In contrast, external motivation to respond without prejudice is conceived of as resulting from social pressure to comply with nonprejudiced norms. Thus, our goal was to develop a large number of items to isolate and independently assess these alternative sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Care was taken in developing the items to focus on the origin of or reason underlying the motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, we wished to assess why people were motivated to respond without prejudice. To that end, we developed 10 items to assess internal motivation to respond without prejudice (e.g., "I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me" and "Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept") and 9 items to measure exter-

nal motivation to respond without prejudice (e.g., "I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others" and "I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others").⁴

Participants indicated their level of agreement with each item on a scale that ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). Items were reverse coded when necessary such that high scores on each scale reflected higher levels of that type of motivation. Two separate samples completed the initial 19 items so that we could conduct exploratory factor analyses on the first sample and then a confirmatory factor analysis on the second sample. A third sample completed the final set of items and provided an opportunity to replicate the confirmatory factor analysis. For clarity of presentation, the three samples are described first, and then the analyses are presented.

Method

Sample 1 consisted of 135 introductory psychology students (78% female; 94% White). Sample 2 included 245 introductory psychology students (74% female; 84% White). Both samples completed the initial set of 19 items in medium-sized groups (approximately 10–50) as part of a packet of questionnaires and received extra course credit for their participation. Sample 3 consisted of 1,363 introductory psychology students (60% female; 85% White) who completed the final set of 10 items (i.e., after respecification) as a part of a packet of questionnaires. They completed the questionnaires during a mass testing session at the beginning of the semester and received extra course credit for their participation. Black participants were excluded from all samples. Finally, a subsample of Sample 3 ($N = 159$) filled out the IMS and EMS scales 9 weeks after the mass testing session to examine the test-retest reliabilities of the scales.

Scale Development Results

Exploratory Factor Analysis With Sample 1

An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to determine whether the items were consistent with the theoretical assumptions underlying internal versus external motivation to respond without prejudice. If the internal and external motivation items reflect a single, general motivation to control prejudice, then, consistent with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) findings, the factor analysis should identify a single factor on which both the internal and external items would load. If, however, these items assess distinct motivations, the IMS and EMS items should load onto separate factors. The 19 items were included in a principal-components analysis using SPSS for Windows (1996) with an oblimin rotation. The initial analysis suggested that there were two strong factors and two weak factors with eigenvalues over 1.00. The third and fourth factors were not theoretically meaningful, and so the two-factor solution was examined. The first factor accounted for 28% of the variance (eigenvalue of 5.33)

⁴ We also included items that focused on the consequences of violating personal standards (e.g., "I feel disappointed with myself when I have a prejudiced thought or feeling"). However, we wanted our measures to reflect the reason underlying the motivation and not the anticipated affective reactions (particularly given that one source of predictive validity focuses on the nature of affective consequences when responses are discrepant from standards). Therefore, these items were not included on the scales.

a sample of participants. Later in the article, we present the correlations between our measures, a prejudice measure, and Dunton and Fazio's overall MCPR, as well as the two subscales that constitute the MCPR.

and consisted of items that reflected internal motivation to respond without prejudice. The second factor accounted for 20% of the variance (eigenvalue of 3.74) and included items that assessed external motivation to respond without prejudice. Four items were dropped from further analyses because they either loaded on both factors, suggesting that they did not differentiate internal from external motivation to respond without prejudice, or failed to load on either of the factors with a factor loading of .50 or above.

Confirmatory Factor Analyses Across the Three Samples

Confirmatory factor analysis offers the advantage over exploratory factor analysis of allowing researchers to statistically test the fit of their theoretical model against their actual data. To assess the goodness of fit of the two-factor solution in Sample 1, the remaining 15 items were submitted to confirmatory factor analytic procedures using LISREL 7 with the initial model based on the results of exploratory factor analysis. The specified model had a simple two-factor structure with the internal items placed on one factor and the external items on the other factor with the errors set to be uncorrelated. The goodness of fit of the model to the data was evaluated using Jöreskog and Sörbom's (1993) goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI). These measures are standardized and range from 0 to 1, with 1 signifying a perfect fit. GFI and AGFI values of .85 and above are considered to reflect a good fit of the model to the data (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993).

The initial model fit the data moderately well (GFI = .91 and AGFI = .87). However, examination of residuals of the factor solution suggested that the fit could be improved by eliminating items. Specifically, we respecified the model by eliminating the item with the largest positive or negative residual values. Respecification continued until the model that provided the best fit to the data was identified. The final model consisted of five IMS items and five EMS items. To the extent that these two motivations merely reflect a general motivation to control prejudice, a single-factor solution should provide a better fit to the data than a two-factor solution. Therefore, we tested the goodness of fit of a single-factor solution against the two-factor solution. As can be seen in Table 1, however, the direct comparison of the one- and two-factor solutions indicated that the two-factor solution provided a significantly better fit to the data, $\chi^2(1, N = 135) = 47.57, p < .01$. The final IMS and EMS items and their factor loadings are presented in Appendix A.

The strongest corroboration of the adequacy of any model is the cross-validation of model fit across independent samples. Samples 2 and 3 provided the opportunity to test the fit of the final two-factor, 10-item model from Sample 1. The GFI and the AGFI indices for Samples 2 and 3 are shown in Table 1. In each case, results suggest that the two-factor model fit the data well and that the two-factor model fit the data significantly better than the one-factor model, $\chi^2(1, N = 245) = 315.78, p < .01$, and $\chi^2(1, N = 1,352) = 1413.41, p < .001$, for Samples 2 and 3, respectively.

Reliability and Correlations of the Final Scales

The procedures used to develop and refine the scales led to the deletion of almost half of the original items, resulting in

Table 1
Goodness of Fit of Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Fit index	Sample 1		Sample 2	Sample 3
	Initial	Final	Final	Final
One-factor solution				
GFI	.86	.88	.66	.75
AGFI	.81	.81	.47	.60
χ^2	131.70**	81.58**	408.73**	1,747.39**
df	90	35	35	35
Two-factor solution				
GFI	.91	.96	.93	.96
AGFI	.87	.93	.89	.93
Decrease in χ^2 (vs. one factor) ^a	15.06**	47.57**	315.78**	1,413.41**
df	89	34	34	34
N	135	135	245	1,352

Note. GFI = goodness-of-fit index. AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index.

^a Distributed as χ^2 with 1 df.

** $p < .01$.

rather short scales. Short scales are easy and quick to administer but sometimes suffer from low reliability. The reliability of the final IMS and EMS, however, maintained reasonable alpha levels (ranging from .76 to .85) across the three samples (see Table 2). In addition, both scales showed reasonable 9-week internal test-retest reliabilities (IMS $r = .77$; EMS $r = .60$). It is also of interest to note that the correlations between the final IMS and EMS were small and negative in each sample ($r = -.14$ to $-.15$), suggesting that the scales are fairly independent. Thus, rather than reflecting a single, general motivation to avoid prejudice, our IMS and EMS items appear to reflect distinct, independent sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Thus, people can be motivated to respond without prejudice primarily for internal reasons, primarily for external reasons, or for both internal and external reasons, or they may not be particularly motivated to respond without prejudice for either set of reasons.

PHASE 2: CONVERGENT AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY

The IMS and EMS appear to assess distinct sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. In order to determine whether they in fact tap meaningful individual differences, we examined how they related to a variety of other self-report measures. It would be important, for example, to know the extent to which these new measures are related to established measures of prejudice. In addition, the EMS has a clear focus on concern over how one would be evaluated by others. In this regard, it is important to examine the extent to which the EMS assesses a specific concern with how prejudiced responses would be evaluated or simply measures a more general concern with social evaluation and self-presentation. Thus, in establishing initial evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of the IMS and EMS, we examined the correlations of these measures with

Table 2
IMS and EMS Reliabilities (Cronbach's Alpha)
Across Three Samples

Motivation scale	Sample 1 (<i>N</i> = 135)	Sample 2 (<i>N</i> = 245)	Sample 3 (<i>N</i> = 1,352)
IMS	.85	.84	.81
EMS	.79	.76	.80

Note. IMS = internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale; EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice scale. The Cronbach's alphas are based on the final five-item scales.

a variety of measures of prejudice, social evaluation, and self-presentation.

Our findings suggest two distinct sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. However, Dunton and Fazio's (1997) MCPR scale does not differentiate between these sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Given these apparent inconsistencies, we were interested in examining the relationships between our IMS and EMS and Dunton and Fazio's MCPR scale. Thus, in a data collection effort separate from the other studies reported herein, we administered both the MCPR and the IMS and EMS. After summarizing the initial evidence supporting the convergent and discriminant validity of the IMS and EMS, we present the comparisons between the IMS, EMS, and MCPR measure.

Method

In order to establish the convergent and discriminant validity of our scales, 300 introductory psychology students (78% female; 88% White) completed a packet of questionnaires (see below). Participants completed the packet in hour-long sessions for extra course credit. There were three random orders of the questionnaires. Of these 300 participants, only 247 had completed the IMS, EMS, and MRS (McConahay et al., 1981) at the beginning of the semester in a mass testing session. Analyses were performed only on the 247 participants for whom we had a full set of responses.

To compare the IMS and EMS with the MCPR, we asked a separate additional sample of 119 introductory psychology students (62% female; 90% White) to complete all three measures, as well as a standard measure of prejudice, Brigham's (1993) Attitude Toward Blacks Scale (ATB). Participants completed the packet of measures in half hour-long sessions for extra course credit.

Results

Relation of IMS and EMS to Measures of Racial Prejudice

Participants completed a number of the frequently used self-report measures of racial prejudice, each of which was developed to assess some form of positive and negative reactions to Blacks (see Appendix B for sample items and scoring procedures). The MRS, for example, was designed as a subtle measure of prejudice on which participants presumably cannot strategically alter their responses to present a socially desirable image. The Pro-Black Scale and Anti-Black Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) were designed to measure the positive and negative components of people's contemporary racial attitudes separately.

The ATB (Brigham, 1993), consisting of several subscales, was developed to assess a variety of components underlying Whites' racial attitudes. The MRS and Anti-Black Scale are scored such that high scores indicate higher prejudiced attitudes toward Blacks. The Pro-Black Scale and ATB are scored such that high scores indicate less prejudiced attitudes toward Blacks. In addition, participants completed several other prejudice-related measures, including the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and the Protestant Ethic Scale (PE) and Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale (HE; Katz & Hass, 1988). RWA is a measure of the racist-fascist personality with higher scores indicating a more racist-fascist personality. The PE and HE are measures of American core values that provide the basis for the more specific Anti-Black Scale and Pro-Black Scale, respectively. High scores on the PE and HE indicate a strong commitment to the measured value.

If the IMS measures people's internal motivation to respond without prejudice, then theoretically it should be strongly related to measures of prejudice (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Dutton, 1976; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). For example, Devine and colleagues have shown that people who score low in prejudice on the MRS also report having strongly internalized their non-prejudiced attitudes (e.g., Devine et al., 1991). People who are internally motivated to respond without prejudice, therefore, should have more positive attitudes and less negative feelings toward Black people. Consistent with these expectations, the IMS was negatively correlated with the MRS and the Anti-Black Scale and positively correlated with the ATB and the Pro-Black Scale (see Table 3). Thus, as expected, high levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice were associated with low-prejudice attitudes. In addition, the IMS was negatively correlated with the RWA and the PE and positively correlated with the HE. These findings provided strong convergent validity for the IMS, indicating that internally motivated people tend

Table 3
Correlations Between the IMS and EMS and Other Measures

Measure	IMS	EMS
Motivation measures		
IMS	—	-.15*
EMS	-.15*	—
Prejudice measures		
Modern Racism Scale	-.57**	.22**
Pro-Black Scale	.24**	.03
Anti-Black Scale	-.48**	.12
Attitude Toward Blacks Scale	.79**	-.27**
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale	-.24**	.13*
Protestant Work Ethic Scale	-.18*	.12
Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale	.45**	-.09
Social evaluation and self-perception measures		
Fear of Negative Evaluation questionnaire	.11	.14*
Interaction Anxiousness Scale	-.03	.16*
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale	-.07	-.11
Self-Monitoring Scale	-.02	-.01

Note. *N* = 247. IMS = internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale; EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice scale.
 * *p* < .05. ** *p* < .01.

to express less prejudiced attitudes than those less internally motivated to respond without prejudice.

Because the EMS was designed to measure people's desire to respond without prejudice because of concern over how others would evaluate them if they responded with prejudice, it was not obvious how the EMS would be related to traditional measures of prejudice. However, because external and internal motivation to respond without prejudice are theoretically independent, we did not anticipate particularly strong relationships between the EMS and the prejudice measures. As anticipated, the relationships between the EMS and the traditional prejudice measures were fairly small. The EMS was positively correlated with the MRS and negatively correlated with the ATB, suggesting that high external motivation to respond without prejudice is associated with higher prejudice scores. The EMS also showed a small positive correlation with the RWA. The EMS, however, was not significantly correlated with Katz and Hass's (1988) general value scales (HE or PE) or the more specific Pro-Black Scale or Anti-Black Scale. Taken together, these findings indicated that people who are externally motivated to respond without prejudice tend to report slightly more prejudiced attitudes than those who are less externally motivated to respond without prejudice, when measured under anonymous conditions.

Relations of the IMS and EMS to Measures of Social Evaluation and Self-Presentation

To differentiate our measures from general measures of concern over being evaluated by others and measures assessing people's tendencies for strategic self-presentation, we asked participants to complete a number of individual-differences measures tapping these tendencies (see Appendix B). One set of measures focused explicitly on people's concern over being evaluated by others. Specifically, participants completed the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969; Leary, 1983a) questionnaire, a measure of "apprehension about others' evaluations, distress over their negative evaluations, and the expectations that others would evaluate oneself negatively" (Watson & Friend, 1969, p. 449), and the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS; Leary, 1983b), a measure of social anxiety independent of accompanying behaviors. Both of these measures are scored so that high scores indicate more fear and anxiety in social situations. Although these measures were not expected to be related to the IMS, it was important to examine the extent to which they were related to the EMS, which assesses the extent to which one's motivation to respond without prejudice derives from concern over how one would be evaluated by others. To the extent that the EMS measures something other than generalized fear and anxiety over negative reactions from others, the correlations of the EMS with these measures were not expected to be large. As expected, the IMS was not significantly correlated with either the FNE or the IAS. Also as anticipated, the EMS was significantly but only modestly positively correlated with the FNE and the IAS. The rather small correlations suggest that the EMS assesses something distinct from generalized fear and anxiety in social situations.

To examine the extent to which our measures overlapped with measures of social desirability and strategic self-presentation, we asked participants to also complete the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and the

18-item version of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The Marlowe-Crowne scale measures the tendency to present an unrealistically positive impression of oneself. High scores on the Marlowe-Crowne indicate high social desirability. If people were responding honestly to the IMS and the EMS, then responses should not be related to scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Consistent with expectations, the IMS and EMS were unrelated to the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. The Self-Monitoring Scale measures people's tendency to strategically adjust their behavior to meet situational demands and their ability to make such adjustments. High scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale indicate a tendency and aptitude to be strategic in this way. To the extent that those who report being motivated to respond without prejudice for external reasons are merely high self-monitors, these two scales should be positively correlated. However, this was not the case; participants' self-monitoring scores were not related to either their IMS or EMS scores.

Relation of IMS and EMS With Dunton and Fazio's MCPR and Fazio's MCPR

Although comparing our measures with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) MCPR was not the primary focus of the present research, each purports to assess some form of motivation to respond without prejudice. It is, therefore, of general interest to examine the relationships among the measures. It should be noted that our IMS and EMS measures are conceptualized as identifying the source of motivation to respond without prejudice. In contrast, Dunton and Fazio's MCPR, with its two subscales, is conceptualized as a measure of the amount of motivation to control prejudice, and high scores on the scale indicate higher levels of motivation to control prejudice (see Appendix B). The first subscale of the MCPR measures people's concern with acting prejudiced; as noted previously, items on this subscale assess both internal and external reasons for controlling prejudiced responses (higher scores indicate more motivation). The second subscale measures restraint to avoid dispute both generally and more specifically with regard to Blacks (higher scores reflect a willingness to suppress one's own reactions to avoid conflict). Overall, the MCPR scale is scored so that higher scores indicate stronger motivation to control prejudice; scores on the MCPR and the subscales range from -3 to +3.

Table 4 contains the correlations of our IMS and EMS with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) overall MCPR, the concern with

Table 4
Correlations Between the IMS, EMS, ATB, and MCPR

Measure	IMS	EMS	ATB
MCPR	.22*	.36**	.20*
Concern with acting prejudiced	.38**	.26*	.35**
Restraint to avoid dispute	-.21**	.35**	-.20*
ATB	.72**	-.33**	—

Note. IMS = internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale; EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice scale; MCPR = Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Scale. $N = 119$.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

acting prejudiced and restraint to avoid dispute subscales, and Brigham's (1993) ATB as an overall prejudice measure. First, note that the pattern of correlations of the IMS and EMS with the ATB in this different sample replicates the pattern reported in Table 3. That is, the IMS and ATB are strongly and positively correlated; the EMS and ATB are much less strongly and inversely related. The correlations of the ATB with Dunton and Fazio's overall MCPR and the concern with acting prejudiced subscale are positive but much smaller in magnitude than the correlation of the ATB with the IMS. These findings support the contention that the ATB is strongly related to internal motivation to respond without prejudice. The small negative correlation between the ATB and the restraint to avoid dispute subscale suggests that those with more prejudiced attitudes (i.e., low ATB scores) are more willing to suppress their own reactions to avoid a potential dispute.

To the extent that the IMS measures internal sources of motivation to respond without prejudice, it should be positively but modestly related to both the MCPR and the concern with acting prejudiced subscale because both the overall scale and the subscale contain items that presumably assess motivation to control prejudice resulting from internalized personal standards. However, it is less likely that the IMS would be positively related to the restraint to avoid dispute subscale. Consistent with expectations, the IMS was positively correlated with the MCPR and concern with acting prejudiced subscale and negatively correlated with the restraint to avoid dispute subscale (see Table 4). It is worth noting that the magnitude and direction of the correlations of all three of Dunton and Fazio's (1997) scales with the IMS are very similar to these scales' correlations with the ATB. The negative correlation of the IMS with the restraint to avoid dispute subscale suggests that people with low levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice are more likely to suppress their personal opinions to avoid a dispute than counterparts with high levels of internal motivation. Indeed, such restraint may be adaptive for those whose opinions (e.g., higher prejudiced) do not adhere to the social norm.

To the extent that the EMS measures external motivation to respond without prejudice, then it should be positively though only modestly related to the MCPR and concern with acting prejudiced subscale because items tapping concern over how others would evaluate prejudiced responses are part of both measures. As can be seen in Table 4, the correlations between the EMS and these two measures are positive but modest. The correlation between EMS and the restraint to avoid dispute subscale is of particular interest. Each reflect a concern with how others would respond to one's behavior. Although the two scales are positively correlated, the relationship is modest, suggesting that the two scales measure at least somewhat different aspects of people's concern over the evaluative reactions of others.

To further investigate the similarities and differences between conceptualizing motivation to respond without prejudice in terms of the amount compared with the source of the motivation, we examined how people in groups reflecting the four combinations of high and low internal and external motivation on our scales (based on median splits of the IMS and EMS) scored on Dunton and Fazio's (1997) measure. The patterns observed appear to be quite sensible. Specifically, we found that people who reported high levels of both internal and external motivation

to respond without prejudice on our scales tended to report the highest scores on Dunton and Fazio's scale ($M = 0.73$). In addition, those who reported low levels of both internal and external motivation tended to report the lowest scores on Dunton and Fazio's measure ($M = -0.05$).

The scores for the remaining two groups, however, suggest that it may be profitable to measure internal and external motivation separately. Consider, for example, that those who reported being motivated to respond without prejudice primarily for internal reasons ($M = 0.29$) and those who were motivated primarily for external reasons ($M = 0.38$) both tended to report intermediate scores on Dunton and Fazio's (1997) measure. However, these two groups should be fairly distinct conceptually. The ATB, for example, revealed that those who were primarily internally motivated and those who were primarily externally motivated reported significantly different attitude scores, $t(80) = -10.72, p < .001$. Moreover, those who were primarily internally motivated reported on average the least prejudiced attitudes ($M = 6.10$), whereas those who were primarily externally motivated reported on average the most prejudiced attitudes ($M = 4.61$).⁵

In reviewing the pattern of responses across what Dunton and Fazio (1997) identified as their internal and external items, primarily internally motivated and primarily externally motivated participants tended to endorse different subsets of Dunton and Fazio's items. That is, our high internal participants tended to endorse the Dunton and Fazio's internal but not external items, whereas our high external participants tended to endorse Dunton and Fazio's external but not internal items.⁶ As a result, on Dunton and Fazio's measure these two groups of participants appear equally motivated to respond without prejudice. However, examining only the amount of motivation may obscure important differences between these groups of people that derive from the reasons underlying their motivation to respond without prejudice, an issue to which we turn our attention in the predictive validity portion of the article.

Summary

In sum, the IMS and EMS showed good convergent and discriminant validity. The IMS was strongly related to measures of prejudiced attitudes but was unrelated to measures of social evaluation and self-presentation. These findings are consistent with the conception of the IMS as a measure of participants' motivation to respond without prejudice due to internalized low-prejudice beliefs. The EMS had small to moderate relationships with measures of prejudiced attitudes and measures of social evaluation but was unrelated to measures of self-presentation. These findings suggest that although the EMS is somewhat related to traditional measures of prejudice and social anxiety, it appears to measure something beyond prejudice or social anxiety. Similarly, although sensibly related to Dunton and Fazio's

⁵ Those who are both internally and externally motivated ($M = 5.74$) and those who are neither internally nor externally motivated ($M = 5.12$) reported intermediate prejudiced attitudes. This pattern of findings has been found across samples and prejudice measures (e.g., the MRS).

⁶ We also factor analyzed Dunton and Fazio's (1997) motivation to control scale. Consistent with their findings, their internal and external items loaded on the same factor.

(1997) measure of the amount of motivation to control prejudice, the IMS and EMS appear to identify distinct sources of any such motivation. The goal of the next portion of the article is to explore the utility of assessing the alternative reasons underlying people's motivation to respond without prejudice.

PHASE 3: PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE IMS AND EMS

Having established two distinct, reliable scales with clear evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, our next step was to explore the predictive validity of our measures. That is, for the measures to be useful, they should predict different theoretically meaningful outcomes. We sought to establish the predictive validity of our scales using two methods. Our first approach was to explore the nature of people's affective reactions to failing to live up to own-based (i.e., internal) and other-based (i.e., external) standards for how Blacks should be treated. Our second approach was to examine the extent to which people reported endorsing the stereotype of Blacks under private or public conditions.

Affective Consequences of Failures to Meet Standards Prescribed by Self Versus Others

The crucial difference between the motivation to respond without prejudice for internal compared with external reasons concerns the evaluative audience who sets the standard for appropriate behavior against which prejudiced responses are judged. When the motivation to respond without prejudice derives from internal standards, the self is the evaluative audience of importance (i.e., the self prescribes the standard). When the motivation to respond without prejudice derives from external standards, significant others constitute the important evaluative audience (i.e., others prescribe the standard). Concern over how one would be evaluated by these distinct audiences should not only fuel one's motivation to approach the standard (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957) but should also influence how one feels about failing to meet the standard (e.g., Higgins, 1987).

Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory, for example, posits that when people's actual self characteristics are discrepant from ought (should) standards, agitation-related emotions result, the specific form of which depends on whether the standard violated is one's own (i.e., internal) or imposed on one by others (i.e., external). According to the theory, discrepancies between people's actual responses and their *personal standards* for whom they think they should be (i.e., ought-own discrepancies) lead to feelings of guilt, uneasiness, and self-contempt (i.e., the feelings associated with self-punishment that result from violating a personally accepted moral standard). When others prescribe the *should* standard against which the appropriateness of responses is evaluated, however, discrepancies (i.e., ought-other discrepancies) are associated with feeling fearful and threatened (i.e., the feelings associated with impending punishments from others).

There are clear parallels between Higgins's (1987) own and other ought-self-guides and the internal and external *should* standards against which prejudiced responses can be evaluated. Applying the logic of Higgins's self-discrepancy theory to the present focus on violating own- versus other-based standards

for how one should treat Blacks provides theoretical leverage for validating internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, we propose that distinct patterns of affective distress should be associated with failure to meet standards established by self versus others, depending on whether one is motivated to respond without prejudice toward Blacks primarily for internal versus external reasons.

As a first step toward establishing the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS, we used the method developed by Devine and her colleagues (e.g., Devine et al., 1991) to assess the affective consequences of discrepancies between how one should respond and one's actual responses. Because we were interested in both internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice, we examined discrepancies from people's personal standards for how to treat Blacks and discrepancies from standards for how to treat Blacks imposed on them by an important referent group. Personal standards were operationalized as in several previous studies examining the relation between prejudice and discrepancies and participants' affective reactions (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuerink, 1993; Zuerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996). To operationalize other-based standards, we needed a referent group that participants would perceive as important and that would possess nonprejudiced standards for how to treat Blacks. This referent group should also be expected to enforce its standards (i.e., have the power to impose sanctions). To meet these criteria, we selected the University of Wisconsin—Madison campus as the reference group for defining other-based standards. This campus is well-known for being liberal and is often identified as one of the nation's highly PC campuses (Houston, 1990) and one that enforces its PC mandates. We expected that most discrepancies from campus standards would reflect responses that were more prejudiced than permitted by the campus standards.

Our empirical strategy, then, was to collect reports of ought (*should*) standards, actual (*would*) responses, and affective reactions to *should-would* discrepancies for two groups. For one group, discrepancies were assessed from participants' reports of their personal *should* standards, whereas for the second group discrepancies were assessed from participants' reports of the campus-based *should* standards. The affect measure included items that theoretically assessed the consequences of violating one's own standards or standards imposed on one by significant others (i.e., guilt and threat, respectively), as well as items that were not expected to be related theoretically to either type of discrepancy. For all participants, we examined the nature of affective consequences to discrepancies as a function of self-reported IMS and EMS scores.

Our central hypotheses were as follows. When discrepancies are assessed from personal standards, we expected IMS to interact with discrepancies, such that the highest level of guilt-related feelings would be experienced by those high in internal motivation who also had large discrepancies between their actual responses and their personal standards. When discrepancies are assessed from campus standards, however, the key prediction is an interaction between EMS and discrepancy magnitude, such that the highest level of threat-related feelings would be experienced by those high in external motivation who also have large discrepancies between their actual responses and their perceptions of the campus standards.

To the extent that some people report being motivated to respond without prejudice for both internal and external reasons, our empirical strategy affords the opportunity to examine the nature of the affective distress experienced by these people when discrepancies are assessed from own- and other-based standards. These individuals' affective reactions may depend on whichever standard is made salient. As such, they may feel guilty when discrepancies are assessed from personal standards (i.e., due to failure in one's own eyes) but feel threatened when discrepancies are assessed from other-based standards (i.e., due to failure in others' eyes). Finally, for those who report not being motivated to respond without prejudice, no distinct patterns of affective distress should be associated with discrepancies from either own- or other-based standards.

Method

Respondents, participating in mixed-gender and mixed-IMS and -EMS groups, were randomly assigned to complete the personal standard ($n = 152$; 75% female; 97% White) or campus standard ($n = 144$; 73% female; 94% White) versions of the discrepancy questionnaire. Participants had completed the IMS, EMS, and MRS in a mass testing session completed at the beginning of the semester. The sessions ranged in size from 8 to 40. Participants were informed that the study involved completing several questionnaires, some of which involved reactions to Black people. The experimenter assured participants that their responses would be kept completely confidential and emphasized the importance of being open and honest. Participants then completed the discrepancy questionnaire (see below) after which they completed several other questionnaires, including the FNE, IAS, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and Self-Monitoring Scale. When everyone was finished, participants placed their questionnaires in a box in the front of the room. Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and given extra-credit points. One participant from the personal standard group was dropped from the sample because she did not follow instructions.

Assessing Discrepancies From Personal Standards

The discrepancy questionnaire consisted of three sections (i.e., personal *should* standard, *would*, and affect measures).

Personal standard measure. Following Devine et al. (1991), participants first completed the personal standards *should* measure. Personal standards were measured by having participants report how they personally believed they should respond in five different intergroup scenarios involving Blacks (see Devine et al., 1991, for additional details). For example, one situation read as follows: "Imagine that you saw a young Black woman at the grocery store with four small children. **Your initial thought should be—'How typical'.**" Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with the statement in bold on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Responses to the five items were averaged to form an index of personal standards, ranging from 1 to 7 with lower scores indicating less prejudiced responses (Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$).

Would measure. The second section of the questionnaire assessed how participants believed they actually would respond in the same scenarios. After reading instructions explaining that actual responses may or may not be consistent with personal standards and that there were no right or wrong answers (see Devine et al., 1991), participants indicated how they actually would respond in the scenarios. A total *would* score was created by averaging participants' ratings across the five scenarios such that higher ratings were associated with more prejudiced actual responses (Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$).

Discrepancy index. Finally, a discrepancy score was calculated for each participant by subtracting his or her *should* score from his or

her *would* score for each scenario and summing across the scenarios (Cronbach's $\alpha = .61$). Positive discrepancy scores indicate that one's actual responses are more prejudiced than one's *should* responses.

Affect measure. Finally, participants reported how they were feeling about how well their *would* ratings matched their personal *should* standards. Following Devine et al. (1991), participants rated the extent to which each of 39 affect items (e.g., *guilty*, *fearful*, *happy*, *sad*, and *angry at others*) applied to how they were feeling on a scale that ranged from 1 (*does not apply at all*) to 7 (*applies very much*). Devine et al.'s original affect list contained only 35 items and did not include a sufficient number of items to create a reliable index of the type of affect theoretically associated with ought-other discrepancies (i.e., threat). Because measuring this type of affect is necessary to test the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS, following Higgins and colleagues' work (see Higgins, 1987), we added items reflecting this form of agitation-related affect (e.g., *fearful* and *threatened*).

Assessing Discrepancies From Campus Standards

The procedure for the campus standard group was identical to that for the personal standard group. The only difference between the two groups concerned the standpoint from which participants reported *should* standards. That is, in the personal standard group, participants responded to the *should* items based on their own personal standards for how they believed they should treat Blacks. In the campus standard group, the introductory comments were adapted to explain that participants were to respond to the interpersonal scenarios based on the standards established by the University of Wisconsin—Madison community. These instructions read as follows:

Our campus at the University of Wisconsin—Madison can be thought of as a community. Like all communities, the campus has standards or guidelines for appropriate behavior in various situations. These guidelines suggest how people should behave in certain settings. Based on this campus's standards for how you *should* respond, consider the following intergroup situations.

The same five interpersonal scenarios were then presented to participants. They first made ratings of the University of Wisconsin—Madison campus's standards for how they should respond and then rated how they actually would respond. Total campus *should* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .63$), *would* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$), and discrepancy (Cronbach's $\alpha = .74$) scores were created as in the personal standards group. Positive discrepancy scores indicate that actual responses are more prejudiced than permitted by the campus standards. Finally, participants completed the affect measure.

Results

Overview

The data were analyzed using hierarchical regression. Main effects were assessed simultaneously, thus testing the significance of the unique portion of variance attributable to each variable. Increments in R^2 due to interactions were assessed at the step at which the relevant interaction term was entered into the regression equation. Following Aiken and West's (1991) suggestion, predictor variables were centered in all analyses. When analyses revealed significant interactions, the nature of these interactions were examined by calculating predicted values. Specifically, we substituted one standard deviation below the mean of the relevant variable for small values and one standard deviation above the mean for large values into the regression equation (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

Comparability of personal standard and campus standard

groups. In what follows, we present the findings for discrepancies from personal and campus standards in separate sections. Prior to conducting the primary analyses, however, we examined a variety of descriptive statistics to ensure that our personal standard and campus standard groups were roughly comparable. Specifically, the groups were compared in terms of the level of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (i.e., IMS and EMS) as well as participants' self-reported level of prejudice (i.e., MRS and ATB). As can be seen in Table 5, the means and standard deviations of these measures suggest that the personal standard and campus standard groups were comparable. We were also concerned that responding to the alternative *should* standards might affect the overall distribution of *would* responses. As shown in Table 5, however, the groups also proved to be comparable on this measure. Moreover, as we have seen in several other studies (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Zuwerink et al., 1996), *would* responses were linearly related to prejudice scores in both groups, such that higher *would* ratings were associated with higher levels of self-reported prejudice ($\beta = .33$ and $\beta = .40$ for personal and campus standards groups, respectively). These data suggest that reporting personal or campus standards prior to the report of actual responses did not dramatically affect the report of their actual *would* responses.

Construction of affect indices. Affect indices were formed on the basis of an exploratory factor analysis. The 39 affect items were included in a principal-components analysis using SPSSX with an oblimin rotation. The analysis revealed five interpretable factors with eigenvalues over 1.00 accounting for 66% of the variance. Five affect indices were created based on the five factors from the factor analysis. Items that loaded onto one of the factors at .50 or higher were averaged to create an overall index score for each participant. The theoretically most important indices reflect negative feelings directed at the self (i.e., *negself*) and threat-related feelings (i.e., *threat*). The *negself* index, which accounted for 37% of variance, included *angry at self*, *guilty*, *uneasy*, *embarrassed*, *annoyed at self*, *disappointed with myself*, *disgusted with myself*, *regretful*, *distressed*, *ashamed*, and *self-critical* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .93$). The *threat* index, which accounted for 4% of the variance, included *fearful*, *threatened*, *tense*, *afraid*, *anxious*, and *frightened* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$). Three additional affect indices, not expected to be associated with personal or campus-based *should-would* discrepancies, included *negother*, which accounted for 6% of the variance and included *irritated with others*, *disgusted with others*, and *angry at others* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$); *positive*, which accounted for 16% of the variance and included *friendly*, *happy*,

energetic, *good about myself*, *optimistic*, *content*, *satisfied with myself*, *good*, and *proud* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$); and *sad*, which accounted for 3% of the variance and included *sad* and *helpless* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .73$). The conceptual meaning of these factors is consistent with Devine and colleagues' previous work (e.g., Devine et al., 1991) and Higgins's (1987) theorizing on the nature of affective consequences of discrepancies from ought and ideal standards.

Personal Standards Results

Total should and total would ratings. Personal standards *should* ratings and *would* ratings were analyzed using IMS, EMS, and their interactions as predictor variables. Given previous findings (e.g., Devine et al., 1991) and the relationship between IMS scores and prejudice measures observed in the present research, we expected that participants' personal standards *should* ratings and *would* ratings would be predicted by their IMS scores. As anticipated, the only significant findings for the *should* ratings involved participants' internal motivation to respond without prejudice, $F(1, 140) = 66.16, p < .001$ ($\beta = -.57$), such that high IMS individuals reported less prejudiced personal standards than their low IMS counterparts.

Analysis of the *would* ratings similarly revealed a significant effect of IMS scores, $F(1, 140) = 43.19, p < .001$ ($\beta = -.47$), such that high IMS participants reported that they would respond with less prejudice compared with low IMS participants. In addition, there was a significant effect of EMS scores, $F(1, 140) = 12.89, p < .001$ ($\beta = .25$), such that high EMS participants indicated that they would respond with more prejudice than their low EMS counterparts. The interaction was not significant.

Discrepancies from personal standards. Discrepancy scores in the personal standard group ranged from -6 to $+13$. Out of 151 participants, 61% had positive discrepancies, indicating that their actual responses were more prejudiced than their personal standards indicated was appropriate. Consistent with our previous work, this finding shows that the majority of participants were willing to admit that they sometimes responded in a more prejudiced manner than they personally thought they should. Discrepancy scores were zero for 32% of the respondents, indicating that a full one third of participants reported that they would respond in a manner consistent with their personal standards. A small number of participants (7%) had negative discrepancy scores (i.e., suggesting that they would respond with less prejudice than they personally thought they should). Negative discrepancies from personal standards are conceptually am-

Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for the Personal Standards and Campus Standards Samples

Measure	Personal		Campus		Significance
	M	SD	M	SD	
Modern Racism Scale	-14.34	10.33	-13.23	10.50	$t(270) = 0.89, ns$
Attitude Toward Blacks Scale	5.54	.82	5.48	1.01	$t(277) = -0.59, ns$
Internal motivation	7.83	1.29	7.71	1.58	$t(287) = -0.73, ns$
External motivation	4.61	1.96	4.27	1.95	$t(287) = -1.46, ns$
Would responses	2.24	.97	2.05	1.20	$t(287) = 1.46, ns$

biguous (see Monteith et al., 1993). Because there were too few negative discrepancy cases to permit a systematic examination of their effect on discrepancy-associated affect, these cases were excluded from the main analyses (cf. Devine et al., 1991).⁷

Although the full range of discrepancy scores was present at all levels of the two motivation scales, zero discrepancy scores were more prevalent among those low in external motivation to respond without prejudice, some of whom were high in internal motivation and some of whom were low in internal motivation. These circumstances naturally would lead to discrepancy scores, on average, being larger among high EMS participants. The hierarchical regression analysis conducted on discrepancy scores from the personal standards using IMS, EMS, and their interaction as predictor variables bears this out. Indeed, the only significant effect on discrepancy scores was a main effect of EMS scores, $F(1, 140) = 14.47, p < .001 (\beta = .31)$, such that high EMS participants reported larger discrepancies than low EMS participants. The main question of interest, however, is whether discrepancies from personal standards are differentially associated with negative self-directed affect as a function of the source of people's motivation to respond without prejudice.

Affective Reactions to Discrepancies From Personal Standards

Each of the affect indices was analyzed using hierarchical regression using IMS, EMS, discrepancy scores, and all interactions between these variables as predictor variables.

Negself. One of our primary interests centers on whether discrepancies from personal standards are associated with negative self-directed affect, particularly for those who report being highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice. Based on our previous work (Devine et al., 1991; Zuwerink et al., 1996; see also Higgins, 1987) and the strong relationship between self-reported measures of prejudice and our IMS measure, we expected that only those high in internal motivation to respond without prejudice would respond to large *should-would* discrepancies with elevated levels of negself. Those with small discrepancies were expected to experience low levels of negself. The regression analysis supported these expectations. Specifically, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of discrepancy scores, such that respondents with larger discrepancies experienced greater levels of negself, $F(1, 139) = 52.52, p < .001 (\beta = .53)$. The main effect was qualified, however, by the predicted $IMS \times Discrepancy$ Scores interaction, $F(1, 136) = 4.77, p < .04 (\beta = .16)$. As can be seen in Figure 1, low and high IMS individuals with small *should-would* discrepancies experienced very low levels of negself. However, when discrepancies were large, high IMS individuals reported more elevated levels of negself than their low IMS counterparts.⁸ No other effects were significant.

Threat. The analysis of the threat index revealed only a main effect of discrepancy scores such that individuals with larger discrepancies reported experiencing more threat than those with smaller discrepancies, $F(1, 139) = 21.32, p < .001 (\beta = .37)$. Thus, although participants with large discrepancies from personal standards reported elevated threat, these feelings were not systematically related to participants' internal or external motivation to respond without prejudice.

Positive, Sad, and Negother. The analysis of the positive




Figure 1. Negative self-directed affect as a function of internal motivation to respond without prejudice scores and discrepancy scores.

index revealed only a main effect of discrepancy scores, such that individuals with larger discrepancies reported feeling less positive than those with smaller discrepancies, $F(1, 139) = 21.95, p < .001 (\beta = -.38)$. Analysis of the sad index revealed only a main effect of discrepancy scores such that participants with larger discrepancies reported feeling more sad than those with smaller discrepancies, $F(1, 139) = 14.48, p < .001 (\beta = .32)$. Finally, the analysis on the negother index yielded no significant findings.

Campus Standard Results

Campus should and would ratings. First, it is worth noting that, overall, campus *should* standards were perceived to be quite nonprejudiced. On the 7-point *should* scale, the average *should* rating was 1.77 ($SD = 0.80$) and, as such, was consistent with the reputation that the University of Wisconsin—Madison campus has for not tolerating prejudice (or being PC, depending on one's perspective). Participants' campus *should* ratings and *would* ratings were analyzed using IMS, EMS, and their interaction as predictor variables. The only significant effect to emerge in the regression analysis on campus *should* standards was a main effect of IMS, $F(1, 141) = 9.43, p < .003 (\beta = -.26)$. Thus, although campus standards were perceived to be strongly nonprejudiced by all participants, high IMS participants reported the campus standards to be somewhat less prejudiced than their low IMS counterparts. This finding most likely reflects that people who are high in internal motivation to respond without prejudice are more likely to spend time with other low-prejudice people than those low in internal motivation to respond

⁷ When the negative discrepancy data were included in the analyses, the findings were essentially unchanged.

⁸ Because negself and threat are correlated at .63, it was important to demonstrate that major findings were upheld when the variance shared by these indices was statistically removed. Thus, the primary analysis on negself was repeated partialing out the variance due to threat, and the primary analysis on threat was repeated partialing out the variance due to negself. In both cases, the major findings and the interpretation of them remained unchanged.

without prejudice. As a result, they may use this specific reference group as a standard and judge the campus as somewhat less prejudiced.

The analysis of the *would* index revealed only a significant main effect of IMS scores, $F(1, 141) = 55.59, p < .001$ ($\beta = -.53$), such that high IMS participants reported that they would respond with less prejudice than low IMS participants.

Discrepancies from campus standards. Discrepancy scores in the personal standard group ranged from -9 to $+28$. Out of 144 participants, 82 (57%) had positive discrepancies, indicating that their actual responses were more prejudiced than the campus standards indicated was appropriate. This finding indicated that a little over half of the participants were willing to admit that their behavior would be more prejudiced than the campus *should* standards permit. Thirty-six (25%) of the participants had zero discrepancy scores (actual responses matched campus standards), and 26 (18%) of the participants had negative discrepancy scores (actual responses were less prejudiced than campus standards). Thus, almost half of the participants reported that their behavior would be equally or less prejudiced than the campus standards indicated they should. Negative discrepancies are conceptually meaningful in the present context and were included in all analyses. It seemed possible, for example, that positive feelings (e.g., *pride* and *pleased with myself*) may be associated with negative discrepancies.

A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted on discrepancy scores from the campus standards using IMS, EMS, and their interaction as predictor variables. The analysis revealed a significant effect of IMS scores, $F(1, 141) = 29.64, p < .001$ ($\beta = -.42$), such that high IMS participants had smaller discrepancies between how they believed they would respond and how the campus standards dictated they should respond compared to low IMS participants. These findings suggest that whereas people low in internal motivation reported that their actual responses violated campus standards, those high in internal motivation reported that their actual responses closely matched or showed less prejudice than permitted by the campus standards. This interaction was qualified by a significant IMS \times EMS interaction, $F(1, 140) = 4.73, p < .04$ ($\beta = -.17$). The pattern of the interaction indicated small discrepancies were reported by high IMS participants who were low in EMS ($\hat{Y} = 0.09$) and high IMS participants who were also high in EMS ($\hat{Y} = 0.55$). Larger discrepancies were reported by low IMS participants who were low in EMS ($\hat{Y} = 2.59$). The largest positive discrepancies were reported by low IMS participants who were also high in EMS ($\hat{Y} = 5.89$). The very small discrepancies among high internal participants partly reflects the fact that many high IMS participants (based on a median split) had negative or zero discrepancies (they accounted for 50% of negative and 75% of the zero discrepancies).

Affective Reactions to Campus Standards Discrepancies

As with the personal standard group, each affect index was analyzed using hierarchical regression, with IMS, EMS, discrepancy scores, and all the interactions among these variables as predictor variables.

Threat. Of primary interest in the campus standard group was whether those who reported being motivated to respond without prejudice for external reasons reported feeling fearful

and threatened when their actual responses were discrepant from the campus *should* standards (i.e., ought-other discrepancy; cf. Higgins, 1987). The regression analysis on the threat index revealed a significant main effect of discrepancy scores, such that respondents with larger discrepancies experienced greater levels of threat, $F(1, 140) = 4.73, p < .04$ ($\beta = .19$). In addition, there was a significant main effect of IMS, such that respondents who were high in internal motivation to respond without prejudice experienced less threat than those low in internal motivation to respond without prejudice, $F(1, 140) = 10.81, p < .002$ ($\beta = -.28$). The key finding, however, is that the predicted EMS \times Discrepancy Scores interaction was significant, $F(1, 137) = 4.73, p < .04$ ($\beta = .19$). As can be seen in Figure 2, low and high EMS participants with small discrepancies from campus standards reported low levels of threat. Large discrepancies from campus standards, however, were associated with heightened threat only for those high in external motivation to respond without prejudice. In other words, discrepancy magnitude only had an impact on threatened affect for those who were high in external motivation. No other effects were significant.

To ensure that the threat findings were specific to the prejudice context and do not simply reflect people's general concern over being evaluated by others, we repeated the analyses on the threat index using participants' FNE, IAS, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and Self-Monitoring Scale scores as covariates. In this way, we could partial out participants' dispositional tendencies to be concerned about being evaluated by others as well as their dispositional tendencies to strategically alter their behavior to meet situational demands. In the analysis, the only significant covariate was IAS, $F(1, 132) = 7.86, p < .01$ ($\beta = .28$), suggesting that those high in dispositional interaction anxiety felt more threat than those low in dispositional interaction anxiety. The primary results of the covariate analysis, however, were identical to the results summarized above, both in terms of the pattern observed and the significance levels. That is, when the individual-differences measures were partialled out, the theoretically important EMS \times Discrepancy Scores interaction remained significant, $F(1, 129) = 5.92, p < .02$ ($\beta = .20$). Thus, the threatened feelings reported in the present study appear to be more specific than a general concern over being




Figure 2. Threat as a function of external motivation to respond without prejudice scores and discrepancy scores.

evaluated by others or over presenting oneself in socially desirable or strategic ways. It was the combination of being externally motivated to respond without prejudice coupled with large discrepancies from other-based standards that produced the threatened feelings.

Negself. The analysis on negself revealed a significant main effect for discrepancy scores, such that respondents with larger discrepancies experienced greater levels of negative self-directed affect, $F(1, 140) = 11.31, p < .002 (\beta = .30)$. This main effect was qualified by the $IMS \times$ Discrepancy Scores interaction, $F(1, 137) = 21.84, p < .001 (\beta = .47)$. The pattern of this interaction indicated that high and low IMS individuals with small discrepancies (\hat{Y} s; 1.44 and 2.11, respectively) experienced low levels of negself. When discrepancies were large, high IMS participants experienced more negself ($\hat{Y} = 3.14$) than their low IMS counterparts ($\hat{Y} = 2.79$). No other effects were significant in this analysis.

This pattern is very similar to the pattern of negself observed in response to discrepancies from personal standards. It appears that thinking about campus standards activates participants' personal standards, at least for those high in internal motivation to respond without prejudice. Considering the fact that for high IMS participants there is substantial overlap between their personal and the campus standards (i.e., both prohibit prejudiced responding), it is not surprising that these participants would feel guilty when their actual responses were discrepant from either personal or campus standards.⁹ It is worth noting, however, that it appears that thinking about personal standards does not necessarily lead people to think about campus-based standards. Consider, for example, that those who are high in external motivation to respond without prejudice only felt threatened affect when discrepancies were assessed from campus standards.¹⁰

Positive, negother, and sad. No significant main effects or interactions were observed on the positive or negother indices. The hierarchical regression analyses of the sad index, however, revealed a significant IMS main effect, such that high IMS participants reported feeling less sad affect than their low IMS counterparts, $F(1, 140) = 4.30, p < .04 (\beta = -.19)$. The analysis also revealed a significant $EMS \times$ Discrepancy Scores interaction, $F(1, 136) = 5.78, p < .02 (\beta = .22)$. The predicted values from this interaction revealed a crossover pattern that is not readily interpretable. Specifically, low EMS individuals with small discrepancies ($\hat{Y} = 1.95$) and high EMS individuals with large discrepancies ($\hat{Y} = 2.39$) experienced relatively higher levels of sad affect than high EMS participants with small discrepancies ($\hat{Y} = 1.60$) and low EMS participants with large discrepancies ($\hat{Y} = 1.62$). No other effects were significant.

Discussion

Examination of the specific types of affect that follow from violations of own- and other-based standards provides strong supporting evidence for the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS. That is, when discrepancies were assessed from personal standards (i.e., ought-own), large discrepancies were associated with feelings of guilt and self-criticism, particularly for those who were highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice. However, when discrepancies were assessed from participants' perceptions of the campus standards (i.e., ought-other),

large discrepancies were associated with threatened affect, particularly for those who were highly externally motivated to respond without prejudice. It is worth noting that these feelings were independent of participants' dispositional concerns about being evaluated by others. Moreover, discrepancies from own- and other-based standards did not systematically influence reports of other types of affect (e.g., positive and sad) for either internally or externally motivated individuals. Thus, discrepancies from own- and other-based standards appear to lead to qualitatively distinct affective reactions that vary as a function of the source of motivation to respond without prejudice.

Public Versus Private Reports of the Stereotype of Blacks

Encouraged by this initial evidence, we sought additional behavioral evidence in support of the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS by examining the effect of making stereotype-relevant responses either privately or publicly. More specifically, in our next study, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they endorsed the stereotype of Blacks either privately and anonymously or publicly, by reporting their responses directly to the experimenter. The experimenter, an advanced student at the university, is likely to be perceived as a good representative of the campus and its well-understood nonprejudiced standards. As a result, reporting responses directly to this person should make concerns over the impression one would make on others highly salient.

When reporting personal beliefs about the stereotype privately and anonymously, people should be freed from social concerns about complying with normative expectations and should be willing to report their true beliefs about the stereotype. Previous work has suggested that when such reports are given privately, high-prejudice people report endorsing the stereotype to a greater degree than their low-prejudice counterparts (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995). In the present context, then, we would expect a strong effect for internal motivation when reports are given privately (i.e., low IMS participants will report stronger endorsement of the Black stereotype). Reporting personal beliefs about the Black stereotype publicly, in our case directly to the experimenter, should make normative expectations regarding the inappropriateness of stereotypic responses highly salient. Consideration of both the nature of the social context in which participants make their responses and the motivations

⁹ Indeed, when the campus and personal standard groups are combined into a single analysis on negself in which IMS, EMS, discrepancy score, and standard type are predictor variables, only the $IMS \times$ Discrepancy Score interaction is significant, $F(1, 276) = 27.83, p < .001$. This analysis suggests that those who are high in internal motivation respond to discrepancies with elevated negative self-directed affect regardless of whether discrepancies are assessed from their own or significant others' standards.

¹⁰ When the campus and personal standard groups are combined into a single analysis on threat in which IMS, EMS, discrepancy score, and standard type are predictor variables, the $EMS \times$ Discrepancy Score \times Standard Type interaction is marginal, $F(1, 276) = 3.57, p = .06$. This analysis suggests that those who are high in external motivation only respond to discrepancies with elevated threatened affect when discrepancies are assessed from significant others' standards.

tapped by the IMS and EMS led us to expect a three-way interaction between IMS, EMS, and reporting condition on reports of endorsement of the Black stereotype.

More specifically, we expected that participants low in internal and high in external motivation to respond without prejudice would be most prone to strategically altering their responses in public and should show the greatest difference between private (more stereotypic) and public (less stereotypic) reports of endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks. High internal participants, regardless of their level of external motivation, are expected to show little difference between their private and public reports of the Black stereotype, and they are expected to indicate little endorsement of the Black stereotype. Participants low in both internal and external motivation are not especially likely to show differences in their reports of the Black stereotype in the private and public conditions.

Method

Respondents were 80 introductory psychology students (75% female; 97% White) who participated individually and received extra course credit for their participation. The IMS, EMS, and ATB were completed as part of a mass testing session early in the semester. Participants were considered eligible for the present study if their responses fell into the top and bottom 30% of the IMS and EMS distributions. Participants who met the selection criteria were contacted by phone and invited to participate. The final sample consisted of 20 participants in each of the high internal–low external, high internal–high external, low internal–high external, and low internal–low external groups. Participants were informed that the study involved completing a questionnaire concerning stereotypic beliefs about various social groups. Half the participants were randomly assigned to complete the questionnaire in private and were assured that their responses would be anonymous. The other half of the participants were randomly assigned to give their responses orally, and it was made clear that the experimenter would record their response. They then rated the extent to which each of 35 traits, some of which were known to be part of the prevailing cultural stereotype of Blacks (Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) as well as others, were characteristic of Blacks on a scale ranging from -3 (*uncharacteristic*) to $+3$ (*characteristic*). The stereotype index was created by summing participants' responses to the 14 stereotype-related traits: *athletic, aggressive, rude, criminal, dangerous, violent, low in intelligence, unreliable, careless, free-loaders, ignorant, streetwise, rhythmic, and lazy* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$). Scores on the stereotype index could range from -42 to $+42$ with lower scores indicating less endorsement of the stereotype. Scores around zero suggest that participants believed that the trait was neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of Blacks.

Results

Participants' responses on the stereotype index were submitted to a 2 (IMS: high vs. low) \times 2 (EMS: high vs. low) \times 2 (reporting condition: private vs. public) between-subjects factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). As expected, the analysis revealed a main effect of IMS, such that high IMS participants were less likely to endorse the stereotype ($M = -0.03$) than were low IMS participants ($M = 6.08$), $F(1, 72) = 9.87, p < .01$. The analysis also revealed an IMS \times Reporting Condition interaction, $F(1, 72) = 5.37, p < .05$. Whereas high IMS participants reported similarly low endorsement of the stereotype in private ($M = -0.70$) and in public ($M = 0.65$), their low IMS counterparts reported stronger endorsement of the stereotype in

private ($M = 9.90$) than in public ($M = 2.25$). However, these effects were qualified by the anticipated IMS \times EMS \times Reporting Condition interaction, $F(1, 72) = 4.79, p < .05$. The means are presented in Figure 3. Protected t tests revealed that, as expected, a significant difference between the private and public reporting conditions occurred only for those who were both low in internal and high in external motivation to respond without prejudice, $t(18) = 2.97, p < .01$ (all other t s $< |1.59|$). Also as expected, these participants reported stronger endorsement of the stereotype in the private than public condition.

Because we also assessed participants' prejudice level on Brigham's (1993) ATB scale, this study afforded us the opportunity to directly compare a measure of prejudiced attitudes with our IMS and EMS measures in predicting the behavior of participants and their overall sensitivity to the public–private manipulation. Our final analysis examined responses on the stereotype index as a function of prejudice and whether responses were reported privately or publicly. Thus, responses on the stereotype index were submitted to a 2 (ATB: high prejudice vs. low prejudice) \times 2 (reporting condition: private vs. public) between-subjects factorial ANOVA. Three participants had not completed the ATB in the mass survey. These 3 participants came from three different cells of the full IMS \times EMS \times Reporting Condition design.¹¹ As anticipated, the analysis revealed only a significant main effect of ATB scores, such that high-prejudice participants reported stronger endorsement of the stereotype ($M = 5.42$) than did low-prejudice participants ($M = 0.67$), $F(1, 76) = 5.10, p < .05$. The ATB \times Reporting Condition interaction was not significant ($F < 1$). It appears, then, that prejudice measures such as the ATB are not particularly sensitive to the alternative motivations to respond without prejudice that lead to different responses in the private and public reporting conditions.

Discussion

As anticipated, participants' endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks varied as a function of their motivation to respond without prejudice and the social context in which they responded. Specifically, the source of people's motivation to respond without prejudice influenced their responses to the social climate in which they reported prejudice-relevant beliefs. When under the scrutiny of a (presumed to be) nonprejudiced audience, only those who were primarily externally motivated seemed to adjust their expressions of prejudice to conform to social pressure. These findings provide strong behavioral evidence of the predictive validity of the IMS and EMS. In addition, it is noteworthy that the ATB alone was not sufficient to identify those whose reports of stereotype endorsement shifted across reporting conditions. Only by examining the sources of people's motivation to respond without prejudice were we able to identify those who showed differential behavioral responses across the public and private reporting conditions.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In the present series of studies, we provided evidence concerning the development and validation of separate measures of

¹¹ The results of the full IMS \times EMS \times Reporting Condition analysis with these 3 participants removed is identical in pattern and significance to the analysis reported on the full sample.




Figure 3. Mean stereotype endorsement as a function of internal motivation to respond without prejudice scores, external motivation to respond without prejudice scores, and response condition.

internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. The cumulative evidence across the studies supports our contention that there are distinct internal and external motivations underlying people's desire to avoid prejudiced responses. For example, the series of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses established the presence of two distinct factors. In three separate samples, the IMS and EMS scales were only slightly negatively correlated, suggesting that the scales are fairly independent. In addition, the test-retest and internal reliability analyses suggested that the scales possess good psychometric properties. Evidence regarding the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales was apparent in the theoretically sensible pattern of relationships the IMS and EMS show with measures of prejudice, social evaluation, and self-presentation. In addition, comparison of the IMS and EMS with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) MCPR measure further supports the suggestion that the IMS and EMS measure qualitatively distinct sources of motivation to respond without prejudice.

The significance of the alternative sources of motivation to respond without prejudice is most clear when the evidence presented supporting the predictive validity of our scales is considered. We demonstrated that qualitatively distinct affective reactions are associated with discrepancies from own- and other-based standards as a function of the source of people's motivation to respond without prejudice. When discrepancies were assessed from personal standards, large discrepancies were associated with guilt and self-criticism, particularly for those who were highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice. When discrepancies were assessed from significant others' standards, large discrepancies were associated with threatened affect, particularly for those who were highly externally motivated to respond without prejudice.

Our final study demonstrated that the overall likelihood of

stereotype endorsement differed as a function of situational circumstances and the source of people's motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, only participants who were primarily externally motivated (i.e., high EMS and low IMS) showed differences in their reported endorsement of the stereotype of Blacks as a function of whether they supplied their responses in private or publicly. It appears that for these participants, making their responses in public cued the potential evaluation of the external audience (i.e., the experimenter), and they strategically altered their responses to avoid revealing their true prejudiced attitudes. In the absence of these cues, they responded with strong endorsement of the stereotype. Those who were internally motivated, regardless of their level of external motivation, as well as those who reported not being particularly motivated to respond without prejudice, showed little difference in stereotype endorsement whether they gave their responses privately or publicly. Taken together, these findings suggest that it would be important to consider the joint influence of people's internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice when evaluating the likely impact of situational demands on responses.

The Need to Move Beyond Traditional Prejudice Measures

The findings across our studies also suggest that in developing our theorizing related to the control of prejudice, we need to look beyond traditional measures of prejudice. Previous theorizing on the control of prejudiced responses has emphasized the importance of being motivated to control prejudice as a precursor to initiating control efforts (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990). Until quite recently, researchers have depended on traditional

attitude measures as a proxy for motivation, under the assumption that only those who report low-prejudice attitudes would be motivated to respond without prejudice. The present studies suggest that the relations between traditional attitude measures and motivation to avoid prejudice is complex. For example, examination of the correlations of our IMS and EMS with measures of racial attitudes suggests that traditional attitude measures are more strongly related to internal than external motivation to respond without prejudice. The IMS was strongly correlated with various prejudice measures (e.g., MRS, ATB), such that those who are highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice reported low-prejudice attitudes. The EMS, however, was only somewhat negatively correlated with the prejudice measures. Thus, a large range of prejudice scores, from low to high, were reported among those who are highly externally motivated to respond without prejudice. Moreover, the findings from our final study suggested that knowing one's prejudice level was not sufficient to identify those who were most sensitive to whether responses were reported privately or publicly. Clearly, attitude measures alone cannot represent the diversity of reasons underlying people's motivation to respond without prejudice.

We believe that the pattern of findings across our studies suggests that it may be productive to explore the independent and joint effects of the distinct internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice. Doing so may help to elucidate when efforts to respond without prejudice are likely and what types of control strategies are implemented, as well as the efficiency and efficacy of control efforts that may follow from the alternative sources of motivation. As previously noted, control is important to many contemporary theories that consider the interplay between relatively automatic and controlled processes involved in prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990). Although these models suggest when control efforts are likely (e.g., when people are motivated and have the opportunity to implement controlled processes), they are not particularly specific about the nature of the strategies involved in exercising control (e.g., individuation of targets, suppression of stereotypes, or correction for already activated stereotypes; see Devine & Monteith, *in press*, for a review). Although, at one level, the goal of control efforts is the same whether the motivation derives from within or without, in subsequent research it will be important to determine whether the control mechanisms engaged are similar when the standard to be met is self-imposed or other-imposed and whether these mechanisms lead to effective control. In what follows, we consider additional theoretical and empirical benefits likely to be accrued by assessing the alternate sources of motivation to respond without prejudice.

Consequences of Violating Own- and Other-Based Standards: Prejudice Reduction or Escalation?

Given the distinct patterns of affect that our participants experienced in response to discrepancies from personal and campus-based standards, it is worth considering the longer term consequences for how people might adjust to the everyday circumstances in which they are likely to confront pressure to respond without prejudice for internal reasons, external reasons, or both. Monteith (Monteith, 1993; Devine & Monteith, 1993) found that negative self-directed affect experienced by low-prejudice

participants with large discrepancies from personal standards activated a self-regulatory cycle that facilitated their control of future responses to outgroup members. In the present research, participants who reported being internally motivated to respond without prejudice also experienced negative self-directed affect when their actual responses violated their personal standards. We would expect internally motivated people, like Monteith's low-prejudice participants, to attempt to control (reduce) prejudiced responses in future intergroup interactions as part of their ongoing efforts to respond consistently with their internalized nonprejudiced values. To date, however, Devine and her colleagues have not examined the role of threat-related affect in future prejudice-related responses (e.g., Devine et al., 1991). Threat-related affect is experienced under different circumstances (i.e., discrepancies from other-based standards for those who are motivated to meet those standards) and may be accompanied by different outcomes.

We are much less sanguine about the likelihood that threat-related feelings, in the absence of guilt, will lead to prejudice reduction. Consider, for example, that when discrepancies involve self-imposed standards, it is difficult to escape the watchful eye of this evaluative audience. Thus, the most effective and efficient way to escape guilt-related feelings is to learn to respond without prejudice (i.e., to change one's responses). This would, of course, have the added benefit of helping the person meet a personally important goal. In contrast, when others impose the standard, simply avoiding situations in which nonprejudiced social pressure is experienced or situations involving contact with outgroup members would be effective strategies to remove the anticipated threat. Neither of these alternatives would likely lead to prejudice reduction.

Further, to the extent that these alternatives are closed off (e.g., one's workplace is the context in which the external standards are imposed), other concerns arise. Higgins (1987) cautioned that the motivational nature of ought-other discrepancies might be associated with feelings of resentment (i.e., resentment of the anticipated punishment to be inflicted by others). This resentment may be fueled by constantly having to be on guard to avoid violating other-imposed standards for appropriate conduct. A very real concern is that people who are primarily externally motivated may grow to resent the infringement on their freedom and feel increased frustration and reactance, which may ultimately fuel their prejudices (Brehm, 1966).

Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (*in press*) recently found that high-prejudice people, who they argued were not personally motivated to respond without prejudice, could control the expression of prejudiced thoughts in the presence of external motivation (i.e., they were told to suppress the stereotype). However, these control efforts were associated with high levels of frustration. Frustration did not result from control efforts for their low-prejudice participants. Although Monteith et al. did not examine the consequences of high-prejudice people's frustration, it seems plausible that such resentment could ultimately culminate in these people lashing out against the nonprejudiced norms, those exerting social pressure, or even outgroup members. We suspect that such expressions of backlash would be most likely to occur under highly anonymous conditions (e.g., a darkened street, judgments for which one cannot be held personally responsible). To the extent that backlash is likely, short-term gains (i.e., curtailing immediate expressions of prejudice) could lead

to long-term negative outcomes (i.e., resentment of imposed regulations discouraging prejudice and the escalation of prejudice). It is even tempting to speculate that the recent resurgence of White supremacist groups (Janofsky, 1995; Schneider, 1995) may, in part, reflect backlash against the current norms prohibiting expression of racial prejudice.

Backlash seems much less likely from those who report being externally but also internally motivated to respond without prejudice. After all, nonprejudiced social pressure is consistent with their internalized personal standards; thus, they may be much less likely to resent such external pressure. The fact that they are internally motivated indicates that responding without prejudice is a personally accepted moral responsibility. Although these people are concerned about how others would evaluate them if their responses revealed negativity toward Blacks, we believe their internal motivation is primary. It is instructive, as noted earlier, that those who are high in both internal and external motivation tended to respond to discrepancies from personal standards with feelings of guilt (but not threat); discrepancies from campus standards, however, led to threat-related feelings, but also feelings of guilt. Thus, thinking about discrepancies from other-based standards appeared to bring to mind these participants' personal standards as well. We expect that despite the unpleasant affective consequences of violating nonprejudiced standards, those who report being motivated to respond without prejudice for both internal and external reasons will persist in their efforts to control future prejudiced reactions.

These findings have implications for a long-standing conundrum in the prejudice literature. It has long been assumed that responsiveness to social pressure or concern over being evaluated by others undermined the sincerity of professed internal reasons to respond without prejudice (e.g., Crosby et al., 1980; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). Our data suggest that the situation is considerably more complex. Some of our participants, although they reported being concerned about how others would evaluate them if they responded with prejudice, also reported being highly internally motivated to respond without prejudice. We believe their struggles with controlling prejudice (i.e., learning to control personally unacceptable responses) are markedly different from those of their high externally motivated counterparts who are not internally motivated to respond without prejudice (i.e., hiding their true attitudes from others). As such, we believe it would be a mistake to assume that their external motivation casts doubt on the sincerity of their internal motivation. Further, we propose that the qualitatively different goals that externally motivated people possess suggest that not all external motivation is equivalent. Therefore, by assessing both internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice, we may be able to gain insight into the nature of the different types of challenges people face in contemporary conflicts over the expression of prejudice.

Encouraging Prejudice Reduction Through Social Pressure: Striking a Delicate Balance

At present, we know very little about the developmental sequence of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Examination of how people's motivation to respond without prejudice changes over time may supply insights concerning how most effectively to reduce prejudice in the long run. One possibility is that external motivation precedes internal

motivation and that to initiate change, the social climate must discourage expressions of prejudice. Indeed, this was the logic underlying legislative changes that made overt discrimination based on race illegal and made admitting to prejudice socially taboo. This logic also forms the basis of Blanchard et al.'s (1991) proposal that prejudice reduction efforts need to "focus . . . upon the goal of creating social settings that minimize the public expression of discriminatory or otherwise interracially insensitive behavior" (p. 101). When not under the scrutiny of those enforcing the nonprejudiced norm, those who are only externally motivated to respond without prejudice may, as our final study suggested, respond consistently with their prejudiced attitudes. Therefore, although discouraging overtly prejudiced responses may be desirable, it appears that internal motivation may be necessary to sustain efforts to respond without prejudice over time, particularly when no immediate external standards are salient (Ausubel, 1955).

The question remains concerning how the power of normative pressure can most effectively be harnessed in the service of creating such internal motivation to respond without prejudice. It is clear that social pressure and norms (either favoring or opposing prejudice) can affect people's prejudice-related responses (e.g., our final study; Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1996). The challenge is to encourage behavioral change without concomitantly increasing resentment (cf. Brehm, 1966), which could impede prejudice reduction. Maximizing the utility of social pressure for promoting prejudice reduction will require creating a delicate balance between exerting sufficient external pressure to encourage the desired outcome (e.g., nonprejudiced response) but not so much pressure so as to provide a clear external justification for one's behavior (cf. Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). To the extent that there is insufficient external justification to explain one's nonprejudiced behavior, as dissonance theory suggests, some internal justification will be sought. Thus, consistency pressures may encourage the internalization of nonprejudiced attitudes, particularly if the behavior is freely chosen and perceived to be irrevocable (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957).

To the extent that nonprejudiced responses come to be generated consistently and do not appear to be under situational constraints, these individuals may infer that their behavior reflects their underlying attitudes (Bem, 1972). Thus, they may come to view themselves as the types of people who do not respond with prejudice and be motivated to act accordingly in future situations. Those interested in harnessing the power of normative pressure to encourage prejudice reduction would be wise to follow the lessons of dissonance and self-perception theorists. Subsequent research exploring these issues may reveal insights concerning how individuals, organizations, and even the government can most effectively discourage prejudice.

It should be noted, however, that creating internal motivation is not equivalent to eliminating all negative responses toward the stigmatized group. Indeed, Devine and colleagues (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Devine et al., 1991) have conceptualized creating such internal motivation as only the initial step in the process of overcoming prejudice. The subsequent steps involved in reducing prejudice require learning to overcome rather spontaneous, yet very well-learned negative feelings and stereotypic responses. That is,

despite changes in attitudes and motivation, more implicit (and presumably less controllable) negative responses remain as rivals to these more explicit reports of attitudes and motivation (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Indeed, a set of issues that is currently center stage for a number of investigators concerns the interplay between explicit and more implicit responses (see Banaji, 1997). An exciting set of issues to explore concerns the extent to which explicit changes in motivation over time are related to changes in the nature and controllability of the more implicit components of people's attitudes and reactions to members of stigmatized groups. It will be important to examine, for example, whether those who are primarily internally motivated and who generally report small discrepancies between their *should* standards and their actual responses are less prone to implicit biases as well.

Conclusions

Increasingly, prejudice researchers are concerned with the reasons underlying efforts to respond without prejudice. When compelling normative or external reasons for responding without prejudice exist, the prevailing tendency has been to discount internal reasons. Our analysis suggests that the nature of contemporary conflicts associated with motivations to respond without prejudice are considerably more complex. Indeed, our work suggests that the contemporary dilemma for some people concerns appearing prejudiced to oneself (and possibly others), whereas for others the only dilemma concerns appearing prejudiced to others. To facilitate the exploration of the nature of such contemporary prejudice-related dilemmas, we developed separate measures of internal and external sources of motivation underlying efforts to respond without prejudice. Our studies provided strong evidence in support of these motivations and suggests that they can be reliably assessed using our IMS and EMS. We believe that empirically disentangling internal and external sources of motivation to respond without prejudice paves the way to examine the impact of these distinct motivations on efforts to avoid prejudice and thus may improve our understanding of the dynamic forces associated with controlling prejudice. In addition, it is our hope that the internal and external motivation measures will facilitate future efforts to identify factors that may promote or thwart prejudice reduction.

References

- Adler, J., Starr, M., Chideya, F., Wright, L., Wingert, P., & Haac, L. (1990, December 24). Taking offense: Is this new enlightenment on campus or the new McCarthyism? *Newsweek*, 116, 48–54.
- Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. London: Sage.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba Press.
- Aronson, E. (1968). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 4, pp. 1–34). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Ausubel, D. P. (1955). Relationships between shame and guilt in the socializing process. *Psychological Review*, 62, 378–390.
- Banaji, M. R. (Ed.). (1997). Unconscious forms of stereotyping and prejudice [Special issue]. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33(6).
- Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (1995). Gender stereotyping in judgments of fame. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68, 181–198.
- Bem, D. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 6, pp. 1–62). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Blanchard, F. A., Crandall, C. S., Brigham, J. C., & Vaughn, L. A. (1994). Condemning and condoning racism: A social context approach to interracial settings. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 79, 993–997.
- Blanchard, F. A., Lilly, T., & Vaughn, L. A. (1991). Reducing the expression of racial prejudice. *Psychological Science*, 2, 101–105.
- Brehm, J. W. (1966). *A theory of psychological reactance*. New York: Academic Press.
- Brehm, J. W., & Cohen, A. R. (1962). *Explorations in cognitive dissonance*. New York: Wiley.
- Brigham, J. C. (1993). College students' racial attitudes. *Journal of Applied and Social Psychology*, 23, 1933–1967.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control process view. *Psychological Review*, 97, 19–35.
- Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). *Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 87, 546–563.
- Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 24, 349–354.
- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 5–18.
- Devine, P. G., & Elliot, A. J. (1995). Are racial stereotypes really fading? The Princeton trilogy revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 1139–1150.
- Devine, P. G., Evett, S. R., & Vasquez-Suson, K. A. (1996). Exploring the interpersonal dynamics of intergroup context. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation and cognition: The interpersonal context* (Vol. 3, pp. 423–464). New York: Guilford Press.
- Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1993). The role of discrepancy-associated affect in prejudice reduction. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception* (pp. 317–344). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (in press). Dual processes in stereotyping. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual-process models and themes in social and cognitive psychology*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 817–830.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Fazio, R. H. (1992). New technologies for direct and indirect assessment of attitudes. In J. M. Tanur (Ed.), *Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases of surveys* (pp. 203–237). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (1986). Prejudice, discrimination, and racism: Historical trends and contemporary approaches. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 1–34). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (1991). Changes in the nature and assessment of racial prejudice. In H. Knopke, J. Norrell, & R. Rogers (Eds.), *Opening doors: An appraisal of race relations in contempo-*

- rary America (pp. 201–241). Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- D'Souza, D. (1991, March). Illiberal education. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 267, 51–79.
- Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual difference measure of motivation to control prejudiced reactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 316–326.
- Dutton, D. G. (1976). Tokenism, reverse discrimination, and egalitarianism in interracial behavior. *Journal of Social Issues*, 32, 93–107.
- Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). *A theory of objective self-awareness*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE model as an integrated framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 23, pp. 75–109). New York: Academic Press.
- Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 1013–1027.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A cognitive theory of dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology*, 58, 203–210.
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 61–89). New York: Academic Press.
- Greeley, A., & Sheatsley, P. (1971). Attitudes towards racial integration. *Scientific American*, 222, 13–19.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological Review*, 102, 4–27.
- Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review*, 94, 319–340.
- Houston, P. (1990, December 24). He wants to pull the plug on PC. *Newsweek*, 116, 52–53.
- Janofsky, M. (1995, June 28). Skinhead violence is worldwide and growing, a report finds. *The New York Times*, p. A11.
- Jones, E. E., & Sigall, H. (1971). The bogus pipeline: A new paradigm for measuring affect and attitude. *Psychological Bulletin*, 76, 349–364.
- Jöreskog, K., & Sörbom, D. (1993). *LISREL 8: Structural equation modeling with the SIMPLIS command language*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, 893–905.
- Katz, I., Wackenhut, J., & Hass, R. G. (1986). Racial ambivalence, value duality, and behavior. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 35–60). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (1986). *Beliefs about inequality: Americans' views about what ought to be*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Leary, M. R. (1983a). A brief version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 9, 371–375.
- Leary, M. R. (1983b). Social anxiousness: The construct and its measurement. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 47, 66–75.
- McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 91–126). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- McConahay, J. B., Hardee, B. B., & Batts, V. (1981). Has racism declined? It depends on who's asking and what is asked. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25, 563–579.
- Monteith, M. J. (1993). Self-regulation of prejudiced responses: Implications for progress in prejudice-reduction efforts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65, 469–485.
- Monteith, M. J., Deneen, N. E., & Tooman, G. D. (1996). The effect of social norm activation on the expression of opinions concerning gay men and Blacks. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 18, 267–288.
- Monteith, M. J., Devine, P. G., & Zuwerink, J. R. (1993). Self-directed versus other-directed affect as a consequence of prejudice-related discrepancies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64, 198–210.
- Monteith, M. J., Spicer, C. V., & Tooman, G. D. (in press). Consequences of stereotype suppression: Stereotypes on AND not on the rebound. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*.
- Schneider, K. (1995, March 6). Triple murder causes alarm about hate groups' growth. *The New York Times*, p. A1.
- Schuman, H., Steeh, C., & Bobo, L. (1985). *Racial attitudes in America: Trends and interpretations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sears, D. O., & Kinder, D. R. (1985). Whites' opposition to busing: On conceptualizing and operationalizing group conflict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, 1141–1147.
- Sherman, S. J., & Gorkin, L. (1980). Attitude bolstering when behavior is inconsistent with central attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 16, 388–403.
- Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1986). On the nature of self-monitoring: Matters of assessment, matters of validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 125–139.
- SPSS for Windows (Version 6.1.4) [Computer software]. (1996). Chicago: SPSS, Inc.
- Taylor, D. G., Sheatsley, P. B., & Greeley, A. M. (1978, June). Attitudes towards racial integration. *Scientific American*, 238, 42–49.
- Watson, D., & Friend, R. (1969). Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 33, 448–457.
- Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72, 262–274.
- Zuwerink, J. R., Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., & Cook, D. A. (1996). Prejudice towards Blacks: With and without compunction? *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 18, 131–150.

(Appendix follows)

Appendix A

Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS) Items

Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people. Some of the reasons reflect internal–personal motivations whereas others reflect more external–social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other. In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the scale below.

Scale item	Factor loadings	
	Factor 1: IMS	Factor 2: EMS
External motivation items		
Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.	.05	.73
I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.	-.003	.78
If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.	.22	.67
I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.	-.16	.83
I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.	-.22	.69
Internal motivation items		
I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.	.76	.15
According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. (R)	.71	-.16
I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.	.77	-.08
Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.	.77	-.05
Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.	.74	-.08

Note. (R) indicates reverse coded item. Participants rated 10 items on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). When participants complete the scales, the IMS and EMS items are intermixed. The factor loadings are from an exploratory factor analysis.

Appendix B

Convergent and Discriminant Validity Measures and Sample Items

Modern Racism Scale (McConahay et al., 1981). Seven items rated -4 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*; $\alpha = .85$):

It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America. (R)
Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.

Pro-Black Scale and Anti-Black Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988). Twenty items rated 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).
Pro-Black Scale items (10 items; $\alpha = .75$):

Black people do not have the same employment opportunities that Whites do.
It is surprising that black people do as well as they do, considering all the obstacles they face.
Most blacks are no longer discriminated against. (R)

Anti-Black Scale items (10 items; $\alpha = .84$):

On the whole, Black people don't stress education and training.
Most Blacks have the drive and determination to get ahead. (R)
Very few Black people are just looking for a free ride. (R)

Attitude Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993). Twenty items rated 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*; $\alpha = .89$):

I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public place.
I think black people look more similar to each other than white people do.
Generally blacks are not as smart as whites.
I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks. (R)

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1981). Twenty-four items rated 0 (*disagree strongly*) to 5 (*agree strongly*; $\alpha = .84$):

Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to preserve our way of life.
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other peoples follow. (R)

Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale and Protestant Ethic Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988). Twenty-one items rated 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale items (10 items; $\alpha = .74$):

One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.
One should be kind to all people.

Protestant Ethic Scale items (11 items; $\alpha = .66$):

People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.
Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.
Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely.

Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969; Leary, 1983a). Twelve items rated 1 (*not at all characteristic of me*) to 5 (*extremely characteristic of me*; $\alpha = .92$):

I am afraid that others will not approve of me.
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.
Other people's opinions of me do not bother me. (R)

Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983b). Fifteen items rated 1 (*The statement is not at all characteristic of me*) to 5 (*The statement is extremely characteristic of me*; $\alpha = .91$):

I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers.
In general, I am a shy person.
I seldom feel anxious in social situations. (R)

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Thirty-three items rated true or false ($\alpha = .77$):

I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
I always try to practice what I preach.
I like to gossip at times. (R)

Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Eighteen items rated true or false ($\alpha = .70$):

I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (R)

Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997). Seventeen items rated -3 (*strongly disagree*) to +3 (*strongly agree*; $\alpha = .73$).

Concern with acting prejudiced subscale (nine items, $\alpha = .73$):

It's important to me that other people not think I'm prejudiced.
In today's society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any manner.
I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that may be considered prejudiced.

Restraint to avoid dispute subscale (four items, $\alpha = .68$):

I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they might be. (R)
If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint.
I'm not afraid to tell others what I think, even when I know they disagree with me. (R)

Note. (R) indicates reverse coded items. The Modern Racism Scale is from "Has Racism Declined? It Depends on Who's Asking and What Is Asked," by J. B. McConahay, B. B. Hardee, and V. Batts, 1981, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25, pp. 563-579. Copyright 1981 by Sage Publications, Inc. Items reprinted by permission of Sage Publications. The Pro-Black Scale and Anti-Black Scale are from "Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict," by I. Katz and R. G. Hass, 1988, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, p. 905. Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Items reprinted by permission of the author. The Attitude Toward Blacks Scale is from "College Students' Racial Attitudes," by J. C. Brigham, 1993. Items reprinted with permission from *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 23, pp. 1933-1967. ©V. H. Winston & Son, Inc., 360 South Ocean Boulevard, Palm Beach, Florida 33480. All rights reserved. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale is from *Right Wing Authoritarianism*, by B. Altemeyer, 1981, Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba Press. Copyright 1981 by the University of Manitoba Press. Items reprinted with permission. The Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale/Protestant Ethic Scale is from "Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict," by I. Katz and R. G. Hass, 1988, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, p. 905. Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Items reprinted by permission of the author. The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale is from "A Brief Version of the Fear of

Negative Evaluation Scale," by M. R. Leary, 1983, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 9, pp. 371-375. Copyright 1983 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Inc. Items reprinted by permission of Sage Publications. The Interaction Anxiousness Scale is from "Social Anxiousness: The Construct and Its Measurements," by M. R. Leary, 1983, *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 47, pp. 66-75. Copyright 1983 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Items reprinted with permission. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is from "A New Scale of Social Desirability Independent of Psychopathology," by D. P. Crowne and D. Marlowe, *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 24, p. 351. Copyright 1960 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission of the author. The Self-Monitoring Scale is from "On the Nature of Self-Monitoring: Matters of Assessment,

Matters of Validity," by M. Snyder and S. Gangestad, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, p. 137. Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association. Items reprinted by permission of the author. The Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale is from "An Individual Difference Measure of Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions," by B. C. Dunton and R. H. Fazio, 1997, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, pp. 316-326. Copyright 1997 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Inc. Items reprinted by permission of Sage Publications.

Received September 9, 1997

Revision received March 24, 1998

Accepted April 9, 1998 ■

Call for Nominations

The Publications and Communications (P&C) Board has opened nominations for the editorships of the **Journal of Abnormal Psychology**, **Journal of Comparative Psychology**, **Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition**, **Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition**, **Professional Psychology: Research and Practice**, **Psychological Review**, and **Psychology, Public Policy, and Law** for the years 2001-2006. Milton E. Strauss, PhD; Charles T. Snowdon, PhD; James H. Neely, PhD; Arie W. Kruglanski, PhD; Patrick H. DeLeon, PhD, JD; Robert A. Bjork, PhD; and Bruce D. Sales, JD, PhD, respectively, are the incumbent editors.

Candidates should be members of APA and should be available to start receiving manuscripts in early 2000 to prepare for issues published in 2001. Please note that the P&C Board encourages participation by members of underrepresented groups in the publication process and would particularly welcome such nominees. Self-nominations are also encouraged.

To nominate candidates, prepare a statement of one page or less in support of each candidate. Send nominations to the attention of the appropriate search chair—

- David L. Rosenhan, PhD, for **Journal of Abnormal Psychology**
- Lauren B. Resnick, PhD, for **Journal of Comparative Psychology**
- Joe L. Martinez, Jr., PhD, for **JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition**
- Sara B. Kiesler, PhD, for **JPSP: Attitudes and Social Cognition**
- Judith P. Worell, PhD, for **Professional Psychology: Research and Practice**
- Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., PhD, for **Psychological Review**
- Lucia A. Gilbert, PhD, for **Psychology, Public Policy, and Law**

—to the following address:

c/o Karen Sellman, P&C Board Search Liaison
 Room 2004
 American Psychological Association
 750 First Street, NE
 Washington, DC 20002-4242

The first review of nominations will begin December 7, 1998.