REPRESENTING ISLAM: SEPTEMBER
11 AND THE JAPANESE MAINSTREAM PRESS
ALICE ALLAN
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
The September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent US-led “war on
terror” have provided a seemingly endless supply of news stories. Whether the
focus is on Afghanistan, Iraq or the borderless terrain of “international
terrorism,” “Islam” is regularly implicated in some way. The aim of this
article is to study the way Islam has been portrayed in Japan’s mainstream newspapers
both before and after the September 11 attacks. Japanese newspapers are a
compelling site for the study of this phenomenon, due in part to their
pervasive presence in Japanese society. Islam’s portrayal in the Japanese mainstream press is all the more
interesting in the light of the complex political and historical relationships
between Japan and the Islamic world.
This article will argue that the September 11 attacks led to increased coverage of Islam in the Japanese mainstream print media that reinforced pre-existing stereotypes even as it established a more detailed picture of Islam. The article examines newspaper articles from 1999 to 2005 in Japan’s four highest-selling newspapers: the Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, using examples indicative of each newspaper’s portrayal of Islam, and providing graphs where appropriate to illustrate each newspaper’s coverage.
The article is divided into two sections. The first outlines the representation of Islam in the newspapers from 1999 to September 11, focusing on three recurring themes: “Islamic fundamentalism” (isuramu genrishugi, イスラム原理主義), “Islamic extremism” (isuramu kagekiha, イスラム過激派) and “religious conflict” (shûkyô shôtotsu, 宗教衝突). The second section examines the “two-fold effect” of the September 11 attacks on the representation of Islam in the Japanese mainstream press: the process by which increased discussion of Islam in the Japanese press after September 11 both challenged stereotypical representations and also led to their reinforcement. This section considers the representation of Islam in the Japanese press immediately after the September 11 attacks, later during the coverage of the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently when the “war on terror” moved to Iraq.
Islam in the Japanese Mainstream Press 1999 to
9/11
In pre-9/11 newspaper coverage, one might anticipate some variation in
the representations of Islam, perhaps even a balance between positive and
negative representations. In reality, the majority of articles that mentioned
Islam between 1999 and September 11 did so in the context of violence, in
covering conflicts such as those in Bosnia, Iraq, Indonesia or the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taking the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as an example, here Islam was regularly represented in a negative way
due to the often violent activities of Palestinian groups that identify
themselves as “Islamic.” The activities of these groups meant that even within
articles that discussed positive aspects of the situation, such as those on the
progress of peace talks, Islam was not necessarily represented in a positive
way. The following graphs from three randomly selected months demonstrate that
in coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Islam was more frequently
represented in terms of “Islamic fundamentalism” or “Islamic extremism” than
simply as the religion of the Palestinian people.
Of course, this
prevalence of articles in which Islam was represented in terms of “fundamentalist”
or “extremist” activity does not automatically imply an imbalance in the
coverage of the newspapers concerned. The press focuses on events that affect
people’s lives, so the continued violence attributed to groups such as Hamas or
Islamic Jihad in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can hardly be ignored. The
focus of the present analysis is not to argue that there is a one-sidedness to
the representation of Islam within the coverage of conflicts such as those in
Israel and Palestine, but to establish whether this representation meets Hall’s
criteria for a stereotype.[1]
Islam, Fundamentalism and Extremism
Arjomand characterizes Islamic fundamentalism as “the endeavor to purify
pristine Islam from subsequent accretions and alien influences by means of
returning to its scriptural foundations.”[2]
But when the terms isuramu genrishugi (イスラム原理主義, “Islamic
fundamentalism”) or isuramu kagekiha (イスラム過激派, “Islamic extremists”) are used in Japanese newspapers, they can
signify very different groups with different aims, from Hamas, to the Taliban,
to an “Islamic extremist group” that kidnapped thirteen Japanese in August
1999.[3]
References to “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” made up 17% of the overall
coverage of Islam in the four newspapers in 1999, 12% in 2000, and 25% in 2001
up until September 11.[4]
Next I will examine articles that are indicative of each newspapers’ coverage
from this period to establish whether the use of this term constitutes a
stereotype within the representation of Islam in the Japanese press.
In December 1999, the Yomiuri
reported on a plane hijacking by the Pakistani “Islamic extremist group”
Harakat ul-Mujahideen, which demanded the release of one of their leaders from
an Indian prison.[5] The article
suggested that the group might be connected to, and receiving the support from,
the “Islamic fundamentalist force, the Taliban.” The article did not indicate,
however, what type of connection this might be, what the support was, or why
the leader of the group was imprisoned to begin with. The clearest explanation
of the connection between these two groups was the articles’ subheading, which
referred to “Islamic brotherhood” (isuramu dôhô, イスラム同胞). The use of this term, as well as
characterization of the groups as “Islamic fundamentalists/extremists” in this
case negates the need for further explanation of their attributes or
motivations. In other words, the representation of Islam in this example ties
these groups together and makes them immediately intelligible to readers.
A similar example comes from the Asahi
in October 1999, after the release of four Japanese hostages who had been
kidnapped by a Kyrgyz “Islamic armed group.” The author explained that “the
background to [the kidnapping] is the magnification of Islamic fundamentalism that
came about after the fall of the Soviet Union in central Asia.”[6]
Here, while the political background of the kidnapping is alluded to, again the
article contains no explanation of what the kidnappers were aiming to achieve.
The reference to “Islamic fundamentalism” becomes, in effect, an explanation in
itself.
Another example of the use of “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” to
immediately explain the cause of a conflict can be seen in a one-line article
from the Mainichi from January 1999. The article reads “The United Nations Security Council has
discussed the situation in Afghanistan and again publicly requested the
cease-fire of Islamic fundamentalist forces such as the Taliban.”[7]
Because this article is so brief, readers need to understand what “the
situation in Afghanistan” is and how the Taliban is involved. As this article
stands, however, “Islamic fundamentalism” is the only factor that serves as an
explanation for the UN’s request for a cease-fire.
While the use of “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” as a shorthand
explanation was quite common in articles from the pre-9/11 period, some
examples did not follow this pattern entirely. One small article from the Yomiuri, for instance, entitled
“Killing of twenty worshippers in random shooting at mosque”[8]
reports: “Last night, a man suddenly turned on worshippers and fired a gun,
killing twenty people. According to Sudanese state television, the man who
fired the gun was a member of the Islamic fundamentalist extremist organization
‘Atonement and Self-Denial’ and the cause is thought to have been religious
antagonism.” The important thing to note in this instance is the inclusion of
the final reference to the “cause” of the incident: “religious antagonism.”
This example suggests that in pre-9/11 coverage, clarification of what caused
“Islamic fundamentalists” to engage in violence was still sometimes considered
necessary. It will become clear that in post-9/11 coverage this type of
explanation became superfluous as the link between “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism”
and violence was reinforced.
Another atypical example comes from the Mainichi on September 10, 2001. This article reports on a string of
attacks in Israel, including one carried out by a “madman” who wreaked havoc in
a suicide bombing in Israel’s North.[9]
The “military branch of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas” are reported to
have claimed responsibility for the actions of the “madman.” From the Palestinian point of view, this man
may actually be seen as heroic, but for present purposes the significance of
this description is the fact that it exists at all. It suggests that in
pre-9/11 coverage a distinction was still being made between “Islamic
fundamentalists” and those “mad” enough to carry out suicide attacks such as
this.
The Nikkei provides another
example in which the actions of “Islamic fundamentalists/extremists” are not
represented in an entirely stereotypical way. This particular article refers to
the aforementioned kidnapping of thirteen Japanese at the hands of Kyrgyz “Islamic
militants” in August 1999. With the release of the last four hostages in
October that year, references to “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” dominated
the headlines of international news pages in each of the four newspapers. The
day after the hostages were released, Nikkei
Journalist Ishikawa Yohei wrote of a looming conflict between “militant Islamic
extremists” and “increasingly dictatorial governments” in Central Asia. [10]
Ishikawa stated that “anti-government Islamic armed forces have fled the
oppressive Uzbek Prime Minister Karimov” and that these forces are thought to
have received the support of an international terrorist organization. Ishikawa
went on to describe the situation in Central Asia at that time: “It is not just
that authoritarian politics have been slowing the progress of democratization,
but also a background of social problems, such as a huge divide between rich
and poor, mean that, as in this case, it is easy to make connections with
extremist Islamic fundamentalists with access to international terrorist
networks.” So, while the actions of the “Islamic extremists” are not defended
here, the author does suggest that the political climate in Central Asia is
exacerbating the situation. The implication is that while the actions of these
kidnappers cannot be condoned, the kidnapping was in some way understandable in
the context of political oppression. Thus, the motivations of these particular
“Islamic fundamentalists/extremists” are not solely attributed to their
religious beliefs, but are represented within a wider political context.
The above examples suggest that in some articles from the pre-9/11
period there existed tendency to use “Islamic extremism” or “Islamic
fundamentalism” to sum up the causes of a conflict or the motivations of various
groups, allowing journalists to leave possible political or social factors of a
story unexplored. In these instances, therefore, the representation of Islam
functioned as a stereotype in that it was simplified and lacked depth. At the
same time, during this period “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” did not always
constitute an explanation for violence. Furthermore, it is important to note
that the above themes of “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamic extremism” were
not the only representations of Islam the Japanese mainstream press before
September 11. Neutral articles that mentioned Islam simply because they
referred to a Muslim population, or a more positive cultural context, were also
published at this stage.[11]
Furthermore, there were numerous headlines and articles that discussed the
Taliban, Hamas and other groups such as these without mentioning Islam, using only the terms “fundamentalist” or
“extremist” in their descriptions. The following graph, based on an analysis of
headlines in August 2001, separates the representation of Islam into four main
categories: violence, politics, religion and culture:
The dominant category – violence – refers to articles that discussed
Islam in terms of “Islamic fundamentalism,” “Islamic extremism” or other
conflicts involving Muslims. These “other conflicts” constitute another
category within the representation of Islam in pre-9/11 coverage: the
representation of what the Japanese press often labeled “religious conflict” (shûkyô shôtotsu, 宗教衝突) between
Islam and Christianity. Islam was not, therefore, the only religion subject to
a negative representation in pre-9/11 newspaper coverage. In articles such as
these, Islam and Christianity were
usually represented as being both the instigators and victims of violence.
The above analysis has shown that pre-9/11
coverage of Islam in the Japanese mainstream press was primarily characterized
by references to violence, but that within this representation a certain degree
of complexity was evident. Where Islam was represented in terms of
fundamentalism and extremism, there were instances when these terms functioned
as stereotypes, and other cases where “Islamic extremists” and “Islamic
fundamentalists” were represented in a more detailed way. The existence of more
neutral and positive articles that mentioned Islam also suggests that at this
stage it was not completely synonymous with its primarily negative
representation. The question to be considered now is: Did this situation change
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and if so, how did it
change?
Islam in the Japanese Mainstream Press 9/11 to
2004
This section examines the “two-fold effect” of the September 11 attacks
on the representation of Islam in the Japanese mainstream press. The term
two-fold has been chosen because in some instances the increased discussion of
Islam after September 11 challenged the stereotypical representations outlined
above. At the same time, however, numerous examples from each of the four
newspapers point to a reinforcement of this stereotypical representation. To
illustrate this development, this section will analyze the way Islam was
represented in the Japanese press immediately after the September 11 attacks,
later during the coverage of the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently
when the “war on terror” moved into Iraq.
September
12: The Japanese Mainstream Press Responds to the Attacks
As soon as word of the September 11 terrorist attacks reached Japan, its
airways were flooded with radio interviews and, as in many other countries,
Japanese television replayed the destruction of the twin towers on a seemingly
endless loop. The reaction of the Japanese press appeared to show, for the most
part, a desire to echo Prime Minister Koizumi’s sentiment of “sharing in
America’s anger.”[12] Even the
generally anti-US Asahi reacted with
outrage, stating “This is a challenge to the world,
no, a challenge to everything modern civilization has accomplished.”[13]
The Yomiuri called the attacks
“an absolutely unforgivable act.”[14]
The Mainichi
asserted that “we absolutely will not forgive this terrorism”[15]
and the Nikkei added “… this
sort of indiscriminate terrorism will not achieve anything. All we can say is
that it is difficult to forgive.”[16]
Immediately, the Japan-US alliance – which had already
been debated in the press that month due to the fiftieth anniversary of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8 – took
on a new significance. If the attacks
were “unforgivable,” was Japan bound to support America, and if so, in what
way? The Yomiuri’s editorial took a
predictably pro-US stance, declaring “It is important that the whole
world, including Japan, relentlessly tracks down those responsible.”[17] The Asahi’s
September 12 editorial continued in its uncharacteristically pro-US tone,
emphasizing “Japan must cooperate as major countries have done and play a
positive role in responding to this situation.”[18]
By contrast, the Mainichi
and Nikkei’s sympathy for the US was
qualified. While calling the attacks “unforgivable,” the Mainichi’s editorial also warned “the fight against terrorism does
not equal a ‘clash of civilizations.’ Thinking of it as ‘Islam versus the West’
is mistaken.”[19] The Nikkei’s September 12 editorial expressed shock at America’s vulnerability,
asking why the FBI and CIA had not known about the attacks, and how the
hijackers had been allowed to board the planes in the first place. By September
13, however, the Nikkei’s perspective
seemed to fall in line with that of the Asahi
and Yomiuri. “The fight against
terrorism is not someone else’s problem,” its editorial stated this time. “This
is the test of the true value of the Japan-US alliance.” [20]
Islam and the Reasons for the Attacks
As is common in the coverage of any disaster, in responding to the
attacks the media tried to provide a reason that could somehow “make sense” of
what had happened. Australia’s Sydney
Morning Herald newspaper, for example, cited a warning issued by Osama bin
Laden three weeks prior to September 11, which stated he and his followers
would carry out “an unprecedented attack on US interests for its support of
Israel.”[21]
The New York Times was less
forthcoming with concrete reasons for what its editor called “an unfathomable
attack,” but explained what had happened in terms similar to those of US
President George W. Bush, lamenting that “we suffer from an act of war without
any enemy nation with which to do battle.”[22]
So, while grappling with the issue of the Japan-US alliance, the Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi and Nikkei also offered a number of explanations
for the attacks, and it was in this area of the immediate post-9/11 coverage
that the nature of their representation of Islam was most apparent.
One important aspect of this coverage was the initial speculation in
some newspapers that Palestinian groups had been involved in the attacks. The Yomiuri, for instance, speculated on
September 13 that “Islamic fundamentalist organizations Hamas and Islamic
Jihad” were responsible.[23]
The author explained this suspicion by saying “Anti-American sentiment has been
growing amongst Palestinians due to America’s protection of Israel.” Continuing
this theme, the Mainichi’s September
13 edition published a story entitled “America’s Pain
is Joy.”[24]
The accompanying photograph pictured a Palestinian woman rejoicing at news of
the attacks (see figure 1):
|
Figure 1: “America’s pain is joy”
– Mainichi Shimbun, September 12,
2001. |
This type of article is significant for a number of
reasons. While some writers contend that images of Palestinians celebrating at
the news of the attacks damaged the Palestinian cause,[25]
for our purposes the fact they refer to Palestinian sentiment at all is in
itself noteworthy. In pre-9/11 newspaper coverage, references to “anti-American
sentiment” amongst Palestinians were almost non-existent, articles about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict being usually characterized by a dreary procession
of death tolls resulting from “suicide terrorism” (自爆テロ, jibaku tero) or “retaliatory attacks” (報復攻撃, hôfuku
kôgeki). With articles
such as the one above, however, the political grievances of the Palestinian
population were at least being
highlighted.
But an examination of the actual text of this article suggests its
emphasis was not on the Palestinian cause as such. The article begins: “In the Islamic world, there are many people who, at the
same time as harshly criticizing this terrorism, are shouting for joy.” The
author then quotes Osama bin Laden as saying “As long as America continues its
policy of treating Muslims as the enemy in Palestine and Kashmir, there will be
no peace in America.” So, while the reasons for the Palestinian
resentment of the US are being highlighted, these reasons are being represented
in primarily religious rather than political terms.
Of course, this may not have been the aim of the article at all. It could
perhaps be that for the “anti-US” Mainichi,
emphasizing the elation of the Palestinians was deemed appropriate, or was even
meant to shock readers in its illustration of an overt and inappropriate
religious reaction. Whatever the author’s intention, the interpretation the
article favors, what Stuart Hall terms its “preferred meaning,” is clearly one
that underscores the religious aspect of the Palestinian reaction and the
reaction of others in the “Islamic world.”
The Asahi –
a previously anti-US newspaper now apparently turned US supporter –addressed the Palestinian reaction with an
article similar to the Mainichi’s,
entitled “Voices of joy from Palestinian independent areas”[26]
(see figure 2):
|
Figure 2: “Voices of joy from Palestinian
independent areas” – Asahi Shimbun, September 12, 2001. |
At the same time as publishing articles such as these, however, the Asahi also emphasized the lack of
Palestinian involvement in the attacks. Another article entitled “DFLP deny involvement,” quoted
Yasser Arafat as saying “this is a terrible act,” and stated the attacks were
orchestrated by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden’s reasons reportedly included “the
stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, the hostile US policy towards Iraq’s
Muslim population and the support of the Jewish state (Israel) that violates
the Palestinian people and the Holy Land.”[27] The article went on to state that bin Laden had
established an “International Islamic holy war on Jews and the crusaders.” This article again detailed the political
reasons for the attacks while also placing them within a religious context. The
Asahi’s front-page report on the
attacks on September 12 did not offer any political context for the attacks,
but simply quoted the editor of an Arab newspaper as saying “This is without a
doubt the work of Islamic fundamentalists.”[28]
In both these examples, therefore, the “Islamic” aspect of the attack functions
as a condensed explanation.
The above examples hint at the aforementioned two-fold effect of the
September 11 attacks on the representation of Islam in the Japanese mainstream
press. In asking why America had been attacked, the press were compelled to
detail the grievances of Palestinians, Osama bin Laden and the “Arab-Islamic
world.” At the same time, these details were often represented in religious
terms, particularly in discussions of bin Laden’s “Islamic
fundamentalist/extremist” ideology. The following article from the Yomiuri, “’Holy war’ leader bin Laden
‘most dangerous terrorist,’” also accentuates bin Laden’s religious
motivations:
Saudi Arabian Islamic
fundamentalist leader Osama bin Laden, wanted in America as the “number one
terrorist” and leading a “jihad (holy
war) on America,” has surfaced as the ringleader of the simultaneous terrorist
attacks that took place in America on the 11th. Apart from the fact
that there is no other person with the necessary manpower and wealth at their
disposal to carry out this unprecedented simultaneous terrorism on America
besides bin Laden, who possesses an international terrorist network, there has
recently been information that bin Laden was planning large-scale terrorism
against America…. The basis of bin Laden’s extremist ideology includes the idea
that the present state of the world is “A crusade on the Islamic world by the
Christian and Jewish civilizations, coming primarily from America” and
maintains that the expulsion of America from the Islamic world and attacks on
Arab administrations that collude with America are “a Muslim’s duty.”[29]
This two-fold representation of Islam was also evident
in the Mainichi. On its September 12
front page bin Laden’s motivation was summed up by describing him as the
“Islamic extremist and so-called ‘mastermind’ of international terrorism”
behind the attacks.[30]
By contrast, another article argued that “Doubts about America have grown as a result of
its taking a consistently harsh stance towards Palestine, and its
self-appointment in the Arab-Islamic world Middle East peace as an ‘impartial
go-between.’”[31] In these
examples, the Mainichi by turns
represented Islam in a stereotypical way and offered a clear explanation of
what it saw to be the politics behind the attacks.
In discussing who might have been behind the attacks, the Nikkei first considered the possibility
that “Middle Eastern groups” that were “critical of America” might be
responsible, before concluding that the only person with the monetary and organizational
power to carry out the attack was bin Laden.[32]
In describing him, the Nikkei first
mentioned bin Laden’s status as an “Islamic fundamentalist,” his wealth and
ties to international terrorism before commenting on the political motivations
for his actions.[33] The Nikkei summarized these motivations by
quoting bin Laden as saying “America and Israel must be banished from the
Arab-Islamic holy lands.” Here again, as with the Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi, the “Islamic” aspect of bin
Laden’s motivations and character was accentuated in his description.
From September 12 to 30, the combined total of
articles that mentioned Islam across all four newspapers climbed dramatically
from 122 for the same period in August, to 1,370. As the above examples
indicate, some of these articles
seemed to be genuine attempts to comprehend the perceived anger within “the
Islamic world” directed towards “the West” that was seen to be behind the
attacks. At the same time, this increased discussion of Islam did not always
result in a challenge to the stereotypes of “Islamic fundamentalism” and
“Islamic extremism.” Coverage of the immediate aftermath of September 11
therefore represents the two-fold effect of the attacks on the representation
of Islam in the Japanese mainstream press.
“War on Terror” in Afghanistan
President George W. Bush declared America’s “war on terror” on September
12, 2001, and US forces entered Afghanistan twenty-five days later. By October
29, the Japanese Diet had passed the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,”
effectively allowing for the deployment of Japan’s jieitai (自衛隊, Self-Defence Forces) to the Indian Ocean to aid US troops.[34]
The war in Afghanistan provided the next platform for the representation of
Islam in the Japanese mainstream press. As will become clear, not all of the
four newspapers were supportive of the Bush administration’s decision to go
into Afghanistan, or the jieitai’s deployment.
How, then, did this contentious issue influence the representation of Islam in
the Japanese mainstream press?
The Mainichi called the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law “quickly knocked-up.” [35]
“A policy that crushes terrorism is not enough,” its editorial stated. “It is
necessary to have diplomatic efforts that address the relief of the gap between
rich and poor as well as the political and religious tensions that breed
terrorism.” In the context of this critical stance towards the invasion of
Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the Mainichi
was still willing to publish articles that offered an alternative view of
“Islamic fundamentalism.” In late October 2001, the Mainichi invited a Muslim sheik to discuss the difference between
Islam and “Islamic fundamentalism.” The subheading sums up the sheik’s words:
“I can’t forgive the terrorist attack on America but I sympathize with the
‘opposition to a world focused on America.’”[36]
This article is significant not just in terms of its timing, but in that it
provides an insight into the political grievances of the Islamic world from a
Muslim’s own perspective, a rarity in both pre- and post-9/11 coverage in each
of the four newspapers.
In the Asahi’s
case, while its traditionally anti-US stance seemed to have shifted in the wake
of September 11, by the time American troops were deployed to Afghanistan it
seemed to have reverted to its original point of view. The Asahi’s coverage of the US invasion often focused on the Afghan
people themselves. An article from early October 2001, entitled “Fear of
getting involved in America’s attacks” [37]
included a photograph of a young soldier standing guard, awaiting the
inevitable advance of the American troops (see figure 3):
|
Figure 3: “Fear of getting caught
in America’s attacks” – Asahi Shimbun,
October 3, 2001. |
As the US
advance into Afghanistan continued, the Asahi
wrote “America has strengthened the bombing that will lead to the fall of the
city of Mazar-e-Sharif, disregarding Pakistan’s advice. The resumption of
bombings during Ramadan was hastily decided in opposition to voices from the
Muslim side.”[38] The accompanying photograph shows
the exterior of a mosque in the city centre surrounded by worshippers (see
figure 4):
|
|
The text underneath this photograph reads: “After the Taliban took control
of the capital Kabul in 1996, Kabul’s residents, who are opposed to
fundamentalism, especially musicians and artists, fled to this city.” The Asahi’s choice of words in this case is
particularly interesting in that it represents the population as innocent and
helpless against the US invasion.
In contrast to the Mainichi and Asahi, the Nikkei was supportive of the jieitai’s
deployment, one editorial stating: “If we do not deploy the jieitai...we will be seen to be looking
at the situation as if it were someone else’s problem.”[39]
Instead of focusing on the damage done by the invasion, the Nikkei reported in late October 2001
that “The Afghan attack is going well.”[40]
This
particular article included a
photograph of a young boy riding through the streets next to a demolished
building said to belong to the Taliban – a stark contrast to the Asahi’s photograph of the young soldier
waiting for the US troops to arrive (see figure 5):
|
|
Figure 5: “Afghan attack is going well” – Nikkei Shimbun, October 31, 2001.
The Yomiuri expressed
disappointment at the hesitation of Japan’s opposition parties in backing the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. One editorial stated: “It was expected
that most of the political parties would take a supportive stance for Japan to
firmly participate in the united international front against terrorism and to
show an attitude of confronting terrorism.”[41]
In line with this support for the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the Yomiuri’s coverage of the Afghan
invasion focused on the ongoing oppression of the Afghan people rather than any
damage military action would cause. The Yomiuri’s
Afghan correspondent wrote: “What I notice when walking through the towns of
Afghanistan is that female figures are extremely rare. In line with the teachings
of Islam, women are clearly acting so as not to attract a man’s glance.”[42]
The above examples suggest that
during October 2001 there was a growing divide between the Asahi and Mainichi, and
the Yomiuri and Nikkei, as each newspaper situated itself as either supportive or
critical of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the jieitai’s deployment. The Yomiuri and Nikkei’s coverage tended to represent Islam in a negative way,
emphasizing the connection between Islam and oppression or acts of violence. In
the Asahi and Mainichi, Islam was more positively represented as the political
aspects of the invasion and its effect on the Afghan population were
accentuated.
Japan enters Iraq
As the American “war on terror” shifted focus from
Afghanistan to Iraq, so did the lens through which the Japanese press viewed
Islam. It was during the war in Iraq that the Japanese military became involved in the “war on terror” in a more
concrete and controversial way than ever before. The
introduction of the Iraq Special Measures Law on 26 July 2003 permitted the deployment of the jieitai to Iraq in a peacekeeping capacity – the first deployment
of Japanese troops without a UN mandate since World War II.[43]
The move sharply divided public opinion, but in mid-January 2004, six hundred jieitai troops were dispatched to the
southern Iraqi city of Samawah, as political and public support for the Iraq
war dwindled around the world.
Unsurprisingly, the Yomiuri did not question the deployment. “Don’t turn support of
Iraq into a tool for political controversy”[44]
read the headline of one editorial. Nevertheless, the Yomiuri’s writers were not oblivious to the challenges the jieitai would have to face in Samawah.
Alongside this editorial, an article entitled “Pay attention to etiquette/women can’t look up,” read: “In
Samawah in Iraq’s south, where the jieitai
will be deployed, the majority of people are Shi’a Muslims and society is
deeply rooted in the traditional ‘clan system.’ Samawah has a particularly
conservative local flavor even by Iraqi standards.” The author warned that
while Iraqi people have a mostly positive attitude towards the Japanese, the jieitai should remain aware of cultural
differences. “In daily life, it is essential to avoid behavior that is seen to
be rude according to Islamic customs,”[45]
the article stated. It went on to explain that women are not allowed to leave
the house without an escort, talk in a “corrupt” way or meet another person’s
gaze while outside the house. It could be said that this article tacitly
legitimised the jieitai’s presence in
Samawah, representing it as a place in need of a more progressive influence.
Whatever the author’s intended meaning, Islam, at least Shi’a Islam in Samawah,
is represented here as oppressive and potentially volatile.
The Nikkei’s editor called the
implementation of the Iraq Special Measures Law “a serious decision that will
set up a system in which Japan is engaged with the war on terror” and a small
step, at least, towards creating a Japan with a powerful international image.[46]
Here again, Iraqi society was represented as needing Japanese support, with an
article entitled “Cracks widen amongst people, religion, surrounding direct
elections and Iraqi society.”[47]
This article examined the differing views of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims as the
prospect of an Iraqi election loomed. The Shi’a were said to be calling for
direct elections and “a constitution made by Iraqis, not foreigners.” The Sunni
religious leaders were quoted as saying “If the Shi’as seize power, [Iraq] will
become a religious state like Iran.” In this example, therefore, the complicity
of religion in every aspect of Iraqi society was also emphasized, while the
discussion of the differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims added a degree of
nuance to the way Islam was being represented.
The Asahi called the Iraq war
“too impatient” and the America that called for it okashii (おかしい, strange).[48] One editorial replied to Koizumi’s apparent
determination that the jieitai would
become an army by asking: “Is there really that much honor in becoming an army? Is there no honor
in being a Self-Defence Force?” But even if the Asahi was reluctant to support the war or the jieitai’s deployment, it could not overlook the sentiment of some
Iraqis who desired a swift overthrow of the Hussein administration. One article
pointed out: “There is concern in the American government that a Shi’a-run,
strictly Islamic political administration will be established.” [49]
The author then quoted one Iraqi as saying “It is an insult to look at the
Shi’a sect as extremists. The important thing is not to repeat the dictatorship
a second time. For that to happen, we had better have a government that is
elected by the people.” Here again, the influence of religion on Iraqi society
was emphasized, particularly in the choice of photograph for the article, which pictured Iraqis praying for their desired
election result (see figure 6):
|
Figure 6: “Continued straying from democracy”
– Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 2004. |
The Mainichi did not support the jieitai’s
involvement in Iraq, maintaining: “there are doubts about the moral cause of
the war.”[50] Like the Asahi, however, in covering the war in
Iraq the Mainichi still published
stories that highlighted negative aspects of “Islamic custom.” An article entitled
“‘Killing of immoral women’ custom remains in Iraq” told the story of a number
of Iraqi women who, after being unfaithful to their husbands, had fled to
shelters to avoid an “honor killing” at the hands of their own family.[51]
The article ended with a quote from one of the women who said “I don’t think
the day when I can return to my family will ever come.” A negative
representation of Islam is inescapable in this story, even if the author’s aim
was to emphasize the fact that even though the US military have overthrown the
Hussein regime, the situation these women will have to endure is unlikely to
change in the near future.
In the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, the increased representation of Islam in the Japanese
mainstream press had two related consequences. The increased discussion of
Islam created a more detailed picture of what the terms “Islamic
fundamentalism” and “Islamic extremism” actually signify than was evident in
pre-9/11 coverage. At the same time, simplified representations of Islam that
were used to explain acts of violence also gained strength. The graph below
shows that in mid-2002 the number of articles that mentioned Islam had
increased, and that Islam was still overwhelmingly represented in terms of
violence.
The above examples also
suggest that each newspaper’s position on either side of Bush’s “with us or
against us” divide subsequently influenced the way Islam was represented in
their coverage. Editorial stances on issues such as the deployment of the jieitai were reflected in the differing
representations of Islam across the four newspapers. Therefore, the
representation of Islam in the Japanese mainstream press evolved from one that
was characterized by an “Islamic fundamentalism/extremism” stereotype to an
increased discussion of Islam that both questioned and reinforced this
stereotype. More recent articles suggest an augmenting of this stereotypical
representation through the introduction of the Sunni/Shi’a divide in coverage
of the war in Iraq.