

## **Victim of Colonialism or Model of Colonial Rule? Changing Japanese Perceptions of Egypt, ca. 1860–1930**

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The Japanese displayed an extraordinary interest in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but their perception of Egypt changed radically during that period. From the 1860s to the 1890s, many Japanese thought Egypt's situation was similar to Japan's. When Egypt's growing debt led to increasing intervention by European powers, Japanese officials regarded Egypt's eventual loss of sovereignty as a cautionary tale and minimized Japan's dependence on European loans. But after Japan's 1895 victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese officials used European colonial administration as a model and justification for their own colonial rule in Korea and Taiwan. When Japan's alliance with Britain destabilized after World War I, the Japanese contrasted their enlightened colonial policies with those of Britain, with Egypt then perceived as an example of British misrule. The ways Japan viewed Egypt between the 1860s and 1930s were strongly influenced by Japan's changing relationship with Britain and its evolving status in the world community.

### **Accommodation or Confrontation**

Since the mid-nineteenth century, when Western powers pressured Japan to sign a series of “unequal treaties,” Japanese leaders have often differed over how much to accommodate and how much to resist or confront the world's leading powers. The young leaders who took power during the Meiji Restoration (1868), many from the regions of Satsuma and Chōshū in southern Japan, were often called the Sat-Chō *hanbatsu* 藩閥 (clique or coalition). They generally employed a cautious, pragmatic, accommodating approach in dealing with the great powers (Totman 1998, 22–26), since they believed it was necessary for Japan to become strong and wealthy in order to regain its national sovereignty and join the ranks of the great powers. In contrast,

many opponents of the Sat-Chō clique were hardliners who called for greater resistance to or confrontation with the great powers.

In the past, these contrasting tendencies during the Meiji 明治 era (1868–1912) have been labeled “Herodian” versus “Zealot” (Toynbee 1953) and “realist” versus “idealist” (Conroy 1960). The contrast has also been expressed in terms of Meiji leaders who advocated a policy in accordance with “the laws of the world” and their opponents who called for “a more ideal international order” (Iriye 1989, 735). Conforming to *taisei junnō* 大勢順応 (world trends) is a Japanese concept that has been used to explain a policy of “international accommodationism” (Burkman 1998). Such labels emphasize distinctions that existed at either end of a spectrum—with accommodation on one end and confrontation on the other; but the degree of accommodation or resistance was always a matter of debate, even within the highest councils of government. *Accommodation* is used here as a label for the general policy that prevailed in Japan from the 1860s to the 1920s, before hard-line militarists came to the fore during the 1930s.

### The Issue of Mixed Courts & Treaty Revision

Between Commodore Matthew Perry’s (1794–1858) visit to Edo (Tokyo) in 1854 and Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, many Japanese perceived their country’s situation to be extremely precarious. Japan’s position vis-à-vis the West was seen by many Japanese as similar to that of other “Eastern” countries, particularly Egypt. Egypt’s program of rapid Westernization (1863–79) under Khedive Ismail Pasha (1830–95) overlapped with the first decade of the Meiji program of modernization (1868–78). The nature of Egypt’s system of mixed courts, the reasons for its financial crisis, and the British occupation of Egypt were all of special interest to Japanese leaders of various persuasions in the decades after the Restoration (Bradshaw 1992, 2001, 2004).

Japanese and foreign observers frequently drew comparisons between Egypt and Japan during the early Meiji era. The British editor of the *Japan Weekly Mail* (*JWM*) wrote in 1876, “no one who has watched the recent history of Japan can fail to see that it presents many points of resemblance to that of Egypt” (*JWM*, May 27, 1876: 463). Egypt’s leaders were the “first in the East” to engage in an all-out effort to bring about rapid Westernization by decree, an effort in which the ruling clique of Japan was actively engaged as well. For several decades, however, the goal of achieving the revision of Japan’s “unequal treaties” was a high priority. These treaties, which allowed foreigners resident in Japan, when charged with breaking the law, to be tried by their own consular courts instead of Japanese courts, were regarded by most Japanese as unacceptable infringements on the sovereignty of their nation. Egypt was also bound by similar treaties; but in 1869 the Egyptian

Minister Nubar Pasha (1825–99) called for the abolition of “capitulations” at an international conference in Cairo and proposed the establishment of “mixed courts” for Egypt in place of consular courts (Brinton 1950; Wilner 1975). Nubar Pasha’s proposal attracted the attention of Japan’s ruling elite.

Léon Roches (1809–1901), French ambassador to Japan, may have provided the Japanese government with information about Egypt’s proposals; and a Japanese official in Istanbul may have received documents relating to Egypt’s legal system from Nubar Pasha himself in 1871, the same year that Japan established a Ministry of Justice and convened a conference to consider the compilation of a new Japanese civil code. To facilitate the process of revision, the government sent a mission headed by Prince Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視 (1825–83) to visit the leading treaty powers in 1871. Iwakura was a member of the faction at the Emperor’s court that actively participated in the anti-Tokugawa coup, which brought accommodationists such as Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 (1841–1909) and Inoue Kaoru 井上馨 (1839–1915) to power. After Japan’s major treaty powers refused to consider revision of the unequal treaties in 1872, the need to study the nature of relations between European powers and states such as Egypt became more urgent (Auslin 2006, 173; Medzini 1971; Nakaoka 1988; Perez 1986, 70; Sims 1969, 67–114).

A young member of the Iwakura mission to the West, Fukuchi Gen’ichirō 福地源一郎 (1841–1906), left the main group in 1873 and went to Egypt in order to conduct a special study of its legal system. Fukuchi then submitted a report to Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi 副島種臣 (1828–1905) in which he advocated the adoption of a mixed-court system on the Egyptian model in order to help gain credibility in the eyes of Japan’s treaty powers and thus support revision of its unequal treaties (Altman 1965, 134; Fukuchi 1873; Furukawa 1988, 50; Huffman 1980, 71; Inō 1966, 117–19; Nakaoka 1988). Another translated study on the judiciary rights of consular officers in Turkey and Egypt was submitted in 1873. Over the next few years, numerous documents relating to Egypt’s courts were collected and reports on them submitted to the government. Early in 1875 Mitsukuri Rinshō 箕作麟祥 (1846–97), a young Justice Ministry official who had just completed translating the French Napoleonic Code, began to collect information to write a report on Egypt’s legal system. Mitsukuri served as deputy minister of justice during the treaty revision crisis of 1889 (discussed below). He drafted a preliminary report and then, in 1878, submitted an official report on Egypt’s legal system for publication (Nakaoka 1988; Mitsukuri 1878). Even Minister of Public Works Itō Hirobumi (later Japan’s first prime minister) commissioned a foreign employee, John Davidson, to write a report in 1877 on Egypt’s system of mixed courts (Nakaoka 1979, 1988).

Heated discussions regarding treaty revision also took place in the emerging Japanese press. In 1873 Tokyo’s first daily newspaper, the *Tōkyō*

*Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞 (Tokyo daily news, hereafter *TNN*) made its appearance; Fukuchi Gen'ichirō resigned from government service in 1874 and became its editor in chief.<sup>1</sup> Opinions voiced by Fukuchi in this paper tended to support the ruling clique's position on treaty revision and reached a wide reading public (Altman 1965, 123, 137; Bradshaw 1992; Kawabe 1921; Wildes 1927). Fukuchi's interest in Egypt was evident in many articles he wrote for the *TNN* over the next decade. In 1876, following the establishment of the mixed tribunals in Egypt, Fukuchi advocated the adoption of a similar system for Japan. Between 1876 and 1880, there were on average fourteen editorials a year in the *TNN* (over seventy in all) that focused on the ways to rid Japan of extraterritoriality (Huffman 1980, 122; *TNN* October 27, 1874; February 5–7, 1876).

In 1880 the Japanese government promulgated a new penal code. Inoue Kaoru, now foreign minister, initiated a new effort to bring about treaty revision, but he asked for consular jurisdiction to be completely abolished in most cases, which the foreign powers promptly refused to consider. Thus, when Inoue presided over a diplomatic conference on treaty revision in 1882, he was careful to propose a system of mixed courts during a transition period of five years, after which extraterritorial rights would be abandoned. This attempt still proved unsuccessful, and the conference broke up after six months (Idditti 1940, 246; Inoue Kaoru 1968; Jones 1931, 98–99).

By this time, opposition to Sat-Chō domination of political power and growing support for a constitutional form of government had resulted in the proliferation of new political parties in Japan. The treaty-revision issue became a major weapon with which ambitious party politicians could attack the government. One such politician, Ono Azusa 小野梓 (1852–86), a leader of the *Rikken Kaishin Tō* 立憲改進黨 (Constitutional Progressive Party), wrote an essay on treaty revision in 1884 that expressed many of the common criticisms Meiji intellectuals had of the government's program for treaty revision. Ono had stopped over in Egypt on a return voyage from Europe in 1874, and Alexandria, Cairo, and Port Said “furnished important examples of political ineptitude leading to loss of independence for his later writings” (Davis 1980, 31). Ono worked as an official in the Ministry of Justice (1876–81) and was close to Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1838–1922), an intermittent member of the Meiji oligarchy who developed close links to Mitsubishi shipping interests (Lebra-Chapman 1973; Ozaki 2001, 69). Ōkuma and Ono advocated a swifter move toward constitutional government. Because Ōkuma's growing power posed a threat to key members of the Chōshū faction, Ōkuma was forced out of the government in 1881, and so Ono resigned from the government as well (Davis 1970). In 1884 Ono wrote *Jōyaku kaisei ron* 条約改正論 (Discussion on treaty revision) in which he argued that mixed courts would increase extraterritorial privileges as they had in Egypt, a country which he considered a “colony of both Eng-

land and France” (Davis 1984, 157). Ono argued that Western judges in the mixed-court system there were not appointed by the government but by a diplomatic conference, which meant that the Egyptian monarch had no power to dismiss them. They were thus different from hired foreign advisers the government could dismiss at will. Ono was clearly convinced of the relevance of Egypt’s example for Japan.

As for Fukuchi, even after Egypt was occupied by Britain, he still argued that the positions of both Japan and Egypt with regard to the powers were in certain respects the same, and that British policy vis-à-vis occupied Egypt was therefore relevant for Japan. When Britain decided to allow the taxation of foreigners, Fukuchi was quick to point out the inconsistency in British policy. In March 1883 he published British Foreign Minister Lord Granville’s (1815–91) circular on the taxation of foreigners in Egypt in the *TNN* and commented as follows:

We shared the apprehension of enlightened men that any attempt on our part to remedy it would give rise to an international question. Unexpectedly, however, there comes to us this wonderful circular concerning the situation in Egypt . . . the European Powers are in the same position in Egypt as in our country, the extraterritoriality system being in full force. . . . To remedy this it is proposed to subject the foreigners to the same taxation as the natives. (*JWM* March 31, 1883: 210)

Fukuchi then urged the Japanese government to make representations to Lord Granville at once in order to take advantage of the circular that he had issued. If England refused, he argued, then she would “expose herself to the risk of incurring the condemnation of all the countries of the world,” because the Liberalism her government professed would be exposed as a sham (*JWM* March 31, 1883: 210). This had little effect on the British government, however, and Fukuchi’s efforts, at least in the short-run, failed to achieve their aim.

Opposition to the acceptance of Egyptian-style mixed courts became more widespread in Japan after the British occupied Egypt in 1882. By 1886, when representatives of the treaty powers sat down again to discuss treaty revision with Inoue, opponents of mixed courts included party politicians and individuals in the government close to Ōkuma Shigenobu, who in 1882 founded the Constitutional Progressive Party. This party tended to represent the urban capitalist classes and to espouse an English utilitarian ideology (Ōtsu 1927, 2: 520).

The British and Germans nevertheless proposed that a system of mixed courts similar to those in Egypt be instituted in Japan as part of a wide-ranging reform of the legal system. In order to overcome continuing opposition of the foreign powers to treaty revision, Inoue proposed a plan in 1887 that agreed to a majority of foreign judges for all cases, civil or crimi-

nal, in which one party was a foreigner (Hattori 1963, 116; Inoue Kiyoshi 1955, 147–48; Jones 1931, 109; Pyle 1969, 109).

The liberal newspaper *Jiji Shimpō* 時事新報 (Current events), founded in 1882 by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901), got word of Inoue's plan and strongly opposed it, insisting that Japan's sovereignty never be compromised for the sake of treaty revision. Inoue's efforts met with strong and determined opposition. Prime Minister Itō informed the powers that negotiations would be suspended, and Inoue resigned in September 1887 after having led the negotiations for treaty revisions for eight years. Itō took over the post of foreign minister temporarily and then persuaded Ōkuma to take the job (Brown 1955, 112; Hiratsuka 1929, 1: 31–32; Hirota 1930, 245–46; *Jiji Shimpō* June 24, 1887: 2; August 4, 1887: 1; Takeuchi 1935, 92–93).

Ōkuma resumed similar treaty negotiations with the great powers but adopted different tactics and altered Inoue's plan to Japan's advantage; but, in the end, he agreed to a transitory system of "mixed benches," or the inclusion of naturalized foreign judges in the supreme court (Lebra-Chapman 1973, 86). The British agreed that in return for the end of extraterritoriality after five years and tariff autonomy after twelve, the Japanese would allow foreign residence, travel, and trade in the interior of Japan.

A draft of the treaty was finally submitted to London in January 1889 (Pyle 1969, 109); but after the London press got wind of it, a translated copy appeared in a new newspaper, *Nihon* 日本 (Japan), which led to an outburst of opposition to the "Ōkuma Treaty." The *Nihon* represented an emerging group of influential journalists who advocated a middle path for Japan, a compromise between blind imitation of the West and the retention of what was best in Japanese tradition. Its editors championed a compromise between universalist and nationalist viewpoints. Ōkuma's plan was nevertheless supported by editors of the following papers: The *Yūbin Hōchi* 郵便報知, the *Yomiuri* 読売, the *Ōsaka Mainichi* 大阪毎日, the *Asano* 朝野, and the *Keizai Zasshi* 經濟雜誌 (Hishida 1905, 141; Inoue Kiyoshi 1955, 147–48; Jones 1931, 110).

The British-owned *Japan Weekly Mail*, an advocate of treaty revision and supporter of the gradualist approach of the ruling elite, attempted to defend the proposed treaty by pointing out the technical differences between Egyptian mixed courts and the system of mixed benches that had been proposed for Japan. In contrast to the Egyptian system, in which the judges were appointed by the powers themselves, the Japanese system would have naturalized foreign experts who would be appointed by and responsible to the Japanese government alone (Fox 1969; *JWM* April 20, 1889: 372).

But by the time of this article in 1889, arguments of this kind were no longer convincing. Factions within the ruling elite, leaders of the new political parties, and ultranationalist activists such as Tōyama Mitsuru 頭山滿 (1885–1944) all wanted full treaty revision and not half-way measures that

had apparently worked to the disadvantage of the Egyptians. In addition to Itō and Inoue, other Sat-Chō leaders, such as Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋 (1838–1922) from Chōshū, Terashima Munenori 寺島宗則 (1832–93) from Satsuma, Soejima Taneomi from Hizen, Gotō Shōjirō 後藤象二郎 (1838–97) from Tosa, and the conservative privy councilor Motoda Nagazane 元田永孚 (1818–91), were opposed to the Ōkuma plan. Mixed courts had been followed by Nubar Pasha's "mixed ministry," which was followed by revolt and British occupation. The *Nihon* argued that if the Japanese "tolerate interference, we shall be classed with Turkey and Egypt" (Kuga 1938, 561–62; *Nihon* August 22–September 5, 1889; Pyle 1969, 115).

Finally, in October 1889, a bomb was thrown into Ōkuma's carriage by a member of the patriotic society Genyōsha 玄洋社 (Dark ocean society), the most active group among ultranationalists who were strongly opposed to compromise with Western powers. This event brought negotiations regarding treaty revision to a sudden halt. The would-be assassin obtained his bomb with the assistance of Tōyama Mitsuru, spiritual head of the Genyōsha. Moreover, members of the ruling elite and Japan's new party leaders were against the domination of the Sat-Chō, so treaty-revision negotiations remained at a standstill (Fujimoto 1923; Norman 1944; Ogata 1940; Sugimori 1984).

### **The Demise of Egypt & the Question of Debt**

The Japanese were also preoccupied by the question of whether to borrow money from Western powers to finance Japan's rapid industrialization. Both the ruling clique and their political opponents took a particular interest in the nature of Egypt's debt crisis in the 1870s, and the negative example of Egypt's debt crisis was frequently used by those opposed to borrowing capital from the West.

Public debate on the relevance of Egypt's case for Japan was stimulated in 1876 by an editorial in the *Japan Weekly Mail*. After Prime Minister Disraeli (1804–81) purchased shares of the Suez Canal in 1875, the British government sent commissioner Steven Cave to Egypt to investigate the Khedive Ismail's finances. In April 1876, the *London Mail* published a copy of the commissioner's report, which the *Japan Weekly Mail* commented on, pointing out the many similarities between Egypt's and Japan's situations and concluding: "Egypt has fallen into serious trouble. . . . We trust Japan will have wisdom enough to profit by the lessons they teach, and thus avoid them" (*JWM* May 27, 1876: 463).

The Meiji oligarchs had arranged for two small loans in 1870 and 1873, but they were not united on whether to contract more loans. Inoue, acting as minister of finance, reported in 1873 that the national debt was an estimated ¥140 million (ca. US\$140 million), which greatly alarmed the public.

Ōkuma was called on to make a study of the situation and calmed the public by estimating the debt to be only a little over ¥31 million (ca. US\$31 million), of which only ¥5.5 million (ca. US\$5.5 million) had come from external sources. Inoue resigned to start his own trading company, and Ōkuma took charge of the Finance Department until 1880 (Idditti 1956, 146–47; Lockwood 1954, 253; Moulton and Ko 1931, 490–97; Porter 1915, 241; Roberts 1973, 92; Sugiyama 1988, 21).

Despite Ōkuma's best efforts, the cost of crushing the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 and other problems put further strain on the government purse. A financial crisis thus emerged in Japan at exactly the same time as Egypt's debt crisis. There was in fact so much talk of the similarity of Egypt's and Japan's positions that the governor of Hong Kong, when he visited Japan in 1879 and addressed the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, took pains to point out the differences between Japan and Egypt to calm the public. He stressed, for example, the way in which Japanese leaders lived modestly in comparison to Egyptian leaders (*JWM* June 21, 1879).

In late 1879 Ōkuma encouraged the establishment of the Yokohama Specie Bank to deal in hard currency and handle the transactions of foreign exchange, hoping that this would attract gold and silver reserves out of private hands within Japan; but the amount of available capital in 1880 was still so little that Ōkuma proposed that the government borrow ¥50 million (ca. US\$45 million) from foreign sources (Idditti 1956, 191–92). His proposal was supported by the Satsuma faction but strongly opposed by the Chōshū clique. A debate in the press ensued, with the example of Egypt serving as a warning to those who supported raising the loan. One newspaper argued that people “ignorant of the principles of political economy” feared raising a loan. Such people erroneously “quoted the examples of Turkey and Egypt,” claiming that the poverty of those countries was due to foreign loans (Smith 1955, 98; see *JWM* December 4, 1880). Former U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant, who was visiting Japan at this time, added his voice to the warnings against borrowing money (Keene 2001, 317).

Disagreement led to a deadlock that was settled by sending the matter to Emperor Meiji (1852–1912, r. 1868–1912) for arbitration. The throne decided against a foreign loan, which “nearly ruined [Ōkuma's] career” (Smith 1955, 98). In August 1880 Inoue submitted a suggestion on how to resolve the financial crisis, and in 1881 a Chōshū man took over as minister of finance.

Japan's ambassador to London at this time, Mori Arinori 森有礼 (1847–89), was also monitoring events in Egypt with great concern. From Satsuma, Mori studied in England and the United States before the Restoration and later served as Japan's first ambassador to the United States (1870–72). He passed through Egypt on his way to London to study in 1865. In 1884, his primary task while ambassador in London was to facilitate the revision of

the “unequal treaties” (Hall 1973). Mori pursued this goal so forcefully that his conduct was not always appreciated by his British colleagues. One reason for Mori’s almost frantic behavior “might be described as [his] haunting nightmare of Egypt—spiraling foreign debts, financial disarray, rebellion, massacre of Europeans, a foreign occupation, loss of independence—all of which transpired while Mori was accredited to the government which conducted that occupation. The Western governments seemed to have a different set of rules in dealing with non-European states, and Mori took great pains to set Japan apart from other Asiatic countries” (Hall 1973, 69).

However, by 1884 Japan’s financial situation had improved so much that the *Japan Weekly Mail* suggested that “Japan is rapidly recovering from her unworthy and wholly erroneous apprehension that the result of pecuniary obligations incurred abroad might resemble the mishaps of Turkey or Egypt” (*JWM* June 28, 1884: 608–9). Nevertheless, another decade would pass before the Japanese would contract a new foreign loan.

The British occupation of Egypt and the European competition for spheres of influence in Africa in general during this period drew London’s attention away from Japan’s demands for treaty revision. This situation was frustrating to Ambassador Mori and other Japanese visiting London, as they often found that their British hosts talked endlessly about African affairs but failed to take sufficient note of Japan’s problems. One Japanese writer complained that, “If, after a week of continental politics, South African controversies, the Egyptian question . . . and everything but . . . Japanese affairs—if after a week of your London life, you do not begin to be disturbed by a peculiar sensation of your own littleness, you are not a true lover of your race and country” (*Japan Times* April 28, 1897: 2).

British diplomats did not hesitate to point out the importance of African affairs to their Japanese colleagues. Sir Ernest Satow (1843–1929), British Minister to Japan from 1895 to 1900, explained to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō 青木周蔵 (1844–1914) in 1898 that the British could do little in East Asia until Fashoda had been “arranged for” (Lensen 1966, 93).<sup>2</sup>

After the Meiji Restoration, Mori had been an ardent supporter of rapid Westernization. While ambassador in London, however, partly due to his observation of the Egyptian crisis, Mori became more of a nationalist. After returning to Japan in 1885, he was made minister of education and became the architect of Japan’s patriotism-inspiring education system. His reforms nevertheless aroused the anger of conservatives, and Mori was assassinated in February 1889 (Hall 1973).

Japan’s fear of borrowing money from the West is often attributed to the example of Japan’s Asian neighbors falling dangerously into debt. Until 1897, it is said, the “Japanese were wary of financial imperialism, seeing it in operation among their Asiatic neighbors” (Lockwood 1954, 253); but “the Japanese were not only acutely conscious of what was happening in

China in terms of spiraling foreign indebtedness, but [were also] more than dimly aware of comparable developments in places such as Egypt and Turkey” (Lehman 1982, 174).

In 1897, the director of the Department of Finance’s Bureau of Computation, Baron Sakatani Yoshio 阪谷芳郎 (1863–1941), wrote that the most important reason for Japan’s reluctance to borrow capital was the fear of overdependence on foreign capital. He cited the examples of both Egypt and Turkey as having been particularly instructive (Lehman 1982, 174; Norman 1975, 222–23). The negative example of Egypt thus appears to have had a significant impact on Japanese policy.

### Pan-Orientalism in Japan & Egypt

Egypt’s occupation by Britain enlivened Japan’s critics of accommodationist policy, who began increasingly to call for unity with the “Orient” to overcome the “Occident.” In 1890 a popular Japanese political novelist, Shiba Shirō 柴四朗 (1853–1922, whose pen name was Tōkai Sanshi 東海散士), published a short history of modern Egypt that was highly critical of British imperialism. Shiba had studied at the Wharton School of Business in Philadelphia, where his most influential teacher, an Irish-American, held very anti-British views. He began working on *Kajin no kigū* 佳人の奇遇 (Encounters with beautiful women) soon after returning to Japan in 1884. Between 1885 and 1897, it was published serially in eight parts and became not only the most popular political novel of its day but perhaps the most popular of all Meiji novels (Feldman 1952, 73; Fujimura 1932, 523; Sakai 2000; Sansom 1968, 42, 414; Tōkai 1890; Yanagida 1966–67).

Shiba’s novel took the reader on a tour of revolutionary movements around the world and voiced particular sympathy for followers of Urabi Pasha, the Egyptian nationalist whose uprising had been crushed by the British. Shiba capitalized on the intense Japanese preoccupation with international affairs at the time, and his characters’ espoused noble pan-Asianist ideals. Japan, one character said, would “preside over a confederation of Asia,” would “restrain the rampancy of England and France,” and would “thwart the designs of Russia” (Beasley 1982, 153; Feldman 1952, 72; Sansom 1968, 412–14). Shiba’s *Kajin no kigū* and history of modern Egypt both manifested a widely felt sympathy in Japan for the “oppressed peoples” of the world in the period before treaty revision was finally achieved.

Another work that expressed sympathy for “oppressed” Egyptians was called *Conversations with Urabi Pasha*, published in 1892. Several Japanese notables made a point of visiting Urabi (1841–1911) in exile on Ceylon on their way to or from Europe (Itagaki 1984, 524; Nakayama 1934, 601). Urabi’s revolt coincided with the height of a popular rights movement in Japan, and many leaders of this movement felt sympathy for him. Egypt was

seen as a fellow “Oriental” nation whose contributions to world civilization predated those of Europe. Urabi’s reputation as a fierce nationalist who wanted to free the Egyptians of foreign control and rid the country of debt also appealed to many Japanese (Fujita 2005; Itagaki 1984; Nakayama 1934, 601d; Tayara 2004; Tresilian 2005).

The ideology articulated by Shiba, Toyama, and others in the 1890s and again increasingly in the 1930s is often labeled “pan-Asianism,” but “pan-Orientalism” is perhaps a more suitable appellation. Japanese who were highly critical of European colonialism were inclined to see the world divided into the “East” and the “West”; and their vision of the East corresponded to the area that Europeans regarded as the Orient. The *Japan Weekly Mail* noted that when “a party calling itself the Asiatic Society” was formed in Tokyo, its goal was to consolidate “the strength of the Orient” and that the “brotherhood included such names as Beloochistan, Turkestan, Afghanistan and Arabia” (*JWM* July 26, 1884: 91). The “Orient” stretched from North Africa and the Levant to Japan. There was a North–South split in the minds of many. As Japanese writer Nakamura Masanao 中村正直 (1832–91) explained in 1874: “northern peoples came to use the products from southern areas; southern countries imported the manufactures of the northerners” (Nakamura 1874, 134).

In 1890 pan-Asianist Miyazaki Yazō 宮崎弥蔵 (1867–96) proclaimed: “Let China once revive and base itself upon its true morality, then India will rise, Siam and Annam too will revive, and the Philippines and Egypt can be saved” (Miyazaki 1982, 47). These words had a powerful effect on Yazō’s younger brother Miyazaki Tōten 宮崎滔天 (1871–1922), a critic of the “Europe-first” policy of the Meiji oligarchs (Jansen 1984, 75), who later wrote, “when I heard this, I got up and danced for joy. My longstanding doubts suddenly melted away under the influence of this vision” (Miyazaki 1982, 47).

This vision of the Miyazaki brothers was to assist the rise of the Orient against the Occident. Although the roots of Japanese pan-Asianism are often traced to this period, it is rarely pointed out that the vision of Japanese confrontationists in the late nineteenth century was confined not only to Asia but also to all lands where European imperialism was in evidence, including, in particular, Egypt.

### **British Egypt as a Model Colony**

Japanese attitudes toward European colonialism in Africa began to change significantly by the turn of the twentieth century. By 1894 Japan had concluded agreements regarding treaty revision with Britain, and shortly thereafter the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) broke out. By terms of Japan’s victory in 1895, it attained equal status with Western countries as a treaty

power in China, received an indemnity equivalent to almost one-third of its total national revenue at that time, and acquired Taiwan as a colony (Beasley 1987, 39; Hou 1965, 23–24; Moulder 1976, 184; Young 1970, 27).

Japan's victory greatly enhanced its international stature, improved its financial situation, and brought it firmly into the league of European colonial powers. Many Japanese stopped looking at Egypt as a victim of colonialism and began to regard British rule in Egypt as worthy of study for various reasons. The Japanese wanted their own attempts at colonization to succeed, and they wanted to at least appear to be acting as civilizing colonialists. The sense of solidarity formerly felt by many Japanese for those under the burden of European colonial rule now gave way to a sense of community with European colonial powers (Bradshaw 1992, 1993, 1994). The administration of Lord Cromer (1841–1917), consul-general and *de facto* ruler of Egypt from 1883 to 1907, was of particular interest to the Japanese until the 1930s. The Japanese treated Cromer's Egypt as a model, but they were more interested promoting a positive image of their own colonial rule than in actually imitating British methods of rule (Kibata 1994, 57).

Two foreign legal advisers to the Meiji government were consulted with regard to how to implement Japan's rule in Taiwan. On April 22, 1895, the French advisor, Michel Joseph Revon (1867–1947), recommended that, following the example of France in Algeria, Taiwan be incorporated eventually—not immediately—as a prefecture of Japan. On April 30, however, British lawyer and advisor William Kirkwood (1850–1926) recommended that Taiwan be governed by a governor-general and legislative council responsible directly to the emperor, and thus not be directly subject to laws of the Meiji Constitution. On June 17, 1895, a rapidly organized Taiwan Affairs Bureau debated the alternative proposals, and foreign ministry official (and future prime minister) Hara Takashi 原敬 (1856–1921) supported the French proposal. To avoid the popular image of a “colony”—at this time associated with European rule over Africans—most members of the Bureau sided with Hara and the French advisor. But soon the outbreak of resistance to Japanese rule led to the implementation of direct rule by military officers on August 6, 1895. A civilian government was instituted on April 1, 1896, but *de facto* military rule continued. In 1898, the fourth military governor-general, Kodama Gentarō 兒玉源太郎 (1852–1906), and the Chief of Civil Administration in Taiwan, Gotō Shimpei 後藤新平 (1857–1929), decided that regardless of what Taiwan was called, it needed to be governed like a colony and that Western colonial legal institutions would be instructive (Cai 2008; Wang 2000, 45–47). Under the Kodama administration (1896–1906), many studies of European colonial practice were undertaken, and, ultimately, “the experience of the Western powers in Africa was taken as a precedent for Taiwan” (Taga 1977–78, 67). Japanese colonial administrators made meticulous studies of many forms of European colonial rule,

including French rule in North Africa; but the British administration in Egypt appears to have provided a more important model, particularly in the early twentieth century after Japan and Britain became allies. Gotō is said to have been strongly influenced by Germany during his medical education there, but he was apparently influenced more by the British example of colonial rule. When Gotō introduced flogging as a punishment in Taiwan, he claimed that Lord Cromer advised him personally to adopt flogging when governing “uncivilized people” like the Taiwanese (Botsman 2005, 214; Lee 1999; Umemori 2006a, 2006b). The most prominent Japanese penologist at this time, Ogawa Shigejirō 小河滋次郎 (1863–1925), criticized the Japanese decision to introduce flogging as due to thoughtless “worship of foreign countries” such as the Western imperial powers that created a separate caste of colonial subjects who were not regarded as deserving equal treatment under the law. Ogawa’s opponents eventually responded by accusing him of having been too influenced by the “irrational fervor” and sentimental idealism of the Christian prison reformers (Botsman 2005, 216). Thus, the Japanese administrators of Taiwan defended their introduction of flogging by referring to similar punishments in European colonies such as Egypt, and they dismissed the Christian humanist critique of the practice as impractical idealism.

Japan’s establishment of *de facto* control over Korea during the Sino-Japanese War also offered an opportunity to imitate or emphasize the similarities with British rule in Egypt. In October 1894, after the outbreak of the war, Inoue Kaoru was sent to Korea as Japan’s extraordinary envoy (Conroy 1960, 271) and gave considerable thought to what policy Japan ought to adopt in Korea. Two months later he wrote Prime Minister Itō that he had decided to pursue the same policy “which England follows in Egypt” (Beasley 1987, 51). The British had showed in Egypt that increased economic involvement with a country provided one means to increase political involvement. Inoue clearly wanted to “Egyptianize” Korea (Duus 1995, 92, 105, 135, 168) by advancing loans to Korea. Inoue wrote: “What was England’s pretext for intervening in Egypt? Was it not in the fact that England had obtained a position of real interest there by supplying Egypt with capital? I firmly believe that if we wish to solidify our position in Korea and establish a pretext for intervention in its internal affairs, we must obtain real interests there” (cited in Duus 1995, 92). As it turned out, Inoue’s plans were short-lived since he did not obtain the necessary support from the Japanese government to carry out his goals. But studies of Egypt’s administration published in the next few years enabled future Japanese colonial administrators to carry out more detailed planning that owed much to the model of British administration in Egypt.

Part of the incentive for studying European colonial administration came from Japan’s own lack of experience in the administration of overseas

dependencies. But the Japanese were also determined to draw parallels between their own role in Korea and the role of the British in Egypt in order to give legitimacy to their rule on the peninsula. Itō and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu 陸奥宗光 (1844–97) frequently took pains to impress upon foreign representatives in Tokyo that the Japanese saw their position in Korea as similar to that of the British in Egypt or of the French in Tunisia. The Belgian ambassador to Japan commented: “Count Ito and Mutsu always proclaim very loudly that they do not want to annex Korea,” but “Japan wants to establish herself as a protector in imitation of England in Egypt, France in Tunisia and Madagascar and Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Lensen 1966, 41).

By the time the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) broke out in southern Africa, Japan and Britain were drawing closer. In 1899, British Rear Admiral and Member of Parliament Lord Charles Beresford (1846–1919) proposed that Britain and Japan cooperate in playing a role in China similar to that of Britain in Egypt (Williston 1937, 93). The precarious position the British found themselves in during the Anglo-Boer War and the mostly positive attitude of the Japanese press toward Britain during that war helped pave the way for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Japanese criticism of British imperialism had diminished by the outbreak of the war, but the emerging socialist and Christian reformist movements in Japan at the time gave expression to a new dimension of criticism of British imperialism. In general, however, the Japanese press expressed considerable admiration and sympathy for the British cause during the war. Britain’s growing realization during the war that it needed an ally also contributed to the establishment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Bradshaw 1992; Fujita 2005; Nish 1985).

The successful establishment of British rule throughout South Africa had a strong but ambiguous impact on Japanese expansionism. To those who hoped to see Japanese trade with all regions of the world expand, British control of southern Africa helped reinforce the fact that much of the world was under British domination and that, if Japan intended to trade with these areas, close cooperation or alliance with Britain was going to be necessary. To those who dreamed of Japanese imperial expansion, on the other hand, the life and vision of Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) served as a source of inspiration. The tension between a search for world markets and a search for secure markets under Japanese control on the adjacent Chinese mainland remained a central feature of Japanese thought over the next decades. For a while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance allowed the Japanese to pursue both goals simultaneously, but the hostile reaction of European powers to Japan’s peaceful economic penetration of Africa contributed to Japan’s decision to place greater emphasis on control over the adjacent Chinese mainland (Asian-African Research Organization 1966, 3–24).

Soon after the Russo-Japanese War erupted in early 1904, the Japanese forced a treaty upon the Koreans, making Korea virtually a protectorate of Japan. The Japanese authorities at this time expressed their desire to obtain copies of Lord Cromer's report on Egypt (Adu 1976, 50); and British diplomats, for their part, showed themselves favorably disposed toward Japan's role in Korea, comparing Japan's position there with Britain's imperial presence in Egypt. In March 1904 the British Minister in Seoul, John Newell Jordan (1852–1925), reported that, in his opinion, Japan would undoubtedly "succeed in Egyptianising Korea" but, in doing so, would "receive less assistance from the native element than the British authorities need in Egypt."<sup>3</sup> In a June 1904 report, Jordan commented: "If England, the Japanese argue, has given her best talent for the reorganization of Egypt, Japan, if she hopes for similar success, must do the same for Corea [*sic*]."

The Egyptian model was clearly evident in the program of "reform" that the Japanese presented to the Korean government in August of that year. Jordan commented in October that the Japanese "appear to have followed with some closeness the model set by Britain in Egypt and to have given concrete expression at the outset to the functions which, as gradually defined, were exercised by the early British Financial adviser" in Egypt.

Another indication of the influence of British rule in Egypt on Japanese colonial administration was the number of books on this subject produced by Japanese colonial bureaus. In 1905 Katō Fusazō 加藤房藏 authored a book describing Egypt as a model for the administration of protectorates; in 1906 Inoue Masaji 井上雅二 authored a book on British administration in Egypt that was meant to be useful for administering Korea; and Kamata Eikichi 鎌田栄吉 produced a book in 1909 on Egyptian financial affairs as a resource for Japanese administrators in Korea. A Japanese group in Taiwan also published an "Encyclopedia" on various methods for the administration of colonial territories that included information on British rule in Egypt (Rinji Taiwan Kyūkan Chōsakai 1909; Rūkasu 1898; Tsurumi 1983, 214; Wang 2000, 274–75).

### **British Egypt as an Example of Colonial Misrule**

Ultimately, between World War I and World War II, the Japanese and British leaders began to criticize each other's colonial practices, often with Egypt as a point of comparison. Anti-colonial agitation in Korea gave British arch-imperialist Lord Curzon an opportunity to share his criticism of colonial policy in Korea with his Japanese colleagues as early as 1919. The head of Britain's Foreign Office Far Eastern Department asserted that, in India and Egypt, the British attempted to rule in the "interest of the natives with a view to educating them to take up a larger share in the government," but "the Japanese do exactly the reverse" (O'Brien 2004, 273). In 1922, Ma-

ruyama Tsurukichi 丸山鶴吉 (1883–1956), the head of the colonial political police in Korea, wrote, “when we compare our rule to the British in India or Egypt we can see that we have done a much better job in a much shorter time. We have achieved higher literacy rates in Korea than the British have in India or Egypt” (cited in Robinson 1984, 330). As Britain and Japan became more hostile to each other in the 1930s, the nationalists in each country found more reasons to criticize the colonial policies of the other.

Thus, by the approach of World War II, Japanese interest in Egypt had come full circle. Egypt was initially perceived as a country whose efforts at modernization and attempts to revise its treaties with the West were worthy of imitation. Then Egypt’s debt crisis and occupation by Great Britain served as a cautionary tale for the Japanese. Many Japanese sympathized with Egypt and felt a sense of solidarity with all victims of Western imperialism. But once Japan had acquired her own overseas colonies and formed an alliance with Great Britain in 1902, the Japanese began to regard British colonial administration of Egypt as an object of study, both to glean ideas to apply in Japan’s own colonies and to use in defending their own colonialism from criticism. Finally, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance fell apart during the interwar years, the Japanese and British began criticizing the colonial policies of each other, and Egypt was often the point of comparison. Egypt thus came to be perceived in Japan as a country where British misrule was evident.

## Notes

*The authors appreciate the very useful suggestions of several anonymous reviewers. For a more complete bibliography on works related to Japanese-African relations, contact Richard Bradshaw (rick.bradshaw@centre.edu).*

<sup>1</sup>In 1911 the *Tōkyō Nichinichi* joined with the *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun* (Osaka Daily News) to form the *Mainichi Shinbun* (see de Lange 1998; Huffman 1997; Kawabe 1921). The British-owned *Japan Weekly Mail* (1870–1917) included English summaries of and comments about articles in Japanese-owned newspapers. Thus the *Japan Weekly Mail* is cited as a source about the content of Japanese newspapers.

<sup>2</sup>Fashoda (presently known as Kothok) was a village in southeastern Sudan that was the site of a major conflict of British and French colonial interests in 1898; Britain ultimately prevailed.

<sup>3</sup>The quotations in this and the following paragraph come from archival material cited in Adu (1976) and dated March 16, 1904; June 29, 1904; and October 19, 1904.

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