Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
Exam #
EVIDENCE FINAL S96
FORTUNE
Last four digits of SS #
The Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable. Closed book and
closed rules. There are 75 questions, each counting one point.
You have three and a half hours if you need it. The exam has been
edited to minimize questions running from one page to the next.
That causes the bottom margin to be large on some of the pages
l) P's estate v. D over the ownership of a golden egg. P's
estate claims D stole it; D claims P gave it to her. D offers W
who would testify that two months before his death P said, "I'm
going to give D my golden egg." Admissible over a hearsay
objection? Why or why not?
2) On the facts of (l) W would further testify that later that
week P said, "I gave my golden egg to D." Admissible over a
hearsay objection? Why or why not?
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
3) On the facts of (l) W would further testify that on his death
bed, P said, "I know I'm going to die. Tell D I love her." This
testimony is admissible as:
i) state of mind of the declarant
ii) a dying declaration
iii) a declaration against interest
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (i) only
e) (ii) only
4) Pedestrian v. D for injuries sustained when P was struck by a
hit and driver, who was driving a 1995 black Mercedes. P did not
see the license number. P would testify that someone came up to
her immediately after she was struck and said, "Lady, are you
okay? I got the license number. It's "N2XTC." The individual then
ran off. At trial, to prove the registration of the vehicle, P
would testify to what the individual told her. P's testimony is:
a) admissible as non-hearsay for its effect on the hearer
b) admissible as an excited utterance
c) inadmissible as self-serving
d) inadmissible because the declarant is not available
5) On the facts of (4) P would rely on the following statute, "In
any hit and run case, ownership of a motor vehicle shall be prima
facie evidence of operation at the time of the hit and run. " P
can establish that a 1995 Mercedes with the vanity plate "N2XTC"
was registered to D. What is the effect of the statute?
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
6.) On the facts of (4), assume that D is criminally prosecuted
for the hit and run and the prosecutor seeks to rely on the
statute above to establish D's operation. Assuming the state has
enough evidence to create a jury issue, should the judge give the
following instruction to the jury.
"It is presumed that the owner of an automobile is the
operator thereof. This presumption is, however, subject to
rebuttal. In any event, you should not convict unless you
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was operating the automobile."
Should the instruction be given? Why or why not?
7) On the facts of (4) assume that P would call Dr. Casey, the
emergency room doctor, to testify that P said, My back hurts
terribly." Dr. Casey's testimony should be admissible as:
i) a statement for the purpose of medical treatment
ii) a statement of present physical condition
iii) an admission of a party
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (i) only
e) (ii) only
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
8) Dr. Casey would further testify that he asked P if she could
lift her leg and that in response P lifted her leg. If offered to
prove that P could lift her leg is this hearsay? Why or why not?
9) P v D in a case where the date of X's death is important. To
prove X's date of death Witness would testify that she went to
the cemetery and read the inscription on the headstone of the
deceased. Without regard to whether an objection would be
sustained, which of these statements is true:
i) The inscription is hearsay;
ii) The inscription is the Best Evidence
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
Evid Fnl 596 -- Fortune
10) On the facts of (9) Witness would further offer an affidavit
signed and acknowledged by X's son stating that X died on a
certain date. The affidavit:
i) self-authenticates;
ii) is hearsay;
iii) is the Best Evidence of the date of X's death
* * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
e) (i) only
11) Sybil was shot in the chest by either Henry or David under
circumstances which indicate she knew her assailant. David is
charged with the murder. The state calls W, an ambulance
attendant, to testify that when he arrived at the scene Henry
with Sybil and Sybil said, "Henry, get me a blanket. I'm cold."
Sybil thereafter died. Sybil's statement is:
a) admissible as a dying declaration
b) admissible within the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule as tending to show that Sybil did not believe
Henry to believe her assailant
c) admissible as non-hearsay as tending to show that Sybil
did not believe Henry to be her assailant
d) admissible as non-hearsay because the ultimate issue is
whether David shot Sybil
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
12)D is charged with the murder of V in an apartment shared by D
and X. The state calls P, a policeman, to testify that X came to
the police station and gave P a butcher knife with the
accompanying statement, "This is the knife D stabbed V with." P
said nothing in response. P's testimony to X's statement is:
a) admissible as a present sense impression;
b) admissible as non-hearsay -- the verbal part of an act;
c) admissible as the adoptive admission of P;
d) inadmissible hearsay.
13) On the facts of (12), at the police station X~told P that, "I
held V while D stabbed him." On investigation , the police found
V's body in the apartment and blood-stained clothing belonging to
both D and X in the washing machine. Assume that the state
indicts X and D for murder and they are tried separately. D is
tried first and the state calls X as a witness. X asserts the
privilege against self-incrimination and his claim is upheld by
the judge. The state wishes to call P to testify to X's
statement. Is this admissible as the statement of a co-
conspirator? Why or why not?
14) Is X's statement in (13) admissible as a declaration against
interest? Why or why not?
Evid Fnl 596 -- Fortune
15) On the facts of (12), the state calls W to testify that he
was with D two days before V's death, that D was agitated and
said, "I'm going to kill V!" W's testimony to what D said is
admissible as:
i) an admission
ii) a statement of intent within the Hillmon doctrine
iii) an excited utterance
* * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
e) (i) only
16) On the facts of (12), the state offers the lab report of M,
an employee of an independent testing laboratory, showing that V
had A negative blood, the blood on the clothing is A negative,
and that neither D nor X has A negative blood. Is this report
admissible? Why or why not?
Evid Fnl 596 -- Fortune
17)0n the facts of (12), assume that M testified at the
preliminary hearing of D to the contents of his laboratory report
and was cross-examined by D's counsel. Assume that at trial the
defendant's objection to the introduction of the lab report is
sustained and the state offers the transcript of the preliminary
hearing. The state offers no explanation for M's absence. The
transcript is:
a) admissible
b) admissible because there was a prior opportunity to cross
c) inadmissible because the state has not explained its
failure to present M as a witness
d) inadmissible
18)State v D for murder of V. D offers W to testify that A, now
deceased, made a deathbed statement to him that B, also deceased,
told A he killed V and buried the gun in his backyard. A search
of the backyard reveals the murder weapon. W's testimony to what
A said B said is:
a) admissible as a dying declaration containing a
declaration against interest
b) admissible as a dying declaration containing a dying
declaration
c) inadmissible because no hearsay exception covers A's
statement to W
d) inadmissible because no hearsay exception covers B's
statement to A
l9)State v Franks for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. He was stopped on August 5 for a traffic violation
and six ounces of cocaine were found under the front seat of the
car. The elements of the crime are: l) possession of cocaine; 2)
knowing it to be cocaine; 3) with intent to distribute. Franks
testified at trial that he had borrowed the car and did not know
that there was cocaine under the seat. On cross examination he
was asked whether he was familiar with cocaine and he answered
that he "wouldn't know cocaine if he saw it."
Evid Fnl 596 -- Fortune
(continuation of Question 19)
The state now offers to prove that on the preceding April 15,
Franks was apprehended with 1/4 gram of cocaine, that he was not
arrested or charged with possession of cocaine, but was warned
that he would be in trouble if caught again. Would you allow the
state to prove the April 15 incident? Why or why not?
20)0n the facts of (19), assume that Franks moves prior to trial
to exclude any reference to the April 15 incident-~n the ground
that the substance in question was a headache powder rather than
cocaine. Franks asks the judge to determine the nature of the
substance involved in the April 15 incident while the prosecutor
insists that this is a matter for the jury to decide. What should
the judge do?
21) On the facts of (19), the state offers Able, the detective
who dealt with Franks on April 15, to testify that on August 5 he
was walking through the police station and saw Franks being
questioned by police officers and that Franks called out to him,
"Hey, Sam what kind of break will you give me if I tell you where
I got the stuff this time?" Able did not reply because he was not
involved in the August 5 arrest. Able's testimony is:
a) inadmissible as part of the state's case in chief but
admissible to impeach Franks' testimony that he did not know
the nature of cocaine;
b) inadmissible as a statement made in the course of plea
negotiations
c) admissible only if the court admits proof of the April 15
incident;
d) admissible
Evid Fnl 596 -- Fortune
22) State v Dugan for the assault of Vernon in Tom's Tavern of
September 2d. Dugan claims self-defense -- that Vernon was the
first aggressor.
Vernon testifies that he was peacefully sitting in the bar when
Dugan struck him with a broken beer bottle. Dugan's lawyer wants
to ask Vernon on cross-examination if six months earlier he was
convicted of misdemeanor assault and given 30 days in jail. There
is a good faith basis for the question. The court should:
a) allow the question to be asked to attack Vernon's
character for truthfulness but not allow extrinsic evidence
of the conviction;
b) allow proof of the conviction to attack Vernon's
character for truthfulness;
c) allow proof of the conviction to attack Vernon's
character for peacefulness;
d) not allow either the question or extrinsic evidence of
the conviction.
23) On the facts of (22), after Vernon testifies, Dugan proposes
to call Tom the bartender who to testify that Vernon was drinking
heavily, that he threw the first punch and hit Dugan with a
chair. Objection is made to Tom's further testimony that Vernon
"would have killed him" had Dugan not defended himself with the
broken bottle. Would you permit Tom to so testify? Why or why
not?
24) On the facts of (22), Tom further proposes to testify that
Vernon is a regular patron who always gets belligerent when he
drinks. Would you permit this? Why or why not?
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
25) On the facts of (22), Tom further proposes to testify that
he knows Vernon to be a violent and untruthful person. The court
should allow Tom to testify that in his opinion:
i) Vernon is untruthful;
ii) Vernon is violent;
* * * *
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
26)On the facts of (22), the state has a good faith basis for
believing that Tom and Dugan have been running an illegal betting
operation out of the tavern. Paul, a former bartender, is
available to testify that he saw the betting slips and saw Tom
and Dugan dividing money.
a) Tom may be asked about the betting operation but Paul cannot
be called as a witness if Tom denies its existence;
b) Paul may testify to the illegal betting operation;
c) Tom may be asked about the betting operation only if the
court determines that there is an element of deceit involved;
d) No questions may be asked of Tom nor may Paul testify to
what he observed
27) On the facts of (22), Dugan would testify in his own behalf
that two days before Wanda told him that Vernon was always
looking for a fight and had beaten up somebody six months before
and been convicted for misdemeanor assault. Admissible over a
hearsay objection? Why or why not?
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Evid Fnl s96 -- Fortune
28) Paul v Anthony's Pizza for personal injuries sustained when
he was forced off the road by a speeding delivery truck bearing
the name Anthony's Pizza. The defendant's answer to the complaint
denies that a driver of Anthony's Pizza caused the accident.
Paul offers to testify that when he was in the hospital Joe
Anthony, the owner of Anthony's Pizza, visited him and said,
Don't worry about a thing. I'll make sure your hospital bills are
paid." Is this statement admissible against Anthony's Pizza? why
or why not?
29) On the facts of (28), Paul would further testify that
Anthony said, "I'm sorry my driver forced you off the road." This
testimony is:
a) inadmissible as a statement made in the course of plea
negotiations
b) inadmissible because Anthony lacks personal knowledge to
what occurred
c) admissible to show that the driver worked for Anthony but
not to show that the driver was negligent
d) admissible
30) On the facts of (28) assume that Paul is able to identify
the driver as Doug, a 17 year old high school student. Paul would
call Richard to testify that he rode with Doug on many occasions
and that Doug is a "really bad driver." Richard's testimony is:
a) admissible because Doug's character as a driver is put in
issue by Paul's allegation that the driver was negligent
b) admissible as circumstantial evidence that Doug was driving
negligently on the occasion in question
c) inadmissible unless put in the form of Doug's reputation for
recklessness
d) inadmissible
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
31) On the facts of (28), Paul calls Edwards, a clinical
psychologist to testify that Paul suffers from traumatic neurosis
as a result of the accident. Which of the following is true:
i) The judge must decide, as a preliminary matter, whether
expert testimony will be of assistance to the jury;
ii) The judge must decide, as a preliminary matter, whether
Edwards is qualified as an expert;
iii) The judge must decide as a preliminary matter whether it is
reasonable for Edwards to base her opinion on certain reports not
in evidence
* * * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
32) IRS v. Frost, a law professor in a civil suit for tax
deficiency in which there is an issue of Frost's claimed expenses
while teaching away from home. Frost would testify as to his
expenditures (so much for rent, so much for groceries etc.)on the
basis of a list brought to court. The IRS attorney objects to
Frost consulting the list while testifying. What foundation must
be, laid before Frost consults the list?
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
33) On the facts of (32), assume that Frost consults the list
while testifying. The IRS attorney asks to see the list before
cross-examination, The IRS attorney is entitled to see the list
because:
i) it is the statement of a witness
ii) Frost consulted it while testifying
* * * *
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
34) On the facts of (32), on cross-examination of Frost, it is
established that there are receipts to document some of the
expenditures. Frost did not bring the receipts to court. The IRS
attorney asks the court to strike Frost's testimony as to those
items on the ground that the receipts are the Best Evidence of
the expenditures. Should the motion be granted? Why or why not?
35) Assume that the judge rules that the Best Evidence Rule
requires Frost to produce the receipts. After a recess Frost
reports that he has been unable to find them. The judge should:
a) not allow Frost to testify to the contents of the receipts;
b) not allow Frost to testify to the contents of the receipts
unless the judge decides by a preponderance of the evidence that
Frost did not lose or destroy the receipts in bad faith;
c) allow Frost to testify to the contents of the receipts and
let the jury decide by a preponderance standard whether Frost
lost or destroyed the receipts in bad faith;
d) allow Frost to testify to the contents of the receipts
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
36) While crossing Limestone at Maxwelton, P, a law student, was
killed by a hit and run driver. D was subsequently arrested and
charged with reckless homicide, the elements of which are: 1) D
killed V; 2) recklessly. D's not guilty plea has the effect of
forcing the state to prove all elements of the crime. In opening
statement to the jury D's counsel argues that the evidence will
be insufficient to prove that D was the driver and, in the
alternative, that the evidence will show that P was crossing the
street out of the crosswalk and against the light and thus caused
his own death.
The state calls C, a friend of P, to testify that she has known P
for many years and that in her opinion P was a careful
pedestrian. This testimony is:
a) admissible because this is a homicide case
b) admissible as evidence of habit
c) inadmissible because it is irrelevant whether P was careful
on the night he was killed
d) inadmissible because D has not introduced evidence that P
was a careless person
37)Would the evidence in (36) be admissible after D calls B, a
bystander, to testify that P tried to cross the street against
the light and out of the crosswalk? Why or why not?
38) On the facts of (36), assume that B testifies that the
crosswalk was on the north side of the intersection. The
prosecutor asks the judge to take judicial notice that the only
crosswalk is on the south side of the intersection. The judge
knows that the prosecutor is correct. Should the judge take
judicial notice? Why or why not?
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
39) On the facts of (36) to prove D's ownership of the car which
struck p, the state offers a photocopy of a 1996 certificate of
registration bearing the seal of the Fayette County Clerk stating
that KY license xyz 123 (with a current sticker) is assigned to a
1989 Honda Civic vehicle number 134589PRX owned by D. The defense
objects on grounds of:
i) Best Evidence; ii)lack of authentication;
* *
On which ground, if either, should the objection be sustained?
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
40) On the facts of (36), the state calls A, an autobody man, to
testify that the day after P's death D brought his car to A's
shop to have a crumpled right front fender replaced. A replaced
and painted the fender. D objects that the repair is a remedial
measure. Should this objection be sustained? Why or why not?
41)On the facts of (36) , the state calls Officer to testify that
he looked D up in the phone book and called the number assigned
to D; a woman answered and stated that D was not home; 0 left his
number and asked the woman to have D call him; an hour later he
received a call from a man who identified himself as D. In the
ensuing conversation the caller admitted striking P. D objects to
0's testimony concerning this conversation on authentication
grounds. Should the objection be sustained? Why or why not?
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42)On the facts of (36), the state calls 0 to testify that four
days after the event he located D at his place of employment; 0
identified himself and said he wanted to ask some questions about
a hit and run on Limestone; D then said, "Officer I'll take care
of this if we can keep it out of the newspapers." D objects that
his statement was an offer of compromise. Should the objection be
sustained? Why or why not?
43)On the facts of (36) The state offers a series of witnesses to
prove that two years earlier D was involved in a hit and run
incident in Louisville. The pedestrian was not killed and the
civil claim was settled by D's insurance carrier. D was charged
with leaving the scene of the accident but the criminal charge
was dismissed at the request of the pedestrian. This evidence
should be:
a) admitted to prove identity
b) admitted to prove intent
c) excluded because the dismissal of the criminal charge bars
introduction of the evidence in a later trial
d) excluded because the unfair prejudice to the defendant and
the danger of becoming involved in collateral matters
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
44) On the facts of (36), assume that D testifies in his own
behalf and admits, for the first time, that he struck P. He
testifies that he was driving at a moderate rate of speed south
on Limestone when P stepped out in front of him. After D
testifies the state would call W to testify as an adverse
character witness. W would testify that D's reputation is of a
bad driver who is untruthful. W should be permitted to testify
that:
i) D's reputation for truthfulness is bad
ii) D's reputation for carefulness is bad
* * * *
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
45) On the facts of (36), assume a civil case arising out of the
car pedestrian incident. During the course of settlement
negotiations in the civil case D's attorney said, "My client was
going at least 20 miles over the speed limit." The state seeks to
introduce this statement in the criminal case to show D's speed
at the time of the accident. The statement is:
a) admissible because it is a statement of fact
b) admissible because it is a fact learned during settlement
negotiations
c) inadmissible because it is a statement of fact made during
the course of settlement negotiations
d) inadmissible because character cannot be proved by specific
acts
46) D's attorney would further object to the statement in (45)
on hearsay grounds. Should the objection be sustained? Why or why
not?
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
47) State v. X and Y for the murder of V. After being arrested
and interrogated for twelve hours without food or water, X
confessed that "Y forced me to do it. y held a gun on me and said
he~'d shoot me unless I shot V." X now claims that he had nothing
to do with the murder and only confessed to end the
interrogation. X moves to have the confession suppressed as
involuntary.
i) the judge must decide this issue as a preliminary matter out
of the hearing of the jury;
ii) the judge must apply a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
deciding the voluntaries of the confession
iii) x may testify at the hearing on voluntaries without being
subject to cross-examination on other issues in the case
iv) if the judge decides the confession is voluntary D's counsel
may still urge the jury to disregard the confession as unreliable
* * * *
a) all of the above are correct
b) (i)1 (ii), and (iii) are correct
c) (i), (iii), and (iv) are correct
d) (i), (ii) and (iv) are correct
e) (iv) only is correct
48) On the facts of (47), assume the confession is ruled
admissible against X. The state urges that it be received against
Y as well as:
i) a declaration against interest
ii) a statement of a coconspirator
iii) a verbal act
* * * *
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
On which grounds is X's confession admissible against Y?
a) (i) and (ii)
b) (i) and (iii)
c) (i) only
d) (iii) only
e) none of the above
49) On the facts of (47), assume that the judge rules that X's
confession is admissible against X, but not against Y, in the
joint trial of X and Y. The judge proposes to instruct the jury
to consider X's confession only against X. Y objects on
constitutional grounds. Admitting the confession with a limiting
instruction:
a) is constitutional because it is assumed that juries will
comply with limiting instructions
b) will violate Y's constitutional rights
c) will violate Y's constitutional rights unless Y testifies
d) will violate Y's constitutional rights unless X testifies
50) On the facts of (47), assume that X testifies in his own
behalf and denies having been involved in V's death. The
prosecutor seeks to question D about a two year old conviction
for assault in the second degree. Second degree assault is a
class D felony, punishable by up to five years in the county
jail. D was sentenced to six months, which he served. The
question is:
a) admissible
b) admissible if the judge finds that probative value outweighs
prejudicial effect to X
c) not admissible if the judge finds, pursuant to FRE 403, that
prejudicial effect to X substantially outweighs probative value
d) inadmissible
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
51) Assume that the judge allows the question in (50). Is X
entitled to a limiting instruction? If so, what should it say?
52) On the facts of (47), the prosecutor would seek to ask X
about an application he filled out for admission to graduate
school. The application was completed after V's death. In the
application X answered "no" to the question, "Have you ever been
convicted of a felony." The question should be
a) allowed
b) allowed in the discretion of the court if there is a good
faith basis for the question
c) disallowed because X's character for truthfulness is not in
issue
d) disallowed because the application was completed after the
crime charged
53) D retained Attorney to represent him in a divorce case. D
asked Attorney to help him conceal assets from his wife. Attorney
refused to do this and told wife's attorney of his client's
intentions D then fired Attorney. The wife's attorney has now
subpoenaed Attorney to testify. The judge should rule that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply because:
i) A waived the privilege when he told the wife's attorney of
the client's intentions;
ii) D forfeited the privilege by firing A;
iii) D sought A's help to perpetrate a fraud
* * * *
a) all of the above reasons;
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) an d (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
e) (iii) only
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
54) Paul v. Acme Company for injuries sustained on Acme's
loading dock, due to the alleged negligence of B, an Acme
employee working on the dock. B allegedly dropped a heavy box
on P.The incident was witnessed by C, another Acme dockman
helping B, and by D, an Acme secretary who was off work
waiting for C, her husband, to get off work. Acme's CEO is E.
Larry, house counsel for Acme, interviewed B,C, D and E after
the accident. Assume that all four said essentially the same
thing: "B dropped the box on P." Which of the statements are
within the attorney client privilege?
i) B's statement
ii) C's statement
iii) E's statement
* * * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (i) only
e) (iii) only
55) On the facts of (54), assume that after the accident B, C, D
and E went drinking with F, a policeman. The four Acme employees
all told F that B had dropped the box on P. F now would testify
for P to the statements of the Acme employees. Over a hearsay
objection which statements are admissible:
i) B's statement
ii) C's statement
iii) D's statement
iv) E's statement
* * * *
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
a) all of the above
b) (i), (ii), and (iii)
c) (i), (ii), and (iv)
d) (i) and (iv)
e) (i) only
56) On the facts of (54), assume that B was fired after he was
interviewed by Acme's attorney. He then was interviewed by P's
attorney and a paralegal working for P's attorney. B told P's
attorney that he dropped the box on P. Can P's attorney call B as
a witness over an objection based on the attorney client
privilege? Why or why not?
57) On the facts of (54), assume that B tells P's attorney what
he told Acme's attorney
i) B can waive Acme's attorney client privilege
ii) Acme forfeited the privilege by firing B
* * * *
a) both of the above are true
b) (i) is true
c) (ii) is true
d) neither of the above is true
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Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
58) On the facts of (54), assume that B is called as a witness
by P's attorney and surprises P's attorney by saying that he did
not drop the box on P. P's attorney would call the paralegal to
testify to B's statement that he dropped the box on P. Is this
admissible as the admission of Acme? Why or why not?
59) On the facts of (54) , if the statement of B is offered
(through the paralegal) as a prior inconsistent statement
(i) the judge should instruct the jury to consider it for
impeachment purposes only
(ii) the judge should not allow the paralegal to testify because
P is seeking to impeach his own witness
* * * *
a) both of the above
b) (i)
c) (ii)
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
60) State v. D for robbery. Defense: alibi. The defendant claims
that he was in his high school physics class at the time of the
robbery. In support he calls Teacher as an alibi witness. Teacher
testifies that D was in class at the time. On cross-examination
Teacher testified that D "almost never" missed class. Should the
state be permitted to call W who sat behind D in physics and who
would testify that D was not in physics on the date in question?
Why or why not?
24
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
61) On the facts of (60), should W be permitted to testify that
D had missed "about half the physics classes" that semester? Why
or why not?
62) State v. D for assault of V. After the event V suffered from
post-traumatic stress and was unable to provide a description of
his attacker. Under hypnosis V described the attack and the
attacker. This led to the arrest of D. At trial V would, if
permitted describe the attack and the attacker. ~ best objection
to this testimony is:
a) The testimony interferes with D's Constitutional right to
Compulsory Process;
b) V is not a competent witness;
c) There is no way to ascertain what portions of V's
recollection are the result of recovered memory and what portions
are the result of confabulation;
d) There is no scientific basis for believing that hypnosis
may result in recovered memory
63)State v. D for murder. The prosecution alleges that D shot V
in a domestic disturbance. D claims that V committed suicide. The
state offers morgue photos of the entry wound to show the absence
of powder burns for the purpose of showing that the shot was
fired from several feet away. The judge should:
a) admit the photos;
b) admit the photos unless convinced that prejudice to the
defendant substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence;
c) exclude the photos unless convinced that probative value
substantially outweighs the prejudice to the defendant;
d) exclude the photos
25
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
64) On the facts of (63), the prosecutor offers the following as
evidence that D intentionally shot V. Which of the following most
clearly should be excluded on proper objection?
a) D purchased the gun one week before V's death;
b) D initially denied knowledge of the shooting and changed the
story to suicide after he learned that he had been identified as
running from the house after the shooting;
c) D struck V with a bat three days before V's death;
d) Five years before D was convicted of first degree
manslaughter for the killing of his first wife
65) On the facts of (63), D calls W to testify that he has known
D for the last five years and that D's reputation for
peacefulness is good. The prosecutor would seek to ask W if is
aware that two years earlier D was arrested for shoplifting. What
is D's strongest argument that the question should not be
allowed?
a) the subject of the question is not relevant to the
credibility of W's testimony;
b) the matter is a misdemeanor not a felony
c) W could not be expected to have heard of the arrest
d) allowing the question might necessitate the introduction of
extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter
66) On the facts of (63), the state seeks to call W, D's present
wife, as a witness to testify to incriminating confidential
statements D made to her before marriage. D objects on the basis
of "spousal privilege." Should D's objection be sustained on the
ground that the confidential statements are privileged? Why or
why not?
26
I?
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
67) Should D's objection in (66) be sustained on the ground that
D has the right to prevent his spouse from giving adverse
testimony? Why or why not?
68) P sues D Hospital for complications arising from an
operation performed by Dr. Morte. P alleges that Morte was
negligent and that D was negligent in granting operating
privileges to Morte. In support P alleges that Morte was an
incompetent doctor and his incompetence was, or should have been
known, to D. P offers evidence of six claims of medical
negligence against D arising out of operations performed by Morte
in the year before P's operation. This evidence is:
i) admissible to show notice to D
ii) admissible to show D's negligent character Which of the
above is correct?
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) but not (ii)
c) (ii) but not (i)
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
69) P offers to prove that D terminated Dr. Morte's operating
privileges after she filed her claim against D. This testimony
is:
a) admissible as relevant to Dr. Morte's character
b) admissible as relevant to D's negligence in granting
operating privileges to Dr. Morte
c) inadmissible as a remedial measure
d) inadmissible as an attempt to settle
27
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
70)In a bank robbery case, which of the following is most clearly
characterized as demonstrative evidence, rather than real
evidence:
a) the jury's view of the bank which was robbed;
b) the defendant's demeanor in the courtroom;
c) a photograph of the bank lobby, used by a witness to show
the positions of the customers at the time of the robbery
d) the gun dropped by the robber outside the bank
71) A and B are charged with the murder of V. C is a 15 year old
girl who witnessed the event and talked with A afterward. Officer
interviewed C a week after the event and the pertinent part of
0's report reads:
According to C, A and B threw V over the cliff, then went down
into the quarry and beat his head in with rocks. They took $20
and his car keys. A told me afterwards that it was his idea and
he was sorry for what he'd done.
Assume that C is called as a state's witness and surprises the
prosecutor by testifying that V fell off the cliff and A and B
tried to save him from falling. Which of the following is true?
i) The prosecutor must show C a copy of 0's report before
questioning her about its contents
ii) ordinarily the prosecutor must question C about her
statement to 0 before calling 0 to testify to that statement
iii) If 0 testifies to C's statement, the jury should be instructed to use it only insofar as it affects C's credibility
* * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
e) (ii) only
28
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
72) On the facts of (71), assume that C was charged as a
juvenile with facilitation of murder. In a plea agreement she was
allowed to plead guilty to misdemeanor theft and receive 30 days
house arrest in return for her testimony against A and B. She
then testified before a grand jury that:
A and B stole V's car keys, threw V over the cliff, V climbed
back up, they threw him over again, knocked him down with rocks,
then went down to the quarry floor, and beat him to death with
rocks. A told me afterwards it was all his idea and he was sorry
he'd led B astray.
Which of the following is true?
i) The prosecutor may call C as a witness even if the
prosecutor knows that C has recanted her grand jury
testimony and will testify that V fell off the cliff
ii) The grand jury testimony can be used to show that A and B
murdered and robbed V even if C refuses to answer any questions
when called as a witness
iii) The grand jury testimony cannot be used to show that A
confessed to C after the crime because that would be double
hearsay
* * * *
a) all of the above
b) (i) and (ii)
c) (i) and (iii)
d) (ii) and (iii)
e) (i) only
73) On the facts of (71) , assume that C testifies consistently
with her statement to the Officer and the grand jury. The defense
attempts to cast doubt on her testimony by showing the favorable
plea bargain. Is the defense entitled to do this over prosecution
objections that juvenile records are sealed?
29
V
Evid Fnl S96 -- Fortune
74) On the facts of (71), assume the defense is allowed to
impeach Z with the plea bargain. The prosecution then seeks to
introduce the statements made to the Officer and to the grand
jury.
i) Statement to Officer is admissible
ii) Grand jury testimony is admissible
* * * *
a) both (i) and (ii)
b) (i) only
c) (ii) only
d) neither (i) nor (ii)
75) If the prosecution is permitted to introduce the statement
to the Officer in (74) should the jury be instructed to consider
it only insofar as it affects the credibility of Z? Why or why
not?