
1. Internalism and Externalism about Justification

**Internalism:** the view about justification according to which all of the factors required for justified belief must be cognitively accessible to—already known or experienced by—the subject and thus internal to her mind.

**Externalism:** the view about justification according to which some of the factors required for justified belief may be external to the perceiver’s cognitive perspective.

2. Goldman’s Externalism: Reliabilism

According to internalism, if you were justified in believing p, then all your internal epistemic duplicates would be justified in believing p, too. The externalist about justification says that you and your internal epistemic duplicates can differ with respect to what you’re justified in believing.

**Process Reliabilism:** a version of externalism according to which S in believing that p iff S’s belief that p is linked to the fact that p by a reliable process.

S does not have to know how her belief is produced.
S does not have to possess evidence that the process leading to her belief is a reliable one.
S is justified in believing that p only if her belief was in fact produced by a reliable process.

3. An Externalist Account of Justification: Take One

Goldman’s initial account of justification goes as follows:
1. All beliefs produced by reliable processes (of the sort that require no beliefs as input) are justified.
2. All beliefs produced by conditionally reliable processes that received beliefs as input which were themselves justified are justified.
3. No other beliefs are justified.

In virtue of what is a process reliable?
A process is reliable insofar as it tends to produce true beliefs.

4. An Externalist Account of Justification: Take Two

Say that a belief B of S’s is "undermined" if S believes (or "ought" to be using a process that would generate a belief) that belief B was formed in an unreliable way. Then:
1. All beliefs produced by reliable processes (of the sort that require no beliefs as input) are justified, unless they’re undermined.
2. All beliefs produced by conditionally reliable processes that received beliefs as input which were themselves justified are justified, unless they’re undermined.
3. No other beliefs are justified.