INTRODUCTION

Country Background

Sudan is a state in central Africa, straddling the cultural and geographic divide of North and sub-Saharan Africa, directly south of Egypt and bordering eight other countries. With an estimated population of 40 million people covering nearly a million square miles (about a quarter of the size of the United States), Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has been enveloped in a costly civil war in all but ten years of its existence. The most recent struggle, begun in 1983, cost the country over 2 million lives and has displaced over 4 million people (CIA Factbook, 2005).

Sudan has two distinct major cultures, Arab and Black African, which have different demographics, religions, historical backgrounds and political preferences. The northern Sudanese states include the majority of the population (22 million), cover the majority of the country geographically, and include most of the major urban centers (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). Historically, the north was deeply influenced by Egypt during the time of the pharaohs. Later, Islamic and Arabic traders left their mark on the northern Sudanese, who primarily speak Arabic and practice Islam (Althaus, 1999).

Compared to northern Sudan, the southern region of the country has experienced far more difficulties in the country’s short history. The south, which has a population of around 6 million, has endured the brunt of the civil violence in the country (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). Southern Sudan has a very heterogeneous population, with some 117 different languages and 50
ethnic groups, it resembles traditional African heritage (Althaus, 1999; Sedan Yearbook, 1983). Due to decades of civil war and neglect by the northern government, southern Sudan has suffered from a severe lack of infrastructural development. The economy is predominantly a rural subsistence economy (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). Christian missionaries in the early 1900s converted many southerners to Christianity (around 10 percent today). However, most practice some form of traditional African religion.

Since becoming independent of Britain, the Sudanese people have consistently endured both repression and poverty. Other than brief periods of democracy (1956—1957, 1965—1968 and 1986—1988), Sudan has suffered under repressive regimes. According to the Polity IV index, which is a measure of a state’s regime type, Sudan has been a solid non-democracy in all but 13 years from 1956 through 2002 (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). This includes the twelve years prior to the onset of the current civil war and all years during the conflict.

Poverty often walks hand-in-hand with repression; Sudan is no exception. With a GDP per capita of less than US $300 at the beginning of the war and a current GDP per capita of US $433, Sudan is among the top ten percent of poorest countries in the world (CIA Factbook, 2005). While not the primary cause of internal conflict, poverty has worked to fuel the flames of rebellion while making civilians the biggest victims of the struggle.

Conflict Background

One must examine both the history of British colonialism and the role of Islamic fundamentalism to understand civil war in Sudan. In the early 19th century, Sudan was governed by Egypt, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. Early fault lines developed in the country between the Arab northerners and the black African southerners, who stood on opposing sides of
the slave trade. In 1879, British General Charles Gordon was given the task by the Egyptians of pacifying Sudan and ending the slave trade. In 1885, Gordon was killed trying to quell a revolt led by Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi, who sought to revive and purify Islam in the state. Al Mahdi, who was successful in the revolution, and his successor, Khalifa Abdallah, established Sudanese nationalism with close ties to the Islamic faith in their thirteen year rule (Glickman, 2000).

Khalifa Abdallah was defeated in 1898 by Lord Kitchener and a British force, which led to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956). This Condominium generally capped internal violence. However, British policies worked to divide the country and can be blamed for much of the violence occurring following their withdrawal from the state. These policies included the support of Islamic Sudanese nationalism in northern Sudan in order to prevent the spread of Egyptian influence and to protect British interest in the Suez Canal (Woodward 1990, 20-5). At the same time, the British worked to spread a distinctly African Sudanese identity in southern Sudan, which was safe from the spread of Islam under British occupation. While the British cannot be blamed for initially establishing the ethno-religious divide between the north and the south, the sixty years of their administration did little to quell the division and likely worked to further divide the country (Daly 1989, 22; Woodward 1990, 4-5, 77-78; Glickman 2000). After the withdrawal of Britain in 1956, the south was immediately marginalized and repressed by the north-dominated national government (Daly 1989, 89; Woodward 1990, 107).

Though British policies certainly widened the divide between the north and south, the root of the animosity in Sudan is Islamic fundamentalism in the north, which has consistently discriminated against non-Muslim southerners in their attempt to spread Islam throughout the
country (Yoynbee 1965, 5-6). The radical Islamist project attempted to establish a state governed under the Islamic laws of the shar’ia and viewed *jihad* (holy war) as an acceptable strategy for pushing Islam throughout the state. Given the Islamic leadership’s view of the universal transcendence of Islamic fundamentalism, there has historically been no possibility of integrating Sudan’s diverse populations into a single pluralist state (Lowrie, 1993). This view, of course, is unacceptable to non-Muslims in southern Sudan, whose struggle to resist religious repression led to the decades-long civil war in the country (Glickman 2000).

The most recent Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) was directly related to the first Sudanese civil war (1956-1972), which began in the first year of independence and lasted nearly sixteen years. The first conflict erupted when the Sudanese government attempted to force Arabic as the country’s official language and Islam as the official religion. It ended in 1972 when the government granted the south extensive autonomy (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). This peace was to be short-lived. In 1982, the central government reneged on many of its promises of self-rule and imposed Islamic law on the whole country, which led to the renewed violence the following year. Additionally, the discovery of vast reserves of oil in southern Sudan intensified the causes for rebellion (Althaus 1999; Glickman 2000). During the first Sudanese civil war (1956-1972), Chevron discovered oil in the area between the northern and southern regions. Seeing that the oil revenue was disproportionately benefiting the north, combined with the government’s reneging on previous promises, southerners were anxious to start the rebellion anew. The rebel groups originally stated overthrowing the government as their fundamental goal. However, in later years of the conflict, southern goals diverged with some wanting complete secession, with others seeking regional autonomy, religious freedom, and profits from natural resource extraction (oil specifically) (Fisher, 1999).
Since the second civil war began in 1983, over 2 million people died as a result of fighting, disease and hunger. Another 6 million civilians fled the area, moving mostly to Kenya and Uganda (Althus, 1999). Much of this devastation was due to irresponsible government tactics. According to US government and international human-rights officials, the Islamic state in Sudan committed “gross human rights violations” and worked to aggravate wide-scale famine throughout the country (Locante, 1993). Other than deaths, Christian and other religious minorities saw their civil rights restricted continually during the course of the war. Amnesty International reported “disturbing accounts of extrajudicial executions, disappearances and torture” carried out by the Islamic government in the north (Locante, 1993). During the war, non-Muslims in government-controlled areas were subject to shari’a, or Islamic law. Under the 1991 penal code, for example, all non-Muslims were banned from most jobs in the government, including the military and judiciary, could not testify against Muslims in courts, and were required to memorize the Qur’an to learn Muslim-based curriculum in the schools (Locante, 1993).

The size of both the government’s military and the rebel organizations grew over time due to aid from outside forces. At the turn of the century, over 50 percent of the government budget was spent on military supplies (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 136). Aid from countries such as Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya also contributed to the growth of government forces (Glickman, 2000). The exact size of the rebel organizations was difficult to measure given that the insurgency was generally unorganized and heavily fractionalized, with alliances between rebel groups changing sometimes on a daily basis. The largest rebel organization in Sudan was the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army). Led by John Garang, the SPLA had great success in the early years of the war. After eight years of fighting, it was able to drive the national army...
out of most of the south (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 126). In August 1991, the SPLA split into two warring factions between the Dinka and the Nuer, two of the largest ethnic groups in the south (Johnson 1998; Nyaba 1997). Later, it divided into three main factions including (1) the SPLA Torit faction led by John Garang; (2) the SPLA Bahr-al-Gazal faction led by Carabino Kuany Bol and (3) the SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement) led by Rick Machar. In 1997, the last of these three groups (SSIM) concluded a peace agreement with the Government, forming the UDSF (United Democratic Salvation Front) (Fisher, 1999; Foek, 1998). After forming this alliance, Machar’s SSIM was able to plunder, steal and destabilize the peace process while the government turned a blind eye due to the alliance (Foek, 1998). Most reports considered the Garang-led SPLA faction as the main rebel organization in Sudan; however, many other such organizations fell under the umbrella of rebel groups called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to which the SPLA belong. These included the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Beja Congress Forces, and the New South Brigade (The Military Balance, 2003-2004).

The Cold War played an important role in the Sudanese civil wars, particularly in the first war (1956-1978). Prior to the Six Day War in 1967, the United Kingdom supported the Sudanese government. Following this war, Sudan was distanced from the West while Soviets moved in to support the government (Cooper, 2003). During the height of the Cold War, the US government considered the dictatorship in Khartoum a key African ally due to their staunchly anti-communist stance. Since the 1989 military coup put a fundamentalist Islamic movement in power, Sudan has been considered a supporter of terrorism (Althus, 1999).

The most recent civil war has certainly not been confined to the Sudanese borders. Fleeing civilians in the south journeyed to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Egypt in large numbers. In 1999, US State Department officials estimated that some 350
thousand people lived in refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda alone (Althus, 1999).
Displacement of peoples resulted in what international humanitarian organizations call the “lost generation” of Sudan due to the absence of educational opportunities, basic health care and few prospects for productive employment (Globalsecurity.org, 2005).

THE INSURGENTS

Who are the Rebels?

In response to persistent northern efforts to unify the country by forcing Islam and the Arabic culture, southern political organization and guerrilla movements arose in the early 1960s. The most significant of these groups, the Anya Nya guerrilla movement, appeared in 1962 and eventually transformed into the SLM (Southern Sudan Liberation Movement) in 1971. Pressure from the SLM was a leading factor in the creation of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, which ended the first Sudanese civil war by granting considerable autonomy to the south.

While this agreement led to eleven years of peace, the root of the problem—northern efforts to establish an Islamic state—continued during the period of peace. Numeiri, the Sudanese government leader during this time, yielded to political pressure from the opposition Umma Party in 1983 by renewing the enforcement of shar’ia throughout the country with the passage of the “September laws” (Woodward 1990, 157). These laws led to thousands of public punishments including floggings, amputations and executions of non-Islamic southerners (Langewiesche 1994, 27). In his efforts to punish southern rebels, in 1983 Numeiri sent Lieutenant Colonel John Garang to quell a mutiny of government soldiers in the south. Rather than follow these orders, Garang encouraged a mutiny and garnered the support of the troops around him, forming the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which later led to the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM was the major force working to overthrow the Sudanese government during the second civil war.

Southern rebels in Sudan received political, military and logistical support from neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea during the civil war (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 136). The United States also aided the rebels indirectly. In February 1998, for instance, the US allocated $20 million in “non-lethal” military assistance to the governments supporting the SPLA rebel groups in order to defend opposition groups in their countries backed by Sudan. Occasional CIA programs also worked to aid the Sudanese rebels (Glickman, 2000).

**Geography**

Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a land area of nearly one million square miles. Bordering countries include Chad and the Central African Republic (west), Egypt and Libya (north), Ethiopia and Eritrea (east), and Kenya, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (south). The Red Sea lies along nearly 500 miles of the north-eastern border. The Nile River runs northward through the central part of the country, which includes nearly all of the Nile’s great tributaries.

Like the peoples, the Sudanese geography also falls along a North/South divide. Southern Sudan is a Texas-size area of prairies, woodlands, shallow rivers and marshes. The people residing in this area, who have more in common with people deep in Africa’s heartland than those in the northern part of the country, live traditional lifestyles of subsistence living off of the land (Althaus, 1999). No more than twenty-five miles of southern Sudan has paved roads and the vast majority of the region is without electricity or gas (Foek, 1998). The geography in northern Sudan is extremely diverse, ranging from uninhabitable deserts in areas to the west and east of the Nile, to mountains, clay plains, plateaus and rich grasslands (Country Studies, 2005).
Sudan’s diverse geography played a key role in the most recent civil war. Rebel fighting followed a seasonal pattern with heavy fighting during the dry season followed by a reduction in fighting during the months with heavy rainfall. The oscillation in rebel commitments between soldiering and farming encouraged disorganization and insubordination among rebel groups. These problems were compounded by the geographic isolation of many rebel units, which led to many independent warlords fighting among themselves as they attempted to overthrow the government (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 135-6). The recent cultivation of the oil industry in Sudan also placed higher stakes on the civil war. In the last quarter of 1999, Sudan began exporting large amounts of oil from the southern areas via a pipeline extending from the south-central region of the country to Port Sudan along the Red Sea (CIA Factbook, 2005). The extraction of oil from the south fueled the flames of war as southerners complained that the revenues benefited only the northern areas (Lacey, 2005).

**Tactics**

Both rebel and government tactics took on an increasing level of sophistication as the war progressed. Traditionally, SPLA forces practiced guerrilla tactics, including hit-and-run raids on government convoys, checkpoints and towns in order to disrupt supply lines, destroy government equipment and steal weapons, ammunition, cars, food and medicines (Vasagar, 2004; Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 136). Rebels were generally equipped with automatic weapons stolen from government forces (Foek, 1998). In 1996 and 1997, rebel groups boosted their efforts by capturing a substantial number of tanks and armored cars from the Sudanese government (Human Rights Watch, 1998). The rebellion also acquired advanced weapons such as Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and Belgian-made automatic rifles, which rebels claim were stolen from government forces.
(Vasagar, 2004). The improvement of rebel equipment gave rebel organization better mobility and more consistent re-supply capabilities (World Tribune.com, 2002).

The recent flow of oil from southern Sudan also gave the rebels a new target. For instance, rebels bombed the newly-built oil pipeline in September 1999, exactly 20 days after the first shipment of Sudanese oil was exported to Asia (Fisher, 19991). Oil installations were under continuous attack in the later years of the war, despite SPLA warnings to oil companies operating in southern regions that it considered their operations to be military zones (Agence France-Presse, 2001).

In recent years, foreign governments played a key role in aiding rebels with more advanced weapons. Ethiopia provided T-55 tanks in the 1980s and Uganda provided similar arms via the international arms market during the 1990s. Israel was criticized by the Sudanese government for supplying weapons and training to the SPLA, including a supply of anti-tank missiles via the Israeli embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (World Tribune.com, 2002). Other supplies of arms and military assistance came from Eritrea and Uganda, which were firmly behind the effort to overthrow the current government (Human Rights Watch, 1998). In addition to supplies, Ugandan troops were directly involved in anti-government fighting, engaging the government on Sudanese territory on a number of occasions. The United States was also indirectly involved in supporting the rebels by providing military support to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

The Sudanese government used a number of tactics to prevent their overthrow. One of their most successful tactics was fueling the flames of internal struggles within the rebel organization. The Sudanese government worked to frame the conflict as a struggle among southern tribes, while seeking peace with all groups individually (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 128).
In the later years of the war, the government worked through northern militia groups to fight the rebel organizations. The government-backed Janjaweed militia, for instance, continues to wreak havoc in the western region of Darful (see Sidenote 1).

   Government weapons came from a variety of sources. Recent arms suppliers included China, Iran, Yemen, South Africa and former Soviet bloc states such as Kazakhstan. Before being invaded by the US in 2003, Iraq played a role in providing technical assistance and military training. Malaysia also played an indirect role by providing funds for arms purchases. Until 1995, France supported government forces by sharing satellite intelligence of SPLA movements, providing military training and technical assistance, and aiding the Sudanese government in negotiating access to neighboring Francophone states in order to stage attacks (Human Rights Watch, 1998). The recent export of oil also helped the government build links with arms suppliers. For instance, an agreement signed with Russia in 2002 gave Sudan rights to manufacture Russian battle tanks in exchange for oil concessions (Human Rights Watch 2003, 457).

   Like rebel weaponry, government weapons became more advanced over time. Recent acquisitions of large quantities of light and medium arms and ammunition, medium tanks, artillery, and air power drastically increased their ability to fight rebels. These weapons included MiG fighter planes, Mi-24 helicopter gunships, modified version of the classic Soviet T-54 tank and SCUD missiles (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Overall, advanced weaponry such as night-vision systems and night-time air bombing gave the government a strong edge in military capability over the rebel organizations (World Tribune.com, 2002).

   Unfortunately, one tactic that both rebels and the government had in common was the utter disregard for civilian casualties. Beginning with the SPLA split between Dinka and Duer
fighters in 1991, divides between southern factions led to viscous attacks on civilian targets. For instance, in 1992 the SPLA-United alliance razed twenty-five Dinka villages, looting cattle and killing many civilians including young children (Jok & Hutchinson 1999, 131). Other tactics included extortion, rape, torture and murder (Foek, 1998). A recent report from the international medical organization Medicins sans Frontières (MSF) blamed warring parties on both sides for “appalling civilian mortality from infectious disease and violence” (MSF Press Release, 2002). Such tactics included rape, murder, assault and the denial of access to humanitarian aid. The government forces were equally culpable in harming civilians. In 2003, for example, human rights groups accused the government of engaging in a “scorched earth policy” in the Western Upper Nile of the South, killing or driving out civilians in order to make room for oil companies, whose revenues were used in part to fund the government forces (Cobb, 2003). Unfortunately, disregard for civilian life made the innocent the biggest victims of the Sudanese civil war (Althaus, 1999).

**CAUSES OF THE WAR**

Most sources report that the conflict in Sudan was simply a fight between Sudan’s Arab north versus the black African south, or between northern Islam and southern Christian and animist faiths; however, scholars have recently begun to explain that the war was actually far more complicated than this (Althus, 19999). Scholars such as Douglas Johnson (2003, 5) have recently argued that the root cause of the Sudanese conflict was based on the traditions of governance rather than a conflict between Arabs and Africans. Beginning with Turkish conquerors in 1821, the governments of Sudan worked to exploit the impoverished Muslim subjects in the north, who “passed on their losses to non-Muslims on the periphery.” This
tradition of exploitative governance resulted in what Johnson calls the “Sudanic state,” which exploits all civilians with the south receiving the brunt of this exploitation.

One of the most direct causes of the current divisions in Sudan can be traced to British decisions in the transitional period from colonialism to an independent state. During this period, the British failed to consider southern needs in preparation for independence. Southern Sudanese leaders were not even invited to participate in the negotiations during the transitional period in the early 1950s. In the post-colonial government constructed in 1953, the “Sudanization Committee” was comprised of on 6 southern leaders from some 800 available senior administrative positions (Kasfir 1979, 369). This allowed the northern-dominated administration to use the political machinery to force their Islamic agenda across the entire state. Although southern opposition groups initially tried to redress their grievances within the framework of a unified Sudanese state, religious persecution left non-Muslims with few peaceful options to counter these policies (Wai 1981, 117; Bartkus 1999, 136).

In the early years of the Sudanese state, the northern government passed many measures to repress the non-Muslim population. For instance, in February 1962 the government expelled all Christian missionaries from the country and closed Christian schools (Gurdon 1989, 68). These measures, along with indiscriminate attacks on protesters in Southern villages in late 1962, caused sporadic fighting and army mutinies in the south, which transitioned into a full-scale civil war (Hannum 1990, 311). Though the southern Sudanese had little chance of successfully overthrowing the government, the repressive policies of the government left them to choose between the lesser of two evils: either endure escalating religious and cultural persecution or fight (Bartkus 1999, 137).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s three key events led to peace. These included the 1969 coup, which placed Colonel Jaafar Numeiri in power, who then proposed that Sudan become a secular, socialist state. Second, bloody confrontations in 1971 between the Umma Party and Ansar brotherhood, two organizations consistently opposed to compromise with the south, led to a reduction in the power of Islamic fundamentalism in the government. Third, strong leadership by rebel leader Joseph Lagu overcame ethnic divisions and personal rivalries among the disparate rebel groups, bringing them together into the stronger Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (Bartkus 1999, 137). These events led to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which provided for the demobilization of guerrillas and their reintegration into Sudanese society. More importantly, it provided for a great deal of religious and cultural autonomy for the South.\(^1\) Due to the enhanced political autonomy, southern factions were able to live in harmony during the eleven years following the agreement, expressing their disagreements through peaceful, political means (Johnson 1988, 6).

The autonomy and freedom delivered to the south by the northern government was to be short-lived, however. As Islamic fundamentalists, who opposed the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement from the start, grew in political power, President Numeiri was forced to announce in late summer of 1983 that Sudan would once again become an Islamic state (Ottaway 1987, 891, 893). This announcement was followed by a series of decrees, which came to be known as the “September Laws.” These decrees severely restricted the rights of non-Muslims (Woodward 1990, 111; Ottaway 1987). During the first two years following the passage of these laws, thousands of public punishments, including floggings, amputations and executions, were handed out after extrajudicial trials (Langewiesche 1994, 27). Once again, in 1983 Sudan

---

\(^1\) See Bartkus 1999, 137-8 for more specific facets of the agreement.
plunged deep into a second civil war pitting non-Islamic southerners against religious and cultural intolerance by Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Khartoum (Bartkus 1999, 141).

OUTCOME

Conflict Status

In the early years of the 1990s, the international community, led by Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, led a push to bring peace to Sudan. Under the auspices of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), these countries began their mission in 1993. Since then, results have been mixed. In 1994, the IGAD initiative pushed the 1994 DOP (Declaration of Principles) plan, which aimed to identify the key elements necessary for a successful peace settlement. This agreement was not signed by the Sudanese government until 1997, after it lost several major battles to SPLA forces. Also pushing the government towards peace was the NDA (National Democratic Alliance), an umbrella coalition of opposition parties in the north and the south created in 1995. The NDA included opposition groups such as the SPLA, DUP and Umma parties. By uniting rebel and opposition groups into one organization, the Sudanese civil war became more than ever a center-periphery fight rather than a north-south conflict (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005).

In addition to signing the DOP plan in 1997, the Sudanese government signed a series of agreements with rebel organizations led by former Garang Lieutenant Riek Machar. These included the Khartoum, Nuba Mountains, and Fashoda agreements. Like the IGAD, these agreements called for a measure of autonomy for the south and the right of self-determination
Despite the agreements of the early and mid-1990s, the struggle in Sudan continued largely unabated in large areas of the country past the turn of the century. Great humanitarian crises brought on both by war and a drought in 2000-01 caught the attention of the international community who provided, and continues to provide, large amounts of humanitarian aid to Sudan in order to ward off mass starvation (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). Beyond natural disasters, the victimization of civilians by both the government and rebels came to the attention of the international community in the last decade.

Beginning in early 2002, Sudan saw a series of important agreements leading to a more peaceful country. In June 2002, a round of peace talks began under the previous IGAD initiative. Led by international observer countries including the US, UK, Norway and Italy, these talks ended on July 20th with the signing of the Machakos Protocol. This agreement provided for a six-year interim period after which a referendum on self-determination would be held in the South, providing the region with a clear choice between a united Sudan and separated states. The agreement also states that the Islamic Shar’ia law would continue only in the Northern regions (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005).

Later that summer (August 2002), a second round of talks began between the warring factions to discuss the sharing of power and wealth. This round brought together President Beshir and SPLA-leader John Garang in a historic meeting in Kampala. More importantly, the talks resulted in the signing of an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on October 15th, 2002, which called for a complete cessation of fighting for three months. A third agreement in February 2003 strengthened the two sides’ stand on the cessation of hostilities (GlobalSecurity.org, 2005). This agreement called for the creation of a new international team to verify and monitor compliance with the agreement. These agreements were extremely important
to Sudan’s long-term stability given previous studies finding that the inclusion of the international community in the peace negotiation process to be crucial to its success (Walter, 2002).

The last two years of the civil war saw a series of important agreements, which resulted in peace in much of the country. In January 2004, the government and rebels signed an accord on wealth sharing, which had become a major issue in later years of the fighting (especially since the export of oil in 1999). Later that year, on May 24, 2004, the warring parties signed three key protocols providing for six years of autonomy for southern Sudan followed by a referendum on the political future of the region. Finally, in January 2005, a peace agreement signed by southern rebels and the government of Sudan marked the end of the 21-year long struggle (Crilly, 2005). Signed by Sudan’s Vice President Ali Osman Taha and SPLA leader John Garang, this agreement called for a permanent cease-fire between the two sides. Additionally, it placed Garang to the post of First Vice-President in an important power-sharing deal.

Learning from previous mistakes of the Rwandan civil war, neither side disbanded their armies under the agreement, which provides both a deterrence against a possible genocide while, on the other hand, leaving the country in a state of tension given that either side could quickly resume the conflict if the peace process hits a snag (Njorge & Makgabo, 2005; Lacey, 2005; Walter 2002). Despite government reports of repeated violations in the cease-fire by rebel factions, today the majority of Sudan rests in tenuous peace (IRINnews.org, 2005).

**Duration Tactics**

Two key features of the second Sudanese civil war make it stand out among all civil wars. The first is the widespread atrocities against the civilian population, perpetrated by both the government and rebel factions. The second is the duration of the war, which lasted twenty-
one years. Several factors led to both the intensity and long duration of the war. One factor is the government’s ability to keep southern rebels fighting among themselves. Jok and Hutchinson (1999, 135-6) explain that the Khartoum government skillfully played rebel forces against each other by allying with southern factions as they attempt to gain control over the rebel movement. This led to roughly balanced forces between the warring rebels, which further prolonged the conflict.

A second factor contributing to the duration of the war was the government’s inability to handle guerrilla tactics practiced by Garang’s SPLA forces. Moreover, local support for rebel organizations helped them maintain supplies to continue fighting. A third factor was the government’s unwillingness to bend on its efforts to extend Islamic law to the entire country. According to SPLA leader John Garang (1987), given the options between peace under Islamic law versus a prolonged and deadly struggle, most southern Sudanese felt that war was better than peace. Further, the government’s history of reneging on promises led to an extremely low level of trust between the warring parties. This highlights the need for an international presence if peace in Sudan is to continue following the January 2005 agreement (Lacey, 2005).

Finally, one can look at resources as a factor that contributed to the long duration of the civil war. After beginning exports of oil in June 1999, the Sudanese government initially claimed that the oil profits would be shared throughout the country in order to build roads, schools and irrigation projects. The failure of the government to spread the oil wealth to Southern regions, however, strengthened the resolve of the rebel organizations (Fisher, 1999). The discovery of oil also raised the stakes for winning the civil war. That is, the victor of the civil war would have control over a large supply of oil reserves, making both sides more resolved in their struggle (Glickman, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).
External Intervention and Conflict Management Efforts

Until recently, the international community was overall neglectful of efforts to end the Sudanese civil war (Althaus, 1999). Efforts in both the 1990s and the 2000s were almost exclusively diplomatic with earlier efforts to promote peace coming exclusively from Sudan’s African neighbors. Fortunately, recent efforts by the international community have made significant progress in promoting peace in the region. One of the most significant developments in the peace process in Sudan was a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Following these attacks, The Bush administration placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, making them susceptible to the same US military intervention experienced by other states including Afghanistan and Iraq (Matheson, 2005). Under pressure from both African-American leaders and Christian activists in the US, who noted the Islamic government’s repression of religious rights, the Bush administration worked for peace in the country (Raghavan, 2005). The main result of this pressure was to signal to the government of Sudan that military intervention on the side of the rebels was likely, making the government more apt to make concessions to the rebel organization. Ultimately, this pressure led to the agreement in early 2005.

In addition to pressure from the US, which seemed to be the most significant conflict-management force, other actors in the international community played roles in promoting peace in the country. For instance, the United Nations is currently looking into the logistics of providing a peacekeeping force in Sudan to help make the January 2005 deal a success. Other countries and organizations, such as South Africa and the African Union, have committed assistance to helping enforce this agreement (Lacey, 2005). The vast majority of external efforts, however, have come in the form of humanitarian assistance. Responding to humanitarian crises
such as famine in the 1980s, for instance, the UN and several dozen private relief agencies set up Operation Lifeline Sudan to channel food and other aid to the south. This operation, which was originally meant to be a short-term humanitarian fix, was in operation for nearly the entirety of the Sudanese civil war (Althaus, 1999). More recent efforts, such as a donors conference held by Norway in April 2005, are important international efforts to aid the peace process in Sudan.

CONCLUSION

After twenty-one continuous years of war, prospects for future peace in Sudan may finally be looking up. While atrocities still continue in the Darfur region, the agreements signed recently bode well for a peaceful future. The root causes of the civil war, including religious repression, unequal distribution of wealth and power, and ethnic discrimination, which have been addressed in recent agreements, must continue to be at the forefront of Sudanese politics if peace is to continue in the country. Fortunately, the recently-signed agreement follows policy advice from civil war scholars such as Walter (2002) by establishing a transition period (six years), a merging of fighting forces, sharing of oil wealth and a division of political offices. Specifically, the inclusion of SPLA leader John Garang as one of Mr. Bashir’s vice presidents will provide previously-ignored southern groups with a strong voice in government, which should go a long way in reducing rebel grievances. A second positive sign for the future of peace in Sudan is the increased interest of the international community in establishing and sustaining peace in the country. Kenyan general Lazaro Sumbeiywo, for example, acted as the chief mediator during the negotiations leading to the 2005 peace agreement. Efforts from Norway, who held a donor’s conference in 2005 to bring significant developmental aid to Sudan during the transitional period, should also help in future efforts to sustain peace (Lacey, 2005).
While this author is overall optimistic regarding the prospects for future peace in Sudan, one might have easily come to the same conclusions following the conclusion of the first Sudanese civil war in 1972. Currently, the most pressing issue in the country is the crisis in Darfur, which must come to a quick and peaceful end before the conflict spreads again throughout the country. If the political leaders have truly learned from the mistakes made during the tenure of peace following the first civil war, we should expect the country to become more peaceful and prosperous as time progresses. However, if strict Islamic fundamentalists are allowed to force their views upon the non-Islamic population in the south, once again we will likely see the country plunged into a long and devastating civil conflict.
References


Sidebar 1: Crises in Darfur

One of the most pressing issues facing Sudan and the international community today is the conflict in a north-west region of Sudan known as Darfur. Demanding that the Sudanese government stop arming the Arab groups in the region, address underdevelopment, and discontinue discrimination, two new rebel groups, the SLM (Sudan Liberation Movement) and later the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) began a rebellion in February, 2003 (IRINnews.org, 2005). Unable to directly respond to the crisis itself due to the costly fighting in the south, the government responded by backing armed militias, known as the “Janjaweed” (US Department of State, 2004).

The government-backed “Janjaweed” militia pursued a “scorched earth” policy in Darfur with widespread killing and raping of civilians and the razing of entire villages. For example, in February 2004, a band of both militia members and government soldiers attacked the village of Taila, killing 67 people, abducting 16 girls, raping over 93 females and displacing over 5,000 people (US Department of State, 2004). Overall, the violence in Darfur has caused around 180,000 deaths through violence, hunger and disease while over 2 million have fled the region (Thomasson, 2005). UN officials have referred to the crises in Sudan as the world’s worst humanitarian crises (BBC News, 2005). US Secretary of State Colin Powell, placing full blame on the Janjaweed and the Sudanese government, has called their actions nothing short of genocide (CNN.com, 2004).

Recently, the international community has made moves lessen the humanitarian suffering and work towards a tenuous peace in Darfur. For example, the AU (African Union) has deployed 2,300 troops to monitor the often-broken cease-fire in the Darfur while the UN WFP (World Food Program) works desperately to distribute food throughout the region. Despite these efforts, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has pleaded adamantly for more international assistance, noting that the WFP faces a chronic shortage of funds (CNN.com, 2005) while the AU claims that an additional $466 million will be needed to sufficiently monitor the cease-fire (IRINnews.org, 2005). While failing to do little to disarm the Arab militia, the government of Sudan has also hindered efforts towards peace by denying visas to UN teams and blocking food and health aids from reaching its own people (US Department of State, 2004; Thomasson, 2005).
Ultimately, as Annan warns, continued crisis in Darfur could help unravel the accord that ended the second Sudanese civil war in early 2005.

Sources:


Sidebar 2: Lost boys of Sudan

Good endings can come from bad beginnings, as an inspiring group of young Sudanese refugee known as the “Lost Boys” of Sudan (named after the lost boys in Disney’s “Peter Pan”) have come to show the world. Fleeing the violence of the second Sudanese civil war in the late 1980s, some 33,000 Sudanese children (mostly boys) fled their homes in the mid-1980s after their families were killed by government forces. These children, coming mostly from the Dinka or Nuer tribes of Southern Sudan, journeyed hundreds of miles through the East African desert. Thousands miraculously survived the ordeal, finding refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya (Messina & Messina, 2005).

To survive the journey, the Lost Boys became each other’s families with the older boys, many just 9 or 10, caring after the younger ones. Many of these children died on the trek of starvation, thirst or animal attacks. To survive, the children often had to suck water from mud on the ground, eat leaves and carcasses of dead animals, and cross crocodile-invested rivers. It is estimated that no more than fifty percent of the Lost Boys (around 10,000) survived the journey, finally finding safety from UN and Red Cross relief workers at the Kakuma refugee camp in 1992 (Walgren, 1994).

In 1999, the UN Refugee Agency and the US Department of State collaborated to bring 3,400 of the Lost Boys to the US for permanent resettlement. Since then, they have been placed throughout the country in cities such as Omaha, Seattle, Richmond and Grand Rapids. Upon arriving in America, boys under the age of 18 were assigned to foster homes and attend schools. Those above 18 had to go to work, where their low levels of skill forced them to take menial, low-paying jobs. While the Lost Boy’s transition to America has been rocky at times, overall their story is one of astonishing tragedy and perseverance (Crawley, 2000).

Sources:


**Table 1. Sudan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>SPLA and other factions vs government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>November 1983 to January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>2 million (1983—2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type prior to war</td>
<td>-7 [polity4 variable in polity 4 data- ranging from-10 to 10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type after war</td>
<td>-6 in 2002 (war was ongoing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita year war began</td>
<td>$US299.9 [constant $ - 2000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita 5 years after war</td>
<td>$US289.6 [constant $ - 2000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents</td>
<td>SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army), several other factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Religion-based struggle for control of central government and/or succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel funding</td>
<td>Funding from Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea. Indirect aid from the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of geography</td>
<td>Large country with few paved roads has retarded government efforts to control rebel groups while encouraging inter-rebel fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of resources</td>
<td>Oil first exported in 1999 raised the stakes of fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate outcome</td>
<td>Peace agreement signed in January, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome after 5 years</td>
<td>Tenuous peace, atrocities continue in Darfur region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of UN</td>
<td>Long-term humanitarian aid, currently considering peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of regional organization</td>
<td>OAU active in 1990s in working for peace, efforts led to 2005 agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>4 million since the start of fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for peace</td>
<td>favorable, but tenuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
Casualties and refugees: CIA Factbook, 2005  
Regime Type: Polity IV (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995)  
GDP/capita: World Bank World Development Indicators
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1898—56</td>
<td>Sudan ruled by Anglo-Egyptian condominium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Sudan gains independence from Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956—72</td>
<td>First Sudanese Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>President Numayri declares the introduction of Shar’ia (Islamic law) and later martial law. Relations with non-Islamic south deteriorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>Rebels begin to organize SPLA led by John Garang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Sadiq al-Mahdi become prime minister after Numayri is desposed by a group of officiers (Apr), 3 years of chaotic government begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Lieutentant-General Omar Hasson al-Bashir (leader of National Salvation Revolution) takes power in a coup, dissolves parliament (June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Government offensive seizes southern territory, including SPLA headquarters at Torit (July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Government officials and rebels hold first talks in Uganda and Nigeria (Feb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>IGAD, a regional conflict-solving body, urges self determination for the south. Sudanese government quits talks (May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Presidential elections begin, Bashir wins (March); UN Security Council passes sanctions against Sudan for sponsoring terrorism (Apr); Bashir calls for national reconciliation and peace talks with rebels (May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Sudanese government signs deal with SSIM and other rebel groups, isolating SPLA (Apr); Government and SPLA begin peace talks in Kenya (Oct); US government imposes economic sanctions against Sudan (Nov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>US lunches missile attack on pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum (Aug)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Bashir dissolves the National Assembly, declares state of emergency (Dec)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2000  Talks resume but end 5 days later after rebels accuse government of indiscriminate attacks on civilians (Feb); Bashir re-elected for another 5 years in elections boycotted by main opposition parties (Dec)

2001  UN lifts sanctions against Sudan, US sanctions continue (Sept); Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi arrested after his party, the Popular National Congress, signs memo of understanding with SPLA (Feb); UN’s World Food Programme struggles to feed 3 million facing famine (Mar)

2002  Government and rebels sign a ceasefire agreement in Switzerland (Jan); Talks between Sudanese government and SPLM yield “Machakos Protocol,” addressing issues of religion and self-determination (July); Bashir meets rebel leader John Garang for the first time (July); Government and SPLM sign ceasefire during the latest round of peace talks (Oct)

2003  Rebels in Darfur rise against government, claiming the region is neglected by the government (Feb); PNC leader Turabi is released from detention, ban on PNC lifted (Oct); government and SPLA sign security deal, clearing the way for peace talks (Sept-Oct)

2004  Army moves to stop rebels in Darfur, hundreds of thousands of refugees flee from Darfur to Chad (Jan); UN accuses pro-government Arab “Janjaweed” militias of genocide in Darfur (Mar); government and southern rebels agree on power-sharing protocols as part of peace plan (May)

2005  Garang and chief government negotiator Taha sign a comprehensive peace accord ending the civil war (Jan); donors at a conference in Norway pledge $4.5 billion to help southern Sudan (Apr)

Information for this chronology comes from the following sources:

BBC News, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk

Reuters, available: www.reuters.com

### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles plan, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSIM</td>
<td>South Sudan Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSF</td>
<td>United Democratic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Information for Map

- A map dividing the North (Moslem, Arab, South (Christian, Black), government control, and rebel activity can be found at [http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/sudan2.htm](http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/sudan2.htm)

- A map with famine, specific areas of the war, and refugee movements can be found at [http://myweb.uiowa.edu/cthyne/sudanmap.pdf](http://myweb.uiowa.edu/cthyne/sudanmap.pdf)


- A more detailed map with the Sudanese provinces can be found at [http://www.theodora.com/maps/sudan_map_large.html](http://www.theodora.com/maps/sudan_map_large.html)

- A map focusing on areas of Darfur affected by the war can be found at [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/darfur/map.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/darfur/map.html)