The International Community’s Reaction to Coups

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With ten attempts since 2010, coups d’etat are surprisingly common events with vital implications for a state’s political development. Aside from being disruptive internally, coups influence interstate relationships. Though coups have important consequences, we know little about how the international community responds to these upheavals. This paper explores what drives global actors to react to coups. Our theory differentiates between normative concerns (for example, protection of democracy) and material interests (for example, protection of oil exports) as potential determinants of international responses to coups. We argue that coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction. Using newly collected data, we explore the number of signals that states and IOs send to coup states from 1950 to 2011. The analyses reveal that coups against democracies and wealthy states draw more attention. States react when democracies are challenged by coups, while IOs react to coups in Africa and coups during the post-Cold War period. We surprisingly find that heavy traders and oil-rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction, suggesting that international actors are more driven by normative concerns than material interests when reacting to coups.

On February 11, 2011, Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down as president of Egypt as the result of a military coup. The international community, including 11 states and the European Union, Arab League, G8, IMF, and United Nations (UN), praised the efforts of Egyptians and the army to oust their standing leader (Grier 2011; Morey, Thyne, Hayden, and Senters 2012). In contrast, the 1952 coup in Egypt that overthrew King Farouk’s monarchical regime received virtually no reaction from either states or international organizations (IOs). Such
inconsistency is common when dealing with a single state, but even more so when looking at reactions to coups across many states. For example, 11 states and three IOs harshly responded to the 1980 Bolivian coup, while not a single actor paid attention to coups that happened in the same year in Suriname, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Uganda. Likewise, states and IOs rarely respond to coups in the same manner, even when under the same leadership. The Obama administration released six official statements of condemnation following the March 2009 coup in Madagascar, and then responded to a coup in Honduras 3 months later with a single statement.

International responses to coups are best summarized with a single word: inconsistent. Sometimes outside actors overwhelmingly respond to turnover of a regime; at other times, they ignore unconstitutional changes in leadership. The inconsistency is surprising, particularly when we consider the important influence of coups on the domestic and international political environments. Coups can spark and extinguish civil wars (for example, Afghanistan 1978 and Colombia 1953, respectively), and coups can both derail and stimulate democratization (for example, Thailand 2006 and Portugal 1974, respectively). Because each of these outcomes are clearly linked to important processes like trade (Milner and Kubota 2005), interstate conflicts (Russett and Oneal 2001), and economic development (Colaresi and Thompson 2003), an improved understanding of when and how external actors responds to coups is important to the policy community. This is particularly true given that policies of states like the United States and IOs like the Organization of American States (OAS) mandate the automatic punishment of coup leaders to protect democracy. Yet, these policies are not applied consistently, and we know little about the implications of this inconsistency for the international community.

Improving our understanding of international responses to coups is also important for researchers focusing on democratization. Recent studies have shown that coups increase the likelihood of democratization (Thyne and Powell 2013), and that postcoup elections happen more quickly in the post-Cold War world (Goemans and Marinov 2012). Both studies theorize that international support for democratization plays a key role in both outcomes. Though one might expect that the supposed anticoup norm emerging after the Cold War automatically leads global actors to condemn coups, we cannot say for sure because surprisingly little research addresses the reaction of the international community to coups.

Coups can also speak to a debate in the broader scholarly community over whether states are driven primarily by economic and material interests versus normative concerns (Mitchell 2003; Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Given that coups happen across a variety of states—democratic/authoritarian, rich/poor, strong/weak, economically integrated/isolated—examining reactions to these events provides a unique opportunity to see how states prioritize their interests. Coups can also inform us about signaling more generally. Though the bulk of reactions to coups come with few tangible material costs, scholars increasingly recognize the importance of such signals (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Even cheap signals have important implications, because they signal the tolerance of the international community for coups. Silence or support may inspire coups elsewhere, while widespread condemnation may lead to counter-coups and widespread uprisings.

This paper asks: what motivates the international community to react to coups? To gauge global reactions, we use a new data set that tracks the responses of states and IOs to successful coups identified by Powell and Thyne (2011). We explore the number of signals, positive and negative, that a state receives from IOs and other states in the aftermath of a coup. We then investigate whether normative or material concerns, or both, compel international reactions to
coup. The analyses reveal that normative interests motivate the international community to respond to coups, as turnovers within democracies draw more attention than coups within nondemocracies. Additionally, the passage of time and the growth of the anticoup norm after the Cold War have led the global community, particularly international institutions, to react more to coups. We also find evidence that material interests drive responses to coups, as wealthier regimes receive more attention when overturned. However, heavily trading and oil-rich states do not necessarily receive more reaction. Taken together, our discussion indicates that while the international community’s reaction to coups is somewhat driven by material interests, normative concerns seem to be more influential in motivating coup response.

Capturing the International Community’s Reaction to Coups

In this paper, we explore conditions that compel the international community to react to coups. Coups are “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat a sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011:252). While it might be fruitful to gauge how the global community responds to unsuccessful coups, data are not available to broadly explore such reactions because these events are often brief and unreported, making it difficult to conduct a systematic empirical test of the global community’s response. We therefore focus on what makes states and IOs react to successful seizures of power. A coup is defined as successful if the elite perpetrators “seize and hold power for at least seven days” (Powell and Thyne 2011:252). Our analyses cover the 228 successful coups that took place from 1950 to 2011.

The specific reactions we investigate are signals (both positive and negative) that states and IOs send to a coup state. Signals are “actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor” (Gartzke 2003, 1). Signals include verbal reactions to a coup, such as UN secretary-general Ban Ki Moon’s 2011 statement commending Egyptians for exercising their rights and offering the UN’s help in assisting a regime transition (Radio Free Europe 2011). Signals also include policy actions toward a coup state, such as the United States pledging $2 billion in debt forgiveness and loan guarantees to Egypt after Mubarak’s ouster (Landler 2011). Positive signals toward coup states indicate support from the international community for leadership change, whereas negative signals indicate disapproval of a power shift.

While global actors can signal both positively and negatively toward coups, we do not explore the type or direction of signaling here. Were we to explore the direction of signals sent to a coup state, a dyadic analysis would be more suitable. This is because the direction of a signal is most likely a function of the unique relationship between a particular actor and a coup state. For example, we can imagine that democratic actors send negative signals to coups against fellow democracies, whereas the expected direction of signals from autocratic countries is unclear or may even be positive. However, because we are concerned with the global conditions and systemic environment that provokes attention to coups, we leave future work to model the dyadic relationship between actors and coup states. Instead, we focus on the total number of reactions, both positive and negative, that actors send to coup states. This is an important first step. The international community does not react to every coup, and there is wide variation in the amount of attention coups receive. By identifying how the qualities of coups and coup states influence the amount of global attention they garner, we learn about the values and commitment of the international community.
Normative and Material Costs of Coups to the International Community

This paper explores whether the international community’s treatment of illegitimate regime transitions reflects a normative commitment to democracy or whether material and economic interests motivate international actors to respond to coups. Drawing a contrast between these interests allows our efforts to speak to more general debates in the field. Realists would likely expect international reactions when coups threaten states’ material, economic, and security interests. In contrast, constructivists would likely anticipate the emerging anticoup norm and the development of democratic norms to spur international responses when coups threaten the prevailing normative and ideological agenda. Meanwhile, liberals and neoliberals are apt to focus on how the development of international institutions influences both state and organizational responses to coups. Investigating the link between normative and material interests and coup responses reveals the international community’s values, particularly as they relate to illegal regime transitions. We begin our discussion by developing expectations based on normative concerns.

Normative Interests in Coups

After World War II, the international community established democracy promotion as a central goal and propagated norms of democracy through global institutions. Coups are perhaps the biggest threats to these espoused global values of democracy. The effects of coups in democracies are profound, since coups are the foremost reason democracies fail (Onwumechili 1998; Kieh and Agbese 2004). Because coups within democracies substantially increase the risk of democratic failure, and because the international community has a strong normative commitment to democracy (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Pevehouse 2005), we expect coups within democracies to draw international ire.

A normative commitment to protecting democracies from coups is in fact explicitly incorporated into the charters of many IOs. International agreements often require their members to punish coups against democratic regimes. For example, the OAS passed Resolution 1080 in 1991, which includes a promise to “promote and consolidate” representative democracy. This resolution calls for the secretary-general to convene a meeting following an irregular interruption of power, during which the offending regime can be suspended with a two-thirds vote from other members. The anticoup stance was further bolstered in 2001 with the passage of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which pledges to respond to any “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime” of a member state. Given this clear commitment to democracy, the OAS’s suspension of Honduras following the 2009 coup that overthrew President Manuel Zelaya should have come as no surprise.

Like international institutions, many mature democratic countries have explicitly made a normative commitment to punishing coups against fellow democracies. The United States, for example, has since 1993 forbade US funds from being “expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or decree.” This policy led the United States to cut off everything but humanitarian assistance to the Malian government following their 2012 coup and even spurred a militarily intervention of 20 thousand troops to ensure the return of President Aristide to Haiti in 1994.
Given that the espoused norms of the international community heavily favor democracy, and that institutions and states have specific policies to restore and protect democracy, it is likely that coups against democracies will elicit a great deal of global attention. Conversely, coups within nondemocracies are less likely to draw global reaction because the international community has not formalized a commitment to condemning illegal turnovers in nondemocratic regimes. Also, coups within nondemocracies are relatively common and rarely lead to stunning political change. Among the 228 successful coups coded by Powell and Thye (2011), around 65% occurred in nondemocracies. Though coups increase the likelihood of democratization (Thyne and Powell 2013), they most often replace one authoritarian leader with another. This means that international actors are less likely to react to coups within nondemocracies because they are less of a threat to the democratic community.

Even though coups against democracies are rare, the upheaval of a democratic leader is more likely to garner attention from the international community than a coup against a nondemocratic leader. The attention may be positive or negative—democratic leaders will likely condemn democratic coups, while authoritarian leaders may actually support coups against democracies. Yet, given that the normative values of the international community so strongly favor democracy, the removal of democratic leaders is much more likely to draw ire than the ouster of nondemocratic leaders. For example, the international community reacted quickly and harshly to the 1987 coup ousting democratically elected Fijian Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra. The UN denounced Fiji, and Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the UK suspended foreign aid. Only three years earlier, not a single state or IO responded to overthrow of the dictatorial Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré.

A normative commitment to democracy requires states and IOs to react to coups against democracies more than coups against nondemocracies. Further, it is likely that the more democratic a coup state is, the more the international community will respond. A country with weak democratic or nascent democratic institutions will draw some global response, but a country with strong or mature democratic institutions is more likely to elicit attention when overtaken by a coup. This motivates the following hypothesis:

\[ \text{H1: As a coup state's level of democracy increases, states and international organizations are more likely to react to the coup.} \]

As explained above, the end of World War II brought a normative commitment to democracy that was propagated through global institutions. The normative commitment became even stronger at the end of the Cold War, when the international community was emboldened to spread and institutionalize democracy. This led a variety of actors to agree to condemn coups, resulting in an anticoup norm (Thyne and Powell 2013). Surprisingly, democracies and densely democratic institutions were not the only actors who committed to punishing coup states. Institutions composed primarily of nondemocracies also adopted anticoup policies after the Cold War. Despite decades of adherence to the principle of nonintervention, African states in the 1990s took a more proactive approach to deterring coups. The 1997 Harare summit of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) passed a resolution condemning coups, followed by the 1999 Algiers declaration banning leaders who had taken power via coup since the last meeting or had not held credible elections (Piccone 2004; Ould-Abdallah 2006). However, the overthrow of Henrie Konan Bedie of the Cote d'Ivoire just months after the Algiers Declaration challenged the OAU. Rather than fol-

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3 The mean Polity IV score for states with successful coups is −4.30 (SD = 4.02).
ollowing through on its commitments, the OAU took no punitive measures and even allowed new head of state General Robert Guei to attend the next annual summit (Kieh and Agbese 2004:10–11).

While punishment provisions in the OAU charter initially failed, the anticoup norm strengthened over the post-Cold War period, and the OAU (which later became the African Union) increased its commitment to coup condemnation. After the Algiers Declaration, a meeting in Lome created a more formal framework, where any coup-born regime would automatically “not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union” (Piccone 2004:25). This was strengthened by the abandoning of the OAU’s noninterventionist policy, when at the launching of the African Union in 2002 the organization dedicated itself to “immediately and publicly” condemning coups, and imposing sanctions in the case of “resistance” (Ould-Abdallah 2006:23). The African Union’s policies are an example of how an anticoup norm developed after the Cold War.

Not only did the norms of the international community strengthen after the Cold War, so did its level of activity, willingness, and ability to intervene in matters abroad. The Cold War stifled a number of international institutions from intervening or even speaking out on the domestic affairs of states. Consider the UN Security Council, which passed 646 resolutions from 1946 to 1989 and 1,213 resolutions between 1990 and 2008. The Security Council’s level of activity doubled in just 18 years after the Cold War. Many institutions were similarly paralyzed during the Cold War and could not agree to intervene in what were considered domestic matters. Strategic politics prevented member states from agreeing on which coups were good and which were bad. This left IOs largely silent regarding coups during the Cold War.

Beyond simply ignoring coups, many coups were actually instigated by major powers during the Cold War, so they were not a surprise (Zimmermann 1983; Thyne 2010). While the bulk of the CIA’s efforts to oust Marxist President Salvador Allende in Chile were covert, for example, President Nixon’s overt statements left little doubt that the United States sought his eventual overthrow in 1973 (Kornbluh 1999; Thyne 2010). As with this coup, the rest of the world had little reason to react to similarly anticipated and expected events during the Cold War. In contrast, the end of the Cold War brought forth an anticoup norm, which developed and strengthened as states and institutions adopted policies rejecting coups as a tool of regime change. The passage of time represents the birth and growth of a normative commitment to democracy and a disdain for illegal regime transitions. We should therefore see more international reaction to coups after the Cold War than during it, and coups today should garner more attention than those in the immediate years following the Cold War. This motivates the following hypothesis:

H2: The more recent a coup (particularly during the post-Cold War period), the more likely states and international organizations are to react.

Material Interests in Coups

While the international community frequently adheres to certain norms, actors are also driven by material concerns. Such economic interests are likely to compel global actors to respond to a coup. Instability associated with a coup can jeopardize future economic interactions, making trading partners nervous and therefore likely to condemn the coup. Or, a coup might open up new economic relationships, leading countries to engage and endorse the regime. Either way, the more important a coup state is to the global economy, the more likely the world is to react.
One motivation of actors to react to a coup comes from trading interests. Coups make trading partners fear losing a market for their exports should the new regime put up barriers to trade. They also fear the new regime might block exports, jeopardizing the global community’s importation of valuable goods. Two economic indicators can gauge the importance of a coup state. One is its level of trade. As a coup state is more integrated as a trade partner into the global economy, other actors are likely to respond out of fear of jeopardizing current trade ties or hope of fostering new ones. For example, though the 1993 coup led by General Sani Abacha largely maintained the status quo of military rule in Nigeria, the state’s heavy integration into the international economic community, particularly its agricultural and petroleum exports, helps explain why the putsch garnered strong condemnation from the European Union, the US, the UK, and France. In contrast, the relative unimportance of Lesotho to the global economy helps explain why only a single actor, the United States, reacted to the 1991 coup. The lack of response was particularly surprising because the coup leader quickly handed power over to a democratically elected government. This motivates the following hypothesis:

H3: As a coup state’s level of trade increases, states and international organizations are more likely to respond to the coup.

The presence of primary commodities within a coup state is also likely to draw the world’s attention to a regime change. There are number of commodities to spark reaction, but the commodity most integral and visible to the global economy is oil. Even the rumor of a coup attempt in oil-rich states like Iran and Venezuela can cause a leap in oil prices, which is likely to immediately draw the attention of international actors. For example, crude oil prices spiked to a monthly high of $79.29 a barrel in February 2010 when traders mistakenly thought the coup overthrowing Niger President Mamadou Tandja took place in oil-rich Nigeria (Garrett 2010). We therefore expect the presence of oil within a coup state to bring attention to political instability within that state.

H4: As a coup state’s level of oil production increases, states and international organizations are more likely to respond to the coup.

**Data and Methods**

*Data Collection, Estimator, and Dependent Variable*

We expect that normative and material concerns drive international actors to respond to coups. Tests of our expectations require data on responses from all external actors in the postcoup period. We begin our data collection following Powell and Thyne (2011), who code 228 successful coups from 1950 to 2011. The unit of analysis, postcoup period, is defined as either (i) the six months following a successful coup or (ii) the time until a subsequent coup, if the subsequent attempt comes during the 6-month postcoup period. 4 We

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4 Though six months is admittedly arbitrary, we estimated that this was a reasonable time period for states and IOs to develop official responses. The mean time between a coup and all signals is 57.9 days (SD = 50.23), which helps justify this decision. To be sure, we randomly choose ten coups for more thorough inspection, searching for signals two years beyond the coup date. The six-month rule does not lead to the omission of signals in each of these cases.

5 For example, since 1950 Cuba has had a single successful coup on 03/10/1952. The postcoup period for Cuba includes 03/10/52-09/10/52 (the coup date plus 6 months). Haiti had three successful coups in 1957, including coups on 04/02/57, 05/21/57 and 06/14/57. The three postcoup periods for Haiti in 1957 include 04/02/57-05/20/57, 05/21/57-06/13/57, and 06/14/57-12/14/57. Postcoup dates had to be truncated due to quick successive coups such as this in 16 of our 228 cases.
code international reactions by gathering information on all official reactions from both states and IOs during the postcoup period.\(^6\) We began by scouring news outlets for each successful coup during the postcoup period. Coders relied primarily on the *Historical New York Times* and *Lexis-Nexis* databases. This first step resulted in more than 700 articles for potential coding. After purging unofficial and redundant statements, we were left with 1259 reactions to 98 of the 228 coups. There was no official response from either states or IOs to the remaining 130 coups. The 1259 reactions came from a variety of actors. The most frequent signalers include major power states (29.39%), non-major power states (20.02%), the UN (14.54%), the European Union (12.79%), the AU/OAU (14.85%), and the World Bank/IMF (5.08%). Figure 1 shows a summary of all states and IOs that reacted to coups during the period under study.

Examples of signals are the United States’ and OAS’s reactions to the July 1980 coup in Bolivia. The Carter administration cut off economic aid and withdrew military advisors and embassy staff, while the OAS deplored the coup and expressed “deep concern over the loss of life and the human rights of the Bolivian people” (Getler 1980).\(^7\) In this example, the US’s and OAS’s signals toward the Bolivian coup were coded as negative, though our interest here is primarily in whether or not states and IOs responded to the coup in any manner.

Our dependent variable is the count of reactions from international actors in each postcoup period. We break this down into 3 categories. The first is a count of all signals from either states or IOs for the 98 postcoup periods that received international reactions ($\bar{X} = 2.37$, SD = 4.16). The second category is a count of reactions from IOs, which happen following 69 coups ($\bar{X} = 0.95$, SD = 1.93). The third focuses exclusively on the 87 coups that received reactions from states ($\bar{X} = 1.41$, SD = 2.63). Diagnostic tests indicate overdispersion, so we use a negative binomial regression model (rather than a Poisson model) to analyze the data. All independent variables are lagged one year to avoid endogeneity. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.

\(^6\) By “official reaction,” we mean statements from representatives authorized to speak on behalf of the entire state or IO. For example, Senator DeMint’s statement in support of the 2008 Honduran coup is not coded because DeMint cannot define official international policy on behalf of the US government (Davis 2009). In contrast, Hillary Rodham Clinton’s condemnation of the Honduran coup was coded because the Secretary of State can speak officially on behalf of her government (Sheridan 2009).

\(^7\) Signals like these were also recorded and coded as conflictual or cooperative following the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) scale (Goldstein 1992), although the conflictual or cooperative nature of the signal is not employed in these analyses.
Primary Independent Variables

Our first theoretical expectation is that international actors will be more likely to respond to coups as the democracy level of the coup state increases (H1). We operationalize regime type using the *Polity IV* measure, which ranks every country-year on a scale of −10 (most authoritarian) to +10 (most democratic) (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2009). Though the bulk of states in our data are clearly authoritarian ($\bar{X} = -2.46, \text{SD} = 5.50$), around 27 percent are above 0 and 15 percent are above 5 on the Polity IV measure.

Our second hypothesis predicts that more recent coups are likely to draw reactions from states and IOs. We operationalize this concept in two ways. First, we attempt to directly capture the anticoup norm that developed in the *post-Cold War* period with a dummy variable for the period following the Cold War (1989 onwards; 16.59% of observations). Second, we add the year that the coup happened as an independent variable ($\bar{X} = 1974.2, \text{SD} = 14.29$). We expect each to draw positive coefficients to support our second hypothesis.8

Our third and fourth hypotheses focus on the coup state’s connection to the international economic environment. We predict that reactions from states and IOs to coups should be more frequent in states with high trading volumes and in states that are major exporters of oil. Trade data are taken from version 3.0 of the Correlates of War data on International Trade (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009; Barbieri and Keshk 2012). The values of *Trade* are logged to reduce skewness in the data ($\bar{X} = 6.37, \text{SD} = 1.58$).9 We capture major *Oil Exporters* using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), who code a dummy variable capturing all states whose fuel exports exceed one-third of export revenues (9.22% of observations). We expect both measures to produce positive coefficients to support our expectations.

Control Variables

We include several control variables to isolate the effects of our primary independent variables. First, we expect that states and IOs are more likely to react to coups in wealthier states. Wealthy states are likely connected to the international community both economically and politically, representing potential trading partners or foreign aid donors, for example. Thus, we include the logged value of *GDP/capita* from Gleditsch (2002), with updates from the World Bank’s WDI data set (2012) to capture state wealth ($\bar{X} = 6.50, \text{SD} = 0.916$), expecting to see a positive effect on reactions from international actors.

We also expect coups in *Africa* (37.33% of observations) and the *Americas* (30.41% of observations) to elicit fewer responses than coups in other regions. Two factors motivate these expectations. First, due to their colonial experience, we might expect sovereignty norms to shape decisions about external responses to these countries. Fewer signals are expected toward coups in the *Americas*, for example, due to the historical dominance of the United States over this region. Beginning with the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and reinforced with the “Roosevelt Corollary” (1904), the United States made clear its intent to keep European powers out of the region, with the view that the United States had a “moral mandate” to enforce proper behavior in Latin America. Though perhaps less forcefully, we might expect European colonizers of Africa to consider former colonies as their domain when it comes to responding to coups. The French

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8 We present results using the post-Cold War dummy variable alone. Results using the coup year as an alternative reveal substantively identical findings.

9 In addition to total trade, we also examined total trade as a percentage of GDP. The results are substantively similar to what we present in Table 1.
response to the 2012 Malian coup and the resulting bloodshed lends support to this expectation. Furthermore, while coups undoubtedly disrupt all regimes, they are unfortunately less noteworthy in Africa relative to a plethora of other events that attract international attention in the region (for example, civil wars, genocide, famine).

We also expect states that have experienced recent coups to elicit fewer reactions from international actors. This is because coups are simply less shocking and newsworthy when they happen in states that have had repeated coups in the past. For example, Bolivia had a string of 8 successful coups from 1969 to 1981. We expect reactions to these coups to be infrequent during this period as states and IOs become accustomed to Bolivian coups. In contrast, we would expect ample reaction if Bolivia had a successful coup today, given that they have not experienced a coup since 1981. We capture this concept with a dummy variable, Recent Coup, coded 1 if the state experienced a coup within the past five years of the coup being observed (36.87% of observations). Taken together, we expect both the dummy variables for Africa and recent coups to have a negative effect on the count of international reactions.

Our final control variables are included when we isolate both IO reactions and state reactions as dependent variables. When coups take place, states often have the option of responding collectively through IOs, alone, or by doing both. Likewise, when particularly shocking coups happen (for example, Egypt 2011), we expect both states and IOs to react. Thus, it is important to control for the

Table 1. Determinants of International Reactions to Coups d’état, 1950 to 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) All</th>
<th>(2) IOs</th>
<th>(3) States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>1.658***</td>
<td>0.870***</td>
<td>0.558</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade (ln)</td>
<td>−0.019</td>
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<td>−0.090</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
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<td>Oil exporter</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>−0.476</td>
<td>−0.074</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.426)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
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<td>GDP/cap (ln)</td>
<td>0.483*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.342*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>−0.458</td>
<td>0.644**</td>
<td>−0.513</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.410)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.345)</td>
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<td>Americas</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>0.466</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
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<td>Recent coup</td>
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<td>0.137</td>
<td>−0.095</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
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<td>State reaction</td>
<td>2.544***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO reaction</td>
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<td>1.771***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−2.551**</td>
<td>−4.740***</td>
<td>−2.354**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(0.989)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant (lnalpha)</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>−1.625*</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.944)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi2</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>226.1</td>
<td>100.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>−362.2</td>
<td>−188.6</td>
<td>−280.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (one-tailed).
count of State Reactions when analyzing IO reactions as the dependent variable, and IO Reactions when analyzing state reactions as the dependent variable.

Results

We present our primary findings in Table 1 with each column representing the three categories of our dependent variable: all reactions (Model 1), IO reactions (Model 2), and state reactions (Model 3). Regarding our first hypothesis, we see that all types of reactions are more likely as the coup state’s polity level increases and that this finding is driven primarily by state signalers.

Beyond statistical significance, in Figure 2, we present the substantive influence of the significant independent variables from each model by calculating each variable’s marginal effect on the dependent variable using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). The figure displays how the count of reactions for all states (the diamonds), IOs (the circles), and states (the Xs) varies as each independent variable ranges from 0 to 1 (for dichotomous variables) and from the 10th to 90th percentile (for continuous variables), while holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode. Using this approach, we see a 97.0% (1.136–2.238) increase in reactions from all actors as Polity increases from its 10th to 90th percentile (−8 to +7). Again, this finding is primarily driven by state actors. While the dependent variable for IO reactions is insignificant, we see a 152.9% (0.310–0.784) increase in state reactions as a coup state’s Polity level increases. Though the results do not support our theoretical expectation for IOs, we see at least some support for the first hypothesis when focusing on state reactions.

We suspect that two factors are driving the null finding for the relationship between democracy and IO reactions. First, not all IOs are geared toward protecting democracy. Among those that are, many have only focused on promoting democracy recently. For example, we might be unsurprised that the AU only recently began condemning coups when we consider that the organization has been chaired by three coup-plotters (Gadhaffi, Obiang, and Sassou-Nguesso). And while democracy has taken hold throughout most of the Americas, the bulk of these states democratized during the “Third Wave” of the 1970s (Huntington...
1993). Second, when deciding how to respond to a coup, states may choose to either work alone, through their IO membership, or both. Coups against democracies provide opportunities for leaders to make strong and uncontroversial statements to show leadership. We suspect that they prefer to have the spotlight when making these signals rather than working through IOs.

Our second hypothesis predicts that international actors react more to coups as time passes after the Cold War. This is tested in Table 1 with a post-Cold War dummy variable. The results in Model 1 indicate that all actors are more likely to react to coups that happened after 1989. Focusing on Models 2–3, we see that IOs are driving the heightened reaction to coups in the post-Cold War period, which is consistent with the more recent institutionalization of the anticoup norm by IOs like the AU and OAS during this period. In substantive terms, Figure 2 shows that the measure for the post-Cold War period has one of the strongest effects on the dependent variables. We see a 438.8% (1.452 to 7.824) increase in responses from all actors and a 148.2% increase for IO reactions (0.085–0.211) during the post-Cold War period. Thus, there is fairly strong support for the second hypothesis, with IOs clearly driving the heightened global response to more recent coups.

We find little support for our third and fourth hypotheses. Regarding the former, neither all reactors, IOs, nor states are more likely to respond to coups as the coup state’s trading volume increases. Likewise, neither group is more likely to respond when the coup state is a major oil exporter. There are two likely reasons for these null findings. First, IOs do not trade, and only a small handful of IOs are meant to influence trading relationships (for example, the WTO). It is therefore unlikely that IOs like the UN would pay any more attention to coups that happen in states with major trading volumes or oil exports than to any other state. Second, given that our measures are monadic, they do not capture actual trading relationships between states. While Nigeria has a high volume of trade and significant oil exports, for example, its exports are centered on only a small handful of states (the United States and China), leaving few states to care enough to react to a successful coup in the country. Though it would require a different data set and unit of analysis, an improved measure would capture the dyadic relationships that are not captured here.

The control variables largely support our expectations. International actors are significantly more likely to respond to coups that happen in richer states. In fact, state wealth has the most consistent and nearly the strongest substantive effect of all measures in the model. Figure 2 shows increases in the number of reactions of 218.7% for all actors (0.872–2.779), 100.0% for IOs (0.062–0.124), and 125.2% for states (0.301–0.678). We also expect fewer reactions from international actors to coups that follow recent coups and to coups that happen in Africa and the Americas. The bulk of these expectations receive little support. Neither states nor IOs are less likely to respond to coups in the Americas or to coups that follow recent coups. However, while state reactions to coups in Africa are expectedly less common, we find that IO reactions are 94.0% (0.084–0.163) more common. This finding is heartening, as it indicates that coups in the world’s poorest region are attracting at least some attention from the international community. Finally, we see in Models 2–3 that state reactions and IO reactions are apt to run together. IOs are significantly more likely to respond as the number of state responses increases, and vice versa. Rather than having a substitution effect, these results indicate that both states and IOs respond similarly to coups.

**Conclusion and Implications**

This paper presents some of the first work to broadly measure and gauge the international community’s response to coups. Our theory differentiates between
normative considerations and material interests that might drive responses to coups. We use newly collected data on state and IO reactions to successful coups from 1950 to 2009 to test our expectations. Our findings largely support the argument that normative considerations drive international responses to coups. Democracy promotion is a strong norm of the global community, so not surprisingly, we find that democratic regimes receive more attention when overtaken by coups. We also provide evidence of anticoup norm developing after the Cold War, as global actors became more empowered to respond to coups. Although we find that the overall level of a country’s wealth draws more attention to coups, the amount of trade or presence of oil commodities does not make the community more responsive to coups. Finally, we see that IOs responses come frequently to coups in Africa.

This paper is an important first step to understand a larger process. The next step is to explore the direction and type of signals that actors send to coups. Although we might expect the global community to universally lambast coups, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, that is not necessarily the case. Initial analyses show a great deal of variation in signals by international actors. Sometimes states and institutions send cooperative signals, but at other times, they send conflictual ones. For instance, the global community praised the coup last year in Egypt, but denounced the turnover in power when Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was deposed in 2008. We suspect the direction of signals is a function of the strategic relationship between global actors and the coup state. Future work might also explore whether and how the nature of signals promotes democratization after successful coups. Recent work shows that coups are surprisingly good for democratization, particularly in states unlikely to democratize (Thyne and Powell 2013). It would be useful to uncover whether the reaction of the international community plays a role in promoting democracy among post-coup states. As fledgling research on coups moves forward, we urge scholars to continue to consider the role that international actors play in these events.

References
