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ONLINE APPENDIX

SECTION 1: CLARIFICATION OF MEASURE FOR "US SIGNALS"

What are events data?

According to Schrodt (1995), "*Event data* are a formal method of measuring the phenomena that contribute to foreign policy perceptions. Event data are generated by examining thousands of newspaper reports on the day to day interactions of nation-states and assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical code. For example, if two countries sign a trade agreement, that interaction might be assigned a numerical score of +5, whereas if the two countries broke off diplomatic relations, that would be assigned a numerical score of -8. When these reports are averaged over time, they provide a rough indication of the level of cooperation and conflict between the two states."

In this paper, events data are used to capture signals sent from the US to states in Latin America. One could reasonably argue that "signals" extend beyond the events captured in the most common events datasets, which are perhaps better defined as "interactions." In their purest form, signals would include seemingly immeasurable actions, such as a roll of the eyes or hostile intonation in one's voice. In fact, the origins of signaling theory can be traced to these types of actions within the evolutionary biology literature (e.g., Zahavi 1975; Grafen 1990). As I explain on pages 8-9, however, events data provide the most useful measure available to capture variation in a government's level of support or hostility towards another government on a day-to-day basis because they can be found across a wide scale of time and space.

Examples of these events in the year preceding the Allende coup are presented in Table 1. As we can see, COPDAB (explained below) codes the signal's initiator (init) and the target (target), along with the general activity, a short description (area), and the intensity of the interaction on a weighted scale. For example, the first event (01/01/72) reports an agreement to hold future talks to delimit a fishing border. This is a moderately supportive signal, and is given a +10 on the conflict/cooperation scale. On the hostile side, we see several events in which the US denied allegations by the Chilean government of attempting to foment a coup (e.g., 12/09/72). These moderately hostile signals are coded -6. Likewise, on 02/17/72, WEIS (explained below) reports that the US disapproved of Chile's plan to default on foreign debts, which is a moderately hostile signal (-2.2). On the supportive side, the final WEIS event (12/21/1972) records a meeting between US and Chilean officials, which represents a supportive signal (+1.0).

Appendix Table 1. COPDAB and WEIS codes: Signals Sent from the US to Chile, 1972

COPDAB

year	month	day	init	tar	activity	area	weight
1972	1	1	2	155	agree	To hold talks on fishing & 200 mile limit	10
1972	1	12	2	155	visit	By Congress mission on drug trafficking	6
1972	1	26	2	155	agree	To reschedule $300M owed by Chile government	27
1972	2	17	2	155	express	Disapproval over Chile defaulting on loans	-6
1972	4	12	2	155	meet	OAS meeting in Washington	14
1972	4	15	2	155	deny	US is coercing Chile economically	-6
1972	6	23	2	155	agree	Refinance Chile foreign debt by 29 US banks	27
1972	10	17	2	155	deny	French court barred payment for Chile at US request	-6
1972	12	5	2	155	deny	Charge of US economic aggression against Chile	-6
1972	12	9	2	155	deny	US military aid designed to overthrow Chile gov.	-6
1972	12	20	2	155	discuss	Mounting bilateral problems	6

WEIS

year	month	day	init	tar	description	weight
1972	1	26	2	155	Agree to reschedule debt owed by Chile government	6.5
1972	2	17	2	155	Disapprove over Chile defaulting on bank loans	-2.2
1972	3	23	2	155	State Dept. denies any move to block Allende	-1.1
1972	3	30	2	155	CIA denies effort to foment coup against Allende	-.9
1972	4	15	2	155	US Assnt. Sec. of State explains US position towards Chile	0
1972	4	15	2	155	US denies attempt to block developmental loans for Chile	-.9
1972	4	15	2	155	Chile officials meet with US et al. to discuss debt reduction	2.8
1972	4	20	2	155	US joins in credit accord with Chile	7.4
1972	5	16	2	155	ITT denies attempting to foment a coup against Allende	-1.1
1972	10	17	2	155	US denies influence French court to bar payment to Chile	-1.1
1972	12	5	2	155	US denies Allende's charge of US aggression	-1.1
1972	12	7	2	155	US denies that it is attempting to unseat the Allende gov.	-1.1
1972	12	7	2	155	US explains policy of aiding Chilean armed forces	0
1972	12	7	2	155	US State Dept. accuses Allende of confusing/inaccurate policy	-2.2
1972	12	9	2	155	US denies that military aid is designed to overthrow Chile gov.	-1.1
1972	12	9	2	155	US seeks to reassure Chile on military aid policy	2.8
1972	12	16	2	155	US and Chile agree to talks the following week	3
1972	12	21	2	155	US and Chile meet in Washington to end rift	1

Beyond clarifying the measure, this brief snapshot helps reassure us of the validity of the measure used in the article because, taken together, the events accurately reflect both the overt and covert policies of the US during this period. Declassified documents suggest that the US was indeed attempting to foment a coup in Chile at this time (Kornbluh 1999). A memo dated 10/16/1970, for instance, relates Kissinger's orders to a CIA station chief in Santiago:

> "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup…We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is important that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the [US government] and American hand be well hidden."[1]

[1] See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm for the full text version of this memo.

While the CIA was successful in its primary goal, the events shown in Table 1 suggest that the Chilean government suspected its efforts during Allende's tenure in power. We should expect other governments to be as watchful of US meddling, and vocal if they suspect such activities. The events reported by WEIS and COPDAB understate what we now know to be a very direct and aggressive policy. While understating clandestine activities is perhaps a systematic drawback with the measure, the watering down these events should help avoid Type I error by understating the empirical results.

Why are events data useful?

Scholars using hand-coded datasets such as Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) and World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) have readily shown the usefulness of these datasets in areas such as alliances (Leeds 1999; Lebovic 2004), trade (Pevehouse 2004; Reuveny and Kang 1996b; Polachek 1997) and state tolerance levels (Lebovic 2003). Unlike other popular international relations (IR) datasets that focus on high levels of conflict (e.g., Singer and Small's Correlates of War dataset), event datasets provide information on both cooperative and hostile daily interactions between states. By recording data as they occur, events datasets are able to capture the true interactions between states than more aggregate data collection efforts. When the Palestinians launch a mortar attack on Israel, for instance, Israeli does not wait until the end of the calendar year to retaliate (King and Lowe 2003: 617). Thus, we see the importance of recording daily events as they happen to maximize the precision of our information.

Further, scholars who have provided the events datasets used in this paper have gone to great lengths to assure the validity and reliability of the data. Regarding validity, scholars code events objectively by focusing on the key verb of the interaction. For example, a threat to imply sanctions by the US is coded in the exact manner as a threat to imply sanctions by Guatemala. This allows the user to evaluate ways to best weight the signals as suggested by their theoretical expectations. In this paper, therefore, we can safely assume that a signal from the US to any state in Latin America that is of the same type will be coded consistently regardless of which state received the signal. Regarding reliability, previous independent tests have strongly supported the notion that the coding is reasonably consistent and can be replicated beyond the original coding (e.g., Reuveny and Kang 1996a; King and Lowe 2003).

An explanation of the events data used in this paper

The first dataset used in this paper is the Conflict and Peace Databank (commonly known as COPDAB). This dataset was the first major effort to collect data for daily dyadic conflict and cooperation events. Azar et al. (1972) used over seventy public sources to collect around a half a million intra- and interstate events across 135 states, IGOs and NGOs (see also Azar 1980).

The second dataset used in this paper comes from McClelland (1978). McClelland's goal was to build a bridge between the traditional approach of diplomatic history and the new quantitative analysis of international politics by decomposing history into a sequence of discrete events, which could then be studies systematically using statistical techniques (Gerner et al. 1994: 92). Though similar to COPDAB in many respects, McClelland's WEIS dataset was created to expand the types of actors and to improve upon the conceptual framework of COPDAB. WEIS

covers 243 states, IGOs and NGOs from 1966 through 1992. Besides coding a far greater number of actors than COPDAB, the WEIS dataset is designed to specifically deny the notion that all events can be reduced into one dimension of conflict-cooperation (Goldstein 1992: 370). However, scholars have found the dataset to be most useful when it is converted into the conflict/cooperation scale created by Goldstein (1992), which ranks all events on a conflict/cooperation scale ranging from -10 (most conflictual) to +8.3 (most cooperative). WEIS is often used to test hypotheses side-by-side with COPDAB (e.g., Lebovic 2003, 2004; Pevehouse 2004; Goldstein and Freeman 1991).

The third dataset departs from COPDAB and WEIS by using electronically-coded data to examine world events. Some early work in this vein came from Hays and his colleagues (2003), who used machine coded data from the IDEA project (Bond et al., 1997) to examine the consequences of financial globalization for democratization in emerging market economies. Other such as Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) and Goldstein et al. (2001) have used KEDS data to examine interactions in the Balkans and the Middle East. In an important move to make machine-coded data available to researchers with limited programming skills, King and Lowe (2003) have made public a dataset of over 10 million machine-coded events coving intrastate and interstate events for all states and major actors from 1991 through 2001. Regarding the validity of machine-coded data, King and Lowe (2003: 636) have presented the most significant independent test of the VRA Readers performance, finding the machine-coding of data was "approximately equal" to hand-coding of the same data. In the long run, they argue, machine-coding is superior to hand-coding due to the costs and difficulties in maintaining a trained staff of human coders. King and Lowe's VRA data were used in this paper.

Details on merging and collapsing the three datasets

A few issues arise when combining the datasets into one measure. The first is that the periods overlap from 1966-78 and 1990-92. Reuveny and Kang (1996a) explain that the COPDAB and WEIS datasets can be spliced by regressing WEIS on COPDAB, and then using the constant and coefficients to rescale COPDAB into the lower WEIS values. I followed this technique to create a single value in the first set of overlapping years. The second set of overlapping years includes events coded by WEIS and VRA. Fortunately, King and Lowe (2003) provide a scale to recode the VRA events to the WEIS scale. Given this, events during this period can be merged by taking the mean of the WEIS and VRA events in each overlapping time period.

The next step is to aggregate the events data. Though the other independent variables are coded yearly, collapsing these events into a single yearly value would result in the merging of an enormous amount of information into a single number, which risks conflating signals sent up to 24 months apart. At the other extreme, using daily values would result in control variables that remain constant for 365 observations for each year, and would introduce an enormous amount of zeros (non-events) into the signaling variable. Thus, I take a middle approach by collapsing events into the mean signal sent each month. This aggregation may actually be preferable to taking a daily approach given that coup plotters are likely to consider the general orientation of the US towards the current government in their predictions for future support, rather than jumping the gun on a rash statement from a US official.

One might still be curious in regards to how much variation we should expect to see from month-to-month. If the US is consistent from month-to-month, for example, using monthly data may do more than increase the N of the sample. Descriptive statistics on the "Consistency" variable shed some light on this issue. We recall that this measure is a count of the number of consecutive months that the US consistently sends either a supportive or hostile signal. The median of this measure is 16 months with a standard deviation of 27.9 months. The large standard deviation suggests that US signals indeed vary widely over time.

We get a better understanding of this variation by examining graphic representations of US signals over time for each state. In Appendix Figure 1, I plot US signals for each state in the sample. I limit the analyses to the 1990s so we can easily see variations from month-to-month.

Appendix Figure 1: Variation in US Signals over Time



Appendix Figure 1 (continued): Variation in US Signals over Time



Appendix Figure 1 (continued): Variation in US Signals over Time



Appendix Figure 1 (continued): Variation in US Signals over Time



The large variation in these figures allows us to safely conclude that a monthly analysis is not simply an expansion of the data. Some signals remain rather consistent over time, such as the rather supportive signals sent to Argentina. However, we still see variation among in the level of support. More obvious cases of this variation can be seen in Brazil, Chile and Colombia (among others). Looking at Haiti, for example, we a great deal of variation in 1991 alone, with signals ranging from a high of 4.55 in February to a low of -3.97 in December.

SECTION 2: TEST UNREPORTED IN THE MANUSCRIPT

Footnote 9: Belkin and Schofer's (2005) "counterbalancing" measure is limited temporally (1970 to 1986), which severely reduces the number of potential observations for analyses. Including this measure does not alter the substantive effects of the primary independent variables, so the measure is excluded in Table II. See the online appendix for results including Belkin and Schofer's measure.

In Appendix Table 2, we see the results from the primary analyses when including Belkin and Schofer's "counterbalancing" measure. I present these tests side-by-side with the original findings for ease of comparison. Several points are noteworthy. Most importantly, the primary independent variable (US signals) remains negative and significant across all models. US aid/capita remains negative, but becomes insignificant due to the loss of observations. US MIDs cannot be estimated because there were no MIDs during the limited period of interaction. Overall, the main conclusions from the paper hold: US signals have a significant impact on the likelihood of coups. The impact of hostile signals is stronger than the impact for supportive signals.

One might also suggest that incumbent governments move to protect themselves in the face of hostile US signals. There is little evidence to support this. The correlation between US signals and counterbalancing is minute (-.01) and insignificant. One might also suspect an interactive effect: the effect of US signals on coup attempts might depend on counterbalancing measures. A test of this suspicion again produced an insignificant finding.

Appendix Table 2. Logistic Regression of Coup Attempts in Latin America: Controlling for Counterbalancing Measures

	Original findings			Controlling for counterbalancing		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US signals	-0.277*			-0.500**		
	(0.126)			(0.171)		
US aid/capita	-0.604**	-0.590*	-0.594**	-0.419	-0.372	-0.403
	(0.252)	(0.258)	(0.254)	(0.755)	(0.775)	(0.720)
US MIDs	0.839*	0.871*	0.792*			
	(0.449)	(0.491)	(0.449)			
Positive signals		-0.167			-0.259	
		(0.102)			(0.158)	
Negative signals			-0.363**			-0.683***
			(0.123)			(0.179)
Counterbalancing				-0.704**	-0.740**	-0.701**
				(0.269)	(0.256)	(0.274)
Democracy	-0.029	-0.010	-0.046	1.015	1.013	0.943
	(0.649)	(0.678)	(0.634)	(0.892)	(0.897)	(0.846)
Military regime	1.837***	1.839***	1.810***	2.362*	2.410**	2.258*
	(0.483)	(0.504)	(0.474)	(1.020)	(1.015)	(1.003)
Instability	0.027*	0.027*	0.026*	0.141***	0.143***	0.141***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Civil war	-0.636	-0.599	-0.680			
	(1.004)	(1.014)	(1.015)			
GDP/capita	-0.939	-0.930	-0.933	-2.141*	-2.113*	-2.050*
	(0.727)	(0.762)	(0.717)	(1.229)	(1.229)	(1.237)
Ch. GDP/capita	-1.506	-1.416	-1.488	1.279	1.509	1.415
	(1.687)	(1.764)	(1.704)	(3.534)	(3.495)	(3.491)
Constant	-1.600	-1.604	-1.702	0.026	-0.107	-0.353
	(2.027)	(2.152)	(2.005)	(3.503)	(3.458)	(3.465)
Observations	7125	7125	7125	1742	1742	1742

Footnote 11: Control variables from Table II are held at their mean (continuous) and mode (dichotomous). Full tables used to test H3-H7 can be found in the online appendix.

Evidence supporting this endnote is presented in Appendix Table 3. Two points are noteworthy here. First, though the constitutive terms have a rather meaningless interpretation, we see that they are included in the same model as the interactive terms as suggested by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). Second, the interactive terms reveal substantively identical information as the figures presented in Figure 3 of the manuscript. I include the figures in the manuscript simply for ease of interpretation.

Appendix Table 3. Logistic Regression of Coup Attempts in Latin America: Secondary Analyses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US signals	-0.163	-0.627*	-0.098	-0.237*		
	(0.182)	(0.282)	(0.070)	(0.143)		
Signals*US aid	-0.119					
	(0.092)					
US aid/capita	-0.600**	-0.578*	-0.674	-0.627**	-0.461	-0.471
	(0.255)	(0.259)	(0.667)	(0.248)	(0.311)	(0.309)
Signals*US elections		0.014*				
		(0.008)				
US elections		0.012				
		(0.008)				
Signals*LA elections			0.000			
			(0.001)			
LA elections			0.007			
			(0.014)			
Signals*Consistency				-0.003		
				(0.004)		
Consistency				-0.008		
				(0.006)		
Military signals					-0.358***	
					(0.110)	
Non-military signals						-0.170***
						(0.041)
US MIDs	0.791*	0.978*		0.688		
	(0.472)	(0.501)		(0.472)		
Democracy	-0.020	0.021		-0.053	0.408	0.441
	(0.644)	(0.677)		(0.632)	(0.720)	(0.728)
Military regime	1.854***	1.826***		1.816***	1.950**	1.931**
	(0.481)	(0.489)		(0.471)	(0.710)	(0.711)
Instability	0.027*	0.032**	0.077**	0.024*	0.021	0.021
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Civil war	-0.632	-0.749		-0.630	-0.505	-0.499
	(1.008)	(1.071)		(1.018)	(0.986)	(0.972)
GDP/capita	-0.961	-0.937	-0.871	-1.006	-1.190	-1.241
	(0.729)	(0.729)	(2.474)	(0.697)	(0.878)	(0.878)
Ch. GDP/capita	-1.468	-1.266	-6.120	-1.231	-2.394	-2.489
	(1.661)	(1.770)	(7.120)	(1.636)	(1.826)	(1.828)
Constant	-1.561	-2.002	-1.074	-1.213	-0.967	-0.739
	(2.055)	(2.040)	(7.713)	(1.968)	(2.312)	(2.308)
Observations	7125	7125	2824	7109	5790	5790

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