History 105             Lecture 9   (9 Oct. 2002)  Prof. Popkin

 

The Unification of Germany (1848-1871)

 

            The failure of the revolutions of 1848 left the map of Europe looking almost the same as it had been since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.  Movements for constitutional government and national independence had been defeated throughout the continent.  By 1871, however, the European map had been transformed.  Two major new national states—Italy and Germany—had been created in the middle of the continent, and the European balance of power had been radically altered.  These new national states had written constitutions and parliaments, but they were not the fulfillment of the idealistic democratic hopes of 1848.  National unification in Italy and Germany came about under the direction of authoritarian leaders who adopted parts of the 1848 program for their own purposes.

            The man who engineered the unification of Germany in 1871, Otto von Bismarck, was the most important political figure in 19th century European history.  Bismarck, originally a Prussian conservative, understood that the Metternich strategy of resisting all change had failed.  A successful conservative government would have to take the lead in making social and political changes in order to preserve itself.  Bismarck’s style of reform conservatism proved highly effective and was imitated in other European countries.  By emphasizing German nationalism and a willingness to use force in international affairs, however, Bismarck opened a new period of European conflict that would lead to the great wars of the twentieth century.

 

I.                    The Age of Realism (1848-1880)

A.    1848 and the discrediting of idealism

B.     from politics to economics

C.    Realism and Realpolitik

 

II.                 Bismarck’s Teachers

A.    Napoleon III and the French Second Empire

1.      government promotion of economic growth

2.      aggressive nationalism

3.      modern authoritarian government

 

B.     Cavour and the Unification of Italy

1.      national unification from above

2.      diplomacy, war and unification

3.      authoritarianism and radicalism:  the alliance with Garibaldi

 

III.               Bismarck and German unification

 

A.    From Prussian reactionary to German national hero

B.     Bismarck’s political tactics

1.      taming the liberals

2.      exploiting nationalism

3.      the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870

C.    Bismarck’s German Empire (1871-1918)

1.      combining democracy and authority

2.      the role of the military

3.      conflicts with the Church and the Socialists

4.      Bismarck and the origins of the welfare state

 

 

Alexis de Tocqueville comments on French society during the Second Empire:  “Men… are only too inclined to think only of their private interests, only too ready to see just themselves and withdraw into a narrow individualism in which all public virtue is stifled… The desire to get rich at any price, the taste for business, the love of profit, the search for comfort and material possessions is therefore the most common passion…”

 

Camillo Cavour, on the weaknesses of liberalism and democracy in Italy:  “In Italy, a democratic revolution has no chance of success.  To convince oneself of this, it is enough to analyze the elements of which the party in favor of political change is composed.  This  party is not favored by the masses, who, with the exception of a few small urban groups, are in general very much attached to the traditional institutions of the country.  The force [for change] is limited almost exclusively to the middle class and a part of the upper class.  Both have very conservative interests to defend.”

 

Heinrich Treitschke, German nationalist historian, justifying the annexation of the French territories of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871:  “These provinces are ours by the right of the sword, and we shall dispose of them by a higher right—the right of the German nation, which cannot allow its lost children to remain forever alien to the German empire.  We Germans, knowing Germany and knowing France, know better than these unfortunates themselves what is to the advantage of the people of Alsace, who, because of the misleading influence of their French life, have no knowledge of the new Germany.  Against their will we shall restore them to their true selves.”