CHAPTER 12

The Production of Nature

Colonial Recasting of the African Landscape
in Serengeti National Park

Roderick P. Neumann

This chapter analyzes the history of the establishment of what was meant to be the first national park in British-ruled Africa: Serengeti. It illustrates how European preservationists’ efforts to recast the African landscape into their ideal of a wilderness continent resulted in a protracted struggle over land and resource rights in the park. The analysis of this struggle in colonial Tanganyika (now Tanzania) reveals a process of nature production rather than nature preservation in the establishment of Serengeti National Park. The idea of nature as a pristine empty African wilderness was largely mythical and was made concrete only by relocating thousands of Africans and denying millennia of human agency in shaping the landscape. The history of Serengeti’s creation demonstrates that while processes of development and processes preservation are often seen to be in opposition and clearly produce very different landscapes, they were in fact linked by a shared ideology: the assertion of European control over society and nature in Africa.

The study is primarily based on examination of archival documents of the British colonial administration of Tanganyika. Valuable as they are for re-


constructing the case history of Serengeti National Park, documents written by colonial administrators predictably contain biases and shortcomings. It is therefore important that they be supplemented with other sources (Watts, 1983). The archival research featured here was complemented by on-site research with displaced groups organized to reclaim their lost land and resource rights in the national park (see Neumann, 1995). These latter sources are important for unveiling alternative landscape readings and environmental histories that contest the popular and prevailing narratives that equate African protected areas with timeless wilderness.

The case history is framed by theories of the social production of nature as they relate to the Western concept of landscape. The theoretical development of the idea of nature as social product is most closely identified with Smith’s (1984) *Uneven Development*. To overcome the society–nature dualism of positivist approaches to external nature, Smith proposed two concepts: “first nature,” that which is unaltered by humans; and “second nature,” that which is incorporated into the institutions—the market, the state, money—that have developed to regulate commodity exchange. Under capitalism, first nature disappears as it enters the realm of exchange value and becomes just another commodity, second nature. This is the case even of supposedly pristine nature in national parks, which has been commodified as “neatly packaged cultural experiences of environment” (Smith, 1984, p. 57).

Denis Cosgrove (1984) developed a theory of landscape through arguments that parallel Smith’s. Tracing historically the changing ideas of landscape in England, he argued that as land and labor became increasingly oriented toward production for exchange, they became less capable of portraying idealized (read, naturalized) social relations. The landscape aesthetic in painting and literature refocused on countryside settings where evidence of human labor was erased or hidden. The resulting effect was the creation, materially and symbolically, of two distinct landscapes: one of production ruled by rationality and profit and one of consumption where recreation and contemplation prevail (see also Frykman & Lofgren, 1987; Williams, 1973). By the end of the 19th century, the idea of landscape as an object of aesthetic appreciation became nearly synonymous with the idea of nature.

Through colonialism, the “landscape way of seeing” (Cosgrove, 1984) was transported to East Africa. In colonial Tanganyika, British efforts to preserve nature in national parks coincided with efforts to intensify agricultural production in the territory; that is, to develop nature rather than to preserve it. The introduction of these spatially distinct ideologies, consumption and production, preservation and development, had major ramifications for the transformation of African land rights and land use practices. The counterpart of this spatial dualism is stereotypical British colonial views of African culture, which can be simplified into two ideological currents. On the one hand, the British romanticized precontact African society through such ideas as the moral in-
nocence of Africans, a respect for African bush skills, and a generalized notion of the noble savage (Curtin, 1964; Grove, 1995). But on the other hand, Africans were seen as untapped labor who through development and modernization could become efficient producers within the sphere of the British colonial economy.

National park advocates used the traditional and modern stereotypes simultaneously in pushing their agenda. That is, they argued that confining wild animals in parks would actually promote development elsewhere by reducing conflicts between wildlife and African agricultural. Within parks, preservationists argued that resident Africans could be allowed to stay if they continued to live "traditionally." The fact that human labor was denied in landscapes of consumption as conceptualized by European preservationists meant a significant alteration of land use and land access for Africans. At Serengeti, British notions of who was or was not Maasai, who had customary rights of occupation, and what "traditional" land use practices would be allowed there framed the political conflict that ultimately led to the forced evacuation of the park.

**IMAGINING WILD AFRICA**

Proposals to preserve nature in national parks in East Africa began in the early years of the 20th century. In Tanganyika, local game officials first proposed establishing a system of national parks in the 1920s, although the strongest push for the idea originated outside the colony. In 1931, the London-based conservation organization the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE) spearheaded the cause, sending their representative Major Richard Hinston to Tanganyika to investigate the needs and potential for developing a nature preservation program. The report that resulted stressed that "the keystone . . . is the recommendation regarding the formation of a number of national parks without delay." Hinston's report provided the basis for the SPFE's efforts to forge an international agreement. The Convention for the Protection of the Flora and Fauna of Africa was held in London in 1933, resulting in an international agreement that closely followed the SPFE's proposals. A section in the London Convention obligated all signatories to investigate the possibilities for national parks in their respective colonies.

It is clear from Hinston’s report and the London Convention that the prime interest of European preservationists was to reserve wild nature in Africa in a system of national parks. The nature preservationists were driven in part by a fear of losing “Eden,” a fear that their vision of Africa as pristine wilderness was fading before their eyes (Anderson & Grove, 1987). The sentiments of nostalgia and loss that drive this fear have been common in European preservationists’ thinking and have been particularly strong in the settler colo-

ancies of East and southern Africa. National parks are meant to represent primordial, undisturbed, and unchanging nature in Africa. The definition, designation, and regulation of national parks were, to a large degree, concerned with making ecological reality conform to this imagined African landscape.

National park advocates had to confront the fact that there were established African societies living within the proposed boundaries of national parks. If European preservationists found Africans to be living in what they deemed a “natural state,” then they could be protected within parks as another native species. If Africans deviated from the ideal of the “natural,” their presence came into conflict with the preservationists’ vision. The SPFE made clear that humans were not welcome in parks, but pointed out that a “native” presence in the parks might be tolerated, as in the case of Parc National Albert (Belgian Congo) where “the Pygmies are rightly regarded as part of the fauna, and they are therefore left undisturbed” (emphasis added).

Preservationists crudely constructed ideas of "traditional culture" and society–nature relationships in Africa. That is, their ideas were formed not from detailed ethnographic knowledge, but from long-standing stereotypes about African race and culture, particularly the notion that some Africans were living in a natural state. In the extreme, preservationists considered Africans as morally and socially equivalent to wildlife species in need of protection. These ideas can be traced to the historical process of colonial conquest, where the line between hunting animals and making war on Africans was often blurred (MacKenzie, 1987). Once conquest was complete, these views persisted in less pernicious form and were incorporated into the discourse of nature preservation.

It was the European preservationists' prerogative, moreover, to determine the precise character of “primitive culture.” That is, just as there was a particular European landscape ideal of unspoiled nature which Africa represented, there was an interrelated concept of primitive human society that Africans represented. Both had more to do with European myths and desires than with African reality. Those Africans whose behavior did not fit with British preconceptions of “primitive man” could not be allowed to remain in the national parks, the symbol of primeval Africa, regardless of their claims to customary land rights. National parks were at once symbolic representations of the European vision of Africa and a demonstration of the colonial state's power to control access to land and natural resources.

**HARNESSING THE “VAST UNDEVELOPED CONTINENT”**

The disruption of African land use practices resulting from nature preservation programs was a point of political friction not only between Africans and Europeans, but also within European colonial society. British colonial thinking
was far from monolithic, and there was strong opposition to the preservationists' ideas. Throughout the British colonial period, administrative officers continually criticized the national park proposals for interfering with African land and resource rights. From their perspective, for example, hunting by African residents inside the proposed parks was acceptable, since "when such natives have enjoyed customary rights of hunting there is no reason or justification for depriving them of these rights." A. E. Kitching, a district officer and later provincial commissioner, exemplified this position. To Major Hingston's 1931 report he responded:

The Hingston recommendations . . . pay no regard to native interests. They involve the alienation in perpetuity of thousands of square miles of the land of the Territory . . . to "create the finest nature park in the Empire." The recommendations appear to me to be so wrong in principle as to make any detailed examination unnecessary.

Kitching's response reflected the thinking of a large contingent of colonial officials at all levels who were more concerned with the economic and social development of Africa than with preservation of its wildlife. Beginning in the 1930s (but only making significant advancement after World War II) development advocates took an ideological position that ran counter to the preservationists' visions of primitive Africa. While the SPFE and others were working to preserve nature, those trying to develop the productive potential of the territory were working hard to eradicate it. In many areas of East and southern Africa, wilderness was seen to be increasing since the early 20th century as an advancing tsetse fly front (and the sleeping sickness that accompanied it) forced the evacuation of thousands of square kilometers (Neumann, 2002).

In fact, the Tanganyika Game Preservation Department was itself originally organized principally to control rather than to protect wildlife. Charles Swynnerton was recruited in 1919 to be its first director based on his experience with tsetse fly eradication efforts, which in those days were practically synonymous with the eradication of wildlife habitat. Swynnerton saw the elimination of tsetse as the key to the commercial exploitation of Africa:

Tsetse are actually holding up . . . the development of a continent . . . holding up also vast grazing areas which, if they could be stocked, would . . . provide homes not merely for Natives, but for settlers . . . The vast undeveloped Continent of Africa can supply England's needs of raw materials, but she can never be developed adequately while the tsetse remains in possession.

The Tanganyika Game Ordinance of 1921 (drafted by Swynnerton) included a schedule of game reserves within which wildlife would receive varying degrees of protection. Whether engaged in habitat alteration or preservation, the ideology underlying the agenda of the Game Preservation Department was control over nature.

British agriculture and livestock specialists were critical of African practices, advocating direct state intervention and the application of scientific principles in land use. As the director of the Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry put it, "We are trying to stop them [Africans] from being their own worst enemies" (Tanganyika Territory, 1936, p. 31). He argued that "traditional native husbandry" was essentially inefficient and destructive, a situation that could only be rectified by "some form of government intervention" (Tanganyika Territory, 1935, p. 147).

Efforts to modernize agricultural production and harness African labor intensified in the 1940s. The postwar period in East Africa was marked by a "second colonial occupation" (Low & Lonsdale, 1976, p. 12), characterized by new education programs for Africans, infrastructural development, and cash-crop expansion (Iliffe, 1979). These programs and policies required increased intervention to raise rural production and hence a deeper penetration of the colonial state into nearly all aspects of African society (Beinart, 1984). In other words, postwar development would channel African labor into greater and more efficient production through the collateral transformation of nature. This agenda was institutionalized in 1946 when the government established the Development Commission, which issued the first 10-year development and welfare plan a year later.

Outside the scope of the development plan but directly related to its broad goals were a number of agricultural schemes intended to introduce new export crops and a new social organization of production. Some of these will be examined later in the discussion of Serengeti National Park's establishment.

**DEFINING RIGHTS, PRODUCING NATURE**

Following the signing of the 1933 London Convention, the Colonial Office in England increasingly pressured the government in Tanganyika to comply with its terms. Specifically, they were urged to investigate the possibilities for a system of national parks. Tanganyikan game officials concentrated their attention on the Serengeti region near the border with Kenya, which the government had already placed under protection as a game reserve under the 1921 Game Ordinance. The level of protection, however, was insufficient for nature preservationists, and the SPFE soon focused on Serengeti in its efforts to establish the first national park in British-ruled Africa.

As the pressure for park establishment increased, members of the colonial administration in Tanganyika voiced their concerns over the political problems that could arise with resident Africans and over the impact that preservation would have on agricultural production. For example, the initial pro-
posal for Serengeti National Park in Hingston’s report would have placed 70,000 Africans under the authority of the park in one district alone. Some colonial officials argued that African land rights were protected under the League of Nations Trusteeship doctrine and that any restrictions on these rights would adversely affect their livelihood. Far and away the most prevalent theme of the comments of Tanganyikan officials was a concern that the parks would interfere with local customary rights to grazing, hunting, and minor forest products. Consequently, acting governor D. J. Jardine wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies asking that a clause be added “to the effect that the protection of vegetation in national parks does not interfere with the rights at present enjoyed by the native inhabitants to pasture or to forest produce.” The secretary’s eventual reply points out that nothing in the national park definition makes “native” habitation inconsistent, “provided that they are controlled by Park authorities.”

The government in Tanganyika eventually drafted a new game ordinance that included a clause declaring Serengeti a national park. The government established a special committee to review the bill. The committee reiterated government concerns over indigenous rights in the proposed park. The committee recommended “that the requirements of the National Park not be allowed to interfere with existing grazing or water rights.” Thus, the residents of the area were allowed to remain and Serengeti was declared a “national park” in the revised 1940 Game Ordinance. This level of legal protection and administrative control was still unsatisfactory to the SPFE and associated preservationists, however, and they lobbied hard for a distinct national park ordinance and an independent board of trustees.

Ultimately, Serengeti National Park took on great symbolic significance for preservationists. This fact helps to explain the SPFE’s unceasing lobbying efforts. It came to embody for the society much of what it wished to accomplish for nature preservation in Africa. The society stressed to the government in London

that the first National Park to be established in a Mandated Territory of British Africa should be modeled as closely as possible on the provisions of the Convention. The Serengeti National Park is likely to serve as a model for others in the British African Colonies and elsewhere and it is on this account that the Committee address the Secretary of State while its constitution is as yet undetermined.

As the prototype national park, then, it was meant to establish in law the preservationists’ vision of wild Africa. The result of SPFE’s efforts was the passage of the 1948 National Park Ordinance, which created strict legal protection for Serengeti National Park and established an autonomous governing body, the Serengeti National Park Board of Trustees, to oversee its administration. Significantly, the ordinance explicitly permitted the unhindered movement of people “whose place of birth or ordinary residence is within the park.” This left open the difficult question of who did or did not have a legal right to be in the park. The proposed park boundaries were immediately disputed by Africans living there and consequently were not finalized until 1951. Though the secretary of the new Serengeti National Park Board of Trustees reassured the government that “the rights of the Masai . . . to occupy and graze stock in the Park are unaffected by the Ordinance,” less than a week later the new park warden wrote that the trading post and Masai cattle market in Ngorongoro must be removed because they “interfered with the amenities of the park.” It soon became clear that the ordinance constituted a formula for unrest.

ENCLOSURE AND EVICTION

As it happened, Maasai pastoralists had the most to lose in terms of the total area of land that had passed to national park control. They soon initiated acts of protest against the park authority. By the early 1950s, the government had to set up a special administrative post in the park because the “Masai were openly defying the Park laws, and the political situation had consequently become explosive and a magnet for agitators.” A further government response to the unrest was to write down in a “bill of rights” precisely what the Masai who were living in the park could expect. The Masai did not participate in drawing up the bill of rights and were only allowed to see it after it had been completed. In this way the park officials kept within the written law but violated its spirit. That is, the 1948 National Parks Ordinance explicitly protected customary rights, but only government officials decided what those rights were and who would be entitled to them. Tradition had to be invented (Ranger, 1983) to meet the needs of colonial park authorities. In a case, for instance, where a critical grazing area overlapped with important wildlife habitat, it was reasoned that the Masai “presence may not be in accordance with strict tribal custom” (Tanganyika Territory, 1957, p. 27). It was the park administration that determined the extent of the customary land of the Serengeti Masai, restricting their movements to such a small area that the provincial commissioner was moved to call their decision “a complete breach of faith with the Masai.”

The question arises, then, upon what historical and ethnographic knowledge was the bill of rights based? Like the so-called Bushmen of Namibia, the Maasai have held a powerful grip on the imagination of European explorers, soldiers, and administrators (Gordon, 1992; Collet, 1987). Early stereotypes from initial contact and conquest filtered into the consciousness of the colonial administrators who followed, crystallizing into a view that “equated no-
madic and semi-nomadic pastoralism with a primitive and undeveloped form of social order" (Collett, 1987, p. 138). Based on this conceptualization, the bill of rights written down in Serengeti was essentially a blueprint for an imagined primitive culture. It specified what the basic necessities of material life would be and how they would be acquired. The bill was a reflection of preservationists' desires for a natural relationship between Africans and the land, a statement of their vision of the Maasai as closer to nature than to civilization.

Fulfillment of the European vision of primitive Africans living “amicably amongst the game” meant ignoring economic development and cultural change within resident communities. Under their bill of rights the weapons that the Serengeti Maasai were allowed to carry were restricted to “spears, swords, clubs, bows and arrows.” Those Maasai who were allowed to stay were placed under strict control to assure that they remained “primitive.” In defining homestead building codes in the Maasai “bill of rights,” the chairman of the National Park Board of Trustees explained the reasons why they wished the word “traditional” to be inserted in the draft definition in order that the Masai living in the Park should retain their present primitive status. He and the D.N.P. felt that if the Masai changed their habits and wished to build other types of housing, they should do so outside the area of the Park which is to be reserved as a natural habitat both for game and human beings in their primitive state [emphasis added].

In the mind of the preservationist, the Maasai in the park were a colonial possession and could be preserved “as part of our fauna.”

Like the “Pygmies” of Parc National Albert, the Maasai were imagined to be living more or less harmoniously with nature because they were nomadic, did not hunt, and generally did not cultivate. When Africans did not live up to European stereotypes, attempts were made to make them conform. In the context of Serengeti, these attempts generated more conflict. For instance, some Maasai did in fact cultivate, though the national parks director tried to explain the presence of cultivators in Ngorongoro Crater as a result of the Maasai having become “much adulterated with extra-tribal blood.” Based on British interpretations of African culture, the legal logic by which these cultivators could be evicted ran as follows: since we know that Maasai did not traditionally cultivate, any cultivators in the crater must be non-Maasai, and since no non-Maasai may live in Maasailand without a permit from the Native Authority, they are therefore without legal rights.

Other land use practices that have been historically important to pastoralism in East Africa were unacceptable as well, particularly the use of fire to manipulate vegetative growth. Fire was a critical element in Maasai pasture management, eradicating disease-bearing ticks and maintaining grasslands (Tanganyika Territory, 1929, p. 8: 1933, p. 81). Infested pastures would be temporarily abandoned and burned until the threat of disease had been removed. Fires in the highlands surrounding Ngorongoro Crater and elsewhere would open up forest glades of high-quality forage. The 1940 Game Ordinance, however, outlawed this practice within Serengeti National Park, though the park administration was unsuccessful in its efforts to stop it. Fire thus became a point of struggle between park officers and resident Maasai. The preservationists were, in sum, inventing Maasai tradition as the need arose, banning some practices and freeing others from change in an effort to mold the Maasai to their national park ideal. This effort coincided with and was inseparable from their efforts to re-create the imagined landscape of Serengeti National Park.

The Maasai were not the only residents in the park. The Ndorobo and the Sukuma, among others, hunted and cultivated. Though nothing in the law prohibited the practice, park officials had all along planned to evict cultivators. Soon after the park was gazetted they began plans to amend the ordinance to explicitly forbid cultivation.” The 1948 National Park Ordinance contained an inherent contradiction. The “saving clause” read,

Nothing in this Ordinance contained shall affect . . . the rights of any person in or over any land acquired before the commencement of this Ordinance.

Yet the law also gave the trustees power to make regulations concerning hunting and a variety of land use practices, which would almost certainly interfere with existing rights. The ambiguity of the law had the effect of fanning the flames of discontent as administrative officers would tell park residents that their rights were fully protected, while park authorities would try to enforce regulations to restrict their activities. The government’s “solution” was to pass an amended law in 1954, which removed the contradiction by revoking the saving clause, and replacing it with one that expressly denied any right of occupant to cultivate and gave the governor extraordinary powers to prohibit any other activities deemed undesirable.

The actions of the board of trustees and the park staff contrasted starkly with the government’s development schemes operating outside the boundaries of the park. In an adjacent district, a development project was initiated in the late 1940s to, among other things, introduce “more intensive methods of agriculture” and to clear fly-infested bush for relocations of households and livestock (Moffett, 1955, p. 375). Maasailand had the largest of the local schemes in terms of area, encompassing 23,000 square miles. The scheme’s main objective was to “improve Masailand as a ranching country” and “induce a more stable economy” (Moffett, 1955, p. 531). Scheme managers set about clearing thousands of acres of wildlife habitat with bulldozers with intentions to build roads, schools, and dispensaries. These schemes on the edge of Serengeti further
sharpened the distinction and widened the symbolic and ecological gap between the landscapes of production and consumption.

In Serengeti, meanwhile, park officials began making plans to evict cultivators living within the park.19 Acknowledging that the National Park Ordinance legally protected cultivators’ rights, officials proceeded anyway, though worrying that “their eviction is not going to pass unnoticed among local agitators and it is therefore important that it should receive legal sanction.”

The disputes between park residents and the park administration evolved within the context of a rising tide of African nationalism across East Africa fueled by the politics of land. In 1951, the year that the Tanganyika government finally set Serengeti’s boundaries, the British colonial government in Kenya declared the Mau Mau Emergency, centered just 3 hours drive from the park headquarters. The fighting there between the African Land and Freedom Armies and the colonial government continued throughout the period of greatest unrest in Serengeti.

As East Africa threatened to explode over the issue of African land rights, the preservationists were advocating, and gaining government support for, the dislocation of hundreds of families to create what was popularly viewed as a playground for white tourists. Rather than retreating in the face of growing nationalist sentiments surrounding African land rights, nature preservationists pushed the issue. As unrest among park residents grew, the preservationists’ position hardened and became less ambiguous over the issue of human occupation in a national park. “The interests of fauna and flora must come first,” a park manager wrote, “those of man and belongings being of secondary importance. Humans and a National Park can not exist together.”

Something clearly had to give. In April 1956 the government published a report on the problems, recommending that Serengeti be reconstituted so that nature preservation and human interests be spatially segregated (Tanganyika Territory, 1956). Preservationists objected to the recommendations because the suggested area was too limited for wildlife migrations and they compelled the government to appoint a committee of inquiry to revisit the situation.

Many of the concerns about the future of the park were now stated in the discourse of the second colonial occupation, with its influx of technocrats trained in applied fields such as agronomy and soil science (Beinart, 1984). By now the SPFE had changed its name to the now the Fauna Preservation Society (FPS). Their agents in the field were no longer big game hunters and former soldiers, but scientists. The FPS sent Professor W.H. Pearsall, a biologist, to Serengeti to produce a report, which ultimately provided the basis of the committee’s findings. The committee called for a “more scientific approach” (Tanganyika Territory, 1957, p. 16) as they sought to ensure that the park would function as a “viable ecological unit” (p. 23). Within this scientific approach, the idea that humans and nature must be spatially separated was now referred to as a “principle” (Tanganyika Territory, 1957, p. 15).

At the heart of the committee’s recommendations was an endorsement of the principle that human rights should be excluded in any national park. The committee recommended that the national park should be reconstituted in the Western Serengeti, and that the Ngorongoro Crater sector be excised from the park and managed as a special conservation unit where Masai pastoralists would be allowed to stay. Summing up the resulting National Park Ordinance (Amended) of 1959, the chairman of the board of trustees wrote:

Under this ordinance the Tanganyika National Parks become for the first time areas where all human rights must be excluded thus eliminating the biggest problem of the Trustees and the Parks in the past. (Tanganyika National Parks, 1960)

DISCUSSION

There are three points that I would like to draw from this case history. First, the establishment of national parks in colonial Tanganyika was as much a process of nature production as of nature preservation. The incorporation of Tanganyika into the global economy meant a pattern of landscape partitioning: large tracts of land were considered suitable for agriculture, and the rest preserved from the forces of capitalist production. Nature was produced in national parks based on a preconceived, culturally constituted vision of Africa as primeval wilderness. Initially, the vision could include the people who claimed customary rights of occupation and use, because they could be considered to be part of primeval nature. Within a Eurocentric evolutionary view of culture, hunters and gatherers and nomadic pastoralists were considered to be living more off the fruits of nature than their own labor and would not therefore necessarily disrupt the landscape aesthetic. Ultimately, however, the myth of the Maasai as “natural” humans could not be sustained as preservationists were increasingly confronted with the evidence of their labor and agency. Thus nature, as represented in national parks, was produced by removing the people who, ironically enough, had influenced the ecology of the Serengeti through thousands of years of human agency (Collett, 1987; Homewood & Rodgers, 1987).

Second, the colonial government’s efforts at intensifying agricultural and livestock production through development schemes near Serengeti National Park created contradictions and sharp distinctions between the landscapes of production and those of consumption. Yet despite the contrasting effects on African society and landscape, preservation and development projects sprang from the same ideological roots. There existed in each program an unrelenting belief in the superiority of European culture and science and a contemptuous view of African land use practices. In both projects, these beliefs served to justify the violent shift of control over land and resources from local lineages to
the state. Both were about controlling nature, one for aesthetic purposes, and the other for intensifying production. Borrowing from Raymond Williams's analysis of the transition to capitalist property relations in England, development and preservation are related parts of the same process—superficially opposed in taste but only because in the one case the land is being organized for production . . . while in the other case it is being organized for consumption—the view (Williams, 1973, p. 124).

Ultimately, in agrarian societies, control over nature equates to control over people. In each case, African production practices had to be removed, reoriented or reorganized depending on the needs and desires of the colonizers. The two colonial programs—preservation and development—thus introduced a new spatial separation of culture and nature, production and consumption, thereby transforming the African landscape and severing historical human–land relationships and customary control over land and resources.

Finally, the history of Serengeti National Park can be read as a cautionary tale for contemporary efforts to establish and maintain parks and protected areas in Africa. Notions of static African societies living in concert with nature persist in present-day protected area proposals. Namibia is a case in point. In the 1980s, the government planned to allow the Ju/wasi people to remain inside a proposed game park if they hunted only with bows and arrows (Volkman, 1986). Economic development, such as ranching, was prohibited because it violated the imposed definition of "traditional" culture. The Ju/wasi would become, in essence, another tourist attraction—this in spite of the fact that far from being "primitive" or "traditional," they had been incorporated into the world economy in various ways for over a century (Gordon, 1992).

Such protected area designs beg the question of inevitable cultural change. Proponents of these culture/nature reserves often gloss over the surrender of political power and loss of control over daily life that is required of would-be residents. Proposals such as the Ju/wasi game park also make clear that Western preservationists are still captivated by a way of seeing traditional African society as living in aesthetic harmony with the landscapes of nature.

NOTES

3. Under Secretary of State to SPFE, 2/10/39, TNA Secretariat File 12005.
9. Acting Governor Jardine to Secretary of State Cardiffe-Lister, 1/8/33, TNA Secretariat File 12005.
10. Secretary of State to Governor MacMichael, 17/5/34, TNA Secretariat File 12005.
11. Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Examine the Game Bill, 1940, 16/4/34, TNA Secretariat File 2727.
12. SPFE Secretary to Under Secretary of State, 29/8/39, TNA Secretariat File 12005.
15. P. Blackley, Secretary, Serengeti National Park Board of Trustees to Member for Local Government, Dar Es Salaam, 18/10/51, TNA Secretariat File 10496.
16. Minutes of the second meeting of the Serengeti National Park Board of Trustees, 23/10/51, TNA Secretariat File 10496.
17. District Commissioner Masai/Monduli to District Officer Ngonororo, 5/3/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
18. Acting Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, to Member for Local Government, 20/5/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
19. Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, to Member for Local Government, 28/1/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
21. Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, to Member for Local Government, 19/1/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
22. Notes on a meeting between the Chairman of the National Park Board of Trustees, the Director of National Parks, and the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, 28/3/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
23. Barclay Leechman, Chairman of the Serengeti National Park Board of Management, in the minutes of the Serengeti National Park Board of Management meeting, 23/7/53, TNA Secretariat File 40851.
24. Acting Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, to Director of National Parks, 8/6/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69. The provincial commissioner pointed out that a recent census had determined that 82 out of 216 families cultivating in the crater were Masai.
25. Tanganyika National Parks Director Molloy to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, Report on Human Inhabitants, Serengeti National Park, 8/6/55, TNA Arusha Regional File G1/6, Accession No. 69.
26. Notes on an informal discussion held at the Ngonororo Rest Camp among members of the SNP Boards of Trustees and Management, TNA Arusha Regional File T3/2, Accession No. 69.
27. Confidential letter, District Commissioner, Masai/Monduli, to Provincial Comm-
missioner, Northern Province, 23/6/52, TNA Arusha Regional File T3/2, Accession No. 69.


29. Notes on an informal discussion held at the Ngorongoro Rest Camp among members of the SNF Boards of Trustees and Management. TNA Arusha Regional File T3/2, Accession No. 69. The notes state that the park administration "would be both willing and able to evict all non-Masai from the park within a year or two:"

30. Confidential letter, District Commissioner Masai/Monduli to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, 23/6/52, TNA Arusha Regional File T3/2, Accession No. 69.

31. Wilkins, SNP Board of Management, to SNP Board of Trustees, 16/2/54, TNA Secretary File 10/496.

REFERENCES


