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Editor’s Note

The Southeast Review of Asian Studies (SERAS; formerly called Annals), published by the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, highlights the scholarly activity of Asianists in the Southeast. The main forum for scholarly activity has been the annual meeting. The Conference provides scholars an opportunity to present their findings in a number of panels organized around common themes. This volume publishes some of those papers that have been selected in a refereed process. It also publishes the official record of the annual meeting, including the corrected program, abstracts of some of the papers presented, and minutes of the annual business meeting. SERAS also presents other material by and about Asianists in the Southeast such as articles, essays, and reports on professional programs.

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Asianists in the Southeast are invited to submit articles and book reviews for Volume 27 (2005) by March 1, 2005. Preference will be given to papers actually presented at the 2005 annual conference, but scholars may submit other work as well.

Please submit all work electronically as an e-mail attachment to the editor at dmetraux@mbc.edu or mail a hard copy and a disk version to: Daniel Metraux, Chair, Dept. of Foreign Languages, Literatures and Cultures, Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, VA 24401 USA.
I. Introduction

In 1937 and 1941, a key group of American diplomats — the “Japan Connection” — struggled to prevent a Japanese-American war. The Japan Connection consisted of the experts on Japan in the U.S. Department of State and Foreign Service who consistently advocated American-Japanese cooperation between 1922 and 1952. Their ranks included William R. Castle, Jr., Joseph C. Grew, Hugh R. Wilson, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, and Eugene H. Dooman. From the late 1920s to the early 1950s, these American diplomats insisted that cooperation between the United States and Japan would block Soviet expansion, stabilize East Asian relations, and obviate the need for American globalism.1

Although all of these men served in Japan during the 1920s and early 1930s, Castle, Grew, Wilson, Moffat, and Dooman formed a much looser aggregate than the well-studied “China Hands” who dominated the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department.2 Unlike the China case, American diplomacy with Japan did not produce a tightly-knit cluster of specialists who shared frequent assignments in Tokyo.3 Castle, Grew, and Moffat kept extensive diaries, now available at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Castle’s diary, which opened to researchers in January 1985, is a particularly rich source. Along with his own ideas, Castle
made detailed entries about his interactions with other members of the Ja-
pan Connection. The diaries of Castle, Grew, and Moffat helped solidify
the Japan Connection. During critical periods, such as the start of the Sino-
Japanese War, Castle, Grew, and Moffat circulated their diaries to keep
each other informed of their views and actions.

Castle, Grew, Wilson, and Moffat, in fact, initially focused on other
regions of the world. Because they entered diplomacy through the Euro-
pean sections of the Department, Castle, Grew, Wilson, and Moffat viewed
Japan from the perspective of United States relations with Europe — espe-
cially the Soviet Union. Dooman, on the other hand, was trained as a Japan
expert, and he never ventured much beyond East Asian matters in his ca-
reer. The American diplomats most active from 1922 to 1952 in promoting
close U.S.-Japanese relations thus formed a “connection” united more by
their ideas than by their assignments.4

The members of the Japan Connection formed their views on Japan
during an era of Japanese-American cooperation in the 1920s.5 In part be-
cause of these circumstances, Castle, Grew, Wilson, Moffat, and Dooman
agreed by 1929 that American policy in East Asia should be grounded on
friendship with Japan, although the European-oriented members of the group
reached this conclusion through a different path than Dooman. Strongly
influenced by elitism, racism, and anti-communism, Castle, Grew, Wilson,
and Moffat opposed an extensive commitment of United States resources
to East Asia. Although East Asia merited American attention, Castle, Grew,
Wilson, and Moffat hesitated to exert American leadership in the region
because they argued that the United States had more important interests in
Latin America and Europe.6 Japan’s actions during the 1920s persuaded
these four upper-class, European-oriented diplomats that the island nation
represented the only instrument that could be counted on to block Soviet
expansion in East Asia (a key goal for these four diplomats) and thereby
allow the United States to preserve its power for use in regions they as-
signed a higher priority (i.e., Latin America and Europe).7

Dooman, on the other hand, by the 1920s had risen through the ranks as a
member of the first generation of U.S. Department of State-trained experts
on Japan. As is often the case with area experts, Dooman approached Japan
with a deep appreciation for its culture and its people.8 Dooman agreed with
the other four members of the Japan Connection that the United States should
avoid alienating the Japanese and should encourage the island nation to re-
main an active member of the western-dominated international order.9

After 1929, the members of the Japan Connection attempted to influ-
ence American foreign policy in accordance with their pro-Japanese ideas.
William Castle, as U.S. Ambassador to Japan and later as Under Secretary
of State, led the Japan Connection from 1929 to 1933 in shaping President Herbert Hoover’s East Asian policy.\textsuperscript{10} The Japan Connection’s power, however, steadily deteriorated under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Between 1937 and 1941, the Japan Connection struggled to prevent a Japanese-American war. In 1937, Grew, Dooman, Moffat, Wilson, and Castle successfully urged restraint in response to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. By 1941, however, the national and international contexts of power had shifted to eliminate the Japan Connection’s influence. Despite frenzied efforts, these American diplomats failed to produce a Japanese-American rapprochement before the disaster at Pearl Harbor. A comparison of 1937 and 1941 demonstrates the Japan Connection’s declining role in shaping America’s Japan policy.\textsuperscript{11}

During this period of escalating Japanese-American tensions, Grew emerged as the most influential member of the Japan Connection, but as the American Ambassador in Japan, Grew never attained the level of influence held by Castle during the Hoover Administration. Often isolated in Tokyo, Grew depended on fellow members of the Japan Connection in Washington to argue for his recommendations.\textsuperscript{12} In 1937, Moffat and Wilson supported Grew within the Department, while Dooman worked with the Ambassador in Japan and Castle helped as an “informed outsider” in Washington, D.C. By 1941, the Japan Connection had lost its strong base within the Department, and its members failed to reverse the increasingly anti-Japanese nature of American foreign policy.

After 1933, Grew and Castle pursued the same pro-Japanese program through different mediums. Unlike Castle, Grew decided to remain in official service as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan.\textsuperscript{13} Castle, on the other hand, refused to serve under Franklin Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{14} Relying on his personal wealth, Castle did not hold a job after he left the State Department in March 1933. Instead, Castle established himself as an “informed outsider” in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{15} Besides private conversations with American and foreign officials, the former Under Secretary publicized his views through numerous speeches and articles.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite their different positions, Grew and Castle agreed on the basic tenets of American foreign policy in East Asia.\textsuperscript{17} Although frustrated by continued Japanese aggression in China, Grew and Castle remained convinced that the United States must not risk war to stop Japan.\textsuperscript{18} Based on their strident anti-communism and because they assigned a higher priority to Latin America and Europe than to East Asia for U.S. involvement, Grew and Castle refused to block forcefully Japanese expansion, and they flatly rejected any tactics that risked escalation.\textsuperscript{19} In sum, Grew and Castle advocated a passive policy toward Japanese aggression in China. Although they
admitted that the United States should protest Japanese actions that infringed on U.S. treaty rights in China, they remained adamant that the United States must avoid any action that might provoke Japan.

From 1933 to 1937, the Roosevelt Administration followed this passive policy toward Japan, but Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, never accepted the ideological premises of this stance as envisioned by the Japan Connection. The President and his Secretary, unlike the Japan Connection, shared a more global vision of American foreign policy. Persuaded that the United States had to oppose any nation that endangered free trade and international respect for treaties, Roosevelt and Hull wanted to prevent Japan as well as other “revisionist” powers such as Germany and Italy from carving the world into autarkic economic spheres.20

Yet, ever conscious of domestic and international limitations on American action, the President and his Secretary often compromised their principles.21 With respect to Japan in the early 1930s, both Roosevelt and Hull remained committed to preserving American treaty rights in East Asia, but they pursued a non-active policy because they had little choice. When Roosevelt entered the White House, the Great Depression still restricted American foreign policy. England and France, moreover, refused to challenge Japan. For Roosevelt and Hull, a passive East Asian policy represented a tactical delay, not a strategic withdrawal. Until a more opportune time, the Roosevelt Administration would neither confront nor accept Japan’s assertive stance in East Asia.22

Castle, Grew, Wilson, Moffat, and Dooman, however, were willing to accept an enlarged role for Japan in East Asia. Unlike Roosevelt and Hull, the Japan Connection ranked blocking Soviet expansion (via U.S.-Japan cooperation) and preserving American power (for use in Latin America and Europe) as top priorities for U.S. policy in East Asia. The Japan Connection viewed securing free trade and international respect for treaties as less important goals. For Castle, Grew, Wilson, Moffat, and Dooman, U.S. interests in East Asia (and elsewhere) were best served by avoiding any action that might alienate Japan and by seeking opportunities for American-Japanese cooperation.

An example of the differences between the Roosevelt Administration and the Japan Connection arose in the mid-1930s over the question of an accommodation with Japan. Both Grew and Castle contemplated a rapprochement with Japan whereby the United States would recognize Japan’s expanded power in East Asia in return for a firmer guarantee by Japan of American rights in China. Grew and Castle hoped that a new arrangement with Japan, besides stabilizing Japanese-American relations, would discourage Soviet expansion into East Asia.23 The Roosevelt Administration,
however, refused any such accommodation with Japan.\textsuperscript{24}

For the Japan Connection, the Roosevelt Administration presented a very different national context from the Hoover years. The members of the Japan Connection now had to contend with a Secretary of State and a President who did not share their conception of American foreign policy in East Asia.\textsuperscript{25} The members of the Japan Connection could not hope to change the more globally inclined views held by Hull and Roosevelt. Instead, the Japan Connection had to appeal to the pragmatic nature of the Secretary and the President while avoiding the appearance of being pro-Japanese.\textsuperscript{26} This changed national context confined the Japan Connection to a defensive posture in the years preceding Pearl Harbor. Although these American diplomats could at times successfully urge restraint, they failed in 1937 to persuade the Administration to accept Japan’s dominance of East Asia.\textsuperscript{27}

\section*{II. 1937: Start of the Sino-Japanese War}

During 1937, the Japan Connection successfully met the challenges of this new national context. The Japan Connection convinced Hull that the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July did not warrant a major initiative by the United States. Instead, Grew, Dooman, Moffat, Wilson, and Castle urged the Secretary to continue his passive policy toward East Asia. Despite his growing anti-Japanese sentiments, Hull accepted the arguments of the Japan Connection, and the Secretary deftly deflected attempts by others in the U.S. government to pursue an actively hostile policy toward Japan.\textsuperscript{28}

After a small clash of arms on 7 July 1937 escalated into full-scale fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops, Grew immediately advised the State Department to continue its passive policy toward East Asia.\textsuperscript{29} An offer to mediate the Sino-Japanese dispute or any other pressure on the Japanese to compromise, Grew argued, was doomed to failure. Japan was committed to resisting western influence in East Asia, Grew maintained, and he correctly predicted that Japan would refuse an offer of mediation. Instead, Grew counseled the Department to send notes to Japan “only . . . where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation . . . .”\textsuperscript{30} Grew argued that this policy had improved Japanese-American relations in the preceding four years and that this stance would help restrain Japan by avoiding “irritation which would merely . . . spur the Japanese to further aggression.”\textsuperscript{31} In the hope of keeping “Japanese-American relations on a fair equilibrium,” the Ambassador tried to restrict American diplomacy to actions for “the record.”\textsuperscript{32} To achieve this goal, Grew consistently advised informal protests against Japanese actions, and he opposed American participation with other western powers in castigating Japan.\textsuperscript{33}

In forming these recommendations, Grew depended on Dooman, the
new Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo. From 1933 to early 1937, Dooman ran the Japan desk in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department, but in late 1936, Grew requested that Dooman be assigned to Tokyo. Dooman eagerly accepted the appointment because he had chafed under the stern style and pro-Chinese orientation of Stanley Hornbeck, the chief of the Far Eastern bureau.\(^{34}\)

Even before Dooman arrived, Grew predicted that they would be “as thick as thieves,” and throughout the next four years, Grew constantly consulted Dooman and relied on him for information about Japanese politics and for early drafting of important documents.\(^{35}\)

Grew and Dooman received strong departmental support from Jay Pierrepont Moffat and Hugh Wilson, two other members of the Japan Connection. After a two-year stint in Australia, Moffat returned to the Department in July 1937 as Chief of the newly-reorganized Division of European Affairs.\(^{36}\) Wilson, who had served as the American Minister to Switzerland since 1927, then joined Moffat in the Department in August as an Assistant Secretary of State.\(^{37}\) Besides formulating American policy toward Europe, Wilson and Moffat supported a cautious stance toward Japan because the two men, like Grew and Dooman, wanted an East Asian policy that would, in Moffat’s words, “safeguard our nationals, preserve our interests and keep us out of all involvement.”\(^{38}\)

Hull’s unique management style allowed Wilson and Moffat to influence America’s East Asian policy. Especially when the Secretary was “puzzled about a situation,” he held rambling conferences in his office where all the top officers in the Department, regardless of specialization, offered their recommendations.\(^{39}\) Together, Wilson and Moffat exercised a strong voice in this setting.\(^{40}\) Through Wilson and Moffat, Castle strongly seconded the passive policy advocated by Grew and Dooman. During the latter half of 1937, Castle met with Wilson and Moffat often to discuss the American stance toward Japan, and Castle reinforced their opposition to any coercive action against the island nation.\(^{41}\)

In the Department debates of 1937, Wilson and Moffat repeatedly conflicted with Stanley Hornbeck. Although promoted to political adviser to the Secretary in 1937, Hornbeck continued to dominate the Division of Far Eastern Affairs because his former assistant, Maxwell Hamilton, succeeded him as the division chief.\(^{42}\) The dispute between Wilson and Moffat, on one hand, and Hornbeck, on the other, revolved around how much coercion the United States could use, or threaten to use, in its East Asian policy. In 1937, Hornbeck argued that the United States could safely threaten Japan.\(^{43}\) Hornbeck’s abrasive personality, however, encouraged Hull to consult Moffat and Wilson. Annoyed by Hornbeck’s lack of tact and his ver-
bose memoranda, Hull complained that the former Far Eastern Chief “just fusses at me all the time.”

During the early months of the Sino-Japanese war, the Department followed the cautious policy advocated by Grew, Dooman, Wilson, Moffat, and Castle. In his first public statement after the outbreak of fighting, Hull on 16 July faulted neither Japan nor China, but instead presented a very general list of American principles including avoiding force in the settlement of disputes and international respect for treaties. Although increasingly angry at the Japanese, Hull assured Grew on 29 July that his policy would be “not to make uncalled for and likely to be futile protests or gestures of interference.” In a further statement released on 23 August, Hull explicitly applied his principles of 16 July to the Pacific, but the Secretary still avoided blaming either China or Japan. In formulating this policy, Hull relied on his own innate caution which was reinforced by the advice of Grew, Dooman, Wilson and Moffat. Besides consulting Wilson and Moffat, Hull constantly requested Grew’s advice on policy questions, deferred to Grew’s discretion on how to approach the Japanese, and let the Ambassador know he was pleased with Grew’s actions.

By August, Grew expressed great satisfaction with Hull’s policy, and the Ambassador took every opportunity to assure the Secretary of the wisdom of this course. Grew’s pleasure with Hull’s policy, in fact, encouraged the Ambassador to overstep his bounds in late August. Grew had been mulling over the future shape of American policy, and after consulting the entire Embassy staff, Grew wrote a long telegram to the Secretary on 27 August. Dooman strongly supported Grew’s actions because both men saw an opportunity to influence Hull.

Grew and Dooman sought to advance American interests in East Asia through an accommodation with Japanese expansionism. For Grew and Dooman, this adjustment reflected “practical common sense.” Both men assumed that, without war, the United States could not alter Japan’s actions in China. Since the United States had already registered its disapproval of Japan’s aggression, Grew and Dooman argued that the Department should now adopt a “policy of dignified silence.” In the hopes of building on Japanese appreciation of recent American policy, Grew called for a “special endeavor” by the United States not to go further in its condemning Japanese actions. This policy, Grew argued, would increase protection of American rights in East Asia as well as offer a future opportunity to help settle the conflict when, as Grew expected, the Japanese became bogged down in China.

Grew’s telegram had an immediate effect on the Department. According to Wilson, the note dissuaded the Secretary from sending “a rather
ominous document to the Japanese.” Moffat noted that Grew’s reasoning reassured the Secretary to continue his passive policy toward Japan, but Hull refused any special effort not to offend the Japanese. The Secretary, moreover, asserted that Grew and the Embassy had to be awakened to the depth of American outrage at Japan’s behavior and to the need for an “American policy over a long term with respect to condoning treaty breaking and aggression.”

After a long drafting process, Hull responded on 2 September. In this terse note, Hull stressed American disapproval of Japanese actions and the Secretary’s fervent commitment to the principles he had outlined on 16 July and 23 August. Although the Secretary would continue his policy not “to call names or to make threats,” he strongly notified Grew that “we should not allow ourselves to be hampered . . . by being especially solicitous that what we do shall not be displeasing” to either Japan or China.

Stung by the Secretary’s rebuke, Grew immediately altered his course. As directed by Hull, Grew made stronger protests to the Japanese Foreign Office, especially over Japanese bombing in Nanjing. On 15 September, Grew also wrote Hull an even longer letter to demonstrate that the Embassy did not diverge from the Department’s stance. In this deferential note, the Ambassador stressed that his “main purpose” in the earlier telegram had been to advise the continuation of the current American policy. Grew did not, however, discard his pro-Japanese views in his note of 15 September. In a delicate balance, the Ambassador still maintained that American interests would be served best by avoiding any unnecessary irritation of Japan.

The exchange of letters between Grew and Hull demonstrated the limits of influence by the Japan Connection under the Roosevelt Administration. While Grew and the others could encourage a passive policy not to confront Japan, these diplomats could not persuade Hull to accommodate Japan’s expansionism. For the Japan Connection, an adjustment to Japan’s new position would increase protection of American interests in East Asia. Hull, however, refused any acceptance of Japanese aggression. As Wilson explained to Grew in the fall of 1937, Hull was motivated “by a righteous indignation to adopt what some term a ‘vigorous stand’ and is deterred therefrom by the type of argument that we have launched.”

In this atmosphere, the members of the Japan Connection during the rest of 1937 worked with Hull to keep the United States committed to a cautious policy toward East Asia. In October, Wilson and Moffat helped defeat the first consideration of economic sanctions against Japan since the start of the Sino-Japanese War. Wilson and Moffat then played key roles in Hull’s successful efforts to scuttle the November Brussels Conference, a meeting convened in response to Roosevelt’s quarantine speech of
5 October. (This speech reflected Roosevelt’s more globally inclined views on foreign policy. Because the “epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading,” the President proposed that the law-abiding nations “quarantine” the aggressor states “to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.”) To sustain Hull’s acceptance of a passive policy, Moffat and Wilson repeatedly stressed that economic sanctions would inevitably lead to war, that the United States could not depend on British naval support in the case of hostilities with Japan, and that a fully defeated Japan risked Soviet expansion in China. Meanwhile, Castle encouraged popular opposition to Roosevelt’s quarantine speech. To defeat Roosevelt’s initiative, Castle began a series of speeches warning that any form of sanctions against Japan would inevitably escalate into war.

III. The Japan Connection’s Influence Declines

From 1938 to 1940, changes in the national and international contexts of power diluted the influence of the Japan Connection. Nationally, the Japan Connection lost its strong power base within the State Department. Wilson left Washington in January 1938 to become the American Ambassador to Germany. Moffat immediately noted the loss of his ally. Besides holding a lower rank than Hornbeck, Moffat suffered an ever-increasing workload as European tensions escalated. From January 1938 to May 1940, when he was transferred to Canada, Moffat had little time for East Asian issues because he had to formulate an American response to Adolf Hitler’s aggression in Europe. By 1941, neither Wilson nor Moffat held positions permitting them to shape American policy toward Japan.

The weakened position of the Japan Connection in the Department occurred just as Hull began to adopt a harsher stance toward Japan. Hull did not abandon caution after 1937, but the Secretary became less willing to maintain a strictly passive policy toward Japanese expansion. For example, although Hull strongly opposed formal economic sanctions, the Secretary in 1939 officially discouraged private American loans to Japan. From 1938 to 1940, Hull followed a policy of harsh rhetoric mixed with softer actions that avoided confrontation while slightly harassing Japan.

Continued Japanese aggression further undermined the Japan Connection’s case. From 1938 to 1940, despite hesitancy and occasional indecision, Japan continued to spread its influence in Asia. During early 1938, the Japanese military escalated the war with China. Bogged down on the continent, the government of Prince Konoye Fumimaro then decided in November 1938 to abandon fully the Washington Treaty system. In September 1940, viewing Germany’s summer victory over France as an opportunity for further expansion, Japan joined with Germany and Italy in
the Tripartite Pact. That month Japanese forces also occupied northern Indochina. 75

Top American officials grew increasingly alarmed by Japan’s unrelenting movement in Asia. During the late 1930s, decision-makers in Washington viewed Japanese aggression as part of a global movement by totalitarian states to impose restrictive political and economic practices on the world. In an international system of seemingly interlocked threats from Germany, Italy, and Japan, American foreign policy assumed a more global nature as policymakers argued that the security of the United States required the survival of Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union. 76 In this changing national and international context, many of the arguments of the Japan Connection lost relevancy. If the United States needed Britain to resist Hitler and if England depended on raw materials from her southeast-Asian colonies, then the United States, according to Roosevelt and others, must protect those areas from Japanese expansion. 77

Despite strenuous efforts, the Japan Connection failed to counteract the increasing globalism of American foreign policy. From 1938 to 1941, Grew and Castle emerged as the two most influential members of the Japan Connection while Dooman supported Grew’s efforts to avoid a Japanese-American conflict. Preoccupied with European questions, Moffat and Wilson devoted only marginal attention to East Asia. 78

From January 1938 to December 1941, Grew and Dooman fought a defensive battle to preserve a passive policy toward Japan. Realizing the growing pressure within the Department for an active stance, Grew, with Dooman’s support, usually argued strongly that the United States must not use economic sanctions against Japan. Grew and Dooman were convinced that the Japanese viewed control of north China’s raw materials as vital to the empire’s existence. Given this commitment, the Japanese would not, they argued, be cowed by American economic pressure. The Ambassador and his Counselor stressed, moreover, that sanctions risked war in an area of limited American economic and strategic interests. 79

While Grew and Dooman worked officially from 1938 to 1941 to avert a Japanese-American clash, Castle increased his unofficial activities to the same end. During 1937, Castle supplemented the efforts of Grew, Dooman, Wilson, and Moffat. Castle refrained from greater activity during that crucial year because he was distracted by his position on the Republican National Committee. Despite his duties with the Republican party, in the years leading up Pearl Harbor Castle increased his public criticism of the Roosevelt Administration. Through his articles and speeches, Castle tried to mobilize opposition to what he perceived as a dangerous activism by the President. 80 In late 1940, Castle also helped organize the America First Committee in the hope that this new group could block Roosevelt’s foreign policy. 81
Yet, the efforts by Grew, Dooman, and Castle failed to halt the progressive deterioration in Japanese-American relations. On 24 July 1941, Japan occupied southern Indo-China, and in response Roosevelt immediately froze Japanese assets in the United States. The President’s order soon escalated into a complete embargo of American trade with Japan including oil, a commodity vital to Japan.82 The sudden increase in Japanese-American friction dismayed Grew as well as Japanese Prime Minister Konoye. Because Japan depended upon American oil, Japanese leaders had to make a decision: either Japan must reach an agreement with the United States or attack the European colonies in Southeast Asia to ensure a supply of oil. Negotiation or war presented the only two possibilities. In this atmosphere of crisis, Konoye asked for a private meeting with Roosevelt to discuss Japanese-American differences. Once informed of Konoye’s initiative, Grew immediately urged the Administration to accept.83

Grew’s strenuous efforts to encourage a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting illustrated his lack of influence in the State Department in 1941. From August to October, the Ambassador argued repeatedly that the United States should accept Konoye’s offer. Japan now realized, Grew maintained, that the United States would oppose Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Having awakened Japan to the depth of the American commitment in East Asia, the United States must now encourage those members of the Japanese government who wished to avoid war. Although Grew praised the earlier forceful posture of his government, the Ambassador stressed that further pressure would not force the Japanese to submit. Rather, Grew feared that only a positive response to Konoye’s initiative would check the descent to war.84

The Department flatly rejected his recommendations. In particular, Hull and his advisers, reflecting the distrust of Japan that pervaded Washington by 1941, rebutted Grew’s position that a meeting could occur without prior agreement on points of dispute.85 The Department demanded explicit assurances of change in Japanese policy, especially on China, before any meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. By the beginning of October, the possibility for a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting had died.86

The failure of the proposed conference starkly revealed the Embassy’s lack of influence in the year preceding Pearl Harbor.87 By the fall of 1941, Grew lamented his isolation from the Department.88 In this vacuum, the Ambassador busied himself with repeated warnings to the Department that Japan would rather attack than submit to American coercion. Grew relied heavily on Dooman for these telegrams, but in the end, the Embassy’s telegrams did little good.89
While Grew and Dooman tried to combat their isolation in Tokyo, Castle was forced to stop his public opposition to Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Castle began 1941 with numerous speeches, but on 29 April, the former Under Secretary suddenly collapsed. This collapse and the resulting operations to extract his colon removed Castle from the public debate for the rest of 1941. 90

IV. Conclusions
Could the Japan Connection have averted the Second World War in the Pacific? Certainly Grew, Dooman, Moffat, Wilson, and Castle offered ideas after 1937 to deescalate Japanese-American friction. 91 Yet, Roosevelt and Hull consistently rejected those proposals, and because of diplomatic rigidity on both sides of the Pacific, Japan and the United States moved inexorably toward war from 1939 to 1941. Neither nation wanted war, but because top American and Japanese officials held “two mutually exclusive views of world order,” the leaders of the two powers refused to make the compromises necessary to avert a clash. 92 Japan’s attempt to establish an economically self-sufficient sphere of influence in East Asia conflicted with the American vision of an economically interdependent world linked through free trade. 93 War was not inevitable because opportunities arose in which Japan and the United States might have reached a rapprochement. 94 But each time top policymakers in the two countries decided on courses of action that escalated Japanese-American friction.

The Japan Connection failed to shape a Japanese-American accommodation in the years before Pearl Harbor for several reasons. Individual weaknesses decreased their influence. Grew and Dooman, for example, suffered from excessive optimism that the Japanese would cease to expand. The national and international contexts of power in the late 1930s especially diluted the Japan Connection’s influence. Nationally, these American diplomats never convinced Roosevelt and Hull to discard a globalist vision of American foreign policy. Only in 1937, moreover, did the Japan Connection hold a strong position within the Department from which to discourage a confrontation with Japan. By 1941, the Japan Connection lacked a strong voice in Washington. Grew and Dooman were isolated in Tokyo, and Castle fell ill. Even if the members of the Japan Connection had persuaded Roosevelt and Hull to seek a settlement with Japan, Grew, Dooman, Castle, Moffat, and Wilson never confronted the problem of how to persuade the increasingly anti-Japanese American public to accept a probably distasteful compromise. 95

The international context of the early 1940s also provided an inhospitable climate for the Japan Connection’s ideas. In a world of seemingly interlocked aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan, alliance with Britain,
China, and the Soviet Union made sense to most officials in the Roosevelt Administration. In 1937, without a war in Europe, the United States could decide not to resist forcefully Japan’s aggression in China. By 1941, however, with Europe dominated by Hitler and with Asia threatened by continued Japanese aggrandizement, many United States policymakers maintained that vital American interests were at stake. Roosevelt and Hull argued by 1941 that American security required the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and this assumption committed them to oppose Germany and Japan. Even with a stronger bureaucratic position and fewer individual shortcomings, the Japan Connection would have had difficulty convincing the President and the Secretary to accept a foreign policy more tolerant of Japanese actions or one of delaying a sharp fissure. Unlike the Hoover years, the national and international contexts of power from 1937 to 1941 undercut the Japan Connection’s influence.

Notes
3 Because shared ideas helped unify the Japan Connection, I have argued elsewhere that these American diplomats held an “ideology.” In this argument, I have borrowed Michael Hunt’s “commonsensical” definition of an ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.” Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), xi. For a complete discussion of ideology these men shared and how those ideas changed over time, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection.”
4 Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Policies Toward the United States,” in Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868-1941: A Research Guide, ed. James W. Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 435-443. For a detailed discussion of international relations in East Asia during the 1920s, see

6 Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 47-49.

7 To Castle, the Japanese were natural friends for the United States in the East Asia. Unlike the Chinese, Castle claimed that the Japanese were a civilized people who could be trusted, and he further asserted that Japan wanted cordial relations with the United States. William R. Castle, Jr., Diary, 16 March 1929, vol. 14, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. For more detail on the views of Castle, Grew, Wilson, and Moffat, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 1-49. At this time, historians are allowed to paraphrase the Castle Diary, but direct quotes are not permitted by the Castle family.

8 See comment by John Carter Vincent, an American expert on China, that “The China hands could make a better case for China than China could for itself, and the Japan hands could make a better case for Japan than Japan could for itself. No question about it, we were partisans. It got into your blood.” Quotation by Vincent in Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 214.

9 During the 1920s, both Dooman and Ballantine argued that Japan’s movement toward liberal democracy represented a genuine stage in modernization, and they opposed actions, such as the Immigration Act of 1924, which offended Japan and thereby weakened the pro-Western, “moderate” elements in the Japanese government. Eugene H. Dooman, Interview, May 1962, Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, New York, 14-16; and Joseph W. Ballantine, “Memoirs, 1888-1970.” Box 1, Joseph W. Ballantine Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California, 51-53, 62-64. For more detail on the views of Dooman and Ballantine, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 49-61.

10 With help from Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo Dooman, U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland Wilson, and Grew, who became U.S. Ambassador to Japan in 1932, Castle worked with President Hoover to undermine Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson’s more coercive policy toward Japan. For example, Castle helped restrict the U.S. response to Japan’s expansion in Manchuria from 1931 to 1933 by publicly undermining the attempt by Stimson to threaten possible American sanctions against Japan. Castle also altered the American stance during the London Naval Conference of 1930. For the Japan Connection’s actions during the Hoover Administration, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 62-122. For a summary of Castle’s activities during the Manchurian Crisis, see Barney J. Rickman III, “Ideology and Influence: William R. Castle, Jr. and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933,” Paper presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Conference, College Park, Maryland, August 1990.

11 For a detailed discussion of the Japan Connection’s actions from 1933 to 1941, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 123-202.


13 Foreign Service officers, according to Grew, “must be prepared to shift our loyalty if not our thinking” after a new president is elected. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 2:1448. Un-
der the new Administration, Grew set out to keep “the boat [i.e., Japanese-American relations] from rocking.” Grew to Hornbeck, 8 May 1933, “Grew, Joseph C., 1933,” Box 184, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

14 Besides his friendship with Hoover, Castle’s elitism prevented him from working for a candidate who, Castle claimed, appealed to the lower classes. Castle, Diary, 8 November 1932, vol. 21. See also ibid., 4 October, 9 November 1932, vol. 21.


19 Grew, Ten Years, 164-165; and Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 217-220.


21 For examples by Roosevelt, see Dallek, Roosevelt, 65, 127, 131, 143.


23 Castle, Diary, 15 January 1935, v. 27, and 14 June 1936, v. 31; and Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 221-225.


25 Besides being close friends, Castle and Hoover shared similar ideas about American foreign policy. Stimson, on the other hand, held a global vision of American diplomacy that closely resembled Roosevelt’s views. For the friendship between Castle and Hoover, the ideas that they shared, and their disagreements with Stimson, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 62-73.

26 On the danger of appearing pro-Japanese, see Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 213.

27 For later efforts by Grew and Dooman in 1939 to achieve an American-Japanese accommodation, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 172-174.

28 Utley, Going to War, 3-22.

29 For the continuation of Japanese penetration in north China after 1933 and the growth of Chinese resistance, see Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 39-40; Grew, Ten Years,


36 Before going to Australia, Moffat had honed his bureaucratic skills from 1932 to 1935 as Chief of the old Division of West European Affairs.

37 For Wilson’s excitement at being able to work with Moffat in shaping American policy, see Wilson to Moffat, 30 June 1937, vol. 12, J. Pierrepont Moffat Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

38 Moffat to Norman Davis, 8 September 1937, vol. 12, Moffat Papers.


40 Grew realized his dependence on support from Wilson and Moffat for his recommendations, and he praised them as a “stabilizing influence” in the Department. Grew to Wilson, 30 September 1937, “Grew, Joseph C.” Box 2, Wilson Papers. Likewise, Wilson and Moffat appreciated Grew’s position in Tokyo, because the Ambassador had the ability to “be very firm without being antagonistic.” Moffat to Grew, 18 December 1937, vol. 12, Moffat Papers.

41 Castle, Diary, 24 August, 14 September, 9, 31 October, 14 November, 15, 19, 23, 29 December 1937, vol. 34.

42 Thomson, “Department of State,” 84; and Utley, *Going to War*, 8.


Hull to Grew, 29 July 1937, FRUS, 1937 3:297-298.


Hull to Grew, 29 July, 5, 6, 7 August 1937, FRUS, 1937 3:297-298, 328-329, 353. See also Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 243.


Moffat, Diary, 27, 28, 29, 30 August, vol. 39.

According to Moffat, the Secretary intended the note to show the Ambassador how the Department “viewed the Asiatic conflict in a different light from himself.” Ibid., 2 September 1937, vol. 39.

Hull to Grew, 2 September 1937, FRUS, 1937 3:505-508. Hull concluded that, if Japan wanted American good will, then the island nation should listen to American calls for restraint “now.”

Grew, Diary, 3 September 1937, vol. 85.

For examples, see Grew, Ten Years, 217-219; and Grew to Hull, 10, 20, 27 September 1937, FRUS, 1937 3:521-522, 535-536, 553-554.

Grew to Hull, 15 September 1937, FRUS, 1937 3:525-530. Grew also stated that he fully shared the American “outrage” at Japanese aggression, and he assured the Secretary that, “I do not advocate and have not advocated our tying our hands in order not to displease Japan.”

Grew later confided to Moffat that he had not changed his goal after Hull’s letter of 2 September. The Ambassador still intended to work “as long as possible to keep American factual relations with Japan on equilibrium for the future welfare of American interests.” Grew to Moffat, 21 September 1937, vol. 84, Grew Papers.

Wilson to Grew, 18 October 1937, “Grew, Joseph C.,” Box 2, Wilson Papers. In the words of one historian, Hull remained committed during 1937 to a policy of “no confrontation, no withdrawal, and no assent” toward Japan. Utley, Going to War, 10.

Address by Roosevelt, 5 October 1937, Peace and War, 383-387.


Castle, Diary, 8, 13 October 1937, vol. 34.

Although audiences disliked his criticisms of China, Castle recorded that most people seemed to agree with him that American interests in East Asia did not warrant the inherent dangers of a coercive stance. Ibid., 25 October, 2, 16 November 1937, vol. 34.

For examples of Hull’s reliance on Wilson, see Castle, Diary, 29 January, 2 March 1938, vol. 35.

Depicting Hornbeck as leader of the “messianic school of thought” within the Department, Moffat lamented that, without Wilson, he had less success in countering Hornbeck’s call for an active policy toward Japan. Moffat, Diary, 31 January 1938, vol. 40.

Repeatedly in the early months of 1938, Moffat noticed that the Secretary was “growing so increasingly perturbed over the plight of the Democratic powers and the increasing gains of the Dictatorships that he is swinging ... to the left of the middle of the road which he has heretofore pursued.” Moffat, Diary, 1, 2 January 1938, vol. 40. For further examples of Hull’s harsher stance, see ibid., 29, 30, 31 January, 10 February, 1938, vol. 40. Other members of the Japan Connection also noted the Secretary’s shift. See Castle, Diary, 1 December 1937, vol. 34, and 18 February 1938, vol. 35.

Moffat, Diary, 29 March, 1 April 1938, vol. 40; and Utley, Going to War, 44-57.

Utley, Going to War, 78.

Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 259-260; and Iriye, Origins of the Second World War, 59-64.

On 3 November, Prime Minister Konoye called for a “new order” in East Asia that would exclude western influence. Later in the month, the Japanese Foreign Office summarily informed the United States that Japan no longer recognized American treaty rights in China. In early 1939, Japan began to move southward by occupying the Hainan and Spratly Islands. Japan then humiliated the British by blockading Tianjin.

Iriye, Origins of the Second World War, 67-68, 75-76, 113-118. For more on Japanese goals in the Pact, see LaFeber, The Clash, 191-195, especially p. 191 where LaFeber states that the new Foreign Minister “Matsuoka [Yosuke] was a loud voice urging that Japan fully support the Axis powers, in part so that Japanese could more effectively exploit the crumbling colonial empires in Southeast Asia.”

For the increasing globalism of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, see Iriye, Origins of the Second World War, 69-70, 74-75, 87-89, 96; Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 142; and Utley, Going to War, 32-33, 57-58, 92, 178, 180.

For an example of this globalist thinking, see Roosevelt to Grew, 21 January 1941, in Grew, Ten Years, 361-363.

For Wilson’s opposition to an American confrontation with Japan, see Castle, Diary, 23 February 1940, vol. 39; Utley, Going to War, 88-93; and Wilson to Grew, 9 March 1940, “Grew, Joseph C.,” Box 2, Wilson Papers.

Grew, Diary, 1 August 1938, vol. 93; and Heinrichs, American Ambassador, 264-273. For more detail on the efforts by Grew and Dooman to influence American foreign policy from 1938 to 1941, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 171-186. In the fall of 1940, Grew temporarily weakened his opposition to a forceful stance against Japan because of his dismay over the sudden fall of France. By early 1941, however, Grew had returned to his former position.


82 Historians differ over whether Roosevelt meant to cut off Japan’s supply of oil in July or whether lower-level bureaucrats imposed an embargo without the President’s knowledge. For the former interpretation, see Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, 246-247; and for the latter, see Utley, *Going to War*, 151-156.
84 The Ambassador admitted that Japan might not fulfill agreements reached at such a meeting, and Grew varied in his estimation of how far Konoye could go in meeting American demands, but Grew clung to his conviction that only by talking could the two nations prevent a clash. Ibid., 340-345, 351.
85 For the distrust of Japan in Washington, see Utley, *Going to War*, 159-160.
88 Heinrichs, *American Ambassador*, 349. For examples of Grew’s frustration with the lack of information on policy from the Department, see Grew, Diary, 30 April, 10 July 1941, Box 1.
89 Grew, Diary, 3 November 1941, Box 2; and Heinrichs, *American Ambassador*, 354-357.
90 For a discussion of Castle’s limited activities during 1941 as well as the ways Castle’s elitism restricted his success at mobilizing public opinion, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 196-199.
91 American acceptance of another Grew initiative for an accommodation with Japan in 1939, for example, might have satisfied the Japanese and thus avoided Pearl Harbor or at least delayed a Pacific war. Surely implementation of Castle’s call in October 1940 for American acceptance of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine would have preserved peace by acknowledging Japan’s dominance in Asia. See Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 172-189, 196-199.
94 For a discussion of various proposals made by Japan and by the United States in fall 1941 to avert a clash, see Utley, *Going to War*, 165-175. For a detailed discussion of the efforts by Joseph Ballantine, another member of the Japan Connection, to seek a “modus vivendi” between Japan and the United States in November 1941, see Rickman, “The Japan Connection,” 189-196. Many of the documents for these various Japanese and American proposals are included in Akira Iriye, *Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999).
95 Much of the historiography on the coming of World War II has also failed to address the question of what was politically feasible given the anti-Japanese state of American public

TAIWAN’S 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S POLITICS AND RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA

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The March 2004 re-election of Chen Shui-bian as President of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan reaffirmed the incumbent president as the choice of the people of Taiwan. China, however, viewed Chen’s re-election as a major blow to its plans for unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. China was hoping, and expecting, that Chen’s rival would win the election, and China would then be able to press Taiwan for unification with the mainland. Chen’s victory dashed the hopes of his political rivals as well as those of China. This article examines the election results and assesses their implications for Taiwan’s domestic politics, and assesses the implications of Chen’s victory for China-Taiwan relations. This article answers two questions. First, what is the political future of Taiwan’s major political parties? Second, what are the prospects for peaceful relations between Taiwan and mainland China?
Results of the 2004 Presidential Election and Significance for Taiwan’s Domestic Politics

Chen’s victory in the March 20, 2004 Taiwan presidential election came at the end of a tight race between incumbent President Chen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and challenger Lien Chan of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT). With more than 80 percent of Taiwan’s 16.5 million eligible voters casting ballots in the hotly contested race, Chen won a slim victory with 50.1 percent of votes cast to Lien’s 49.9 percent. Four years earlier, Chen won 39.3 percent of the vote in a three-way race against Lien and independent candidate Soong Chu-yu (James Soong). Soong won 36.8 percent of the vote, far ahead of Lien Chan’s 23.1 percent. In 2004, Soong — who had created the People First Party after his 2000 defeat — joined Lien on the challenger ticket as the Vice-Presidential candidate, putting up a strong challenge to the Chen-Lu ticket. The KMT and the PFP sensed victory in 2004 because Chen was weakened by high unemployment, a sluggish but reviving economy, hostile relations with mainland China, and the legacy of an earlier KMT impeachment attempt. Despite these problems, the 2004 presidential campaign was a horse race, with polls taken before the election showing the two tickets in a virtual dead heat. The March 20, 2004 election results revealed that Chen received 6,471,970 votes to Lien’s 6,442,452, a difference of less than 30,000 votes, and a 0.228 percent margin of victory.

Immediately after the election results became public, the KMT disputed Chen’s victory and called for a recount of all ballots cast. The KMT based its rationale for a nationwide recount on the grounds that Chen and incumbent Vice-President Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu) had likely benefited from sympathy votes from a botched assassination attempt in southern Taiwan the evening before the election. Chen and Lu were slightly injured in the attempt. In response to the assassination attempt, Chen’s government put security forces on alert and called out 200,000 military and police – traditionally believed to be KMT supporters – thereby preventing them from voting in the election. Lien-Soong followers, called the “Pan-Blue Alliance” of KMT, PFP and New Party supporters among others, carried out protests and a sit-in in front of the Presidential Office the night of the election results. They also filed a lawsuit with the Taiwan High Court to seek an annulment of the presidential election and to have all presidential ballots nationwide recounted. They protested on the grounds of the circumstances surrounding the unexplained assassination attempt against Chen and Lu, and they argued that the number of ballots certified invalid was unusually high. More than 330,000 ballots allegedly were spoiled. The ranks of protesters swelled to 10,000 people Sunday and Monday as people fin-
ished work and school. On Monday following the election, Taiwan’s high court ordered all ballot boxes sealed to preserve evidence.

After a nine-day recount of all 16.5 million used and unused ballots, nearly 40,000 questionable ballots were discovered. Despite the number of questionable ballots, Chen was inaugurated for a second term on May 20, 2004. A High Court ruling on the ballots to determine the winner of the March 20 election was not possible before Chen’s scheduled inauguration. Of the 13.5 million ballots cast, 23,000 ballots found disputable originally belonged to Chen and some 16,000 to Lien. DPP supporters argued that the number of Lien ballots would not be significant enough to change the election results.

Chen’s victory ended his status as minority president. When Chen won in 2000, many people believed it was a fluke and attributed his victory to the three-way race. In the 2000 presidential race, the KMT ran then-Vice-President Lien Chan rather than James Soong, former governor of Taiwan and lieutenant to President Lee Teng-hui. Discouraged at being passed over by the KMT as the presidential candidate, Soong split from the KMT and ran for president as an independent candidate. Despite warnings from challengers Lien and Soong that electing Chen would upset Taiwan’s security and economic stability, Chen garnered nearly 40 percent of the vote in the March 2000 presidential three-way race, but only enough to make him a minority president. Many people attributed Chen’s victory to the KMT split. Nevertheless, Chen’s 2000 election marked an historic transfer of power after more than five decades of KMT rule of Taiwan. The DPP was established in the 1970s as an organization in opposition to the KMT that was ruling Taiwan under martial law. The ROC government viewed the DPP as an illegal and subversive organization until 1986 when it recognized the DPP as a legal political party.

Throughout Chen’s first term, the KMT-dominated legislature tried several attempts to frustrate Chen’s policies, and even tried to impeach Chen. Despite this opposition, in the 2004 presidential race Chen increased his percentage of the vote from less than 40 percent to more than 50 percent, an increase of nearly 1.5 million votes. In 2000, the KMT was one of the richest political parties in the world with assets of more than $20 billion. By 2004, its financial troubles were widely known. There were even rumors that the cash-strapped KMT would sell its luxurious headquarters building in Taipei in northern Taiwan and open smaller grassroots offices throughout southern Taiwan to better appeal to ethnic Taiwanese and minority Hakka voters.¹ Now that the DPP’s Chen has won the presidency twice, there is little dispute that the DPP is the ruling party of Taiwan. The KMT had difficulty adjusting to the DPP as ruling party during Chen’s
first term because the KMT saw Chen’s victory as a fluke and believed his presidency would last only one term. Throughout Chen’s first term, the KMT-controlled legislature put up considerable resistance to Chen’s initiatives, hoping to win back the presidency in 2004. Now that the KMT has again lost the presidency to the DPP, the KMT must recognize that it is now the official opposition party, not a ruling party merely sitting out one term of office.

The KMT could hold onto the notion of majority party because the Pan-Blue Alliance maintained a majority of seats in the separate December 2001 legislative elections. Although the number of seats held by the KMT actually dropped from 110 to 68 in the 2001 legislative election, it could count on the PFP’s 46 seats and the New Party’s (NP) one seat to cobble together a 115 seat majority in the 225 seat legislature. The Pan-Green Alliance of the DPP and TSU captured only 100 legislative seats, five short of the Pan-Blue Alliance majority. This split government – the DPP as ruling party in the executive branch, and the Pan-Blue Alliance acting as majority coalition in the parliament – allowed the KMT to hold onto the fiction that it was Taiwan’s true governing party.

Following Chen’s re-election, the KMT needs to learn how to be an effective opposition party. At the least, the KMT needs a new identity, and needs to find a niche issue that resonates with voters. Regarding identity, the KMT has long been associated with the Mainlanders who retreated to Taiwan from mainland China toward the end of China’s 1945-1949 civil war. In the first decade of the Nationalist government’s move to Taiwan, Mainlanders made up only about 12 percent of the population. After imposing martial law in 1947, the minority of Mainlanders governed the majority through the KMT. Despite gradually increasing its ratio of local Taiwanese in the general party membership and in the Central Standing Committee, many ethnic Taiwanese continue to see the KMT as the party of the mainlanders (and particularly the party that imposed martial law in Taiwan from 1947-1986), and the DPP as the party of ethnic Taiwanese. The perception is only partly based on fact. Today, the majority of KMT membership is Taiwanese. Chen’s predecessor, the KMT’s President Lee Teng-hui, was ethnic Taiwanese, and actually lent a lot of support to Chen’s 2000 presidential campaign. Furthermore, the KMT still enjoys considerable support in Taiwan. Approximately 15 percent of the people living in Taiwan are considered Mainlanders, the group who migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland in 1947-1949.

If all Taiwanese always voted for the Taiwanese candidate, it would be impossible for KMT candidates to garner significant support in presidential and legislative elections. But this is not the case. Moreover, if there
were a true Mainlander party on Taiwan, it would be a small, permanent minority party because Mainlanders comprise only a small percentage of the electorate. In fact, Taiwanese do vote for the DPP, PFP and KMT. For example, in the 2001 legislative election, the PFP, headed by former KMT member James Soong, got about 20 percent of the vote. But the 20 percent of the vote is much larger than the percentage of Mainlanders on Taiwan. This means that there were plenty of Taiwanese who voted for the PFP. Today, most members of the DPP are ethnic Chinese, but consider themselves to be Taiwanese. The concept of Taiwan ethnic identity resonates more strongly in the DPP than in the other political parties, and the issue of Taiwanese identity resonated in the 2004 presidential election much more than the 2000 and 2001 elections. The emphasis on Taiwan identity, epitomized by the DPP campaign slogan “Taiwan? Yes!,” clearly benefited the DPP. Both the Chen-Lu and Lien-Soong tickets worked hard to prove that their respective ticket was more “ Taiwanese” than the other, leading Lien and Soong to prostrate themselves and kiss the ground to demonstrate their love for Taiwan. For the first time in an election, the KMT courted the idea of permanent separation from mainland China, thereby acknowledging a distinctive Taiwan sovereignty. President Chen, after being shot in a botched assassination attempt, even claimed that he was protecting Taiwan’s democracy with his own body. Many Taiwanese in southern Taiwan believe that Taiwanese should support fellow Taiwanese and should not allow outsiders (mainlanders) to rule again. Despite the aforementioned cross-over votes of Taiwanese and Mainlanders, Taiwanese identity will remain a core issue in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The KMT therefore needs to work harder, particularly at the grass-roots level, to appeal to ethnic Taiwanese voters.

The KMT has already begun this work by moving away from its unification platform by courting the idea of permanent separation from mainland China, thereby acknowledging a distinctive Taiwan sovereignty. The stakes for the KMT are high in the December 2004 legislative elections. The DPP and its Pan-Green supporter, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), have a good chance of obtaining more than half the seats (more than 113 seats) in Taiwan’s legislature. Although the Pan-Blue’s PFP seats might increase, it is likely that the KMT will lose seats, as it did in 2001. While the PFP’s increase might offset the KMT loss, the DPP is looking at a Pan-Green legislative majority in late 2004. The stakes are high for Chen and the DPP as well. A Pan-Green majority would be more likely to support President Chen’s proposed initiatives to revise the constitution and other legislation.

Even though the KMT has a good chance of losing more seats in the legislature, it does not mean it should be resigned to the dust heap of history. India’s Congress Party made a dramatic political comeback in the spring
2004 parliamentary elections. The Congress Party appealed to impoverished Indians who felt left out of the economic advances enjoyed by other Indians throughout the early 2000s under the BJP-led coalition government. The KMT similarly needs to find its niche in an issue or set of issues. To regain the presidency or to maintain its legislative majority, the KMT needs to make that issue resonate with both Mainlanders and Taiwanese.

Significance for Cross-Strait Relations
There was much nervousness on the part of China, the United States and Taiwan-watchers when Chen Shui-bian, former mayor of Taipei and supporter of Taiwan independence cast his hat in the ring for the 2000 presidential election. Immediately before the 2000 Taiwan presidential election, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Premier Zhu Rongji, his face contorted with rage, angrily warned the people of Taiwan that they would pay if they chose the wrong candidate in the election. For much of its existence, the DPP has supported and advocated Taiwan independence from the Chinese mainland. Throughout his 2000 candidacy, however, Chen shied away from the issue of Taiwan independence, and instead pledged to travel to China soon after his inauguration, if permitted by Beijing, to seek dialogue with China’s leaders.

Chen’s first term largely avoided talk of Taiwan independence. China and Taiwan have been separated by a half-century stalemate. The government of the ROC on Taiwan considers the ROC to be a sovereign state. The government of the PRC, however, considers Taiwan a renegade province of the Chinese mainland. The PRC has never renounced the threat of the use of force in trying to unite Taiwan with China. As part of its unification efforts, China expects any leadership of Taiwan to accept Beijing’s “one-China” principle. According to the principle, both sides of the Taiwan Strait must accept that there is one China, and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of all of China, including Taiwan. Taiwan never has accepted this policy. The ROC government argues that the PRC’s jurisdiction never has extended over Taiwan, Penghu (Pescadores), Kinmen, and Matsu, the area currently ruled by the government of the ROC.

In his first inaugural address, Chen pledged that as long as China had no intention to use military force against Taiwan he would not declare Taiwan independence, change the country’s name, push for the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the ROC constitution, or promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. Three days before his 2004 inauguration, China’s cabinet-level Taiwan Affairs office issued a strongly worded statement warning Chen against any attempt to push for Taiwan independence.
China demanded that Chen accept the “one China” principle as a precondi-
tion for cross-Strait dialogue.

Vice-President Lu interpreted the Chen-Lu victory as a proof that there is
a clear Taiwan-centric consciousness in the mind of the majority of Taiwan’s
people. It is true that the past two decades have seen a significant rise in
ethnic Taiwanese identity. Relevant public opinion polls showed that 60 per-
cent of the people agreed that Taiwan and China are each its own distinct
state on either side of the Taiwan Strait. However, polls also indicate that
people on Taiwan support the status quo of Taiwan’s sovereignty rather than
outright independence or unification. Under the status quo, which president
Chen supports, Taiwan seeks neither unification with mainland China nor
permanent separation from the mainland at this time. More than 70 percent
of those polled in an April 2004 poll identify with and have emotional at-
tachments to the current ROC name, flag, and anthem.

Taiwan’s voters are hesitant to embrace permanent separation from
mainland China. President Chen called for a referendum to be held con-
comitant with the presidential election. The referendum had two questions.
The first question asked voters whether they want Taiwan to seek talks
with the mainland on a peace and stability framework. The second ques-
tion asked voters whether they want to purchase more advanced anti-mis-
sile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s defense. Fewer than half the number
of voters who cast ballots in the concurrent presidential election bothered
to mark a referendum ballot. The KMT encouraged a boycott of the refer-
endum, but it is not clear if the failure of the referendum to garner the
required number of votes was due to the boycott. Of those who partici-
pated in the referendum, however, ninety-two percent marked “yes” on
both issues.

In his 2004 inaugural speech, Chen mollified the United States and China
by ruling out Taiwan independence for the next four years and saying any
kind of relationship with China was possible with the Taiwan people’s con-
sent. In particular, he pledged to make no changes to Taiwan’s relationship
with China, and said he would honor the promises made in his first speech
four years ago. Perhaps most significant, however, Chen in his 2004 ad-
dress reaffirmed his pledge to amend the ROC Constitution. The ROC con-
stitution was promulgated in 1947 when the KMT still ruled the ROC on
mainland China. The ROC moved to Taiwan in 1947-1949, and dropped its
claim over the Chinese mainland in 1991. In 2004, the ROC claims jurisdic-
tion over the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Matsu, and Jinmen. Based on these
changes, Chen in his presidential campaign race pledged that, if elected, he
would amend the ROC constitution to reflect the ROC’s current status. In
particular, Chen has proposed to reduce the number of seats in the national
legislature, eliminate two branches of government and adopt a three-branch system of government,\(^{10}\) lower the voting age to 18, enshrine the rights of Taiwan’s minority groups and phase in a professional military to replace the existing system of conscription.

While Chen did not propose amending the constitution to declare Taiwan independence or change the name of the country from ROC to Republic of Taiwan, China nevertheless views the idea of amending the constitution as inflammatory. China views Chen’s plans as a separatist move because it would break the continuity of the ROC and represent the founding of a new Taiwan state. China especially balks at the prospect of changing the island’s name and legally-defined territories.\(^{11}\) China views the Chen administration as illegitimate, and does not believe that Chen has the legitimate authority to amend the ROC constitution. Initially, Chen planned to hold a referendum on a new constitution in 2006. In his 2004 inaugural speech, President Chen appeared to have watered down his plans for a new constitution. He ended any speculation that he would attempt to change the national name, flag and anthem, by arguing that since the people of Taiwan are still divided over the preferred status of Taiwan’s relation with China,\(^{12}\) he would merely amend the constitution to create a streamlined and efficient government to better suit Taiwan’s needs.\(^{13}\) Chen appeared to have abandoned plans to hold a referendum, and stated that he would submit the amended constitution to the national legislature for passage instead. An ad hoc National Assembly\(^{14}\) would then be elected to deliberate the new constitution. After deliberation, the National Assembly would be abolished. While he gave no timeline for the changes, Chen hoped to have a new version of the constitution enacted by the end of his presidency in 2008.\(^{15}\)

The United States found Chen’s inaugural address responsible and constructive. Before the election, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly warned the Chen administration that U.S. pledges to defend Taiwan should not be perceived as a “blank check” for Taiwan to do whatever it wanted to do.\(^{16}\) The United States is legally obligated under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself. What assistance is offered is left strategically ambiguous. The Bush administration indicated that the United States appreciated Chen’s commitment not to take steps that would unilaterally change the status quo, was open to Taiwan’s openness to seek accord with China. The United States found that Chen’s address created an opportunity to restore dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.\(^{17}\)

**Prospects for Unification**

China is clearly unhappy with Chen’s victory. For the first time, a majority of Taiwan’s voters cast their ballots for an avowedly pro-independence
candidate. Scholars and military personnel in China make it clear that China is not about to relinquish its claim over Taiwan, and is willing to use force, even military force in a war with the United States, to prevent Taiwan independence.

The KMT’s defeat in the 2004 presidential election, however, makes it less likely that Taiwan will unite with China. The recent pattern of presidential and legislative elections does not look good for unification. Since 2000, the KMT has lost two presidential elections and lost seats in the national legislature. It is likely to lose more legislative seats in December 2004. The KMT’s defeat likely means that China has lost its final opportunity to press Taiwan for unification. In the coming months and year, China-watchers will be studying China’s strategy for eventual Taiwan unification. There is good evidence that China is currently planning a rapid decapitation strike against Taiwan, to occur before U.S. assistance arrives in the region. Less dramatically, China may hope that increased economic independence across the Taiwan Strait will eventually lead to unification.

In 2002, there was $65 billion cumulative foreign direct investment by Taiwan companies in the mainland. China is Taiwan’s top trading partner. In 2003, shipments to China accounted for more than 25 percent of Taiwan’s exports. Despite increasing economic integration between China and Taiwan, there is no evidence that the more than 500,000 Taiwan businessmen in China are an active pro-unification force. In fact, many Taiwan businessmen in China are owners of small and medium size businesses, which are often more sympathetic to the pro-independence DPP. The experience of World War I demonstrates that trade and investment, or even economic interdependence, are not forces strong enough to prevent war.

Conclusion

By June 2004, protests against the presidential elections had quieted down, and it appeared that the protesters accepted the inauguration of President Chen. China has been less accepting. China’s response to President Chen’s inaugural address was to accuse President Chen of being the “biggest threat” to regional peace and stability, and to accuse him of having a pro-independence agenda. China has repeatedly vowed to “crush the Taiwan separatists.” Chinese scholars and military personnel in early June proposed that, before the end of 2006, China make preparations on political, military and economic fronts to oppose any move by Taiwan towards independence. China has also increased harassment of pro-independence Taiwan businesses in mainland China, causing some of them to consider relocating to
Vietnam or India. The harassment of Taiwan businesses could backfire. Taiwan companies employ more than 10 million people in China. Forcing these companies to leave by creating a hostile environment would hurt millions of Chinese workers and exacerbate China’s rising unemployment problem.

Despite China’s objections to Chen’s re-election and U.S. warnings to Taiwan not to rock the boat, the United States has once again warmed up to Taiwan. This has been evident by the way the United States allowed Vice-President Annette Lu to make transit stops in Las Vegas and San Francisco for her June visit to El Salvador; the way the Pentagon released a report warning about a massive military buildup on the mainland directly facing Taiwan; and by the way the United States applauded the recent decision by Taiwan to approve the purchase of US military items, including anti-missile systems, airplanes and diesel-electric submarines. It is also evident by the U.S. decision to allow the planned visit to Taiwan of a high-ranking US military officer, Major-General John Allen, to discuss the military situation. Allen is in charge of Asia-Pacific affairs at the Pentagon. In the past, the United States had restricted such trips to officers no higher than colonel so as not to upset China. For now, the warm winds are blowing in Taiwan’s direction. However, they could blow away from Taiwan if the Chen administration stirs up trouble by pursuing independence. For now, President Chen seems willing to concede to U.S. pressure that he tone down inflammatory rhetoric. Evidence of this was his willingness to drop from his inaugural speech a reference in to a referendum on constitutional reform. His Presidential Office also made it clear that Vice-President Annette Lu was speaking only for herself only when she proposed that the nation’s name be changed to “Taiwan Republic of China” during her stopover in San Francisco.

The next four years may test China’s patience, Taiwan’s restraint, and U.S. diplomacy. Each of the parties appears serious about their respective commitments. China insists that Taiwan accepts the “one China” principle, Taiwan insists that it should be able to determine its own fate, and the United States insists that it will stand by its commitment to help Taiwan defend itself. Evidence of these commitments are the military exercises each party plans to carry out in the region this summer. China plans to carry out joint land-sea-air exercises in the Taiwan Strait to enhance its ability to control the sea zones in, and air space over, the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan plans to stage live-fire military drills around Penghu, which is 30 miles off Taiwan’s western coast and speculated to be the target of Beijing’s invasion and occupation campaigns. The Pentagon in spring 2004 announced that it would deploy six B-52 bombers on Guam, supposedly to deter North Korea but with the obvious dual purpose of curbing China. The United
States in June conducted a joint exercise with Japanese air forces in Guam, the nearest U.S. military base to Taiwan. Also, the United States will carry out naval operations in the Asia-Pacific as part of its plan to demonstrate U.S. ability to provide credible combat power across the globe by operating in five theaters. With each of the parties demonstrating such resolve, the next four years will require great patience and diplomacy by China, Taiwan and the United States.

Notes
1 Discussions with Taiwan scholars at the workshop “Taiwan After the Election,” Yale University, New Haven, CT May 1, 2004
2 The KMT is a Leninist party in which apex of power is concentrated in the Central Standing Committee and its secretariat.
4 Liao Dachi, “No Pain, No Gain – A Look at Taiwan’s Democracy after the 2004 Presidential Election,” paper presented at the workshop “Taiwan After the Election,” Yale University, New Haven, CT, May 1, 2004, p.3.
5 The “state-to-state” description means that Taiwan is not a renegade province of China, as China claims, but is a sovereign state since the ROC’s founding in 1912, and that following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has been under divided rule and jurisdiction. The “state-to-state” concept was first raised by former ROC President Lee Teng-hui in an interview with *Deutsche Welle* [the Voice of Germany] in July 1999.
6 For an analysis of impact of the Taiwan 2000 presidential election on Taiwan-China relations, see Elizabeth M. Freund, “Taiwan-China Relations since the Election of President Chen Shui-bian,” in *Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election*, Deborah A. Brown, ed. (St. John’s University: 2001), pp. 201-215.
10 The ROC Constitution provides for a central government with five branches. They are the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Judicial Branch, the Examination Branch, and the Control Branch. President Chen proposes to eliminate the Examination and Control Branches.
11 The 1947 ROC Constitution claims jurisdiction over all of mainland China, as well as the territories claimed by Taiwan today. The ROC government in 1991 dropped its claim over mainland China, recognizing that it had not governed the mainland since 1949.
12 The three forms of Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China are status quo, unification or independence.
14 The National Assembly was an ROC government institution responsible for acting as an electoral college to elect the president and Vice-President, to impeach the president and Vice-President, and to amend the constitution. ROC presidents are now popularly elected.
16 Ibid.
18 According to Wang Jisi, Senior Researcher, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Taiwan people voted for Chen not because of his pro-independence stance, but as a rejection of the corrupt KMT. Interview with Wang Jisi, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China, June 11, 2004.
19 Interviews with academics and military personnel at China Foreign Affairs University, National Defense University, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, June 7-11, 2004, Beijing, China.


THE NEW LOOK OF URBAN CHINA: PUBLIC SQUARES AS SYMBOLS OF MODERNITY

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Two years ago I presented a conference paper called “Old in the Newest New China.” That was about photo-history publications that have appeared since the middle 1990s and their role in a nostalgia craze and in stimulating new, individual views of China’s modern history.¹ My topic here concerns something “new in the newest new China.” The use of the word “new” in a title is partly intended as irony or humor, but also is an attempt to keep in step with the Chinese themselves. That which is new seems to have been very important to many Chinese, especially to educated urban Chinese, for most of the past century. Postmodernists, post-structuralists, and other “postists” might see significance in this concern with “the new,” and with who defines what is new. I am not oriented to these theoretical outlooks, and my comments are mostly personal, informed by efforts to have good information and be objective. In any case, I find this subject interesting and think it is important.

My subject is new-style public squares in Chinese cities, why they are being built, and what they might mean in the contemporary culture. My primary focus lies with new public spaces that appear to be part of a loose
program to provide the Chinese people environments of modernity and thus play a role in changing people’s consciousness and sensibilities. The desired effect seems to be to create a sense of order, cleanliness, and well-being, in the idiom of modernity, so that these new public spaces may transform the mental world of the laobaixing. (For educated urban people whose mental world has already been transformed to some extent, it seems important for government to show its ability to create such public spaces.) It should be noted that “public space” is a large category that may include a variety of kinds of projects, which might be undertaken with private as well as public investment. Further, any kind of public space, whether a public square, a commercial center, a residential development, or a recreational attraction—or some combination of two or more of these—has the same characteristics as the public squares that are the major focus here. As there are similarities between public squares and other kinds of public spaces, this discussion also introduces articles on these related subjects for stimulus and comparison.

My interest in this topic grew through my own observations in several different cities over the past four or five years. It was 1999 when I realized that several of the cities I visited had new public squares. The places I saw are diverse: In Hefei, the capital of chronically poor Anhui province, there was a city center newly built or refurbished, with a pedestrian street; the old home of Li Hongzhang lies at hand and attracts tourists, virtually all of them Chinese in this inland city. Shaoxing is a smaller city near Hangzhou, famous as the writer Lu Xun’s hometown. In Shaoxing there is one focus for the Lu Xun area, a reconstructed historic neighborhood. There is also a new, modern-style square, very contemporary. Then there was Qingdao, which for the past century has been one of China’s genuinely modern-appearing cities because of its position on the Shandong coast and the international influences—German, Japanese, and now Korean—that have come naturally to the city because of its role as a port. Qingdao has an international beer festival (no surprise!); it has an extensive “German” area; and it has several modern centers, usually called “squares” although some of them are round, which I thought were done with some class. Farther inland, Jinan, the dowdy old capital city of Shandong, has undergone a facelift that centers on a new modern square. Jinan has been known over the centuries for its natural springs, located right in the middle of the city. The springs are now drying up and not nearly so attractive as in earlier decades. In the same downtown area is a newly-built stretch of hard-surface square, with a hideous ultra-modern abstract sculpture, a huge glittering ball hoisted on a tall “golf-tee” base, in the center of this square.

China’s largest cities have many of these projects: Beijing has its array
of new architecture along Chang’an Jie and especially Jianguomennei. More closely related to my subject, the shopping district of Wangfujing has been converted into a pedestrian street for almost a kilometer. Special features include groupings of sculptures of “old Beijing” figures—a barber, a rickshaw-man, children playing in an oversize shoe. Most striking is the opening of the Roman Catholic cathedral, which even in the late 1990s was barely visible from the street; its surrounding wall has been removed, and the church has been made into a highlight of Wangfujing. Elsewhere around the city there is a variety of new parks, large and small. Shanghai also has its pedestrian street, several hundred meters of the busiest section of Nanjing Road, and the Bund is another focus of activity. And Shanghai has the new public area on the site of the former British racetrack (I remember walking by this area on visits to Shanghai over several years during the late 1990s, and not having any idea what was going on inside there). When the area was finished, the new Shanghai Art Museum and Concert Hall were revealed as centerpieces in an elegant new People’s Square. Xi’an, one of China’s oldest cities, has gone through phases of reconstruction and remodeling. First, the old city wall was rebuilt to create the only intact traditional wall in any large city in China. Then during the past five or six years the very center of the city has been rearranged. Xi’an’s new square calls attention to an appealing common feature of these projects: usually they bear some relationship to the historic character of the city. In Xi’an, the area between two major downtown landmarks, the Bell Tower and the Drum Tower, was razed, and a pleasant park combining grass and concrete, was built there, built beside (what else?) an underground shopping area, behind which is a newly constructed old-style building containing restaurants and souvenir shops.

We saw two more cities with similar projects on a trip in September 2003, Harbin and Dalian. Both were well-designed cities through the 20th century, it would seem. Harbin has blended old and new and incorporated Chinese and imported, or “foreign,” features very well. St. Sophia, a Russian Orthodox cathedral, has been made the focus of a beautiful square, after being attacked during the Cultural Revolution, then neglected and piled up with trash until the decision was made to rehabilitate this landmark. The cathedral houses an excellent museum on local history (which even includes icons of the Russian Orthodox faith). Harbin also has its own pedestrian street, Central Street, through a downtown area of the city where the commercial center of the city’s Russian population was located. Dalian, which has a reputation as one of China’s richest cities, enjoys a strong base in international trade with much high-tech activity. Thus the city seems to have had little difficulty in financing its projects to create
new-style public spaces. Dalian seems an excellent example of a city that has most successfully used historic features of its environment to create contemporary urban public spaces. The major center of downtown Dalian is Zhongshan Square. This “square” is a huge traffic circle, covered in thick green grass and criss-crossed by stone walkways. The space owes its appeal to the early modern buildings arrayed around this circle; most of these were originally built by foreign businesses during the past century. Looking beyond these earlier buildings in almost any direction, one sees contemporary high-rise buildings, most of them commercial. The general impression is that “old” and “new” in modern Dalian blend well in an appealing, human environment. Besides this main urban center, Dalian also has its “Russian Street” approximately one kilometer north of Zhongshan Square. This “Russian Street” is presently being completed, made ready to receive tourists. It is hard to imagine that these buildings could have survived at all, but the city has found the means to put them back together in good style, creating an historic district several hundred meters long. This concludes my own tour of the new-style urban public spaces that I have seen personally, to indicate how I became interested in this subject and suggest the variety of possibilities.

Efforts to find information on “public space” proved rewarding. This is a relatively new field in China, and there is now a profession concerned with the design of public space. (One should make such a statement cautiously, because it is obvious that, even in China’s modern century, most cities of any size have had some kind of planning. Despite such grand plans as completing the razing of Beijing’s old city wall and building the city’s subway below the course of the wall, however, for much of the period since 1949 urban planning languished.) Publication in this field has burgoned since the early 1990s. There are at least two major centers interested in the design of public space, Qinghua University in Beijing and Southeast University in Nanjing. My major source confirms my own sense that the construction of new public spaces has been a phenomenon of recent years. This source talks about a “public-square craze” and a “pedestrian street craze” during the late 1990s. Other useful material includes articles in journals such as The Reader (Dushi), The Orient (Dongfang), and English-language magazines such as China Today and Beijing Review that seek to display the nation’s progress as a modern society; these materials will be cited below.

Any discussion of public space in contemporary China should begin by recognizing that urban design has a long and important history in China. In introductory courses on China we learn the importance of the imperial city, its north-south axis, its focus on the throne and the emperor who sits there
at the very center of civilization. China’s earliest cities, and even smaller cities and towns that were administrative centers, started with a wall and, wherever possible, used the north-south axis. Thus from earliest times, Chinese cities have been designed by application of earlier concepts of “public space.” As many have observed, the subject was made to experience what authority wished him to experience in such cities. To the extent that leaders in Chinese cities today intend through these places to project a certain experience onto their modernizing citizens/subjects, it remains true that public space is used in the same way now as in the past. So there is an important question here about the extent to which this “new in the newest” is an orchestrated phenomenon. I cannot claim to have a conclusive answer to this question.

Another aspect of inquiry for this subject is the question of mixed motivations and mixed effects for these great projects in contemporary China. Having suggested that one purpose for building new public spaces is to control, manage, or lead the people of urban China to experience modernity as a goal of leadership, I would next observe that there are other motivations, some of them related to this one. Political advancement must be regarded as one motivation: today’s mayor of Hefei might be tomorrow’s governor of Shanxi, and this same person might be appointed to the Standing Committee a few years later on. Such a career path is more likely if the person’s work is done successfully at the local level. The widespread interest in public-space projects among local officials is suggested in a report that some leaders in smaller municipalities unwisely spend too much of their funds on these projects.5

Tourism is another motivation for public space projects. Just as in the 1980s Chinese cities sought permission to build a hotel deemed fit to receive foreign visitors, today they seek to develop local historical and cultural sites as a means to attract tourists both foreign and Chinese. The latter might visit at any time but now are most likely to travel during two “golden weeks of tourism,” the first ten days of May and of October.6 Other motivations will be suggested as we continue, but one impression I have gotten is that, like much else about changes in China today, not just the motivations but also the effects of these public-space projects are varied. Unintended consequences abound in most of the projects considered here, even in such simple activities as the sale of unauthorized merchandise or the exchange of unwelcome opinions. So although a local mayor carries out a great square-building project hoping to lead his people to a comfortable condition of unquestioning modern consciousness, his project might produce results less desirable to the mayor and his superiors at the provincial and central levels.

Another kind of public space is the theme parks that have been built in
or near some Chinese cities. An article on theme parks by Ian Buruma that appeared in a June 2003 issue of *The New York Review of Books* offers stimulating comment on public spaces. Although entitled “Asia World” and beginning with generalizations about Japan and Korea as well as China, most of Buruma’s essay is about China. An experience shared by all these Asian societies was to see their traditional cultures apparently discredited and rendered irrelevant. A common response, at least during certain periods in their modern development, was to attempt to adopt Western ways wholesale, even though in each society there also were strong reactions to this uncritical adoption of foreign ways. In Buruma’s view the May Fourth spirit was too thoroughly anti-tradition, producing Mao Zedong’s sweeping effort to terminate the effects of tradition using the methods of his idol, Qin Shi Huangdi. The culmination of Mao’s imperial approach to remaking China was the Cultural Revolution. Buruma likens Mao’s approach to building a great theme park: “In a way, Mao turned the whole of China into a grotesque theme park, where everything seen, spoken, or heard had to conform to his fantastical dictates.” Acknowledging that there is a difference between a theme park and such a closely controlled society, Buruma still maintains “…there is something inherently authoritarian about theme parks, and especially the men who create them.” Deng Xiaoping changed the program, Buruma says, while still seeking to use the theme park approach: Shenzhen and the other special economic zones on the southern coast became Deng’s new-style theme parks.

Buruma notes the popularity of Lee Kuan Yew, the admired former premier of Asia’s model city-state, Singapore. Lee is often invited to China, where he outlines the Singapore model for leaders of China’s aspiring cities. While the Singapore model is capitalist, Buruma observes that it contradicts Westerners’ assumption that capitalism leads rather directly to liberal democracy. Buruma concludes that although chinks in the Chinese system do not rule out the possibility that China might evolve into an open society and a democratic state, China seems more likely to become “a continent-sized Singapore….the whole world as a gigantic theme park, where constant fun and games will make free thought redundant.”

Buruma’s analysis is stimulating but perhaps too sweeping. Deng Xiaoping’s theme park was indeed different from Mao Zedong’s, and developments even since Deng’s passing suggest stronger chances for the positive possibilities that Buruma does indeed see as possible. “Market socialism” has been a Pandora’s box for those in the Chinese leadership who wish to retain the old authoritarian model. There are many indications that the effects of new urban public spaces are mixed, and that they might become even more mixed further on (this is still not to say that these mixed
effects would all be desirable). On the positive side, new public spaces in Chinese cities offer ordinary people opportunities to feel that they are part of a clean, modern environment. They are places for relaxation and recreation, comfortable places that families and friends may enjoy. They may also be places for discussion of serious questions and presentation, at least to one’s friends, of discordant opinions. At their best, the new public spaces give people a connection to their city’s history, even if in some cases the link to the 20th century, not to earlier historic times, would seem to be strongest; this connection is valuable for urban moderns of any society. Yet another positive feature is that public squares and pedestrian walkways provide security and support consumer commerce. While none of these features rule out the mindless continental theme park that Buruma fears, they also are not limited to this.

What are the negative possibilities of these public-space projects? Some are cultural, some historical, and some economic. Poor design and less than great art can easily render a large expenditure for one of these projects wasted. The new public square in Jinan, Shandong, is an appropriate example here; while thousands will come because the space is new, its coldness and aesthetic failures are not in its favor as a long-term asset for the city. Furthermore, the historic downtown streets that were removed to make way for the square are remembered only in street signs showing where they used to be. In Xi’an, ancient Chang’an of the great Tang dynasty, where history should rule, this link to history was seriously damaged when planners went at least one step too far in the most recent phase of “development” by adding a giant video screen to the façade of a department store at one corner of the Bell Tower circle. It is impossible not to notice this giant screen from any point around this major center of the city, especially when it is displaying animated commercial messages. There was yet another downside, at the beginning of this project in Xi’an: inner city residents, who had lived for decades and longer in the space now occupied by the park that links the Bell Tower and the Drum Tower, were forcibly moved. Their protests were ignored, their movement squelched, and the rebuilding of downtown Xi’an carried out.

Despite such downsides, other comment on the nature of public art suggests positive possibilities for public spaces in China today. In an essay entitled “Freedom and Exchange,” Yin Shuangxi observes that both China’s earlier planned economy and today’s market economy place certain limits on artistic expression, but that the market economy offers good opportunities for exchange between the artist and the public. Yin notes that if in the past, political authorities had too large a voice in decisions about public art, today it is possible for professionals to make these decisions on behalf
of ordinary people. Wherever possible, Yin believes, local residents have the right to a voice in these decisions. Art is concerned with the pursuit of freedom, he says, but it is even more important to have an exchange or interaction between the artist and those influenced by his art. Yin recommends that “the public nature of art is first so that art may be nurtured to modernity by the people.”14 This is a most optimistic statement about the possibilities for art as an element of public space.

In another article, “Public Space and Collective Experience,” writer Yi Ying claims this for the possibilities of public space: “The public realm is a place where it is possible to formulate public opinion—which also is to say, what is expressed in public art put in public space is a cultural relationship, and is not a function of practical life; it is a realm in which the artist’s creation and public opinion may carry on a dialogue.” This statement of the possibilities, like Yin’s, is inspired by the German theorist Jurgen Habermas, who has had great influence among Chinese intellectuals in recent years.15 Given that these are statements by people expressing the aesthetic point of view, it is clear that some among China’s idealistic intellectuals have optimistic ideas about the meaning of new public spaces.

Is it possible to find, or create, an environment in China that is both “Chinese” and “modern”? I ask this question as a way to suggest the bias that we as Westerners almost certainly bring to this issue. But it also suggests the dilemma that Chinese leaders, intellectuals, and now developers face—and have faced for at least a century—as they seek to create modern public spaces in their country today. A foreigner’s impression would likely be that the loveliest streets and public spaces of such cities as Dalian, Tianjin, and Shanghai would come closest to meeting the criteria I have suggested. Dalian seems an excellent example of such a place. Important parts of the city retain beautiful examples of architecture that seem to recall a successful accommodation between China and a variety of foreign imperialist powers. As that period actually developed, the terms of accommodation were set by the foreigners. Still, that urban environment and the era it recalls, provides a base for a Chinese modernity that might be essential for the current surge into modernity. In Dalian and elsewhere an important ingredient is the material wealth that has been accumulated. This allows the creation, or re-creation, of a stable, predictable environment that reflects confidence, security, and peace. This is not an environment that can be reduplicated in every city or town in China very soon; still there is no denying that it makes a good model.

Wealth for China was a goal of Deng Xiaoping, not simply for the sake of being wealthy, but for the sake of improving the life of the Chinese people. Inasmuch as it should include all, the humble as well as the edu-
cated and talented, this goal can be too readily forgotten (or has already been forgotten?). In public life, however, appealing public spaces may positively affect the sensibilities of the mass of the people. This is to suggest that public use of China’s growing wealth may accomplish positive goals: as these public spaces are created, individuals may first experience comfortable modernity vicariously. I would suggest that Ian Buruma’s notions about the appeal of theme parks should be supplemented by the point that many Chinese—like people everywhere—appreciate grandiose spaces and constructions. To be able to create such works would seem to recall for those who govern China, as for most of those whom they govern, the great periods of Chinese civilization. For most Chinese, the recovery of this expansiveness must seem an important goal of both nationalism and modernization. While one must believe that most Chinese can ultimately be satisfied only with such individual goals as a comfortable material life, good opportunities for education and work, and a pleasant physical environment, appealing public squares can suggest these possibilities until they can be realized.

While new public squares orient people to the present and the future, a sense of identity that is related to the past is also important. I began by referring to my earlier paper on “old in the newest new China,” nostalgia and the reflection it stimulates on the recent experience of individual Chinese people. This reflection helps to strengthen people’s sense of identity. In his studies of Shanghai (his home), Hanchao Lu of Georgia Tech has shown that mainland China’s most successful modern city has for the past several years enjoyed a tremendous enthusiasm for nostalgia, which focuses on the 1920s and 1930s, a period formerly regarded as the city’s most compromised and decadent. This feature of contemporary popular culture in Shanghai suggests this historical dimension of modern identity. Shanghai’s development over the past decade might well be unprecedented. An unimaginable investment has been made since the early 1990s, its effects so profound on the city’s physical layout that administrators found it necessary to produce a new map every few months during the late 1990s. Yet Shanghai people have also been wrapped up in this consuming passion of nostalgia for the old ways of city life and culture. Again, this “old” is really quite recent, referring as noted to the 1920s and 1930s, or as Lu notes, simply “the ’30s” in local parlance, a reference that sidesteps association with the decadence of the Republican period. The absorption with nostalgia is a matter of benign neglect for Shanghai authorities, who seem to regard it as essential to the city’s current success. Hanchao Lu observes that this nostalgia culture seems to provide comfort and a sense of identity for Shanghai people as their city continues its burgeoning development.

In Shanghai, the ongoing new construction means that many older areas
must be razed. The city leadership has set aside some historic neighborhoods for preservation, a policy both intelligent and perhaps psychically necessary. One of these neighborhoods includes the building where the Chinese Communist Party was established in July 1921, a major monument of China’s 20th-century history. The neighborhood is made up of mostly two- and three-story row houses, a style characteristic of the early decades of the last century. Redevelopment was placed in the hands of a Hong Kong firm, which has invested US$150 million in the project, the new form of the area dubbed Xintiandi or “New Universe,” “New Heaven and Earth”!

In Lu’s words, “Xiantiandi is designed to be a theme park with a planned residential community, shopping centre and amusement complex. The project has a slogan, ‘Where yesterday meets tomorrow in Shanghai today.’ Well said.”

This is an appropriate summation for the complex phenomenon underway in Shanghai and in many other cities in China. Done well, this “new in newest China,” the new public squares, can blend with a usable re-evaluation of China’s earlier, more frustrating period of modernity—this “new old” of nostalgia and individual views of China’s recent history—to support a workable present and a positive modern experience as the 21st century proceeds.

Notes

1 For the evolution of this study, refer to note 16.
2 While in Shaoxing I learned that the city was also the home of Cai Yuanpei, the sometime anarchist, aestheticist, and educator who is best known as president of Beijing University during the May Fourth Movement in 1919.
3 The Jinan square project is pointedly referred to as an example of officials, presumably the mayor, having control rather than designers, who probably would have made this public space more appropriate to the overall environment. See Wang Peng, Systematic Research on Civic Public Spaces in China (English title) (Chengshi Gonggong Kongjian de Xitong Jianshe) Nanjing, Southeast University Press, 2001, p. 75. Note that the Chinese title is more accurately translated as “Systematic Construction of Urban Public Spaces."
4 Wang Peng, Systematic Research on Civic Public Spaces in China.
5 This observation is made in Beijing Review, which would seem an unlikely source for such a candid comment. There has been a perceptible change toward candor in many of China’s foreign-language periodicals, where apparently those responsible have recognized the appeal of transparency to readers abroad. See “Speeding Up Urbanization” in Beijing Review, February 6, 2003, pp. 19-21.
6 These travel periods are built around the May 1 international labor holiday and the October 1 National Day. It is patriotic to travel and to spend money for travel.
8 Buruma, p. 55.
9 Ibid.
10 Buruma, p. 56.
11 Buruma, p. 57.
As suggested, the city leaders of Xi’an have generally respected their city’s history as part of its modern development. In the neighborhood surrounding *Da Yanta*, the “Big Wild Goose Pagoda,” which lies outside the city wall in the southeastern area of Xi’an, no new construction is allowed to exceed the pagoda in height. Clearly any such provision was set aside in the recent projects to remodel the commercial buildings near the Bell Tower, which is now almost overwhelmed by these upscale shopping malls. Thus, commerce has taken precedence in the heart of Xi’an. It is worth observing that the Bell Tower does present problems, most obviously in traffic flow precisely in the center of the city, so its continued presence makes it a monument to historical preservation—at least thus far.

This aspect of the project in Xi’an was the subject of a report in *China Rights Forum*, the journal of Human Rights in China, at some point in the late 1990’s. I get this journal, but unfortunately I have discarded this issue. I have been unable to locate it through internet searches.

See Yin’s “Ziyou yu Jiaoliu” in Dongfang (Orient) 2003, no. 5, pp. 27-30. His recommendation is suggested by Jurgen Habermas. Yin cites Habermas’ *The Modern Horizon* for the idea that in Enlightenment Europe, new conditions of freedom in themselves allowed people to decide the nature of modernity.


See “Old in the Newest New China: Photographic History, Private Memories and Individual Views of History,” in *The Chinese Historical Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 2004). An early version of this study was presented at the Southeast Region conference of the Association for Asian Studies in January 2002. It was also presented at the conference on “Modern Chinese Historiography and Historical Thinking” at Heidelberg University (Germany) in May 2001. A Chinese translation was published in *Chuban Guangjiao* (English title *A Vast View on Publishing*), a journal of the publishing profession, no. 66 (June 2002).


Lu, p. 169.

Lu, p. 175.
‘SOME UNSEEN POWER’: PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY’S REIMAGINING OF HINDU CLASSICISM

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Classical, or antique knowledge continued to be favored by English intellectuals from the English Renaissance well into the nineteenth century. Simultaneously, this was an age of great acquisitions of information by exploring and expanding into the diverse worlds outside England, from Celtic Britain to South Asia. It is not difficult to imagine the emerging British Empire as an entity grounded upon knowledge, combining Greco-Roman tools of learning with imperial objects of information, synthesized within a dual rhetoric of Englishness and power which created a new system of imperial knowledge. Classical methodologies were central to British epistemologies as intellectuals sought to understand the new and unusual Empire. A near-fetishization of the ‘classical’ formed the zeitgeist of British epistemological activity and was a constant, subversive “Unseen Power.”

Most frequently, the obsessive imperial notions of the “classical” have been presented as ways to “orientalize” and inferiorize Indian intellectualisms; the preface to the Dublin edition of Dissertations and Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the History and Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature, of Asia, a collection including essays by William Jones and oth-
ers, includes the patronizing statement that it affords “the utmost pleasure to a reflecting mind, that the Arts and Sciences, which are rapidly advancing towards a state of perfection in Europe, are not confined to that quarter of the globe.” Instead, the authors have uncovered evidence that “[i]n the East, where Learning seemed to be extinguished, and Civilization nearly lost” people at one time were capable of coherent thought and could—with the help of Englishmen—learn to think again and “dissipate the gloom of ignorance”. This was the dominant ideology within the counter-discourse of Romantic “rebels”, but there was also a movement to canonize Hinduism as a classicism like the Greek and Latin traditions. To demonstrate the value of Indian thought, and as proof of its legitimacy as academic knowledge, these intellectuals employed Hinduism to enrich their philosophy and art.

Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) is an ideal example of this Romantic counterculture. Shelley was learned in Greek and Roman traditions, but unlike other learned Romantics such as Byron and Southey, he cultivated and privileged Indology as well as “Western” classicisms. He pursued knowledge of both Hindu and Islamic traditions, but, like his fascination with Greece over Rome, his interest in and understanding of Hinduism superseded Islam. At the time of his sudden and premature death, he had been involved in a process of intensive acquisition of knowledge about India, and there is no reason to assume that it would not have otherwise continued. As with Greece, Shelley appreciated ancient India as a “classical civilization” and seems to suggest a rebirth. While such a perception would, at first glance, appear to support the imperialist justification that India and China were once acceptable civilizations but had stagnated and degenerated in modernity, it was no different from a similar understanding of ancient Greek and Roman civilization. An examination of a few of his poems provides evidence for this tendency in his allegory, his imagery, and, as the focus of this paper demonstrates, his development of a philosophy. This contributes to a greater theory: Shelley’s classical Indology was not a mere hobby, but an essential part of his classical studies. As poet, pupil, and philosopher, Shelley elevated Indology to a full-fledged branch of classicism which made significant contributions to his epistemological development.

Shelley’s artistic and philosophical debts to India are evident in much of his work after 1812, when he began a process of self-education that would lead him to recognize Hinduism as not a deformed religion, but worthy of academic privilege comparable to Greek tradition. This was inspired by his reading of two novels set in India, Owenson’s *The Missionary* and Lawrence’s *The Empire of the Nairs*, which he lauded extensively in his letters. The eroticized, exoticized India presented in these novels...
attracted Shelley, like so many of his contemporaries; Dharni Dhar Baskiyar, in an essay on India and Shelley, notes this enthusiasm, “It is abundantly clear that his interest in India was so keen that he eagerly laid his hands on whatever literary, aesthetic, or philosophical material relating to this country he came across.” Unlike his contemporaries, however, Shelley must have recognized potential for greater civilizational depth, as he began to read more coherent academic works about India. His correspondence with Thomas Hookham, a London bookseller, proves that he read the works of the British Indologists Sir William Jones, Edward Moor, and William Robertson in 1812. Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley comments in the introductory note to her 1839 edition of Shelley’s poems of 1817 that Shelley had read Arrian’s *Historica Indica*. Shelley also experienced contemporary India through his cousin, Thomas Medwin, a member of the English East India Company, who related his experiences in India to Shelley through conversation, and also allowed him to read his journal. In 1820, Shelley embarked on a quest to learn Arabic, and Medwin began to help him later that year, continuing into 1821. His education through reading and conversation led him to express interest in experiencing the modern version of the classical civilization firsthand, and to this end, Shelley exchanged letters with T.L. Peacock of the English East India Company in 1822. Shelley wrote, “I wish I had something better do to than furnish this jingling food for the hunger of oblivion called verse, but I have not; and since you give me no encouragement about India, I cannot have.”

The secondary literature includes considerations of several works, including the *Esdaile Notebook*, *Queen Mab*, *Prometheus Unbound*, and “Ode to the West Wind” as examples of Indian influence in Shelley’s poetry by reason of the presence of Hindu allegories. Indeed, these allegories are significant, but Shelley recognized India as possessed of greater, more ancient depth. Further, there have been studies on Shelley’s ideologies of imperialism, but these have omitted the deeply “academic” component of his contributions to ideologies of imperial knowledge. During the early 20th century, prior to Indian independence, the *Calcutta Review* published Cyril Modak’s “Some Hinduism In Shelley,” which focused primarily on Shelley’s identity as a *bhakta* (disciple of devotion) and argued that Shelley owed his aesthetic style to Indian poetry. However, by creating a “classical triad” to replace the duality of purely Western antiquity, Shelley fundamentally challenged dominant ideologies of Indian knowledge, elevating India to such a level that it could be integrated into his aesthetic method and philosophy as well as the epistemological and moral formulations expressed in his poetry. Because Shelley recognized the intellectual value of Hinduism, he integrated it deeply into his metaphysical poetry focusing on
reality and physicalism. An investigation of two poems, “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” and Epipsychidion, reveals that Shelley’s Indology supported his development of a new thought-system, which in turn demonstrated his re-imagining and legitimization of Hinduism.

The first aspect of Hinduism that contributes to Shelley’s philosophy in Epipsychidion is bhedabheda (non-dualistic dualism) which is apparent throughout the poem. This Indian philosophy of non-dualistic dualism is discussed in Edward Moor’s Hindu Pantheon. Cyril Modak, in the Calcutta Review, commented in his discussion of Epipsychidion, “And so did Shelley long eagerly in love and worship to blend mystically with Beauty-Love-Truth, which is God.” Shelley’s Epipsychidion does not contain actual non-dualism, nor has it true dualism, for Epipsychidion recognizes both unity and separation.

Throughout Epipsychidion, the poet laments the separation of him and the addressee into two bodies. He describes them as “one spirit within two frames,” which communicates the soul-union common to non-dualism. They are one twofold soul divided into two distinct bodies, “conscious, inseparable, one” and when the speaker states earlier, “to divide is not to take away,” bhedabheda becomes even more prevalent, because, in bhedabheda, when the two-in-one soul is divided, they do not become half-selves, but instead, they transform into two fully separate entities. Shelley would have been familiar with another shade of this through Sir William Jones, who noted this metaphysic as it applied to Shaivism; Shiva and Parvati can inhabit a two-in-one form known as ardhanarishvara.

The poem concludes with a crescendo of bhedabheda as the poet mourns the physical division of himself and the addressee. He writes of one hope within two wills, one will split between two minds, one life, one death, one immortality, and one annihilation. The final examples of life, death, immortality, and annihilation hearken to the role that karma (action) plays within bhedabheda. In bhedabheda, while the souls and minds may exist in separate forms, they experience the events of life and the causal karma in identity. We can be fairly certain that Shelley was familiar with the Bhagavad Gita, either through Jones’ paraphrases or by reading it through translation, as Charles Wilkins’ rendering was available in the late eighteenth century. In Atmasanyamayôg, book 6 of the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna, an avatara of Vishnu, puns on the double meanings of “atman”: “Let each man raise The Self by Soul, not trample down his Self, Since Soul that is Self’s friend may grow Self’s foe. Soul is Self’s friend when Self doth rule o’er Self, but self turns enemy if Soul’s own self hates Self as not itself.” Because of Shelley’s familiarity with Jones, Moor, and the Bhagavad Gita, he was well-acquainted with bhedabheda and so was able to explore it in detail in Epipsychidion.
The second primary example of Indian influence in *Epipsychidion* is *bhakti-yôg* (moksha by devotion). *Bhakti-yôg* utilizes devotion in hopes of attaining *moksha*, symbolized by unveiling. The poet aspires to remove the veil obscuring the “veiled Divinity,” or, the addressee, by using “prayers and tears.” Prayers and tears are manifestations of devotion. Cyril Modak has characterized Shelley as a *bhakta*, like Tagore and medieval Indian *bhakti* poets, and Shelly clearly seems a *bhakta* in *Epipsychidion*. Eventually, after a trek through a forest reminiscent of Sita’s expulsion to the forest in the *Uttararamayana*, the poet reaches the end of his journey of devotion, and the veil obscuring the “Divinity” is removed, commemorating the culmination of his faithful devotion. In the same way, followers of *bhakti-yôg* aspire to reach an enlightened, liberated state by way of devotion.

*Bhakti* and *bhedabheda* often exist in concert, frequently in worship of shaktis. It is not impossible that Shelley’s poem of devotion to a “soul out of my soul,” the literal meaning of “Epipsychidion”, exemplifies non-dualistic dualism and devotion. This also exists in “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty.” The ideal of intellectual beauty seems clearly to be a personification of a devi, either Kali or Durga. Since Durga appears elsewhere in Shelley’s poetry in a different guise, it is more likely that “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” describes the Kali of Ramprasad Sen, Valmiki, and Kalidasa: a Mother Goddess inherent in all women and all beauty. Shelley’s Kali does not destroy without cause; rather, she obliterates to transform. Indeed, Shelley may have derived this concept from other authors, as the introduction to Charles Wilkins’ rendering of Shakuntala (from the *Mahabharata*) characterizes Shiva as “The Destroyer! Or rather, The Changer of Things! For annihilation is no part of their Faith!” For Ramprasad, Kali does not dominate Shiva, but has the power to transform a demon-child into Shiva. This early understanding of creative destruction endured through Shelley’s poetry.

Kali alternately descends to Earth and leaves, unlike Vishnu or Lakshmi, who are omnipresent because of their many avatars. In the fourth stanza, the speaker implores Beauty to “depart not as thy shadow came.” Kali appears to humans suddenly and threateningly, and the speaker wishes for the Spirit not to depart as quickly as it had arrived, for a quick departure would mean the loss of much of his sense of the aesthetic.

The third stanza expresses the Spirit’s unique and oft-misunderstood nature. Shelley theorizes that his predecessors vainly tried to characterize Beauty by utilizing names of “God and ghosts and Heaven;” however, they did not present a true picture of the Spirit. Again, in the fourth stanza, Shelley characterizes the Spirit as “unknown and awful.” This reinforces the iden-
tity of Kali as a misconstrued, wrongly demonized devi, and as a devi to be viewed with trepidation and veneration.

The final lines of this section are rife with metaphors of night and darkness, and it seems that, as with Milton’s dark flames of hell, Shelley expresses a light of darkness. He utilizes the darkness metaphor again in the fourth stanza. Kali is black in color; the word “kali” means “black” or “the black one” in Hindi. She is known as the “dark goddess,” and so it is logical that, if Shelley is utilizing the simile of darkness amplifying a flame or simply being the incarnation of the flame, the darkness is Kali. The last stanza of “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” lauds autumn over summer and evening over morning, which by extension, praises the manifestations of darkness in the natural world. Additionally, Shelley states that the Spirit is “like darkness to a dying flame.” Critics who seek to apply this poem to Greek mythology may attempt to apply the Muses, who provide inspiration and are creative forces as manifestations of “Intellectual Beauty.” This is no more accurate than an application of Sarasvati to this poem. The Muses and Sarasvati do not amplify what creation already exists, but instead, they inspire the creation into existence. Contrarily, Kali does have powers of amplification and utilizes them often in Hindu tradition.

In the fifth stanza, the poet details the reverence he had previously held for the “ghosts” that he condemned in the third stanza. He gives a brief intellectual biography claiming that when young and unenlightened, he had attempted to utilize Judeo-Christian religion to attain intellectual beauty. His renunciation of Judeo-Christian religion further demonstrates that he sought elsewhere for intellectual beauty. However, when philosophizing, the poet has his first experience of the Spirit: “Sudden, thy shadow fell on me; I shrieked, and clasped my hands in extacy!” Shelley utilizes the word “shadow” to describe the Spirit, and Kali is frequently identified with darkness and shadow, as stated above. Because of the fear that Kali tends to inspire even in her worshippers, it is logical that the poet would shriek at his first encounter with her; yet, worshippers soon realize that Kali is not cause for terror, but for awe, and so the poet experiences “extacy” after his initial shock.

In the final stanza of “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” the speaker acknowledges, “One who worships thee and every form containing thee,” which refers to the worshipper of intellectual beauty who recognizes the devi as the essential, intrinsic spirit of all women, and who recognizes a quasi-female sense of immaterial beauty. Shelley was a definite aesthete, and there is a vast secondary literature of the early and mid-20th century on Shelley’s aestheticism. Additionally, there are several occasions in Shelley’s poetry and biography where his adoration of women manifests itself, thus:
Shelley worshipped every form containing “intellectual beauty,” from abstract beauty to aesthetics of literature to her incarnations in human women. His vision of “intellectual beauty” characterized his lives of the pen, the mind, and the body. As such, he did not merely develop a theoretical philosophy, but, like many Hindu mystics and yogis, he implemented it himself.

Since Shelley utilized multiple forms of intellectual beauty, it was necessary to develop an arrangement of realities and worlds. While there was an abstract beauty, there was also a represented beauty, and an embodied beauty. Another idea that is predominant in Shelley’s poetry is maya, or the illusion of the transient, impermanent, phenomenal world, which is superimposed upon a real, intransient world. James Notopolous suggests that this concept derives from the Platonic notion of a world that one perceives inaccurately; for example, the world appears to be changing, but in reality, it is constant. Shelley recognized that this existed in Plato, but Shelley’s familiarity with maya through the Bhagavad Gita reinforced his ideas of the divergence between appearance and reality. Additionally, the Platonic worlds did not include a conception of the illusion as a world in itself; for Plato, the illusion was a flawed misperception and hardly worth consideration. In Vedic tradition, maya recognized the unreal world as a valid, extant world, though a world that pales in comparison to reality. This contrast between Platonic forms and maya was identified in the essay “On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India” in the aforementioned Dissertations and Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the History and Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature, of Asia, making it even more probable that Shelley recognized it.

Materiality and forms characterized much of Shelley’s poetry, and many of these distinctions drew on the Bhagavad Gita and Mahabharata. Mukti, or liberation from material forces, is a concept that supports Epipsychidion’s bhedabheda, but is absolutely central to the “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty.” “Beauty” consecrates all human thought or form, and examples of consecrated human form exist throughout Indian devi tradition, including Kali’s skirt of severed hands and her necklace of severed heads. The heads and hands are examples of Kali worshippers’ ultimate renunciation of material things. This doctrine of detachment from materialism is a significant point in the Bhagavad Gita and comprises part of Shelley’s statement, for he uses the word “Intellectual” to refer to everything non-material, including, but not limited to, mental labors. Shelley describes a sense of aestheticism, but it is a particular sort: an immaterial aesthetic. Just as in the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna advocates the detachment from the material as a sublime liberation, Shelley refers to an aesthetic that is not bound by material manifestations alone, but is “consecrated” and transmigrates into an abstract as well as a material sense of beauty.
These few examples serve to illustrate Shelley’s contribution to the theory and practice of formation of a counter-discourse, characterizing Hinduism as a third branch of the classical canon. He recognized differences and similarities between Greek and Hindu classical traditions, one example being his multilayered consciousness of reality. He illustrates the notion of the immaterial aesthetic repeatedly in his poetry, with diverse examples among the two poems considered here. In “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” Kali fosters detachment from materialism but does consecrate human form. The object of adoration of Epipsychidion exemplifies a different shade of this; the poet and the addressee are one person in two bodies, and this bhedabhedic union struggles for liberation (mukti) from the material and physical constraints.

After his ‘discovery’ of the academic study of Indian knowledge in 1812, Shelley began to understand Hinduism as a classical tradition on its own merits, not as a translation of Greek or Roman antiquities “disguised by Asiatick fiction” as did many of his contemporaries, including Indologists. Instead, he understood Indian, Greek, and Roman antiquities as linked by chronology and the quality of being “classical”, but as thoroughly separate Indo-European traditions. Harnessing the power of the English fetish of “classicism”, Shelley reconstructed the classical canon by admitting Indian knowledge as a third branch and legitimizing it alongside Greece and Rome with its inclusion in his poetry, thus rebelling against the dominant imperial ideology of the inferiority of Indian knowledge.

Notes
1 This paper was originally presented at the annual meeting of the Southeast Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, January 16-18 2004. I wish to thank Eric Strahorn, Tamara Valentine, Jennifer Manlowe, and Alan Pope for their valuable feedback in preparation and at the conference.
2 Preface to Dissertations and Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the History and Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature, of Asia. Dublin, 1793.
3 For example, see in the Letters Shelley’s missive to T.J. Hogg on June 21, 1811, “Have you read a new novel, ‘The Missionary,’ by Miss Owenson? It is a divine thing:—Luxima, the Indian priestess, were it possible to embody such a character, is perfect. ‘The Missionary’ has been my companion for some time.” Consider A.M.D. Hughes, The Nascent Mind of Shelley, Oxford: Clarendon, 1947 as a secondary source on Lawerence’s influence on Shelley. S.R. Swaminathan offers a discussion on the roles of these novels, particularly The Missionary, in forming Shelley’s attitudes with regard to India, in his “Possible Indian Influence on Shelley”.
Shelley to Claire Clairmont, October 29, 1820, in *Letters*. “I have read or written nothing lately, having been much occupied...by Medwin, who relates wonderful and interesting things of the interior of India.” Shelley’s friend T.J. Hogg notes Medwin’s influence in his biography of Shelley.

Shelley showed interest in learning Arabic in a letter to John Gisborne, October 29, 1820, in *Letters*. “Can you tell me any thing about Arabian grammars dictionaries & manuscripts, & whether they are vendible at Leghorn, & whether there are any native Arabs capable of teaching the language?” In the aforementioned letter to Claire Clairmont, he wrote, “I am going to study Arabic—for a purpose and motive as you may conceive.—I wish you would enquire for me at Florence whether there are an Arabic Grammar and Dictionary, and any other Arabic books, either printed or Manuscript, to be bought.” Also, Shelley to T.L. Peacock, November 8, 1820, “A schoolfellow of mine [Medwin] from India is staying with me, and we are beginning Arabic together.”

Shelley referred to him as “English Peacock, with his mountain fair,/Turned into a Flamingo, that shy bird/i’ the Indian air—have you not heard/When a man marries, dies, or turns Hindoo/His best friends hear no more of him?” Letter to Maria Gisborne, 233-236. These words might also apply to Shelley in 1820, the year of this writing, for, in addition to his continued classical Indology, he had immersed himself in Medwin’s accounts and their study of Arabic as well, as referenced earlier.


See, for discussions of *bhedabheda* itself, Bhaskara, also Ramanuja, Vijnanabiksu, Nimarka, and Vallabha.

Modak, 49.

Swaminathan argues repeatedly that Shelley was wholly advaita, or non-dualistic, in *Vedanta and Shelley*, but in his argument, is surprisingly silent about *Epipsychidion*. *Epipsychidion* is the best example of Shelley’s work which harmonizes both dualism and non-dualism.

*Epipsychidion*, 574.

*Epipsychidion*, 540.

*Epipsychidion*, 161.

*Epipsychidion*, 584-587.


*Epipsychidion*, 244.

*Epipsychidion*, 225.


“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 46.

“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 27.
“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 40.


“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 74-77.

“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 45.


“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 59-60.

“Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,” 81-82.


“On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India” in *Dissertations and Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the History and Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature, of Asia*. Dublin, 1793. 10.
NARRATIVE AND PEACE

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This essay was delivered as part of the President’s Panel at the 2004 meeting of SEC/AAS in Gainesville, Florida. The impetus to compose this essay originated in several faculty initiating a Peace Studies Certificate Program at Kennesaw State University which, in turn, got me thinking not only about peace issues, but how peace studies could be enhanced in collaboration with Asian Studies. Furthermore, I want to show that the term comparative philosophy is obsolete: there is only philosophy and creative philosophizing. Ultimately, it is my hope that creative philosophizing can become a way to peace.

Aristotle recognized that narrative, for him tragic, comic, and epic poetry helps us order our lives, that the discordances of our lives can be subsumed within a greater concordance. Kung Fu-Tzu understood that close study of the Shih Jing, the Classic of Poetry, was an indispensable aid in a regimen of self-cultivation. Indigenous traditions around the world consider stories and storytelling to be an integral part of the fabric of life. In the opening of her novel Ceremony, Leslie Marmon Silko writes,
I will tell you something about stories,
They aren’t just entertainment.
Don’t be fooled.
They are all we have, you see,
all we have to fight off
illness and death.

You don’t have anything
if you don’t have the stories.¹

We know that art in general has an affective power and that narrative, in particular, brings us together and informs our individual and social expressions of humanity in manifold, concrete ways, but important questions remain: How does it happen? How is narrative related to life? How is narrative related to peace? Paul Ricouer, in “Life in Quest of Narrative,” tells us that the question “What is the relation between narrative and life” reveals a paradox: “stories are recounted, life is lived.”² While I think it is the case that there is a gap between narrative and life that can not be closed, the gulf is not as wide as one might suppose. Ricouer’s hermeneutics is a retort to the correspondence theory of truth which “represents knowledge as the possession of an ‘object’ by way of an adequate representation.”³ By an appeal to a conceptualization of rationality grounded in a logic of individuation that insists on a dichotomization between what-is and what-is-not, truth becomes propositional. Following Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ricouer’s hermeneutic phenomenology suggests that truth is an event, an “opening in terms of dwelling.”⁴ Far from the promise of a stable, universal, and structured epistemological condition of truth, “dwelling implies, rather, an interpretive belonging that involves both consensus and the possibility of consensus;”⁵ in other words, an ontological understanding of truth: the conditions for the possibility of truthing.

The Indian Mahayana Buddhist canonical texts known collectively as *Jataka* indicate a view in which narrative and life are intimately related. The *Jataka* are 547 stories, many of which were adapted from Indian folk tales already in existence, recounting the Buddha’s former lives as a Bodhisattva. They contain core teachings about morality, emptiness, and wisdom that are often used as guides to Buddhist practice. The *Jataka* as narrative function not as propositional representations of truth that the reader grasps as objects of knowledge, but as a way “of being brought into intimate connection, of healing or making whole.”⁶ Despite the differences in Buddhist and hermeneutic conceptions of selfhood, a difference I will address later in the essay, narrative functions similarly between the two philo-
sophical perspectives. One result of interpreting the *Jataka* from Buddhist and hermeneutic strategies yields an eventful theory of truth, the role of reason in concert with emotion, and a practice of the ethical that has therapeutic benefits for the reader. The *Jataka*, therefore, in general and Kisagotomi’s story, in particular, show us relations between narrative and life and how narrative helps us move into closer proximity to peace.

Kisagotomi married the only son of a wealthy man and together they had a male child, but the child died when he was two years old. Kisagotomi had intense attachment for the child. She clasped the dead child to her bosom, refused to part with it, and went from house to house seeking medicine to bring the child back to life. Someone along the way told her to seek out the Buddha that he would have the medicine she was looking for. When she found the Buddha he told her “Yes, I will give you a very good medicine.” He instructed her to bring him mustard seed from a house where no one had died. Carrying her dead child in her arms, Kisagotomi went from house to house and all the people she encountered replied in the same manner: “Oh, lady, you ask a strange question. Many have died in our house.” Ultimately, Kisagotomi was not able to find a single house where no one had died. *Viveka* and *Vairagya* dawned in her mind. She buried the dead body of her child and began to reflect seriously on the problem of life and death in this world. Kisagotomi returned to the Buddha and said, “I am not able to find a single house where no one has died.” The Buddha replied, “All the objects of this world are perishable and impermanent. This world is full of miseries, troubles, and tribulations. Man or woman is troubled by birth, death, disease, old age, and pain. We should gain wisdom from experience. We should not expect for things that do not and will not happen. This expectation leads us to unnecessary misery and suffering. One should obtain Nirvana. Then only will all sorrows come to an end. One will attain immortality and eternal peace.”

The story begins with a description of Kisagotomi’s depth of attachment to her child: the man she has married is an only child, the child is male, and it is her first child. At the death of the child, she clasped the dead child to her bosom and refused to part with it. Instead, she wanders throughout her village and neighboring villages in search of medicine that will bring the child back to life. We, too, suffer the instability of time and like Kisagotomi, we wander the highways and byways of our lives seeking something that will fulfill our lives and ameliorate the suffering we experience and engender on a daily basis. It is in this parallel sense that the relation between life and narrative may be understood. Just as Kisagotomi experiences the discordances of time, so do we. Her suffering is our suffering. As Kisagotomi goes in search of medicine, so do we seek stories that can help
us understand and be at peace with each other, the universe, and ourselves. Ricouer has called this “life in quest of narrative.” It is here, at the intersection between the plot of our lives and the lives of the characters in the texts we read that the gulf between narrative and life narrows. It is here that “the reader belongs at once to the work’s horizon of experience in imagination and to that of his or her own real action.” When these two horizons merge, in what Hans-Georg Gadamer names the fusion of horizons, then there is complete understanding of the text. Thus, narrative is a joint project of both author and reader in which our interpretative imagination bridges the gulf between text and life—as we read, so we live.

Narrative identity, as Ricouer has developed this idea, has a lot in common with the Buddhist notion of emptiness. Both are middle ways between the extremes of what-is and what-is-not, between an immutable self and an incoherent flux of time in which there is a total effacement of self. Narrative identity and emptiness are both dynamic and open built upon the discordant /concordant human condition. As Madhyamika philosophy tells us, what we call the self is a set of interrelated processes subject to and arising from conditions. In its unfolding, emptiness is the precondition for the arising of phenomena and beings, their impermanence, and their liberation. Thus, emptiness is dynamic and open in its inexhaustibility. Narrative identity is also a provisional selfhood that relies heavily on our interpretation of conventional signs and symbols; thus, narrative identity, like a narrative model, is dependent upon the mutually conditioning interplay between reader and text or self and world. In other words, like emptiness, narrative identity is also the precondition for the existence of selfhood, the very structure of its impermanence, and the source of its liberation. To say that narrative identity, like emptiness, is built upon the discordant/concordant human condition is to say all this plus that in its openness and indeterminacy we suffer in time. As the Buddha tells Subhuti in the Diamond Sutra, to be in time is to suffer the burden of compassion and attain the rewards of enlightenment. On Ricouer’s account, our quest for narrative selfhood, despite the dissociation of time, is preserved in the question “Who am I?” Asking this question rescues us or liberates us from the vicissitudes of time and orients us toward the possibilities of an open-ended narrative identity.

It is precisely the preservation of selfhood that marks the beginning of Kisagotomi’s story as one of suffering. Her identification with the conditions of her life—her multiple and dramatic roles of daughter, wife, mother—are brought to a crisis in the death of her only child. The narrative of her life has in some sense failed to deliver her to happiness. It is only when she can, through intimate narrative contact with others, relin-
quishe all views in a radical act of humility and understanding that a new selfhood arises based not on an idealized and conditioned identity, but a personhood narratively mediated and spontaneously performed. As Peter Hershock points out in drawing an important distinction between Ricouer’s hermeneutics and Buddhist hermeneutics, “who we are as persons entails nothing short of removing the very presumption of ontological difference, of the distinction of ‘self’ and ‘other’.” In grief Kisagotomi has erected difference between herself and others. Thus, Kisagotomi’s story highlights a significant difference between hermeneutic and Buddhist conceptions of selfhood. While Ricouer’s hermeneutics opens the possibility of a dynamic self, it is a self that nonetheless remains existentially intact even though it is no longer substantively conceived.

When the Buddha tells Kisagotomi that he does indeed have the medicine she is looking for we wonder what that medicine is. Will he raise the dead child as Jesus raised the dead slave for the Roman Centurion who, too, came to him in humble supplication? Will he make a magic potion from the mustard seed he has told her to bring him? Do we hear the rhetorical emphasis that Kisagotomi herself fails to hear: bring me mustard seed from a house in which no one has died? In any case, we begin to see Buddha’s intention and skillful means (upaya) being played out: Kisagotomi’s task of finding mustard seed brings her into contact with others who have shared her fate. When she encounters others who have had the experience of losing loved ones to death, the others’ replies that she has asked a strange question moves Kisagotomi toward the aporetic moment in which her former prejudices begin to crumble and are replaced momentarily by confusion, but which will then open the possibility of a new way of understanding and, ultimately, a new way of living. It is her encounter with others, meetings in which people relate to her their own stories of loved ones who have died, that makes it possible for her to realize and escape her own suffering.

Then the moment of truth arrives: 

Then the moment of truth arrives: *Viveka* and *Vairagya* dawned in her mind. *Viveka* is a Sanskrit term that is translated as “discernment,” the recognition of the distinction between real and unreal. *Vairagya* is translated as “dispassion,” a mood and a practice of renunciation or the abandonment of passion. For Kisagotomi, hearing the stories of others’ losses helps her to realize the truth of her own child’s death and that her expectations about life and death are delusional. Upon this realization into the truth of life and death, she buries the dead body of her child. Narrative, as Ricouer tells us, helps us to “develop a sort of understanding that can be termed narrative understanding,” an understanding “which is much closer to the practical wisdom of moral judgment than to science, or, more generally, to the theoretical use of reason.” Practical wisdom, as understood by
Aristotle, is the means by which we engage in the appropriate action at the appropriate time. Aristotle’s concept implies a curious mixture of reason, common sense, and practice that over time instantiates a mind capable of immediate discernment. It is practical wisdom that helps us to find the mean between extremes thereby avoiding suffering. A hermeneutic appropriation of Aristotle’s term, however, must shift the emphasis away from a superiority of reason to a conception of the role of reason acting in concert with emotion. Kisagotomi not only finds the mean between the extremes of attachment and denial, but her journey has taken place within a context of compassion and loving-kindness in concert with reason that leads to a breakdown of her alienated self and its conventional boundaries of guilt, struggle, suffering, and death. Acting in an appropriate manner by burying her child Kisagotomi has her mind deepened and redirected toward the all important task of pondering the great matter of life and death. We are told at the end of the tale that she later became a Buddhist nun and eventually attained enlightenment. Thus, Kisagotomi’s story is, in one reading, a narrative about moving from a state of suffering to a state of peace.

Not wanting to take this important word for granted, I must ask, “What is peace?” For most of us, peace is primarily negative peace, a peace that is based on an institutionally coerced absence of conflict. This account of negative peace presupposes that peace is the effect of a particular course of action(s) that usually entail some degree of violence because the source of agitation is always fundamentally external: you and I are fundamentally at odds. Thus, violence (cause) leads to peace (effect). This is an old way of conceptualizing peace that is predicated on at least three main assumptions: retaliation, self-possession, and the exclusivity of love. In the ancient view of retaliation, there are at least three ideas that form its foundation: that one’s position in the social group supercedes performative competence (and a fortiori, that one’s own social group supercedes all others), that violence is the best way to solve problems, and that mere survival trumps a life that is lived well. Self-possession is two-fold, the privileging of one’s own I over the other; and maintaining the superiority of the family, clan, tribe, or nation over all others. Finally, the exclusivity of love reflects an old way of thinking in that the idealized form of relation, love, is reduced to the exclusive property of the couple in love. All the above reflect an archaic way of thinking that is inherently divisive, confrontational, and destructive. Given the pervasiveness of this conceptualization, skepticism about the probability of peace has not only survived, but has also thrived.

As an alternative to archaic ways of conceptualizing peace, both the Buddha and Emmanuel Levinas can be understood as proposing positive
conceptions of peace in which the source of agitation is a fundamental lack of harmony between interiority and external conditions. You and I are not fundamentally at odds, but that because of my own inner turmoil I am obstructed from seeing your uniqueness and my responsibility for you. In his essay “Peace and Proximity” Levinas shows that conventional European ways of answering the question about how to attain peace have proven to be a failure. They have failed primarily because it is assumed that one or more metaphysical principles (e.g. Plato’s idea of a transcendental Good, Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, Aquinas’ God, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, Mill’s Principle of Utility) precede (as indicating a fundamental conception of the nature and identity of ultimate reality) and supercede (in their role of ameliorating external conflict) a fundamental relationship between human beings, what Levinas calls an ethical relationship. Traditional definitions such as “peace on the basis of the state,” and “peace as tranquility or rest,” are belied, according to Levinas, by the failure of Europe to realize peace, “a worn out Europe!” a Europe with a “bad conscience.” Furthermore, he writes,

Peace . . . will no longer be reducible to a simple confirmation of human identity in its substantiality, anchored in itself, in its identity of I. It will no longer be a question of the bourgeois peace of the man who is at home behind closed doors, rejecting that, which, being exterior, negates him. It will no longer be peace in conformity with the ideal of the unity of the One that all alterity disturbs.

All of these conceptions of peace, in which one or more ontological principles stands in or substitutes for the face to face encounter of one human being with another, depend upon the three categories of old thinking I briefly outlined above. Instead, Levinas suggests that peace is a “relation with alterity . . . a relative alterity” and “independent of all appurtenance to a system, irreducible to a totality and as if refractory to synthesis.” Peace is “the fraternal way of a proximity to the other, which would not be simply the failure of coincidence with the other, but which would signify precisely the excess of sociality over all solitude—excess of sociality and love.” Only in the proximity to the other and the realization of the uniqueness of the other is peace realized. The “proximity of the neighbor—the peace of proximity—is the responsibility of the I for the other, the impossibility of leaving him alone before the mystery of death.”

When Kisagotomi is sent on the search for mustard seed from a household that has not known death, the Buddha has sent Kisagotomi on a quest for peace through the excess of sociality and love. She meets face to face with her neighbors who are other at least in the sense that she has become
isolated by her griefbound delusion and at first relates to them solely in the spirit of utility. That is to say, Kisagotomi is with them only to the degree in which they can provide something useful to her. Furthermore, her neighbors, those who might provide her with the mustard seed, are reduced to the genus; thus, she is obstructed from seeing their uniqueness. Kisagotomi’s I is thus an alienated consciousness, a griefbound consciousness. The telling of stories brings Kisagotomi into proximity to the other and allows her alienated self to be washed away. Levinas, in his essay, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” writes, “to be in relation with the other face to face—is to be unable to kill. This is also the situation of discourse.”16 Like Kisagotomi meeting her neighbors—that anyone, anywhere, anytime is a neighbor is implied by the Jataka and Levinas—face to face, the sharing of stories about the significant moments in our lives brings us into proximity with each other and opens the possibility of peace, justice, and love.

Bibliography


Notes
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POLITENESS AS A SOCIAL STRATEGY IN JAPANESE CULTURE

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1. Introduction
Japanese linguistic politeness has long been observed by linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, historians, educators and many others who are interested in Japanese language and culture. It has become a common impression that Japanese people as a whole, whether they are old or young, well educated or less educated, rich or poor, men or women, behave in a polite manner in human contact situations, whether such situations are public or private. Japanese linguistic politeness has become an inseparable part of the Japanese social and cultural patterns or an expected social behavior in the Japanese society. However, most previous researches remain at a superficial level by describing such a polite social behavioral pattern in various human contact situations without exploring the nature and sources of such a polite behavior. Unlike most traditional definitions of linguistic politeness which focus on surface language forms as observed in the Japanese language in relation to the expected Japanese social manner, this paper, from some psycholinguistic perspectives, defines ‘polite-
ness’ as a social strategy in the Japanese culture beyond surface language forms themselves. One of the arguments presented in this paper is that so-called ‘polite’ or ‘honorific’ language forms as commonly employed by the speaker in various communicative settings do not necessarily always indicate that the speaker must be a ‘polite’ person. The so-called ‘polite’ language is more about a particular language form itself than about the speaker himself/herself. Another argument presented in this paper is that all speakers in the same speech community make rational choices of particular language forms to achieve their communicative intentions in particular social and cultural settings (cf. Elster 1986, 1991). In other words, the speaker’s choice of a particular language form at a certain point during a discourse is not only constrained by a set of commonly observed social and cultural principles and rules but also is intentionally manipulated by the speaker himself/herself. In other words, such an intentional manipulation of language or language forms is motivated by the speaker’s communicative intentions. In so doing, in the first place the speaker is fully aware of the norms and principles of language use as observed by speakers in the same speech community, and thus the speaker is also aware of the fact that any intentional ‘violation’ or ‘manipulation’ of such norms and principles will offer him/her the most desirable outcomes as expected. It is in this sense that we say speakers not only employ polite language forms as a social strategy in human communication but also manipulate them as a linguistic means to achieve their communicative intentions. Also, it is in this sense that we say speakers are recognized as ‘rational actors’ because they know which linguistic means serves their communicative intentions with most desirable outcomes as perceived.

This paper explores the relationship between language forms and their social and cultural functions by focusing on some typical Japanese polite forms as commonly used by the general Japanese public in natural communicative situations. From some social and cultural perspectives, Japanese polite forms and choices of such forms are studied in terms of their pragmatic functions. In order to do so, this paper raises and answers several specific and closely related questions: (1) What causes the complexity of polite forms in the Japanese language? (2) What is the relationship between the speaker’s language choice and the so-called linguistic ‘politeness’? (3) What is the relationship between linguistic ‘politeness’ and the speaker’s social strategy or rationality in human contact situations?

Rather than attempting to answer such questions in an abstract theoretical manner, this paper explores such questions be means of investigating and explaining why Japanese polite forms are used as such in natural human interaction contexts, including the relationship between the addresser
and the addressee, the particular speech setting where the utterance is made, the speaker’s communicative intention, and the outcome as perceived and expected by the addressee. Thus, this paper goes beyond the analysis of language surface forms but instead focuses on the relationship between language forms and functions. One of the most important motivations for this paper is that the relationship between language forms and functions is not always or necessarily one-to-one (i.e. one form for one function). This is because one language form may serve different functions in different speech contexts. One of the crucial arguments in this paper is that it is the speaker who makes the most appropriate choice of a particular language form (in this case, a polite language form) in order to achieve the most desirable outcome (i.e. the intended result).

The language performance data for the study are some selected instances of the use of Japanese polite forms as observed in Japanese native speakers’ natural conversations in various speech contexts. The language performance data provide empirical evidence supporting the arguments presented in this paper. Several conclusions are reached through this study: (1) Japanese polite forms, especially polite addressing forms, are developed through the Japanese social hierarchical structures, which include specific social relations determined by the Japanese social structure, relations between the genders, and relations among family members. As a result, Japanese has established a complicated addressing form system and corresponding morphosyntactic rules to be observed by all members in its society, and the violation of these ‘prescribed’ rules may have undesirable consequences. (2) The speaker’s ‘polite-
ness’ should not be determined by the conventional language forms alone, because the use of so-called ‘polite’ language forms in a particular communicative setting does not always mean that the user is necessarily a polite person.

(3) The speaker may choose a particular addressing form to either lengthen or shorten the perceived social distance that he/she is currently having with the addressee. It is the speaker who chooses the most appropriate linguistic form at a certain point during a discourse to achieve his/her communicative intention and the most desirable outcome.

II. The Matrix of Speech Production

There have been many discussions on the relationship between language forms and functions. One of the most commonly accepted notions is that language forms serve their corresponding functions. That is, a particular language form is used for a particular function (cf. Perdue 1993). It is true that there exists a conventional relationship between language forms and functions (cf. Wei 2000a, 2000b). Without an understanding of this relationship, any discussion of language use or choice would be impossible or incomplete. This paper describes speech production in terms of a matrix of speech production. Such a matrix is understood as an interconnected net-

![Diagram of the relationship between addresser and addressee](image-url)
work of relationships between language forms and functions and between the addresser and the addressee (see Figure 3). Thus, speech production, including any choice of a particular language form, is explained in terms of such relationships. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between language forms and functions.

Figure 1 shows that language forms contain several linguistic components or fields: phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. Phonology is about structural organization of speech segments (i.e. how speech segments are organized into a sequence based on language-specific phonological rules), morphology is about word structures (i.e. how words or morphemes are formulated based on language-specific morphological rules), syntax is about grammatical structures (i.e. how sentences are formulated or structured based on language-specific syntactic rules), and semantics is about word meanings (i.e. how meaning, including both word and sentence meaning, is realized based on language-specific semantic rules). Each of these linguistic components or fields (as indicated by the lines) has its own principles for organizing language forms, and these linguistic fields and principles are closely related to each other and serve specific language functions (as indicated by the

FIG. 3. Social & cultural principles and rules for human communication
Language functions in turn serve language use, which is studied in the linguistic field of pragmatics. Thus, the four linguistic fields (as indicated by each oval) are connected through the relationship between language forms and functions. However, this paper proposes that although language forms and functions are inseparably connected, the choice of a particular language form for a particular function is not ‘static’ but ‘dynamic’ in the sense that it is the speaker who makes rational choices for his/her communicative intentions in a particular speech event. This leads us to Figure 2.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the addresser (speaker) and the addressee (listener) in any speech setting. It shows that the relationship between the addresser and the addressee is bi-directional (as indicated by the two opposite arrows linked by a straight line). This relationship is bi-directional because language choice is not only determined by the addresser’s relationship with the addressee, but it is also influenced by the addressee’s feedback (as indicated by the arrow) to the addresser’s speech output. This means that the addresser’s language choice is also dependent on the addressee’s feedback (i.e. the outcome of the speech event as expected by the addresser) (cf. Wei 2002).4 If the addressee’s feedback satisfies the addresser’s intention or expected outcome, the communication is successful. Otherwise, the addresser must reconsider his/her language choice in order to achieve the most desirable outcome.

In addition to the relationship between language forms and functions (Figure 1) and that between the addresser and the addressee (Figure 2), this paper further proposes that it is social and cultural principles and rules in any society that govern human communication. This proposal claims that all speech behaviors are governed or constrained by a set of social and cultural principles and rules as commonly observed by the members in the same speech community. What makes the ‘model’ illustrated in Figure 3 different from other models of communication is that this model presents a network in which the relationship between language forms and functions and the relationship between the addresser and the addressee are interconnected and governed by a set of social and cultural principles and rules for human communication.

Figure 3 shows that language forms (indicated by line B) are chosen by the addresser who pays attention to his/her relationship with the addressee (indicated by line A) in terms of appropriate language forms for effective communication. Thus, language forms, the addresser and the addressee are interconnected. The appropriate language forms as chosen should serve the addresser’s communicative intention (indicated by line C) and play particular communicative functions. Such well-intended communicative
functions perform important pragmatic roles (i.e. linguistic pragmatics) in communication. Thus, the speech output produced by the addressee for particular pragmatic effects on the addressee (indicated by line D) results in a perceived outcome. However, successful communication is also based on the addressee’s feedback to the addressee’s message. If the feedback is the desired outcome as perceived by the addressee, the communication is successful; otherwise, it is not. If the latter happens, the addressee must repeat this process by reconsidering A and B (cf. Wei 2002).

In addition to this speech production process, the crucial part lies in the center of this matrix (i.e. the network). This center contains a set of social and cultural principles and rules as an axe which controls or governs human communication, including all the parties involved, such as the addressee, the addresser, language forms to be chosen, and language functions to be desired. Figure 3 is not simply a combination of Figure 1 and Figure 2. It illustrates what elements are involved in human communication and how such elements are interconnected and governed by the social and cultural principles and rules as observed by all speakers in the same speech community.

Relevant to the current study are the issues of conventional language forms and their functions, the relationship between polite language forms and a ‘polite’ person, and the role of the speaker in relation to the appropriate language forms and his/her communicative intentions. This paper proposes that without the matrix which interconnects all the parties and factors involved in human communication and the axe which controls or governs human communication as illustrated in Figure 3, any discussion of these issues would remain at a superficial level.

### III. Conventional Language Forms and Functions

The relationship between language forms and functions has long and widely been discussed by linguists, including sociolinguists and psycholinguists, with a focus on the normative use of language in various social contexts. It has been commonly recognized that particular language forms serve particular functions in human communication. As illustrated in Figure 1, language forms are composed of four discrete and interrelated linguistic levels: phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. Structural principles at any of these linguistic levels govern and constrain the formal organization of a particular linguistic component. For example, phonology studies how speech segments (i.e. phonetics) are organized into phonological units, morphology studies how elements are organized into meaningful units (i.e. word formation), syntax studies how morphemes are organized into meaningful sentences (i.e. sentence structure), and semantics studies how mean-
ings are realized at any levels of linguistic structure. In other words, the output of the linguistic structure at any of these levels is the language form. Any human language must have its own language forms (i.e. language forms are language-specific), and without such language forms, human communication would be impossible. The language forms that the speaker chooses in a particular communicative setting to a particular addressee are assumed to play their specific functions. Language forms and functions are ‘conventional’ in the sense that all speakers in the same speech community realize the connection between a particular language form and its particular function (i.e. the intended ‘meaning’) (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1982; Wilson and Sperber 1991; Minami 1989; Kikuchi 1996, 1997). Of course, because language evolves, language forms in a language may develop or change synchronically and/or diachronically. This paper studies most commonly used Japanese polite forms with a focus on their morphological structure and communicative functions.

This paper assumes that Japanese polite forms are deeply embedded in the Japanese social hierarchical structure through its history of social and cultural development. This is because the sources of Japanese addressing forms originate in the clearly stratified social status of individuals. Thus, various Japanese polite forms directly reflect the social status that the addressee is currently holding in relation to the addressee (cf. Goffman 1967, 1971; Brown and Levinson 1987; Kikuchi 1996, 1997). In Japanese society people are supposed to pay tribute to the social hierarchy which is strictly based on the individual’s status, age, and gender. Japanese social and cultural principles and rules require the speaker to use polite language to show his/her respect for the other person’s position, whether at work, at home, in school, or in any other places. If you cannot use polite language (e.g. polite addressing forms) properly, you cannot do business in Japan, or your speech behavior will be regarded as unacceptable. This means that the normative use of polite language is a common practice and a socioculturally expected speech behavior.

It has been noticed that all speakers in Japanese society are fully aware of the importance of using appropriate language, including polite language forms and their corresponding conjugations (i.e. inflectional morphology) and required morphemes, in various human contact situations. Speakers involved in a discourse are very conscious of their differing social status and use ‘polite’ addressing forms accordingly. Social status may involve hierarchies such as superiors vs. subordinators, advisors vs. advisees, older vs. younger, men vs. women, and so on.
Senpai, hitotsu ikaga desu ka.
‘Shall I pour a drink, senior?’

Sensee no oku-sama o-kagen ikaga desu ka.
‘How is teacher’s (your) wife?’

Kore wa sensee ga o-kaki ni natta hon desu ka.
‘Is this book written by professor (you)?’

Tanaka-sensee wa nen ni gokai mo shiken o nasaru n desu.
‘Professor Tanaka gives tests five times a year.’

O-jii-san no hige wa nagai ne.
‘How long Grandfather’s beard is!’

O-nee-chan, doko ni iku no.
‘Where are you going, old sister?’

These instances of the normative use of polite addressing forms reflect that speakers are aware of the differential social status that their addressees are holding. In [1] the speaker regards the person being addressed as being ‘higher’ than himself in terms of expertise, knowledge, years of experience, ranking, and so on. The addressing forms like ‘senpai’ and ‘ikaga’ are the indicators of the speaker’s respect for the person being addressed. In the same manner, in [2]-[4] the speakers address their professors always by using ‘sensee’ and other corresponding polite terms or morphemes such as ‘-sama’ and ‘-o’.

Also, in [5] and [6] the speakers use the appropriate terms and the corresponding polite morphemes like ‘-san’ and ‘-chan’.

The above uses of the polite forms provide evidence that conventional language forms are employed by speakers to serve communicative functions by following the normative use of language in their society. The so-called normative use of language is the communicative interaction pattern shared by all speakers in the same culture (see Figure 3). The examples reveal the fact that speakers’ speech behavior is constrained and governed by a set of social and cultural principles and rules, and the violation of such principles and rules would result in an unacceptable social behavior. In other words, the polite addressing form that the speaker uses to a particular person is not always what he/she can freely choose but is determined by the social hierarchical relation that he/she is currently holding with the addressee. It has been well known that in Japanese society or in everyday Japanese social life, if the speaker fails to use polite language properly, he/she will never succeed in business, in education, in everyday life, or in any other aspects of Japanese life. The importance of using polite language properly in Japanese society can never be overemphasized. In other words, the normative use of conventional language forms is what the society expects from all speakers observing its social and cultural prin-
ciples and rules. All this concludes that speakers naturally accept the norms of language use in their speech community in a conventionalized interaction type.

IV. ‘Politeness’ as a Social Strategy

One of the central concepts in linguistic pragmatics is politeness. It has been suggested that politeness is another level to conversational interaction besides other rules and principles governing human communicative interaction (e.g. Lakoff 1972, 1973b, 1977b; Leech 1980, 1983). In the framework proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987), politeness is a notion understood as a regulative procedure in communicative behavior between individuals involved in any discourse. Brown and Levinson (1978) have developed an explicit model of politeness which is assumed to have validity across cultures. Their model is based on the idea that people take various strategies for interactional behavior because people engage in rational behavior to achieve satisfaction of certain wants. According to Brown and Levinson, the wants related to politeness are the wants of ‘face’, “something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 66). The notion of ‘face’ is directly related to the folk-expression ‘lose face’, which is about being humiliated or embarrassed. The rational actions people take to preserve their own faces and those of the people they interact with essentially add up to politeness.

A strength of Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness over the normative or rule-oriented presentations of politeness is that their model attempts to explain politeness by deriving it from more fundamental notions of what it is to be a human being (i.e. human beings are rational and have face wants). Their model offers two advantages. First, norms are discoverable and valid within a particular culture and therefore not too useful in understanding a concept like politeness cross-culturally. Second, even to posit universal, rather than culture-specific, rules as arbitrary primitives is “to invent a problem to be explained, rather than to explain it” (Brown and Levinson 1978: 91). In other words, a set of rules may help us understand politeness phenomena in terms of these rules, but we do not learn very much about why there should be such rules in the first place. Brown and Levinson ask us to accept that people are rational and have face wants rather than offer a set of rules designed specifically for politeness itself. Directly relevant to this paper on politeness in Japanese culture are the notion of politeness as a social strategy and the notion of ‘rationality’ of speakers in linguistic pragmatics.

Thus, in addition to the normative use of language, this paper argues
that politeness in language use is actually the speaker’s social strategy in Japanese culture. On the one hand, the speaker must follow the social and cultural principles and rules for communication; on the other hand, the speaker may exploit so-called ‘polite’ language forms as a social strategy in realizing his/her communicative intention (cf. Suzuki 1978; Craig et al. 1986; Brown and Levinson 1987; Minami 1989; Kikuchi 1996, 1997). This means that the speaker’s use of polite language forms does not always mean that he/she must be a ‘polite’ person or intends to be so. Thus, the relationship between language forms and functions is not necessarily always one-to-one, that is, one form does not produce one function only. The speaker may use polite language forms to play other functions beyond ‘politeness’ itself because of other factors involved in human interaction. This may happen in several scenarios.

‘Father (the speaker’s own husband), it’s midnight now, are you still going out for a drink?’

[8] Uchi no sensee wa itsumo jugyoo ni chikokushite irassharu n desu.
‘My professor is always late for class.’

[9] Buchoo, dooshite wazawaza anna sensee o o-maneki ni naru n desu ka.
‘Chair, (director, etc.), why do you intentionally invite that kind of professor?’

‘Senior, sorry, please do what you like.’

[11] (Between student and professor)
Student: Sensee, konoaida sensee ga jugyoo-chuu ni ossatte ita nihon no kitsuenritsu wa machigatte iru to omou n desu ga.
‘Professor, I think your lecture on smoking in Japan during the class the other day is wrong.’
Professor: Demo ne, Yamamoto-kun, 2001 nendo ni watashi ga shirabeta tookee ni yoru to …
‘But, Mr. Yamamoto, according to my statistics of the investigation in 2001 is …’

[12] (Between two female students)
A: Ano sensee wa kawaii onnanoko ni wa yasashii n da yo naa.
‘That professor is very nice to pretty girls.’
B: Soo da ne. Kono aida nante Satoo-san ni tesuto no naiyoo o oshiete irasshatta yo. Hontoo ni nan to ka shite itadakita mono da ne.
‘All right. You should know that a short time ago the professor even told the content of the test to Ms. Satoo. I really hope somehow the professor can change his behavior.’
[13] (Between two students)

A: Entoo-sensee ga yopparatte irassharu no yo, mata kono aida shinjuku de mita yo.
‘A short time ago I saw Professor Entoo got drunk in Shinjuku again.’

B: O-joo-sama ga toodai ni gookakushite sootoo yorokonde irassharu n deshoo yo.
‘Professor Entoo is quite happy because his daughter was accepted by the Tokyo University.’

In [7] when the speaker uses the polite morphemes ‘o-‘, ‘-sama’, and ‘-reru’ to address her husband, it does not mean that she respects him or his behavior in this particular context. In [8] the speaker, as a student, should address her professor as expected, but, again in this case, the addressing term and the morphemes ‘irasshaimasu’ used by the speaker do not imply that she respects her professor or his behavior. In [9] the speaker uses the polite term ‘buchoo’, ‘sensee’, and the corresponding polite morphemes ‘o-‘ and ‘-ni naru’, but only a sort of complaining is clearly implied, rather than the real respect for the addressee because of what he does. In the similar manner, in [10] although the speaker uses the polite term ‘senpai’, including the corresponding polite morphemes ‘nasaru’ and ‘-kudasai’, he may not necessarily indicate that he is being polite to the addressee. In [11] the student uses the polite addressing form ‘sensee’ and the polite verbal form ‘oshatte ita’ as conventional polite language as expected from a student to his professor. However, when the student pointed out that the professor’s lecture was wrong, the professor, trying to find some reason to support his opinion, uses the polite morpheme ‘-kun’ to address the student, his subordinate. In [12] the students use polite addressing forms like ‘sensee’ and ‘-san’ and polite verbal forms like ‘irasshata’ and ‘itadakitai’, but it does not necessarily mean that they still respect their professor for his unacceptable behavior. In this case, the students use polite language to make sarcastic remarks. Also, in [13] the students use polite addressing forms like ‘sensee’ and ‘o-joo-sama’ and polite verbal forms like ‘irassharu’ to make ironic remarks behind their professor’s back for the implication that their professor thinks his daughter is much better than his students.

Such instances of polite language forms used by a particular addressee provide evidence for the argument that speakers may take a full advantage of polite language forms as a social strategy in achieving the most desirable outcome. It should be apparent that there is no simple equation between the politeness of the speakers and the polite language forms they exploit in a particular interaction type.
V. Speakers as Rational Actors

Departing from the prevailing sociolinguistic view that linguistic choices depend on the social context, the social identities of speakers and their addressees, as well as other factors such as topic, setting, and genre (e.g. Labov 1972b; Hymes 1972a; Gumperz 1977, 1982), this paper claims that while most social context-based approaches can explain normative choices (or normative use of language), they do not explain departures from the norm. This paper argues that speakers’ rationality is the crucial mechanism in linguistic choices (cf. Elster 1989, 1991; Coleman and Fararo 1992; Myers-Scotton 1993), and the social context alone cannot be the crucial determinant in linguistic choices. All speakers are rational actors playing their individual roles in various interaction types. What is missing from most discussions is the fact that it is the speaker who makes choices available to him/her in a particular speech event. That is, all speakers are rational actors (Myers-Scotton 1983, 1993, 1995; Elster 1986, 1989, 1991; Turner 1991; Sperber and Wilson 1996) who possess such a communicative competence that they know ‘what they are doing’ and attempt to achieve the most desirable outcome. In other words, every choice that the speaker makes is a ‘rational’ one with its perceived outcome.

Speakers are called ‘rational actors’ in the sense that they choose particular language forms intentionally to change the perceived social distance that they are currently having with the addressees (Myers-Scotton 1995, 1997). For example, speakers may use polite addressing forms to persons whose status is lower than theirs or use plain addressing forms to persons whose status is higher than theirs. In this case, speakers do not follow the rules for the normative interaction type but, instead, make their own linguistic choices without being constrained by the social context. Speakers are ‘rational’ because they consciously know what linguistic choices best serve their communicative intentions. As Elster points out, “Communication and discussion rest on the tacit premise that each interlocutor believes in the rationality of the others, since otherwise there would be no point to the exchange. To understand other people, we must assume that, by and large, they have consistent desires and beliefs and act consistently upon them. The alternative to this assumption is not irrationality, which can only be predicted on a broad background of rationality, but chaos” (1986: 27).

‘This new year’s employee calls his executive director “Mr. Kobayashi.” The executive director is very angry.’
‘I had come all the way just to see you. You should treat me to a lot of sake.’

[16] (Wife to husband)
Shachoo-san nichiyooobi mo o-dekake ni naru n desu ka.
‘Mr. President, are you still going out even on Sunday?’

[17] (Father to son)
O-too-sama no osharu toori ni shinasai. (Kikuchi, 1997)
‘Please do what your father says.’

[18] (Wife to husband)
Nakayama-buchoo, go-jibun no o-heya kurai go-jibun de o-soojinasattara ikaga desu ka.
‘Mr. Manager Nakayama, how about at least cleaning your own room by yourself?’

[19] (Between mother and her married son)
Son: O-kaa-san, kyoo no nimono wa oishii ne.
‘Mother, today’s boiled food tastes very good.’
Mother: Kyoo wa michiko-san ga o-tsukuri ni natta kara sazokashi oishii deshoo yo.
‘Because today’s food is made by Ms. Michiko (Ms. Michiko is her son’s wife), so I can imagine how delicious it must be for you.’

[20] (Between wife and husband)
Husband: Michiko, ashita dooshitemo kuroi nekutai ga hitsuyoo da to itte oita daroo. Dooshite yooishite okanakatta n da.
‘Michiko, I might have told you beforehand I must wear a black necktie tomorrow. Why didn’t you get it ready for me in advance?’
Wife: Taihen shitsuree itashimashita, go-shujin-sama.
‘I’m very sorry for that, master/sir.’

[21] (Between two colleagues)
A: Hayashi-san, iyaa mata boonasu gengaku ka. Mata hirumeshi setsuyaku demo shinai to yatte ikenai naa.
‘Mr. Hayashi, it is too bad my bonus is cut down again. I have to cut down on my lunch and other expenses once more.’
B: Oretachi ga kooshite yasui hirumeshi o kutte iru tte iu no ni, uchi no oku-sama wa itaria de yuuga ni o-shokuji o nasatte iru tte iu n dakara,yarikirenai yo naa.
‘Although we are eating such cheap lunch here, since my wife said that she is having a great meal elegantly in Italy now, I really can’t stand that.’
[22] (Between two classmates)
A: Are, mada Satoo-kun kite inai no. Satoo-kun wa itsumo chikokusuru n da mono, komatta mon da.
‘Oh, Mr. Satoo still hasn’t come here. Mr. Satoo always arrives late. He is a nasty fellow.’
B: Sono toori da yo. Kyoo mo Satoo-kun wa juuyaku shukkin de irassharu n janai kana.
‘That’s right. Maybe Mr. Satoo is working also as a director today.’

In [14] the person who is addressed by his employee is angry simply because he thinks that the addressing form ‘Kobayashi-san’ is not a respectful one. In [15] the speaker calls himself ‘senpai’ and uses the polite verb form ‘irasshatta’ in making a request. In [16] the speaker addresses her husband ‘shachoo-san’ and uses the polite morphemes ‘o-’ and ‘-ni naru’ in the home context. In [17] the speaker addresses himself ‘otoosama’ and uses the polite verb form ‘ossharu’ to his own son. Also, in [18] the speaker calls her own husband ‘Nakayama-buchoo’ and uses other polite forms like ‘go-jibun’, ‘o-heya’, ‘o-’, ‘-nasattara’, and ‘ikaga’. In [19] the son uses ‘o-’, ‘-san’ to address his mother, which is a conventional form in this case; however, although the mother gets angry because the food is actually not made by herself but by his son’s wife, she uses the polite addressing form ‘Michiko-san’ to her daughter-in-law and other polite forms like ‘o-’, and ‘ni natta’. The mother uses the polite language when she is not expected to do so. In [20] the wife calls her husband ‘go-shujin-sama’, which is not a normal use of polite language to apologize. Correspondingly, she also uses the polite form ‘itashimashita’. The wife does so simply because she does not want to argue with her husband by trying to be polite. In [21] Speaker B uses ‘oku-sama’ to address his wife and other polite forms like ‘o-shokuji’ and ‘nasatte iru’ when he talks about his wife, who has no job but sometimes has a better life than himself. He uses such polite language forms to express his complaint and unhappiness. In [22] both students use the polite addressing form ‘Satoo-kun’ and the polite verbal form ‘irassharu’. Such polite language forms are usually not expected among equals, but they use them anyway to express their complaint against Mr. Satoo’s behavior.

The above instances of departures from the norm can only be explained by looking beyond the social context. In most cases speakers observe the normative use of language as determined by a set of social and cultural principles and rules commonly accepted by all members of the same speech community. However, speakers’ linguistic choices are not limited or totally constrained by the rules for the normative interaction type. Instead,
their linguistic choices may break the normative interaction pattern (i.e. the normative use of language) in order to realize their communicative intentions in a strategic interaction type. Speakers know that their ‘violation’ of the norm will result in the optimal outcome as they desire. It is in this sense that speakers are rational actors in making linguistic choices (cf. Elster 1984, 1986, 1989, 1991; Turner 1991).14

VI. Conclusion
This paper has explored the issues of Japanese politeness by explaining the relationship between language forms and functions, the normative use of polite addressing forms in terms of the addresser’s respect for the addressee’s social status, and speakers’ departures from the norm in making linguistic choices. Several conclusions can be reached.

First, all speakers in the same speech community are conscious of linguistic choices which conform to speakers’ normative views for the interaction type in which they are participants. That is, speakers naturally accept the norms of language use in their speech community in a conventionalized interaction type. In Japanese society, speakers tend to observe the social and cultural principles and rules for using polite addressing forms by respecting other members’ social status in relation to their own. The complexity of Japanese polite addressing forms is caused by the clearly stratified Japanese social hierarchical structure, and the conventionalized language forms serve particular social and cultural functions (cf. Bell 1984; Brown and Levinson 1987).15

Second, there is no simple equation between polite addressing forms and ‘polite’ speakers in that speakers may choose polite addressing forms at a certain point during the discourse to realize their intended but implicit meaning. This is because all speakers possess a general cognitive faculty that equips them with the necessary information processing mechanisms to understand not only what is said but also what is meant (Myers-Scotton 1983, 1993, 1995; Grice 1975; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1996).16

Third, all speakers are rational actors in making linguistic choices. It is speakers’ rationality that provides the mechanisms necessary to explain linguistic choices. Speakers are fully aware of the rewards or the potential consequences of their linguistic choices. They may depart from the normative use of language in a non-normative interaction type. This is because such speakers believe that although there is much risk in breaking the norm, by doing so they may have a better opportunity to realize their communicative desires. Linguistic choices can be better explained by positing that rationality is the main mechanism working on speakers’ linguistic choices (cf. Tracy 1990; Craig, Tracy and Spisak 1986; Willer 1992).17
This paper concludes that what all speakers have in common is the intentionality of achieving some desired outcome which they see as optimal, whether observing the norm or departing from the norm. Linguistic choices are best explained by positing that rationality is the main mechanism working on a speaker’s speech act. Based on the discussion of the relationship between language forms and functions, the relationship between the addressee and the addressee, and the relationship between the speaker’s linguistic choice and communicative intention or rationality, this paper reaches a broad conclusion that speakers employ polite language forms as a social strategy in Japanese culture.

Notes
1 Rational choice theorists come from a variety of intellectual fields, including economics, sociology, political science, and philosophy. Many are interested in game theory. While most would acknowledge the effects on behavior of institutions, such as family or community, and of constructions, such as race, class or gender, they would argue that much of our behavior is intentional, directed at achieving an individual goal. Elster is the Norwegian sociologist, one of the most influential explicators of the rational choice theory. According to Elster (1991: 109-110), “the theory of rational action … tells people what they should do to achieve their ends as well as possible. An agent faces a feasible set of actions that he can take. To each action he can attach a certain set of consequences. To each consequence he can attach a certain probability as well as a certain utility, based on his preferences over the set of consequences. The theory of rational action, narrowly conceived, tells the actor to choose the action with the greatest expected utility.”
2 Perdue (1993) proposes that language forms come before language function (i.e. form before function) in language acquisition, including second language acquisition. The basic idea of this proposal is that particular language forms express particular meanings or serve particular functions. That is why language-specific forms must be learned as such in order for them to be used appropriately in communication. According to Perdue, without the acquisition of the relevant linguistic forms, language acquisition would be unsuccessful.
3 Wei (2000a, 2000b) investigates adult second language acquisition of various English morphemes in terms of acquisition and accuracy orders. Wei’s research findings provide empirical evidence that different linguistic forms play different functions depending on how morphemes are activated in the mental lexicon and that there is a natural relationship between linguistic forms and functions in language acquisition. It is claimed that linguistic forms (i.e. morphemes) are acquired at a different rate because they play different functions in communication. Wei shares the idea of ‘form before function’ proposed by Perdue (1993).
4 Wei (2002) investigates the nature of the bilingual mental lexicon and its activity in speech production process. One of his findings indicates that bilingual speakers switch between two or more linguistic codes at a certain point during a discourse intentionally and purposefully; however, such speakers never code switch blindly. Wei claims that speakers make appropriate linguistic choices depending on their perceived outcomes and also crucially depending on the addressee’s feedback. According to him, the speaker’s “preverbal message” (i.e. the speaker’s communicative intention) at the conceptual level of speech production activates appropriate linguistic choices before the actual speech production comes into play. If the feedback from the addressee is not what the speaker desires, linguistic choices should be reconsidered if the speaker chooses the bilingual mode or code switching.
According to Sperber and Wilson (1982) and Wilson and Sperber (1991), relevance is the most important of the maxims (i.e. a number of subprinciples), meaning that a reader/listener will carry through comprehension processes under the assumption that utterances in a discourse are relevant to it, and will favor interpretations of utterances which give them the most relevance. Minami (1989) and Kikuchi (1996, 1997) discuss some similar issues of language forms and functions in terms of relevance.

Goffman (1967, 1971) takes a fine grained look at how the coordination of linguistic behavior in a dyadic relationship enacts our particular cultural understandings of personhood. He points out that it is the goal of interactants in a social encounter to protect the fragile self-esteem they have of themselves; at the very least, to minimize damage to this esteem, at best, to increase it. Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) define this self-esteem as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself.” Kikuchi (1996, 1997) explains some natural language instances in terms of the relationship between the discourse participants.

Lakoff (1977b: 88) proposes three rules of politeness: 1. formality: don’t impose/remain aloof; 2. hesitate: give the addressee his options; 3. equality or camaraderie: act as though you and the addressee were equal/make him feel good. Leech’s view of politeness involves a set of politeness maxims (1983: 132): Tact Maxim: Minimize cost to other. Maximize benefit to other. Generosity Maxim: Minimize benefit to self. Maximize cost to self. Approval Maxim: Minimize dispraise of other. Maximize praise of other. Modesty Maxim: Minimize praise of self. Maximize dispraise of self. According to Leech, these add up to “an essential asymmetry in polite behavior, in that whatever is a polite belief for the speaker tends to be an impolite belief for the hearer, and vice versa” (1983: 169).

Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) develop a rich theory of linguistic politeness etiquette around Goffman’s (1967, 1971) concept of face. Politeness is a battery of social skills whose goal is to ensure everyone feels affirmed in a social interaction, so its link to a theory of face is transparent (for other views on linguistic politeness, see Lakoff (1973, 1977) and Leech (1983)). Brown and Levinson break Goffman’s concept of face into two aspects, positive and negative face. “The positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that his self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). Negative face is one’s freedom to act, “the basis claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). Brown and Levinson see the two aspects of face as the basic wants of any individual in a social interaction– to be affirmed in his positive self-esteem by at least some others and to be unimpeded in his action. According to Brown and Levinson, linguistic politeness is basically the redressing of the affronts to face posed by face-threatening acts to addressees. Connected to the two aspects of face, we find both positive and negative politeness. Positive politeness seeks to redress the affront to the hearer’s positive face. Negative politeness is oriented to the hearer’s negative face, his desire for autonomy.

According to those authors, polite language forms may serve more than one single purpose of being polite. On the one hand, speakers must use polite language forms in various communicative settings and/or for clearly defined human hierarchical relations as commonly observed in a particular social/cultural domain, but on the other hand, speakers may use such polite language forms in various speech contexts to express other feelings or emotions rather than ‘true’ politeness toward the addressee.

Sociolinguists like those mentioned claim, among other things, that human communication is composed of speech situations (including the setting and the scene), participants (including not only the speaker and addressee, but also the addresor and the audience), speech event (divided into outcomes: the purpose of the event from a cultural point of view, and goals: the purpose of the individual participants), and norms (both of interaction and interpretation).

Like Elster, Coleman and Fararo are prominent proponents of rational choice theory. They
add this characterization to rational choice theory: “Rational choice theory contains one element that differentiates it from all other theoretical approaches in sociology. This element can be summed up in a single word: optimization. The theory specifies that in acting rationally, an actor is engaging in some kind of optimization. This is sometimes expressed as maximizing utility, sometimes as minimizing cost, sometimes in other ways. But however expressed, it is this that gives rational choice theory its power: It compares actions according to their expected outcomes for the actor and postulates that the actor will choose the action with the best outcome” (Coleman and Fararo 1992: xi).

12 In a 1989 book, Elster describes any given piece of human behavior as the end product of two successive filtering devices: (1) The first filter is the set of structural constraints. These are defined as “... all the physical, economic, legal and psychological constraints that an individual faces” (Elster 1989: 14). In turn, these constraints produce what Elster calls an “opportunity set”: the courses of action that are possible, given the constraints. In the case of linguistic choices, structural constraints are those factors generally subsumed under the term ‘social context’. Thus, for discourse analysis, the most important structural constraints are the participants’ social identity features (age, sex, socio-economic status, ethnic group, etc.) as well as characteristics of the discourse situation. Likewise, in linguistic terms, an actor’s opportunity set is his/her linguistic repertoire. (2) The second filtering device includes the mechanisms which are responsible for which alternative from the opportunity set is chosen. The mechanisms highlighted here are rational choice and social norms. In sum, the first filtering device produces objective opportunities: what courses of action are objectively possible. The second filtering device includes mechanisms which realize subjective desires. Elster (1989: 14) says, “In this perspective, actions are explained by opportunities and desires – what people can do and by what they want to do.”

13 Myers-Scotton (1995, 1997) presents an argument for the usefulness and reasonableness of rational choice theory in understanding the linguistic selections which speakers make in their social discourse. ‘Linguistic choices’ or ‘code choices’ refer to selections at all linguistic levels among available alternatives (e.g. one language rather than another, one dialect over another, one style or register over another, one form of a directive or refusal over another). The theory of rational action would explain choices among these alternatives as necessarily involving cognitive calculations. Myers-Scotton emphasizes that such a theory does not claim that people are always rational, but it does claim that a rational choice model covers the phenomenon. She argues that not only are speakers’ intentions behind choices, but that speakers make choices with the expectation that addressees will recognize these choices as carrying intentions.

14 Elster (1986: 4) explains rational choice or rationality in this way: “To act rationally, then, simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set.” Later he adds (1986: 12), “… the desires and beliefs are reasons for the behavior.” A point made repeatedly by Elster is that rationality is a ‘normative’ theory in the sense that it tells people, ‘if you want X, then do Y’. As such it is not necessarily predictive; rather, it explains what people would do if they were rational. Turner (1991: 92) points out, such a rational choice model “turns attention away from behavior as naturally reflecting the social background and setting in which it occurs, in the tradition of such sociological stalwarts as Durkheim and Sumner. Instead, it treats the individual as a fairly autonomous decision maker, reacting to the situation rather than directly reflecting it.”

15 Bell’s (1984) ‘audience design’ model and Brown and Levinson’s (1987) ‘politeness’ model offer mechanisms for making choices. Bell’s central claim is that speakers vary their styles of speaking in order to accommodate to their addressees. Thus, intentionality is a feature of his model. Brown and Levinson’s central claim is that speakers face the problem of how to handle ‘face threatening acts’. They take account of an opportunity set of linguistics choices and then go on to make choices which meet their main goal of preserving the face of their addressee.
While both of these models can be considered rational choice models, both are incomplete (see note 17, Tracy 1990 and Craig, Tracy and Spisak 1986). They limit themselves to very narrow and prescribed goals for speakers.

Myers-Scotton’s (1983, 1993) Markedness Model to explain linguistic choices in social discourse depends on the interaction between norms and rationality. Like Grice’s cooperative principle and related maxims (1975) and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory (1986, 1996), the Markedness Model starts with the premise that comprehension involves much more than decoding the linguistic signal. All three models include as a second premise that the gap between this decoding and what is actually meant to be communicated can be filled by inference, a process driven by the certainty that the message carries intentionality. What all three models share is the assumption that human conversation operates with a guarantee that the speaker usually is behaving rationally.

Tracy (1990) and Craig, Tracy and Spisak (1986) argue that speakers often use politeness strategies for self-enhancement and even aggravation. Willer (1992: 51-52) points out that such principle “are used to pose problems in theory … The principle of rationality is used to pose problems that other parts of the theory are evoked to solve. For sociology, the most important examples in which rationality operates as a principle are social relationships.”
REFUSING TO SERVE: FIVE KOREAN AMERICAN POETS

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In “In Memory of W. B. Yeats,” W. H. Auden famously claimed that “poetry makes nothing happen: it survives / In the valley of its making where executives would / Never want to tamper.” These days, the valleys of academe, where executives often may want to tamper, give spaces that help poetry survive. In those same valleys, executive tampering is part of the history of Asian studies, and continues in the influence of rational choice theory as Bruce Cumings has described it.¹ In that history, the social sciences tolerated the impracticality of languages and literatures in order to conduct the real work of organizing the world into its Cold War dichotomies for American consumption. Norma Field argues that current “devaluation of language and literary study” stems from “[t]he dominance of rational choice, a highly abstract mode of analysis invalidating the need for particular cultures and societies.”²

After the American victory in the Cold War, the universalist assumptions of rational choice helped create the illusion of the possibility of one happy global economic family solving its differences over a happy meal under the golden arches. Passing through the vicissitudes of
poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and their various intersections, the project of modernity underlying Asian studies has emerged stronger than ever. According to Cumings, “[r]ational choice theory is the academic analogue of the ‘free market’ principles that Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan represented in the 1980s, and that are now offered to the ‘world without borders’ as the only possible paradigm of economic development. Like the putative free market, ‘rational choice’ collapses the diversity of the human experience into one category, the self-interested individualist prototype that has animated and totalized the economics profession in America.”

Thus, in the new globalism, the American, at least “the self-interested individualist prototype” that passes for the American, becomes the universal model toward which all the world aspires.

Such totalizing constructions, which Edward Said noted as famously as Auden, have been at the heart of traditional Asian studies. The totalizing assumptions underlying rational choice, assumptions under which the West creates the knowledge that lets us know the rest of the world, are paralleled in the study of global literatures by what Shu-Mei Shih calls “technologies of recognition”; those “technologies” are “the mechanisms in the discursive (un)conscious—with bearings on social and cultural (mis)understandings—that produce ‘the West’ as the agent of recognition and ‘the rest’ as the object of recognition, in representation.” The West is the repository of knowledge while Asia is the known. Kandice Chuh and Karen Shimakawa build on a similar idea of Asia constructed as the known object in arguing that the “consolidation of a phantasmatic ‘Asia’ continues to undergird the solidity and imagined wholeness of a U.S. identity that is (among other things) not-Asian,” so that “the figure of the Oriental Other has been integral to maintaining the semblance of coherence of the Western Self within imperialist symbolic, psychological, and political economies”

The point at which an assumed U.S. identity confronts an imagined Asian other is the point at which Asian American studies confronts Asian studies, particularly in the latter’s historic roots in area studies. As Chuh and Shimikawa note, “[t]he emergence of area studies, of which Asian studies is a part, within the context of and driven by Cold War politics and U.S. foreign relations interests, contrasts against the establishment of Asian American studies consequent to the Third World Movement of the 1960s—a movement arguably specifically opposed to those interests.” In realizing that confrontation, Chuh and Shimikawa choose the ubiquitous “Asian diaspora” as the mediating term for their field of study because neither Asian studies nor Asian American studies adequately describes their project. Diasporas contend with the globalism of rational choice, which, as indicated by Friedman’s “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Resolution,”
lieves in global progress toward a Western, specifically American, political economy. In other words, the rest of the world becomes like America, and becomes recognizable as such.

In the global flows of de-territorialized populations, however, “areas” can no longer be limited to geographical boundaries, and, far from the world being Americanized, America is globalized in a way that challenges universalist assumptions and the coherence of the American self as “not-Asian.” The Korean American poets whose recent volumes I discuss below tamper with the executives of rational choice by making readers question the universalist assumptions of the drive toward totalizing, objective knowledge in the west. Taken together, and through their various aesthetics, these five poets challenge the idea of Asia as a knowable “area” and reveal that the “not-Asian” U.S. and the parallel “coherence of the Western self” are, indeed “phantasmic,” only “semblance” not reality.

Their poetic tampering surfaces in Korean content knowledge as well as in Korean linguistic knowledge, particularly in the uses to which the poets put translation and transliteration. Both Naoki Sakai and Lisa Lowe suggest that translation can carry with it totalizing tendencies in making the west the knower of an orientalized known. Both also address translation in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’sDictée, the foundational Korean American poetic text. Cha disrupts an “ethos of fidelity” or “symmetrical equivalence” in translation, revealing that ethos as “an apparatus of cultural domination” in which “the West” becomes “the universal under which the particulars are assumed.” Several of the poets discussed below follow Cha with further challenges to that assumptive universalism.

Suji Kwock Kim, inNotes from the Divided Country(Louisiana State University Press, 2003), her first book, is the most accommodating cultural informant of the four writers; in that accommodation, she is, in one perhaps paradoxical way, the most “American” because she gives her Korean heritage as the known to the objectively knowing American reader. Her linguistic content parallels the narrative movement of her poems in helping keep Korea and Korean in an orientalized foreign position. Korean words appear throughout the volume, but they are always transliterated and almost always translated. America, at least the America in which the reading is located, remains an English-only country, still not globalized to an active site on the Pacific Rim.

This is not to say that the volume does not have powerful, moving, well-written poems—it did receive the 2002 Walt Whitman award, after all. In the second of four sections, Kim imagines the Japanese Occupation and the Korean War from her grandparents’ and father’s perspectives. The lyric immediacy and anecdotal horrors of poems like “Fragments of the Forget-
ten War,” written in her father’s voice, push a reader to imagine the personal cost of Korea’s historical position: “I’ll never forget the smell of burning flesh. / I’ll never forget the stench of open sores, pus, gangrene, / the smell of people rotting who hadn’t died yet.” The images of occupation and war in Kim’s unflinching gaze make hard reading, a reading often in tension with the music of her lines, as when she rolls multiple alliterations through “Borderlands,” written for her grandmother: “I saw men and women from our village blown to hieroglyphs of viscera, / engraving nothing.”

The incongruity between the music and the images stuns but builds to a purpose when she offers homage to her Korean forbears for their resilience in “Montage with Neon, Bok Choi, Gasoline, Lovers & Strangers,” the final poem of the second section. In Seoul, Kim gets “drunk on seeing what was made // almost from nothing,” on seeing that modern city “built / out of ash, out of the skull-rubble of war”; she also brings division to her Korean American self with a scene from contemporary Korea, imagining a blessing from her elders, men “old enough to have stolen overcoats & shoes from corpses, / whose spirits could not be broken”: “may you never see what we saw, / may you never do what we’ve done.” The blessing itself is divided by paradox: “may you never remember & may you never forget.”

That blessing to her, an American, suggests that the divided country must also be America, the place where she lives, where she both remembers and forgets, from which her “notes” come. Poems from other sections place her in our divided American country as she writes of being Korean American or of Koreans in America. In “Translations from the Mother Tongue,” which ends the first section, she reflects on “Khimjahng,” the autumn preparation of kimchee, and “P’ansori,” traditional story-song. She “want[s] to know what survives, what’s handed down / from mother to daughter.” That desire reflects her distance from the Korean culture of her heritage, some of which may be unknowable to her in a momentary escape from pervasive western knowing: “And I want to know what cannot be handed down, the part of you / that’s only you, lonely fist of sinew and blood, / ... the part of you that first began to sing.”

In the poems “Skin” and “RICE, or Song of Orientalametations,” Kim reflects on anti-Asian racist reactions by other Americans. In the first, she presents a “lady in pearls mistaking [her] / for the kitchen help [she] could have been, or be.” In the second, with one-word lines that stand out from her usually longer ones, she uses the voice of a man caught in Orientalist fantasies. He says, “I / see / you / completely. // I / see / the / Oriental / between / your / thighs.” Those fantasies place the Asian American subject in a static and foreign position, as the pun on “still” suggests when the man later says, “I / will. / Have / you. / Still.” The final poem of the volume,
“The Korean Community Garden in Queens,” suggests that Korea has set down roots in the United States, that neither divided country is static, that Korea is no longer foreign. Though Kim seems to argue that Korea is no longer foreign, she finishes that last poem by referring to the “gardener in the old world.” That “old world” suggests various possible meanings, but one clearly indicates Korea, so that she presents immigrants who live somewhere else than in the country in which they reside, who are not American. Despite several conflicting gestures, the volume, as I read it, ultimately does not fully challenge current “technologies of recognition.”

Another first book that challenges the reader but ultimately not those technologies is Ishle Yi Park’s *The Temperature of this Water* (New York: Kaya Press, 2004). Park domesticates her Korean ancestry by locating it in a multi-ethnic New York. Coming out of the spoken word movement, hers is a rather brash domestication, with openness toward sexuality and her family’s troubles, particularly the troubles of hard work in a fish store located in a racially mixed but divided city. When she turns to her Korean ancestry, often connecting it to the experiences of her Korean immigrant parents and relatives, she becomes a cultural informant somewhat like Suji Kwock Kim. In poems titled “Jejudo Dreams,” “Maehyangri,” “House of Sharing: Comfort Women,” and “Queen Min Bi,” Park looks to various Korean women for ancestral help or influence, but these experiences always foreground the mediation of an American life, and, in their informational content, posit the knowing American subject, with the Korean as the object of that knowing.

Like Suji Kwock Kim, Park inserts multiple transliterated words in her poems, but she does a bit more to mitigate the knowing American subjectivity by refusing to translate most of the Korean she uses. The words blend into her everyday speech, and many are everyday words common to an extended family—she introduces her “Samchun” (a maternal uncle) and her “Kunemo” (a maternal aunt older than one’s mother) as if those words were her elders’ names, when each of them actually signifies a particular relationship. While the lack of translation seems to assert a fractured Americanism, the very blending of untranslated but transliterated Korean as unexotic, everyday language mitigates its strangeness in the reading process. On the one hand, the Korean argues in its everydayness for an America that is not hegemonically “not-Asian”; on the other hand, the blending of infrequent Korean words into the larger flow of English seems to me to yield a kind of literary “managed multiculturalism” that Shu-mei Shih has paralleled to “the corporate version of managed multiculturalism” in the Western reception of global literature. Park’s Korean is both exotified in its untranslated state and domesticated or commodified in its blending with
the English diction and syntax. It is strange but not strange enough to disturb the overall sense of story in these poems, not strange enough to become unmanageable, and the pretense of equivalence in transliteration if not in translation holds as it does in Kim. The problematics of that pretense are suggested by the variant spellings of a favorite working-man’s Korean drink: Kim’s “makkolli” is Park’s “macculi.” Even the Romanized transliterations do not achieve equivalence.

Park, in her performance as Korean American, might prompt Shih’s notation of a “widespread disenchantment with difference-producing stereotypes of all kinds and fatigue with the orientalism analytic.”15 That disenchantment echoes Rey Chow’s problematizing of “authentic” ethnic identity as she theorizes a “coercive mimeticism” that interpellates the ethnic speaker through an Althusserian “hail.” Chow defines this level of mimeticism as one in which ethnic subjects are “expected . . . to resemble and replicate the very banal preconceptions that have been appended to them” by “a process in which they are expected to objectify themselves in accordance with the already seen and thus to authenticate the familiar imagings of them as ethnics.”16 While conforming to such preconceptions cannot be the project of either Suji Kwock Kim or Ishle Yi Park, both run the risk of “objectifying themselves” to become the known “ethnic” to the objectively observing reader, of becoming “the object of recognition, in representation.” In that sense, neither Kim nor Park reflects a “global literature that, according to Shu-mai Shih, ‘should be not . . . literature spiced with exotic or exceptional representatives from the ‘rest of the West’ but a literature that critically examines its own construction by suspiciously interrogating all claims to universalisms, while acknowledging that any criteria emerging from these interrogations will be open to new questioning.’”17 According to Shih’s division, Kim and Park are still part of “‘the rest of the West’” in their roles as managed “exotic or exceptional representatives” who do not finally challenge hegemonic reading practices. The three poets whose works I examine below each show a more “global” aesthetic as each work, in one way or another, “critically examines its own construction,” often “interrogating all claims to universalism.”

In *Translating Mo’um* (Hanging Loose Press, 2002), also a first book, Cathy Park Hong might appear to be even less “global” than the previous two writers. She begins each of her three sections with a poem that presents non-whites exhibited in enforced public display in western countries. In “Ontology of Chang and Eng, the Original Siamese Twins,” “The Shameful Show of Tono Maria,” and “Hottentot Venus,” Hong gives an almost text-book demonstration of Chow’s “coercive mimeticism,” which “demands that the ethnic occupy a space in modern Western society that is categorically equivalent to that of the caged animals described by John Berger.”18
Hong performs that sort of mimeticism in a way that is so over-the-top as to render the expectation as obvious as does Chow. In other words, at the same time as she seems to fall into the mimetic trap illuminated by Chow, she escapes it by making it so blatant a technique. Throughout her volume, Hong continues to embed her informational content in the spectacle of the ethnic body, including her own body, titling the first poem “Zoo,” and identifying her body as, among other things, a “Sideshow [that] invites foreigner with the animal hide.”

Hong, in an often nonlinear or somewhat surrealistic style that aids in the critical examination of her own constructions, writes few poems with identifiable Korean or Korean American stories the way that Suji Kwock Kim and Ishle Yi Park do. A reader can pick up interesting tidbits, however. In “All the Aphrodisiacs,” Hong notes that hangul, the Korean phonetic script was “first used by female entertainers, poets, prostitutes;” in “On Splitting,” she wonders whether painting a Korean bride’s cheeks red “is a sign for blushing . . . for passion, good luck, or maybe it’s to hide the pallor.”

Like Suji Kwock Kim, Hong transliterates her Korean as romanized script. On the other hand, she is a much less dependable translator. Hong begins “Translating ‘Pagaji’” by telling readers to “please fill all appropriate blanks with ‘pagaji’,” then interjects 21 blanks into the poem without ever translating pagaji (gourd), which fits well in only the last blank: “In the old country, the old woman wearing a towel over / her head washed scallions in the __________.” In “Translating Michin’yun” as well, Hong never gives the literal translation of “crazy/wild woman” but offers multiple suggestions that approach the word’s denotations, beginning with the terms “Gorgon, lost hysteric” and moving through other patriarchal constructions of women “If hot-tempered, if having affairs, if too cerebral, if—.”

Sometimes, she engages Korean on the phonemic level, not even giving whole words. She begins “Zoo,” with “Ga,” identifying the sound of the first consonant in the Korean alphabet, and listing the others (na, da, la, ma, ba, sa, ah, ja) throughout the poem. In “All the Aphrodisiacs,” she again lists the first four consonants but this time with their names rather than just their sounds: “gijek niin tigit rril,” again engaging the sensual phonetics of the language. She further points toward the concreteness of hangul in “Scale,” using an apt description for the written construction of Korean syllables: “Korean characters, like stiff phonetic Legos, / wait to join with one another.”

Hong gives the English-only reader an illusion of access to at least the pronunciation of the Korean, but her book’s title preemptively disillusions because pronouncing mo’um as spelled would likely confuse her primary meaning of “body” with the sounds for “vowel.” As Hong writes in an
endnote, the romanized spelling of “body” is *mom*, but that word also would be mispronounced by an English-only speaker in a way that plays with the mother-daughter bonds and tensions that surface in much Asian American women’s writing, including Hong’s, Park’s, and Suji Kwock Kim’s. Hong realizes a further possible confusion with *ma’hum*, or “spirit/psyche,” in the first section of the title poem, creating another transliteration that probably would yield a mispronunciation.

At least twice Hong mistranslates her Korean, toying with the reader who imagines her as a dependable cultural informant. In “Androgynous Pronoun,” after a list of words more or less correctly translated, such as “(*nakshil*) the sound of fishing. (*o-rak*) play,” she adds these two: “(*mip’ta*) rattling stomach (*yep-u-da*) bloated legs.” The words are the infinitive forms of two verbs: “to hate” and “to be beautiful.” In a facing set of more experimental poems, “Wing 2 (Secret Language of Home Exposed)” and “Wing 3 (Secret Language of Home Exposed),” she exposes no language to the reader. Her apparent translations are false. The first stanza of the first poem reads,

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hills piss barley tea
fly rolling high spell eczema a
tongue coated blue rag washing
it tantrum shrill thickets
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The first stanza of the second poem directly faces it, parading as translation:

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udi ru ga moyok
he jigum kuk jinma
di sajimi musun omma
haggi shi-ru gaji ma ya gaji
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The two stanzas share no words, however; the first line of the Korean stanza, for instance, translates as “Where are [you] going? Insult.” Perhaps the “secret” of the home language is that it, like the Korean or Korean American experience itself, cannot be fully translated; in any case, her devious mistranslations destabilize the position of the knowing American reader as “the universal under which the particulars are assumed.”

In the informational content of *Treadwinds: Poems and Intermedia Texts* (Wesleyan University Press, 2002), Walter Lew, a well-known figure in Asian American poetry, often reads more like Suji Kwock Kim than like Hong. Many of his poems are set in a Korean context or include Korean
contexts in them. Most of the Korean poems reflect his personal experience in visiting Korea; from those poems, a reader learns something of Korean culture and customs. In “18 Generations at Ssang-Nyong,” a reader learns of “ancestral mounds,” sees “Soft-eyed oxen” and “a thatched roof,” and sees a farmer drinking and singing “down at the makkoli house.” While Lew doesn’t translate “makkoli” (note the third transliterative variant of the word), he leaves little doubt that a makkoli house is a drinking establishment. He imagines advice from his grandfather in “Mound 1: Silent for Twenty-five Years, the Father of my Mother Advises Me.” In other poems, he uses historical events. In “Leaving Seoul: 1953,” he reconstructs his mother’s experience in the Korean War. In “Pyŏnsa’s Complaint,” he writes in the voice of a “pyŏnsa,” or “movieteller” who sat between the audience and the screen and “provided live narration for silent and untranslated films.” The pyŏnsa complains that, with the advent of dubbing, “soon people liked / A void between // Themselves and the screen, / Where I used to sit.” In “1983” he includes Korean history, particularly the Koreans of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, “les voix des enfants coréens / brûlant à Nagasaki,” in an inspired parody of T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and Reagan’s cold war.

Like Hong’s, Lew’s translation is incomplete and varied; in fact, some is not even in language: his “intermedia” include photographs and collages, some with Korean subjects. Lew also uses the Korean script hangul, as well as some Chinese and Japanese, often in combination with transliteration, and sometimes with translation. In the table of contents, Lew includes hangul and the other languages in many titles; some of the non-English words are translated, some transliterated, and some unchanged when a title appears above its poem. Wei-halaboji, for instance, appears in hangul in the contents, making it unreadable to an English-only reader. The word is translated as “the Father of my Mother” above the poem itself. Lew uses Chinese twice in the contents: the first poem is titled with the Chinese for astronomy, and “1983” is in Chinese characters. While he translates the second title when he presents the poem itself, nothing in the first poem translates or clarifies the title, so reading the title depends on previous knowledge or searching out translation help. The same is true of the hangul: neither translations nor transliterations actually help in reading the script itself, and the reader is either a foreigner to or participant in the discourse.

Lew’s refusing to pander to an English-only reader implies an argument for Korean as well as Japanese and Chinese as a necessary American cultural and linguistic background, as no more exotic or out of place than the French he uses occasionally. The parody of Eliot, along with locating Korea in a colonial transfer of power from Japan to the United States, reinforces that implication. Eliot’s poem works through multiple cultural ref-
erences that point toward ideas and texts central to Eliot’s western tradition. Lew’s demands on the reader for understanding *hangul* and other scripts, and his mixing of various cultural sources carry with them a new imagination of necessary cultural capital for the profitable reading of America and American poetry. His poetry demands the ability to read beyond an English-only or Eurocentric context. That insertion of Asia into America ties into Lew’s political content, which is much more specific than either Suji Kwock Kim’s, Park’s, or Hong’s in its critique of American neocolonialism, a critique that surfaces in “1983” as protests against militarization, and in “Seoul: Winter, 1986,” in which he sees “books for the English-as-a-Foreign-Language exam / For those who would study in the realm.”

Even more pervasively than Lew, Myung Mi Kim engages the political function of language in *Commons* (University of California Press, 2002), her fourth book. In “Pollen Fossil Record,” the concluding section of the volume that gives a self-reflective extension of and commentary on the poetry of the first three sections in a near-parody of informational endnotes, Kim asks, “What is English now, in the face of mass global migrations, ecological degradations, shifts and upheavals in identifications of gender and labor? . . . What are the implications of writing at this moment, in precisely this ‘America’? How to practice and make plural the written and spoken—grammars, syntaxes, textures, intonations . . .” She challenges the reader to “Consider the potential totalizing power of language that serves prevailing systems and demands of coherence.”

Her method of composition intervenes with that “totalizing power,” as underscored by her quotation of Adorno in “Pollen Fossil Record”: “‘The fragment is that part of the totality of the work that opposes totality.’” Almost every page in her book consists of lines, words, or even sounds juxtaposed on the white space with no obvious syntactic or contextual connections between them. Unlike the other four writers, she “translates” almost no clear Korean informational content for an uninformed reader, giving only a single brief reference to the Kwangju uprising: “In this South Cholla Province where all vehicles had been confiscated, we resorted to walking, the method of travel in the Yi dynasty. We reverted back 300 years. / Kwangju, 1980.” A reader recognizes the reference only by already knowing of the uprising; Kim does not act as accommodating cultural informant.

Her engagement with language follows her lack of contextualized informational content. For instance, when she writes, “Sign scarcity, the greeting—*have you eaten today*?”, she nowhere indicates that she has translated a common Korean (and Chinese) greeting. Like Hong, she often breaks
down language to its sounds, sometimes identifying sounds that are impos-
sible to pronounce accurately in Korean, like “pr” or “fl.” In “Siege Docu-
ment,” a poem in hangul that remains untranslated except for the final line,
she brackets each line with a pair of transliterations, one in standard
romanization, and one in her own attempt at accurate phonetic representa-
tion in a process she explains as “Rehearsals of listening: practicing sound
and gesture between languages, between systems of writing. How physically
(almost physiologically) impossible it is to pronounce or even imagine what
Korean words are being depicted under the standard (standardized)
romanization of Korean. The odd vowel blurs, the unclear consonant combi-
nations. Poised between a spectral and a real engagement with Korean.” In
the bracketing transliterations, Kim’s Korean appears in three ways to an
English-only reader, none of which is particularly informational, none of
which can actually be read as accurate representation. The several levels of
always already misunderstood translation/transliteration make available a
critique of poems like Suji Kwock Kim’s or Park’s that seem to offer uncom-
plicated linguistic representation. Often, the only way to “get it” in Myung
Mi Kim’s volume, even on an informational level, is to be able to read and
understand hangul.

For Myung Mi Kim, translation is totalizing, blending other languages
into an English-only American speech. Such an imagined American speech,
howeever, is inaccurate to the real American speech as it exists, just as the
“not-Asian” is inaccurate to the real global America in which various
diasporas have created areas in America in which English is the foreign
language. If a work leaves something untranslated, a full reading experi-
ence de-exotifies, while a translated reading experience requires no attempt
at more than “spectral” understanding and thus leaves the translated lan-
guage/cultural in an exotic position no matter how much the text contains
historically or culturally referential “meaning.” Perhaps, the more “for-
eign” that poems might seem, as they might in Myung Mi Kim’s fractured
presentations, the less foreign they actually are, at least in a globalized
America, because they require a reader to, as Kim writes, “Consider how
the polyglot, porous, transcultural presence alerts and alters what is around
it.” To use the halves of the hair split by Chuh and Shimakawa, Suji Kwock
Kim and Ishle Yi Park seem to write from an Asian American aesthetic,
while Cathy Park Hong, Walter Lew, and Myung Mi Kim seem to write
from an Asian diasporic aesthetic. Ironically, in a globalized, “polyglot”
U.S., the latter three are every bit as American as the first two, and Ameri-
can in a descriptive sense by refusing the universalizing or totalizing ten-
dencies at the historical heart of Asian studies. “Asia” cannot be contained
by geographical delimitations or by the illusion of a universalist global
economy, and America cannot be “not-Asian” in any but a “phantasmic” construction. As these poets show, in the face of diaspora, Asian studies must cross over into American studies, and that crossing over will participate in the refiguration of Asia and America in a subversive globalism that counters the disguised neocolonialism of the celebrated global economy, that refuses to “[serve] prevailing systems and demands of coherence.” If reading this poetry helps in that refiguration, it will have made something happen.

Notes
2 Field, 1265.
3 Cumings, 286.
6 Chuh and Shimakawa, 4 & 5.
7 Ibid., 7.
10 Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 25.
11 Lowe, 134.
12 Sakai, 155.
14 Shu-mei Shih, 24.
15 Ibid., 28.
17 Shu-mei Shih, 29.
18 Rey Chow, 107.
Across a time span of several centuries and many cultures, practitioners of theatrical arts have been subjected to misunderstanding by and marginalization from mainstream polite society, ostracization, and ridicule and scorn from fellow citizens. They have been subject to laws severely restricting the practice of their art, exiling it to the seedy outskirts of town, and denying and discriminating against their own status as fully human and participatory elements of society deserving of equal legal protection as other respectable citizens. This marginalization has ranged from such extremely restrictive laws passed in Elizabethan England banning public performances entirely from the city of London and categorizing traveling players with prostitutes and beggars, to the mild horror still felt in 21st century America by many middle-class parents upon hearing that his or her child plans to go to college to major in theater.
Few students of theater, or anyone having seen the 1998 film *Shakespeare in Love* are by this time unfamiliar with the aforementioned example of the treatment of theater and its artists in 16th century England. Clause 5 of An Act for the Punishment of Vagabonds and for the Relief of the Poor and Impotent, passed by King Henry VIII in 1531 and amended by Parliament in 1572, reads in part:

> And for the full expressing what...persons shall be intended...to be Rogues, Vagabonds and Sturdy Beggars, to have and receive the punishment aforesaid for the said lewd manner of life. It is now published, declared, and set forth by the Authority of the present Parliament, that all and every such person...using subtle, crafty, or unlawful Games or Plays...and all Fencers, Bearwards, Common Players in Enterludes, & Minstrels...all Jugglers, Pedlars, Tinkers, and Petty Chapmen...[which] shall wander abroad, and have not licence of two Justices of the Peace at least...shall be taken, adjudged and deemed Rogues, Vagabonds and Sturdy Beggars.¹

Wickham also chronicles the lawsuit *Worth v Baskerville*, brought before the Lord Chancellor and his Court of Chancery in 1625, in which stage players were found to be “unfit subjects for legal redress.”² The lawsuit was dismissed on the grounds that “the said agreement is made between players, which this Court conceived unfit to be relieved or countenanced in a court of equity.”³

Why, though, were stage plays and actors treated in such a manner? Possible answers lie in the origins of English theater and in social conditions of the time. Prior to the prominence of Shakespeare and his contemporaries on the stage, much popular theater consisted of Corpus Christi plays or mystery cycles, plays presented by the guilds of towns including Wakefield, York, and Chester based on Biblical stories—which some have argued evolved directly from ecclesiastical liturgies—while the Pope and Catholic Church were still the unquestioned religious authorities of the country. However, following Henry VIII’s schism with Catholicism and later his daughter Elizabeth’s Protestant takeover of the throne following staunchly Catholic Mary I, the mystery plays came to be considered heretical for the manner in which they portrayed Christ, God, and Mary and the sacraments of baptism and holy communion.⁴ Plays written for the express purpose of satirizing religious and political tensions even resulted in several actors being burned at the stake as heretics.⁵ Later, as the plague swept London, its spread was assisted by the packing together of patrons in playhouses, resulting in theater buildings being officially relegated to the “Liberties,” or outskirts of London, along with such places, as Steven Mullaney
says, ‘hospitals and brothels to madhouses, scaffolds of execution, prisons, and lazar-houses’, and left there to be judged guilty by association in the minds of respectable members of society. Joseph Lenz writes that:

“The first common ground upon which prostitution and the theater traded was, quite literally, common ground…the theater and prostitution occupied the same place in London, outside the city….This locale indicates the status of theater in culture: it is something kept apart, a distrusted alien that threatens the civil, moral, and social order.”

Though most familiar to western theater enthusiasts, the status of theater in Renaissance England was and is by no means unique in the world. Several Asian theater forms and their practitioners have or currently suffer under similarly unfriendly societal perceptions and reactions, particularly traditions based in puppetry and their close relatives. I will argue in this paper that the causes of Asian puppet theater’s marginal reputation within its societies of origin may be traced to several common correlations: between puppetry and religious ritual and contact with the spirit world, ambiguity of puppeteers’ and actors’ proper place in the human realm, political tensions, and sexual ambiguity. Meanwhile, the effects on puppet traditions and reactions of societies to them may broadly fall under the headings of categorization with outcasts and prostitutes, confinement to and concentration in marginal geographic districts, discriminatory laws, and general mistrust. Furthermore, I would argue that the religious and ritual origins of puppetry are integral to the dubious social status of puppet theater and puppeteers. To establish these links and assertions, I will examine the ritual puppet traditions of the two distinct Asian cultures of Japan and Java: the Japanese Awaji ningyo doll theater, its daughter forms of joruri ballad puppetry and modern Bunraku, and Bunraku’s associated tradition Kabuki; and the Javanese wayang-kulit shadow puppet tradition.

**Japan: Awaji ningyo, joruri, and Bunraku**

As in Bunraku, which is now more generally familiar, Awaji ningyo puppets are operated by three puppeteers—one each for the head and right arm, left arm, and feet—dressed in black. The puppets are constructed of fabric and paulownia wood and may stand over one meter in height. Performances also include a chanter, who narrates the story and recites characters’ lines, and a player of the three-stringed samisen.

Awaji ningyo traces its history as a distinctive art form to sometime between 1570 and 1640 on the island of Awaji, located in the Harima Sea between the major islands of Honshu and Shikoku. Before this time, puppeteers known as Ebisu-kaki were contractually bound to the Nishinomiya shrine in the worship of the deity Ebisu—who will later be discussed at
length—and traveled for part of the year to perform purity rituals for the Ebisu’s appeasement throughout the countryside, for which they needed the permission of the Nishinomiya priests, with whom they were required to split their earnings. However, at some point, the wandering puppeteers began to buck the authority of the priests and travel throughout the year without permission to perform, for reasons possibly including the ability to keep all of their own earnings and an emerging sense of the need for artistic freedom.10 Awaji ningyo puppetry is still performed in Japan today, thanks to a movement begun in the 1940’s to preserve the art form.

“WARNING: This art is for the appeasement of kami,” reads a section of the Dokumbo Denki, a document carried by Awaji troupes detailing the origins of Awaji ningyo. “People should not take this lightly. If they do, it will weigh heavily upon them. People should be sorely afraid.”11 This passage clearly emphasizes the weighty role that ritual puppetry played in Japanese spiritual life. “Far from being a puppet theater for children, Awaji puppeteers performed rituals that maintained rigid ritual purity codes and kept dangerous spiritual forces properly channeled and appeased,” writes Jane Marie Law.12 Kami is sacred nature, with which “everybody and everything in the early Japanese monistic universe…[was] believed to be endowed.”13 In Japanese creation myth, the deities Izanagi and Izanami, after copulating in an attempt to create solid land, have instead a malformed, legless blob—the Leech Child—which they abandon on the ocean in a reed boat. The child drifts alone for years until he is found by the fisherman Hyakudayu, whom he commands to build a temple for his worship. According to the Dokumno Denki, this temporary worship hall became the Nishinomiya shrine, at which “a person by the name of Dokumbo was capable of mediating for this kami and receiving his messages.” However, after Dokumbo’s death, the Leech Child “caused heavy rains and winds, fishing disasters, and mishaps on land,” as there was no longer anyone capable of appeasing him, until Hyakudayu made a puppet to look like Dokumbo, by which he was able to calm the child deity.14

There is little agreement or evidence concerning how or why, but the Leech Child evolved in myth into Ebisu—god of the ocean, fishing, and good luck—obese, crippled, hermaphroditic, and perpetually drunk.15 Though generally beneficent, he was powerful and temperamental—when drunk or in a bad mood, he was known to cause violent storms and bad luck to fishermen—and thus in need of appeasement. This myth and the historical and mythical origins of the Nishinomiya shrine contain abundant clues by which to interpret the role of puppetry and the status of puppeteers in Japanese spiritual life.

The Leech Child myth fancifully conveys the idea of the need for non-
human mediators between humans and deities, kami, or spiritual forces, contact with which ordinary humans are not strong enough to bear; after Dokumbo’s death, no other human was capable of appeasing the Leech Child. For the Japanese, these mediators take the form of puppets, or ningyo. Law lists several purposes for which ningyo were used: as spirit vessels for deities summoned by shamen; as representational equals of people or animals for use as surrogates in healing or purification rites, or to ward off danger from the people they represent; as protection by substitution for small children; or as substitute bodies for possession by a powerful spirit. The common purpose of the puppet, then, was to serve as a receptacle for a powerful supernatural spirit in place of an actual human being, to serve as a mediator between the ordinary human and the dangerous, powerful nonhuman realm. Therefore, “puppeteers and puppets shared a world set apart from the everyday realm. As performers sharing this territory, puppeteers and puppets enjoyed a unique freedom of movement in society and throughout the cosmos. They carried the responsibility for generating order out of chaos and purity out of defilement, and consequently suffered from shifting assessments of their status and worth.”

Law also notes that “the status of puppeteers has fluctuated between respect and esteem and the perception that puppeteers are, because of the nature of the work they do, hinin (nonhuman).” That is, because of their necessarily intimate association with the nonhuman puppets they operate and their constant contact with powerful and dangerous beings from outside the human realm, puppeteers became themselves, in the minds of ordinary Japanese, nonhuman. Modern performances of Awaji ningyo reveal an ultimate example of the blurring of lines between human and nonhuman: at performances, it is customary for local fisherman to get drunk along with Ebisu. “With both audience and deity happily inebriated, there was ‘no distinction between puppets and human beings,’” as Law quotes Niimi Kanji.

Furthermore, the 18th century Japanese scholar Motoori Norinaga conceived of a religious metaphor by which the actions of humans are intimately motivated by kami, just as puppets are animated by their puppeteers. Masahide reminds us, however, that there are both good and evil kami. Beyond portraying puppeteers as diplomats of or to the gods, Norinaga’s metaphor intellectually equates the power of a puppeteer directly with that of a deity or kami. The idea that an individual has such god-like power over a nearly human-sized figure, combined with the knowledge that both benevolent and evil kami exist—both sorts dangerous and frightening—reveals an inherent and natural societal distrust of the puppeteer—of both his power and his very humanity—and his art. Even the tenuousness of the links between the Leech Child’s myth and Ebisu’s, and
Ebisu’s amorphous and socially marginal attributes amplify the senses of vagueness and uncertainty surrounding Ebisu and his puppeteers. However distrusted they were, though, Japanese society depended on the Ebisu-kaki; ordinary humans could not withstand direct contact with divine forces. Law states that “expression of nonecclesiastical, popular religion…centered on activities of a group of people who occupied the margins of Japanese society, while performing ritually integral activities to keep the central systems of meaning functioning.” Thus, puppeteers were stuck in an awkward position of being necessary to society for the performance of a religious function, while simultaneously being distrusted and feared by virtue of performing that function.

In the case of the Ebisu-kaki, marginalization was an indirect geographic consequence, as well as a direct though intangible social one, of their wandering spiritual lifestyle. Law writes of riverbed districts; these areas, though usually dry, might quickly flood during heavy rains and so were useless as farmland or as locations of permanent homes, as they might even cease to exist overnight in a rainstorm. Riverbeds—kawara—were thus geographically and legally ambiguous, un-taxable, and due to their lack of use for permanent means, often became home to people of marginal or ambiguous position and those without permanent homes, such as traveling Ebisu-kaki. The term kawaramono, or “riverbed people”—or even more belittling: kawara kojiki, “riverbed beggars”—came to refer to those outcasts from respectable society who might make their home in a riverbed: “gravediggers, road cleaners, haulers of night soil, comb makers, ritual puppeteers, and midwives.” From this list, it becomes clear that social outcasts and people considered polluted were those whose position was in any way unsettled, nebulous, in transition, or whose profession put them in contact with such things. In addition to traveling puppeteers, this land was home to a variety of ritual performers and shrine attendants, and later became home to other performing artists; it was in the Kamagawa riverbed, or Shijo, in Kyoto that Kabuki is said to have been invented by an Izumo shrine attendant named Okuni in 1603, and was later the site of the first formal puppet theater.

Another class of districts home to ritual performers and other marginal people were the Sanjo districts, which “originated as special compounds for ritual performers (musicians, diviners and deity pacifiers, etc.) attached to major ceremonial centers” between roughly 1045 and 1246. Around this time, kugutsu, another earlier word for puppeteer, also came to be a term for prostitutes, itinerant entertaining women, or puppeteers then otherwise employed—as tanners or in other equally marginal professions—in part due to a document by court scholar Oe no Masafusa dated about 1070, which portrayed kugutsu as stereotypes of exotic nomads given to prosti-
tion and dabbling in sorcery.28

Here we see one of the first correlations between ritual performance and prostitution: guilt by geographic association, analogous to that experienced by performers in Elizabethan England. Whether or not the wives of kugutsu performers were prostitutes and their husbands disreputably employed foreign nomads,29 they shared common ambiguous ground. However, there is also a later and more explicit correlation between ritual puppetry and prostitution: the traveling Ebisu-kaki who broke with the authority of their shrines performed their art for money and personal gain. Perhaps, like prostitutes, the profession of traveling puppeteers—kugutsu or Ebisu-kaki—came to be seen as profane not for its own virtue or lack thereof, but because it was performed for money. Intertwined with their performance for personal profit was the puppeteers’ power struggle with the established authority of the shrine priests.

The combination of their nomadic lifestyle, analogy with prostitutes, and work with potent spiritual forces clearly branded Awaji ningyo puppeteers as outsiders. Jane Marie Law writes that:

[A]ny view of a bounded system implies an Other against which the system is bounded. Just as diseases…are thought to violate the body from the outside and then work within it, so too are outsiders and marginal people feared as sources of some kind of threat to the integrity of social categories and order. This…is the stigma suffered by strangers in cultures around the world. Furthermore, there are the forces of the darker side of consciousness, frequently formulated in mythology as aborted, deformed, or half-developed deities, which inhabit the boundaries, paradoxes, and interstices of this bounded social system—and occasionally have to be reckoned with, and that this “reckoning with” becomes the work of “specialists in impurity.”30 With this thought, we move to the transition of Awaji ningyo to joruri and Bunraku, as well as the concept of puppetry as scapegoating.

The joruri ningyo ballad puppet theater is believed to have developed from Awaji ningyo, as the traveling ritual puppeteers took advantage of their newfound artistic freedom, chanters adopted a more theatrical and declamatory narration style, and the emphasis of the stories performed took on a more romantic rather than religious essence.31 The form takes its name from the heroine of one of its first masterworks, “The Tale in Twelve Episodes of Joruri,”32 but another of its well-known pieces, “The Chest-Splitting of Amida,” is ideal for introducing the idea of scapegoating in puppetry.

In this story, the son of a rich noble is dangerously ill and can only be saved from death by eating the liver of a girl born on the exact day and hour of his own birth. Lady Tenju offers herself as the sacrificial victim, asking in return that the rich man protect her younger brother and erect a
temple for the souls of her dead parents. She is killed and her liver purified and fed to the sick child, who recovers. However, when the rich man enters the sanctuary where the sacrifice had been performed, he finds Lady Tenju alive and asleep in her brother’s arms, while the statue of Amida Buddha has a deep, bloody gash in its chest, having offered itself for sacrifice instead of the innocent girl.

This tale offers two examples of scapegoat victims: Lady Tenju, who offers her own life to atone for the boy’s illness and for the souls of her sinful parents; and the statue of Amida Buddha, which takes responsibility on itself instead of allowing Lady Tenju to die. This principle of scapegoating—in which ningyo serve as soul substitutes to suffer in place of humans—is clearly present in the earlier traditions of Awaji ningyo, in which puppets were deemed necessary to bear contact with the gods in place of humans, and in healing rituals in which a doll, rubbed over the body of its owner, was then thrown into a body of running water to cleanse its owner’s soul. And as puppets bore responsibility for mediating with the gods, puppeteers, by association, came to bear responsibility for the social ills with which their puppets dealt. “Of note here,” writes Law, “is how a particular person, or type of person—an outsider—becomes a symbol for an entire order of meaning. The stranger comes to symbolize all that is unknown, unseen, hidden, mysterious, and potentially capable of bestowing blessing or calamity.” This is the danger for which ritual puppeteers were known, and for which they became scapegoats in Japanese spiritual life.

The theme of scapegoating, with its origins in ritual Awaji ningyo and more explicit expression in joruri, remained, and still exists, in Bunraku. Donald Keene writes:

Puppetry and the operators themselves were long subject to denigration, not only on the part of society, but as an official polity of the government, which imposed restrictions on the activities of puppet operators that did not apply to chanters or samisen players. Even today the operators tend to be looked down on socially, if only because many are badly educated or given to drink and gambling. Beneath such objections it is also possible to detect traces of the ancient belief, going back to the days of the kugutsu-mawashi, that the puppet operators were foreigners, unlike other Japanese.

It is likely, however, that puppeteers’ lack of formal education and susceptibility to alcoholism are side effects of the long and intensive training
necessary to become a puppeteer and the emotional and physical strain of their profession, rather than, as some small-minded people still believe, traits inherent to puppeteers. Thus, Bunraku puppeteers occupy a similarly awkward place in society as Ebisu-kaki did: first outcasted from society because of the work they do—though that work is desired or needed by society—then ridiculed and denigrated for the side effects of their profession. In Bunraku, though, and in the earlier Awaji-ningyo and joruri traditions, the scapegoating of puppets by dehumanization—and of puppeteers by association—is integral to the aesthetics of the form. In Bunraku, the use of beings—puppets—once removed from the human realm is necessary for reasons of artistic expression as well as for the reasons of the spiritual forces at work in its parent form, Awaji ningyo.

Though Bunraku is decidedly less religious in its emphasis than Awaji ningyo, its stories still concern deities, kami, and issues of morality, all of which often involve scenes of intense violence and horror. Keene relates the thoughts of one the greatest writers of Bunraku plays, Chikamatsu:

It is conceivable that a marvelously talented operator could manipulate a doll of human proportions so adroitly that an audience would be incapable of distinguishing the doll from a human being. Such excessive realism, as Chikamatsu noted, far from pleasing the audience, would probably disgust instead…stylization in art and not literal fidelity is what the audience craves. A puppet which was indistinguishable from a human being would certainly not be his equal, for it would lack intelligence and individuality.

However, it would appear that Chikamatsu overlooked perhaps the most compelling reason why “excessive realism” would disgust rather than please an audience, or for that matter why the use of live actors might have the same effect. Perhaps it would simply be too intense, painful, or pathetic to see real human beings in some of the situations portrayed in Bunraku plays. Thus, nonhuman stand-ins, or scapegoats, are substituted in order to make the violence acceptable. Keene goes on to note that “the stylization of gestures and our continual awareness that we are witnessing a play make it possible for us to accept in Bunraku scenes which would be unspeakably horrible if realistically presented,” such as a scene in the piece “The Village School,” in which a nobleman must examine the severed head of his own son. On the possibility of potentially limitless freedom of expression, Law writes that “puppets can be made to do things with ease that human actors can do only with great effort and elaborate theatrical devices. Puppets can fly, change into animals, ghosts, and demons, dismember themselves and one another, and enact terrific physical transformations,” and that puppet theater “can present horror in a way that is at once abstract and concrete….working with puppets may allow for a distancing
from the realities of violence and horror and for an abstract consideration of the basic ideas of finitude, aversion, and tolerance.”^42 Again, though Bunraku is not explicitly religious, it would seem that it contains forces and situations judged inappropriate or impossible for direct human experience, and so a substitute is needed. Law goes so far as to suggest that part of the need for puppetry lies in humans’ need to play God, to exercise their own creative force and will. “Ironically,” however, “the prominence of tragedies in the puppet theater in the end tells us that even when given the chance to become God, human beings repeat God’s mistakes (and, one could argue, God’s sadism).”^43 Of course, it is a well known axiom that in order to commit cruelty to a being, it is necessary to think it less than human. It is necessary, then, that Bunraku puppets remain stylized so as not to resemble humans too closely, while still serving as human substitutes, and for the puppeteers to be dehumanized in the minds of their spectators in order to justify their intimate involvement in such a dangerous game.

Java: Wayang kulit
We turn now to the wayang kulit shadow puppet tradition of Java. Although the island of Java is almost 3000 miles south from Awaji Island of Japan, the puppetry traditions of the two island nations share many of the same themes of spirituality, power, and status within their respective societies and communities of performing artists.

The most auspicious wayang kulit performances take place at night, at the home of the individual or family who has commanded the performance. Performances are typically ordered for major rites of passage, such as the birth of a child, a circumcision, marriage, or death. The dhalang, or puppeteer, sits behind a long white screen, hung in place of the house’s temporarily removed fourth wall, which has a banana tree trunk laid along its base. The tree trunk has holes drilled in it to hold the sticks of puppets as they wait to be used. A lamp hung above the dhalang provides light to cast the shadows. Behind the dhalang sit the players of the gamelan orchestra; the orchestra includes drums, flutes, stringed instruments, and percussion instruments resembling xylophones.

The puppets themselves are flat, constructed of water buffalo hide with elaborate patterns of perforations which provide stunning detail on the screen when lit from behind. They have jointed arms and shoulders, and range in size from six or seven inches to about two feet high.^45

Shadow puppet shows have been known in Javanese courts and villages since the 15th century. Most of wayang kulit’s stories, however, are not indigenous to Java, but concern the gods and heroes of the Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata.^47

Due to their history and function, Javanese dhalang have suffered in the perceptions of their society similarly to the Ebisu-kaki in theirs. Dhalang
were originally employed by kings to travel throughout the country using shadow puppets to teach proper respect for the king to commoners and townspeople. However, as they traveled out of sight of the king, dhalang might “lay bare the king’s secrets,” or reveal the workings of a corrupt or evil king surreptitiously in performance. So a king, while he needed the dhalang to help control his subjects, also had cause to be careful and distrustful of him, since he could also work against the king’s power.48 Laurie J. Sears notes that:

Javanese puppeteers are sharp observers of society and its ills, and shadow tales are among the tools they use to elucidate the workings of power within Javanese society….Rather than being members of a mystified subaltern class, Javanese village performers use the well-known characters and plots of shadow tales to communicate their criticisms of power.49

Yet, while their political power was obvious to both villagers and kings, dhalang were still travelers, and any performer in Java who travels about the countryside is said to mbebarang. This is considered a very humble way to earn one’s living, only slightly less demeaning than begging. The ritual importance of a dhalang in accomplishing the village rites saved his prestige from the lowly regard in which itinerant dancers were held. But he was by no means guaranteed respect.50

And what was the dhalang’s ritual importance? “A dhalang is believed to exert great energy (daya), the energy that radiates from potent persons or objects….To possess great energy gives someone an impressive presence, called prabawa. Sponsors (of wayang kulit performances) hope that the dhalang’s prabawa will be such as to keep spirits at bay,” writes Ward Keeler.51 The sponsors who hire dhalang do so with the hope that the dhalang’s ability to control supernatural spirits will bring peace and prosperity to the family and community. However, as with Japanese kami, there is both good and evil daya; though powerful, a dhalang has the ability to exert both good and evil power. And so his power is distrusted, both politically—because of his ability to undermine a king’s power even though he is needed to maintain the king’s power—and spiritually, because he is seen to control power with “ambiguous potential.” Thus, he occupies a place in society akin to that of the Ebisu-kaki: socially necessary, but distrusted, sometimes even disdained. “[A]ristocrats and many other high-status people have often treated dhalang with some contempt, says Keeler. “That they required a dhalang’s services on occasion meant only that they employed him as they employed other servants. The specialized nature of a dhalang’s knowledge did little to distinguish him from other performers, regarded on the whole as a lowly and dissolute group.”52

But the power of the dhalang is generally regarded with such a mixture of fear, awe, and distrust that to tell a dhalang to stop during a performance
lays a person...open to misfortune, a divine punishment for this usurpa-
tion of the dhalang’s authority....By the same token, it is the dhalang who 
must take responsibility for the proceedings,”53 and this includes every-
thing that occurs in the village during the time of the performance: births, 
deaths, fortunes, and misfortunes. And here again we find the idea of the 
puppeteer as scapegoat. The puppeteer is the person who commands the 
spirits during a performance, and it is he who accepts responsibility for 
them; a dhalang may even be held responsible for misfortunes that occur 
long after he gives a performance.54 If sponsors of a dhalang continually 
experience setbacks after his performances, he may obtain a reputation of 
having an “inauspicious aura.”

The circumstances under which the dhalang’s services are desired are 
also telling. I have already mentioned above that major rites of passage in 
the life of an individual or family, such as births, circumcisions, marriages, 
and deaths, are often occasions for the sponsoring of a wayang kulit per-
formance. However, “except in the rather specialized instance of ruwatan”— 
the ritual exorcism—“the dhalang does not usually accomplish a specific 
ritual purpose.”55 Ruwatan performances are reserved for instances in which 
someone is judged to need protection from the demon Kala. On the island 
of Bali, adjacent to Java, another variety of wayang kulit—wayang sapuh 
leger—is considered appropriate for such exorcism rituals, and the events 
which would render somebody in need of protection from Kala include, 
among others, falling asleep under an incomplete roof.56 The form wayang 
suddhamala is also appropriate for exorcism, as well as life cycle rituals, 
including the appearance of adult teeth, puberty, and marriage.57 It is sig-
nificant that all instances in which wayang kulit performances are ordered—
for ritual exorcism or otherwise—involves major periods of transition, un-
rest, unsettledness, or ambiguity. Apparently, it is in these periods or situ-
ations in which people are judged to be most vulnerable to the influences 
of powerful spirits, which must be warded off. Recall that in Japanese spiri-
tuality, it was also people in positions of ambiguity—travelers, those who 
dealt with the spirit world, and those whose professions involved death or 
birth—who were considered to be dangerous and polluted.

Javanese dhalang also put themselves in positions of dehumanization, 
as Japanese puppeteers do. An account of the need for a dhalang to per-
form exorcism rituals relates that “the puppeteer may be strong enough to 
handle the sacred mantras, or the power of the mantras could harm 
him....Although even the victim could technically read the mantras and 
thus send Kala away, it is [the god] Wisnu pretending to be a dhalang who 
must recite the mantras out loud in order to release their power.”58 The 
mantras are so powerful, it would seem, that even Wisnu must dissociate
from his ordinary self in order to recite them. The dhalang, in metaphorically becoming Wisnu, becomes himself less human. Besides the metaphorical dehumanization, dhalang, through the medium of shadow puppetry, are dehumanized even more extremely than other puppeteers, who at least remain visible to the spectators and operate dolls with recognizable human shapes and proportions. Wayang kulit puppets, however, are barely recognizable as human, with their disproportionately long arms, asymmetrical shoulders, tiny waists, and grotesquely stylized faces. Furthermore, the actual puppet isn’t even visible to most of the audience, only its shadow. The dhalang focuses his energy into a being that isn’t even tangible; it’s a mere shadow, but with the voice of the dhalang. A picture caption in Sears’ book states the matter succinctly: “The puppeteer becomes a shadow as he sits in front of the clown puppets and the refined hero.”

There is also, in Balinese spirituality, a special concern with physical space. All space is thought of in terms of its relation to the sacred mountain Gunung Agung, the mythical home of the gods. Space that faces toward the mountain is kaja—pure and auspicious—while space facing away from the mountain, toward the sea, is kelod—impure and inauspicious. The “middle world” is considered the “space that is appropriate for human beings to inhabit.”

That this distinction is drawn, and that the dhalang takes care to orient himself in the “auspicious space” and not the middle world—the space appropriate to humans—reinforces the idea that the ritual puppeteer doesn’t quite belong to the ordinary human realm. Although kaja is sacred space, its sacredness makes it somehow inappropriate for human habitation. One of the circumstances requiring an exorcism is having fallen asleep under an incomplete roof; this is a physical position of extreme ambiguity: is the person inside or outside? Ambiguous places are vulnerable, dangerous places, and the dhalang have the dubious task of mediating among them. Dhalang are also travelers, like Ebisu-kaki—an ambiguous physical condition—and with regards to concerns of geographic space, one can hardly help but think of the riverbed and Sanjo districts of Japan, the spaces inhabited by travelers, ritual performers, and others considered to exist somewhat outside of the stable, earthly realm, who were perceived as other than completely human.

There also arises in wayang-kulit the question of prostitution. While I found in my research no explicit linking of dhalang to prostitutes, there is evidence of significant tension over the fact that in order for a performance to occur, money must change hands. Keeler relates:
That the dhalang receives payment, particularly cash payment, for his services suggests some denigration of his status. Some sponsors...adopt just such a demeaning view of the dhalang. It is probably in order to stave off such unflattering reflections that dhalang often stress in conversation their total indifference...to the sum they are paid, or even whether they are paid at all. They insist that they will perform for indigent sponsors for little or nothing....

Though it has a spiritual function, wayang-kulit is also a social event. Dhalang perform as a service, but also must earn a living, and the tensions between these two aspects of performing cause the dhalang’s spiritual role to be profaned in the minds of many. The same was true of the “free-lance” wandering Ebisu-kaki: Awaji ningyo began as a religious ritual, but became a source of entertainment for spectators and of artistic expression and personal financial gain for puppeteers, causing them to be looked down on for their ambiguous role.

Japan: Kabuki
It is now necessary to return to Japan, to the Kabuki tradition. Kabuki, though not a ritual or a puppet tradition, relies heavily on Bunraku in its stylization and in some ways represents the epitome of the exclusion of theater practitioners from mainstream society, especially in regard to sexuality and sexual ambiguity.

Kabuki is said to have developed in the Shijo riverbed district of Kyoto in 1603, when a shrine attendant named Okuni began to perform dramatic skits in the form of suggestive dances. Soon, Okuni’s performances were being imitated by troupes of prostitutes, and some Kabuki plays became elaborate devices by which prostitutes advertised their services. Whether in an attempt to put an end to Kabuki altogether, or, as Brandon suggests, to forcibly separate the professions of prostitute and actress and stop the violent brawls that often erupted between samurai audience members over the attentions of specific actresses, women were banned from the stage in 1629. For Kabuki to survive, young male actors had to take their place, leading to the emergence of onnagata: men whose specialty it was to play female roles. It was perhaps thanks to the onnagata that Kabuki shares such a strong link with Bunraku. Plowright writes that:

When young kabuki actors were faced with the challenge of finding a subtle way of playing women, they focused on the essential elements of a woman’s gesture and hit on certain exaggerated characteristics which derived from the amplified movements of the puppet theater. In turn, the puppet theater began to replicate the movements of
particular kabuki actors so that the audience were able to recognize the characteristics of their favorite performers.67

Even before the banning of women, however, cross-dressing was somewhat common on the Kabuki stage. Plowright mentions scenes in which “a rake was...played by a woman and a prostitute by a male,” turning the scene into an erotic solicitation for brothel clients. Not only cross-dressing, but the eroticisation of androgyny, was popular. Brandon writes of wakashu-gata, young actors of ability and beauty...usually fourteen to seventeen years of age. They played the roles of boys or handsome young men, gentle and somewhat effeminate. Their slightly plump faces and bodies were said to have a neutral quality intermediate between male and female, and they were likened to statues of Buddhist deities...in the early Kamakura period.68

The likening of the effeminate actors to sexually amorphous deities is notable, and calls to mind the hermaphroditic Ebisu. While Ebisu-kaki were not so directly thought of as sexually androgynous, there might have been a degree of ambiguity, as male puppeteers operated puppets of either sex, requiring them to learn and transmit to their puppets the delicate movements of women.

Whatever the Kabuki actors’ beauty, their sexual amorphism, as well as their residence in the riverbed districts, earned them classification with prostitutes and other marginalized people. “Prostitutes and actors, like others who took money from performing, were classified by officials as pariahs,” writes Brandon. “Kabuki managers and actors...were called kawara kojiki (riverbed beggars)....When they did go out of the quarter, they were required to wear woven hats made out of sedge grass to hide their faces, the same type of hat worn by outcasts and criminals under arrest.”69 As was the case in the Elizabethan English theater concerning the banning of women from stage and the social concern of effeminacy, Kabuki actors became outcasts not directly because of their profession, but because of a side effect of legal sanctions against their art form: that is, the popularity of effeminate male actors which became necessary to preserve Kabuki after the banning of women. The situation also mirrors that of Bunraku puppeteers—their reputations denigrated because of peripheral consequences of their intense training and lifestyle—and of the ritual performers of Awaji ningyo and wayang kulit, who become outcasts first as a spiritual necessity, but remained so due to their nomadic and marginal lifestyle.

Conclusion
Theater traditions around the world, and specifically the puppet theaters of Japan and Java, show remarkably similar patterns of social marginalization of actors and performing artists. In the cases of wayang kulit and Awaji
ningyo and its associated traditions, these tendencies can be traced directly to the theater’s origins in religious ritual and its spiritual role in society. Although this spiritual function is highly necessary, the metaphorical positions in which ritual performers must work are often socially ambiguous and precarious, and judged by their respective societies to be spiritually dangerous. Therefore, theater practitioners frequently find themselves marginalized from mainstream social life, confined to the nebulous outer limits of earthly existence, their reputations denigrated, and even themselves dehumanized. Due to the artistic medium in which they practice and its particularly strong ties to religious ritual, puppeteers are especially vulnerable to these consequences, and the religious roots of the puppet theater are so potent that they still affect the perception of puppeteers by the societies in which they work. So potent, in fact, that their importance is often dismissed with anger by patrons of the arts to which they gave birth. Jane Marie Law tells of her first experience researching the religious origins of Awaji ningyo:

I was occasionally directed away from this line of research with the admonition that a study of the religious aspects of Awaji puppetry was either off the mark, unimportant, or worth leaving out of the record altogether. One man I interviewed told me it was a real shame I was only interested in such ‘embarrassing’ parts of the tradition.70

On the contrary, puppet theater has been such a vibrant and influential element of Asian culture precisely because of its “embarrassing” origins in religion, and only by understanding those auspicious beginnings is it possible to realize why puppetry is even today considered a serious and legitimate art form in many parts of the world.

Notes
2 Ibid., 185.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 131.
5 Ibid., 22.
7 Ibid.
8 These are bigger than Bunraku dolls; Awaji puppetry was traditionally an outdoor spectacle, while Bunraku is typically performed indoors for smaller audiences. Puppetry scholar Nagata Kokichi commented that using Awaji puppets on an indoor stage is “like putting a wild animal in a zoo. It loses all its wildness.” (Law, Puppets of Nostalgia, 17-18)
10 Ibid, pp. 84, 148-49.
14 Law, “Religious Authority and Ritual Puppetry,” p. 91.
15 Ibid, 82.
16 “Ningyo” is also translated as “doll.
18 Ibid., 52.
19 Ibid., 90.
20 Law, *Religious Authority and Ritual Puppetry*, p. 86.
23 Ibid., 70.
24 Ibid.
25 Hence the inclusion of midwives, a class of people who, like the Ebisu-kaki, it would appear, should be admired rather than denigrated for the societal necessity they provide.
27 Ibid., 72.
28 Ibid., 94-101.
29 There is much doubt as to the literal accuracy of Oe’s account; still, Donald Keene asserts theat “we cannot disregard Oe’s general implication that the puppeteers led lives so unlike those of the sedentary Japanese that they were taken for foreigners.” (Keene, *No and Bunraku*, p. 130).
32 Ibid., 135-36.
34 Incidentally, *joruri* means “the pure world of the healing Buddha.” (Plowright, p. 137)
37 Keene, 159.
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 125.
43 Ibid., 26.
49 Sears, p. 21.
51 Ibid., 174.
52 Ibid., 168.
53 Ibid., 169.
54 Ibid., 175.
55 Ibid., 177.
56 Farley Richmond and I Nyoman Sedana, “The Production of Holy Water.” Unpublished Ms, University of Georgia, Athen, p. 4.
57 Ibid., 4-5.
58 Sears, p. 239.
59 Ibid., 3.
60 Richmond and Sedana, p. 2.
61 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 6.
65 Plowright, p. 120.
66 Brandon et al., p. 7.
67 Plowright, p. 121.
68 Brandon et al., pp. 39-40.
69 Ibid., 3-4.
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by Daniel A. Metraux


The *Times* article praised Kanehara for the portrait of young people in Japan since the 1990 collapse of Japan’s “bubble economy” of the 1970s and 1980s. “It is a world of ‘freeters,’ young Japanese surviving on part-time jobs and unconcerned with their future; of unsentimental sex and a profound inability to communicate verbally; a world in which a killing is viewed with amorality. The institutions that built postwar Japan—the family, school and companies—are noticeable by their absence. In a nation known for its social cohesion, the characters have no interest in playing a role in society, but only in finding personal satisfaction among themselves. Unlike Japanese in, say, their 30s, the characters in the novel are not disillusioned at Japanese society, since they had few expectations to begin with. ‘There are many people who don’t expect anything from society,’ Ms. Kanehara says. ‘That’s precisely why they are looking inward or to people closest to them. I never knew the bubble era, so my way of looking at things can’t help being different. Since I was born, I’ve never experienced a time of prosperity. Without my being aware, it’s possible that my writing reflects the era.”

The Japan that I observed ever so briefly in March 2004 after a four year absence is a society that is undergoing revolutionary changes in values and behavior in every sphere of life from education, popular culture to business and government. The result is a process that is radically changing the Japanese cultural landscape making it a place vastly different from its traditional and even recent past.

This view of Japan is carefully chronicled in John Nathan’s most recent work, *Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation’s Quest for Pride and Purpose*. Nathan, the Takashima Professor of Japanese Cultural Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara and author of highly praised books on Mishima Yukio and on Sony, explores many facets of contemporary
Japanese society ranging from education, families, business, politics and foreign relations.

Nathan analyzes a nation experiencing dramatic change as Japan moves away from many of its traditional values towards a very uncertain future. A long and demeaning recession has weakened the foundations of the traditional family system and has contributed to the rapid rise of divorce and increased physical abuse of children by their families. The recession has contributed to the weakening of the bond between Japan’s corporations and their employees who are losing their right to employment for life. More and more Japanese are growing skeptical of their nation’s over half-century dependant relationship with the United States and nationalistic and xenophobic books are climbing up the best-sellers list.

One matter that Nathan discusses brilliantly is the traumatic breakdown of order and cohesion in Japan’s primary and secondary schools and the increasingly rebellious nature of Japanese youth. He writes about riotous conditions in classrooms in a country once famous for respectful children. His best chapter depicts chaos of the classroom where teachers across the country have simply lost control of their students. Disruptive students rule the roost bringing intolerable disorder and physical attacks on other students as well as teachers and administrators.

Nathan writes: “Classroom breakdown is only part of a larger crisis of anger and withdrawal that has bewildered parents and educators... In the United States, suspension is a legal option; in Japan suspension and expulsion are taboo under any circumstances. Promotion is based on attendance only, and holding a student back is very rare. A high school student can graduate with failing grades if he has attended classes 50 percent of the time. A shibboleth of the new education policy is ‘education of the heart.’ Nathan adds that since the Japanese economy collapsed in 1990 and prospects for the future have been further compromised, students have lost their motivation for study and the nation’s once highly vaunted achievement test scores have fallen below those of the US.

Nathan finds a similar crisis in Japan’s homes: “Since the economy collapsed in 1990, the divorce rate has soared: many children live with single parents too harried by their own lives to look after them. Layoffs, unheard of in Japan until recently, have put breadwinners in a vise, and promoted anger, alcoholism, and domestic violence. Families in straitened circumstances convey disappointment about the value of education.”

A March 21 (2004) report in the Yomiuri Weekly notes that outbursts of rage are increasing common among young adults as well. Store clerks and hotel personnel are reporting raucous behavior by customers and guests, most often men in their 20s and early 30s, who turn nasty and even violent
if they do not get their way. “From a sociological perspective, the condition is largely peculiar to the current generation of young adults. Their parents came of age in the immediate to mid-postwar years, a time of struggle and hard work. The elders thus coddled and overly protected their kids, not wanting them to experience their earlier hardscrabble existence. They thus spawned a generation of spoiled brats. And just as spoiled brats are known for their temper tantrums, today’s generation of young adults has become known for its hair-trigger outburst of rage.”

Nathan views a Japan which is trying to rediscover its true identity and to reconfirm its uniqueness. “Establishing an authentic sense of national self and purpose in the modern world required the merging of two disparate and often irreconcilable cultures, one native, inherent, grounded in history, the other founded on concepts such as individualism and intractably foreign. This exercise in cultural synthesis continues to tax and trouble the Japanese imagination.”

Nathan’s research consists mainly of exhaustive interviews with a wide range of Japanese from all walks of life including teachers, housewives, businessmen, company employees as well as celebrated politicians like Ishihara Shintaro and Tanaka Yasuo and authors like Oe Kenzaburo. The reader will be fascinated with the differing views of Japan held by Ishihara and Oe. Ishihara’s sense of renewed nationalism and yearning for tradition is contradicted by Oe who warns of the inherent danger of this nationalism:

Our identity as Japanese has withered away. From the European and American vantage, we appear to be Japanese. But inside ourselves, who are we? What basis do we have for building our identity? In the past, we had awe and reverence for our fathers and our ancestors. This is still powerful in Korea and in China. But in Japan the family has come apart, and our sense of community has also disappeared. Now we have nothing but the reflection of ourselves we see in the eyes of the West. We are confused and lost. The response to that lostness is nationalism. People like Ishihara gather around them those who have no basis for identity and entice them with the power of the state. They tell us we are all the emperor’s children. The state becomes a crutch for those who are no longer able to stand alone, like plastic implanted in a dysfunctional penis….But if we stand upright and alone and proceed straight ahead as individuals, relying on nothing outside ourselves, I believe we will each discover a basis for our identity as Japanese individuals within the multiplicity that is Asia. We will discover a credo. And I believe we will also discover the basis for a new morality.
Oe and Ishihara were once literary friends, but their differing views have made them implacable enemies. Ishihara considers Oe to be a traitor to the state while Oe deems his rival to be a dangerous fascist, yet, as Nathan notes, both consider themselves to be moralists and both “are driven by a quest for the substantial sense of self that has eluded Japan since the earliest days of modernization.” When Nathan leaves Oe’s residence, he meets Ishihara, now the powerful governor of Tokyo, walking alone down the street. He muses, “Leaving one and encountering the other in the space of a few minutes, I felt that I had traveled between the poles of the ambivalence that continues to be a troubling condition of contemporary Japanese life.”

Nathan is not entirely pessimistic about Japan’s future. He notes, for example, the expanding relationship between Japan and China, not only in terms of trade, but also in cultural relationships and exchanges. Japan’s economy is starting a noticeable revival and much of the nation’s creative genius is as productive and proficient as ever. Nathan’s Japan is clearly a nation breaking away sharply from its past and trying desperately to find its own unique identity, but where it will go is anybody’s guess.

One cannot ignore Japan, which still has the world’s second largest economy. One must also understand what is going on in Japan today, and reading Nathan provides us with many helpful clues.


Reviewed by Lin Lin Aung
Georgetown University

The Trouser People: A Story of Burma in the Shadow of the Empire is a captivating travelogue on Burma by Andrew Marshall. Marshall carefully relates his own experiences in Burma, filled with excitement and thrilling adventures. He was inspired to write this book on Burma by Sir George Scott’s diaries at the British Library in London. After reading diaries of the unsung Victorian adventurer who helped establish British colonial rule in Burma, he decided to investigate what has changed and what has remained untouched in Burma in little over a century. Marshall was curious whether the ferocious wild Wa headhunters still existed in Burma. He also wanted to know whether the witch doctors of the Pa-O still recommended tying your grandmother’s hairs around one’s neck as a cure of insanity. Throughout the book, Marshall recalls Scott’s experience in Burma to be compared to his very own, which allows readers to compare modern Burma with Burma in the late nineteenth century.
In the prologue, Marshall relates, “In a hundred years, Burma is no longer a British colony, but a military dictatorship – one of the world’s most brutal and enduring. The military’s disastrous rule had led a prosperous, fledgling democracy into misery and pain.” Shortly after his arrival to Burma, he got the first taste of modern dictatorship when his car was chased by the Military Intelligence after visiting a politically significant place in Rangoon.

When Scott first arrived Burma in 1870s to be a teacher at St. John’s College in Rangoon, he realized that Burma was on its way to becoming the busiest rice port in the world. He was fascinated by the magnificent Shawdagon Pagoda, which he remarked as “Majestic, impregnated with the worship of countless centuries, the great golden stupa rises high into the serene and thrilling blue with an infinite grandeur impossible to put into words.” He introduced soccer in Burma and the first organized football match was played at St. John’s College in 1879.

During King Thibaw era, Scott happened to be in Mandalay in the early 1880s. Therefore, he had an opportunity to witness an ancient royal dynasty as it descended into chaos. Scott carefully recorded the mismanagement of the Thibaw administration as well as atrocities by the incompetent King Thibaw and his ruthless wife Supayalat in their attempt to stay in power. It was rather appalling to learn their brutal torture methods in exterminating all potential rivals as well as punishing those who displeased them. Interestingly, these facts are little known in Burma. Reading this section reminds one of how unfortunate Burma has been for well over a century, despite a stint when it had a democratic government (roughly 1948-1962). The citizens were badly exploited and consequently suffered through monarchy (1878-1885), British colonialism (1885-1942), Japanese fascism (1942-1945) and military totalitarianism (1962-Present).

Marshall goes on comparing Mandalay in 1880 with Mandalay today. He talks about how Mandalay is now being manipulated by Wa and Kokang heroin traffickers and how local people have been driven out of the city. He writes:

1 When British annexed Burma in 1885, King Thibaw was forced to exile to India along with Queen Supayalat. He never saw Burma again. He died at the age of fifty-eight of heart attack. The Queen returned to Rangoon in 1916.

2 Under the democratic government led by U Nu, Burma was blooming into a country of prosperity. However, it was not completely free from civil turbulence. One significant example is that the ongoing civil war between the government and ethnic insurgents broke out during that period.
Traditionally, Mandalay was a cradle of art and culture, and its genteel inhabitants were said to speak the most refined form of Burmese. All this had changed in recent years. Mandalay had become a boom town, fuelled by the mercantile spirit of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from China – almost half the city’s million or so inhabitants were now Chinese – and by a massive influx of drug money from wealthy Wa and Kokang heroin traffickers.

After meeting with Tawpaya – King Thibaw’s grandson in Maymyo, Marshall’s next adventure was to visit Shan state – the state bordering China, Laos and Thailand. Marshall explains in detail about how Shan state used to be divided into thirty different states, each with a hereditary ruler called a saopha. The British exercised the classic divide-and-rule model in Burma. While Burma Proper was under direct British rule, the saophas in Shan state were allowed to continue to run their own states on one condition that all natural resources of their states belonged to the Crown. Some saophas were hated as authoritarian rulers exploiting their own people, but some were recognized for their good will projects aiming towards their region’s development. Such saophas as Sao Kawng Kiao Intaleng, the fifty-third saopha of Kentung, raised taxes so that they could lead extravagant lives building huge palaces and having many wives.

One of the highly respected saophas was Sao Kya Seng who was married to a distinguished Austrian woman, Inge Sargent. The princely couple was highly applauded for their unwavering efforts to implement democratic principles in the region and raise the living standards of their people while showing great affection for their people. In 1959, 34 Shan Saophas formally surrendered their feudal powers and Shan States were transformed into Shan State. When the military government took over in 1962, many Shan leaders were detained. Sao Kya Seng too was detained and soon killed, but the regime still refuses to confirm his death.

Marshall vigorously visited several Shan towns and villages that were mentioned in Scott’s diaries such as Kalaw, Inlay and Taunggyi. He took great interest in Burma’s hill people, especially exotic Padaung women also known as “giraffe women” or “long-necks” for the heavy brass rings

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4 Padaung people like to call themselves “Kayan” and assert that Padaung is what Burmese call them. Therefore, they will be addressed as Kayan from this point. A Padaung girl usually dons her first ring between the age of eight and ten. Roughly speaking, the ring is as thick as an adult’s little finger. More rings are added each year until the girl reaches adolescence. It is recorded that a group of Kayan women visited England in the 1930s as a part of the famous Bertram Mills Circus and they were very well received.
they wear around their necks. Despite the heavy brass rings, Kayan women do all the hard work such as plowing the fields, fetching water and carrying heavy goods to market. While in Yawngewe, Marshall visited the “long-neck village” run by Hupin Hotel. He was so distressed to learn that these Kayan women were not allowed to leave the compound because people in charge did not want tourists to see them for free. He strongly questioned the existence of this “long-neck” village, which he termed “the Victorian freak show” or “human zoo.”

Marshall afterwards set off to visit such areas as Ho Pong and the green valley of Nam Zarng where people were being forced to relocate or killed with their homes set on fire by the military. These people are victims of an ongoing half-a-century-civil-war between Burmese groups and ethnic freedom fighters. Shans are trapped between Burmese troops and insurgency groups because they are forced to support both parties or get killed. As a result of the regime’s operation called four cuts,\(^5\) Shan people live in constant fear with their villages being torched, women being raped (to death in many cases), villagers being drafted as army porters, tortured and killed. Marshall correctly compares the regime’s infamous tactics to those of the British during the pacification of Upper Burma.

Showing great enthusiasm to retrace the most exciting as well as dangerous years of Scott’s career in Burma, Marshall decided to travel to Kentung or Kyaing Tong - the capital of Golden Triangle and Mongla – one the most important drug-running centers today in Burma. Though it was an insignificant village during Scott’s time, Mongla has now been transformed into a big city with casinos and night clubs because of Lin Mingxian – a former Shan-Chinese warlord who served as a field commander in the Communist Party of Burma. Rather than contending with him, the regime decided to cut a deal in the name of “peace.” Mingxian agreed to make regular “contributions” to high-ranking Burmese officers and he was granted full autonomy in the Mongla region as well as lucrative business concessions in gold, gems and opium. This “peace” agreement earned Burma the reputation as the world’s largest opium producer. The US State Department has identified Mingxian as a key player in the heroin and methamphetamine trade. In Mongla, an easy access to drugs and many whorehouses are primary sources of critically pervasive HIV in the region.

Marshall stopped at the drug museum in Mongla to see the world’s most ironic things: Buddy photos of General Khin Nyunt and Mingxian and pic-

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\(^5\) The regime initiated this campaign to cut off supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to the Shan State army.
tures of Mingxian⁶ presenting a gift to a man identified as J. Dennis Hastert—whom Marshall assumed as Illinois Congressman Hastert. He states:

Could this be Denny Hastert, Illinois congressman and Speaker of the US House of Representatives? Yes, it could: Hastert visited Burma with a delegation of Republican Congressmen in 1996, ostensibly to inspect drug-eradication methods. The delegation was wined and dined by the generals before visiting Lin Mingxian in Mongla. It was unclear what Hastert achieved by meeting Mingxian, beyond providing a priceless photo opportunity for a known heroin trafficker anxious to whitewash his recent past and recast himself as an anti-drugs tsar. (p. 218)

While Marshall arrived Wa hills, he learned that the Wa were not head-hunters anymore. However, he claims that the modern reincarnation is just as frightening, by which he means the United Wa State Army, one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking organizations. Like Mingxian, the UWSA was also invited by the Burmese government to reinvest its drug profits in legitimate businesses. According to Marshall, it seems to have an enduring and strong relationship with the regime because he witnessed pictures of their Wa leader General Pao Yuqiang with General Khin Nyunt – standing side by side and smirking.

Towards the end of the book, Marshall presents a succinct comparative summary of Burma in a century period as follows:

Scott once called Burma “a sort of recess, a blind alley, a back reach.” It is description that still rings true a century later. The same country which, in the heady years after independence, was tipped to become one of South-East Asia’s success stories is today a recluse in a region of breakneck change. The 1962 military coup plunged Burma into an isolation not known since King Thibaw’s time, and transformed a fledgling democracy rich in natural resources into a land of poverty and fear. The generals who run the country still rage against the evils of colonialism, yet they share at least one thing with the imperialist of old: a blind conviction that they alone know what is best for the country. Most people living in Burma today have never known true peace or true freedom. (p. 289)

Marshall goes one step further and speculates how Scott might have reacted to what is happening in modern Burma: How would he react to a government that spends over half of its budget on defense while malnutrition rates among the under-threes compare with those of Burundi and Sudan? Or to the military generals, who bogusly present themselves as enemies of narcotics trade, are selling their country to ethnic-Chinese drug lords? He

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⁶ Ironically, Mingxian was the chairman of the Mongla Action Committee on Narcotics.
writes, “Scott would react as the rest of the world does: with anger and with horror.”

Marshall has made a significant contribution to Burma through writing this book. The Trouser People: A Story of Burma in the Shadow of the Empire is a most thought-provoking book portraying Burma under monarchy as well as colonialism through Scott’s diaries, and depicting all the contemporary issues of modern Burma through Marshall’s own exhilarating adventures.


(Contributors include: N. Coe, Re DeKoninck, V. Forbes, A. Greer, G. Hugo, P. Kelly, T.G. McGee, M. Perry, J. Poon, J. Rigg, P. Rimmer, and P.P. Wong)

Reviewed by Ingelise Lanman
Indian River Community College

Southeast Asia (SEA) remains a mosaic of diversity with over 520 million people, a fragmented region with continuing internal conflicts despite the unifying influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Southeast Asia Transformed: A Geography of Change, brings into careful focus not only change since 1945, and the results, but how these transformations continue to affect many aspects of life in this area.

Supported by meticulous references following each chapter, the authors present a myriad of charts, graphs, and tables, reflecting a range of detail seldom found in a collection of essays such as this. Highlights of the book include political development, people, environment and natural resources, agriculture, urbanization, rural-urban relations, international transportation, information technology (ICT), industry, trade, and tourism.

Chia Lin Sien and Martin Perry begin with a clear, historical overview of Southeast Asia in their introductory chapter, laying out a pattern placing the factual discussions included in each of the following essays. The primary unifying feature of SEA is its maritime character reflected in the fact that all of the countries within the region except Laos are either archipelagic or coastal. Colonial use of the region’s primary resources (rice, lumber, spices, copra, among others) is also a unifying attribute. Chia and Perry add yet a third influence which is the proximity of China and India, both with immense populations, and vital, distinctive cultures historically flowing into SEA. Even more important a legacy is evident in the “overseas
Chinese,” immigrants to the margins of the South China Sea numbering over fifty million by 1995. Their economic and political significance is much greater than the numeric estimate.

Peter Rimmer determines in Chapter 8 that SEA and the global economies come together at international airports and container ports. The first in SEA was built in Singapore in 1972. Containerization, he emphasizes, is most important when considering the phenomenon of change in the region. Singapore continues to rank first or second in world container ports. Successful businesses along with extensive construction give firm support for Singapore’s containerization, while expanding the economy and adding jobs. One only has to look at the enormous number of container loading docks filling the great harbor to realize how Singapore has kept its number one ranking since 1995. This island nation with its beautiful, efficient Changi airport, along with Hong Kong, and Bangkok, leads the region in air passenger numbers, thereby supporting Rimmer’s idea that container ports and airports bridge local economies in SEA with global economies. Rimmer adds that motorization plays an important part of inland SEA’s transport, but it is not as satisfactory a measurement of regional economic development in a global context as international container flows, and movements of air passengers.

Neil Coe’s excellent reporting of information and communications technology policies and institutions in Chapter 9, includes well-developed charts like Table 9.4: “ICT Policies and Institutions for Selected Countries in SEA,” which reveals the main countries and key actors, within a context of policy. He underscoring the fact that of all the ASEAN members, Singapore is often identified as a world class example of integrated, national-level ICT planning. In fact, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, in 1999, told ASEAN, “ASEAN cannot afford to be left behind by the IT age.” Subsequently, the ASEAN Information Infrastructure (AII) was adopted at their meeting in Manila that year.

Rodolphe De Koninck considers the “green revolution,” agricultural development after 1960, in Chapter 5. Rice production, he explains, has increased steadily within the eight major rice-cultivating countries: Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Significant yield patterns in other crops continue to improve in the region.

Although a reasonably broad perspective on each of the twelve chapter topics is covered by this collection of essays, little focus is given to the more specific details of general, daily living in different regions of SEA. For example, my research in July 2002, within a single block of apartment/condos in Singapore, (Blk.661, Choa Chu Kang), showed that over 30 per
cent of the residents had young family members with personal computers for their schoolwork, but adults in the households were not computer literate. Many jobs including taxi driving, food shops, etc. do not yet require computer knowledge. Generational divisions striate societal levels regarding current technology even in the most advanced of areas of SEA like Singapore. It is possible that the addition of more focused statistical data like this might enrich the conclusions already available in *Southeast Asia Transformed: A Geography of Change*.

This book is in itself a comprehensive library of current and past information about Southeast Asia, skillfully compiled to be read and enjoyed by both scholars and others interested in the region.


Reviewed by Daniel A. Metraux
Mary Baldwin College

A small group of Western teachers and advisors played a critical role in Japan’s rapid modernization during the Meiji era (1868-1912). They assisted in the development of modern industrial, educational and political systems and of a formidable military. Some of these Westerners also introduced Japan to their native lands through their books, articles and public lectures and acted as a critical bridge between Japan and the West.

Scholars have written a considerable number of monographs that have rescued many of these persons from obscurity. I have read many of these works, but am most impressed with James L. Huffman’s 2003 biography of American journalist Edward H. House (1836-1901). Huffman labored for over three decades tracking down every scrap of information available in the United States and Japan to reconstruct the life of House. The result is a magnificent biography that reveals both the strengths as well as the foibles of one of the outstanding foreigners in Meiji Japan.

House left his native Boston in 1858 to become a reporter for the *Tribune* in New York. He quickly became one of the star journalists on what was then the most influential newspaper in the United States. Choice assignments included coverage of John Brown’s trial and execution in 1859 and Japan’s first diplomatic mission to the United States in 1860. House’s fame as a rising journalist brought him into contact with a number of public and literary figures including Mark Twain with whom he developed a
long-lasting and deep friendship (the Twain friendship finally broke down in a very ugly public quarrel late in House’s life). He also enjoyed good friendships with Walt Whitman, Artemus Ward and other luminaries.

During the 1860s House developed a fascination for Asia, so much so that he contributed short stories featuring Asian topics to American magazines. He yearned to visit the East and finally persuaded the *Tribune* to send him to Japan as America’s first regular correspondent there. House became an avid student of Japanese history and culture and, unlike some of his Western contemporaries, portrayed Japan as a most progressive and civilized nation struggling to maintain its dignity and independence against unwarranted encroachments by Western imperialists. House’s regular dispatches, which were first carried back by ship and then telegraphed from California to New York, conveyed this very favorable image of Japan to his American readers. House soon gained the reputation as one of the leading journalists reporting on Japan in the early Meiji era.

House soon made numerous contacts with leading Japanese officials, who were impressed with his fair reporting and willingness to listen to the Japanese version of events. There were several English-language newspapers in the Tokyo-Yokohama region run by foreigners that expressed a *gaijin* view of life in the 1870s, but no foreign outlet for Japanese views. Members of the Japanese government therefore determined to open their own English-language paper in 1877, *The Tokio Times*, with House as its editor. For the next three years until the paper’s demise House argued persuasively for such issues as Japan’s need for tariff autonomy and eventual acceptance as an equal among nations. James Huffman suggests that House’s editorial work clearly presented Japan’s own worldview to the West in a highly coherent manner and helped advance Japan’s endeavor to win her place among the nations.

Concerning the contributions that House made, Huffman notes:

House mattered for the contributions he made, and he mattered for the issues his life illustrated. The former is easier to describe, though arguably less important. As a young member of Horace Greeley’s stable of brilliant *New York Tribune* writers, he helped to shape U.S. images of the zealot John Brown and introduced the first Japanese visitors (1860) to U.S. readers; he also played a pivotal role in sending Mark Twain’s national career into orbit…. During his early years in Tokyo, he was among the most important of what one scholar has labeled the “teachers of the American public,” helping his fellow countrymen form positive views of Japan with articles that challenged the strange-inferior-Oriental narrative. In this regard, Japan’s early image as an advocate of justice resulted in part from his accounts of
the Maria Luz episode, and his book on Japan’s 1874 expedition to Taiwan still shapes the standard narrative of that episode. Within Japan itself, House was a pioneer in the development of orchestral music and sent his students off into a stunning array of public posts. And in his most important role, as crusader, he more than anyone else induced [the U.S.] Congress to return the Shimonoseki indemnity to Japan and articulated, like no other writer in English, the case against the unequal treaties. Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu called House the “one who laid the groundwork” for treaty revision, “the one we should call the grand old champion.” (pp. 270-71)

House’s work did much to promote America’s and the West’s largely very favorable image from the 1870s through the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. His writing as an apologist for Japanese imperialism in the late 1800s also had a role in smoothing the West’s reaction to Japanese expansionism at that time.

House had a genuine concern for the welfare of the needy and the lives of women in Japan. During the late 1870s and early 1880s he opened, taught in and managed the Hausu Gakko (House School) that offered training in math, reading, writing and sewing under the instruction of himself and a Japanese instructor. The school was praised by observers for its innovations and principles and for its help to over three dozen needy girls, some of whom later rose to positions of prominence in Japanese society.

Huffman gives us an in-depth view of House’s personal life—his very painful fight with gout that landed him in a wheel-chair given to him by the powerful political leader Okuma Shigenobu—and his deep relationship with a young woman, Aoki Koto, whom he adopted as his daughter when as a girl she was on the verge of suicide.

Huffman’s work also gives us a very vivid portrait of life in Japan in the late 19th century. Huffman has drawn upon House’s voluminous writings and on hundreds of letters between House and major figures in both the United States and Japan. The book is brilliantly researched and written in a clear lively manner. It would be ideal for use in a college course on modern Japan.
PROGRAM OF THE 43rd ANNUAL MEETING

Sponsored by the University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
January 16-18, 2004

The program has been corrected to reflect what occurred, rather than what was planned. In accordance with AAS policy, only those registered attending participants are listed and the titles of papers are those as they were presented at the meeting. Papers that are abstracted in this volume are indicated by an * before the title. Papers published in this volume are indicated by an # before the title.

Friday, January 16
3:00 Executive Committee Meeting
4:00-8:00PM Registration
7:00-10:00pm Film: And the Moon Dances by Garin Nugroho and presented by Karl Heider

Saturday, January 17
8:00-5:00PM Registration
8:30-10:30AM First Session Panels
10:30-10:45AM Break
10:45-11:45AM Presidential Address
11:45-Noon Break
Noon-1:30PM Luncheon/ Business Meeting
1:30PM-3:30PM Second Session Panels
3:30-3:45PM Break
3:45-5:45PM Third Session Panels
6:00-8:00PM Dinner
8:00-9:00PM Musical Entertainment

Sunday, January 18
7:30AM Executive Committee Meeting
8:00-10AM Registration
8:30AM-10AM Fourth Panel Session

PROGRAM DETAILS
Friday, January 16
3:00pm Executive Committee Meeting
4:00-8:00PM REGISTRATION
7:00-10:00PM Film: And the Moon Dances by Garin Nugroho and presented by Karl Heider
Saturday, January 17
8:00AM-5:00PM—REGISTRATION
8:30-10:30AM—FIRST SESSION PANELS

PANEL 1: JAPANESE AND AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS IN WAR
[Hickory]
Chair: Joel Campbell, Kansai Gaidai University

*Alarm in Washington: A Wartime “Exposé” of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program
Roger Jeans, Washington and Lee University

*#Trying to Avoid a Japanese-American War: America’s ‘Japan Connection’ in 1937 and 1941
Barney J. Rickman III, Valdosta State University

Konoe’s Last Endeavor: US-Japan Negotiations
Kazuo Yagami, Florida State University

The Battleship Yamato and the Failure of American Intelligence
Jay Clarke, Jacksonville University

PANEL 2: RITUAL, SINCERITY AND HUMAN NATURE [Cedar]
Chair: Todd May, Clemson University

Ritual Extended
Daniel Lilly, Clemson University

Human Nature in Mencius and in Rousseau
Allen Parker, Clemson University

On Sincerity: A Comparative Study
Yanming An, Clemson University

PANEL 3: ASPECTS OF PAN-ASIAN LITERATURE [Birch]
Chair: Katya Vladimirov, Kennesaw State University

Seclusion and Becoming-Imperceptible: Korean Nomadism in Deleuze and Guattan’s Terms
Hyung-chui Chung, Pusan University of Foreign Studies
The Figure of Qu Yuan in Ezra Pound and Bei Dao’s Transnational Moderism: Poetic Displacement in Twentieth Century Literature
James McDougall, University of Florida

Bodyscape: The King Also Dies
Ray Chandresekara, Albany College of Pharmacy

PANEL 4: CONSTRUCTING THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF ASIAN SOCIETIES
Chair, Dorothea Martin, Appalachian State University

*Negotiating the State-Hiratsuka Raicho and Naruse Jinzo
Melanie Czarnecki, Hokkaido University

Reign Era Changes Under Wu Zhao, China’s Only Female Emperor
Norman Rothschild, University of North Florida

A Model for Village and National Reconstruction—Tao Xingzhi’s Work-Study Union Movement
Yusheng Yao, Rollins College

Kingship, Rituals, and Power in Nepal
Nawaraj Chaulagain, University of Florida

PANEL 5: CHINESE ART AND PHILOSOPHY
Chair: Fred Martinson, University of Tennessee-Knoxville

*Turandot: A Chinese Fable
John Thornell, Delta State University

Mengzi, Profit, and What Can(not) Truthfully Be Said
Steven Geisz, Rollins College

Buddhist Landscapes in Chinese Poems of the Pre-Tang Period
Cynthia L. Chennault, University of Florida

PANEL 6: JUXTAPOSING EAST AND WEST
Chair: Xuexin Liu, Spelman College

Ningyo on the Western Toy Shelf, 1870-1920
Judith Shoaf, University of Florida
Revolutionary Women on the Edge of Change: Buddhism in Cuba
Jennifer L. Manlowe, University of West Georgia

“Some Unseen Power:” Hinduism in the Poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley
Monica Piotter, Florida Gulf Coast University

10:30-10:45: Break

10:45-11:45: **Presidential Address**

A New Geography for Asian Studies
David Ludden, Past President, Association for Asian Studies

11:45-noon: Break

Noon-1:30: Luncheon and Business Meeting

1:30-3:30: Session Two Panels

**PANEL 7: ASIAN ART AND RELIGION**
Chair: Susan Lee, Florida State University

Buddhist Content in an early Painting by Zhu Da
Suzanne Wright, University of Tennessee-Knoxville

*Himiko, Shamans, and Mirrors*
J. Edward Kidder, Jr., International Christian University

Indigenous Transformation of a Hindu Temple in Central Java
Mary-Louise Totton, Florida State University

**PANEL 8: PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA**
Chair: Nathan Rousseau, Jacksonville University

Globalization’s Impact on National Identity in China: The Case of Baixa District
Loren Fauchier, Queens University

Gender, Kitchens and National Identity Cooking in Modern Korea
Dennis Hart, Kent State University
Home Cooking? Representing Korean-ness through Food and Cuisine in Korean American Diaspora
Oum Young Rae, Clark University

Economic Nationalism in the Philippine Commonwealth: The Hearings of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs
Steven MacIsaac, Jacksonville University

PANEL 9: NINETEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMATIC INTERACTIONS IN EAST ASIA
Chair: Roger Jeans, Washington and Lee University

Naval Diplomacy in Asia Pacific Waters: The Transmission of Norms
Jonathan Seth Snider, University of Virginia

Across Languages and Cultures: The Perry Expedition to Japan, 1853-1854
Douglas R. Reynolds, Georgia State University

The Contested Terrain of Japanese Remembrance
Matthew Levey, Birmingham-Southern College

PANEL 10: JAPAN THROUGH LITERARY EYES
Chair: James McDougall, University of Florida

Dreams of Japan: Japan in Contemporary Russian Writings
Katya Vladimirov, Kennesaw State University

*The Emergence of Metafiction in the 1930s Japanese Literature
Yoshi Yasuhara, Florida State University

Yanagita Kunio, Jomin, and the Conservative Turn of Japanese Ethnography in the 1930s
David Henry, University of Michigan

PANEL 11: MECHANICS OF EMPIRE: CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Chair: Bill Dorrill, Longwood University

Fiscal Decentralization is Trickling Down?: An Empirical Study of County Governments in China
Jianfeng Wang, Western Michigan University
Soldiers in Motion: An Examination of Chinese Military Strategy and Recent Developments
Wei-Chin Lee, Wake Forest University

Pan-Hanism: Forerunner of Chinese Nationalism
Winston Lo, Florida State University

**PANEL 12: BUDDHISM IN THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY CLASSROOM**
Chair: Bina Gupta, University of Missouri-Columbia

*Introducing Indian Buddhism into the Curriculum: New Approaches and Methods*
Jason Neelis, University of Florida

*Teaching Chinese Religions at Public Universities*
Mario Poceski, University of Florida

*Japanese Buddhism in the Public University Classroom*
Shinobu Arai, Institute of Oriental Philosophy

*Are We on the Road to Shambala? Approaches to Tibetan Buddhism in the Public University Curriculum*
James Apple, University of Alabama

Break: 3:30-3:45

3:45-5:45: Session Three Panels

**PANEL 13: CENTER. PERIPHERY AND ETHNICITY**
Chair: Barney J. Rickman III, Valdosta State University

*Manipulating the Center: Daimyo and Shogun in 16th Century Japan*
Ronald Frank, Pace University

*Rum, Whiskey, and Tea: The Influence of Presidential Ethnicity on U.S. Asian Policy*
Thomas A. Breslin, Florida International University

The Korean Question in Russian Diplomacy, 1886-1888
Pak Bella, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
PANEL 14: CONTEMPORARY CHINA
Chair: Bob Moore, Rollins College

*China's WTO Compliance: Commitment and Progress in the Initial Stage*
Penelope Prime, Kennesaw State University

*China's Recent Diplomacy*
John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology

*China's Urban Development*
Clifton Panell, University of Georgia

*The New Look of Urban China: Public Squares as Symbols of Modernity*
Ed Krebs, China Bridge

PANEL 15: COMMUNICATIONS: ABSTRACTS IN ASIAN LANGUAGE AND MUSIC
Chair: Monica Piotter, Florida Gulf Coast University

*Celebrate Students' Learning of Chinese Language and Culture: A Case Study of the Application of the 5 Cs in Foreign Language Learning*
Phebe Gray, Lee University

*Politeness as a Social Strategy in Japanese Culture*
Xuexin Liu, Spelman College

*Communicating the South Asian Identity Through Language*
Tamara Valentine, University of South Carolina-Spartanburg

*Toward a Social History of Vietnamese Music in the Twentieth Century*
Eric Henry, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

PANEL 16: NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN ASIA
Chair: Savita Nair, Furman University

*Chen Renbing 1919-1990: Outspoken Intellectual*
Jeannette Ford, Bethune-Cookman College

*The Invisible Kampung (Village): The Developing National Consciousness Among Malays on the Malay Peninsula Before 1940*
Ingelise Lanman, Indian River Community College
Benevolent Autocracy or Panchayati Raj? The Royal Commission upon Decentralization and Indian Opinion, 1907-1909
Heather Frazer, Florida Atlantic University

PANEL 17: PRESIDENTIAL PANEL: NARRATIVES OF PEACE
Chair: Tom Pynn, Kennesaw State University

*The Power of Narrative: Introductory Remarks
Tom Pynn, Kennesaw State University

*The House of Being Still Stands: Nuclear Holocaust and Human Meaning
Alan Pope, University of West Georgia

A Day, Just Like Any Other Day: August 6, 1945
David Jones, Center for the Development of Asian Studies, Kennesaw State University

PANEL 18: ASIAN ART HISTORY
Chair: Suzanne Wright, University of Tennessee-Knoxville

*Jesuits and the Arts in Mughal India
Punam Madhok, East Carolina University

*Stein and Trinkler on Rawak: A Mandala Style Moves East
Fred Martinson, University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Meanings and Functions of the Beautiful Courtesan in Edo Japan
Susan Lee, Florida State University

6:00-8:00: Dinner

8:00-9:00: Musical Entertainment

Sunday, January 18

7:30am: Executive Committee Meeting

8:00-10:00am: Registration

Session 4 Panels: 8:30-10:30am
PANEL 19: ASIAN AESTHETICS
Chair: Yanming An, Clemson University

*The Aesthetics of Emptiness
John C. Maraldo, University of North Florida

*Violence and Sensibility: Rasa and the Reclamation of Feeling Through Art
Harriette Grissom, Atlanta College of Art

*Silent Thunder and the Texture of the Earth: An Introduction to Japanese Ceramics
Jason Wirth, Oglethorpe University

*From Cosmology to Poetry: Taoist Themes in Poetry of Su T’ung-p’o
Tom Pynn, Kennesaw State University

PANEL 20: POLITICAL ISSUES IN INDIA AND INDONESIA
Chair: Marc Gilbert, North Georgia College & State University

*The Prospects for the B.J.P. in the Indian General Election of 2004
Lewis Fickett Jr., Mary Washington College

*Caring for the Masses: The Successes and Failures of the Famine Policy of the Government of Bombay
Sandra L. Norman, Florida Atlantic University

*The Politics and Thought of Amien Rais: Implications for Indonesian Democracy
Paige Johnson Tan, University of North Carolina-Wilmington

A Vaisnava is Automatically a Brahmana
Michael James Gressett, University of Florida

PANEL 21: CASE STUDIES IN ASIAN RELIGION
Chair: J. Edward Kidder, Jr., International Christian University

Walking through the Indigenous Religious Field in Malaysian Borneo: A Field Report
Wei Zhang, University of South Florida

*Globalizing Japanese Religion: The Soka Gakkai in Australia and Quebec
Daniel Metraux, Mary Baldwin College
Shinto: A Japanese Brand of Taoism
E. Leslie Williams, Clemson University

PANEL 22: CHINA’S LITERARY HISTORY
Chair: Tamara Valentine, University of South Carolina-Spartanburg

*Ah Q Progeny: Post-1949 Creative Intersections with the Ah Q Discourse
Paul B. Foster, Georgia Institute of Technology

“Putting into Words What Can’t Be Put into Words”: García Márquez’s “Tales for Children” as Koan
Donna Gessell, North Georgia College & State University

East-West: The Cultural Interpretation of Literature and Art
Barbara Tucker, Trident Technical College

PANEL 23: ENSURING THE FUTURE
Chair: Phebe Gray, Lee University

Learning English the Hard Way: Constraints in China’s Approach to English Education
William Donnelly, Grove City College

Analysis of the Errors Identified among Second/foreign Learners of Japanese in Narrative Discourse
Misa Yamamoto, Appalachian State University
Abstracts of Papers Presented

In order to demonstrate the nature of research conducted by our membership as well as the institutions that attend our meeting, SERAS publishes abstracts of papers presented at our annual meeting. The following pages contain many, but not all the abstracts of papers that were prepared and submitted by the authors. They have been edited for length and clarity and arranged by the panel in which they were presented.

Panel 1: American and Japanese Encounters in War

Roger Jeans, Washington and Lee University

Alarm in Washington: A Wartime ‘Exposé’ of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program

In the summer of 1944, American government authorities were alarmed when a book appeared entitled, Japan’s Secret Weapon. Billed as an exposé of Japan’s biological warfare (BW) activities, it also criticized the United States government as being unprepared to cope with such a threat. Written in a very lurid manner, it worried government officials, who feared it would panic Americans.

This paper takes cursory looks at Japanese and American wartime BW programs and then focuses on this little-known incident. It describes the concern shown by U.S. government authorities, examines in some detail the contents of the book, discusses various government assessments as well as press reviews of the volume, and, finally, attempts to answer the questions: who was the author, and why did he write such a book? In the conclusion, the paper briefly evaluates the impact of this sensationalist would-be “exposé” of Japan’s wartime BW activities.

Barney J. Rickman III, Valdosta State University

Trying to Avoid a Japanese-American War: America’s “Japan Connection” in 1937 and 1941.

American-Japanese diplomacy from 1937 to 1941 offers an opportunity to study how the ideas of a key group of American diplomats influenced history. The “Japan Connection” consisted of the experts on Japan in the U.S. Department of State and Foreign Service who consistently advocated American-Japanese cooperation between 1922 and 1952. Their ranks included
William Castle, Joseph Grew, Hugh Wilson, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, and Eugene Dooman. From the late 1920s to the early 1950s, these American diplomats insisted that cooperation between the United States and Japan would block Soviet expansion, stabilize East Asian relations, and obviate the need for American globalism.

After limiting the American response to Japan’s aggression in Manchuria (1931 to 1933), the Japan Connection struggled from 1937 to 1941 to prevent a Japanese-American war. In 1937, Grew, Dooman, Moffat, Wilson, and Castle successfully urged restraint in response to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. By 1941, however, the national and international contexts of power had shifted to eliminate the Japan Connection’s influence. Despite frenzied efforts, these American diplomats failed to produce a Japanese-American rapprochement before the disaster at Pearl Harbor. A comparison of 1937 and 1941 demonstrates the Japan Connection’s declining role in shaping America’s Japan policy.

During this period of escalating Japanese-American tensions, Grew emerged as the most influential member of the Japan Connection. As the American Ambassador in Japan, Grew depended on fellow members of the Japan Connection in Washington to argue for his recommendations. In 1937, Moffat and Wilson supported Grew within the Department of State, while Dooman worked with the Ambassador in Japan and Castle helped as an “informed outsider” in Washington, D.C. By 1941, however, the Japan Connection had lost its strong base within the Department, and its members had failed to reverse the increasingly anti-Japanese nature of American foreign policy.

Panel 4: Constructing the Multiple Layers of Asian Societies

Melanie Czarnecki, Hokkaido University

Negotiating the State – Hiratsuka Raicho and Naruse Jinzo

“The Motherhood Protection Debate,” (bosei hogo ronsô; 1915-1919), which was part of a series of debates (Chastity Debate, Abortion Debate, Prostitution Debate), was publicly disputed by a prominent group of pioneers associated with the Women’s Movement in Japan. In particular, the core debate (1918-1919) summoned responses from four prominent figures actively involved in the “improvement” of women’s position in Japan: Women’s magazine “Blue Stockings” (seitô) founder and socio-literary critic Hiratsuka Raichô (1886-1971), poet and social critic Yosano Akiko(1878-1942), socialist advocate and writer Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980), and
“Good Wife, Wise Mother” (ryôsaikenbo) ideologue Yamada Waka (1879-1957). This paper attempts to re-read Raichô’s contributions to “The Motherhood Protection Debate” within the context of her relationship to Christian Japanese educator and founder of Japan Women’s University (1901) Naruse Jinzô (1858-1934). While the impact that Swedish maternal feminist Ellen Key (1849-1926) had on the development of Raichô’s philosophy toward the role of mothering has been the subject of a number of studies; the influence that Naruse had on the transformation of Raichô’s position from “anti-ryôsaikenbo” to that of “maternal essentialist” has received less critical attention.

This research aims to narrow that gap in scholarship by addressing the significance of Raichô’s association with Naruse at Japan Women’s University. Raichô was first drawn to Naruse’s ideas after reading his book, “Jyoshi Kyôiku” (Women’s Education, 1896). There, he outlines his curriculum for women’s education according to three phases: educating women as 1. human beings (ningen), 2. women (fujin), and 3. citizens (kokumin). I employ Naruse’s three-step educational plan as a framework within which to evaluate the current of Raichô’s thinking and her ultimate stance during the “Motherhood Protection Debate.” Finally, I demonstrate that Raichô appropriated the notion of strategic methodology from Naruse, and used as a political weapon her position as a “strategic essentialist,” to attempt to manipulate the state into providing protection for mothers.

Panel 5: Chinese Art and Philosophy

John Thornell, Delta State University

Turandot: A Chinese Fable

The opera, Turandot, by Giacomo Puccini is based on a fable set in ancient China. It is a story of the transformation power of love set to music. Puccini wrote the opera based on an earlier work by Venetian playwright, Carlo Gozzi. Turandot was Puccini’s last opera. He died before its completion and the alternate ending written by Franco Alfano has long been the source of controversy. The paper examines Puccini’s reasons for writing an opera set in ancient China. It also looks at the opera in the context of Puccini’s personal life, most notably personal struggles he faced while writing Turandot, but also scholarship suggesting that some of the female characters in the opera mirror those in Puccini’s personal life.
Panel 7: Asian Art and Religion

J. Edward Kidder, Jr., International Christian University

Himiko, Shamans and Mirrors

The Wei zhi description of the Wa and its chief paramount, the female shaman Himiko who ruled the “kingdom” of Yamatai in the third century AD, differs so greatly from the Nihon shoki and Kojiki stories of purportedly the same time, there would appear to be little connection. The former is an outsider’s view of the cultural and social conditions in Japan, the latter the eighth century view of local political struggles and interpretations of strange happenings. However, the exchange of gifts between the Chinese court and Himiko created a substantive link with a lasting legacy. Himiko sent two missions, the first in 238. The Chinese then supplemented their reciprocal gifts by special gifts, which included 100 bronze mirrors, 50 catties of beads, and two swords. Although dated mirrors are proportionately rare (fewer than ten percent of hundreds of inscribed mirrors), 12 mirrors found in Japanese tombs bear dates between 235 and 244. These are often called “Himiko mirrors.” She died about 248. Such rather ordinary objects took on a collective symbolism and became the imperial regalia, the mark of royal authority. This same mark of authority was woven into the mythology of the Sun Goddess. In view of the late writing of the Sun Goddess stories (tile roof on Amaterasu’s weaving room, use of horses, etc.), it is not surprising that Himiko and the Sun Goddess share many similar attributes.

Panel 10: Japan through Literary Eyes

Yoshi Yasuhara, Florida State University

The Emergence of Metafiction in the 1930s Japanese Literature

Japanese literature of the mid-1930s saw metafictional stories from several leading writers: the protagonist of each story—the image of author facing the writer’s block—questions the existing style of fiction in search of a new one. In this paper, an analysis of two metafictional stories of modern writers—Fugen (Bodhisattva, 1936) of Ishikawa Jun (1899-1987) and Sarumen kanja (1934) of Dazai Osamu (1909-1948)—shows the precursors of postwar novelists as the writer-critic.

The contemporary critic Asada Akira (1957-) states that in postwar Ja-
pan, significant critics emerged from among novelists in contrast to those before the war, highlighting that the writer’s viewpoint is indispensable to the critic’s one-sided perspective from a reader. In addition, Asada’s argument, which takes place in the discussion on the history of Modern Japanese criticism with his fellow critics, Karatani Kôjin, Hasumi Shigehiko, and Miura Masashi, also stipulates the times around 1935 was the intersection of the different critical currents: mainly the accelerating westernization and the counter-westernization. In this discussion, however, the metafictional story-making by Ishikawa and Dazai is not discussed. Thus, my question explores how Ishikawa’s and Dazai’s metafictional story was formulated and what their vision for a new novel anticipates culturally. Facing the growing tension of Japanese militarism, their formal experiments address a reconciliation of literature and social issues.

Panel 12: Buddhism in the Public University Classroom

Mario Poceski, University of Florida

Teaching Chinese Religions at Public Universities

This paper is an exploration of issues in the development and teaching of courses on Chinese religions at public research universities. Drawing on my experience of teaching a number of courses on the subject at UCLA, the University of Iowa, and the University of Florida, I consider the place of Chinese religions in the undergraduate curriculum and reflect on the prospects and challenges of introducing ancient religious traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism to American students. Some of the specific themes discussed in the presentation include the availability and choice of textbook, the organization and presentation of course materials in lecture and discussion settings, the use of audiovisual media as pedagogical tools, and the incorporation of Chinese religions as an integral part of a comprehensive program in the humanities.

Shinobu Arai, Institute of Oriental Philosophy

Japanese Buddhism in the Public University Classroom

This presentation discusses how teaching Japanese Buddhism contributes to the training of college level students’ cross-cultural interpretative abilities. The paper proceeds by taking account of two phases: first, the initial transmission of Buddhism into Japan from foreign countries and then, the
introduction of Japanese Buddhism into North America during modern times. With these two phases in mind, students can then compare and contrast how the Japanese accepted and/or manipulated the reception of Buddhism in ancient times up through the middle ages, and then consequently how the Japanese manipulated Buddhism during the time in which Zen Buddhism was initially introduced into North America. Discussing these phases provides students the opportunity to interpret, appreciate, and criticize the subject matter as the consequence of cultural, social, and political interactions that occurred in both the acceptance and introduction of Buddhism in either Japan or North America.

James Apple, University of Alabama

**Are We on the Road to Shambala? Approaches to Tibetan Buddhism in the Public University Curriculum**

This paper analyzes how Tibetan Buddhism may be presented in the public university environment through the discipline of religious studies. After briefly establishing criteria for the study of religion in a public university, the paper looks at several strategies for teaching the Buddhism of Tibet that moves away from essentialist models of classification and interpretation. The paper suggests strategies for interpreting Tibetan Buddhism based on analyzing diachronic change through cultural contact. The proposed goal of such a pedagogical approach is to orient students toward a critical and documented approach to the study of Tibetan Buddhism that is self-conscious about its own presuppositions while not perpetuating myths about Tibetan Buddhism as a trans-historical and utopian tradition. A trajectory where one emerges from Shambala and begins to understand the complexity of this thing we call “Tibetan Buddhism.”

**Panel 15: Communications: Abstracts in Asian Language**

Phebe Gray, Lee University

**Celebrate Students’ Learning of Chinese Language and Culture: A Case Study of the Application of the 5 Cs in Foreign Language Learning**

Discussion of how an entry level Chinese linguistic class utilizes the standards for foreign language learning as guidelines set by the American Council of Teaching Foreign Language (ACTFL) as a theoretical framework in course design and instruction. The author engages the students in applica-
tion and reflections of the 5 C’s in the standards for foreign language learning in their Chinese language learning. The author also shares the student’s learning of Chinese language and culture, and confirms the benefit of using the 5 C’s as a guidelines in teaching and learning.

In the literature review section, the author explores the relevance of the 5 C’s, namely: Communication, Cultures, Connections, Comparisons, and Communities in general foreign language teaching and learning settings. The author then discusses the application of the 5 C’s in Chinese language and culture specifically in a linguistic course, entitled LIN 201: Chinese Language and Culture.

The author conducted a document analysis, in which she analyzes the students’ reflection paper as part of the course work. The author summarized the themes in the students’ reflection of each of the five areas in the standards for foreign language learning. The students reflected on how they communicate in Chinese other than English both inside and outside the classrooms; how they gained knowledge and understanding of Chinese culture, how they connected Chinese language and culture with their own disciplines; how they developed insights into the nature of Chinese language and culture; and how they planned to participate in multilingual communities both in the local communities and abroad.

In conclusion, the author celebrated the students’ learning in Chinese language and culture, and confirmed the benefit of using the standards for foreign language learning as a theoretical framework in teaching language and culture courses.

Xuelin Liu, Spelman College

Politeness as a Social Strategy in Japanese Culture

Unlike most traditional definitions of linguistic ‘politeness,’ which focus on surface language forms in relation to the expected social manner, from psycholinguistic perspectives, this paper defines ‘politeness’ as a social strategy in Japanese culture beyond language forms themselves. It argues that ‘polite’ (honorific) language forms exploited by the speaker do not necessarily indicate that the speaker must be a ‘polite’ person. So-called ‘polite’ language is about language form itself rather than about the speaker him/herself. It further argues that if the speaker makes a rational choice of a particular language form for his/her communicative intention, he/she may try to be polite as socioculturally expected. In other words, the speaker’s language choice is not only constrained by social and cultural principles and rules, but also is manipulated by the speaker him/herself.
This study focuses on some typical Japanese addressing forms shared by the general Japanese public. These addressing forms are categorized in terms of their semantics (i.e., word meanings), syntax (i.e., grammatical structures) and morphology (i.e., word structure) and their possible social and pragmatic meanings (i.e., functions). The research question to be answered is who can be recognized as a ‘polite’ speaker in Japanese society. The language data collected from naturally occurring conversations provide evidence that (1) the speaker’s ‘politeness’ should not be determined by the conventional language forms alone, because four possible scenarios may occur: polite form = polite speaker, polite form = impolite speaker, plain form = polite speaker, plain form = impolite speaker. Thus, ‘politeness’ should not be a static concept; (2) the speaker chooses a particular addressing form to either lengthen or shorten the social distance that he/she is currently having with the addressee. Thus, ‘politeness’ should be an elastic concept; (3) it is the speaker who chooses the most appropriate addressing forms to achieve his/her desired outcome.

Panel 16: Nationalism and Political Activism in Asia

Ingelise Lanman, Indian River Community College

The Invisible Kampung (Village): The Developing National Consciousness Among Malays on the Malay Peninsula Before 1940

The fabric of developing Malay nationalism before 1940 has often been discounted in current available sources. While it is true that the overwhelming impact of World War II made the period following the war considerably more urgent in the acceleration of nationalism in Malaya, a growing national awareness in the years between the wars did have an important impact on the society of the Malay Peninsula.

A combination of factors including the impact of Islam, the British colonial Administration, the divisive educational system, and the plural society nurtured a desire among the Malays to protect their heritage and to become political leaders of the land where they were the indigenous people. This was shown by the large and varied number of publications in Malay between 1920 and 1940, which generated as well as represented associations and groups aimed at changing the structure of society on the Malay Peninsula. The threads of nationalism were drawing together, weaving the fabric on the loom. If, in fact, this had not occurred, it would have been impossible to have the rapid development of nationalism following the war. The Malays were unified as a “nation” by the early twentieth century because
they were part of an “imagined” or “invisible” community with a common language, religion, and cultural roots. This, then, is the invisible kampung, or village, in the title. This paper shows the importance of this concept.

Panel 17: Presidential Panel: Narratives of Peace

Alan Pope, University of West Georgia

The House of Being Still Stands: Nuclear Holocaust and Human Meaning

The “A-Bomb Dome,” formerly known as the Industry Promotion Hall, is a building that miraculously survived the atomic blast at Hiroshima in 1945. This paper explores the image of this surviving building, along with German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s proclamation that “language is the house of Being,” to meditate on what of the human spirit survives nuclear holocaust. Use is also made of the diaries maintained by surviving physician Michihiko Hachiya and other existential phenomenologically oriented philosophers, including Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur. It is suggested that it is meaning that survives, and it is language in its poetic – as opposed to scientific – sensibilities, resonant with primordial silence and ambiguity, that connects us to an essential need to preserve and communicate meaning. The conditions whereby nuclear holocaust can arise are fostered by a modern technology that gets lost in a character of challenging forth, stripping the world of its natural resources and making the things of this world into standing reserve. Existentially, the way out of our predicament, and the means by which future nuclear catastrophe can be averted, is through genuinely grieving the losses inherent in the state of the modern world and in learning to heed the silence at the base of our own authentic language, the aspect of Being that would survive a future holocaust and yet which ordinarily is covered over by mundane concerns.

Panel 18: Asian Art History

Punam Madhok, East Carolina University

Jesuits and the Arts in Mughal India

This paper explores how artists at the courts of the Mughal Emperors Akbar (r. 1556-1605) and Jahangir (r. 1606-27) in Northern India learned and adapted the Western techniques and Christian subjects introduced by Jesuit missionaries from Goa, the Portuguese colony in southwestern India.
In their apostolic endeavors, the Jesuits made use of engravings and paintings representing Christian subjects. Beginning in 1580, they introduced the Mughal court to a wide spectrum of Renaissance art at their missions in Fatehpur Sikri, Agra, and Lahore. The perspective and modeling seen in these works aroused much interest. The Mughals, a young dynasty, were looking for ways to legitimate their claims to sovereignty. As Muslim rulers in a conquered country, they had to reconcile their Timurid-Islamic background with the strong, ancient culture of their Hindu subjects.

Although the Mughals never adopted the Christian faith, they found realistic Christian images ideal tools for demonstrating their status and superiority as rulers. The arguments of the Counter-Reformation defending the use of realistic Christian imagery, presented by the Jesuits, struck them as appropriate for justifying their own interest in figural, naturalistic representations. Mughal artists first familiarized themselves with Western images by copying and imitating them, then began creating compositions of their own, depicting Christian themes in an Indo-Persian style. The paper academy supplied by the Jesuits to the Mughal Emperors helped them translate their own ideas of governance into visual form. Quite contrary to their intentions, the Jesuits became providers for imperial Mughal propaganda.

Fred Martinson, University of Tennessee-Knoxville

**Stein and Trinkler on Rawak: A Mandala Style Moves East**

Since 1995 I have explored four ideas about how Buddhist mandalas are expressed in Chinese art history as part of a series of presentations to the Southeast Conference of the Association of Asian Studies. This research journey has included mandalas per se; the iconography of Dazu as a site-mandala; and the way in which structures on Buddhist mountains are built in regard to mandala or mandala-like plans.

A reasonable explanation of how these layouts came to be thought of as mandalas is that they may agree with concepts found in plans farther to the west in central Asia and even India. This thesis examines the kinds of descriptions Chinese Buddhist travelers such as Fa Xian (traveled 399?414), Song Yun (traveled 518), Xuan Zang (traveled 629?45) and Yi Jing (traveled 671?95) gave for important sites. Depending on their commentary and the preservation of the sites they describe, the physical layout of their subjects may give us some insight into the transitions that led to particular arrangements of sites in China.

In researching this topic from 1999 to the present, I have become intrigued with one site that may be mentioned by Xuan Zang: the Rawak
Vih- ra, which is located just northeast of Khotan. Little seems to have been done on this site since Sir Aurel Stein’s treks there at the turn of the twentieth century except for Emil Trinkler, a German, who traveled there in the late 1920s and published several books on his discoveries in the early 1930s. His writings give us rather conclusive dates for Rawak. There has been one more visitor about 1996, Richard Bernstein, a New York Times book critic - I will mention his comments. The shape of the stupa at Rawak will illustrate my theme of mandalas, and I will use some of the images in the best condition from the finds of Stein (91 statues published) and Trinkler (31 statues published) to examine how styles from Indian areas came early to the Taklamakan Desert. Brief mention of one or two of the half a dozen other stupas close to Khotan will provide the context.

Panel 19: Asian Aesthetics

John C. Maraldo, University of North Florida

The Aesthetics of Emptiness

If all things are empty of substantial form, as the Buddhist teaching goes, how can there be any appreciation of aesthetic forms? What sense would it make to speak of poetic and visual art practices as expressions of emptiness? I sketch an answer to these questions through the perspective of the Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji, relate it to his teacher Nishida Kitaro’s philosophy of the place of absolute nothingness, and then extend this to help us better see some work of contemporary avant-garde calligraphers like Morita Shiryu, who also appeal to the Buddhist teaching. Finally, I will attempt to illustrate and test their insights using examples from recent Japanese calligraphy and western abstract expressionism.

Harriette Grissom, Atlanta College of Art

Violence and Sensibility: Rasa and the Reclamation of Feeling Through Art

From the perspective of rasa theory, art is an alchemy that transforms and humanizes raw, overwhelming emotions through exquisite sensibility. By savoring emotion, audiences attune to the subtlety and non-discursive meaning of feeling at the same time they experience its power and consequence. Indian cinema achieves considerable impact without resorting to graphic depictions of sex and violence, while Western audiences often remain numb and unmoved by the most shocking images. To what extent is the failure of
sensibility in Western media related to increasingly shrill evocation of violent, confrontational content? The presentation examines the psychological nature of imagery through the work of James Hillman and looks to rasa theory as a way to move toward a more salutary, differentiated articulation of feeling.

Jason Wirth, Oglethorpe University

 Silent Thunder and the Texture of the Earth: An Introduction to Japanese Ceramics

I concentrate on situating a Zen Aesthetic within the larger framework of Japanese ceramics. I begin by discussing the basic kinds of ceramic traditions and within such a lineage, I emphasize two central motifs that characterize part of that lineage. 1) the silent thunder of the refinement of materials: works whose emphasis is to thematize reflectively both their materials and their character as ceramic art works. 2) Austere Density: works that present dynamic asymmetry, austerity, and forlornness. Under the latter, I will discuss the famous thematic of wabi-sabi as well as the larger context of Zen aesthetic categories. I will then attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the various ways that these two traditions endeavor to make the earth speak by transforming it into a ceramic artwork.

Tom Pynn, Kennesaw State University

 From Cosmology to Poetry: Taoist Themes in Poetry of Su T’ung-p’o

In what ways can the Dao De Jing provide an interpretative context for the Neo-Daoist poet T’ao Ch’ien (365-427 CE)? In earlier works, Hall and Ames have alerted us to the aesthetic sensibility, the “‘life-is-art’ attitude that has been the signature of the Chinese tradition.” An aesthetic sensibility implies that human beings, like artists, creatively construct our lives within and out of always evolving novel situations. In the various philosophical traditions that comprise the Chinese tradition, there are subtle differences in how one accomplishes the task of fashioning a life. In general we can say, following Hall and Ames, that one makes a life by “developing productive relationships among ingredients.” For the Daoists, neither rationality, nor fidelity to the past will play a leading role in the human project, as they often appear to do for Confucians. Instead, a Daoist feels his/her way into novelty. Feeling one’s way into and through novelty is not reducible to sensation or emotion. Rather, the relations established
within the field of one’s experience are informed by empathy and deference according to what Ames and Hall term “wu-forms” than by a faith in the power of conventional traditions of language and ritual. Thus, placing the Dao De Jing alongside the poems of T’ao Ch’ien reveals similar philosophical ideas germane to Daoist traditions, but more importantly, the aesthetic theme of creatively constructing a life out of one’s participation in novelty.

Panel 20: Political Issues in India and Indonesia

Lewis Fickett Jr., Mary Washington College

The Prospects for the B.J.P. in the Indian General Election of 2004

Beginning in April 2004 and extending over a ten-week period, India, the world’s largest democracy, will hold its 14th General Election since achieving independence in 1947. Essentially, the election will be between two competing coalitions—the first, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (the BJP) – a right-wing, nationalist anti-Muslim party headed by Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, presently in power; and the other, the remnants of the old Indian independence Congress Party headed by Sonia Gandhi, the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the assassinated grandson of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Given the present strong state of the Indian economy and contemporary “feel-good” factor of Indian voters, Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and his party seem poised for an overwhelming victory at the polls, but what are the main obstacles to such a result. First, the old Congress Party has revived somewhat since 1999 and has gained much of its popular base. Second, the BJP’s coalition with the huge “dalit” party BSP in India’s largest state has collapsed. Third, in India all parties disappoint, and the BJP has disappointed more than most while in office, so an upset is very possible.

Nevertheless, as long as Vajpayee remains firmly in control of the BJP, all should proceed well. The danger remains that should the BJP begin to slip, extremist elements within the party such as those responsible for the Ayodhya Temple Tragedy in 1972 or the Gujarat Pogroms in 1992 might reemerge on the Indian political scene.

Sandra L. Norman, Florida Atlantic University
Caring for the Masses: The Successes and Failures of the Famine Policy of the Government of Bombay

Famine, often brought on by drought and accompanied by plague, was a persistent problem in India during the latter half of the 19th century. The Bombay Presidency was particularly hard hit between 1896 and 1904. The Government of India established a Famine Commission in 1878 which studied the underlying causes of famine, and drought and plague, and made a series of recommendations to alleviate some of the problems. These ranged from expanding irrigation schemes to relief of land revenue taxes to inoculation against plague and were ultimately collected in the Famine Code. Subsequent commissions in 1896-1897 and 1900 endorsed the principles of the original Commission while adding stronger language for early suspension of land-revenue and rents and the establishment of a Famine Commissioner to assume a pre-emptive role.

Both the popular press and members of the Indian National Congress Party repeatedly accused the Bombay Government of failing to follow the recommendations of the Famine Commission, of paying lip-service to the Famine Code, and of leaving millions of people to suffer the effects of the triple threat of drought, famine, and plague.

Using government reports on famine, as well as the writings of members of government, members of the Indian National Congress Party and the native press, this paper will examine the application of the Famine Code to the Bombay Presidency during the administrations of Lord Northcote and Lord Lamington

Paige Johnson Tan, University of North Carolina—Wilmington

The Politics and Thought of Amien Rais: Implications for Indonesian Democracy

Amien Rais was known at the time of Suharto’s fall as Bapak Reformasi, the Father of Reform, for his prominent role in bringing down the long-serving dictator. Since 1998, Amien has continued to play a conspicuous role in the country’s politics, founding the National Mandate Party (PAN), pioneering the Central Axis coalition of Islamic parties, being elected speaker of Indonesia’s upper house of parliament, overseeing Indonesian constitutional reform, and machinating the downfall of President Abdurrahman Wahid and his replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Amien also promises to be a strong player in the next Indonesian elections, scheduled for 2004, through which he hopes to achieve his ultimate goal: securing the Indonesian presidency for himself.
As was the case with many of Indonesia’s new politicians, entering the *reformasi* period, little was certain about Amien’s political thought or the concrete policies he wished to pursue. As a former head of the modernist Muslim organization, *Muhammadiyah*, it was assumed that Amien would take an Islamist line. Previous statements made by Amien upholding the interests of indigenous Indonesians (Muslims) at the expense of Chinese Indonesians (non-Muslims) seemed to confirm this view. Amien’s *reformasi* credentials were strong. In contrast to Megawati’s reserved approach to the protests which brought Suharto down, Amien was on the campuses and in the parliament grounds encouraging students, at some personal risk to himself. With these *reformasi* credentials, it was believed by many that Amien would be an active proponent of dismantling the remaining pillars of the *ancien regime* and bringing to reality the dream of Indonesian democracy.

Five years into the *reformasi* period and considering Amien’s importance for the upcoming Indonesian presidential election, it is appropriate to look again at Amien’s politics and thought. Some important questions beg to be answered. What does Amien Rais believe? How can we see his beliefs being operationalized in the practical politics he has engaged in? Have his beliefs changed over the course of the transition? And, if so, why? What meaning does Amien’s thought hold for prospects for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia?

**Panel 21: Case Studies in Asian Religion**

Daniel A. Metraux, Mary Baldwin College

**Globalizing Japanese Religion: The Soka Gakkai in Australia and Quebec**

A key characteristic of the new Japanese religions that distinguish them from more traditional religions in Japan is their universalistic orientation and international missionary zeal. The goal of this paper is to study the phenomenon of the globalization of Japanese religion through an analysis of the growth of the Soka Gakkai International (SGI) in Australia and Quebec. SGI’s appeal is both social and religious. A key factor for SGIA’s growth in Australia and Quebec is its emphasis on the concept of community. The fast pace of life, constant movement of people, and a sizeable growth of immigrants have created a sense of rootlessness among many Australians and Quebeckers. SGI’s tradition of forming small chapters whose members often meet in each other’s homes or community center creates a tightly bonded group. SGI members find their movement’s form of Buddhism appealing because it is said to give them a greater sense con-
Confidence and self-empowerment permitting them to manage their own lives in a more creative manner.

Panel 22: China’s Literary History

Paul B. Foster, Georgia Institute of Technology

Ah Q Progeny: Post-1949 Creative Intersections with the Ah Q Discourse

Through an analysis of five derivative novels featuring Ah Q, or his progeny, as protagonists in the post-1949 period, this paper demonstrates how the Ah Q discourse crosses intellectual and popular boundaries and maintained relevance throughout the second half of the twentieth-century. While the vast intertextual literary legacy of Ah Q includes works whose authors adopted the pen name “Ah Q” in the 1930s, as well as nearly twenty stage and screen adaptations from the 1920s to 1990s, a number of little known derivative novels form a direct literary legacy of the Ah Q discourse. These novels include Lan Xin’s Modeng Xiaojie: A Q xiaojie zhuan (Miss Modern: the biography of Miss Ah Q; 1950); Bi Shui’s A Q waizhuan (The unofficial biography of Ah Q; 1969); Ding Yi’s A O waizhuan (The unofficial biography of [Ah Q’s son] Ah O; 1971); Chen Guokai’s Modeng A Q (Modern Ah Q; 1988); and Lin Liming’s A Q hou zhuan (Sequel to the true story of Ah Q; 1994). These works, combined with the political and cultural discourse on Ah Q, and rising education levels of the Chinese population throughout the twentieth-century, demonstrate that the Ah Q symbol and knowledge about Chinese national character have gradually disseminated beyond academic circles. Ah Q traverses time and genre to construct the Ah Q discourse, perpetuate the symbol of Ah Q, and sustain Ah Q’s relevance into the twenty-first century. Analysis of Ah Q’s “creative progeny” provides clues as to how Ah Q contributes to the construction of modern Chinese national character and identity, which after all is an inclusive, not merely an academic, identity.
President David Jones called the business meeting of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Southeast Conference, Association for Asian Studies, to order at 12:45 at the Hilton Conference Center at the University of Florida in Gainesville on January 17, 2004. After several announcements, he introduced S. Yumiko Hulvey, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, thanking her for her excellent job as local arrangements chair. Dean Hulvey welcomed SEC members to the University of Florida and then in turn introduced Neil Sullivan, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, thanking him for his support of the SEC meeting. Dean Sullivan welcomed the SEC to the university of Florida and expressed his pleasure at hosting an organization so dedicated to promoting cultural understanding and appreciation across the world. In a lighter vein, he urged us to meet the ‘gators at Lake Alice.

President Jones next recognized former AAS President David Ludden and thanked him for his presidential address of earlier that morning. The minutes of the 2003 Annual Business meeting on Jekyll Island were then accepted as submitted.

Yumiko Hulvey reported on local arrangements. She explained that the Hilton had been selected as the best site due to its number of meeting rooms, its accommodations and its food service, but urged attendees to visit the main campus of the University of Florida as well. She thanked Program Chair Chris Jespersen for his help in support in planning the meeting.

President Jones then acknowledged the membership of the Executive Committee of the SEC, and gave special thanks to Yumiko Hulvey and Chris Jespersen for meeting arrangements.

Program Chair Jespersen expressed his pleasure in the opportunity to meet in person those with whom he has been in electronic communication, and thanked those who had proposed panels and papers and those who had offered assistance. He noted his particular appreciation of Archivist Ken Berger’s posting of relevant information on the SEC website. He reported that there would be 23 panels on a diversity of topics; he had assembled most of the panels from individual paper submissions but felt they held together well for the most part. He thanked all for attending.
President Jones announced that Vice President Kate Kaup was unable to attend due to the very recent birth of a baby girl. On her behalf, he introduced the slate of candidates for the office of vice president, Farley Richmond and Bill Head, and the candidates for executive committee member-at-large, Jan Kiely and Ronnie Littlejohn. He asked for but received no nominations from the floor. SEC Members were directed to the ballots on the tables and asked to vote, then turn the ballots over to the tellers, Tom Pynn and Alan Pope. The election proceeded.

Kristin Stapleton, SEC representative to the AAS Council on Conferences, gave a brief description of the council’s purpose and noted that the upcoming AAS meeting will be in San Diego. She reported that the SEC had won an Outreach Grant from the COC for a workshop for school teachers on Islam, which was being conducted by Sylvia Krebs on the UF campus that day.

Jim Gillam, the editor of SERAS, announced that Volume 25 was being distributed with registration packets; it contained 200 pages of very good content. This last year there had been many submissions, which made final decisions difficult. He encouraged all panelists to submit their papers; in this regard he asked all panel chairs to make sure that panelists filled out the educational information forms he’d distributed to all panels. He announced that this year’s report was his swan song; a new editor would be chosen by the Executive Committee. He expressed his enjoyment at serving as editor, a task he volunteered for in order to see what his colleagues in the region were up to. He learned editing on the job and expressed his gratitude to all for their support and patience over the last four years.

Ken Berger, SEC Archivist, was not present. He has resigned from all of his SEC/AAS positions, and has made arrangements with the Special Collections Library of the Duke University Libraries to continue the files in their repository.

Secretary Treasurer Charlotte Beahan pointed out the copies of the Treasurer’s Report on the luncheon tables and briefly elucidated its contents: revenues exceeded disbursements, and the SEC continues in economic health, with an ending balance of $20,376.28 as of 31 December 2003. Acceptance of the Treasurer’s Report was moved, seconded and then accepted by the assembly.

President Jones apologized for omitting Outreach Coordinator Sylvia Krebs from his recognition of the Executive Committee. Kristin Stapleton delivered Krebs’s report on this year’s Outreach workshop for northern Florida elementary and secondary teachers on the topic of Islam which was being held in conjunction with the SEC meeting. AAS had provided $2,000 toward the presentation by Jeff Key and John Goulde of Sweetbriar,
and Ishan Bagby of the University of Kentucky. Each teacher received a packet of materials on Islam. Jeff Key is planning to put up much of the material presented on the web, for the benefit of other pre-college teachers. Stapleton acknowledged the financial support of AAS, and the SEC, and the logistical support of Asian Studies at the University of Florida. President Jones then thanked the latter for their role in the workshop.

**Roger Jeans** reported that the Auditing Committee (Jeans and Clifton Pannell) had examined the SEC books and found them in order. Jeans pointed out that the account book began in 1972, and had but three blank pages remaining—a piece of SEC history.

The Student Prize Committees’ reports followed. Marc Gilbert announced that the prize for the graduate paper went to a beautifully argued paper, “Different Destinations on a Risky Voyage: American Military Advisors and the South Korean Army, 1948-1950,” by Jongnam Na at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It was recommended by Michael Hunt. Mr. Na could not attend, as he was on that very day defending his M.A. thesis in Chapel Hill. **Tamara Valentine** reported a tie for the undergraduate paper prize, which this year went to Emily Paige Ballou, University of Georgia, for “Origins in Religious Ritual of Asian Puppet Theater Forms and the Marginalization of Theater Artists” and Leah Latella, UNC Chapel Hill, “Ama: A Traditional Past, An Erotic Present, and A Hardworking Future.” Their sponsors were Farley Richmond and Jan Bardsley, respectively. A check for $100 will be sent to each of the three student prize winners. All three papers will be published in SERAS if the winners so desire.

**Lucien Ellington** reported that this is the eight year he has been able to report on *Education about Asia*, and thanked David Jones and the newest editor, Kristin Stapleton as well as AAS past president David Ludden for his support in a transitional period. He also thanked all contributors and solicited future contributions and questions. The Winter issue is in press, and contains a section on the book and film *To Live*. The Spring issue will be guest edited by Frank Chance of Penn on teaching Asia through the visual arts. The fall issue will focus on integrating early Asia into the curriculum; David Keightley will be the guest editor. Fifty percent of each issue is saved for general topics on Asia. President Jones expressed appreciation for Ellington’s hard work.

On behalf of **Vice President Kate Kaup**, absent due to the birth of her daughter, President Jones reported that the **2005 annual meeting** will be held at the University of Kentucky in Lexington. Kristin Stapleton of UK will serve as 2005 local arrangements chair and Paige Johnson Tan will be program chair. Jones thanked both Tan and Stapleton for their willingness
to serve. Kristin Stapleton then invited all to the University of Kentucky and noted that while UK beat Florida in basketball, she doubted that UK could top Florida’s 2004 SEC arrangements—but that they would give it a good try! She solicited suggestions for the upcoming meeting.

President Jones called for announcements from the floor. Daniel Metraux of Mary Baldwin announced the annual conference of the Virginia Consortium on Asian Studies at Washington and Lee on February 7, which this year had a full program on North Korea. The most recent issue of the consortium’s Virginia Review of Asian Studies was on Burma, with great participation by Burmese scholars. He has information sheets in the lobby; it is also available online. He solicited submissions for the fall issue. Suzanne Wright of UT Knoxville announced that the UT library had just purchased the entire *Siku quanshu* in an electronic version. Everyone is free to use this through the UT Library’s data base. She had placed brochures on its use in the lobby; this is a marvelous base for China scholars. Yumiko Hulvey thanked all her colleagues at University of Florida for their help with the conference. Marc Gilbert announced two events: in March, a Conference on World History in Boston at Northeastern University, and the June meeting of the World History Association in Washington DC.

President Jones solicited ideas for meeting venues for the 45th annual SEC meeting in 2006.

President Jones reported Election Results. In a very close election, Farley Richmond was elected the new vice president; Ronnie Littlejohn was the new at-large member of the Executive committee.

All were reminded that their registration included a sit-down dinner on Saturday evening, followed by a musical performance by a UF student composer/pianist.

The meeting was adjourned at approximately 1:30.
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