Southeast Asian Nationalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Reexamining Assumptions

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This article critically reexamines the assumption that the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) significantly influenced Southeast Asian nationalists and their anti-colonial movements. A survey of the region finds that, with only two exceptions—the Philippines and Vietnam—the war made only a minimal impression at the time. Nationalists in the Philippines and Vietnam responded positively to the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), actively pursuing Japanese aid as a result. Contradicting existing assumptions, the historical record reveals that in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, most nationalists in the Philippines and Vietnam became alienated from Japan when this rising Asian power turned its back on fellow Asians in favor of joining the Euro–American club of turn-of-the-century imperialists. This article ultimately suggests that assumptions about the war’s impact may be more a reflection of Euro–American fears of Japan’s rise to power than of its true legacy in Southeast Asia.

Assumptions of Influence: Japan on Southeast Asia

This article assesses the impact of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) on Southeast Asia’s emerging nationalist leaders and their movements. Some historians have concluded that Japan’s victory over Imperial Russia in 1905 exerted a direct influence on contemporary nationalists in Southeast Asia who were seeking to free their countries from colonial domination. Assumptions about the inspirational influence of the Japanese victory and its immediate impact are not difficult to find. One example is this statement in a contemporary textbook by D. R. SarDesai, a historian of the region:

The shining example of Japan’s military victory over Russia in 1905 inspired Asian nationalists tremendously. Not only was the myth of European invincibility nurtured by colonialists and missionaries thereby destroyed, but it also held the hope that, given an opportunity, Asians could build up their country’s military and economic strength to a very advanced level. Such sentiments were expressed in the autobiography of almost every prominent Asian nationalist of that time.¹
This article, however, contends that this assumption is incorrect and may originally have been a misreading by nervous Europeans. Such a misperception is not unreasonable, because, in fact, the people of Asia were delighted by the Japanese victory, just as the people of Europe and the United States were surprised and shocked. But did popular exhilaration over the Japanese victory exert a particular influence on Southeast Asia’s nationalist leaders?

In summer 2005, I participated in an international centennial retrospective symposium in Tokyo on the Russo-Japanese War. I arrived a few days before the proceedings and decided to visit the famous (or infamous) Yasukuni Shrine, much in the news because of the former Japanese prime minister’s visits to honor the country’s war dead—which include some Class-A war criminals. After visiting the shrine, I toured the adjoining Yūshūkan War Memorial Museum, which was featuring a special display on the 1904–5 war. At the end of this major exhibit was a small display of photographs and statements from Asian leaders who praised Japan’s victory. The Southeast Asian nationalist included in this display was Ba Maw (1893–1977), a Burmese who was active in a number of pre–World War II nationalist struggles but is best remembered as a Japanese collaborator during the Pacific War (1941–45). Ba Maw’s statement was filled with praise for the “brilliant” Japanese defeat of Imperial Russia; he stated that this Asian victory immediately filled him with nationalist resolve to free his people from British colonial rule. This testimonial is impressive—until the museum visitor notes Ba Maw’s birth and death years printed beneath his photograph: Ba Maw was only twelve years old in 1905 and was many years away from participating in his country’s nationalist struggle. In addition, there was little in the way of a Burmese nationalist organization to lead in 1905.²

So, if Ba Maw was only twelve in 1905, who among Southeast Asia’s nationalist leaders was actually around and active in a nationalist struggle on which the Japanese victory could have exerted a direct influence? Was the impact of the war universally felt, or were some countries and nationalist leaders affected more than others? How did the Japanese military victory translate into nationalist rhetoric or programs? Was any impact long standing, or was it merely fleeting?

To assess the importance of Japan’s victory early in the twentieth century, this article also looks at an earlier event, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. The possible impact on Southeast Asian nationalism of this conflict has not yet been noted, but it should be. This article argues that this earlier conflict seems to have had a disproportionately greater impact on the active Southeast Asian nationalists of the period than the Russo-Japanese War a decade later. Just why the earlier Japanese victory has been overlooked may be because the dominant historical interpretation of the era
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has followed a Eurocentric concern with the emergence of Japan being viewed as a possible threat to the West’s position in Asia. However, Southeast Asians gained an earlier respect for Japan’s emerging power in 1895 because they witnessed the Meiji (1868–1912) regime’s sound defeat of the once-mighty Middle Kingdom. What follows is a comparative survey of the region that tests casual assumptions about Southeast Asia’s nationalist response to the Russo-Japanese War—especially when compared to the region’s response to the Sino-Japanese War—and draws more definitive conclusions than have heretofore been made.

A Survey of Southeast Asian Nationalism, ca. 1905

This section looks at the independent kingdom of Thailand; the British colonies of Burma, Malaya, and Singapore; and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). The following sections offer more detailed examinations of the Philippines and Vietnam. It was in these latter two colonies that anti-colonial nationalist movements had already appeared and the true impact of Japan’s victories against China and Russia can be evaluated.

Thailand

The nationalist goal in Thailand was to preserve the country’s independence, which required stability rather than revolution and meant that Thais supported the status quo as centered in the royal family. Experimentation was tolerated only if initiated by the king and carried out by his royal bureaucracy. The Thai situation reflected the geographic reality of the country, sandwiched between the French to the east (Indochina) and the British to the west (Burma) and south (Malay Peninsula). In this geographic position, Thailand’s primary goal was to balance one European power against another. This strategy began in 1855, when King Mongkut (1804–68, r. 1851–68) signed the Anglo–Thai Treaty, followed by a similar agreement with France the next year. Later, in 1868, treaties were also signed with other European powers. By concluding treaties with a number of European states, none gained preeminent status, and all were committed to maintaining an independent Thai state. The British and French willingness to keep Thailand as a buffer between them was finally accepted in a modus vivendi in 1896, when the two powers guaranteed the integrity and neutrality of the Menam basin (the central plain of the Chao Phyra River that forms Thailand’s core).

In a practical sense, the individual treaties with European powers allowed Mongkut, and later his son Chulalongkorn (1853–1910, r. 1868–1910), to carry out a sort of reverse “divide-and-conquer” strategy that balanced advisors from competing European states while promoting reform programs that strengthened the kingdom. As long as no one set of advisors
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gained an upper hand, there was no cause for concern. Under the guidance of European advisors, Thailand instituted a number of social, military, judicial, and governmental reforms and engaged in the rapid development of the country’s infrastructure of telegraph lines and railroads. Mongkut and Chulalongkron balked only at introducing participatory democracy, preferring to appoint advisory councils to help them rule. Since Thailand was instituting reforms and preserving its autonomy, Meiji Japan held little fascination for the Thai ruling elite.

One reference to the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Thailand was made by David Wyatt, who included it among the factors that motivated an abortive military coup in 1912. The coup was planned by a group of ninety-one junior officers who were then in their twenties, but the uprising was discovered and promptly quelled by superior officers. All of the plotters were arrested and meted out prison sentences of twelve years to life. However, the fact that the coup was planned long after 1905 makes it unlikely that the war played a large part in the thinking of the plotters. A more plausible explanation was an internal military rivalry. Soon after coming into power, the Oxford-educated son of Chulalongkorn attempted to build a special Guards Brigade and a private army called the “Wild Tiger Corps,” moves that were bitterly resented by the regular military. Senior officers moved against the new units through administrative and budgetary in-fights, but the young officers were less sophisticated and chose direct action, leading to their downfall.

Burma

If a link between the Russo-Japanese War and a coup in Thailand seven years later is a tenuous thread, the linkage between the war and the nationalist undertaking in Burma is even shakier. Quoting authors of European histories, F. S. V. Donnison noted that the 1905 Japanese victory delighted Asia and, in the same paragraph, indicated the first rumblings of what would become Burmese nationalism. One of these rumblings was the religious revivalism of a Buddhist monk, while another was the founding in the colonial capital of Rangoon of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA). The YMBA’s radical anti-colonialism turn came much later, however, and so too did the Burmese concern with Japanese military successes.

Malaya & Singapore

British colonial administrators in Malaya did not disturb the (preexisting) ruling Islamic sultanates but rather incorporated them into the government by a system of indirect rule that left traditional society untouched. With the ruling elite thoroughly incorporated into the colonial system, news of East Asia’s 1905 war was little more than a source of speculation for a small group of royals whose very existence was the antithesis of nationalism.
Meanwhile, Singapore was a tightly controlled British port city with a Chinese immigrant merchant population whose primary concerns were not political. However, had Singapore’s Chinese residents expressed any political sentiment, it undoubtedly would have been in opposition to Japan, which had humiliated the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) in the Sino-Japanese War.

**Dutch East Indies (Indonesia)**

Indonesia’s nationalist movement was comprised of a number of very different individual organizations, the earliest of which was the *Budi Utomo* (Beautiful Endeavor), founded in 1908 by a Javanese educator and his students who came from the ranks of the lesser *priyayi* (traditional ruling elite) class. Though never “political,” the *Budi Utomo* was critical in that it sought to retain a sense of cultural identity in the face of “Westernization,” even as it pressed the government for more European-style education. The next organization to arise was the *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union, SI), founded in 1911 by batik cloth merchants in Surakarta, central Java. Despite the organization’s religious name, its members were primarily concerned with competition from ethnic Chinese merchants. Only later did the SI evolve into a diverse and multilayered movement that stressed resistance to outside forces.7

Another of Indonesia’s nationalist origins was found in a religious organization whose inspiration came from late-nineteenth century Middle Eastern reform movements. Indonesia’s links with the Islamic world had increased dramatically, thanks to the development of the steamship, which eased the physical strain and cost of long-distance travel to Mecca for the *hadj* (religious pilgrimage). By the turn of the century, many hundreds of Indonesian faithful had made the trek to Mecca and upon their return enlivened the country’s religious life. In 1912, a religious official of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta founded the *Muhammadiyah* (Way of Muhammad) to reform Islam and resist missionary efforts by Dutch Christians. Over time, the *Muhammadiyah* grew to become Indonesia’s largest religious organization, and Islamic modernist teachings contributed significantly to the development of the country’s national ideology. Through the *Muhammadiyah*, many Indonesians looked to movements coming out of the Middle East for inspiration rather than toward Japan’s imitation of the West.8 In 1905, the people of the Dutch East Indies were still in the early stages of formulating a response to European colonial rule, but there is no indication that Japan’s 1905 victory was a source of nationalist inspiration.9

**Philippine Nationalist Interest in Japan**

In Southeast Asia, only the Philippines and Vietnam had noticeable nationalist responses to the Russo-Japanese War, because their nationalist
movements had progressed to a point where they were prepared to break from colonial rule and were looking for a way to do so. By 1904, critical cores of nationalists in both countries had emerged and formed organizations that sought the removal of their Spanish, American, and French colonizers. That their initial efforts were frustrated by Euro–American military superiority and effective police intelligence networks only increased Filipino and Vietnamese interest in the Japanese example.

**Japan & the Philippines in the Late Nineteenth Century**

Japanese nationalists and Spanish colonial officials were knowledgeable about each other and usually looked to prosper at the other’s expense. An early example of the more predatory relationship was Sugiura Shigetake (1855–1924), whose 1886 booklet *Hankai Yume-monogatari* (Dream of Hankai [a Chinese warrior]) proposed sending Japan’s outcasts to the Philippines. Once there, they would mingle with Filipinos and wait for the opportunity to rise up against Spain. A similar proposal was made by another Japanese nationalist of the Meiji era, Sadakaze Suganuma (1865–89), who looked to the Philippines because its colonial ruler was the weakest of the Europeans, thus making possible a revolt led by Japanese immigrants. Once a new government was established, the new independent kingdom could be offered to the Japanese Emperor. These men, and others, formed at least four societies in Meiji Japan that looked to expansion into the “South Seas,” including the Philippines.\(^{10}\) Conversely, some Spaniards favored schemes to bring Japanese immigrants to the archipelago to enhance the colonial economy. In 1889, the Spanish minister to Tokyo proposed a Japanese immigration plan similar to the agreement then operative between Japan and Hawai‘i. The proposal did not go far, however, because powerful religious authorities in Manila voiced strong oppositions.\(^ {11}\)

In contrast to these schemes, some Japanese and Philippine nationalists knew each other as personal friends. Liberal Party founding member Suehiro Shigeyasu (1849–96, a.k.a. “Tetchō”) and the prominent Philippine nationalist Dr. Jose Rizal (1861–96) met on a ship bound for the United States in 1888. Rizal was already well acquainted with Japan, having lived there for a time during which he became involved with a Japanese woman. The two Asian nationalists traveled across the Pacific together, toured the United States, and continued as traveling companions as far as London. Suehiro spoke well of his Filipino friend and later published a political novel based on his travels with Rizal.\(^{12}\)

In addition, the Spanish and Japanese governments sought to develop formal commercial and diplomatic links between 1868 and 1888, a time Philippine historian Josefa Saniel has referred to as the “decades of probing.”\(^ {13}\) The results of these efforts, however, were mixed. Although trade during the 1889–98 period increased by 1,258 percent (from ¥227,486 to ¥3,294,183),
this figure remained less than 1 percent of Japan’s total trade. While still small, this increase in trade indicates that there was real interest between the two parties. Growth was ultimately halted in 1898 by the Spanish-American War.

**Japan & Filipino Nationalists**

A decade before the Russo-Japanese War, Filipino nationalists were well aware of Japan’s increasing military prowess. Even as the Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s subsequent annexation of Taiwan (in 1895) filled Spanish colonial officials with apprehension, the significance of the emergence of a strong Asian benefactor was not lost on Filipino nationalists. Filipinos began patronizing Manila’s small Japanese merchant community, and an increasing number of Philippine travelers went to Japan to seek political and military support for their cause. In early May 1896, the arrival of the Japanese naval training ship Kongo gave Filipino nationalist leaders what they hoped would be a valuable contact. Though the details are murky, it appears that the Japanese owner of a dry goods store, Tagawa Moritarō (“Jose”), who was married to a Filipina, served as interpreter at a meeting he arranged between the ship’s commander, Captain Serada, and prominent leaders of the revolutionary society Katipunan. Included in the revolutionary contingent were the group’s supremo, Andres Bonifacio (1863–97), and his close confederate, Emilio Jacinto (1875–99), plus Daniel Tirona and Pio Valenzuela (1869–1956). The Japanese officer was presented with a letter addressed to the Emperor requesting assistance for the cause of Philippine independence. He was also given gifts of fruit and an ornately engraved picture frame. Since Japan was still in the process of consolidating its gains from its recent victory over China and wished to maintain good relations with Western nations, the Japanese commander is said to have made a number of non-committal remarks that left his Filipino hosts unsatisfied. Still, for propaganda purposes, the Katipunan officials portrayed the meeting in a more positive light.

With the outbreak of fighting between Filipino insurgents and the Spanish government in late August 1896, Japan sent two observers: Consul Shimizu of the Japanese legation in Hong Kong and Lieutenant Colonel Kususe Yoshihiro of the Taiwan Army’s headquarters. These two men were followed by Sakamoto Shirō, who had earlier been active in Korea in advancing Japan’s interests. Sakamoto arrived in March 1897 under the guises of a representative for an Osaka-based trading firm and a newspaperman for three different Tokyo-based publications. During his extended period of service, he authored 110 reports and became such a partisan for Philippine independence that, in August 1898, he recommended that a battalion of Japanese marines be dispatched to assist the Philippine freedom fighters against potential American aggression. His superiors quickly rejected his
appeal. In addition, Tokyo sent six other military officers to observe the end of Spanish rule and the period before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War.\footnote{18}

During that period, Filipino nationalists seemed to have had good reason to believe that Japan would welcome, and even support, Philippine independence. On October 31, 1898, Teodoro Sandiko (1860–1939) sent a report to General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) about an “informal banquet” given by a certain Captain Y. Tokizawa at the Japanese Consulate in Manila. Sandiko claimed that the entire Japanese community of Manila attended and that the room was decorated with crossed Japanese and Filipino flags. Impromptu speeches usually ended with shouts of “Long Live the Independence of the Philippines.” More concretely, the Japanese said that, should the Filipino Revolutionary Government wish to send some young men to Japan to study munitions manufacturing, they would be well received.\footnote{19}

Earlier, in late June 1898, a representative of the Philippine revolutionary government, Mariano Ponce (1863–1918), arrived in Tokyo and immediately sought permission to purchase arms. His way was prepared by Jose Anacleto Ramos (1856–1921), a Filipino revolutionary who had become a naturalized Japanese citizen and had taken the name J. Ishikawa. Earlier, too, Ishikawa served as an intermediary between the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Aguinaldo’s government-in-exile in Hong Kong. At first, Japanese officials in the coalition government of the Shimpotō (Progressive) and Jiyūtō (Liberal) parties were very favorably disposed to the Philippine request. In 1898, the Japanese still viewed themselves as outsiders to the European-dominated imperialist order and genuinely subscribed to an “Asia-for-the-Asians” doctrine. However, it soon became evident that the United States was utterly opposed to any support for the rebels, and relations between the American and Filipino governments deteriorated rapidly. Due to diplomatic pressure, Ponce’s work in Japan became impossible, at least through official channels. As well, Ramos and Ponce seem to have had a falling out, negatively affecting Tokyo’s impression of the Philippine nationalist movement.\footnote{20}

Later in 1899, Ponce met the Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who was also in Tokyo. Sun promised to assist the Filipino diplomat, and, through a complex and convoluted series of payments and transactions involving Japanese, German, and Chinese agents, an arms shipment was arranged. The shipment of arms and ammunition was sent aboard the Japanese ship Nunobiki Maru in July, but, unfortunately for the Philippine revolutionaries, the ship had to be abandoned on the twenty-first during a typhoon off the Saddle Islands near Shanghai.\footnote{21}

In August 1899, during the height of the Philippine-American War (February 1899 to July 1902), U.S. secret police kept a close watch on Japanese
agents who entered the country to meet with officials of the “insurgent” government. The supposed Japanese objective was to evaluate the Filipinos’ capability for winning independence from the North American aggressor. Should the agents return a positive evaluation, the Japanese government might consider extending aid, including arms. Japanese contacts with Philippine forces continued into the following year when T. Hōjō, Chancellor of the Japanese Consulate in Manila, consulted with General Mariano Trias (1868–1914) about battle conditions and other factors that might induce Japanese diplomatic intervention. By spring 1901, with the war going badly for the Philippine government, Japanese interest shifted to facilitating the departure to Japan of pro-Japanese Filipinos such as Dr. Simeon A. Villa (d. 1945), who, along with Aguinaldo, had just been captured by American forces.22

Although these wartime attempts failed to gain support of the Japanese government, Filipino nationalists persisted in their efforts into the early years of the American colonial regime. The more radical members of the Philippine nationalist cause mounted these efforts, individuals whom the American press and government officials referred to as “irreconcilables.” In 1904, Luke Wright (1846–1922), the American governor of the Philippines, sent his surveyor of customs, F. S. Cairns, to Japan to investigate the activities of the Filipino expatriate community there. Cairns found that Jose Lucban, the brother of irreconcilable Philippine general Vicente Lucban, arrived in fall 1903 from Hong Kong and attempted to purchase weapons and establish friendly relations with the Japanese government. Although he had a number of meetings with officials from the Imperial household and the military, Lucban failed to accomplish either of his missions.23

Japan’s Post-1905 Shift & Filipino Disillusion

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War re-ignited the aspirations of Filipino nationalists that Japan might help them gain independence. However, the Japan of 1905 was far different from what it had been only a few years earlier. After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan seemed to engage in a pattern of diplomacy that encouraged Filipino nationalist aspirations. However, in the aftermath of its stunning victory over the Russian Empire, Japanese government officials and military officers steadfastly refused to entertain Filipino nationalists. Most Philippine nationalists quickly concluded that Japan had adopted the imperialist ideology of the era and would no longer help fellow Asians liberate themselves from European domination. Instead, Japan realized that if it were going to succeed in the world, such sentiments were a luxury that could not be enjoyed.

In 1905, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō (1848–1913) and U.S. Secretary of War William H. Taft (1857–1930) exchanged confidential notes regarding their respective interests in Korea and the Philippines, assuring each other that they would respect the status quo. This initial exchange was followed by
an open agreement in 1908 between U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root (1845–1937) and the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Takahira Kogorō (1854–1926), that expanded the area of mutual assurances to include Hawai‘i, various islands in the Pacific, and the territorial integrity of China.\(^{24}\)

Still, the mystique of Japan’s success against the West continued to have a hold on at least some Philippine nationalists who remained “irreconciled” to American rule. Philippine Constabulary intelligence reports in early 1906 noted that hardcore nationalist radicals hoped for the outbreak of war between China, Japan, and the United States, in which an uprising in the Philippines could help Japan and would lead to freedom.\(^{25}\) The image of Japan as potential benefactor also continued as a theme in the nationalist press even after most Philippine political leaders had been co-opted by the United States and were focusing their energies on securing an elected seat in the recently inaugurated Philippine Assembly. On March 5, 1908, the radical newspaper *El Renacimiento* (The Renaissance) ran an editorial of a hoped-for Japanese invasion to liberate the country from American rule, citing the 1905 victory:

> The proximity of Japan to the Philippines enables her to land on them, within four days after war is declared, an army of occupation, that is to say, in the first moments of the war they will be able to repeat with success the famous attack upon the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, February 8th.\(^{26}\)

Meanwhile, the December 3 issue of *El Renacimiento* proclaimed that Japan would take the Philippines, thus redeeming it from American imperialism:

> Filipinos, if we do not want Japan as a ruler, a people that give to their Emperor a fanatical and blind adoration, nevertheless, we want her as a leader, as a redeemer, as a guide, as breath to the existence of the nations of the Orient and of a people gathered under the same name and united by ties of fraternity and of blood more or less strong.\(^{27}\)

### Artemio Ricarte: The Last Japanese Partisan

Of all the “irreconcilables,” the most prominent was Artemio Ricarte (1866–1945), who refused to take an oath of allegiance to the United States when he was captured in July 1900. Ricarte was deported to Guam and was then sent into exile in Hong Kong until he snuck back into the Philippines in late December 1903. He was captured again in May 1904, after attempting to rekindle the anti-American war, and was sentenced to six years of solitary confinement for sedition. Released in 1910, Ricarte went to Hong Kong, where he linked up with an expatriate Japanese samurai who owned a brothel in the British crown colony. Ricarte continued his plotting and sent letters to the Japanese government asking for assistance. While in Hong Kong, Ricarte seemed relatively harmless until he attempted to direct
a rebellion in Manila in 1914 that became known as the “Christmas Eve Rebellion.” To escape deportation from Hong Kong, Ricarte fled to Japan with the assistance of some Japanese shishi (“men of honor”), especially the statesman Gotō Shimpei (1857–1929). Ricarte eventually settled in Yokohama, where he remained until World War II, when he was brought back to the Philippines by its Japanese conquerors. By that time, however, he was already a forgotten old man, peripheral to the new world of the occupied Philippines.  

Reactions in French Indochina, Especially Vietnam

Laos & Cambodia

In 1905, French Indochina was comprised of four administrative units that were officially protectorates: Tonkin (approximately the northern third of present-day Vietnam), Annam (approximately the central third of present-day Vietnam), Cambodia, and Laos. These protectorates each retained monarchies and royal families. An additional unit was Cochinina, an outright colony, which comprised the southern third of Vietnam. In Laos and Cambodia, the rulers and the general population were so thoroughly preoccupied with internal problems that the Russo-Japanese War passed almost unnoticed. Furthermore, since neither of these two French protectorates, unlike Vietnam, was witness to any military activity connected to the war, its impact was, at most, indirect.

Until 1893, when the French formed a protectorate over Laos, the area had not been united as one polity since the mid-sixteenth century. Instead, the territory had been divided into a number of principalities dominated by the lowland-dwelling ethnic Lao; but each principality was also home to several different ethnic minorities, living predominantly in the highlands. It is doubtful that the Lao States would have managed to retain their precarious independence if French adventurer Auguste J. M. Pavie (1847–1925) had not decided that they should be united under the protection of France. In 1893, the French declared that King Oun Kham (d. 1895) of the Luang Prabang principality was the ruler of all Laos. In the other small principalities, the former royal families retained authority over daily provincial affairs and were encouraged to intermarry with members of the presiding royal family. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the Lao elite were still so preoccupied with internal affairs that the Japanese victory did not inspire them to thoughts of independence, and they continued to view the French as “benevolent protectors, or at least as a lesser of evils.”

When Cambodia became a protectorate in 1863, the French “protected” King Norodom (1834–1904) from the neighboring Thais as well as from uprisings by rival Cambodian elite groups, including members of his own family. After Norodom died, the French chose as his successor his half-
brother Sisowath (1840–1927), who had cooperated with them against anyone who showed any anti-colonial inclination, including members of the Cambodian provincial elite—and even two of Norodom’s sons. During the Russo-Japanese War, the royal family and Sisowath’s elite supporters were embroiled in maneuvers for power and influence among themselves and the French administration in Phnom Penh. Although news of the war and the diplomatic crisis over the docking of Russian ships in Indochina’s neutral waters probably reached some of the Cambodian elite, there is no record of any interest in these events. Nor was there apparently much interest in Japan’s modernization. Instead, any notion of “reform” was seen as a French imposition that had to be resisted. Under these circumstances, the Meiji modernization program and its military successes were ignored as members of the Cambodian elite clung to their antiquated traditions.

**Vietnam**

In contrast to the ease by which French colonial officials could control Laos and Cambodia, the Vietnamese steadily resisted French rule. In a sense, the Vietnamese were merely continuing a millennia-long tradition that had pitted them against Chinese and Mongol invaders and regional enemies, such as the Thais, Laotians, Khmers, and Chams. The French annexation began with an attack on the southern port of Da Nang in August 1858. The defending Nguyen Dynasty, based in the royal city of Huế, was split between two opposing viewpoints. Most argued for granting the Europeans trade concessions so the regime could concentrate on suppressing domestic peasant uprisings and invading bands of Chinese Taiping rebels known as the White, Yellow, and Black Flags. A smaller group of officials favored resistance, though, properly predicting that the French were after more than mere trading ports. King Tự Đức (1829–83, r. 1847–83) sided with those in favor of negotiations that allowed France three provinces in the far southern provinces of the Mekong Delta by 1862. As the minority bloc of officials had predicted, the French soon demanded further concessions, and, in 1882, troops commanded by Henri Riviere (1827–83) seized Hanoi in the far north. The following year, King Tự Đức died, heirless, throwing the court into factional anarchy. By August 1883, the advance of French artillery units on Huế induced the court mandarins to sign a treaty making the country a protectorate.

Ironically, the French victory only signaled the beginning of Vietnamese resistance led by Regent Ton That Thuyet (1835–1913), who controlled the newly enthroned twelve-year-old King Hàm Nghi (1871–1943). In response to French demands that the court disarm its citadel and reduce the size of the country’s armed forces, Thuyet ordered an attack on the French positions on the night of July 4, 1884, while he, the boy king, and their supporters escaped to the mountains. Once safe, Hàm Nghi issued an edict call-
ing on all Vietnamese to rally to his support and reappointed all officials who had been discharged for supporting resistance. The King’s appeal sparked a national campaign that cut across social and economic lines and became known as the Can Vuong (Save the King) movement. Meanwhile, the French gathered the remaining members of the compliant court and enthroned a collaborator, Đỗ Khánh (1864–89), as the new king. The Royalist rebellion was dealt a severe blow in November 1888 when Hàm Nghi was captured and sent into exile in Algeria. At the time, Thuyet was in China seeking assistance for their struggle and managed to avoid a similar—or worse—fate. Meanwhile, the Can Vuong movement continued until 1897 and was especially strong in the country’s central and northern provinces.

The most impressive center of resistance was led by Hoàng Hoa Thám (1845–1913), better known as De (Colonel) Thám, the “Tiger of Yen-The,” in an area northeast of Hanoi. De Thám combined royalist support for the legitimate monarchy with a peasant revolt that began when the French colonizers usurped native lands. Long after French forces had systematically overwhelmed one pocket of royalist rebellion after the other, De Thám held out, protected by the loyalty of his strong base of peasant support. By 1894, this support and clever military tactics enabled De Thám to create a “quasi-feudal” domain in this strategic area with the full knowledge of French administrators. In 1897, the French finally negotiated a truce with De Thám, who continued to hold the Yen The area free from foreign intervention. Though De Thám’s area of control was limited, it was, in the words of nationalist leader Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940), “like a little island of freedom after the loss of our country.” De Thám’s autonomous area existed until he was eventually killed by a French-hired assassin in 1913.

As the son of a teacher in Nghệ An province of central Vietnam, Phan Bội Châu was also deeply affected by the Can Vuong movement. He and his family were spared any direct effect of the violence of the period, but Phan made friends with individuals who were part of the Can Vuong movement. Still, Phan remained apolitical until 1897, when, at the age of thirty, he went to Huế. There, he expanded his horizons by befriending a number of individuals who introduced him to the writings of prominent Chinese reformer–intellectuals such as Liang Qichao (1873–1929). With the death of his father in 1900, Phan felt released from familial duties and from then on devoted his life to political activism. Phan and his new comrades developed a three-stage plan for the liberation of their country that would begin by linking themselves with remnants of the Can Vuong movement to mount a campaign of political violence. The conspirators would then find a leader of royal lineage to serve as a figurehead for the struggle while simultaneously seeking outside assistance from a strong and friendly country.

Building a rudimentary network and attempting an abortive attack on a French garrison took two years. In the meantime, in spring 1903, Phan met
“Marquis” Cường Để (1882–1951), the son of a prince, and won him to the cause. This addition to the group greatly expanded its base of support, and Phan spent a full year traveling around the country, gaining further contacts and building the organization. By May 1904, Phan, Cường Đệ, and almost twenty other principal leaders met and founded the Vietnam Modernization Association (Duy Tân Hội), which formalized the original group’s earlier goals. Phan and his close associate Nguyen Thanh then decided it was time to address the third goal and that, between them, Phan should be the one to travel abroad. For centuries, Vietnamese had looked to China as their model and occasional patron, but interest shifted decisively to Japan because it had modernized its society and become a formidable military power, easily defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War and forcing the Euro–American powers to keep their distance. It took Phan until late February 1905 to raise the necessary travel funds and secure the organization sufficiently before he and two Duy Tân Hội traveling companions could depart. Interestingly, the final Shanghai-to-Kobe leg of the journey was delayed for one month until the final Japanese victory of the Russo-Japanese War in the Tsushima Straits, an outcome that confirmed what the Vietnamese already thought of Japan.

At the time Phan Bội Châu was making his way to Japan, another prominent Vietnamese nationalist, Phan Chau Trinh (1872–1926), was visiting the southern coastal city of Nha Trang with two companions. While Phan Bội Châu and his confederates sought to retain the traditional mandarin ruling structure, Phan Chau Trinh and his group, who had no faith in the old leadership, had broken with the dynastic system and dropped their own official positions. Instead, they were also traveling the country to rouse their fellow scholars–gentry to the new challenge of breaking with the past in favor of founding a modern, constitutional government and rejecting French rule. Upon arriving at Nha Trang, the three travelers learned that a Russian war fleet headed for Japan was in anchor at nearby Cam Ranh Bay. Disguising themselves as merchants with a load of vegetables and eggs, they rented a fishing boat and went out into the bay to view the fleet. Out in the water, they tried to talk to the Russian sailors, but the lack of a common language frustrated their attempts. Despite their inability to establish verbal contact, the formidable war technology of the vessels in Rear Admiral Zinovii Petrovich Rozhestvenskii’s (1848–1909) Baltic fleet impressed the three Vietnamese profoundly. Soon thereafter, they were astonished to learn that only three of the ships had survived the assault by the Japanese Navy once the fleet reached the Tsushima Straits.

Meanwhile, upon arriving at the port of Kobe, Phan Bội Châu took a train to Yokohama, where he quickly sought out Liang Qichao, the prominent Chinese exile, who, in turn, introduced him to important Meiji Restoration officials. The most important of these men were Count Ōkuma Shi-
genobu (1838–1922), a leader of the Progressive Party and twice formerly prime minister; Viscount Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932), the party’s president and former minister of education; General Fukushima Yasumasa (1852–1912), director of the Shimbu Military Academy; and Kashiwabara Buntarō (1869–1936), an educator and member of the Japanese House of Representatives. The Japanese advised Phan Bội Châu to return to Vietnam and send Cương Độ to Japan—so he could live in safety, away from the French secret police—while Liang proposed bringing Vietnamese students to Japan to study and, in that way, build Vietnam’s future. By late August 1905, Phan had returned to Vietnam, where he and his comrades quickly developed a plan to recruit and finance young boys for study in Japan. Phan then went back to Japan and prepared for the first students, who arrived shortly thereafter. Phan placed the students in schools associated with his Japanese Progressive Party allies. Phan Bội Châu had taken to the suggestion of an education program in Japan because, in addition to believing that Vietnamese and Japanese were of the same race, he also thought the Japanese had a superior civilization and level of knowledge. As a product of his time, Phan was strongly influenced by Social Darwinist ideas he had absorbed from a variety of contemporary Chinese writers. Recognizing Japan’s superiority, he believed, was a necessary first step to awaken the Vietnamese to the dangers of the modern world. He feared that Vietnam might otherwise go the way of the ancient Cham kingdom, which the ascendant Vietnamese crushed in their inexorable southward expansion from the north to the Mekong Delta. Placing students in Japanese schools, especially schools with strong military education curricula, was the best way to prepare a new generation of leaders who could save their country and culture from French annihilation.

Phan Bội Châu’s program of study in Japan for young Vietnamese became known as the Đông-du (Go East, or Eastern Travel) Movement; and over the next two years, upwards of two hundred Vietnamese students enrolled in a number of Japanese schools, including the Shimbu Military Academy and the pan-Asianist Tōa Dōbun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture School). As successful as the program was, it encountered serious problems due to the July 10, 1907, treaty between France and Japan that regularized relations between the two states. This change in Japan’s diplomatic status had an immediate impact on the education program. As Japan gained increasing recognition and status among the world powers, she seemed less inclined to encourage, or even tolerate, Asian nationalists and their activities. Instead, agents of the French secret police, the Sûerté, were free to extend their activities to Japan. In 1908, the monitoring of public cable messages in Tokyo led to the arrest of Vietnamese couriers transferring funds from Saigon to support the young scholars in Japan. One agent infiltrated a group of Vietnamese visitors and observed their handing over of a substan-
tial sum of money to Cường Đệ. When the travelers returned to Saigon, they were promptly arrested. The information extracted from them under intense interrogation led to many further arrests, which yielded subversive literature from Japan and numerous documents.46

Thanks to the discoveries made by increased Sĩiérté activity in Vietnam as well as Japan, the French government demanded that Japan deport Phan Bội Châu, Cường Đệ, and the students. Because Tokyo was reluctant to take such a drastic step immediately, the government’s Ministry of Home Affairs sent military police to schools with Vietnamese students and had each student write a letter home. Anxious parents wrote back to their children pleading for them to return. As well, hundreds of parents and relatives in Vietnam were subjected to harassment, and some were even arrested. By mid-1908, the students began returning, even though Phan tried to delay the returns. Then, in fall 1908, orders from the Interior Ministry instructed the Tòa Dōbun Shoin to drop its Vietnamese students. Phan Bội Châu tried to elicit support from Inukai and Fukushima, his influential Japanese friends, but they were either unwilling or unable to oppose the government’s new anti–Vietnamese nationalist policy. Later, Inukai was able to secure free return passage for the Vietnamese students from the Japan Mail Line. By November 1908, only a few students remained in Japan, and they would henceforth be on their own.47

In early February 1909, at the insistence of the French, agents of the Japanese Ministry of the Interior raided Phan Bội Châu’s residence. Phan was tipped off and escaped with a handful of newly printed propaganda materials, but his deportation was imminent. On March 8, he departed Tokyo for Hong Kong. Cường Đệ avoided capture until late October, when he was put on a ship bound for Vietnam via Shanghai. Fearing arrest by French authorities in the Chinese port, the Vietnamese prince slipped ashore, and, with the help of some Chinese students, went overland to Hong Kong where he joined Phan Bội Châu. For the next few years, Phan and Cường Đệ lived in China and Thailand, where they remained free to plot revolutionary schemes. Returning to Vietnam was out of the question due to the severe French repression that had eliminated their old comrades of the Duy Tân Hội. Disappointed by the Japanese government’s new diplomatic priorities that ended support for the colonized peoples of Asia, Phan Bội Châu, especially, turned his attention to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary party, the Tongmenghui, a predecessor to the Kuomintang, for inspiration.48

Despite the immediate failure of the Đông-du Movement, the idea of education for national revitalization took root in Vietnam. The first domestic attempt at setting up a nationalist school was the Free School of Hanoi (Dòng Kinh Nghia Thuc), formed in 1907, shortly after a meeting between Phan Bội Châu and the school’s founders. This school and another, the Quốc Học in Huế, were both based on the educational ideals of the noted
Meiji educational reformer Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). Like the Đông-du Movement, this educational initiative was destined to last only a short time, but it had the effect of introducing new ideas. Among the students whose lives were profoundly changed by schools such as these was a young boy from central Vietnam who would eventually lead his country’s successful revolutionary struggle under his adopted name: Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969).

The Exceptional Cases of the Philippines & Vietnam

Southeast Asia’s nationalist response to the 1905 Japanese victory against the Russians was as variegated as the region itself and was affected by local factors, including each individual colony’s stage of political development. By 1905, nationalism was still a distant political movement for most Southeast Asians. This is not to say that most of the subject peoples appreciated colonial rule. Except for a few local rulers who gained by collaborating with the European powers, the people of Southeast Asia recognized that they were being exploited by foreign conquerors. But resistance, if any, was still limited to simple anti-foreigner responses. Most of the region remained under the sway of traditional rulers or aligned by traditional ethnic identification.

The two exceptions to this general pattern were the Philippines and Vietnam. Of the two, it was Philippine nationalists who were relatively more advanced by the late nineteenth century, and they were very interested in the Japan that had thoroughly beaten the mighty Chinese Empire in 1894–95. During their struggle first against Spain and then the United States, Filipino revolutionaries looked hopefully to the emerging Japanese for assistance; but Japan played a cautious role in the conflict by limiting its involvement to observation. The bitter lesson for most Philippine nationalists was that Japan could not be relied upon for substantial assistance. After their defeat by a vastly superior American army, the majority of Philippine nationalists took a pragmatic approach and chose to work with the Americans, who promised to share more and more power with Filipinos over time, working toward an eventual goal of Philippine independence. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, a Philippine national census had been completed and electoral districts created that would soon send Filipino representatives to a national assembly as the first step in that process of working toward self-government. Filipino leaders were impressed with the Japanese victory over Russia, but they recognized that Japan had no real interest in helping her fellow Asians.

The other country that responded to Japan’s ascendance was Vietnam, where the nationalist movement was built on a long tradition of resistance to foreign conquerors. Though defeated by French arms, the Vietnamese
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gained inspiration from the Meiji regime and sought contacts at a variety of levels. The Đông-du Movement was the most concrete example of Vietnamese interest in Japan, but this initiative was fleeting, since the Japanese government soon aligned itself with the European imperialist powers in the region. The Vietnamese, like the Filipinos before them, came to recognize that small countries had to watch over their own interests. They could learn from observation, but they had to maintain their own agency if they were to avoid a future colonization by an Asian, rather than a European, power.

This regional survey addressed assumptions about the profundity of the 1905 drama for Southeast Asian nationalism. The interesting remaining question is why some observers have attached such great importance to the Russo-Japanese War for the people of Southeast Asia. Could it be that assumptions about the war’s impact are more a reflection of the profundity that the war had on Japan and the Euro–American world? We know that Japan’s military prowess came as a rude shock to prevailing notions of “Western” cultural and racial superiority. It is, therefore, very possible that the shock and surprise felt by the Euro–American world has been uncritically assumed to have been as great on Asia and, therefore, to have been a central cause of the origins of nationalism in Southeast Asia. Japan’s advance certainly impressed Southeast Asians, and nationalists from the Philippines and Vietnam thereafter sought Japanese assistance. However, Japan’s own postwar policies limited the potential influence that she might have gained with the region’s emerging nationalist movements. Japan turned her back on her fellow Asians in pursuit of the dominant, Western-defined notion of what constituted a strong modern nation—a notion that, at the time, included colonial empires.

Notes


2One early organization, the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA), patterned after the Young Men's Christian Association in the West, did not take the lead in developing a Burmese national consciousness until after World War I. Even then, it began by stressing religious issues, such as the desecration of temples by British troops, who wore their boots inside the temples.


7Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), presents the best overview of the origins and


14Ibid., 139.

15Ibid., 179–89.


22Letter to “Rosalia Magdalo” (Aguinaldo) from “Paula Pardo” (insurgent agent in Manila) dated (Manila) August 23, 1899, 10–11; letter, unsigned, unaddressed, dated September 10, 1899, 12; report of “Davila,” Captain of the General Staff of the Insurgent Army, dated October 11, 1900, 12–13; and letter from S. Narahara in Manila, to Ishikawa in Yokohama, dated March 23, 1901. The last letter was also registered in the Japanese Consulate in Manila. All correspondence in “Communication Showing Relations of Japanese and Filipinos in the Philippine Islands,” H. B. Collection, Box 5. Future Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon recounted his wartime
contact with two Japanese, Captain Tei Hara and Lieutenant Saburo Nakamori, in his memoir The Good Fight (New York: Appleton, Century Co., 1946), 55–64.


24Lydia N. Yu-Jose, Japan Views the Philippines, 1900–1944, rev. ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 17.


26“Japan and the United States: Philippines, Apple of Discord,” El Renacimiento, (Manila), March 5, 1908, translation in H. B. Collection, Box 5.

27“Problem of the Orient,” El Renacimiento (Manila), December 3, 1908, in H. B. Collection, Box 5.


35Chandler, History of Cambodia, 147.


38Archives Nationales de France, Section Outre-Mer (Paris) (hereafter AOM), A-50 (11 & 17), carton 23, and A-50 NF 595, as cited by Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 73–75. See also Trương Bùu Lam, Patterns of Vietnamese Responses to Foreign Intervention, 1858–1900 (New Haven, CT: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University Monograph Series, No. 11, 1967), 45.


41Ibid., 60–71. See also the recent biography by Trần Mỹ-Vân, A Vietnamese Royal Exile in Japan: Prince Cường Đệ, 1882–1951 (London: Routledge, 2005), 32–35.


46Phan, *Overturned Chariot*, 140–43. See also Phan, “Memoires,” 104–5; and AOM, A-50 NF 28(2), cited in Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism*, 145. An especially important arrest was that of Gilbert Chieu, whose hotels in Saigon and key provincial cities were valuable logistic hubs for the Vietnamese anti-French resistance.


50Earlier, Phan Bội Châu had tried, unsuccessfully, to convince Ho Chi Minh’s father to send his son to Japan. Later in life Ho explained that, even as a child, he wanted to study the West directly. See William J. Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh: A Life* (New York: Hyperion, 2000), 26–27; and Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism*, 255.

51Although a detailed analysis of the reaction of Southeast Asia’s European colonizers cannot be made here, other studies, such as Barbara Watson Andaya’s “From Rûm to Tokyo: The Search for Anticolonial Allies by the Rulers of Riau, 1899–1914,” *Indonesia* 24 (October 1977): 123–56, and the earlier-cited Philippine Constabulary spy reports (notes 19, 20, 25) show clear patterns of highly exaggerated concern bordering on paranoia.