1. Against Endurantism: The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics

1) O at \( t_1 \) is identical with O at \( t_2 \)—i.e., O endures from \( t_1 \) to \( t_2 \). [assume for reductio ad absurdum]
2) O at \( t_1 \) is bent. [premise]
3) O at \( t_2 \) is straight. [premise]
4) If O at \( t_1 \) is identical with O at \( t_2 \), then O at \( t_1 \) and if O at \( t_2 \) share all of their intrinsic properties. [Indiscernibility of Identicals]
5) O at \( t_1 \) is bent and is straight (i.e., not bent). [RAA (1, 2, 3, 4)]

2. Lewis' Perdurantism

Lewis claims that we have three options for blocking this argument:

i. argue that there are no temporary intrinsics—i.e., apparent intrinsic properties are just relations to times;
ii. argue that only the present exists—i.e., that the only intrinsic properties a thing has are those it has at the present moment;
iii. accept the doctrine of temporal parts.

We know that Lewis goes for option iii. But let’s look a little closer at the other options.

**Option i:** Apparent intrinsic properties like bent are actually relations holding between things and times. E.g., O has the bent at relation to \( t_1 \) (and does not have the bent at relation to \( t_2 \)). The bent at relation to \( t_1 \) is a different relation than the bent at relation to \( t_2 \). A contradiction doesn’t arise if we translate the argument in terms of relational properties.

Relational translation of the argument:

1) O at \( t_1 \) is identical with O at \( t_2 \).
2) O has bent-at relation to \( t_1 \).
3) O has the straight-at relation to \( t_2 \).
4) If O at \( t_1 \) is identical with O at \( t_2 \), then O at \( t_1 \) and if O at \( t_2 \) share all of their intrinsic properties. [Indiscernibility of Identicals]
5) O has bent-at relation to \( t_1 \), and has straight-at relation to \( t_2 \). [NO CONTRADICTION. We don’t get \( p \land \neg p \); we get \( p \land \neg q \)]

This response assumes *eternalism* about time—that is, the view according to which all times (past, present, future) are equally real. Remember Lewis claims that this response is “simply incredible”. We know that shape is an intrinsic property, not a relation!

**Option ii:** This option rejects that there are other times at which O differs from how O is now. O is bent (or straight) and that is that. Note, then, that we cannot get the argument off of the ground because the very first premise—premise 1—appeals to different times. But there are no other times; there is just the present. As we
noted last class, Lewis claims that option ii is no endurantist response. It rejects endurance because it rejects persistence—identity over time.

3. Haslanger on Lewis

Haslanger is up to two things in this paper:

a. to argue that perdurantism can give us an account of intrinsic change—it falls prey to the same problems that Lewis argues option i falls prey to;

b. to argue that Lewis’ three options do not exhaust the available options—in particular, there are further ways of developing option i. (This is why I italicize some of the description of option i above.)

Regarding a: According to Lewis, the relational solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics cannot honor our intuitions about what it is to predicate an intrinsic property of an object.

But, Haslanger argues, neither can Lewis!

We think that an object can persist through a change in its intrinsic properties. This is that datum from which the argument against endurantism proceeds.

But, according to perdurantism, there is nothing that persists through a change in its intrinsic properties. What bear the intrinsic properties are the temporal parts of a thing, not the thing itself.

Regarding b: There is what Haslanger calls an “adverbial variant” of option i which Lewis does not give due consideration.

Adverbial modifications of properties: The way that an object has a property is modified by a time.

Just as I might walk slowly (slowly being the modification of the act of walking), something might be bent in a t₁-ly way (or in a t₂-ly way, and so on…).

On the adverbialist solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics, the time (t₁, t₂, and so on) modifies the having of the property and not the property itself.

Adverbialist translation of the argument:

1) O at t₁ is identical with O at t₂.

2) O has-at- t₁ bentness (or is bent in a t₁-ly way).

3) O has-at-t₁ straightness (or is straight in a t₁-ly way).

4) If O at t₁ is identical with O at t₂, then O at t₁ and if O at t₂ share all of their intrinsic properties. (Indiscernibility of Identicals)

5) O has-at- t₁ bentness (or is bent in a t₁-ly way) and has-at-t₂ straightness (or is straight in a t₂-ly way). [NO CONTRADICTION]

Claim: the only way that there could be a contradiction is if being bent and being straight are exemplified, or had, in the same way (say, t₁-ly).

Again, this response assumes eternalism about time—that is, the view according to which all times (past, present, future) are equally real.

According to Haslanger, then, O is intrinsically bent at one time, t₁, and intrinsically straight at another time, t₂. What this comes down to is a revision on the condition of intrinsicness. Remember Lewis characterizes an intrinsic property as a property that an object has independent of any other thing. According to Haslanger, we must, in characterizing the intrinsic properties of a thing, be sensitive to time—i.e., as some philosophers have put it, we must take time seriously. Some intrinsic properties—by their very nature—are properties that a thing has at one time and not at others. One of these is shape. So, in attributing shape to a thing, we must take into account the time of the ‘having’ of shape properties. But this is just to accept the adverbial variant of option i—a variant that can avoid contradiction in the original formulation of the argument from temporary intrinsics.