A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF MEDIATION

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Abstract: We develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on Kydd’s (2003) formal model of mediation, which shows that bias enhances mediator credibility, we offer three complementary mechanisms that enhance mediator credibility. First, we argue that democratic mediators face greater audience costs for deception in the conflict management process because the media in democratic states is more likely to uncover attempts by democratic mediators to provide false information. Second, we argue that information in the global mediation marketplace becomes more accurate as the international system becomes more democratic because there is a wider network of vigilant free presses, which increases the costs of deception for potential mediators. Third, as disputants’ ties to international organizations increase, the mediator’s costs for dishonesty in the conflict management process rise because these institutions provide more frequent and accurate information about the disputants’ capabilities and resolve. We expect each of these factors to increase the frequency of mediators’ efforts to manage interstate conflicts and the success of these efforts. Empirical analyses of data on contentious issues from 1816 to 2001 support our theory. Third party conflict management occurs more frequently and is more successful if a potential mediator is a democracy, as the average global democracy level increases, and as the disputants’ number of shared IO memberships rises. We also find that powerful states serve as mediators more often and are typically successful. Other factors such as trade ties, alliances, issue salience, and distance influence decisions to mediate and mediation success. Taken together, our study provides evidence in support of Kydd’s bias argument, while offering several mechanisms for unbiased mediators to become credible and successful mediators.
Disputants often claim to prefer impartial mediators. They seem more willing to use mediators who are perceived to be unbiased and fair. At the same time, impartiality appears to undermine the mediator’s ability to successfully negotiate a peaceful resolution to a dispute. Remaining impartial may make mediators more attractive, but it also makes them less successful. Biased mediators are more capable of achieving nonviolent outcomes, but how can they do so if disputants are unwilling to use them in the first place? How can potential mediators overcome this dilemma? How can they be both appealing to potential clients and able to deliver desirable results? These are the questions this paper seeks to answer.

Recent research yields two discordant claims: mediators are more attractive to disputants when they remain impartial (Wall and Lynn 1993), but that impartiality can jeopardize mediator credibility and, thus, their performance (Kydd 2003). Scholars also tell us that mediators derive many benefits from mediation—such as a boost in public opinion, heightened international prestige, influence over the disputing states, and the stability of economic and security ties—which give potential mediators a strong incentive to position themselves as neutral and impartial (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). At the same time, Kydd cleverly demonstrates that when a mediator cares solely about peace and derives no benefits from the division of goods at stake, this single-minded focus introduces the possibility of lying to disputants for the best of reasons. This neutral kind of mediator has incentives to convince a disputant that the other side has low costs for war even if it has high costs for war because this information will make a negotiated settlement more desirable than standing firm and risking military conflict. Yet, if disputants know that mediators have incentives to provide false information, they are less likely to turn to mediation as a tool for conflict management in the first place. Thus, mediators face a dilemma: they need to offer impartiality to attract more customers, but their efforts at mediation may be less successful if they cannot credibly communicate information to disputants.

Kydd (2003) argues that a mediator biased in favor of one disputant is more likely to be successful than neutral mediators because it has an advantage in credibly signaling information to its favored state. Biased mediators provide a partial, but incomplete, solution to conflict resolution because
they offer success at the price of others’ willingness to use them. Our approach completes the picture by offering a complementary solution: the influence of the global democratic community and its institutions on the supply and success of credible, neutral mediators.\(^1\) We theorize about how systemic and institutional democratic processes influence choices by potential mediators\(^2\) and focus on how transparency created by the global democratic community influences potential mediators’ behavior. This democracy-based transparency makes even neutral mediators honest and credible and ultimately augments the supply and attractiveness of mediators.

A global democratic community disciplines mediators to tell the truth, making them more credible and appealing to disputing states. This transparency effect is strongest for potential democratic state mediators, although the systemic effects of the democratic community provide better information for all mediators in the conflict management marketplace. We move beyond democratic processes by examining additional factors that influence the credibility and appeal of potential third party managers based on Kydd’s (2003) bias argument. These include political (alliance) and economic (trade) similarities between potential mediators and disputing states (Werner and Lemke 1997). We also test the notion that conflicting parties prefer certain types of mediators, such as powerful and proximate states. Thus, while our theoretical discussion focuses on the global democratic community and its institutions, we attempt to provide a comprehensive statistical model to explain the supply and success of mediation by acknowledging that bias can enhance the credibility of potential third party mediators.

Broadly speaking, we examine both the systemic conditions and mediator attributes that make potential mediators more likely to intervene and more likely to succeed. Bercovitch and Schneider (2000, 146) emphasize the need to explore these supply side factors: “Unfortunately, we do not know the reasons why certain actors become more active in the mediation market, nor whether features such as impartiality are an important asset in a mediator’s inventory of attributes.” Our theory’s contributions to answering these questions are supported by empirical analyses of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project’s dyadic Western Hemisphere data on territorial, maritime, and river issue claims (1816 - 2001).
Third party conflict management occurs more frequently when the international system is more democratic, when the potential mediator is democratic, and when the number of disputants’ shared IO memberships increases. Powerful states serve as mediators more often, and short distances, economic and political relationships between potential mediators and conflicting parties (especially the target) make third party mediation more likely. In addition, examining the supply of mediation more carefully is important because the observed set of mediation cases may not be random if mediators and disputants are strategic in their choices for mediation offers and acceptance of third party involvement (Greig, 2005; Terris and Maoz 2005). This strategic process links decisions to mediate with the success of those mediation efforts. We find that although the global democratic community and ties between mediators and disputants have strong effects on whether disputants turn to third party mediation, their effect on success is conditioned on use. This demonstrates that disputants and mediators have some foresight to use mediation precisely when it is most likely to be successful.

A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF MEDIATION

Much of the third party conflict management literature concentrates on when mediation occurs and the factors that make a mediator desirable, such as neutrality. Bercovitch and Schneider (2000), for example, develop an expected utility model of a potential mediator in a two-party conflict. The model focuses on the stage at which the disputants are both amenable to mediation and prospective third parties consider the value of mediation. It incorporates fixed and variable costs for mediation, as well as the distance between the mediator’s ideal position and the preferences of the conflicting parties. A central deduction from the model is that “potential mediators, if they ever want to be chosen by conflict parties, move rationally towards a neutral position” (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 152-153). Similarly, Fisher (1995) and Young (1967) find that successful mediators are fair and impartial. Parallel scholarship on democratic institutions suggests that the neutrality of courts involved in domestic disagreements builds citizens’ confidence in their state’s use of international courts (Caldeira and Gibson 1995). Nonetheless, based on their empirical analysis, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000, 149)
contend that a neutral stance is not the only variable making a mediator more likely to be selected; rather, the third party’s ability to promote an agreement through the use of leverage, power, and influence also plays a compelling role. Thus, it is no surprise that the United States served as a mediator more often than any other state in the Cold War era.4

Many conflict management scholars view neutrality as an important factor for explaining mediation success as well.5 However, recent formal models demonstrate that the effectiveness of neutrality may depend on the mediator’s ability to provide credible information and the mediator’s preference for the outcome of the dispute. Rauchhaus’ (2006) model focuses on the mediator’s provision of private information, which is modeled separately from the mediator’s bias. His model predicts that “both biased mediators and impartial mediators are expected to serve as effective mediators, and impartial mediators are generally expected to outperform biased ones” (Rauchhaus 2006, 208). Similarly, Kydd (2006) argues that mediators with moderate levels of bias and long-run reputational concerns may be more effective. In contrast, Smith and Stam’s (2003) model suggests that neither biased nor unbiased mediators will alter the intra-war bargaining process. Yet, mediators might be effective through offers of carrots and sticks, which mitigate the disputants’ commitment problem.

Our model builds upon Kydd’s (2003) formal model, and incorporates Rauchhaus’ (2006) view that mediators help to resolve private information problems. Kydd (2003) argues that in order to be credible enough to prevent conflict escalation, mediators must be biased in favor of one side. Because unbiased mediators have incentives to avert war between the disputants, “only mediators who are effectively ‘on your side’ will be believed if they counsel restraint” (Kydd 2003, 597). Kydd’s (2003) study poses an interesting dilemma. Impartiality improves disputants’ confidence in a mediator, but may threaten the mediator’s credibility and diminish its prospects for successful mediation. A mechanism for making impartial mediators credible would resolve this dilemma. In order to identify such a mechanism, we consider supply-side factors in the mediation marketplace that influence the frequency and quality of information about interstate disputes, as well as domestic institutional factors.
that influence the credibility and impartiality of particular mediators. Credible mediators are able to mitigate private information and commitment problems more readily in the conflict management process, making disputants more likely to accept offers of mediation assistance.

We begin by incorporating the democratic community’s influence into Kydd’s (2003) conflict mediation model. We argue that the global democratic community influences the supply of neutral and credible mediators through three primary mechanisms: 1) the mediator’s regime type, 2) the level of global democracy, and 3) disputants’ shared memberships in international organizations. We formally specify each of these mechanisms in the next section.

The Basic Bargaining Game

The study of strategic incentives and mediation is captured nicely by Kydd (2003) in a simple bargaining game between two players. Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) attempt to resolve a dispute over a one-dimensional bargaining space. Player 1 does not know P2’s level of resolve, thus adding the key ingredient of uncertainty that breeds conflict. The role of the mediator (M) is to signal P2’s resolve to P1. It does so after Nature determines P2’s resolve and signals it to M. Kydd’s model includes a parameter to capture the noise of the signal that the mediator receives from Nature, denoted as $\varepsilon$, which is assumed to lie between 0 and 0.5. Lower values of $\varepsilon$ occur when Nature sends mostly correct information about P2’s resolve, while higher values of $\varepsilon$ imply greater noise in the information Nature sent to the mediator. After receiving the signal from M about P2’s resolve, P1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to P2. P2 either accepts the offer or the two states engage in conflict.

Interestingly, Kydd concludes that the mediator must be biased towards P1 in order to convey credible information about P2’s type. Only a friend’s advice to cut a deal is credible. This is driven by the assumption that the mediator’s payoff for a peaceful resolution is some proportion (-1 < $\beta$ < 1) of P1’s piece of the pie ($x$); that is, $\beta x$. When $\beta$ is positive, the mediator is biased in favor of P1, and has an incentive to work to increase $x$. When $\beta$ is negative, M is biased in favor of P2 and works to minimize $x$. When $\beta = 0$, M is unbiased, since it has no incentive to alter the agreement. M’s payoff for a conflict
outcome is $\beta x - c_m$, where $c_m$ is the mediator’s cost of war. No matter what the value of $\beta$, M prefers a peaceful outcome. Herein lies the problem in terms of the mediator’s credibility. Kydd demonstrates that unbiased mediators ($\beta = 0$) always have an incentive to send the signal that P2 has low costs for conflict and thus high resolve. Only for certain levels of bias ($0 < \beta^* < \beta < \beta^{**}$) can M credibly signal high resolve to P1. The implication is that unbiased (or P2-biased) mediators will be less successful in their endeavors because they cannot credibly signal P2’s resolve. This lack of credibility means that players cannot solve the problem of private information. Only when a mediator that is biased in your favor tells you to cut a deal do you have an incentive to listen.

So how does the global democratic community influence this result, if at all? We argue that there are three transparency mechanisms at work that influence the credibility of unbiased mediators in this model. First, the institutional features of the mediator’s home state influence the reputational, electoral, and policy failure costs for deception in the mediation process. The second mechanism emanates from the aggregate effects of the global democratic community, which provides better and more frequent information about the dispute and the mediator to the disputants and the global audience. Because this effect is systemic, it raises the costs of deception for all potential mediators, regardless of their individual characteristics. The third mechanism begins with the supply of information provided by international organizations. As the supply of neutral information from international organizations increases, potential mediators face higher costs for deception.

We propose adding a simple cost function to Kydd’s model that captures the costs mediators incur for sending false information: $-b(S_n - S_m)$, where $b$ is the probability that the mediator will be caught when sending an incorrect signal to P1 about P2’s resolve, and $(S_n - S_m)$ captures the degree to which the signal sent by M differs from the signal sent by Nature. We can think about this cost term as representing the transparency of the mediator’s environment, or the extent to which the mediator’s motives and behavior can be accurately discerned by the media, politicians, and citizens in its home state, and by the media, other governments, and international organizations in the international system.
In other words, it is the degree to which transparency of the international environment and the mediator’s domestic political structure promote or discourage dishonesty.

In the appendix, we describe the equilibrium conditions for the revised model. By adding the cost of lying component to the mediator’s utility function, we can derive a threshold, \( b^* \), or the tolerable probability of being caught. As long as \( b > b^* \), the mediator is motivated to stick to the true signal even if it is impartial and would otherwise only care about achieving peace (\( \beta = 0 \)). As \( b^* \) increases, mediators will tolerate higher risks of getting caught. Anything that causes \( b^* \) to decrease disciplines the mediator to stick to the true signal revealed to it by Nature. The threshold is influenced in part by the degree of deviation from the true signal (\( S_n - S_m \)). Smaller deviations from the true signal increase \( b^* \). The mediator is more willing to venture sending a false signal if it is a white lie, or if (\( S_n - S_m \)) is small. The mediator’s costs for war, \( c_m \), are positively related to \( b^* \) as well. As the costs of failure increase, the incentive to use any means necessary to achieve peace rises. On the other hand, the mediator is more likely to send a true signal as \( b \) increases because the truth telling equilibrium condition, \( b > b^* \), is more likely to hold. All three transparency mechanisms (the regime type of the mediating state, the influence of the global democratic community, and the influence of international organizations), though somewhat distinct, increase \( b \) and raise the mediator’s costs for sending false information. Higher values of \( b \) reduce the private information problem and allow P1 and P2 to find a bargain and avoid war. When the mediator’s costs for deception increase, truth telling is more likely, even if the mediator is unbiased. In other words, transparency allows mediators to simultaneously be unbiased and truth-telling, meaning they are both more attractive to disputants and more capable of successfully producing peaceful settlements. We elaborate on each of the causal mechanisms in the following three sections.

**Credibility Derived from the Mediating State’s Domestic Institutions**

Democratic states face greater costs for sending false information as mediators because their deceptive behavior is more likely to be uncovered in the process of public scrutiny. In other words, \( b(S_n - S_m) \) is
larger for democratic mediators than for autocratic mediators. One component, \((S_n - S_m)\), conveys that bigger lies represent bigger costs for the mediator. This difference allows us to capture the degree of deviation from the true signal as a choice for the mediator; when it tells the truth, it is zero. The other component, \(b\), is larger for democratic states because the transparency of democratic institutional processes makes it harder for the mediator to fudge the signal in the interest of garnering peace. The process of public scrutiny makes it more likely that the mediator’s deceptive actions will be revealed and that the mediator will pay a potentially greater audience cost for foreign policy failure. Because democratic mediators have larger values of \(b\), they pay larger costs for sending false information to P1 about P2’s resolve.

Numerous scholars argue that the transparency of democratic institutions, such as the free press, generates greater credibility for democratic states’ foreign policy behavior and higher audience costs for foreign policy failure (e.g., Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Smith 1996; van Belle 1997; Downs and Rocke 1995). Democratic states suffer greater costs for deceptive mediation because the false information they provide to disputing states is more likely to be uncovered by the media and other domestic constituencies. When a leader is found to be untruthful, he or she may suffer a variety of domestic costs including a decline in approval, inability to push a domestic agenda, and removal from office in extreme situations. These higher costs translate into more truth telling by democratic mediators and greater confidence in their veracity. Not only should this produce higher success rates, it should also yield a higher likelihood for mediation by democratic states relative to non-democracies.

Even as far back as the early 1850s, American mediation efforts were checked by democratic institutions. In 1852, the U.S. Senate demanded to know the details of R. M. Walsh’s assignment as a special envoy charged with mediating a dispute between St. Domingo and Haiti. In compliance, President Fillmore submitted the communications between Walsh and the Department of State to the *New York Times*, which published them in full. The State Department directives to Walsh include specific instructions on the need to remain neutral, the conditions under which he should threaten Haiti
with a blockade by France and the U.K., and the level of naval force that was at disposal to make good on these threats (New York Times 1852). Public access to these precise directions made it more difficult for Walsh to deal dishonestly with St. Domingo and Haiti.\(^8\)

A more recent example illustrates the high costs democracies face for deception in interstate conflict management.\(^9\) On a number of occasions, President Bush and other White House officials made several claims about Iraq’s program to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD).\(^10\) They argued that the United States had uncovered information about Iraq’s attempts to purchase uranium and high-strength aluminum tubes from African states for the development of nuclear weapons, and used this evidence to justify a hard line position on Iraq’s WMD program. Several media outlets in the United States conducted detailed research on these claims, finding very little evidence to support the White House’s position.\(^11\) For example, Washington Post writer Joby Warrick (2003a) uncovered several sources claiming that Iraq never attempted to purchase uranium, and that Iraq’s attempts to purchase aluminum tubes were unrelated to any supposed nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Joseph Wilson (2003), who was hired by the CIA to travel to Africa to examine the veracity of these claims, wrote a critical op-ed in the New York Times claiming that he found absolutely no evidence to support the claims.

This deception produced costs on two fronts. Domestically, the revelation that President Bush and his officials provided faulty information eventually eroded public support. Bush’s near record-low approval rating has made it difficult for him to pursue his domestic agenda, and his party lost control of Congress in the 2006 elections. Though it is difficult to differentiate the costs derived from this deception from the costs derived from the insurgent violence and mounting US casualties, it is likely that the outrage against the war would be tempered if the US had found evidence of a thriving WMD program. Citizens have a high tolerance threshold when they are convinced that the costs are necessary to achieve a noble goal, such as preventing the spread of communism during the Cold War, and when they believe that their leaders make honest efforts to peacefully resolve a conflict.\(^12\)
On the international front, perceived U.S. dishonesty over WMD in Iraq has undermined American leadership years later during negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program. Responding to allegations by U.S. intelligence agencies that North Korea had provided Syria with designs for a reactor, Syrian ambassador Imad Moustafa told media outlet CNN that the veracity of such claims were undermined by the “proven record of this administration to fabricate lies” (CNN 2008). The allegations prompted Congressional demands for more detailed facts and raised the need for North Korea’s proliferation activities to be included as a topic of concern during the six-party talks. However, the Bush administration’s slow provision of public information regarding the North Korean-designed facility, and the shadow of dishonesty still lingering from Iraq, have weakened the superpower’s ability to guide the talks. North Korea’s resistance to disclose its export of nuclear technology stalled the talks for several months (CNN 2008). The unsubstantiated claims made against Iraq also created reputation costs for the United States when confronted with Iran’s nuclear weapons program and Iran’s alleged role in interfering with the Iraqi political process. American attempts to link Iran with the Iraqi militias, for example, have been met with immediate criticism from a variety of sources (Cooper and Mazzetti 2007), while U.S. efforts to convince the world of the impending threat from Iran’s nuclear program were quickly dismissed by a variety of state and IO leaders (Afrasiabi 2006; Associated Press 2007).

Scholars similarly demonstrate that when a state is caught lying, its international reputation and agenda-setting influence in interstate negotiations are reduced. As Sartori (2005,125) shows, repeated play in diplomatic settings pushes states toward honesty in diplomacy: “States’ leaders and diplomats often speak honestly in order to maintain their ability to use diplomacy in future disputes or negotiations.” Mediators have an analogous incentive to behave as honest brokers, especially if the openness of their home government increases the chance that lies will be revealed, and particularly if they value the ability to mediate in future disputes. Alterman (2004) offers a good summary of the variety of costs associated with high-profile instances of dishonesty, using examples of various U.S. Presidents:
“Had FDR told the truth about Yalta to the country, it is far more likely that the United States would have participated in the creation of the kind of world community he envisioned when he made his secret agreements. John Kennedy's deception about the nature of the deal to which he agreed to insure the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba also proved enormously detrimental to his hope of creating a lasting, stable peace in the context of cold war competition. [Lyndon Johnson’s false assurances regarding the second Tonkin Gulf incident] destroyed not only his ambitious hopes to create a ‘Great Society’ but also his own presidency and most of his political reason for being. And Ronald Reagan, through his lies about Central America, created a dynamic through which his advisers believed they had a right to initiate a secret, illegal foreign and military policy whose aims were almost perfectly contradictory to the President's stated aims in such crucial areas as dealing with governments deemed to be terrorist.”

Clearly, democratic leaders suffer audience costs for providing false information in diplomatic settings, regardless of the success or failure of the associated foreign policy itself.

If we consider the influence of a potential mediating state’s political institutions on its decision about whether or not to manipulate private information, we see that the transparency and oversight of democratic political systems disciplines democratic mediators to remain honest, which means that even unbiased democratic mediators become an attractive option for conflict resolution and can successfully help the parties reach a peaceful settlement. We offer:

**Hypothesis 1a**: As a potential mediating state’s democracy level increases, it is more likely to serve as a conflict manager.

**Hypothesis 1b**: As a mediating state’s democracy level increases, the likelihood that it will successfully manage disputes rises.

**Credibility Derived from the Global Democratic Community**

The second source of credibility focuses on the systemic effect of the global democratic community. As the international system becomes more democratic, there is a larger global media presence to collect independent information about disputes. These systemic effects generate costs for deception for all mediators because the probability of a revealed lie increases.

With over half of the states in the world in the 21st century possessing democratic institutions (Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre, 1999), the supply of free presses has increased substantially as well. At the monadic level, van Belle (1997, 409) reports that the presence or absence of a free press coincides with
the presence or absence of democracy 86% of the time. In addition to reducing the likelihood of dyadic militarized conflict (van Belle, 1997), free presses generate greater information and potential costs for disingenuous diplomacy. The global supply of free presses has risen dramatically in recent decades, corresponding with global trends towards increased democratization. In 1980, 46% of countries had partly free or free presses; this increased to 65% of states with free presses in 2006 (Freedom House, 2007). These trends suggest rising costs for deceptive mediators because the likelihood of being caught in a lie increases. Halim (2002, 196) notes that, “Good relations with the media, backed by a steady flow of information and explanation between the mediator and media, is crucial to projecting an image of the mediator’s neutrality, rationality, and efficacy.”

We can return to the Iraqi example as a more specific illustration of how systemic levels of democracy and free presses affect a mediator’s credibility. Dozens of international media outlets contributed to the uncovering of the truth about Iraq’s alleged attempts to develop nuclear weapons. When Secretary of State Colin Powell identified a specific compound in northern Iraq as a terrorist chemical weapons plant, for example, several foreign journalists traveled to the area, finding no evidence to support Powell’s remarks. For example, The Guardian’s Luke Harding (2003) explained, “…the terrorist factory was nothing of the kind - a dilapidated collection of concrete outbuildings at the foot of a grassy sloping hill.” In a broader context, a recent study by two nonprofit journalism groups reports that President Bush and his top aides made 935 false statements about the security risk posed by Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion (Lewis and Reading-Smith 2008). As before, this deception resulted in substantial domestic and international audience costs. The administration’s future efforts to reprimand Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons program, for example, were severely hampered due to its dishonesty in dealing with Iraq. It was forced to prematurely authenticate Iran’s claim that its nuclear ambitions were entirely peaceful, in spite of support for tougher sanctions from Germany and the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council (Economist 2008).
Less democratic states are also constrained by the media. China and Russia’s dishonesty in the Oil-for-Food scandal following the first Gulf War in Iraq was revealed by Fox News, Al-Hurra (a U.S.-funded satellite television station in the Middle East), and other international news sources in the mid-2000s, which limited their ability to help manage and direct post-war settlements and rebuilding following the second Gulf War. Historical examples indicate that autocratic mediators who lie are likewise seen as less attractive options later on. During the 1853 dispute between Russian and Turkey over various ports and principalities, Austria’s mediation efforts failed because it proved to be untrustworthy. Austria’s initial claim of neutrality was called into question when it demanded payments from Turkey (New York Times 1853a), and then Austria’s assertion that the U.S. was supplying Turkey was discounted precisely because it came from a dishonest information broker (New York Times 1853b). Austria’s deceit regarding its impartiality undermined its reputation and its subsequent effort to provide information about the Russo-Turkish dispute.

One conclusion from this discussion is that as the democratic community grows, we are more likely to see democratically-influenced mediators that are perceived as truthful and fair. The probability of getting caught lying is a function of the transparency of the mediation process and the systemic environment. Mediators that are integrated with the democratic community are more likely to get caught if they are lying, and a stronger democratic community brings more opportunity for transparency. In other words, a vibrant democratic community produces a greater supply of the preferred type of mediators, those that are credible as well as unbiased. As a result, there is a concomitant rise in the frequency of using mediators. The norms underpinning dispute resolution in democratic societies, as well as the transparency of democratic political processes, produce an important systemic phenomenon.

Critics might contend that we are conflating credibility with supply, or that increasing costs for mediator dishonesty might instead produce a larger pool of credible mediators with a smaller group of actual mediators. We disagree with this premise. While our theoretical model focuses on factors that influence the costs for telling lies, it also recognizes that mediators gain benefits from successfully
managing conflicts, which is the basis for Kydd’s assumption that mediators always prefer peaceful settlement to conflict. Mediators stand to gain a lot for successful efforts, including a boost in public opinion, influence over the disputing states, heightened international prestige, and the stability of economic and security ties. Mediators tied to the democratic community have specific interests in getting involved as conflict managers to help ensure the survival of other democratic regimes (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003), and to protect free and open markets. President Bush’s last-breath mediation attempt in the Middle East, arguably an effort to improve his historical legacy, illustrates the potential benefits of successful mediation well. Because the global democratic influences all states to be more honest mediators and because such mediators are more likely to be put to use and to succeed, we propose:

Hypothesis 2a: As the global community becomes more democratic, potential mediators are more likely to serve as conflict managers.

Hypothesis 2b: As the global community becomes more democratic, the likelihood that mediators will successfully manage disputes rises.

Credibility Derived from International Organizations

We also expect an increasing presence of international institutions to enhance the supply of credible third party conflict managers. When Kantian values become deeply internalized, “states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own” (Caporaso 1992; Gelpi 1997; Wendt, 1999, 305). Conflicts involving others take on more importance as actors come to view security threats to one member of their community as threatening to all. This parallels a citizen’s attitude toward crime in her neighborhood. Even if her home is not vandalized, she may be concerned because she views it as a threat to her community’s security. One common reaction towards neighborhood crime throughout the U.S. is to form a Neighborhood Watch Program. These programs are institutions designed for the specific purpose of dissuading criminal activity through organized monitoring of the neighborhood. Similarly, states
concerned by the magnitude or proximity of other states’ violent interactions form regional or global institutions to alleviate international conflict.

Global IOs augment the supply of credible mediators in a variety of ways. Already established by previous research, IOs provide institutional mechanisms for third party mediation, meaning that as the global number of IOs increases, IOs themselves are more likely to serve as conflict managers (Authors 2005). Furthermore, as disputants’ shared membership in IOs increases, they are more likely to use third party mediators (Shannon 2005). Of special note are the more indirect, or environmental, effects that international institutions have on the provision of quality third party mediators. Because IOs provide an alternative, independent source of information, they promote the transparency of states (Grigorescu 2003), which in turn become more reliable, honest mediators.

For instance, following the June 2008 border attacks by Eritrea into Djibouti territory, the African Union and the League of Arab States sent fact-finding missions and made independent assessments of the hostilities. Their reports should serve as a basis of neutral information in the event that the two parties eventually agree to mediation by one of the several states that have offered their services (Qatar, France, and Yemen). The Iraqi example further illustrates how IOs promote the credibility of state efforts as conflict managers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was integral in uncovering the false information provided by the Bush administration during its attempt to monitor and secure Iraqi compliance with post war sanctions. In March 2003, IAEA chief weapons inspectors Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei rejected the Bush administration’s claim that Iraq, an IAEA member since 1959, had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger, an IAEA member state since 1969. After interviewing Iraqi and Nigerien officials and comparing correspondence from the Niger government with those provided by the U.S., the IAEA concluded “that these documents, which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger, are in fact not authentic,” and that “these specific allegations are unfounded” (ElBaredi 2003). The agency also revealed that several of the documents that the White House had used to support its claims were
forgeries (Warrick 2003b). The ensuing failure of conflict management, namely the U.S.’s refusal to back down and its initiation of the second Gulf War, proved disastrous for Bush’s approval ratings at home and American prestige abroad. This example demonstrates how IOs help augment credibility in interstate interactions by dispelling erroneous information and keeping conflict managers honest.

An IO’s efforts toward reporting objective facts can also be used to further mediation by the IO itself. The Organization of American States (OAS), for example, sent a commission to visit Ecuador and Colombia to establish the particulars of a March 1, 2008 incursion of Colombian troops into Ecuador’s territory in an effort to pursue and fight the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The commission worked quickly, visiting the site of the incursion and with officials in both states from March 9th to the 12th. In its March 17th report, the OAS commission established the timeline of events, identified particular individuals who were killed, determined the extent of the use of aerial bombing, and other important details (OAS 2008). Praising the OAS’s fact-finding work and efforts at mediation, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon pronounced the OAS an “impartial mechanism” for resolving the militarized disagreement (OAS 2008). Subsequent OAS mediation work produced a pledge to not violate Ecuador’s territory again from Colombia and the establishment of measures to rebuild confidence between Ecuador and Colombia.

Not all IOs will be easily able to provide high quality information in every situation. We surmise that the IOs best situated to keep mediators honest by disclosing relevant facts and evidence to the public are those to which both disputants belong. In a sense, these are the IOs in the disputants’ “neighborhood,” the ones most likely to develop a “neighborhood watch” role vis-à-vis the conflicting parties. As membership in these institutions grows, the supply of desirable and successful third party conflict management efforts by these organizations and states should increase as well:

Hypothesis 3a: As the disputants’ number of shared memberships in international organizations increases, the likelihood that potential mediators will serve as third party conflict managers rises.

Hypothesis 3b: As the disputants’ number of shared memberships in international organizations increases, the likelihood that mediators will successfully manage disputes rises.
Bias as a Complementary Source of Credibility

Because our model was built on Kydd’s (2003) model, it maintains his prediction that biased mediators are more credible. The mechanism driving this original feature is that bias toward one disputant means the mediator has a stake in the outcome of the disagreement and will not simply lie to get peace. In what sort of ways might mediators be biased or how might they benefit from the settlement outcome? We consider two potential types of ties between a potential mediator and a disputant: economic (bilateral trade) and political (alliance portfolio similarity with other states). According to our formal model (and Kydd’s 2003 model), sources of bias should make mediation more successful. Because these two sources of bias have additional information features, traits distinct from the mediator’s stake in the division of the issue under dispute, they also carry with them punishments for lying. In other words, these sources of bias might also be interpreted as truth-telling constraints which make biased mediators more attractive even though they are biased. In a sense, the information feature that produces honesty potentially offsets the bias inherent in dyadic relationships characterized by deep economic or political ties. Below we discuss the bias component that links trade and alliances to mediation success and address how these ties also have information characteristics that make prospective mediators more appealing.

Potential mediators often share interests with a disputant. If the issue in dispute threatens to disrupt their economic relationship, for instance, the mediator and disputant will both be keen to reach an outcome that protects their gains from trade, ensures market health, stabilizes currency, and fortifies domestic economic systems. In Savun’s (2008) thorough examination of the role of various types of bias in mediation, she uses trade as a central component in a composite indicator of bias and finds that close ties make the mediator more credible and successful. Teng (2008) provides a more specific example, demonstrating that despite a troubled history with North Korea, China’s status as its top
trading partner has made it an “honest third party in maintaining the momentum of the six-party talks” (2008, 56).

Extensive economic ties also mean greater expected costs of lying. Russett and Oneal (2001, 130) argue that trade increases communication between states, thereby creating a shared sense of identity and shared values. Potential mediators should be less likely to send false signals to their trading partners in order to avoid jeopardizing these close relationships and their concomitant monetary benefits. Moreover, states that trade with each other often develop an infrastructure to exchange information, and the domestic media is likely to be attentive to disputes involving its home country’s trading partners. As the volume of information and number of potential whistle-blowers increases, it is more difficult for a mediator to send a disingenuous signal. When given the choice, states prefer to trade with more trustworthy partners. If a state proves to be distrustful as a mediator, then it becomes increasingly likely that it will also lose the beneficial trade ties that it has forged with the disputing state. Potential mediators with strong trade ties to disputing states are apt to send true signals because they face greater costs for deception in the conflict management process, making them more attractive mediators.16

China’s unique role in mediating the dispute between the US and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear weapons program provides one example of this expectation. With over $2 and $300 billion in annual bilateral trade with North Korea and the US (respectively), China has been sought by both parties as a mediator. North Korea trusts China because of its historical military support and its continuous economic relationship, while the US is confident that China would be very unlikely to endanger its existing trading relationship by showing dishonesty in the negotiations (Lam 2002; International Crisis Group 2006). Meanwhile, China would benefit greatly from an end to the standoff because regional stability would improve. Overall, China’s significant trade with both disputants enhances its ability to be perceived as a sincere mediator.

Overlapping political views are another way in which a mediator’s preferences might be biased toward one disputant. As a mediator and disputant’s views on defense, world order, common enemies,
and peace become more alike, the mediator’s interests will more closely mirror those of the disputant. As a result, the mediator can more credibly communicate with its preferred disputant, making mediation more likely to successfully produce a peaceful agreement. Shared political interests also imply a variety of connections that facilitate and promote the exchange of information across multiple levels. Mutual preferences on political issues translate into a variety of common institutions and regimes, which in turn correspond to information structures that facilitate the coordination and implementation of joint or similar policies. Two states that share strong security concerns, for example, might belong to a multilateral alliance such as NATO, which institutionalizes mechanisms that assure the transfer of credible information (Risse-Kappen 1996). Or suppose that a potential mediator and a disputant share core ideological beliefs. They would be likely to both be aligned with additional states that also hold these beliefs (Lai and Reiter 2000), resulting in a networks of states with common ideology. Such communities produce a variety of connections in the form of joint summits, mutual systems for monitoring outside threats, joint defense efforts, and so forth. A potential mediator finds it more difficult to send a disingenuous signal to a disputant with whom it shares many overlapping connections with the rest of the international community. States with such ties are more attractive mediators.

In short, because economic and political ties between a potential mediator and a disputant function both as a source of bias and as a source of information, we expect these ties to augment the frequency and success of third party mediation. We offer:

**Hypothesis 4a**: As the ties between a potential mediator and a disputant increases, the likelihood that the potential mediator will serve as third party conflict managers rises.

**Hypothesis 4b**: As the ties between a mediator and a disputant increases, the mediator is more likely to succeed.

**Research Design**

To evaluate decisions by potential mediators, we need to identify: 1) a set of conflicts where mediation could have been offered, 2) a subset of cases in which third party conflict mediation occurred, and 3) criteria for determining which states should be counted as potential mediators. To satisfy the first and
second criteria, we use version 1.0 of the ICOW project’s Western Hemisphere data on contentious issue claims (Hensel, 2001; Mitchell, 2002; Hensel et al., 2008). The ICOW project identifies contentious issue claims based on explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more states over a particular issue. Three types of contentious issues are in the database: 1) territorial claims, where one state challenges sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state, 2) maritime claims, which involve explicit contention between two or more states over the ownership, access to, or usage of a maritime area, and 3) river claims, which involve explicit contention over the usage or ownership of an international river. This database is useful for our purposes because the universe includes all disagreements over these issues, regardless of whether they were resolved peacefully, violently, bilaterally, with third party assistance, or not at all. For each contentious claim, ICOW records every distinct peaceful settlement attempt, distinguishing between bilateral negotiations and third party efforts.

In addressing the third criterion, we use a potential mediator for each year of a dyadic claim as the unit of analysis. To construct a set of such observations, we first consider every ongoing year of a dyadic claim. Because ICOW distinguishes between the challenger, which seeks to change the status quo, and the target, which seeks to preserve it, each case is a unique challenger-target-year combination. For all three issue types (territory, maritime, and river), there are a total of 9,181 claim dyad-years in the Western Hemisphere ICOW data from 1816 to 2001. Next, we create a case for every potential mediator in each ongoing dyad-year of each claim. The set of potential mediators includes all states in the Americas plus the major powers as defined by the Correlates of War Project (Small and Singer, 1982). While this strategy for creating a universe of analysis makes positive values for our dependent variables extremely rare (occurring in less than 1% of the cases), it has three key advantages. First, it eliminates the selection bias problem associated with analyzing only cases in which at least one mediator intervenes. By considering third parties that attempt settlements as well as those whose potential services were not rendered, we can identify the factors that determine when outside
management will occur and which actors are prone to intercede. Second, it allows us to capture
temporal variation in our independent variables. Third, we can examine the individual characteristics of
each potential mediator, such as the mediator’s regime type and its relationship with the disputing states,
which provides the most direct test of our hypotheses.

As we discussed earlier, examining mediation success as well as the decision to mediate is important because selection effects may be at work. In addition, our hypotheses stipulate factors related to both the supply and success of mediation. The first dependent variable, *Mediation Attempt*, equals one for each potential mediator-claim-dyad-year if the potential mediator served as a third party conflict manager at least once in that dyadic claim in that year, and zero otherwise. A potential mediator’s services were used in 276 of 168,031 cases (0.16%). The second dependent variable, *Mediation Success*, is coded 1 if the mediation resulted in an agreement between the two parties, and zero otherwise. Fewer than half (133) of the mediation attempts were successful by resulting in agreements.

Our theory specifies that three primary theoretical variables should affect the likelihood of mediation attempts and success. The first independent variable, *Mediator’s Polity*, captures the regime type of the potential mediating state. Scores are calculated with data from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). This variable captures the difference between a state’s democracy and autocracy scores, with a mean of .606 and a range from -10 to +10. The second theoretical variable, *Average Global Democracy*, represents the intensity of the global democratic community. This variable is calculated as the average Polity IV democracy score per year for all states in the international system. This variable has a mean of 3.43 and ranges from .83 to 5.13. Our third theoretical variable, *Shared IO Memberships*, assesses the information provided by global institutions. This is measured as the count of global multilateral treaties and institutions calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes that both disputants have signed and ratified. Membership in qualifying institutions is measured through the ICOW Project’s Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set, which records the signature and ratification of all multilateral treaties and institutions that explicitly call for the pacific
settlement of political disputes among members.\textsuperscript{20} We focus on this smaller set of IOs because they have an explicit mandate for managing conflicts among member states and they are more likely to provide the kind of neutral information we described theoretically. This variable has a mean of 1.48 and ranges from 0 to 4.

Beyond our primary independent variables, we also recognize that bias may serve as a complementary source of credibility and information, thereby increasing the likelihood and success of third party mediation. To test this argument, we first examine the level of dyadic trade between the potential mediator and the challenger, $\text{Trade}_{PM-Ch}$, the level of dyadic trade between the potential mediator and target state, $\text{Trade}_{PM-T}$.\textsuperscript{21} We also test the influence of strong political ties by including an $\text{Alliance}_{PM-Ch}$ measure, which taps similarities in foreign policy positions of the potential mediator and the challenger, and $\text{Alliance}_{PM-T}$, which makes a parallel assessment for the potential mediator and the target. Both alliance variables are equivalent to Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) measure of alliance portfolio similarities, or $S$.\textsuperscript{22} As Signorino and Ritter point out, the similarity in two states’ obligations to other states “is commonly assumed to reflect the extent to which [they] have common or conflicting security interests” (1999, 115).

We now turn to placing our analysis within the context of a broader understanding of mediation activity. We include several control variables that should affect the costs of mediation, and disputants’ demands for external involvement. Some mediators are more attractive than others due to their power and mediation skills (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). To control for this, we include a variable for the potential mediator’s capabilities as indicated by its CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Ranging from zero to one, $\text{Mediator’s CINC Score}$ measures a potential mediator’s average share of global military, economic, and demographic power.\textsuperscript{23} We also expect states farther away from conflicts to be less willing to mediate because the cost of mediation increases with distance. Greater distances between the capital cities of the potential mediator and the challenger, $\text{Distance}_{PM-Ch}$, and between the potential mediator and the target, $\text{Distance}_{PM-T}$, should discourage intervention. These distances are
based on the “great circle” formula (Fitzpatrick and Modlin, 1986). Next, we anticipate that some types of conflicts should generate more outside management efforts than others. Conflicts over highly salient issues will draw more outside attention than less salient issues (Hensel 2001). Taken from the ICOW data, Issue Salience taps a variety of issue attributes, each of which is thought to increase the issue’s value to one or both sides. Finally, conflicts between states with vastly different military and economic capabilities may generate less interest from potential mediators than those between relative equals. Potential mediators are apt to view highly asymmetric conflicts as situations where their services are more likely to be rejected. Thus, we should observe fewer mediation efforts in such cases. Relative CapabilitiesCh/T captures the relative power asymmetries between the challenger and target state by dividing the challenger’s composite CINC score by the combined CINC score of the dyad. Higher values indicate more pronounced advantages for the challenger, which should diminish the likelihood of outside mediation.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

We present our empirical analyses in Table 1. The first set of tests comes in Model 1, where we use logistic regression with Mediation Attempt as the dependent variable. Beginning with this earlier step in the mediation process provides the best test of our theory because it eliminates potential selection bias that may arise if we focus exclusively on the success of mediation. To follow through, in Model 2, we switch the dependent variable to Mediation Success. Selection bias is then examined explicitly with a Heckman probit model in Model 3 (Heckman 1979).

We find strong support for the first pair of hypotheses, which link the probability of mediation efforts and their success to the potential mediating state’s democracy level. Positive and significant coefficients for Mediator’s Polity in Model 1 ($p < .001$) and Model 2 ($p < .002$) suggest that increases in a potential mediating state’s democracy score significantly augment its likelihood of being acceptable to the disputants and its chances for affecting an agreement. Beyond statistical significance, the
substantive effects for the independent variables are gauged by calculating each variable’s marginal effect on a dependent variable when holding all other variables constant at their means or modes. The Clarify program was used to estimate predicted values for the statistically significant variables in Table 1 (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003). The results for these calculations are presented graphically in Figure 1.25 In this figure, each significant independent variable is plotted with the probability of a mediation attempt on the Y axis, and the entire range of each independent variable on the X axis. In Figure 1a, we see that the likelihood of mediation increases by 111% as regime type varies from its minimum to maximum value, which indicates substantively strong support for Hypothesis 1a.26 The effect of the Mediator’s Polity on mediation success in Model 2 has a similar effect (155.2%), which indicates strong initial support for Hypothesis 1b.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict that the supply of impartial mediators, and hence mediator use and mediator success, will increase as the average democratic level in the international system grows. Again, we find strong support for these two hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 show positive and significant coefficients ($p < .020$ and $p < .001$) for Average Global Democracy. The substantive effect shown in Figure 1b is similar in magnitude to that for the mediator’s level of democracy, with an 82.2% increase in the likelihood of mediation when the average global democracy value shifts from its minimum to its maximum. Somewhat stronger findings are found in Model 2, with the likelihood of mediation success increasing by 241% when average global democracy increases from its minimum to maximum values. Overall, these results suggest that a more widespread global democratic community significantly increases the probability that potential mediators help manage the conflict and the success of their attempts.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b suggest that the provision of credible third party conflict management and the rate of management success should increase as global institutions proliferate. We find support for this argument. The coefficients for Shared IO Memberships are positive and significant in Models 1 and
International institutions securely tied to the democratic community provide a trustworthy source of information through enhanced transparency and higher costs for lying. As shown in Figure 1c, substantive effects for global institutions are similar in size to the effects for global democracy levels. As we move from the minimum to the maximum value for shared institutions, the probability of third party mediation increases by 168%, while the probability of mediation success increases by 137%. These results parallel prior research, which finds that increases in the claimants’ joint IO memberships make institutional third party conflict management more likely (Authors 2005).

Beyond our primary hypotheses, we also predicted that increasing levels of economic and political ties should increase the supply of credible mediators and their chances for producing agreements. We find that both trading relationships and alliance portfolio similarities significantly enhance the likelihood of third party mediation, but only when considering the relationship between the potential mediator and the target state. As shown in Figures 1d and 1e, a move from the minimum to the maximum trade level (Trade$_{PM-T}$) boosts the probability of mediation by 2368%. Increasing levels of alliance portfolio similarities with the target state (Alliance$_{PM-T}$) also spurs potential mediators into action, raising the probability of third party management by 254%. We see similar results in Model 2. Trade ties between the potential mediator and the target state increase the likelihood of mediation success by 2010%. Though positive as expected, alliance ties are statistically insignificant ($p < .16$).

Why might a potential mediator’s ties to the target compel it to intercede whereas ties to the challenger do not? Regarding trade connections, one might speculate that third parties trading with the target have more incentive to mediate a dispute in order to prevent disruption of the status quo trade partnership. Third parties trading with the challenger, on the other hand, may have less incentive to mediate given that they, like the challenger, would likely benefit from a revision of the status quo. They may prefer to let the crisis play itself out in hopes that the challenger succeeds in revising the status quo. The same logic suggests that potential mediators with strong political ties to the challenging state may
also prefer the same type of revisions that the challenging state seeks, giving them little incentive to bring a quick end to disputes.

We also identified several variables that affect the supply and success of mediation, including those that may alter the costs of mediation and disputants’ demands for external involvement. Several of the measures meant to capture these concepts are found to have significant effects on decisions by potential mediating states to intervene in contentious issue claims. First, a long distance between the potential mediator’s and the claimants’ capitals are found to diminish chances for intercession. Substantively, we find that distances between the potential mediator and the target (DistancePM-T, Figure 1f) decrease the likelihood of mediation by 96%. A similar effect is found for this measure when considering mediation success in Model 2 (95%). Although the distance between the potential mediator and the target (DistancePM-Ch) shows the expected negative sign, the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance for either mediation attempts ($p < .12$) or mediation success ($p < .22$). We also find that the power of the challenger relative to the target (Relative CapabilitiesCh/T) has no effect on the likelihood of mediation ($p < .35$). This suggests that power asymmetries between the disputing states play little role in attracting mediation. The same variable is found to significantly increase the likelihood of mediation success, though the effect is the smallest of all variables in substantive terms (-54%). Consistent with Bercovitch and Schneider’s (2000) work, we find that strong states (those with a high value for Mediator’s CINC Score) are much more likely to mediate than weak ones. In fact, the effect of the potential mediator’s strength dwarfs that of any other independent variable. The strongest state (the US) is 10785% more likely to mediate than the weakest (St. Kitts and Nevis), and the mean predicted probability for US mediation in any given claim dyad-year is 0.011 (Figure 1g). We find another strong effect when considering mediation success in Model 2 (11707%). Finally, we see that the salience of the specific issue under contention (Issue Salience) is important in attracting mediation. As shown in Figure 1h, claims with the highest salience level are 2027% more likely to undergo mediation than those
with the lowest salience. The substantive effect remains large (2095%) when considering mediation success in Model 2.

Robustness and Extensions

While the first two models provide the most direct tests of our hypotheses, several issues should be considered to assure the robustness of our results. First, we noted earlier that examining Mediation Attempt and Mediation Success in separate models might produce questionable findings because mediators are likely to intentionally select themselves into cases where they expect to be successful. If so, our analyses would likely suffer from selection bias if we analyzed only cases prone to successful agreements. In other words, the results in Models 1 and 2 do not tell us whether the increased volume of credible information from IOs has more to do with decisions to mediate or with the \textit{a priori} likelihood of mediation success. This is more fully explored in Model 3, where we use a Heckman selection model to jointly estimate the likelihood of mediation and agreement. Interestingly, once state decisions to mediate are estimated jointly with the success of those efforts, almost all of the variables exhibit significant effects only on the first stage of decisions to mediate.\textsuperscript{27} These findings do not necessarily cast doubt upon our conclusions because our significant variables indeed make mediation success more likely. Rather, they imply that mediators are forward thinking and anticipating the likelihood for success when making offers to disputants for conflict management assistance.

Second, scholars have long recognized the dominant role that the United States has played in the Americas. We ran two additional analyses to examine how this dominance affects our results. First, we re-ran our analyses after dropping the US as a potential mediator. Second, we included a dummy variable for the US. With the US dropped as a potential mediator, the variable for Mediator’s Polity drops from significance. Similarly, when we include the US dummy, the effect of Mediator’s Polity and Mediator’s CINC are diminished. These results are unsurprising for a variety of reasons. First, given that the US mediates in roughly one-third of the cases in our dataset, dropping it as a potential mediator leaves far fewer cases of mediation for analysis. Second, because the US dummy correlates with regime
score and CINC, the dummy variable is simply capturing the same variation that we captured otherwise with our more theoretically-informed variables. Third, the results simply confirm that the US has played a dominant role in the Western Hemisphere.

Third, our argument and theoretical model indicate that the transparency added by increasing levels of democracy, average global democracy, and shared IO memberships should increase the credibility of potential mediators. Our empirical tests remain consistent with this by examining how these factors affect mediation while holding bias constant. However, one might also argue that transparency replaces bias as a credibility mechanism. If so, we would expect the transparency variables to play very little role in promoting credibility among biased potential mediators. The effect of transparency should increase as bias diminishes. Evidence of this interactive effect would provide an important extension of our empirical findings by pointing to a fruitful path for future theoretical development. We examine this by adding interactive terms to Models 1 and 2 to capture interactions between the three transparency variables and the four bias variables. Instead of presenting the 24 total models (3 transparency x 4 bias x 2 dependent variables), we consider the effect of the average level of global democracy on the likelihood of mediation attempts and mediation success might be conditioned on alliance portfolio similarities.28

Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) explain many potential problems with simply analyzing interactive coefficients in a table, arguing instead that interactions are best analyzed graphically. We follow this advice by plotting the marginal effect of the primary independent variable (Avg. global democracy) versus the conditional variable (PM/Chal-Tgt alliance similarities) using Boehmke’s (2006) grinter data utility. In Figure 2a, for example, we see that the marginal effect of average global democracy on the likelihood of mediation attempts decreases as political bias increases (while holding all other variables in Table 1, Model 1 constant). This conclusion holds as long as the lower bounds of the confidence interval remain above the horizontal “0” line. These conclusions are significant when
PM/Challenger alliance similarities are between 0 and .80, which represents around 43 percent of the data. The general conclusion is the same whether analyzing PM/Challenger mediation success (Figure 2b, 99% of the data), PM/Target mediation attempts (Figure 2c, 54% of the data), and PM/Target mediation success (Figure 2d, 56% of the data). Taken together, these figures show support for our intuition—credibility derived from the level of global democracy has the strongest effect when bias is low. The transparency measures become less important as bias comes to replace democracy as a transparency mechanism.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we argue that a vibrant international democratic community and a vast web of global institutions supply a healthy stock of credible, unbiased mediators. The democratic community influences the supply of unbiased mediators in three ways. First, as the international system becomes more democratic, the number of potential democratic state mediators increases. Democratic states face greater audience costs for deception in the conflict management process because they face greater scrutiny in the free press and because they pay domestic costs for foreign policy failure. Democratic mediators are more attractive to disputants because their domestic institutions enhance their transparency and credibility.

Second, we show that the global democratic community influences the amount and quality of information available for all potential mediators, whether they are democratic or autocratic. As global democracy levels increase, the amount of global media coverage for interstate disputes also rises because there is an extremely high correlation between democracy and the free press (Van Belle, 1997). Mediators have much better information about the issues at stake and the capabilities and resolve of the disputing parties in an international system populated heavily by democratic states. This increased marketplace of information makes it more difficult for mediators to be deceptive, generating additional audience costs.
Third, democracies have a tendency to create and join international organizations, so the number of global international organizations increases as the system becomes more democratic (Russett and Oneal, 2001). International organizations often overcome collective action problems by providing fair and neutral information. When disputing states jointly belong to a larger number of international organizations, this provides an additional source of unbiased information for mediators, clarifying the issues at stake and the preferences and resolve of each side in the dispute. This could happen both when IOs actively get involved in disputes as conflict managers or through a more passive effect of shared memberships in IOs, which increases frequency of interaction and opportunities for information sharing (Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). Again, such enriched information generates greater costs for mediators who do not tell the truth because false information is more likely to be uncovered by these neutral organizations. Beyond these systemic effects, we also find that strong alliance ties and trade ties augment the supply of credible mediators.

In short, while biased mediators may be more attractive to disputants among the pool of potential mediators, the global democratic community offers an alternative mechanism for unbiased potential mediators to appear credible. Unlike other functions of the democratic community (Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon 2003), these effects need not be tied to power as defined by capabilities because the institutional forces within democracies and democratic forces in the international system increase the quality and quantity of information, which provides neutral mediators with an additional source of credibility.

More broadly, our research demonstrates the benefits of bridge-building efforts between constructivist and rationalist approaches to studying world politics (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002). Our contribution to this emerging literature is to take a rationalist mediation model and demonstrate that changes in the systemic environment, most notably the democratic community, alter the decisions mediators make about when and where to get involved. The vast majority of game theoretic models, including Kydd’s mediation model, focus on strategic
interaction in dyadic settings. Yet, constructivists have demonstrated that systemic environments and systemic norms can alter states’ preferences and identities and thus the choices they make in strategic settings. Our research project shows that a global environment with more democratic states and norms for conflict management, as well a greater media marketplace, matters at the dyadic level. Disputants are able to seek out credible and trusted mediators more readily in a global system that is democratic and transparent. Potential mediators do not shrink away from opportunities to resolve conflicts, but rather see the benefits that can accrue from more peaceful interstate and intrastate environments, including safer economic markets, improved diplomatic reputations, and improved agenda setting influence domestically and internationally. Our theoretical model and empirical findings show that the systemic context within which diplomacy and mediation occurs influences both the supply of mediation attempts and the success of those efforts.

Taken together, our results suggest one plausible causal mechanism by which systemic democracy fosters peace. The greater supply of mediators provided by the democratic community and its institutions helps diffuse contentious issues before they reach the stage of deadly violence. In addition to augmenting the supply of quality mediators, the democratic community’s and global institutions’ pacific efforts seem to be fairly effective once the parties reach an agreement. The democratic peace has an important top-down effect that assists third parties in the resolution of conflicts in world affairs. The transparent nature of democratic regimes and global institutions enhances their abilities to market credible and impartial mediators, opening up greater possibilities for resolving conflicts and pushing the system closer to a Kantian peace.


http://www.fair.org/index.php


http://www.publicintegrity.org/WarCard/


Table 1: Mediation Attempts and Success in the Western Hemisphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency variables</th>
<th>Logit Model 1</th>
<th>Logit Model 2</th>
<th>Logit Model 3</th>
<th>Selection Model 3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation Agreement</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator’s Polity</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.020</td>
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<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Global Democracy</td>
<td>0.137*</td>
<td>0.284**</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared IO Memberships</td>
<td>0.245***</td>
<td>0.213**</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bias variables         |              |              |              |                  |
| Trade PM-Ch            | 0.002        | 0.010        | -0.000       | 0.016            |
| (0.009)                | (0.008)      | (0.003)      | (0.019)      |                  |
| Trade PM-T             | 0.018***     | 0.016***     | 0.007***     | -0.018           |
| (0.002)                | (0.004)      | (0.002)      | (0.015)      |                  |
| Alliance PM-Ch         | 0.228        | 0.758        | 0.110        | 0.897*           |
| (0.281)                | (0.546)      | (0.101)      | (0.489)      |                  |
| Alliance PM-T          | 0.851**      | 0.496        | 0.293**      | -0.490           |
| (0.318)                | (0.492)      | (0.100)      | (0.474)      |                  |

| Control variables      |              |              |              |                  |
| Distance PM-Ch         | -0.062       | -0.064       | -0.025*      | 0.104            |
| (0.053)                | (0.080)      | (0.015)      | (0.064)      |                  |
| Distance PM-T          | -0.284***    | -0.263***    | -0.086***    | -0.098*          |
| (0.060)                | (0.085)      | (0.015)      | (0.058)      |                  |
| Relative capabilities  | -0.065       | -0.784**     | 1.389***     |
| (0.179)                | (0.257)      | (0.314)      |
| Mediator's CINC Score  | 12.373***    | 12.438***    | 4.615***     |
| (0.619)                | (0.858)      | (0.313)      |
| Issue Salience         | 0.280***     | 0.263***     | 0.088***     |
| (0.031)                | (0.044)      | (0.010)      |
| Constant               | -9.714***    | -10.700***   | -4.067***    | -1.487*          |
| (0.406)                | (0.629)      | (0.152)      | (0.877)      |
| Observations           | 167991       | 167991       | 167991       | 167991           |
| Chi-square             | 737.19***    | 358.73***    | 38.92***     | 38.92***         |
| Pseudo R² / Rho        | 0.118        | 0.113        | 0.374        | 0.374            |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at .05; ** significant at .01; ***significant at .001 (one tailed)
Figure 1: Marginal Effects on the Likelihood of Mediation

Figure 1a. Mediator's Polity

Figure 1b. Avg. Global Democracy

Figure 1c. Shared IO Memberships

Figure 1d. Trade - PM/Target

Figure 1e. Alliance Similarity - PM/Target

Figure 1f. Distance - PM/Target

Figure 1g. Mediator's CINC Score

Figure 1h. Issue Salience

Note: Figures generated from Table 1, Model 1.
Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Average Global Democracy Conditioned on Political Bias

Figure 2a. Effect of Avg. Global Democracy on Mediation Attempts

Figure 2b. Effect of Avg. Global Democracy on Mediation Success

Figure 2c. Effect of Avg. Global Democracy on Mediation Attempts

Figure 2d. Effect of Avg. Global Democracy on Mediation Success
The systemic effects of democracy on global conflict management have been examined in other research. For example, Mitchell (2002) shows that as the proportion of global democracies has grown, non-democratic states have adopted a norm for third party conflict management even though they lack internal institutions and norms that would make them naturally amenable to outside mediation. For other research on the systemic democratic peace, see Crescenzi and Enterline (1999), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Harrison (2004), Huntley (1996), Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003), and Oneal and Russett (1999).

We use the term mediation interchangeably with third party conflict management. Our dataset includes third party involvement in multiple forms: good offices, inquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, multilateral negotiations, and peace conferences. When we refer to decisions to mediate, we are using the term broadly to include all forms of third party involvement in interstate conflicts.

Other factors that capture the mediator’s credibility are also found to have differential effects between the supply and success of mediation attempts, including distance, trade ties, and alliance ties to the target.

Many other factors have been identified in the academic literature on mediation as important for understanding the supply side of third party intervention. These factors include conflict intensity and proximity (Regan 2000), conflict stalemate (Greig 2005), previous conflict management (Hensel 2001; Greig 2005), and conflict versatility (Terris and Maoz 2005).

Beardsley and his colleagues (2006) focus on the effect of three mediation styles on success: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Empirical analyses of the ICB dataset suggest that manipulation is the most effective strategy for helping the parties strike an agreement and abating a crisis. The timing of mediation efforts may also have an important effect on success (Greig 2001).

Kydd’s assumption about the range for the signal error focuses on situations where the signal could be informative. His equilibrium results (as well as ours) hold for cases in which the error is informative, or less than or equal to 0.5.

It is important to note at this point that we are not arguing that democratic institutions and norms inhibit lying on a moral level, nor are we arguing that mediators, individuals, firms, and governments associated with the democratic community are less dishonest by nature. The argument is driven more by the influence of the norms of institutional and economic behavior that have developed in Kantian environments. Transparency and reputation become important components of democracies for the sake of efficiency, contracting, profit, and dispute resolution. These norms then spill over into other aspects of political interaction, including mediation.

Walsh’s honest, open efforts paid off. Haiti agreed to continue the military truce and to establish a joint committee of representatives from Haiti and St. Domingo charged with the responsibility of finding a peaceful settlement and guaranteed by the U.S., France, and Britain (New York Times 1852).

Although we realize that this example is not a classical case of mediation, it is consistent with collective third party dispute resolution because the United States was acting on behalf of all states who were (allegedly) threatened by Iraq’s WMD program.

These claims came most famously in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address. Similar claims were made by Secretary of State Colin Powell and CIA director George Tenet before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the months prior to the President’s address (September 2002), and by Colin Powell before the UN Security council (February 2003).

There was also disagreement among US policymakers and bureaucrats, with some CIA officials claiming that there was no hard evidence about Iraq’s WMD program and others, such as George Tenet describing the evidence as a “slam dunk”.

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12 Rhetoric from opposition leaders often emphasizes the pre-war deception, rather than mounting casualties. Senator Clinton’s insistence that Congress would not have approved the war had members known “what we know now” illustrates this point (Balz 2005, A01)

13 In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the international media played a stronger role than the US media in discrediting claims from the White House because the US media feared appearing unpatriotic during a period of impending war (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 2007).

14 Although Iraq did not fully cooperate with weapons inspections routines, it was quite forthcoming on the issue of the alleged purchase of uranium from Niger (ElBaradei 2003).

15 Savun’s (2008) theory focuses on more nuanced features of bias, and her measure is commensurately more complex than the ones we use here. Because our central theoretical focus is on transparency, we do not adopt her measure.

16 While it is true that firms (rather than states) trade with each other, it is also true that states go to great lengths to establish friendly trading ties on behalf of these firms, which should result in the increased flow of information that we describe. For example, governments (not firms) sign preferential trading agreements, which significantly increase the amount of trade between member countries. This approach is similar to other arguments about the pacifying effects of trade (e.g., Russett and Oneal, 2001).

17 Territorial claims are coded from 1816-2001, while maritime and river claims are coded from 1900-2001.

18 In reality, all states could be considered potential mediators. However, some selection rule is necessary to limit the set of potential mediators in order to avoid inflating our data with zeros for the dependent variable. Our decision rule (all states in the region plus major powers) aligns with similar selection rules in the literature, such as those who used politically relevant dyads to analyze interstate disputes (e.g., Russett & Oneal, 2001).

19 This variable is similar to the democratic community variable developed in Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon (2003). Here we use a reduced form of their variable by removing the power capabilities dimension of the measure because our theory does not specify the role of capabilities tied to the democratic community.

20 Relevant global treaties include the charters of the League of Nations and United Nations, declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice or International Court of Justice, the 1899 and 1907 Hague treaties on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This data set is available at <http://data.icow.org>, including documentation that lists the excerpts of the treaty or charter that call for the pacific settlement of disputes.

21 Trade values are taken from version 1.1 of Barbieri’s (2002) dataset. Her dyadic variables sum the total value of imports to state A from state B and the total value of imports to B from A. We make one very important modification to Barbieri’s measures for dyadic trade, recoding missing data as zero. This is one of the steps Gleditsch (2002) advocates in improving such measures due to the enormous amount of missing data.

22 These data were obtained from EuGene (Bennett and Stam, 2000). We use the S measures that are global and weighted. Savun (2008) also uses alliance portfolio similarity as a component in her composite bias measure.

23 Bercovitch and Schneider’s (2000,158) analyses support this assertion: the United States has engaged in by far the largest number of mediations (84), and other strong states are at the top of their list as well (United Kingdom-16, India-12, France-11, and the Soviet Union-5). It is interesting that many of the weaker states near the top of Bercovitch and Schneider’s (2000, 158) mediation list are located in the Middle East. Syria was the second most frequent mediator in the world from 1950-1990 (31 mediations), followed by Saudi Arabia (14), Sudan (9), Egypt (8), Libya (6), and Iran (5). While we do not capture
regional conflict levels in our analyses below, this may become important in the future, especially when we analyze regions other than North, Central, and South America.

24 The salience index combines six dichotomous dimensions, with each dimension contributing up to two points to the salience index, one point per claimant state for which the indicator is present, producing a range from zero to twelve (Hensel et al. 2008, 130-131).

25 Given the results of the selection model (discussed momentarily), Figure 1 displays the substantive effects for mediation use only. Substantive effects for success can be calculated from our Stata do file (web address here).

26 We should note that while the substantive effects seem large, the rareness of the dependent variable produces small predicted probabilities in general. This is similar to other dyadic analyses of international conflict.

27 The primary difference is that the variable for “Avg. global democracy” fails to attain statistical significance in the Mediation stage of Model 3 ($p < .053$), though the variable remains positive as expected.

28 We chose to display the average global democracy among the transparency variables and alliances among the bias variables somewhat arbitrarily. The results are generally consistent when using the other two transparency variables and when using trade as a measure of bias. Findings for all 24 models can be replicated in our do file at [web address here].