The Analogies of Experience

The principle: “Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.” (B 218/AW 683b)

Temporal Thesis (TT): According to Kant, all our perceptions must be combined in time. And since there are three modes of time (permanence, succession, and simultaneity), there are three rules that govern all relations of appearances. (B 219/AW 684a)

First Analogy (i.e. the first rule): “In all change of appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased.” (B 224/AW 685b)

Second Analogy: “All alteration occurs according to the law of the connection of cause and effect.” (B 232/AW 688a)

A general sketch:
(1) All event perception requires successive perceptions of an object.
(2) But this is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition of event-perception. The latter also requires the perception of successive states of the
object, and – since all apprehension is successive – this can never be
determined on the basis of the successiveness of the perceptions themselves.

(3) In order to consider a succession of perceptions as perceptions of successive
states of an object, it is necessary to regard their order as irreversible.

(4) To regard perceptions in this way is just to subject them to an a priori rule,
which in this case must be the schema of causality.

(5) As a condition of the possibility of the experience of an objective succession,
the schema is also a condition of the succession itself, as an object of possible
experience. The schema thus has ‘objective reality’, which is just what the
argument is intended to prove.

The non-sequitur objection (Lovejoy/Strawson):

Kant moves from the reflection that in every instance of event perception the order of
perceptions is determined and thus irreversible, to the conclusion that every event
follows from a preceding state of affairs in accordance with a universal and necessary
law.

According to Strawson, this is a “non-sequitur of mind-numbing grossness”: “to
conceive this order of perception as necessary is equivalent to conceiving the
transition or change from A to B as itself necessary, as falling, that is to say, under a
rule of law of causal determination; it is equivalent to conceiving the event of change
or transition as preceded by some condition such that an event of that type invariably
and necessarily follows upon a condition of that type.”

Third Analogy: “All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as
simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.” (B 256/AW 695a)

(1) We perceive separate substances existing simultaneously.
(2) We require some concept of the understanding in order to say that the
simultaneity of the substances is objective.
(3) This can only understood by the relation of reciprocal influence.
(4) Therefore, only under the supposition of the mutual interaction of substances can
we cognize the simultaneity of substances. (B 257-58/AW 695a-b)

N.b.: This argument is meant as a refutation of Leibniz’s monadology.

Refutation of Idealism:

Kant distinguishes between the following:
(a) material idealism (BAD)
   (i) problematic idealism (Descartes)
   (ii) dogmatic idealism (Berkeley) – refuted in the Transcendental
       Aesthetic
(b) formal (i.e. transcendental) idealism (GOOD)