

## Notes for readings on **Persuasion and Resistance**:

1. John Zaller. 1994. "Elite Leadership of Public Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War." In Lance Bennett and Robert Entman (eds.), *Taken By Storm*. **(in the box)**

**(Very brief and non-technical overview** of Zaller's theory of opinion formation applied to public support for the Gulf War. To get a better sense of the mainstream model, see the graph at the bottom of this page for McGuire's dosage-resistance model of the effects of self-esteem and intelligence on accepting a message linked on the syllabus. Substitute political awareness for self-esteem or intelligence.)

2. **2nd Zaller article, not so brief and more technical.**

### **Read either:**

**a)** Barbara Geddes and John Zaller. 1989. Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 33, No. 2. (May, 1989), pp. 319-347.

(This article examines levels of mass support for propaganda in an authoritarian regime, based on the "mainstream" model of opinion formation outlined in #1);

**or b)** John Zaller. 1991. "Information, Values and Opinion." *American Political Science Review*, 85(4): 1215-1238.

(This article models public support for the Vietnam war and is based on the mainstream and polarization models, which are really 1-message and 2-message models, respectively. Pay attention to the axioms, study the graphs and skip the technical discussion.)

3. Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F. Rich. 2000 . "Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 62, No. 3, August 2000, pp. 790-816.

4. Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge . Forthcoming. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science*. Volume 50 / Number 3/ July 2006

5. Drew Westen. [An fMRI study of motivated reasoning](#): "Partisan political reasoning in the U.S. Presidential Election." **(skim)**

### **6. Especially for IR/Comparative students:**

Philip E. Tetlock. 1999. "Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Past and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 335-366.

(Shows how closed-minded foreign policy elites are to new information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. Tetlock's 2005 book (*Expert Political Judgment: How Good is It? How Can We Know?*) should be required reading for everyone in IR and foreign policy.)

The readings on the website have links to any articles not on the CD.

## Figure 3.6

The relationship between recipient factors and persuasibility as outlined by McGuire (1968). As a recipient factor (such as intelligence) increases, the recipient is predicted to be more likely to comprehend (receive) the arguments contained in the message but less likely to yield to the arguments. Since *acceptance* of the arguments depends on both reception *and* yielding, the lower bound of the reception and yielding curves sets the upper bound for acceptance (or ability to be influenced).

