

## Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate

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**Abstract:** Questions have been raised in recent years about the extent to which the nation is segregating by the political preferences of movers. Some have argued that internal migration selects at least partly on political criteria, and thereby produces evermore Republican and Democratic counties and neighborhoods. This paper is among the first to show that voters *do* geographically sort by partisanship upon relocation to new zip codes over two-year and four-year spans of time. Using unique data for hundreds-of-thousands of partisan migrants across seven states, we show that many Republicans and Democrats apparently do prefer to relocate in areas populated with copartisans. At the same time, registrants of both parties show some tendency to migrate toward more Republican areas (usually suburbs) from one period to the next, suggesting some convergence and interparty mixing on the same turf. Legions of movers are certainly acting *as if* they have detailed knowledge of the political terrain when they move, although political criteria are not everything. Geographic polarization of party adherents is constrained by economic necessity and the location of employment opportunity.

Are Republican and Democratic partisans exhibiting a preference for areas of copartisan strength when they relocate? Or are their resettlement patterns largely independent of the partisan composition of the destination? Movers are faced with numerous possible destination choices, and they certainly do not all converge on the same places. Internal migration is also an exceptionally common phenomenon in the United States -- the most highly mobile society in the history of the world. With 45 percent of the population over age 5 having lived somewhere else just five years earlier (Perry 2003), the potential for mobility to remake the sociopolitical landscape over a couple of decades is clear. The question of our research is whether some consequentially sized subset of movers, those registered to vote and allied with a major political party, are choosing to relocate in areas that are politically congenial in partisan terms, settling in locations among residents who share their political views.

Since the hard-fought 2000 presidential election, research has mounted on the association between geography and political preference (Glaeser & Ward 2006; Black and Black 2007; Gelman et al. 2007, 2009; Morrill and Brown 2007). The nation's population exhibits remarkable spatial diversity in opinion and behavior across a number of dimensions of social and economic life (Glaeser and Ward 2006). Such geographic differentiation may translate into an increasingly observable geographic divide in political party preference. In spite of President Obama's lopsided 2008 victory in many parts of the country, the geographic expression of rival partisan preferences appears to have been heightened in that contest (Gelman et al. 2009; Lesthaeghe & Neidert 2009). The counties that previously voted for the Republican candidates went even more Republican, and the same is true for the traditionally Democratic counties.

Two potential explanations may account for this ever more notable divergence of partisan preferences across space. The first one is *geographic sorting*. By 'geographic sorting', we refer to the mechanism in which citizens vote with their feet. Individuals' politically relevant socio-demographic

characteristics and lifestyle preferences are associated with both their migration decision and their residential destination choice. Let us use California and Texas for example. Imagine a scenario in which conservative voters in California exit the state and move to Texas, and liberal voters similarly desert Texas and resettle in California. Over time, California would experience a net gain of Democratic voters whereas Texas would tip in the opposite direction. The increasing imbalance in the two-party composition of the electorate due to net migration patterns to and from these two states would produce a greater spatial disparity in partisan preferences.

The second mechanism that can account for geographic divergence of partisan preferences is *party sorting* among voters, unrelated to their mobility patterns. Fiorina (2005) theorizes that when the national political parties begin to pull apart on social and economic policy issues, voters take these elite cues and align themselves with the political party that lies most proximate to their partisan preferences. Party sorting clarifies the connection between voters' socio-demographic characteristics, their policy preferences and their party identification (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Levendusky 2009). As a result, ideologically murky groups such as 'Reagan Democrats,' or blocs that are 'socially liberal but economically conservative,' gradually disappear and a less cross-pressured, unmixed pattern of party support results.

While researchers have examined the origin, magnitude and psychological motivation of party sorting with great empirical sophistication (Fiorina 2005, 2009; Levendusky 2009a, 2009b; Layman & Carsey 2002a, 2002b), the empirical evidence for geographic sorting is very thin. But the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. The goal of this paper is to first examine empirically whether there is any evidence of geographic sorting. In particular, our paper examines this question --- for a partisan voter who is moving, is she more likely to pick a neighborhood with a higher concentration of like-minded partisans? Geographic variations in the outward expression of identity are theorized to attract others, stimulating migratory patterns in which people move to those locations that satisfy

psychological needs (Rentfrow, Gosling and Potter 2008). Members of particular groups choose to live in proximity to other group members in order to receive social reinforcement for their values. The prevalence of particular choices in an area is therefore reinforced by the selectivity of population movement. Consistent with related work on local context (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), social influence within these locales also perpetuates a dominant value system by rewarding compliant attitudes and behavior.

This kind of geographic sorting is sometimes credited as a source of increased partisan extremism in the electorate (Bishop 2008). By clustering with like-minded others, neighbors socialize each other into ever more extreme views, consistent with numerous social psychological studies on conformity to group norms (Sunstein 2009; Mutz 2006; Hardin 2002). Sorting by partisanship leads partisans in the sorted neighborhoods toward a more ideological politics than they would develop if they lived in more politically mixed environments. The opposition party comes to be viewed not just as misguided, but as corrupt and evil. Investigating that possible consequence of partisan sorting is beyond the scope of this singular paper with its more modest aims. But once we establish the evidence for geographic sorting, the second part of this paper will explore possible causes for such behavior.

Using unique data drawn from matched voter files from seven states and three separate years with observations at two-year intervals, our study offers the advantage of hundreds-of-thousands of observations of movement from origin-to-destination within and across state lines. Since we are drawing observations from states with party registration, we are also able to characterize the partisan composition of the origin and destination locations, as well as identify the partisan preference of the movers themselves.

## Is Geographic Sorting a Reality?

Previous research on migration has not generally highlighted the importance of the political composition of destinations as a roadmap for prospective migrants in the United States. Demographers have repeatedly observed that most movement over the past few decades has been away from rural and urban to suburban areas, accelerated by the decentralization of employment from central cities (Gordon, Richardson and Yu 1998; Carlini 1985). Economic pull factors have drawn in new residents of all types, regardless of political background. Increasingly, these suburban and exurban areas are heterogeneous by race and class (Hanlon 2009), represented by a mix of Republicans and Democrats at various levels of office, and are considered competitive between the major parties (Hopkins 2009; Lang, Sanchez and Berube 2008; McKee and Shaw 2003; Hale 1995). These studies emphasizing the primacy of economic necessity as the force directing most migration streams suggests that the migrants themselves may have limited control over where they choose to settle, constraining the extent to which their destinations could be politically differentiated.

Reputable scholars have also opined that the relationship between social characteristics thought to be predictive of geographic sorting and partisan preference is not impressive (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Survey evidence from the Pew Research Center indicates that Americans at least *express* a desire for diverse neighborhoods, though Democrats more so than Republicans (Taylor and Morin 2008). One might also note that suburbs of major U.S. cities appear to be attractive and growing on the basis of the migrants' common interest in good schools, lower crime, and a particular type of low density housing development, but not because of either the migrants' or the destination's political leaning (Baldassare 1992; Frey 1985; Frey and Kobrin 1982). Consequently, Republicans and Democrats wind up living side-by-side in these politically diverse locales, and cannot be described as moving to different places according to their partisan biases.

Other skeptics of the relationship between geography and partisan sorting might argue that since people are not especially polarized in their political opinions anyway, they have no reason to seek distinctive destinations. According to much of the voting behavior literature in political science, voters are largely inattentive to politics, with elections being intermittent events, providing only episodic opportunities for politically polarizing thought, if such thoughts occur at all (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth and Weisberg 2008). Moreover, evidence presented by several studies claims to show no appreciable increase in polarization in liberal-conservative ideology or on a variety of controversial issues over a generation or more (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2006; DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996). Certainly the evidence these scholars present would seem to undercut the idea that there has been a new impetus for geographic sorting attributable to greater ideological polarization at the mass level.

### **Geographic Sorting: Direct and Indirect Mechanisms**

We do know that people move for various reasons, with employment and family-related migration at the top of the list. How movers come to choose among a number of alternative destinations, though, may be more important than what causes them to move in the first place. Political segregation may occur indirectly, as a consequence of residential preferences that are associated with partisanship, but only mildly so. Increasing geographic separation between partisans might occur, even in a nation where public opinion is not highly polarized, and even while respondents in surveys will report being tolerant of the other party's views. After all, a preference need not be especially strong, as Thomas Schelling (1971) indicated about racial preferences, in order to produce highly segregated neighborhoods over a span of time. By extension, it is surely possible to imagine that the residential preferences of Republicans and Democrats do not favor their integration, in spite of the fact that survey research may report a desire for more mixing.

If there is geographic sorting by partisanship accompanying mobility, as some insist, it would appear that these residential relocations are occurring *as if* these residents were deliberately using the party composition of alternative destinations as criteria for their residential choice decision making. We say "acting as if," because there is no direct evidence to our knowledge that migrants are regularly making direct observations of the political composition of neighborhoods in selecting one destination over its alternatives. Researchers are unlikely to discover any large number of house hunters using local precinct maps to evaluate prospective neighborhoods. Several possible mechanisms may lie behind any patterns of political sorting that may nevertheless result from mobility, and statistical results consistent with geographic sorting may have more than a single explanation.

#### *Partisan Sorting: A Result of Housing and Landscape Preferences?*

First, Republicans and Democrats may actually prefer different kinds of destinations, housing and landscapes, so their choices are not about neighbors, but about the physical and built environments. Certainly this has been a theme in the recent literature on sprawl and development. Liberals prefer urban and compact development, and more urban settings. Conservatives desire more expansive, and less planned spaces in suburban and rural areas (Lewis and Baldassare 2010; Williamson 2008; Walks 2006).

Income and the type of housing stock associated with purchasing power may also be the primary draws separating the two groups of partisans. Economic status has long been the primary sorting mechanism in the residential mobility process (Clark and Ledwith 2007). Republicans may prefer newer housing, on expansive acreages, and may also be in a position to afford higher cost housing, on average, than Democrats, simply by dint of their higher status (Bartels 2008). If so, there is nothing about the qualities of neighbors, or anticipated social interactions, per se, that leads Republicans and Democrats to geographically distinctive locations, but instead these moves are an

artifact of the income distribution of political party identifiers, and an expression of the purchasing power of the rival groups.

*Partisan Sorting: A Result of Racial/Ethnic Housing Preferences?*

By now it is not news that residential relocation decisions are often guided by knowledge of the racial composition of neighborhoods and schools. Whites will not only flee mixed-race neighborhoods in central cities, but will relocate to all-white suburban neighborhoods and seek to insulate themselves there from the encroachment of minority populations through the erection of institutional barriers, including the creation of wholly new governments (Burns 1994). African Americans, for their part, are less able to translate income gains into choices to live in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods due to persistent discrimination (Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2001; Massey and Denton 1993; South and Deane 1993). Other minority and immigrant groups may cluster as a consequence of in-group preference and solidarity, where they find social and economic support from family members, and can draw upon ethnic resources (Fong and Chan 2010). Self-segregation studies indicate that blacks prefer neighborhoods with considerable black concentrations, though mainly out of fears of white hostility (Krysan and Farley 2001; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi 2002).

Residential segregation by race and ethnicity, then is a function of both out-group avoidance and in-group preference that may have indirect implications for the political composition of places. African American voters, in particular, are known to be lopsidedly Democratic in their partisan affiliation, and Latinos identify with the Democratic Party by a typically 2:1 margin. Sorting processes resulting in racially and ethnically homogeneous Latino and African American communities will certainly leave them politically one-sided, and contingent upon the proximity, income and the salience of specific attitudes, may leave the nearby white communities almost equally homogeneous by party preference (Giles and Hertz 1994).



Separate partisan migration streams informed by racial views will not be present everywhere. In many locations, there are no racial or ethnic minority populations, or their numbers are too small to be a consideration. But no one would argue that migrants always and everywhere consider their race, and the racial composition of prospective destinations. These factors may be responsible for the geographic sorting of Republican and Democratic movers when the parties' mass memberships are divided by race, as they are presently in major metropolitan areas, and wherever diverse populations are of consequential size.

#### *Partisan Sorting on the Basis of Homophily?*

Some have suggested that if partisans are moving apart from one another, and settling amongst each other, the mechanism promoting this geographic sorting process is *homophily*, the desire to live around persons who share the same tastes and values (Bishop 2008, 44-45). This is less a racial determination than it is an educated guess about the values held by local populations, the acceptability of their routines, habits and customs. People are drawn to particular places because they think they will fit in better among the locals there than elsewhere (Gosling 2008; Florida 2008; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Van Ham and Feijten 2008; Marschall and Rahn 2006; McDonald 2007). Dissonance reducing selection criteria may not be *directly* related to politics, but are at least sufficiently associated with political preference to generate geographic sorting as if partisanship was in play as a criteria for discriminating among possible destinations.

There is little evidence that movers are querying real estate agents about the political opinions of local inhabitants before deciding where they want to live. Nor are realtors regularly posting election statistics on their websites revealing how particular housing developments voted in the recent presidential election. Even so, many residents and prospective residents appear to be capable of accurately inferring the partisanship of a neighborhood without having any discussions with the locals at

all, but from visual inspection of residential areas: the type of automobiles in the driveways, Christmas decorations, playground equipment in the back yards, or American flags flying from front porches (Gosling 2008, 19; Marschall and Rahn 2006, 16; Baybeck and McClurg 2005). Specific material possessions appear to have become associated with political preference as political controversy has been extended into more of life's once apolitical domains. According to the 2006 *Cooperative Congressional Election Study* (Ansolabehere 2007), for instance, there is a clear association between owning a pick-up truck and the seven-point party identification scale ( $\tau\text{-}b = -.12$ ;  $p < .0001$ ;  $N = 12,832$ , table not shown). The magnitude of this relationship rivals or exceeds many conventional associations whose importance no experienced social scientist would question. Upon purchasing a pick-up, a customer apparently now "risks" being identified as a Republican. Such associations presumably send signals about consumption preferences that could be used by prospective residents to discern whether homophiles are present.

Consumer psychologists teach that possessions and purchases of particular brands represent the social self – that part of the self that desires to be connected and associated with others, and fears being isolated or abandoned (Schultz, Kleine and Kernan 1989, 360). Within marketing and consumer research, it is well known that particular brands possess personalities or images based on how companies target specific market segments. Consumption offers extensive options for assembling and presenting identity. Consumers, in turn, express themselves by purchasing certain brands, suggesting the strong symbolism attached to products and labels. Particular brands may convey an image of prestige, an upper-class status or rank, for example. Products and brands are extensions of the self not only in the present, but also represent symbols of what we are attempting to become (Gosling 2008; Schultz, Kleine and Kernan 1989). Liberals and conservatives, and presumably Republicans and Democrats, can be detected by the possessions and artifacts they cling to because these preferences are revelatory of a personality that bundles seemingly unrelated attitudes together.

Political sorting across neighborhoods may result even if movers are not consciously attempting to discern the neighbors' politics from the routine appearance of their consumption habits and possessions. This could occur so long as political preference is not entirely isolated from and unrelated to important predilections in other areas of life. A desire for a particular economic good may have some predictive power for an individual's party identification and the relationship need not be causal. If a large proportion of Democrats happen to prefer shopping in a Whole Foods Market to an ordinary supermarket, no one would *causally* attribute their partisan predisposition to the preference for a certain kind of store. Most likely, there is an underlying third cause, identity or personality type, which is causing both the preference for a particular type of food item, and also the party favoritism. Consequently, the inference that a shopper who buys all her groceries at a Whole Foods store is less likely to be Republican than to be Democratic may well be a perfectly reasonable and accurate one. Commercial markets for particular goods therefore have a role in promoting geographic sorting based on differential preferences for specific products (Waldfogel 2006). In this manner, seemingly politically irrelevant preferences going to tastes for particular kinds of grocery and department stores, coffee shops and restaurants, automobiles, and favored recreation activities (e.g., golf, camping, fishing, snow skiing), may be sufficiently related to political viewpoint that their cumulative effect on residential choice is to produce politically one-sided neighborhoods.

Our hypothesis tests presented on the following pages are intended to evaluate the individual migration flow of Republican and Democratic voters across zip codes within states as well as across state boundaries. Consistent with theory, we examine whether the partisan registration of the voter bears any association whatsoever to the partisan mix of the zip code of the destination. We examine migration from 2004 to 2008, from 2004 to 2006, and the period from 2006 to 2008. To be sure, potential confusion about the evidence of political sorting across the landscape can result from the scale at which that evidence is observed and gathered. In what is known as the Modifiable Areal Unit

Problem (MAUP), locations that seem one-sided at one scale of observation, will appear more heterogeneous at a larger scale (Openshaw 1984, Holt, Steel, Tranmer and Wrigley 1996). But the zip code is of appropriate size because it is constitutive of everyday life around the place of residence. Zip codes usually encompass not just a single neighborhood in which a dwelling is located, but also an immediately surrounding area encompassing routine daily destinations, such as schools, banks, and supermarkets. At the same time, the zip code is not as expansive as the county, in which a resident may live on one side, but rarely ever have contact with residents on the other.

If we find that the migration flows of Republicans and Democrats are statistically and substantively distinctive, it would suggest that even over a brief period, the two groups of partisans are sorting according to specific destination characteristics that are at least *associated* with partisanship. On the other hand, if Republicans and Democrats are moving to the same types of locations and are insensitive to the partisanship of the destination, then the sorting hypothesis would not be confirmed, and instead partisan mixing would be more evident.

### **Data and Methods**

To gauge migration flows we use voter files from 2004, 2006 and 2008 from seven states: New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and Pennsylvania, in the East; and California, Oregon, and Nevada, in the West. These states were selected not only because of their adjacency to each other, but because they register voters by political party, and they maintain accessible, high quality, voter registration records.

Using first name, last name, and day, month, and year of birth, we identified all movers in 2004 who wound up in another location in 2006 and in 2008, and all movers from 2006 who had moved by 2008. We examined the four year period knowing that many movers do not surface on the registration rolls at their new location until the high stimulus of a presidential election causes them to re-register. We also examine movers over the periods from 2004 to 2006, and from 2006 to 2008, primarily to

evaluate whether the smaller subset of movers over a shorter span exhibits the same relocation pattern. Using names and complete birthdates in this manner turns out to be a very conservative matching procedure that helps us to avoid false positives. We were not only able to identify movers who located within the same county to other zip codes, but also those who moved within the same state to other counties. Finally, we were able to identify those movers who had crossed state lines into the adjacent states (e.g., Oregon to California; California to Nevada; Nevada to Oregon).<sup>1</sup>

To be sure, movers identified using these voter files surely do not represent all movers within a state or across state lines over a four year or two year span. In Table 1, we use the U.S. Census Current Population Survey from March 2008 to describe the total migration flow within counties, across counties within the same state and across state lines into a state from the adjacent states. First we should note the impressive volume of total migration among the residents of all seven states, ranging from 50,483 movers in tiny Delaware, to nearly 2.9 million in California. Naturally, the share of migrants moving internally to the state is much larger than the share of those arriving from across state lines. Among all movers, Table 1 reports that half to two-thirds of migrants are moving within counties. The percentage migrating across county lines, but within the state, varies widely from just 1 percent in Nevada, to 25 percent in Maryland. The share of migrants moving in from outside the state is lowest in California, at 8 percent, and highest in Delaware at 30 percent (see Table 1).

Of those who are crossing state lines, substantial shares of Nevada's and Oregon's migrant flow originates from California – at 51 percent and 21 percent respectively (see Table 1 upper right). About 39 percent of California's out-of-state sourced migration is from Oregon, and 7 percent from Nevada.

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<sup>1</sup> At this point a question arises as to whether we should evaluate individual movement, or household movement, since many voters move together with family members (e.g., spouses, adult children), as a part of a household unit, not as individuals, suggesting clustering or dependence across individual observations. We certainly investigated the data bearing this truth clearly in mind. But after estimating alternative models, it quickly became clear that with the large number of cases in this research there was no substantively significant difference in estimates resulting from using households as observations, or from clustering standard errors by household. We therefore present straightforward models of individual movement, although the alternatives are available upon request of the authors.

Among the Eastern states, New Jersey receives about 16 percent of its cross-state migrants from Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania receives about 48 percent of its cross-state migrants from Delaware, and a far smaller 12 percent from New Jersey. Maryland, for its part, receives very few migrants from New Jersey (3 percent), but does receive 10 percent of its out-of-state flow from Pennsylvania and 7 percent from Delaware.

[Table 1 about Here]

In Table 2, we present migration figures from 2004 to 2008 for the seven states for instate movers who moved across zip codes during that four year period, for that subset who remained instate but crossed county lines, and for those who moved across state lines into neighboring states. To gauge the relative size of these populations we place them over the total registered voter population in 2008, so for instance, the total number of cross-zip code instate migrants in California from 2004-2008 amounted to about 12.2 percent of the total number of 2008 registered voter population. Of that group, about 32 percent were Republicans, 43 percent were Democrats, and 26 percent were Independent or unaffiliated with any political party.

The largest migratory population as a share of registered voters was in Oregon, at 12.9 percent, and the smallest was in Delaware at only 6.5 percent. Democrats are a larger share of migrants because Democrats are a larger share of registrants generally. The principal exception is New Jersey where a peculiar registration law has encouraged many voters to register as unaffiliated with a major party. Notably a larger share of the strictly cross-county and out-of-state migrants are Republicans suggesting that when Republicans do move, they are more likely than Democrats to leave a county or a state entirely, rather than remain nearby, or within a state.

[Table 2 about Here]

Approximate calculations for recent years suggest that the in-state migrants on the voter file comprise about 20-25 percent of the total in-state migrants estimated by the annual U.S. Census CPS

annual migration studies for Nevada, California, Oregon, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and a higher percentage in Delaware (27-28 percent) and Maryland (33-35 percent). Readers should note that the voter migration data do not present a perfect representation of *all* movers from any of these states. Consistent with previous studies of the registered voter population, the subset of movers included in the voter files we are studying include those who are among the more politically interested and active, because they obviously have re-registered quickly upon relocation. We also expect that the movers included in our data are generally of higher socioeconomic status than the universe of all movers, and they are also somewhat older.

Having acknowledged these limitations of our data, there are also some very important advantages. First, this is a large scale database, and to our knowledge, no one else has assembled complete voter files for purposes of examining the political implications of residential mobility across time. The Census CPS studies are valuable, but contain no political information about the respondents. Extensive housing surveys that often track residential mobility rarely concern themselves with gathering political information on respondents, either, and most surveys offer us numerous reasons to doubt the sincerity of responses on questions about diversity preferences, as even their lead investigators admit (Taylor and Morin 2008). Moreover, because these files contain the entire registered voting population of each state, inferences do not depend either upon a sparse sample or error prone self-reports found in survey data. If studying the selectivity of movement of registered voters over a brief period is the goal, this is an exceptional source of information on voter mobility.

While we do not have the detailed information that bears directly on the deep psychological considerations motivating voters' residential choices, we do have complete information about their zip codes of destination, including each location's partisan composition (percent Democratic, Republican and unaffiliated/independent). By examining the political composition of the destination choice as

indicated by the partisan composition of the area where the migrant chose to settle, we can evaluate whether partisan registrants moved to areas that were appreciably more copartisan, or politically mixed.

### **Partisan Gaps in Residential Relocation**

#### *Instate Movement*

Theoretically a large body of literature suggests that a potential migrant's observations of race and income can serve as signals that a particular location leans toward a particular party, or is likely to share certain political values. But lacking clear indicators of racial and economic make-up, seemingly distal housing and consumer preferences may provide clues also. We now proceed to direct examination of the extent to which a partisan gap *really* appears in the residential choices of actual movers. Importantly, we also control for the partisan leaning of the origin locations -- to determine whether the migrants' destinations are even more politically lopsided once the migrants' origins are taken into account. A final control variable accounts for those who registered with a different party at their destination as opposed to those who remained with the same party.

Evidence for a partisan gap in residential mobility, across zip codes but only for movers within states, appears in Table 3. At the outset, it wasn't at all obvious that there would be much partisan sorting using zip codes as units of observation. After all, some zip codes are expansive and populous pieces of turf, home in the four Eastern states to as many as 50,000 registered voters and 265 square miles (although the Eastern average is only 5,274, and 25 square miles). In the West, they can be even more expansive, though the population average is around 7,975 voters. In many cases, then, it could be possible to live in one corner of a zip code and have little to no interaction with residents living elsewhere in it. If Republicans truly dislike the Democrats in a particular town, there is little need to move out of the town altogether in order to avoid dissonant interactions.



Nevertheless, Table 3 shows that zip codes are subject to a degree of partisan discrimination on the part of relocating voters, in both regions, in all three periods.<sup>2</sup> From 2004 to 2008, Republicans in the West, on average, relocate to a location that is 3.4 percent more Republican than those in the excluded baseline category (Independents and the unaffiliated), and more Republican than the zip code they left behind. Notably, Western Democrats move to locations that are about 0.11 percent more Republican than independents, leaving an average partisan gap of about 3.5 percentage points distinguishing the new neighborhoods of the Democratic and Republican rivals.

[Table 3 about Here]

In the East, the gap is wider. Eastern Republicans move to new zip codes that are, on average, about 2.6 percent more Republican. Eastern Democrats move to zip codes that are on average about 1.5 percent less Republican, for a total gap in the destination locales of about 4 percent. There is variation by state as the individual intercepts indicate. Pennsylvania migrants move to more Republican areas, and New Jersey migrants to more Democratic ones, than the migrants in the excluded baseline state, Delaware. In the West, both Californians and Nevadans wind up in more Republican neighborhoods than the internal migrants in Oregon.

Migration streams do vary some over time. From 2004 to 2006, for instance, Republicans in the East were slightly less inclined to move to more Republican areas than they were in the 2006-2008 period. Eastern Democrats, for their part, were more inclined to move to Democratic locales in the earlier period than in the later. Western Republicans showed the reverse pattern, with a preference for slightly more Republican neighborhoods in the period from 2004-2006 than from 2006-2008. Western Democrats, at the same time exhibited a marginally greater preference for Democratic locations in the latter period than in the former.

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<sup>2</sup>These same results disaggregated at the state level are available upon request from the authors.

We also conducted this same analysis of partisan sorting by counties, *far* larger units than zip codes, though we do not report those results here. Although we did not expect to find any consistent evidence at such a coarse level of granularity<sup>3</sup>, we did find that movers were sensitive to the partisanship of even the counties they were moving to -- with Republicans preferring more Republican counties, and Democrats more Democratic ones. Naturally, the magnitude of the resulting partisan gaps in destination preference is not as great as for zip codes, but surprising differences were still evident.

### *The Out of State Movers*

As Table 2 indicated, tens-of-thousands of voters move across state lines every year, amounting to a sizable percentage of a state's electorate each presidential election cycle (Hood and McKee 2010). As a final step, we also examined the cross-state movers to adjacent states (e.g., CA to NV and OR; OR to NV, CA) from 2004 to 2008, 2004 to 2006, and 2006 to 2008, to see if these moves were also dividing Republican and Democratic registrants by the partisan composition of their neighborhoods. The observations of the origins and destinations are at the zip code level. Table 4 reveals the regression estimates indicating the extent of the partisan cross-state moving gap for each of the two regions. The state intercepts shown in Table 4 are those of the population origin, with the destination states being the other two in the case of the West, the other three in the case of the East.

[Table 4 about Here]

The results generally show a greater gap in partisan destinations for the cross-state than for the within-state migrants. From 2004 to 2008, Eastern Republicans move to out-of-state destination zips that are 3.8 percent more Republican than migrants who are registered as independent or unaffiliated. Democrats move to locations that are 1.5 percent less Republican, producing a 5.3 percent gap. In the West, the gap is smaller -- about 4 percent, during the same period.

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<sup>3</sup> These results will be made available by the authors upon request.

In both regions, but particularly for the Eastern out-of-state migrants, we see considerably greater sorting than we do among their instate migrant population. Cross-state migration is a greater force behind the geographic polarization of neighborhoods than local, within-state migration. Across years too, the results exhibit a remarkable consistency in the propensity for a state's expatriates to wind up being more geographically sorted in their resettlement than the instate migrants that they left behind. Commonly the states on the receiving end of major streams of cross-state migration are more likely to exhibit greater partisan sorting than those that receive only a trickle.

#### *Assessing the Extent of Sorting with Transition Matrices*

Figures 1 and 2 present transition matrixes for the movement of voters within states in the East and West regions, from 2004 to 2008. On the horizontal and vertical axes, we have labeled vigintiles (20ths) of partisan registration. To create these diagrams, voters from 2004 by the vigintile of partisan registration in which they lived are arrayed on the vertical axes, and crosstabulated by the vigintile of partisan registration in which they lived upon relocation four years later. Each cell in the table, then, represents the number of 2004 registrants in each five percent increment that wind up in the same five percent cell, or a more or less politically congenial cell, by virtue of their resettlement.

The shading in the diagram corresponds to frequency, or the number of voters, in each cell, with darker shading indicative of a greater concentration of migrants. The darker shading along the diagonal of the diagram shows that movement is usually to locations with very similar vigintiles of party preference. In the most extreme geographic sorting scenario, the upper left and lower right corners of these graphs would be darkly shaded instead of light, showing a tendency for partisans in highly adverse locations in 2004 to move to far more friendly ones by 2008. But this is not what we see. Instead, movement is more gradual. Movement tends to reflect a change in party composition by one or two vigintiles, but rarely eight, ten or more. Notably, the dark shading in the upper right hand corners of

each diagram indicates that many movers are already living and moving among copartisan locations that are in the highest tiles of support for their party, though certainly there are partisans living on inhospitable turf as well, as shown by darker shades filling the lower left cells. The diagrams also show that Democrats are more concentrated in their highest vigintiles of support than Republicans are, a function of their dense urban settlement.

[Figures 1 and 2 about Here]

Of course calibrating the transition diagrams in five percent increments means that these diagrams will somewhat *understate* the extent of sorting by only displaying the migrants who wound up in a higher or lower 20th of the distribution.<sup>4</sup> As the regression results indicated in Table 3, the moves we typically observe involve a partisan migrant relocating to an area that is generally only 3 or 4 points more politically friendly four years later. Nevertheless, even if this five percent increase in a warmer direction is used as the benchmark to assess the occurrence of partisan sorting across space, our diagrams (and calculations) do show this level of sorting to be occurring for very large numbers of voters. Specifically, about 40.7 percent of Republican within-state migrants in the East found themselves in a higher vigintile of Republican concentration four years later, and nearly the same percentage for Democrats moving to more Democratic turf, at 41 percent. Judging by these same quantitative rules, however, there is clear evidence of political mixing too, as 47 percent of Republicans and 37 percent of Democrats found themselves living in a *lower* 20th of copartisan strength by 2008 (Figure 1). While geographic sorting toward locations of greater partisan homogeneity is present, so too is partisan mixing. Indeed, using this vigintile (5 percent) criterion of substantive importance, mixing has a modest edge on sorting across the Eastern zip codes.

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<sup>4</sup> Readers should note that vigintiles were used for the diagrams primarily because they were convenient for illustration and 25ths, 30ths, or smaller tiles proved to be exceedingly difficult to display. It can be shown that majorities or solid pluralities of in-state partisan migrants do relocate to stronger copartisan locations when the transition matrixes are reduced to 30ths -- or 3.3 percent increments -- instead of the 5 percent increments utilized in these diagrams.

The same is true of the three Western states. Thirty-nine percent of Republicans moved in the direction of greater copartisan comfort, compared with 42 percent of Democrats. On the other hand, 45 percent of Democrats and 47 percent of Republicans moved to at least one *lower* vigintile of copartisan concentration. The shading in the Figure 2 diagrams is similar to that in Figure 1. Most of the movement is occurring in closely adjacent cells. Rarely do we see partisans living in areas where the parties are roughly 50-50 wind up relocating to extremely lopsided (very red or very blue) locations. Any movement toward geographic sorting is therefore gradual, involving a substantial share but somewhat less than a majority of movers across a four-year span -- at least using this vigintile criterion. Certainly the evidence for sorting should be considered alongside the clear evidence of geographic mixing, which also involves a substantial share of politically active citizens.

Finally these diagrams show that the independent/unaffiliated do not usually sort their way toward locations of greater independent/unaffiliated concentration. Usually they move to locations where they are more exposed to Republican or Democratic majorities. Calculations from the data matrixes show that 48 percent of independents migrating within states in the West found themselves in stronger Democratic or GOP areas, and Democratic areas had a clear edge, as the regression results also revealed. The same figure for the East was an even more lopsided 57 percent who settled in more partisan locations than they had originated, again with Democratic locations receiving a larger share of the independent movers.

We do not present transition matrix diagrams for the smaller number of cross-state migrants. But if we did, they would show that a larger share of these longer-distance migrants are sorting by partisanship upon reaching their destinations than is true of the within-state migrants, a result consistent with the regression models in Table 4. This difference is likely because the cross-state migrants are more affluent and have more discriminating power in their choice of destinations. While

of much lower volume than within-state migration, cross-state migration is apparently a stronger force behind partisan sorting in most places in the United States.

### *Geographic Sorting Controlling for Race, Income and Density Differences*

A critical question is whether the extent of geographic sorting by the party affiliation of migrants can be accounted for by non-political differences between the origin and destination characteristics of zip codes. If migrants are selecting their destinations primarily because of their desire to live in whiter, more affluent and less dense neighborhoods, we should see far less sorting explained by partisan orientation once we control for the difference between the destination and origin in the *percentage white non-Hispanic residents*, the *median household income*, and the *population density* of zip codes. We also used a Geographic Information System (GIS) to measure the extent of green space available within three miles of both origin and destination locales, gauging the *number of parks*, and the *total square mileage of park land*. We hypothesize that locations with greater available green space will also draw more net migrants, helping to explain voter relocation. All of these differences are important for a more rigorous test of the partisan basis of geographic mobility. If these variables readily account for migration patterns to and from areas of greater Republican concentration, then it may be the case that the migrants' political preferences are purely spurious as an influence on their destination choices.

Table 5 shows that the impact of party registration on geographic sorting is certainly reduced by including these additional covariates, but it is not eliminated entirely. Certainly when destinations have greater white populations than origins, we observe consistently more Republican party registrants at those destinations. Similarly, when the destinations are higher in income and lower in population density, we also see higher Republican party registration percentages. In the Western states, from 2004 to 2008, a \$10,000 increase in the difference between destination and origin income is associated with a

1 percentage point increase in Republican registration, while a 1,000 person increase in population density per square mile is associated with a -.35 percentage point drop in GOP registration.

[Table 5 about Here]

Parks and parkland are somewhat uneven in their impact on the Republican bias of destination locales. Generally, though, an increase in the number of parks, without regard to size, is associated with superior Republican percentages. Park land area is only statistically significant for the Eastern states, where more acreage at the destination relative to the origin is associated with increasing Republican dominance (see Table 5).

But even after we have accounted for these substantively important sources of difference between origin and destination locations within states, we still see Republicans and Democrats gravitating toward different neighborhoods on the basis of their party preference. In the East, Republicans and Democrats are still moving to locations with opposite partisan inclinations. In the West, Republican in-state movers, on average, still prefer to relocate to neighborhoods that are 2 percent more Republican than independents and Democrats (see Table 5).

For the out-of-state migrants too, the effects of party preference on destination choice remain statistically significant and substantively important after controlling for destination-origin differences (see Table 6). There is no question that population density, income differences, differences in racial composition and the number of parks make a prominent difference in guiding relocation, but there still seems to be a more than minor element of destination choice shaped by individuals' partisan leanings.

[Table 6 about Here]

## **Discussion**

We have known for a long time that there are partisan differences in registration and voting across the national landscape. But we were not sure that human migration patterns follow and

exacerbate those partisan differences, or ignore and attenuate them. Here the main goal has been to show that the relocation patterns of a very large subset of the population, *migrating registered voters*, certainly do take note of them, even if indirectly via the expression of distal preferences for lower density settlement or more park acreage. Large proportions of Republicans and Democrats are moving to locations that are more congenial in terms of their partisanship, even in locations where presumably it would be relatively effortless to avoid an unfriendly or dissonant relationship with a rival partisan.

True, these observable migration patterns could certainly be more geographically polarized than they are. After all, there are populated zip codes where the Republican percentage of registrants hovers right around 0, and the same for Democrats. If partisans really wanted to be safe from conflict and find perfect homophily, why wouldn't they head for one of those? The answer is that relocation is never only about politics, or even principally about it. Jobs and family concerns remain the most important factors in the migration decision, but once the major decisions about relocation have been made, that a move is going to occur, that it will be to this state, to this metro area, to this county; then more micro decisions are made about specific neighborhoods, streets and dwellings. At this level, considerations more proximate to political values may play a more prominent role. The diagrams remind us that the bulk of movement occurs within that subset of locations that are attractive to movers of both partisan persuasions, presumably on the basis of their economic vitality. There aren't very many Democrats, Republicans or independents, rushing to the most lopsided Republican locations because those are often in rural areas where the employment prospects are limited. Similarly, there isn't a stampede to the most lopsided Democratic locations, because many of those locales don't offer much economic opportunity either. Political sorting, then, is confined and constrained by the basic need to make a living.

Because packing-up and moving has always been about more than finding politically congenial neighbors, movers do not polarize or sort themselves to the full extent that a state or metropolitan area



might permit, with Republicans moving to the reddest of red locations, and Democrats moving to the most blue. In the end, perhaps the relevant universe of comparison in relocation research is not all possible zip codes or neighborhoods in a state, but only those to which a prospective migrant might consider moving, a much smaller subset of the total presented in the transition diagrams. Viewed from the standpoint of that narrower range of feasible destinations, a three or five point gap in the partisan leaning of zip codes is substantively wide. Most importantly our results indicate that tens-of-thousands of movers each year not only relocate to places that are friendly to their partisan viewpoint, but to areas that are *more friendly than the ones they left behind*, indicating that a gradual increase in partisan homogeneity accompanies the residential relocation of a large subset of the electorate.

That we see geographic sorting by partisanship to the extent we do is remarkable given the widespread skepticism in the field suggesting that this type of geographic polarization has been wildly exaggerated, or is nonexistent. Although we have gauged this movement over a short period of time, our study is notable because no one has ever shown such effects over a two-year or four-year period. Multiplied over the course of a generation of continued movement, this kind of sorting might eventually result in patterns of partisan segregation that are heightened well beyond anything we see on the present day landscape, particularly in states where the partisan difference in the destination locations is especially wide.

Some might insist that at the end of the day geographic sorting by partisanship or party registration does not matter very much, because party preferences on many matters are not remarkably disparate. But apparently policy preference and political ideology are increasingly lining up with political party identification, thereby augmenting partisan intensity at many levels of political life, heightening partisan commitment and opinion polarization (Levendusky 2009; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Perhaps this increasing partisan commitment is both a cause and consequence of geographic sorting by large numbers of citizens into areas of greater Republican and Democratic solidarity.

The precise impact of greater geographic sorting by party (or greater mixing, for that matter) on mass opinion is not fully known. For the moment, we are agnostic on the subject of whether this kind of geographic sorting is heralding Armageddon, believing that geographic mobility is an interesting phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. Certainly it has interesting and important implications for political campaigning and redistricting, as the denser clustering of partisan populations always does. In turn, the concentration and density of partisan populations will have an impact on legislative representation and the representational styles of legislators, again, very important subjects of political science inquiry (Rodden 2010).

We conclude with a familiar call for continuing work to be done on the relocation paths of *non-voters*, whose patterns of resettlement may show less partisan polarization than what appears here. Work on additional states would surely be helpful, as well as additional years. Analyzing relocation data at granular scales below the zip code would be useful to examine the effect sizes -- to see how much larger the partisan gap between alternative destinations might be using smaller units of observation. Finally, critical research is needed to adjudicate just which of several hypothesized causes is at the bottom of the partisan geographic sorting we have observed here, and why it varies in its magnitude across states. Certainly it is possible that the reason why some states show such wide partisan gaps at the destination locales is because these states are more urban and racially diverse. Movers to larger metropolitan areas in these states will find a far broader diversity of alternative destinations to choose from: in both socioeconomic and political terms. The political parties in these states are probably also more ideologically diverse, creating a greater distance between conservative and liberal poles than likely exists in reputedly moderate states such as Delaware or Nevada. This means that the potential for discriminating among neighborhoods on the basis of partisan or party-like criteria might be far easier in some places than it is in others.

The positive news is that in an economically robust, substantially free nation, we do see a large movement of people across states and neighborhoods in search of better lives for themselves and their families. Migration and resettlement is never easy, however, imposing great psychic costs, along with the financial costs that movement always entails. If part of what eases those psychic costs is finding a population at one's destination that is relatively homophilous in terms of its values we cannot help but think that there is something very positive about this for readjustment. Even if it does turn out to have less than desirable implications for opinion formation, politics remains a small part of people's lives, and election seasons are episodic. Its far more important that people can find daily and routine social support as they get planted and reestablished. Let the crosscutting deliberative networks develop sometime afterward.

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**Table 1. Total Volume of Migration, by State and Type of Move, 2008**

State	Adults Movers in Past Year		Among Movers				Among those Moving into the State from Across State Lines				
	Percent	N	Moved within county (%)	Moved across county (%)	Moved across states (%)	From abroad (%)	From California (%)	From Nevada (%)	From Oregon (%)		From other States (%)
California	11	2,888,023	67	19	8	6	---	7	3		90
Nevada	14	274,315	83	1	15	1	51	---	4		45
Oregon	16	449,079	59	23	16	2	21	7	---		72
							From New Jersey (%)	From Maryland (%)	From Pennsylvania (%)	From Delaware (%)	From other States (%)
New Jersey	8	498,982	66	15	15	4	---	3	12	*	85
Maryland	9	370,951	51	25	23	1	3	---	11	*	86
Pennsylvania	9	865,514	56	22	21	1	16	10	---	*	74
Delaware	8	50,483	63	5	30	2	11	7	48	---	34

Universe: Adults at least 18 years of age

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2008 March Supplement

\* CPS sample does not have any respondents in this category



<b>Table 2. Number and Political Party* of Migrants, by Type of Move, 2004 to 2008</b>			
<b>California</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters 2008			
15,828,265			
Total Migrants	1,937,147	632,944	107,824
% of Total Voters '08	12.2	4.0	0.7
R	611,730	200,010	39,620
% of Migrants	31.6	31.6	36.7
D	831,032	266,133	39,535
% of Migrants	42.9	42.0	36.7
U/I	504,385	166,801	28,669
% of Migrants	26.0	26.4	26.6
<b>Delaware</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters 2008			
580,860			
Total Migrants	38,023	5,780	42,647
% of Total Voters '08	6.5	1.0	7.3
R	12,177	1,965	15,413
% of Migrants	32.0	34.0	36.1
D	17,247	2,513	17,498
% of Migrants	45.4	43.5	41.0
U/I	8,599	1,302	9,736
% of Migrants	22.6	22.5	22.8
<b>Maryland</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters 2008			
3,202,481			
Total Migrants	387,829	144,186	74,238
% of Total Voters '08	12.1	4.5	2.3
R	105,414	39,831	27,141
% of Migrants	27.2	27.6	36.6
D	212,860	77,130	32,837
% of Migrants	54.9	53.5	44.2
U/I	69,555	27,225	14,260
% of Migrants	17.9	18.9	19.2
<b>New Jersey</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters			
4,986,947			
Total Migrants	362,043	140,783	73,173
% of Total Voters '08	7.3	2.8	1.5
R	51,896	20,083	10,617
% of Migrants	14.3	14.3	14.5
D	72,559	26,880	11,874

% of Migrants	20.0	19.1	16.2
U/I	237,588	93,820	50,682
% of Migrants	65.6	66.6	69.3
<b>Nevada</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters			
1,416,965			
Total Migrants	173,476	11,863	26,887
% of Total Voters '08	12.2	0.8	1.9
R	63,531	5,808	11,248
% of Migrants	36.6	49.0	41.8
D	71,103	3,703	10,181
% of Migrants	41.0	31.2	37.9
U/I	38,842	2,352	5,458
% of Migrants	22.4	19.8	20.3
<b>Oregon</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters			
2,586,966			
Total Migrants	332,653	109,538	24,842
% of Total Voters '08	12.9	4.2	1.0
R	106,332	35,534	7,843
% of Migrants	32.0	32.4	31.6
D	126,493	41,892	9,692
% of Migrants	38.0	38.2	39.0
U/I	99,828	32,112	7,307
% of Migrants	30.0	29.3	29.4
<b>Pennsylvania</b>	Total Across Zips Within State	Across County Within State	Across State (to Adjacent States)
Total Voters			
8,422,504			
Total Migrants	561,760	221,093	139,806
% of Total Voters '08	6.7	2.6	1.7
R	180,706	78,970	50,568
% of Migrants	32.2	35.7	36.2
D	288,753	101,354	61,889
% of Migrants	51.4	45.8	44.3
U/I	92,301	40,769	27,349
% of Migrants	16.4	18.4	19.6
Source: State Voter files, 2004, 2006, 2008.			

**Table 3. Pooled Estimates of Sources of the Partisan Bias of Destination Zip Code Choice of In-state Migrants by Election Period and Region.**

Variables	2004 - 2008		2004 - 2006		2006 - 2008	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )
Republican Migrants	2.644** (0.029)	3.405** (0.020)	2.043** (0.034)	3.629** (0.024)	2.905** (0.040)	3.071** (0.021)
Democratic Migrants	-1.458** (0.027)	0.109** (0.018)	-1.675** (0.031)	0.304** (0.022)	-1.355** (0.036)	-0.103** (0.020)
% Republican at Origin Location	0.578** (0.001)	0.543** (0.001)	0.528** (0.001)	0.534** (0.001)	0.557** (0.001)	0.565** (0.001)
Voter Changed Party Registration	.024 (0.027)	-0.487** (0.018)	.010 (0.034)	0.084** (0.023)	0.070** (0.037)	-0.846** (0.021)
Maryland	0.105 (0.062)		-0.131* (0.058)		-0.539** (0.089)	
New Jersey	-5.351** (0.064)		-6.410** (0.059)		-4.773** (0.092)	
Pennsylvania	3.104** (0.061)		4.211** (0.056)		1.596** (0.088)	
Nevada		1.880** (0.034)		2.925** (0.048)		3.843** (0.039)
California		0.526** (0.222)		0.240** (0.035)		2.404** (0.024)
Constant	13.423** (0.067)	15.062** (0.030)	15.181** (0.063)	15.061** (0.042)	13.872** (0.095)	11.830** (0.033)
N	1,348,272	2,395,071	941,994	1,593,066	790,998	1,797,995
R <sup>2</sup> <sub>a</sub>	.51	.35	.51	.34	.47	.38
SEE	11.5	11.2	11.4	11.2	11.7	10.5

\*p-value  $\leq$  0.05; \*\*p-value  $\leq$  0.01

Ordinary Least Squares Estimation; cell entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors). Delaware is the excluded baseline Eastern State, Oregon in the West. Dependent variable is Republican % of registrants in destination zip code at midpoint of time period.

**Table 4. Pooled Estimates of Sources of the Partisan Bias of Destination Zip Code Choice of Cross-State Migrants from Adjacent States by Election Period and Region**

Variables	2004 - 2008		2004 - 2006		2006 - 2008	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )
Republican Migrants	3.788** (0.071)	4.732** (0.077)	3.665** (0.072)	3.985** (0.094)	4.037** (0.073)	5.311** (0.089)
Democratic Migrants	-1.506** (0.069)	0.730** (0.075)	-1.175** (0.070)	-0.064 (0.092)	-1.698** (0.069)	0.578** (0.086)
% Republican at Origin Location	0.220** (0.002)	0.179** (0.002)	0.203** (0.002)	0.141** (0.003)	0.212** (0.002)	0.180** (0.003)
Voter Changed Party Registration	-3.136** (0.054)	-0.781** (0.064)	-3.493** (0.054)	-0.213** (0.079)	-2.877** (0.055)	-0.811** (0.075)
Maryland	2.849** (0.090)		1.984** (0.091)		3.238** (0.092)	
New Jersey	2.949** (0.098)		2.230** (0.100)		2.912** (0.097)	
Pennsylvania	-14.265** (0.082)		-13.375** (0.084)		-12.267** (0.083)	
Nevada		11.069** (0.079)		-1.093** (0.112)		-1.223** (0.118)
California		1.142** (0.068)		1.247** (0.086)		-0.503** (0.091)
Constant	30.842** (0.110)	26.632** (0.104)	31.938** (0.111)	30.975** (0.137)	28.970** (0.109)	27.201** (0.137)
N	329,180	156,783	311,809	113,920	315,783	130,175
R <sup>2</sup> <sub>a</sub>	.25	.19	.22	.06	.11	.09
SEE	15.0	11.4	14.7	11.9	14.6	12.2

\*p-value  $\leq$  0.05; \*\*p-value  $\leq$  0.01

Ordinary Least Squares Estimation; cell entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors). Delaware is the excluded baseline Eastern State, Oregon in the West. Dependent variable is Republican % of registrants in destination zip code at midpoint of time period.

**Table 5. Pooled Estimates of Sources of the Partisan Bias of Destination Zip Code Choice of In-State Migrants by Election Period and Region, Controlling for Origin Destination Differences**

Variables	2004 - 2008		2004 - 2006		2006 - 2008	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )
Republican Migrants	1.063** (0.021)	2.128** (0.016)	0.761** (0.025)	2.251** (0.020)	1.110** (0.029)	1.905** (0.017)
Democratic Migrants	-1.169** (0.020)	0.0369** (0.015)	-1.316** (0.023)	0.178 (0.018)	-1.103** (0.026)	-0.099** (0.016)
% Republican at Origin Location	0.809** (0.0057)	0.708** (0.0005)	0.776** (0.0007)	0.698** (0.0005)	0.799** (0.001)	0.711** (0.001)
Voter Changed Party Registration	-0.062** (0.019)	-0.329** (0.015)	0.072** (0.025)	0.082** (0.019)	-0.099** (0.026)	-0.481** (0.017)
Destination-Origin % White	0.296** (0.0004)	0.210** (0.0003)	0.282** (0.0004)	0.211** (0.0004)	0.292** (0.001)	0.218** (0.0005)
Destination-Origin Income (\$1000s)	0.063** (0.0004)	0.104** (0.0003)	0.070** (0.0002)	0.084** (0.0004)	0.063** (0.003)	0.071** (0.0002)
Destination-Origin Population Density (1000s)	-0.253** (0.001)	-0.353** (0.0009)	-0.260** (0.002)	-0.361** (0.001)	-0.212** (0.002)	-0.373** (0.001)
Destination-Origin Parks	0.172** (0.014)	0.030** (0.008)	0.131** (0.014)	0.029** (0.012)	0.261** (0.028)	-0.003 (0.009)
Destination-Origin Park Sq Mileage	0.037** (0.004)	-0.00002 (0.00002)	0.026** (0.005)	-0.00001 (0.00002)	0.016** (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)
Maryland	0.356** (0.045)		0.134** (0.042)		-0.256** (0.064)	
New Jersey	-2.774** (0.046)		-3.487** (0.043)		-1.827** (0.065)	
Pennsylvania	1.945** (0.044)		2.418** (0.041)		0.490** (0.063)	
Nevada		0.313** (0.030)		0.854** (0.039)		1.784** (0.034)
California		-0.495** (0.018)		-0.341** (0.029)		1.690** (0.019)
Constant	5.514** (0.049)	9.951** (0.025)	7.049** (0.047)	9.928** (0.035)	6.124** (0.068)	7.164** (0.027)
N	1,303,045	2,311,649	931,740	1,552,159	779,196	1,725,045
R <sup>2</sup> <sub>a</sub>	.74	.58	.74	.57	.73	.60
SEE	8.3	9.0	8.3	9.1	8.3	8.5

\*p-value  $\leq$  0.05; \*\*p-value  $\leq$  0.01


Ordinary Least Squares Estimation; cell entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors). Delaware is the excluded baseline Eastern State, Oregon in the West. Dependent variable is Republican % of registrants at destination

zip code at midpoint of time period.


Variables	2004 - 2008		2004 - 2006		2006 - 2008	
	East	West	East	West	East	West
	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )	$\beta$ (SE $\beta$ )
Republican Migrants	1.898** (0.058)	3.734** (0.072)	1.771** (0.058)	3.058** (0.088)	2.036** (0.058)	4.445** (0.084)
Democratic Migrants	-1.146** (0.056)	0.476** (0.070)	-0.934** (0.056)	-0.226 (0.086)	-1.147** (0.055)	0.546** (0.082)
% Republican at Origin Location	0.587** (0.002)	0.319** (0.002)	0.563** (0.002)	0.304** (0.003)	0.578** (0.002)	0.326** (0.003)
Voter Changed Party Registration	-2.634** (0.044)	-0.708** (0.060)	-3.072** (0.043)	-0.088 (0.073)	-2.272** (0.043)	-0.728** (0.071)
Destination-Origin % White	0.266** (0.0009)	0.125** (0.001)	0.262** (0.0009)	0.101** (0.002)	0.272** (0.043)	0.091** (0.002)
Destination-Origin Income (\$1000s)	0.03** (0.001)	0.05** (0.001)	0.03** (0.001)	0.08** (0.002)	0.04** (0.001)	0.07** (0.002)
Destination-Origin Population Density (1000s)	-0.377** (0.003)	-0.408** (0.005)	-0.383** (0.003)	-0.474** (0.006)	-0.334** (0.003)	-0.451** (0.006)
Destination-Origin Parks	1.316** (0.214)	0.260** (0.017)	0.674** (0.124)	0.159** (0.021)	0.772** (0.128)	0.281** (0.020)
Destination-Origin Park Sq Mileage	0.013 (0.008)	-0.0003** (0.00009)	0.024** (0.008)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.019* (0.009)	-0.0003* (0.0001)
Maryland	0.427** (0.074)		-0.160* (0.074)		0.037 (0.073)	
New Jersey	6.158** (0.081)		5.644** (0.082)		5.665** (0.078)	
Pennsylvania	-15.097** (0.069)		-14.381** (0.070)		-13.563** (0.068)	
Nevada		12.244** (0.076)		-4.441** (0.112)		-4.106** (0.118)
California		8.014** (0.092)		-5.355** (0.122)		-6.494** (0.123)
Constant	18.545** (0.094)	18.087** (0.112)	20.044** (0.094)	29.073** (0.133)	17.782** (0.090)	25.342** (0.135)
N	309,217	153,955	309,220	112,414	310,054	127,296

R <sup>2</sup> <sub>a</sub>	.50	.31	.51	.20	.52	.20
SEE	11.6	10.5	11.8	11.0	11.4	11.4
*p-value ≤ 0.05; **p-value ≤ 0.01						
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation; cell entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors). Delaware is the excluded baseline Eastern State, Oregon in the West. Dependent variable is Republican % of registrants at destination zip code at midpoint of time period.						

### East Coast, Republicans



### East Coast, Democrats









Figure 1. Transition Matrixes for Democratic, Republican and Independent/Unaffiliated Movement within State, 2004-2008, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland-Delaware







Figure 2. Transition Matrixes for Democratic, Republican and Independent/Unaffiliated Movement within State, 2004-2008, California-Oregon-Nevada