I. Primary and Secondary Qualities
   (A) Primary Qualities (size, shape, motion)
      (1) These really are in bodies; they are intrinsic to bodies.
      (2) Our ideas of primary qualities resemble the primary qualities.
   (B) Secondary Qualities (colors, odors, felt textures, etc.)
      (1) These are only in bodies as causal powers able to effect in us certain sensory ideas.
      (2) The secondary qualities result from the primary qualities. That is, there is a certain micro-structure – the size, shape, and motion of the innards of things – that causes our sensory ideas.
      (3) Our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the secondary qualities, or anything really existing in the world.

II. Power
   (A) Power means the ability to make or receive any change
   (B) Idea of active power arrived at by the mind’s reflection on itself: the will
   (C) But it is a philosophical confusion to attribute freedom to the will; rather only a person can be free or not.
   (D) Compatibilism: Freedom is consistent with necessity.

III. Substance
   (A) Substances are, first, just objects in the world, things; but substances are, second, the underpinning and support of the sensible qualities we perceive
   (B) Ideas of substance depend upon our sensory modalities; our ideas of substance don’t represent substances as they really are; they present us with the picture we need in order to get around in the world.
   (C) Substance, for Locke, is just a “something-I-know-not-what.”
   (D) Consequences:
      (1) Locke leaves certain questions open to experiment. For example, Descartes had argued that a vacuum is impossible because of the nature of corporeal substance. Locke will not allow this kind of argument.
      (2) Locke’s conception of the world is independent of the nature of substance in general.
      (3) We can never really tell whether the substance of the mind and body are the same or different. Therefore, Locke is neither a dualist, nor a materialist, nor an idealist, but a skeptic.
      (4) If we are to believe in an immortal soul, it will be because of revelation or faith, not philosophical argumentation.
IV. Personal Identity

(A) What is the problem of identity? How do you know that $a$ at $t_1$ is the *same thing* as $b$ at $t_2$? E.g. is the philosophy book in front of you the *same thing* as the philosophy book you had during the last class? In what sense is the acorn that grows into an oak the same thing (organism)? Are you the same *person* you were yesterday?

(B) Locke’s answer for *personal* identity. Personal identity consists in continuity of consciousness. That is, you are the same person that you were yesterday in so far as you can remember being you yesterday.

(C) The standard critique, from Bishop Butler’s *The Analogy of Religion* (1736): “But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet, to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that *consciousness of personal identity* presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, *personal identity*, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.” (emphasis added)