**Negotiating Change: The New Politics of the Middle East (Jeremy Jones)**

1. **Introduction**
   1. ME governments: royal autocracy, military dictatorship, theocracy
   2. 2005 Harvard conference: “stubborn” resistance of “global embrace” of democracy
   3. Need to respect diversity and culture in region
   4. Political biodiversity approach best
   5. Democracy in MER may already be under way
      1. Shared traditions (hospitality, assimilation, coexistence, mutual reinforcement)
      2. Democracy = “mobile idea”
   6. Negotiation = order of the day
      1. New social formations, political parties, women in public life, globalizing economy
      2. West must recognize and talk w/Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood
2. **Chapter 1: Egypt – Mosque and State**
   1. Dynastic republicanism (Mubarak)
   2. Temporal difference between US and Arab views (what is contemporary – for Arabs, longer timeline, meaning less urgency for change)
   3. The return of “people power” (no significant political gain in 2005, though)
   4. MB as big opposition winner
   5. Power of judiciary over executive power significant (elections, emergency law, legality of political parties)
   6. Ambivalence toward political parties (regional trend)
   7. National Democratic Party (NDP) as vehicle for change
   8. PP creation: must be novel & secular but no incentive to merge or form coalitions
   9. Where to allow Islamists in pluralistic political sphere? – Negotiating change w/Islamists key
   10. Current government = power monopoly
   11. Secular opposition = small, ineffectual
   12. Politically motivated violence in the name of religion
   13. Mainstream Islamic movement based on social mobilization
   14. Government made defensive political concessions to Islamists
   15. Government commit to economic and political reform (but limited in action)
   16. Large youth problem (lots of them, no jobs)
   17. Public sphere is disrepair
3. **Chapter 2: Iran – Innovation Impeded**
   1. Regular elections w/strict cabinet approval process
   2. Regional influence impeded by international isolationism
   3. *Ijtihad –* interpretation of Quranic verse to apply to contemporary situations
   4. ME rarely has surprising elections results (except the past 3 elections in Iran)
   5. *Velayet-e faqih* – guardianship of *ijtihad* and law under religious establishment (those who know the Quran better) – inimical to democracy
   6. Monopoly on public space
      1. Set terms of debates and prohibition of alternate voices
      2. Need to bring discourse into public and out of just mosque
      3. Emphasis on coalitions
      4. Secular and religious reformers must work together
4. **Chapter 3: Palestine – Democracy under Occupation**
   1. No Western stake in democracy process unless see Hamas in a way other than just militant Islam
   2. One of freest, fairest elections
   3. Significant urban middle class (basic constituency for democracy)
   4. Highly educated
   5. Unusually cosmopolitan
   6. Long history of democracy in local politics
   7. Grass-roots support for Hamas
      1. Provides social services and religious education
      2. Values: social cohesion, solidarity, religion
      3. Considered “honest” and “pure”
      4. Corruption seen as huge issue to voters (old Fatah)
   8. “Young Fatah” movement for democratic reforms (now growing power)
   9. Generational change in politics
   10. Importance of pluralism and national unity
       1. Free expression of dissent can lead to increased national unity
       2. Key to political and democratic change and progress
5. **Chapter 4: Syrian & Lebanon – Party Problems**
   1. Syria = 1 party power monopoly
   2. Lebanon = parties share power to form government (multiparty system)
   3. Syria: Political parties exacerbate divisions
      1. Negative historical experience
      2. Problems w/PPs: prone to corruption, emphasize ideology over addressing practical problems and solutions
      3. Syria plays leading role in Lebanese politics (Lev gov needs Syrian consent)
      4. Cedar Revolution in Lebanon anti-Syrian
      5. Maintaining coalitions for reform
      6. Party (Ba’ath) as: vehicle for dictatorship, elite in-group, reinforce social cleavages, faction/obstacle to national consensus
      7. Syria requires democracy without political parties (avoid party rhetoric, perhaps focus organization on issues rather than ideology)
   4. Lebanese politics very complicated
      1. PPs a way for particular communities to secure representation in national government (lots of minority groups)
      2. Very little grass-roots in PPs
      3. Function as parties in authoritarian regimes
      4. Hezbollah running state w/in a state (only PP w/mass following)
      5. PP functions: minority representation, promote interest of local leaders, secure electoral success, espouse/promote ideologies, organize/defend/support communities, provide social/individual services, engage in armed struggles
      6. “so-called terrorists may be most convincing democrats:
      7. Hezbollah focuses political energy on mundane/practical issues: provide social welfare, able to function maybe because not a government (haven’t tried to replace Lebanese government w/Islamic republic)
      8. PP purpose: balance interests, preserve political rights, provide economic/social resources
      9. Need step-by-step reform approach
      10. Hezbollah = 3D social/political movement w/deep roots in Lebanese life
6. **Chapter 5: Jordan & Morocco – The Authority of the Legitimate King**
   1. King = everyman, man of the people
   2. King = ubiquitous
   3. Monarchy not based on concept of absolute monarchy (Allah = sole source of sovereignty, absolutism would go against Allah)
   4. Monarchy may be increasingly conducive to democratic transformation than republican structures
   5. Symbolic power key
      1. Real political power and effects
      2. Represents dignity, respect, grace, hospitality
      3. Promotes interconnection, commonality, collective participation, web of reciprocity
   6. Democratic change needs to be a top-down process
   7. Monarch as arbiter can be progressive force
   8. Modernization pursued under guise to preserve peace and national unity
   9. Jordan: PPs seen as secret organization devoted to overthrow monarchy (happened once, why no mass membership)
7. **Chapter 6: Oman – Tradition and Change**
   1. Sultanate!
   2. Difference: historical continuity as nation and state
   3. Preserve tradition as part of change (flexibility, embrace of the new and other)
   4. Looks as if no politics at all
   5. Tradition designed to permit change
   6. Need full consensus
   7. *Shura –* consultation (ancient Quranic way of electing leadership, decision-making)
   8. Come what may attitude to political development (not looking for particular end, see what we get)
   9. Involvement of women in politics (dedication to women’s rights and filling positions w/most capable candidates)
8. **Chapter 7: Dubai – The Airport State**
   1. A “non-place” w/”non-existent” politics
   2. Everything provided (like an airport) – international hub
   3. Democracy emerged as way of representing new economic interests
   4. “political and social consciousness”
   5. Emphasis on provision of excellent infrastructure
   6. Disreputable in ME: Vegas on the Gulf; go to Dubai to get away from conservative nature of other Arab states (space of liberation from unnecessarily restrictive social norms)
   7. Bottom-up entrepreneurialism key
   8. Rational use of resources (profit-driven)
   9. Establishment of “knowledge economy”
   10. Minimal government regulation
   11. “polyglot polity in the making”
   12. Corporate involvement of stakeholders as model for democracy
9. **Chapter 8: Turkey – Islamists in Power**
   1. Islamists firmly established in government
   2. Robust democratic system
   3. Genuine commitment to an inclusive politics; rejected restrictions based on race, etc
   4. Islamists rooted deeply in local politics
10. **Chapter 9: Iraq – Democracy under Occupation, Revisited**
    1. Relationship between occupation and democracy not straightforward
    2. Resistance for and against democracy
    3. Best prospects for democracy come from Shia clerical leadership and culture it represents (must move away from elevating Sunni minority in government)
    4. Ayatollah Sistani may be crucial source of moral and political support for democracy
11. **Conclusion**
    1. Expansion of public sphere
       1. Better *shura*
       2. Continuous negotiation
       3. Real possibility for political change (change already happening)
    2. Western public diplomacy must change
       1. Don’t advocate for democracy, need to listen
       2. Be seen watching
    3. New politics in region must involve negotiation
    4. West must be prepared to accept whatever outcome in ME (it probably won’t look as we think it will)