History 323: The Holocaust Prof. J. Popkin

The Outside World and the Holocaust

What Did the Outside World Know and When Did it Know it?

A British Summary of Information Decoded from Intercepted German Radio Transmissions during the Invasion of the Soviet Union (Sept. 12, 1941): "The execution of 'Jews' is so recurrent a feature of these reports that the figures have been omitted from the situation reports and brought under one heading... Whether all those executed as 'Jews' are indeed such is of course doubtful; but the figures are no less conclusive as evidence of a policy of savage intimidation if not of ultimate extermination." (Cited in Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew, p. 96)

The Riegner Telegram to Dr. Stephen Wise (13 Aug. 1942): "Received alarming report stating that in Führer's headquarters a plan has been discussed and being under consideration according which total of Jews in countries occupied controlled by Germany numbering three and half to four millions should after deportation and concentrated in East be at one blow exterminated in order to resolve once for all Jewish question in Europe. Action is reported to be planned for autumn. Ways of execution still discussed. It has been spoken of prussic acid. In transmitting information with all necessary reservation as exactitude cannot be controlled by US beg to state that informer is reported to have close connections with highest German authorities and his reports to be generally reliable."

State Department Memorandum Regarding Riegner Telegram, (13 Aug. 1942): "It does not appear advisable in view of the Legation=s comments, the fantastic nature of the allegation, and the impossibility of our being of any assistance if such action were taken, to transmit the information to Dr. Stephen Wise as suggested." The telegram was never delivered. (Documents in Berenbaum, ed., Witness to the Holocaust, 253-4)

Official Reactions

US government response to American Jewish leaders' request for a strong public statement condemning murder of Jews (Dec. 1942): President Roosevelt told the Jewish delegation privately, "The government of the United States is very well acquainted with most of the facts you are now bringing to our attention. Unfortunately we have received confirmation from many sources." The State Department official in charge of Jewish matters wrote that "issuance [of a strong statement] would be accepted by the Jewish communities of the world as complete proof of the stories which are now being spread about... In addition the various Governments of the United Nations would expose themselves to increased pressure from all sides to do something more specific in order to aid these people." (Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, 73-74)

US Treasury official report on US State Department treatment of Jewish refugees (1943): "If anyone were to attempt to work out a set of restrictions specifically designed to prevent Jewish refugees from entering this country it is difficult to conceive of how more effective restrictions could have been imposed than have already been imposed on grounds of >security=... These restrictions are not essential for security reasons. Thus refugees upon arriving in this country could be placed in internment camps similar to those used for the Japanese on the West Coast and released only after a satisfactory investigation. Furthermore, even if we took these refugees and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die." (Cited in Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, 133)

British government memorandum to US government warning against special measures to aid Jews (Jan. 1943): "(a) The refugee problem cannot be treated as though it were a wholly Jewish problem which could be handled by Jewish agencies or by machinery only adapted for assisting Jews. There are so many non-Jewish refugees and there is so much acute suffering among non-Jews in Allied countries that Allied criticism would probably result if any marked preference were shown in removing Jews from territories in enemy occupation. There is also the distinct danger of stimulating anti-semitism in areas where an excessive number of foreign Jews are introduced... (b) There is at present always a danger of raising false hopes among refugees by suggesting or announcing alternative possible destinations in excess of shipping probabilities... (c) There is a possibility that the Germans or their satellites may change over from the policy of extermination to one of extrusion, and aim as they did before the war at embarrassing other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants..." (Cited in Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945, 194.)

Swiss Government policy toward Jewish refugees

The German government accepts Switzerland's request to stamp German Jews' passports so that they can be easily identified: A Swiss official's memorandum (Sept. 7, 1938): "It achieves the desired 100 per cent control over the entry of non-Aryan emigrants and makes it possible to settle every case quickly at the border, where the presence of the stamp on the first page, and in appropriate cases, of the visa must be verified." (Häsler, The Lifeboat is Full, 40)

Bulletin to all border police, 13 Aug. 1942: "Refugees in flight solely because of racial reasons--Jews, for example--do not qualify as political refugees." (Häsler, 82)