

## DOSSIER

<https://www.uky.edu/~rsand1/dossier/>

### 0. Curriculum Vitae

#### 1. Teaching Portfolio (75% distribution of effort)

a. All Narrative Outlines

#### 2. Service Materials (15% distribution of effort)

#### 3. Research (10% distribution of effort)

#### 4. DEI Statement

#### 5. COVID Impact Statement

Consolidated PDFs: (click links to open files)

[Sandmeyer Tenure Dossier](#) (en toto)

[Teaching Portfolio section](#)

[Service Materials section](#)

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ZIP Files: (click links to download files)

[Sandmeyer Tenure Dossier](#)

[Teaching Portfolio files](#)

[Service Materials files](#)

[Research files](#)

*Approved by Philosophy Department Faculty, 24 April 2017*

### Department of Philosophy

#### Statement of Promotion and Tenure Expectations:

#### Special-Title Appointments

Special-Title Series appointments are by their nature variable. Some may have an emphasis on teaching; others on service and administration. This variability will be reflected in the Distribution of Effort document (DOE), and promotion and tenure expectations for STS faculty members will depend upon the individual faculty member's DOE over the course of the probationary period or over the course of time since promotion to associate professor.

Evaluation of faculty for promotion and tenure will be based on a continuing record of high quality, effective, and committed teaching at multiple levels of instruction; high-quality and effective advising at the appropriate levels; service to the department, college and university; and a demonstrable commitment to creative and original philosophical research.

#### *Appointment/Promotion with Tenure to Associate Professor*

1. Because the DOE of STS faculty members will normally specify a high concentration of effort in teaching (usually on the order of 70-75% of total effort), the successful candidate will have a continuing record of high-quality, effective, and committed teaching. Although the department both welcomes and values effective, committed advising by its untenured faculty, its advising system is such that it requires of the successful candidate, not that he or she has provided high-quality advising, but only that he or she show at least some evidence of being in the future an effective and committed advisor at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. These achievements will be demonstrated primarily through the teaching portfolio. (The teaching portfolio shall contain the items required, and may also include items suggested, in AR II-1.0-5 pertaining to the teaching portfolio.) Committed and effective teaching can also be evidenced by such matters as participation in professional philosophy teaching forums, invited or contributed talks about the teaching of philosophy, teaching-related publications, and grants to promote instructional innovation or pedagogical research.
2. If the DOE specifies a significant concentration of effort in service, then the successful candidate will have demonstrated high quality service at the departmental, college, university and/or professional levels. The quality and nature of such service will be evaluated principally by the chair and other departmental officers, though at the time of promotion the views of all faculty will also be solicited. If, on the other hand, the DOE does not specify a high concentration of effort in service, then it is expected that the successful candidate will have demonstrated modest levels of quality service to the department and, if relevant, the college, university, and profession, establishing a record of effective collaboration in performance of service responsibilities. All faculty members are also expected to contribute to the collective growth and development of the department and, if called upon, college and university. Refereeing essays, manuscripts, proposals, and applications for journals, presses, and institutions falls under service to the profession.
3. The successful candidate with a DOE including administrative duties will have demonstrated creative and effective performance. This performance will be measured by documents provided by faculty, students, staff, or other administrators on the UK campus. If the administrative duties include off-campus activities, external letters may be solicited.
4. As the DOE of STS faculty will not normally emphasize research but rather teaching or service, the department does not expect that faculty member will have a publication record like that of a Regular-Title Series colleague going up for promotion. The expectations will be commensurate with the effort represented by the DOE over the course of the probationary period. The department does expect, however, that the Special-Title Series faculty member will be able to show a commitment to philosophical or pedagogical research in the form of conference and workshop presentations and publications in journals as well as books. This achievement will be primarily demonstrated by (1) external letters of assessment solicited by the unit from leading authorities in the relevant field(s) and (2) the quality, quantity and regularity of the candidate's presentations and publications (already appeared or accepted for publication). Faculty must demonstrate that they have established an independent research agenda and show evidence of a sustainable long-term commitment to scholarly research and publication. The department also expects successful candidates to have moved beyond the specific research they conducted in their Ph.D. dissertations (as evidenced by the contents of publications and presentations).

**BOB SANDMEYER**  
Assistant Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Kentucky

Research Specialty: Phenomenology, esp. Husserl  
Philosophy of Ecology  
Pedagogy Specialty: Interdisciplinary Education  
Sustainability

## **I. EDUCATION**

Ph.D.	2007	University of Kentucky	Philosophy
M.A.	2005	University of Kentucky	Philosophy
	1995	Colorado State University	Philosophy
B.A.	1987	George Washington University	Philosophy/ Political Science

## **II. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

University of Kentucky	
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy	2014 – present
Environmental and Sustainability Studies Program	
Program Faculty	2013 – present
Director of Undergraduate Studies	2017-18
Senior Lecturer, University of Kentucky, Department of Philosophy	2012 – 2014
Lecturer	2007 – 2012
Mesa State College (Colorado Mesa College), Grand Junction & Montrose Campuses	
Adjunct Faculty, Philosophy	1995 – 1998

## **III. AWARDS**

"Workshop Series Grant," Cooperative for the Humanities and the Social Sciences, S2022 (\$1,500)  
"Environmental Humanities – Undergraduate Engagement," Gaines Center for the Humanities, 2021-22.  
(\$500)  
"Teaching Sustainability + Teaching Sustainably" University of Kentucky Sustainability Challenge  
Grant Recipient, with Helen Turner (College of Design), 2017-2018. (\$47,085)  
Faculty Teach in China Program. Qingdao University of Technology, Qingda, China. 2018. (\$1,750)  
Faculty Teach in China Program. Jilin University, Changung, China, 2017. (\$1,250)

## **IV. TEACHING**

### **University of Kentucky Courses Taught since fall 2017**

#### Graduate Coursework

PHI 680	Graduate Seminar: Time and Time-Consciousness	F17
PHI 755	Independent Study: Husserl	S21
PHI 755	Independent Study: Environmental Ethics	F19

#### Undergraduate Coursework

PHI 516	Phenomenological Directions	S22
ENS 400	ENS Senior Capstone	S18
HON 398	Capstone: Metaphysical Approach to Conservation	S19

PHI 395	Independent Study: Aldo Leopold's Conservation Philosophy	F18
ENS 395	Independent Study: Environmental Psychology	S20
PHI 336	Environmental Ethics	standard fall offering
PHI 300	History and Philosophy of Ecology (cross-listed ENS 300)	S14, S17, S21
PHI 205	Food Ethics (also UKC 180)	standard spring offering
UKC 110	Introduction to the Environmental Humanities	F22
PHI 100	Intro to Philosophy: Epistemology & Metaphysics	standard offering

### **University of Kentucky Courses Taught – fall 2007 to spring 2017**

#### Graduate Seminars

PHI 755	Environmental Philosophy (Independent Study)	S17
PHI 715	Husserl's <i>Logical Investigations</i>	F15

#### Undergraduate Coursework

PHI 561	Problems in Natural Sciences: Mechanism/Teleology	S15
PHI 531	Advance Ethics: Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic	F16
PHI 531	Advance Ethics: Questions Concerning Technology	S16
PHI 516	Phenomenological Directions	F08, S17
PHI 395	Independent Study: The Phenomenology of Nature	F12
PHI 380	Death, Dying, and the Quality-of-Life	F07, S12, S13, F13
PHI 361	Biology and Society	S08–12, S14
PHI 335	The Individual & Society	S07, F11
PHI 310	The Philosophy of Human Nature	F13
PHI 120	Introductory Logic (traditional)	> 10 semesters

#### Online Coursework

PHI120	Introductory Logic (Designer and Administrator)	6 summers
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### **International Teaching**

"Teaching Methods for Interdisciplinary Courses – A Course for Faculty." Summer 2018.

Qingdao University of Technology: Qingdao, China – in association with the UK Confucius Institute.

"American Conservation Philosophy & Its Critique – A Course for Undergraduates." Summer 2017.

Jilin University: Changchun, China – in association with the UK Confucius Institute.

### **Thesis Committee Work**

#### Undergraduate Level

Committee Chair. "Radical Environmentalism in the Age of the Anthropocene." Senior Thesis Project. Josh Ehl, University Gaines Center Scholar, 2020-21.

Committee Member. "Decolonizing Ayahuasca: An Examination of Western Interactions with Entheogenic Plants." Senior Thesis Project. Claire Hilbrecht, University Gaines Center Scholar, 2020-21.

Faculty Advisor. "Conservation: Philosophy and Policy." Senior Honors Capstone. Anne Howard, University of Kentucky, 2019

Committee Member. "Exploring Animal Sentience." Senior Thesis Project. Autumn Murphy, University of Kentucky Gaines Center Scholar, 2014-15.

Committee Chair. "Heaven on Earth: Ecotheologies and Environmentalism." Senior Thesis Project. Sam Beavin, University of Kentucky Gaines Center Scholar, 2013-14.

Committee Member. "The Impact of Aesthetic Design on Bus Shelter Usability." Senior Thesis Project. James Crouch, University of Kentucky Gaines Center Scholar, 2012-13.

### Graduate Level

#### Philosophy

Co-Chair. Ph.D. Dissertation Committee. Lila Wakeman. 2021-present.  
Co-Chair, Ph.D. Dissertation Committee. Steven Winterfeldt, 2021-present.  
Member, Ph.D. Dissertation Committee. Ryan McCoy. 2021-present.

#### Other

Member, M.S. Dissertation Committee, Wildlife Ecology and Conservation Biology, University of Kentucky. Kay Davis, 2021-present  
Expert Reader. M.A. Environmental Psychology, Naropa University. "Good Farming as an Ecopsychosocial Practice." Amy Preece. 2011.

## **V. SERVICE**

### **Academic**

Steering Committee Member, UK Sustainable Agriculture Program, 2011-present  
Faculty Sponsor. Philosophy Club, University of Kentucky (2012-Spring 2022)  
Faculty Sponsor. Philosophy Graduate Student Association, University of Kentucky (2012-2022)  
UK Faculty Sustainability Council, 2016-2020  
Teaching and Learning Advisory Committee, College of Arts and Sciences, UK (Fall 2014 to 2020)  
Graduate Applications Committee, UK Department of Philosophy (2018-Chair, 2019)  
Judge. Dimensions of Political Ecology Working Group Graduate Student Paper Contest (2013, 2019)  
UK Senate, A&S Humanities Representative, 2015-2018  
Academic Planning and Priorities Subcommittee, 2015-18  
Co-coordinator, Speakers Series. Environmental and Sustainability Studies Major. University of Kentucky (Fall 2013 to 2018)  
Committee to Form New A&S Interdisciplinary Graduate Certificate: Environmental Studies (2015-2017)  
Literary Group Leader. *The Stranger*. Henry Clay High School, Lexington, KY (Feb. 2013)  
Advisory Board, Environmental and Sustainability Studies (ENS) B.A. Degree. College of Arts and Sciences, University of Kentucky (2010 – 2013)  
Evaluator. GenEd Quantitative Foundations Outcomes. University of Kentucky (2012)  
Environmental Degree Programs Committee, Faculty of the Environment, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Kentucky (2009 – 2010)  
Education Committee, Tracy Farmer for Sustainability and the Environment, University of Kentucky (2008-2010)  
In-Service Instructor, "Teaching Environmental Ethics," UK Dept. of Philosophy (Fall 2009)

### **Professional Development**

#### Director

Environmental Humanities Initiative. College of Arts and Sciences, UK. (F2021 – present)  
Workshop Organizer. "Teaching Philosophy" by Melissa Jacquart. University of Kentucky Philosophy Graduate Student Association. (October 2020)  
"Sustain-able Pedagogies Workshop for UK Faculty." Co-director with Helen Turner, College of Design. (Summer-Fall 2018).  
Panel Organizer and Presenter. "Interdisciplinary Pedagogy Workshop," Kentucky Philosophical Association. (March 2019)

### Participant

Kentucky Campus Compact Service-Learning Educator Learning Community, 2021-22. (This ELC is designed to prepare individuals to teach with service learning, sessions online.)  
Colby Summer Institute in Environmental Humanities 2020. Colby College (postponed due to COVID-19, August 2021)  
"American Association of Philosophy Teacher's Workshop on Teaching and Learning" at UNC Chapel Hill (February 2019)  
Teaching Team Member, Philosophers for Sustainability. (Spring 2019 – *ongoing*)  
"Extending the Land Ethic: Current Humanities Voices and Sustainability," NEH Summer Institute for College and University Faculty. (June-July 2016)

### Mentoring

Sustainability Mentor. Mentee: Eric Hemphill, University of Central Oklahoma. Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education. (2018-2019)

## **Professional Conferences**

### Organizer

Panel Organizer and Discussant, "Philosophy in an Interdisciplinary Key"  
Kentucky Philosophical Association Panel (March 2019)  
Session Organizer, International Association of Environmental Philosophy Panel. Dimensions of Political Philosophy Conference (February 2018)  
Organizer & Moderator, "International Association for Environmental Philosophy Panel, Dimensions of Political Ecology Conference (February 2018)

### Participant

Moderator, "Animal Phenomenology." International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2018)  
Moderator. "Husserl: Difference, Ecology, and Community." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2017)  
Invited Participant. "University of Kentucky Food Systems Summit." The University of Kentucky (April 2016)  
Invited Participant. "Education for Homecoming: A Sustainable Agriculture Program Convening." The Berry Center, New Castle, KY (May 2015)  
Moderator. "Time, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2014)  
Moderator. "Husserl on Fact, Intentionality, and Emotions." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. (November 2012)  
Moderator, "Governing Nature." Dimensions of Political Ecology Conference on Nature/Society. (April 2012)  
Host. Kentucky Philosophical Association Meeting. (April 2011)  
Moderator. "Studies in Husserl's Phenomenology." 49<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. (November 2010)  
Moderator. "Heidegger and Psychoanalysis." 43rd Annual Meeting of the Heidegger Circle. (May 2009)

## **Professional Publications**

### Editorial Role

Editorial Board Member. *Phenomenological Investigations. Journal of the North American Society for Early Phenomenology.* (2021 – present)  
Secretary. North American Society for Early Phenomenology (Secretary: 2015-2018)

Editorial Board Member. *Cogent OA* (2014 – present)  
President. Kentucky Philosophical Association (AY 2012-2013)  
Vice President. Kentucky Philosophical Association, (AY 2010-2011)

#### Referee

*Environmental Philosophy*  
*Environmental Humanities*  
*Husserl Studies*  
*International Journal of Philosophical Studies*  
*Journal of the History of Philosophy*  
Columbia University Press  
MIT Press  
Ohio University Press  
Pearson Publishing  
Routledge  
*Studia Phaenomenologica*  
Wiley-Blackwell

#### **STEM**

Co-Principal Investigator. 2022 NSF Convergence Accelerator Proposal. Dr. Jawahir, Dr. Atwood, Dr. Hoyt, Dr. Sandmeyer. University of Kentucky.

#### **VI. RESEARCH**

##### **Current Projects**

Invited article: "Hans Jonas" (for Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, 2022)  
"[Developing and Establishing an Environmental Humanities in the University of Kentucky](#)" Draft  
Proposal 2021, UK.

##### **Books**

*Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: its Problem and Promise*. (Routledge, 2009).

##### **Articles**

"The Idea of an Existential Ecology" (*Phenomenology and Place*, Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017.  
"Life and Sprit in Max Scheler's Philosophy." *Philosophy Compass*. (Vol. 7, No. 1. Jan 2012)

##### **Book Reviews**

Adam Konopka. *Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats*. In *Husserl Studies* (2020)  
Andrea Staiti. *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life*. In *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (2016)  
Leopold, Aldo. *A Sand County Almanac and Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation*. By Aldo Leopold. Edited by Curt Meine. – In *Environmental Philosophy* (Spring 2014)  
Mohanty, J.N. *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The Freiburg Years (1916-1938)*. In *Husserl Studies* (July 2013)  
Hickerson, Ryan. *The History of Intentionality*. – In *Philosophy in Review*. Volume XXIX, No. 2 (2009): 112-114.

Husserl, Edmund. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-11.* – In *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45, no. 2 (2007): 338-339.

Tuttle, Howard N. *Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset.* – In *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 44 (2006): 128-29.

Welton, Donn, editor. *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader.* – In *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 43 (2005): 122-23.

## Web Publication

The Husserl Page (<http://www.husserlpage.com/>)

## Presentations

- "A Contemporaneous Critique of Husserl's 1928 Time Lectures." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. *2020 meeting postponed*, October 2021.
- "Oskar Kraus' Criticism of Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*." North American Society for Early Phenomenology (May 2019)
- "Philosophy in an Interdisciplinary Key." Kentucky Philosophical Association (March 2019)
- "The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals." Living with Animals (March 2019)
- "The UK Sustain-able Pedagogies Faculty Workshop – An Overview." Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (October 2018)
- "Sustainability & Philosophy." Invited Speaker, Symposium on Emerging Technologies and Sustainability: Interactions Between Science and Society. University of Kentucky. (Dec 2017)
- "An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity." International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2017)
- "What in the World Does Coexistence with the Animal Mean?" Living with Animals 3: Co-Existence (March 2017)
- "Aldo Leopold's Political Ecology." 7<sup>th</sup> Annual Dimensions of Political Ecology Conference (February 2017)
- "Aldo Leopold and Wendell Berry on the Farm." University of Kentucky Food Systems Forum (December 2016)
- "Jan Patočka's Conception of an Asubjective Phenomenology" Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2016)
- "The Way of the Machine: Wendell Berry and Martin Heidegger on the Essence of Technology." Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists (May 2016)
- "The Value of the Least in Aldo Leopold's Ethics." Kentucky Philosophical Association Meeting (April 2016)
- "Wendell Berry's Critique of Technology in Modern Agriculture." Dimensions of Political Ecology Conference (February 2016)
- "Is Hans Jonas an Ecological Thinker?" International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2015)
- "Philosophy as Rigorous Science? Scheler contra Husserl." North American Society for Early Phenomenology (June 2015)
- "Environment in Scheler and Heidegger." Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists (May 2015)
- "The Value of a Varmint." Living with Animals Conference (March 2015)
- "An Existential Ecology: A Proposal." International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2014)



- "Aldo Leopold's Wilderness Idea." Presented as part of the Environmental & Sustainability Studies Program Speakers Series. Film Presentation and Discussion of *Green Fire: Aldo Leopold's a Land Ethic for our Time*. University of Kentucky (October 2014)
- "A Study of Life and Land and How this Relates to our Home." University of Kentucky (March 2014)
- "The Philosophy of Life: Hans Jonas and Max Scheler." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2013)
- "The Meaning of Ecology: A Study of Homer's *Odyssey* in Leopold and Berry." International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2013)
- "Ecology: Study of the Natural Household." Talk before the University of Kentucky EcoLab. (September 2013)
- "On the Possibility of Creating Non-Human Spaces." Living with Animals (March 2013)
- "The Importance of the Phenomenological Reduction to Max Scheler's Personalism." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (November 2012)
- "The 1930 'System of Phenomenological Philosophy.'" Husserl Circle (April 2011)
- Précis of *Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology*. Kentucky Philosophical Association. (April 2010)
- "An Existential Interpretation of Aldo Leopold's Concept of Land." International Society for Environmental Ethics. (March 2010)
- "Husserl's Zigzag Method and the Problem of a Phenomenological Language." Kentucky Philosophical Association. (May 2009)
- "Our Kinship with the World." International Association for Environmental Philosophy. (October 2008)
- "The Rediscovery of Life within Phenomenology: Hans Jonas and his Relation to Max Scheler." Institute for the Study of Nature at M.I.T. (June 2008)

## **Commentaries**

- "Commentary on James Hart's 'Some Moments of Wonder Emergent Within Transcendental Phenomenological Analyses.'" Husserl Circle (May/June 2022)
- "Commentary on Simon Gurofsky's 'Kant's Principle of Significance.'" Kentucky Philosophical Association (April 2018)
- "Commentary on Matt Pianalto's 'Why Patience is Always a Virtue.'" Kentucky Philosophical Association (April 2014)
- Participant. Kentucky Philosophical Association Two-Day Paper Workshop. (July 2013)
- "Commentary on Ben Dixon's 'A Decision Procedure for Sustainable Development.'" Kentucky Philosophical Association (April 2012)
- "Commentary on Ronald Bruzina's 'Points for a Phenomenology Antecedent to the Dichotomizing of Natur and Geist.'" Husserl Circle (April 2011)
- "Commentary on John Anders' 'An Aporetic Approach to Husserl's Reflections on Time.'" The Husserl Circle (June 2008)
- "Commentary on Sebastian Luft's paper, 'Abnormality and the Counter-Normal of the Phenomenological Reduction.'" The Husserl Circle (February 1999)

## **VII. LANGUAGES**

German: proficient reading level  
 Ancient Greek: basic reading level  
 Modern Hebrew: basic reading and writing level

## **VIII. MEMBERSHIPS**

American Association of Philosophy Teachers  
 Husserl Circle



International Association for Environmental Philosophy  
North American Society for Early Phenomenology  
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy



## DOSSIER: Research Materials (10% distribution of effort)

<https://www.uky.edu/~rsand11/dossier/research>

### Statement of Promotion and Tenure Expectations: STS Appointments<sup>1</sup>

As the DOE of STS faculty will not normally emphasize research but rather teaching or service, the department does not expect that faculty member will have a publication record like that of a Regular-Title Series colleague going up for promotion. The expectations will be commensurate with the effort represented by the DOE over the course of the probationary period. The department does expect, however, that the Special-Title Series faculty member will be able to show a commitment to philosophical or pedagogical research in the form of conference and workshop presentations and publications in journals as well as books. This achievement will be primarily demonstrated by (1) external letters of assessment solicited by the unit from leading authorities in the relevant field(s) and (2) the quality, quantity and regularity of the candidate's presentations and publications (already appeared or accepted for publication).

Faculty must demonstrate that they have established an independent research agenda and show evidence of a sustainable long-term commitment to scholarly research and publication. The department also expects successful candidates to have moved beyond the specific research they conducted in their Ph.D. dissertations (as evidenced by the contents of publications and presentations).

### 1. RESEARCH STATEMENT

#### 2. BOOK

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise](#). New York: Routledge, 2009.

#### 3. ARTICLES

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. "The Idea of an Existential Ecology." In *Place and Phenomenology*, edited by Janet Donohoe, 39-55. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- b. Sandmeyer, Robert. "Life and Spirit in Max Scheler's Philosophy." *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 1 (January 2012): 23-32.

#### 4. REVIEWS

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats](#), by Adam Konopka. *Husserl Studies* 37. (2021): 193-99.
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life](#), by Andrea Staiti. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 54, no. 2. (April 2016): 345-46.
- c. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Aldo Leopold. A Sand County Almanac and Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation](#), edited by Curt Meine. *Environmental Philosophy* 11, no. 1. (2014): 138-40
- d. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years, 1916-1938](#), by J. N. Mohanty. *Husserl Studies* 30. (2014): 71-76.

#### 5. PRESENTATIONS

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. "A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's 1928 Time Lectures." Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2021)
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. "Oskar Kraus' Criticism of Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins." North American Society for Early Phenomenology (May 2019)
- c. Sandmeyer, Bob. "The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals." Living with Animals (March 2019)
- d. Sandmeyer, Bob. "Philosophy in an Interdisciplinary Key." Kentucky Philosophical Association (March 2019)
- e. Sandmeyer, Bob and Turner, Helen. "The University of Kentucky Sustain – able Pedagogies Faculty Workshop: An Overview." Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (October 2018)
- f. Sandmeyer, Bob. "Sustainability & Philosophy." Invited Speaker, Symposium on Emerging Technologies and Sustainability: Interactions Between Science and Society. University of Kentucky (Dec 2017)
- g. Sandmeyer, Bob. "An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity." International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2017)

#### 6. COMMENTARIES

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. "Commentary on James Hart's 'Some Moments of Wonder Emergent Within Transcendental Phenomenological Analyses.'" *Husserl Circle* (May/June 2022)
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. "Commentary on Simon Gurofsky's 'Kant's Principle of Significance.'" Kentucky Philosophical Association (April 2018)

## Sandmeyer – 1. Research

My academic research focuses on two distinct areas: the German philosophical movement of phenomenology, particularly Husserl and Scheler, and the philosophy of ecology and of life, most characteristically expressed in the writings of two disparate individuals, Hans Jonas and Aldo Leopold.

My work on Edmund Husserl's philosophy has been defined in my book, *Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise* (**see document 2.a.**). In that work I argue in that Husserl's extant writings one can discern the promise of a unitary conception of phenomenology. The problem is that no such articulation exists in any of his published works, and his unpublished writings typically advance only fragmentary analyses. While Husserl understood the need to articulate a unitary conception of phenomenology and, indeed, set about to produce a "System of Phenomenological Philosophy" in the 30s, he failed to bring this effort to fruition. This is the great unfulfilled promise of his philosophy.

I remain committed to the scholarship of Husserl's philosophy, and this is evinced in my commentary to James Hart's paper before the 2022 Husserl Circle (**see document 6.a.**) However, since the publication of my book, I have focused my phenomenological research on the early history of the German phenomenological movement. I presented a paper to the North American Society for Early Phenomenology in 2018. In this paper, I favorably evaluated a contemporaneous critique of Husserl's analysis of Franz Brentano's theory of time and time-consciousness (**see document 5.b.**). In 2021, I presented a revised draft of this paper (online) to the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (**see document 5.a.**). For several years now I have engaged the North American Scheler Society in my study of Max Scheler's concept of life and spirit. For an early articulation of this research, **see document 3.b.**, i.e., my *Compass* article titled "Life and Spirit in Max Scheler." Indeed, the philosophy of life is the preeminent philosophical theme tying all my work together. My review of Andrea Staiti's excellent book on the themes of nature, spirit, and life in Husserl's philosophy, which I published in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, exemplifies this concern (**see document 4.b.**) However, I hold that a philosophy of life which ignores the ecological context of relations constitutive of life, itself, remains inadequate to the phenomenon. This is clearly evident in my 2017 presentation before the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (**see document 5.g.**). In that paper, "An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity," I argue that not only is it possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in ecological terms, this, in fact, is the only proper way to think it.

Indeed, my research for the last several years is located directly at the intersection of the two areas stated above. My article in *Place and Phenomenology* titled "The Idea of an Existential Ecology" advances the basic thrust of my research program today (**see document 3.a.**). In that piece, I argue that Hans Jonas's existential interpretation of biological facts, which he articulates in *The Phenomenon of Life*, lacks an explicit ecological understanding of living entities. I seek to resolve this omission by extending Jonas's existential interpretation to the land concept as advanced by Aldo Leopold. What is most promising in this analysis, I show, is that this idea of an existential ecology coordinates well with certain evolutionary models of organism-environment interactions advanced today by neo-Lamarckian evolutionary theorists. There are several new publications which support such my research program. Thus, I reviewed Adam Konopka's *Ecological Investigations for Husserl Studies* in 2021. And I reviewed the new Library of America edition of Aldo Leopold's writings for *Environmental Philosophy* (**see documents 3.a. and 3.c.**, respectively).

Lastly, I have a well-documented history presenting on the concept of sustainability. These presentations relate directly to my pedagogical work in that area (**see section 6.a. of my Teaching**

**Portfolio** on my activities organizing pedagogy workshops). In 2018, Helen Turner and I presented our work on the sustain-able pedagogies faculty workshop here at UK before the American Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (**see document 5.e.**). I was invited to discuss the philosophical coherence of the concept of sustainability to the UK Symposium on Emerging Technologies (**see document 5.f.**) My 2019 presentation on the pedagogy of interdisciplinary education at the Kentucky Philosophical Association centered on my interdisciplinary coursework, particularly on sustainability education (**see document 5.d.**). Later in 2019, I presented my research on "The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals" to the Living with Animals conference (see **document 5.c.**). The Living with Animals conference is a recurring conference occurring at Eastern Kentucky University, and I have been presenting my work there for a decade now.

As I have suggested, my future research centers developing the idea of an existential ecology. The *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* article on Hans Jonas which I am currently writing fits into that project. The work I am doing here at UK to establish and develop an Environmental Humanities Initiative is immediately relevant to my research plans. Not only do I plan on developing a cluster of undergraduate and graduate courses on the philosophy of ecology, but also I intend to organize a nearly carbon neutral (NCN) International Conference on the theme of Cultivating Diverse Voices in the Environmental Humanities, on the theme "#ecologies: (**see my discussion of University Service** in my Service Statement and the recommendations outlined in UK-EHI draft report [**service document 4a**] for more details.)



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### 1. [RESEARCH STATEMENT](#)

#### 2. BOOK

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise](#). New York: Routledge, 2009.

#### 3. ARTICLES

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["The Idea of an Existential Ecology."](#) In *Place and Phenomenology*, edited by Janet Donohoe, 39-55. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- b. Sandmeyer, Robert. ["Life and Spirit in Max Scheler's Philosophy."](#) *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 1 (January 2012): 23-32.

#### 4. REVIEWS

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats](#), by Adam Konopka. *Husserl Studies* 37. (2021): 193-99.
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life](#), by Andrea Staiti. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 54, no. 2. (April 2016): 345-46.
- c. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Aldo Leopold. A Sand County Almanac and Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation](#), edited by Curt Meine. *Environmental Philosophy* 11, no. 1. (2014): 138-40
- d. Sandmeyer, Bob. [Review of Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years, 1916-1938](#), by J. N. Mohanty. *Husserl Studies* 30. (2014): 71-76.

#### 5. PRESENTATIONS

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's 1928 Time Lectures."](#) Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (October 2021)
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["Oskar Kraus' Criticism of Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins."](#) North American Society for Early Phenomenology (May 2019)
- c. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals."](#) Living with Animals (March 2019)
- d. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["Philosophy in an Interdisciplinary Key."](#) Kentucky Philosophical Association (March 2019)
- e. Sandmeyer, Bob and Turner, Helen. ["The University of Kentucky Sustain – able Pedagogies Faculty Workshop: An Overview."](#) Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (October 2018)
- f. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["Sustainability & Philosophy."](#) Invited Speaker, Symposium on Emerging Technologies and Sustainability: Interactions Between Science and Society. University of Kentucky (Dec 2017)
- g. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity."](#) International Association for Environmental Philosophy (October 2017)

#### 6. COMMENTARIES

- a. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["Commentary on James Hart's 'Some Moments of Wonder Emergent Within Transcendental Phenomenological Analyses.'"](#) Husserl Circle (May/June 2022)
- b. Sandmeyer, Bob. ["Commentary on Simon Gurofsky's 'Kant's Principle of Significance.'"](#) Kentucky Philosophical Association (April 2018)

# Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology

# Studies in Philosophy

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**Husserl's Constitutive  
Phenomenology**

Its Problem and Promise  
Bob Sandmeyer



# Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology

Its Problem and Promise

**Bob Sandmeyer**



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To Nell, who has given me wisdom and light.



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## Preface

Several years ago, I began a study of Edmund Husserl's philosophy whose original aim bears little resemblance to this finished project. Ironically, much—though certainly not all—of what I intended in my original project can be found worked out in this study, but it is presented here in a form not entirely recognizable in the terms of the original plan. There is a significant reason for this divergence. Indeed, to explain this reason is to introduce this work.

At first I hoped to study the roots of intentional life as explicated by Edmund Husserl. I intended to focus specifically on Husserl's late works, i.e., those writings he produced shortly before and then after he retired in 1928. The special question that dogged me concerned the self-constitution of the transcendental *I* and particularly the unique conception of historic constitution articulated in Husserl's last introductions. At first, my research proceeded smoothly. It is an exciting time for the scholar of Husserl's philosophy. Apart from the works Husserl published during his lifetime, a large number of his unpublished manuscripts are available today. Since the turn of the millennia, for instance, the Husserl Archive has produced more than sixteen volumes of Husserl's research. A good deal of this has even been translated into English. It seemed the full complement of materials in print would be more than sufficient for my research purposes, and so I had every intention of completing my work and never setting foot in the Husserl Archive.

During the course of my research, I was fortunate enough to receive funding for an extended stay in Germany, and this afforded me the opportunity to delve even deeper into Husserl's writings. Over the course of my stay in Germany, I traveled to Leuven, Belgium and on a number of occasions visited the central Husserl Archive. There I had the opportunity to consult Husserl's manuscripts in their raw form, so to speak.<sup>1</sup> That is, rather than approach Husserl's writings from the context of their presentation in the various volumes of *Husserliana*, I had now the opportunity to examine the bundles of Husserl's manuscripts for myself. This experience marked a change in my understanding of Husserl's investigations. Reading the manuscripts at Leuven was a revelation, and this revelation informs

the direction and content of this present work. Where before I encountered Husserl's writings as presented in clear and articulated contexts, his writings as housed in the Archive offered a chaos of investigative directions and results. I discovered that many of the *Husserliana* volumes, especially those recently published, presented his writings in such a way as to introduce an interpretation of the investigative dynamic at work in the writings, themselves.<sup>2</sup> It is not simply that the fluidity of Husserl's investigations suffered a "distortion," more so it seemed to me that a central direction at work in Husserl's investigations remained concealed in the *Husserliana* volumes. Of course, while at Leuven this was at best a vague presentiment. But this feeling stuck with me and hindered all my further research into the self-constitution of the transcendental *I*, my original project. How could I be assured that my special project would succeed if I remained uncertain whether I understood Husserl's philosophy *as a whole*.

Upon my return to the United States I recognized the need to change the orientation of my project. Rather than examine Husserl's late manuscripts, I decided instead to take up a broader task and seek to understand the complete system of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy—if such a system could be said to exist. Hence I devoted myself to a study of the full range of Husserl's phenomenological writings.

Initially I came to question whether Husserl expresses anywhere a systematic conception of his philosophy. In his published writings, he proffers only "introductions" and fragmentary studies. These provide little which would suggest a systematic frame to the multitude of writings contained in the Archive. My own presentiment favored the view that Husserl's philosophical development expresses a unitary development and, further, his mature investigations can be framed together coherently with the earlier. Husserl, himself, suggests such a conception at the end of *Ideas, First Book*, his first general introduction into phenomenology. The special constitutional studies that were to follow this general introduction were to form a systematic articulation of the total phenomenological problematic. Given that Husserl never published *Ideas II*, my questioning eye turned to his unpublished manuscripts. Can one find there a unitary conception of phenomenology anywhere articulated? This question underlies my present study.

To understand the inherent difficulties of this problem, though, it is necessary to comprehend the composition and organization of Husserl's extant manuscripts. Husserl's *Nachlass* or literary estate contains a wide ranging array of investigations, many of which are highly fragmented experimental studies. An examination of this *Nachlass*, irrespective of the general structure imposed on it by the archivists (including Husserl), exposes a dis-integrated whole. If we look at Husserl's general investigative method, however, it is possible to discern a unique dual orientation at work in his most substantial investigations. Husserl tended to investigate a domain of intentional life only by sketching out a general description of the phenomenon and so frame the correlative structure of the objectivity

as meant in consciousness intentionally. Later, perhaps months or even years later, he would return (and return again and again) to these problems. Rather than simply starting where he had left off, however, he would at once go beyond the frame of the earlier while retrospectively clarifying the investigation with results obtained in later investigations. His method was that of a “zigzag,” a descriptive term Husserl, himself, suggests.

Husserl’s investigations exhibit, then, as I argue, a progressive retrospection on the idea of phenomenology, itself. This methodological feature is relevant as one seeks to comprehend the total frame of Husserl’s research. If the most important part of Husserl’s philosophy is found in his unpublished manuscripts, which he says it is, and these manuscripts exhibit *in principle* a progressive retrospection of the idea of phenomenology, the question then turns on how properly to disclose the idea of phenomenology worked out in them. Seeing this as my goal, it became clear that I would need to begin my study with a statement regarding the unique focus of the study, itself. This is the task of my first chapter. Here I aim to articulate the structure of Husserl’s extant manuscripts quite generally while making clear the zigzag method at work in Husserl’s investigations. For this reason, the chapter is called “A Question of Focus.”

It would be foolhardy merely to presume that Husserl’s variegated investigations form a system of phenomenological philosophy. However strong one’s sentiment may be regarding the unity of Husserl’s investigations, to assume their unity only introduces the danger of seeing unity where none may, in fact, exist. We must remember that Husserl never published a comprehensive system of phenomenological philosophy. Perhaps he never published such a framework because phenomenology is, as he suggests in a number of places, simply anti-systematic. So it seemed reasonable after the first chapter to offer concrete reasons internal to Husserl’s work why this project is legitimate. This is the task of my second chapter. Here I turn to Husserl’s extensive *Briefwechsel* or extant collection of letters in an effort to find in them some statement which would confirm my original orientation. I discovered that Husserl thought the greatest and most important part of his work is found in his unpublished research manuscripts and that these writings express a unitary, if cyclical, line of inquiry. In his exchange with Wilhelm Dilthey and, particularly, with Dilthey’s student and son-in-law, Georg Misch, he argues that an impulse runs through all his writings from 1905 onwards. This impulse works its way through his unpublished writings but is barely discernible from the perspective of his published works alone. He suggests to Misch that phenomenology is “absolute human science,” and this conception of phenomenology is one which informs virtually all of his writings after 1905. In my second chapter, then, I bring together these materials to show that Husserl, himself, at least believes his many investigations express a unitary line of inquiry.

Unfortunately, in his letters Husserl remains quite vague how this impulse actually shapes his investigations after 1905. In chapter three, I take up the

task of constructing a plausible account of this. Tracing the advancement of his descriptions of intentionality and sense-constitution after his encounter with Dilthey, one can identify a significant, if slow developing, methodological revolution at work in his investigations. Quite generally, Husserl came to question the efficacy of the structural model of intentionality which he presented in his *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas, First Book*. The form-matter model of intentionality described in these works offers, he felt, an adequate description of spontaneous consciousness as it intends categorial objectivities, but it fails to account for the primordial constitution of the stream of egoic consciousness, itself. His focus during the teens and twenties thus shifts to the very life of consciousness whereby he sought in progressively deepening investigations to account for the unity of the stream of consciousness, itself. During these years, Husserl developed a new “genetic” model of intentionality. As I argue, this development arose on the basis of Husserl’s investigations into the formal temporal structuring of a singular consciousness, which Husserl initiated soon after his encounter with Dilthey in 1905.

In his time analyses, especially those occurring in 1917–18, Husserl formed the first inchoate articulations of the new genetic method of phenomenological analysis. Very soon after these writings, he came to see a dissonance between his earlier and later phenomenological analyses. This dissonance affects all Husserl’s late work and accounts in my opinion for the discontinuity of a large number of his extant writings. Husserl thus set about in the twenties and thirties to construct a systematic of phenomenology which would coherently articulate the two major frames of his investigations, i.e., the earlier developed method of eidetic description and the later method of genetic phenomenology. In chapter four, I sketch out Husserl’s various efforts in these decades to construct a system of phenomenological philosophy. As I show, the work on this problem occurred in fits and starts and culminated in his efforts—with his assistant, Eugen Fink—to produce a large scale publication entitled “The System of Phenomenological Philosophy.” For a number of reasons both internal and external to Husserl’s work, he never succeeded in completing this project. In chapter four, I sketch the content of this “system” on the basis of draft plans and notes written by Fink during the early thirties. This is only a brief sketch however. Nevertheless, I conclude the chapter by showing that Husserl had a definite plan by which to bring together the earlier, “ahistorical,” and later, temporal models of intentional consciousness into a single frame.

In conclusion, I argue that Husserl’s complete corpus of writings offers the promise of a unitary conception of phenomenology. That Husserl never published his “System of Phenomenological Philosophy” remains, therefore, the greatest unfulfilled promise of his philosophy. Yet even if he and Fink had published the “System,” the work, itself, would have only pointed to new domains of phenomenological research. As Husserl and Fink suggest, every phenomenological result is but a provisional articulation demanding

further work of clarification. It is well known that phenomenology demands absolute self-responsibility. Hence rather than signifying a failure, Husserl's unfulfilled promise imposes a responsibility upon those who follow after him not simply to complete his work but rather to take up this tasks imposed by the idea of rigorous science.

This study contains four appendices corresponding in the main to the four chapters of this study. The first offers a complete listing of the writings Husserl published during his lifetime. Given that our concern focuses primarily—but not solely—on Husserl's unpublished writings, it is useful to know exactly what he did publish and when he published it. The chronology is also important to dispel common errors regarding the exchange between Wilhelm Dilthey, who knew only Husserl's works published to 1911, and Husserl. The second appendix is a complete translation of the correspondence between Edmund Husserl and Georg Misch. Husserl's earlier correspondence with Dilthey has been available in English translation for many years. Given the significance of these later letters to Misch in defining an impulse at work from the time of his meeting with Dilthey in 1905 onwards, it seems prudent to make these available now to English speaking scholars of Husserl's work. The third appendix represents the draft arrangements of Husserl's Bernau time-investigations produced by Eugen Fink. These outlines are useful when considering the investigative dynamic at work in the Bernau time investigations—especially as Husserl's development of the time problematic informs the vaguely defined impulse disclosed in the second chapter. Lastly, the fourth appendix, entitled "The systems of phenomenological philosophy," lays out the various plans produced by Husserl to articulate a systematic of phenomenological philosophy. These plans lie at the heart of this study. In this appendix one can compare the structure of the three major articulated draft plans for a systematic of phenomenology, the first produced in 1921 and the second two in 1930.<sup>3</sup> The appendix contains a composite sketch of the 1921 plan and a complete translation of both draft plans of the 1930 "system of phenomenological philosophy" produced by Husserl and Fink. As chapter four offers an explication especially of these latter two draft plans, they are included in full here.

## NOTES

1. Husserl wrote primarily in Gablesberg shorthand, a form of shorthand now out of use. I am not capable of reading this script, but virtually all of his manuscripts in the Archives are transcribed now. These transcriptions are available to the scholars who visit the Archive.
2. For a more precise articulation of this dynamic, see the section entitled "Husserliana Reconsidered II: The Bernau Manuscripts" in the third chapter.
3. Husserl's plan of the systematic of phenomenology dating from 1926 remained too vaguely formed to include in this appendix.





# Acknowledgments

It seems an almost impossible task to acknowledge with any adequacy those who worked with me and sacrificed for me to make this project a reality. First, I would like to thank the tireless effort of Dr. Ronald Bruzina. Not only did he provide me access to many very important unpublished manuscripts of Eugen Fink's notes, but he spent hours conversing with me about the significance of the writings Husserl and Fink produced in the effort to construct a systematic of transcendental phenomenology. Ron read this work closely and made very many helpful suggestions. I cannot say this with the elegance I would like, so I will simply say that I am very grateful to him for all his help over the years. There are several people who read this work and put to me a wealth of stimulating questions and suggested many helpful comments. These are: Professors Dan Breazeale, Ted Schatzki, and Chris Zurn, all from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kentucky. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Jones in the German Department at UK who offered a fresh perspective as well as a number of helpful suggestions regarding difficult German passages. Professor Larry Gottlob in the Psychology Department also read this work and offered his input. David Bettez in the Office of International Affairs at UK was of enormous help in acquiring the funding necessary for study in Germany during the research phase of this project. I must also acknowledge the helping hand and friendship of Elisabeth Trnka-Hammel while at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg, Germany. My and my family's life during our year in Germany would have been miserable without her as I worked on this project.

The real impetus toward this work centered on my visits to the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Belgium. I must specially thank the Archive and Springer Publishers for permission to include my translation of a number of items by Edmund Husserl here. Dr. Ulrich Melle, director of the Archive, deserves special acknowledgement as do two researchers at the central Archive: Drs. Rochus Sowa and Robin Rollinger. Their kind words of encouragement and direction through the maze of writings available at the Archive were a great help to me. Ingrid Lombaerts, the Archive's former secretary, who both diligently protected Husserl's writings and guided every temporary

inhabitant at the Archive through their day, deserves recognition in this work as well. Mr. Lombaerts has recently retired from the Archive, and this is a great loss to scholars of Husserl's philosophy and to the Archive in particular. A very great debt of gratitude goes out to the Husserl Archive and all the diligent workers there.

Alber Publishers and the Eugen Fink Archive also deserve special recognition here. Alber will be publishing Eugen Fink's notes during his years of assisting Husserl. This work would have been impossible to complete without these notes, for they shaped in a fundamental way the framing of the problematic for me. I wish to thank Hans-Rainer Sepp of the Eugen Fink Archive and especially Mrs. Susanne Fink, who have given me permission to publish my translation of some of Fink's materials. This includes especially the materials in the appendices that has been edited by Ronald Bruzina and which is soon to be published by Alber. I would also like to thank Bärbel Mund at the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek and the estate of George Misch for allowing me to publish my translation of letters Georg Misch and Edmund Husserl. Further, I would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge Elisabeth Schuhmann, who with her recently deceased husband Karl Schuhmann, who together edited the invaluable *Briefwechsel Edmund Husserls*. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Rudolf Makkreel at Emory University, who offered me invaluable assistance as I worked to understand Wilhelm Dilthey's relationship to Husserl.

As to all my friends who helped me as I worked on this project, I would like to acknowledge one in particular. Both a good friend and former colleague, Christine Metzger, spent innumerable hours conversing with me on subjects directly and not so directly related to this work. She has a palpable presence in this work, I believe.

Lastly, I must, of course, mention my family. There is little I can say that would show my sincere gratitude to my "unphilosophical" family. My parents, brothers and my sister taught me the great lesson to respect the voice of my elders and yet not to act or to speak merely as I have been taught. This very Heraclitean teaching informs much of this work. To my wife, Nell, I dedicate this work to you. To my children, Sophia and Lucy, you all are my joy and happiness, my wisdom and light, and this work belongs to you as much to anybody. Your sacrifice made this project a reality. Of course, whatever errors and false paths taken here are solely my own doing. Whatever is good and inspiring in this work is due in large measure to all these people.

# 1 A Question of Focus

The ideal of the philosopher—to work out systematically a completed logic, ethics, and metaphysics which he could justify to himself and others for all time on the basis of an absolutely compelling insight—is an ideal the author has had to renounce early on and to this day.

—Husserl. Epilogue to *Ideas I* (in *Hua V*, 159f).

Confronting Husserl's philosophy presents a serious interpretive problem as one is struck not merely with the question of *how* to enter into his philosophy but also with the more penetrating question of *where* to locate the proper expression of his philosophy. The obvious answer to this latter question points to his published writings, as these would represent its authorized conception.<sup>1</sup> In Husserl's case, unfortunately, this obvious answer is misleading. Even Husserl conceded that his published writings represent only partial and introductory studies and inadequate expressions of the total transcendental phenomenological problematic. Nowhere in these works does he adequately articulate the full range of problems which his philosophy opened up, and in none does he present a complete and systematic conception of his philosophy. It would seem, then, that one must look to Husserl's unpublished writings for such a conception. Happily, a very many of these writings are now available in the various critical collections of Husserl's manuscripts,<sup>2</sup> and these indeed contain ample useful materials in this regard.

Yet this is not to say that his published writings entirely lack any discussion of the full extension of the phenomenological problematic. Husserl concludes his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch* of 1913 (hereafter *Ideas I*)<sup>3</sup> with just such a discussion. But this sketch, explicated in paragraph 153, offers by his own admission only a fragmentary articulation of the full transcendental problematic.<sup>4</sup> Even so, even if Husserl's published writings contain only inadequate discussions of the systematic articulation of transcendental phenomenological philosophy, these would still represent explicit public statements by Husserl regarding the full scope of problems opened up by phenomenology. Before one looks to his unpublished writings for a systematic representation of the full field of phenomenological problems, which we will examine later in this study, it would be prudent, therefore, to begin here with these. So we will turn first to the explication of phenomenological problems in paragraph 153 of *Ideas I*, but given that this remains but a fragment, we will do so with some caution. We intend to use Husserl's explicit published statements of the total problem field of phenomenological

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inquiry as an initial guide for further investigations into his unpublished writings. Our later investigations will aim, therefore, to unearth materials within Husserl's literary estate—unpublished during his lifetime—that provide a more comprehensive expression of the “systematic” of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy.

In this chapter, we shall examine two things. First, we shall provide an account of Husserl's fragmentary sketch of the theoretically rational problem-field opened up by phenomenology in paragraph 153 while also laying forth the broader context of the *Ideas* project which underlies this discussion at the end of the first book. Our aim in this work as a whole is an understanding of the complete “system of phenomenological philosophy.” Paraphrasing Husserl's words in paragraph 153 of *Ideas* I, we could say our aim is an articulated understanding of the full extension of transcendental problems. Yet, as we have already suggested, this overall aim cannot be achieved without a foray into the mass of materials Husserl never published and, indeed, may never have intended to publish. Our second task in this chapter, therefore, will be to articulate the structure of Husserl's literary estate and the composition of the sorts of materials we intend to consult therein. Since much of our analyses in later chapters will center on these sorts of materials, it will be necessary to obtain some clarity as to the kinds of manuscripts with which we must deal in order to achieve the overall ends of this investigation.

### THE IDEAS PROJECT

*Ideas* I represents the first of Husserl's four introductions to a pure phenomenology.<sup>5</sup> From his earliest days Husserl spoke of phenomenology as descriptive science, indeed at first classifying it as a “descriptive psychology”<sup>6</sup>—although he eventually rejected this expression because of the confusions it produced.

Its descriptions do not concern the experiences or classes of experiences of empirical persons. It knows nothing and presumes nothing of persons, myself and others, of my own and the experiences of another. It poses no questions of such, attempts no determinations and makes no hypotheses. Phenomenological description looks to what is given in the strictest sense, looks at experience thus as it is, in itself.<sup>7</sup>

Yet even though Husserl rejected his own earlier characterization of phenomenology as a “descriptive psychology,” he seems nevertheless to retain even in the *Ideas* the view that “phenomenological analyses obtain the character of descriptive-psychological analyses; they function then as the supporting basis for the theoretical explanation of psychology and the natural science of psychic appearances [*geistigen Erscheinungen*].”<sup>8</sup> By

phenomenology, then, Husserl means the investigation and description of essential structures of that which gives itself in experience, that is, in consciousness. But, again, this assertion must be tempered with the acknowledgment that its descriptions concern nothing empirical, nothing worldly and so nothing individual.

As long as it is pure and above all makes no use of the existential positing of nature, pure phenomenology as science can *only* be an inquiry into essence and by no means an inquiry into existence <*Daseinsforschung*>. Every “self-observation” and every judgment based on such “experience” lies beyond its scope. The individual in its immanence can be posited and at best subsumed under the rigorous eidetic concepts that arise from eidetic analyses only as a This-here!—this onward flowing perception, memory, etc. For while the individual *is* not essence, it does “*have*” an essence that can be asserted of it holding evidently. But to fix it [objective-intersubjectively] as an individual, giving to it a place in a “world” of individuated being <*individuellen Daseins*>, such a mere subsumption obviously cannot be attained. For phenomenology, the singular is eternally the ἄπειρον.<sup>9</sup>

I can and Husserl suggests the phenomenologist does take as her example her own experiencing, but this “I” do so only to highlight descriptively the essential features of that sort of experiencing. For instance, on my desk at present stands before me a coffee cup. It is a squat, white cup one uses for cappuccino rather than the longer, broader cups used for standard American coffee. We can also examine this perceptual experience imaginatively to flesh out the manners by which an object is grasped, attended to and thematized perceptually in the ways a sensate objectivity quite generally appears to consciousness.

Before continuing, though, we must pause to note that phenomenological reflection, the reflection upon the act of sense perceiving, for instance, has a unique dual character. As Husserl indicates above, phenomenological reflection is no mere “self-observation” but rather a methodological analysis of the sense-bestowing acts in a consciousness attending to some sensate subject matter. Hence, according to our example, the focal point of our phenomenological reflection proceeds upon the analysis of synthetically linked appearances of an objectivity in consciousness, i.e., the coffee cup on my desk of which I am aware, with the aim to establish an eidetic description of the manners by which said consciousness holds that objectivity *as* such in its grasp. The phenomenon in question is thus the act and its object, and the method of phenomenology is a reduction to this correlative standing of consciousness intending some objectivity. For this reason, Husserl was apt to say that the method of phenomenology is essentially the method of phenomenological reductions. However, since we will more fully introduce the notion of phenomenological reduction later in this chapter, our

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present examination remains preliminary here, lacking the methodological precision we can gain only later.

For the moment, though, let us continue our examination in a simple, or as Husserl might say, naive investigation of the quasi-perceptual experience at issue. (We say “quasi-perceptual” since we engage ourselves imaginatively in this exercise). As we reflect and examine an experience like this, that is to say, the current perception of some nearby object, certain essential features of the perception come into relief. Although my gaze is at present by and large unalteringly directed to the cup, my gaze can remain fixed on something and yet may vary with a simple movement of the head or body. The X at which my attention is directed nevertheless appears before me as a sort of enduring identity amidst and through changing aspects. Furthermore, the object, i.e., the perceptual object, never presents itself entirely all at once—to speak in the active voice—though the object stands there before me as a whole entity. The cup faces me, so to speak. And though the back of the cup does not appear, it nevertheless is somehow there along with that which appears to me. In fact, looking around to the obscured side of the object brings about a new perspective of it, indeed an expected view which was meant all along in the experience of the earlier imperfect perception of the cup. Where before the intuition of the back of the cup remained an empty but generally indeterminate expectation of what I would see if I were to look, now as I actually turn to look at the back my expectation is fulfilled in the new perspective. This is not to say, of course, that I had a clear expectation of what I would see. This is especially true if I had not actually looked at that other side of the cup. I may not be sure *exactly* what the back of the cup look likes, but I expect it to have features I had experienced earlier and, at least, features in common with the perceived front face.<sup>10</sup> As my indeterminate expectations are fulfilled when I turn the back side to face me, I can note that the object endures before me amidst and, indeed, because of the varying appearances. The imperfection of perceptual experience in itself does not diminish the experience of an object *as* something, *as*, in this case, a coffee cup. Rather, the very imperfection of sense perception colors my experience of the given X and is the essential condition that makes possible a harmonious string of appearances which, themselves, form a particular sense or meaning for me of the given object *as such and such*. In other words, if I were to look to the back side and not see the expected continuing curvature of the other face, for instance, but rather something altogether unexpected, I would see this X is indeed different from what I took it earlier to be. The sense of X as I held it earlier in my perceptual consciousness now changes to X as something else in its sense. Naturally, I do not disavow my previous experience of the X as meant earlier, i.e., *as* a cup. Precisely the opposite is the case. The object now stands before me as an “X which I believed was a cup but now see is not.” The phenomenological investigation of perceptual conscious is the analysis and description of just this dynamic, enduring character of this sort of experiencing—that

is to say, the ongoing act of attentive perceiving, on the one hand, and the object, on the other, *as* this X there before me in the transition of its appearings and retaining the sense of an identical X enduring in my view even as it is now grasped as different from what I had earlier taken it to be.

We need not continue with this example to note something striking and essential to perceptual experience as such. In consciousness of this sort, objects appear *to* me, and they appear *to* me imperfectly. That is to say, the object of experience manifests itself in a synthesis of appearings accruing in a temporal structuring in which the sense of it *as* such is instituted. Consciousness thus has a fundamentally temporal character.

Consciousness, that is to say more specifically, my consciousness is at once consciousness *of* that which appears *to* me. Our example has been that of a sensory perception *of* something, and we have been analyzing perceptual consciousness as a paradigm example. Under this aspect, we can see that phenomenology, then, is the analytical investigation and description of the essential character of this dative/genitive on-going sense structuring occurring in an enduring unity of experience. Husserl famously called for a return to the things, themselves—*zu den Sachen selbst zurückgehen*. The central theme of phenomenology, *die Sachen selbst*, is precisely this dynamic on-going sense-determining consciousness. The aim of phenomenology is, thus, an eidetic description of this wondrous dual structuring nexus. And so, broadly stated, it seeks to lay out in its investigations—at least as articulated in *Ideas I*—the structural features of this intertwining of sense (noema) and sense-bestowal (noesis).

Everywhere we track the forms of noeses and noemata. We sketch a systematic and eidetic morphology. Everywhere we bring into relief essential necessities and essential possibilities—the latter as necessary possibilities, i.e., forms of unions of compatibility which are prescribed in the *essences* and are delimited by essential laws. “Object” is for us everywhere a title for the essential connections of consciousness; it appears first as the noematic X, as the sense-subject of differentiating essence-types of senses and positions. Further it appears as the title “actual object” and is then the title for certain connections of reason, eidetically considered, in which the unitary X sensibly unified in them obtains its rational status.<sup>11</sup>

So the unitary X stands as an index of unfolding intentionalities building upon one another<sup>12</sup> in the unity of subjective experience. Husserl thus sets about in *Ideas I* to clarify the concepts sense, intention, fulfilled intention as well as corresponding essential differentiations between positionality and neutrality, and the thetic and material character of intentional acts as such;<sup>13</sup> and thereby his *Ideas I* represents a general study of intentionality. Indeed, “the problem-title which encompasses the entire phenomenology is called intentionality,”<sup>14</sup> though *Ideas I* as we shall see works within a



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self-imposed limitation necessary to its status as an introduction into phenomenological method.

*Ideas I* is the first volume of a proposed three volume work. As we have noted, Husserl sketched out a field of problems and so a hierarchy of re-investigations<sup>15</sup> in the last chapter that were to follow up this first volume. This fragmentary sketch, then, must be understood within the context of the aims of the *Ideas* project as a whole. The provisional explication of the general structures of intentionality in *Ideas I* was undertaken by Husserl to provide the necessary guide for a series of subsequent concrete constitutional studies.

At the same time, not to underestimate the range of necessary analyses in the most universal rational-theoretical stratum of which we speak here, we stress that the eidetic descriptions of the last chapters should hold as mere beginnings. As everywhere else, so here also we only follow through with the methodic aim of working up so much secure ground for each fundamentally new stratum that should be sketched as a field of phenomenological investigations to assure ourselves that the related problems of departure and of ground are formulated on the basis of it and in which we may cast a free view to the problem-horizon which surrounds it.<sup>16</sup>

Husserl hoped, in other words, to present a concrete, systematic presentation of the problematic of sense-constitution and to clarify the place of phenomenology as the science of science.

The first book, as we have just discussed, was meant to initiate the reader in phenomenological method in order to win “the free horizon of ‘transcendentally’ purified phenomena and, thereby, the field of phenomenology in our unique sense.”<sup>17</sup> *Ideas I* was never meant to be the last word. Rather it represents a first entrance into a problematic, one that would require further refinement as later concrete studies came to completion. *Ideas II* was meant to flesh out the constitutional differentiations between the fundamental material regions of natural, psychic and spiritual reality, which in turn delimit the domains of the various factual sciences of nature, psychology and the human sciences. *Ideas III*, then, was to revive the insight laid down in the first book:

that genuine philosophy, the idea of which is the actualizing of absolute cognition, is rooted in pure phenomenology; and rooted in it in a sense so important that the systematically strict grounding and working out of this first of all genuine philosophies is the incessant precondition for every metaphysics and other philosophy “that will be able to make its appearance as a *science*.”<sup>18</sup>

Thus *Ideas I* deliberately abstains from the task of presenting a fully worked out philosophy or even an adequate sketch thereof. Rather it represents a

bridge or invitation, if you will, into the starkly unnatural attitude of phenomenological philosophy.<sup>19</sup> In other words, Husserl consciously delimited the aims of the first book of the *Ideas* trilogy to that of introduction. It lacks the character of “a *framework* <or> comprehensive *plan* in terms of which one could systematically link the highest principles of phenomenological method and explanation with the most manifest and preoccupying features of real existence.”<sup>20</sup>

*Ideas* I is thus propaedeutic to concrete analytical work to follow. Husserl always felt phenomenology was an inherently difficult philosophy to grasp because of the demands it imposed upon the budding phenomenologist. One must withhold assent to the unthematic presumptions implicit in one’s scientific and pre-scientific experience, which requires the neutralization of intentional acts as they are made explicit in phenomenological reflection

In the natural attitude we quite simply *carry out* all the acts through which the world is there for us. We live naively in perceiving and experiencing, in those present <*aktuell*> thetic acts in which unities of the thing and realities of every kind appear and not only appear but also are given in the character of “at hand” and “actual.” Working within natural science we *carry out* acts of thinking ordered logically and experientially, in which these actualities—thus accepted as given—are determined conceptually, and in which also, on the basis of such directly experienced and determined transcendencies, are inferred new transcendencies. In the phenomenological attitude we *arrest* in thorough-going universality the *carrying out* of all such cogitative theses, i.e., we “parenthesize” the effectuated theses. “We do take part in these theses” for the new studies. Instead of living in them, carrying them out, we carry out directed *acts of reflection* upon them; and we comprehend these themselves <i.e., the acts reflected upon> as the *absolute being* which they are, with everything which is in them and is inseparable from their proper being that is meant as such, e.g., being-experienced as such. We live for all intents and purposes now in such acts of a second tier, whose givenness is that unending field of absolute experience—the *fundamental field of phenomenology*.<sup>21</sup>

As a methodological treatise which proceeds upon a radical “break” from natural experience, pre-scientific as well as scientific, the *Ideas* is a Cartesian project. The new science of phenomenology, to which Husserl refers as a radical “positivism in *Ideas* I,”<sup>22</sup> seeks to lay the foundation of the formal and empirical sciences on an apodictic ground of original experience in this uniquely broad sense. Of course, terms such as “positivism” and “empiricism” carry a special philosophical weight which Husserl is careful to highlight and in many ways to distance himself from. No philosophic or scientific theory, Husserl asserts—even that of a modern Humean

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style empiricism, can contravene the highest principle of phenomenological inquiry: that an originary intuition of some givenness—as it, itself, presents to consciousness—is a justifying source of cognition.<sup>23</sup> The first aim of *Ideas* I is, thus, to provide a precise articulation of this principle and, then, the methodological elements by which to free the apodictic ground of the empirical sciences. In this sense, then, phenomenology is first philosophy, the philosophy which seeks to ground and lay forth the lineaments of the kinds of investigation open to the myriad empirical sciences.

The method of phenomenology is one of *ἐποχή* and reduction, suspension and regressive inquiry. “The whole world actually pre-disclosed in experience and posited in the natural attitude, taken completely free from any theory, as it is actually experienced showing itself clearly in the nexus of the experiences, no longer holds for us. It is to be parenthesized without being tested, but it is also parenthesized uncontested.”<sup>24</sup> This sense of world as in-itself, there, at-present, is precisely that which must be put aside, “put out of play,” “placed in brackets.” Yet however Cartesian Husserl’s method in his *Ideas* may be, he clearly cautions that the phenomenologist does not, as does Descartes, “suppose, then, that all the things I see are false” and “persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me.”<sup>25</sup> Descartes’ methodological extension of doubt to the principle of perception, itself, remains foreign to the method of phenomenological *ἐποχή*.<sup>26</sup> Whether or not a perceived object really exists (*as* perceived) or not is not precisely at issue here. That we may quite naturally doubt the veracity of particular perceptions, the soundness of our imaginations, the authenticity of our memories, etc., is not directly relevant to the parenthesizing that we, as worldly subjects, perform. Phenomenological descriptions concern the total systems of conscious intentions, including those whereby doubt becomes manifest. Hence, by bracketing the worldly station of egoic life, what the phenomenologist initiates is a very unique performance. In the phenomenological attitude, every objectifying act as well as every judging, striving, valuing or any intention quite generally which occurs in consciousness is neither denied nor averred. As a phenomenologist—*reflecting* on the total life of intentional consciousnesses unitarily occurring as “mine”—I *qua* phenomenologist aim to articulate in this neutralized consciousness precise descriptions of the thematizations of transcendental consciousness as I *qua* worldly subject live through them.

By virtue of the epoché, I institute methodologically a split in the egoic life of consciousness. I *qua* philosopher<sup>27</sup> reflect on that life, also mine, of egoic consciousness engaged in its living projects, i.e., in and amidst a world with values already marked out and goals already laid forth. This suspension, whereby we become capable of articulating the concrete life of consciousness, is thus of the most radical sort.

This concerns experiences of something worldly, not merely singly, one by one. Any single experience of something has essentially already

“its” universal horizon of experience which carries with itself, although not explicitly, the openly endless totality of the real world as a continuously jointly holding world. I inhibit precisely this antecedent validity <or holding> grounding my entire practical and theoretical life currently and habitually bearing me along in natural life, or one could rather say, I inhibit the antecedent being-for-me of “the” world. I take the force from it that gave me to this point the basis of the world of experience.<sup>28</sup>

Reflecting on conscious life, I *qua* transcendental onlooker—to use an expression Husserl took up only much later—seek in this reflection to disclose and make understandable the total system of conscious intentionalities going on therein—actively as well as spontaneously.

The exact nature of this reflection remains problematic, but Husserl clearly denies it is a sort of “self-observation.”<sup>29</sup> Neither does Husserl suggest that the world is somehow spun out of transcendental ego like a spider spins its web. Rather, the world is always already there for me. This is true in both the natural and the phenomenological attitude, and the suspension at issue here does not alter this fundamental *factum*. Rather, the “always already there” becomes problematized in the suspension. Hence I *qua* phenomenological observer neither deny “my” own mundane existence, the on-going pre-existence of the world, nor do I *qua* philosopher assert any fantastical ability on the part of transcendental subjectivity to create an outer world holding for all. Putting out of play my own worldly captivation, “I” seek rather to disclose once and for all the origin of the hold of reality (in its widest sense) in experience of the flow of appearances for cognition. “Phenomenology’s *telos* is not the truth of what we experience, judge, and declare to be true, the truth of the appearing being, but the truthfulness of being, being in its appearing, in its display, and therefore truth as it is inseparable from the revealing life of consciousness.”<sup>30</sup>

Opened up by the performance of this suspension, thereby, is not merely a new sense of this or that reality holding for me *as* real-for-me (or even *as* unreal-for-me). I find that even I, myself, *qua* real, psychological worldly subject disclosed by this radical method of thetic suspension have a mundane sense in principle the same as for every other mundane being. “Only the intentional structure of the acts whose objective sense refers to the ontic kernel ‘man’ is more complicated than the intentional structure of the acts which mean the ‘table’.”<sup>31</sup> Even if I may at times accidentally mistake a mannequin for a person or a person for a mannequin, that I am essentially dissimilar from a mannequin is, itself, obvious from the standpoint of everyday experience. Obviously, the mannequin is life-less. Or perhaps better said, when I realize my mistake, this difference appears an obvious one. Husserl’s point, however, is that this psychological, worldly I—which I *am*—is essentially similar to any worldly being in that it enjoys its status *as* worldly being precisely by virtue of a system of subjective

yet non-worldly intentions. "If we retain a pure I (and then for every stream of experiencing a fundamentally different I) as residuum of the phenomenological suspension of the world and of the empirical subjectivity which belongs to it, then there is presented with it a transcendence of a unique kind—not constituted—a transcendence in the immanence."<sup>32</sup> Everything worldly is, in other words, the constituted end-product of a system of non-worldly constituting intentions. It is this "reduction" to pure transcendental subjectivity which Husserl hoped in the first book of the *Ideas* to clarify.

The theory of reductions articulated in *Ideas I* is without question the most important aspect of Husserl's phenomenological method, but in many ways the reduction only initiates the first step within a broad investigative project. The reduction represents the essential move of establishing the attitude proper to the style of phenomenological investigation by which particular sense investigations can then proceed. It is for this reason that Husserl imposed an ambitious dual aim on this first book in the *Ideas* project.

In the *First Book*, however, we shall not only treat the general doctrine of the phenomenological reductions . . . we shall also attempt to acquire definite ideas of the most general structure of this pure consciousness and, mediated by them, of the most general groups of problems, lines of investigations and methods which belong to the new science.<sup>33</sup>

Not only is the first book of *Ideas* meant to clarify the precise nature of phenomenological reflection by a thoroughgoing discussion of the doctrine of phenomenological reductions, but secondarily *Ideas I* is meant to lay forth the first ground or essential problem-field opened up by the reductive method. This secondary goal of *Ideas I* is, as we have suggested, the necessary propaedeutic to the constitutional studies as planned in the succeeding volume.

With his *Ideas*, Husserl seeks to establish a new science of phenomenology as a science of essences.<sup>34</sup> Hence he initiates the entire project with a brief but necessary discussion about fact and essence and about the necessity of a fundamental science of essences to ground and make meaningful the systematic relations between the factual sciences. Indeed, without understanding this prevailing aim, the entire first part of the first book of *Ideas I* appears to have only accidental relation to the succeeding chapters.<sup>35</sup> So while it may be the case that phenomenological work proceeds—as Aristotle might say—from that which is most easily known to us, i.e., from "intuitive givens," to that which is of itself most easily known in itself, i.e., to that which is of greatest universality, there is in principle no schism between the two spheres in a phenomenological inquiry. We never in fact rend ourselves from that which is most easily knowable to us. "Within all eidetic spheres, the systematic way proceeds from higher to lower universality, even if the exploratory analysis is tied to something particular."<sup>36</sup> For

reasons of methodological necessity, every investigation of essence, which is the subject matter of phenomenology, is thus tied to the sensible experience of particulars. “Manifestly, the connection of the wider and the narrower, of the *supersensuous* concept of perception (i.e., categorial perception or perception built upon sensibility) and the sensuous concept of perception is neither external nor contingent but rather a matter grounded in the heart of things.”<sup>37</sup> The concrete sense-investigations of *Ideas* II, following upon the general investigation of intentionality in the first book, refer back for methodological reasons, in other words, to sensibility as the ultimate founding investigative stratum. Thus the eidetic investigations of nature, psychic and spiritual reality of the second book could never reach heights of universality without actual consciousness as ground.

Having some account of the goals and methodological framework of *Ideas* I, we can look beyond it to a more thoroughgoing discussion of the writings which Husserl originally hoped to publish on its basis. Our aim here, once again, is to comprehend the full transcendental problematic encompassed in these writings. Although in the factual course of Husserl’s publishing history *Ideas* I turned out to be the first of several published “introductions to a pure phenomenology,” the entire *Ideas* project was always meant to have a much larger scope than the single volume that made it to print. The three volume plan was to present the complete systematic structuring of problems pertaining to phenomenology.

## HUSSERL’S WRITING AFTER IDEAS I

Husserl published *Ideas* I in 1913 as the lead to the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (hereafter *Jahrbuch*), the journal spearheaded by Husserl and other founding phenomenological thinkers as a forum by which to present on-going phenomenological researches in Germany and abroad. By 1913, Husserl was already one of the most famous German philosophers for his *Logical Investigations*, published in 1900/01. Where the *Logical Investigations* initiated a “breakthrough of a newly grounded philosophy; grounded, actually, as phenomenology,”<sup>38</sup> the *Ideas* project was to be the systematic presentation of the program of phenomenological philosophy.<sup>39</sup> Sadly, the latter two volumes of the *Ideas* project never made it beyond Husserl’s desk—at least, that is, until after his death.<sup>40</sup> As with so many of his other planned works,<sup>41</sup> *Ideas* II (and to a lesser extent, *Ideas* III) remained an unfulfilled burden of his and his assistants’ dedicated labors.

Again and again, Husserl would delay the editorial work necessary to complete a publication, turning instead to new writing projects spurred by his encounter with his own earlier investigations. The picture is a frustrating one—both for Husserl and his assistants. Roman Ingarden, for instance, sympathetically describes the lot of Edith Stein, Husserl’s

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assistant during the editing of *Ideas* II (among other projects) as she strove to edit and arrange the manuscripts for publication.

When one reads the letters of Edith Stein, written while she worked as Husserl's assistant . . . it is apparent what efforts she took to induce Husserl to work in a more orderly fashion, and to elaborate the "Ideas". But the same thing happens again repeatedly: he promises to read the manuscript she has prepared for him, and even actually begins to do so, but after several days he starts on something entirely different—new ideas, new conceptions have already occurred to him, new plans of great, unrealized publications.<sup>42</sup>

As we know, Husserl never published the second or third volume of the *Ideas* project, and we can garner only a vague sense of the concrete structure of problems to be worked out from an examination of the concluding pages of *Ideas* I. Yet from the vantage point we have today, now that all three volumes have been published—not necessarily as finished works but rather as editorial constructions—we can see that the last paragraphs of *Ideas* I represent an incomplete précis of volume II.

What is surprising, though, is that in all of Husserl's published writings, there is no more detailed discussion of the systematic scope of phenomenology than is found here at the end of *Ideas* I. Even his *Méditations Cartésiennes*, published in 1931 (hereafter *Cartesian Meditations* or *CM*), which has been aptly described as a deeper reworking of *Ideas* I, concludes without proffering a serious outline of such. Interestingly, Husserl adamantly believed that "in the systematic work of phenomenology, which progresses from intuitive givens to the heights of abstraction, the old traditional ambiguous antitheses of the philosophical standpoint are resolved—by themselves and without the art of an argumentative dialectic, and without weak efforts and compromises."<sup>43</sup> He held fast to the view, in other words, that a fully articulated and worked out phenomenological philosophy would obtain the true and absolute ground by which to resolve the outstanding riddles plaguing every philosophy heretofore. One is left to wonder, then, just how to evaluate this claim, since Husserl never published these succeeding studies nor a complete outline or even what he felt was an adequate characterization of the system of his phenomenological philosophy.

From the vantage point of Husserl's contemporaries, it seemed Husserl had virtually given up writing after 1913—at least until the late twenties. The promised concrete phenomenological studies never surfaced, though his *Ideas* I had made their completion possible. Indeed, during his teaching career, first as *außerordentlichen Professor* at the University of Göttingen and then as *Professor Ordinarius* at the University of Freiburg, Husserl published almost nothing. Apart from some unchanged reprints of the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* I and a number of editorial forwards he wrote



for the *Jahrbuch*, as well as a few brief essays—mostly reminisces of colleagues or reviews—he published nothing in Germany. In the early twenties, he did publish a series of articles centered on the theme of “renewal,” yet these came out only in Japan and all but the first of these was published in Japanese translation.<sup>44</sup> To this day, even, Husserl’s phenomenology is interpreted largely according to the conception put forward in the first book of *Ideas* and to a lesser extent with reference to the other writings he published before his death in 1938.

From the vantage point of his close colleagues and students, though, the situation appeared quite differently. While teaching, Husserl worked tirelessly toward the concrete fulfillment of phenomenology, achieving major innovations of method in these years. Yet this work remained out of the view of the contemporary German philosophical public by and large. Though, as Ingarden describes Edith Stein’s activity as Husserl’s assistant, “it cannot be said that Husserl was uncreative during the whole of the twenty-five years which followed the publication of the *Ideas I*.”<sup>45</sup> Indeed, Husserl exhibited an intense creativity throughout his philosophical career. Although perhaps too great a perfectionist, he was a man of great self-discipline and a prolific writer during his adult life. With at times manic dedication he committed himself daily to his researches, that is to say, to his writing—pursuits which were for him practically equivalent. He was so devoted to his own studies that his personal life atrophied. Malvine Husserl recounts how the young couple gave up virtually all cultural and social activities after Husserl’s first major publication, the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.<sup>46</sup> She understood his personal and professional devotion and allowed her husband to devote himself fully to his “continuous research on logical studies” that culminated in the *Logical Investigations* ten years later.<sup>47</sup> This all-out devotion remained a constant trait of Husserl’s character. Throughout his life, even if mood or external circumstance worked against him, Husserl compelled himself to his writing desk, setting himself to task until the words flowed. He thus established within himself the habit of working out his ideas on paper to such a degree that it can be said that he thought through writing.<sup>48</sup> Yet, unfortunately, his publishing history conceals this fact. To read his published writings is thus to encounter only a fraction of Husserl’s total literary output and a partial view of his philosophy. To understand his complete philosophy, then, one must look beyond the work he published and delve into this sea of his unpublished writings. These writings, more than anything else, attest to the picture of a great analytical thinker working out the multiplicitous problems of his philosophy. They are far more than a mere testament of the man, however, for they contain the most comprehensive expression of his transcendental phenomenology.

It would be misleading to suggest, as might be gathered, that *Ideas I* is the last great work Husserl published. As his retirement approached in the late twenties, Husserl took up the task of publishing once again. As before, though, almost all of what he would publish would be new introductions



or special studies.<sup>49</sup> In 1927 he published an article in the 14<sup>th</sup> edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* entitled “Phenomenology.” In 1928 he published his “Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Consciousness of Time,” and his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* appeared at the end of July, 1929. 1931 saw the publication of his *Cartesian Meditations* in French translation; and in 1936 Husserl published his final work, one hundred pages under the title *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Yet in none of these later “introductions” or special studies can one find a systematic statement or a comprehensive outline of the problems opened up by his general analysis of intentionality in *Ideas I*.

We should pause here, however, to consider two of these later “introductions” in more detail as their unique history is pertinent toward understanding the final developments of Husserl’s philosophy. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article of 1927 is especially interesting not merely because it was one of only two works expressly meant by Husserl to be a collaboration<sup>50</sup> but also because of choice of philosopher with whom Husserl meant to collaborate: Martin Heidegger. On this particular project, Husserl and Heidegger, who at the time Husserl considered his spiritual heir, worked together to produce a single article of introduction into phenomenology for the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Unfortunately, the two men could not reach agreement, and the collaboration failed. Husserl published a final draft of his own work without inclusion of Heidegger’s comments or additions.<sup>51</sup> Although brief, the “Phenomenology” article remains one of the most concise, readable and mature statements of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

The *Cartesian Meditations*, on the other hand, is an exceedingly dense work and the most complete and mature introduction Husserl published after *Ideas I*. It is perhaps the most interesting of all his “introductions” as much for its content as for its genesis and discontinuation. Husserl published the *Cartesian Meditations* in 1931, but only under a French publisher and in French translation.<sup>52</sup> Ostensibly, the *Meditations* is a publication extrapolated in large part from Husserl’s lectures presented at the Institut d’Études germaniques and the Société française on May 23<sup>rd</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup>, 1929. Of the five meditations published in 1931, however, only the first four can be said to be reflective of the lectures Husserl gave two years earlier. Indeed, the so-called “Paris lectures” contain only the briefest mention of empathy and intersubjectivity found in the more robust *Cartesian Meditations*. So even though the French translation of the *Cartesian Meditation* has its origin in the lectures Husserl presented in 1929, Husserl produced virtually half of the total work published, i.e., the entire fifth meditation, after the Paris lectures as he was revising these for publication.<sup>53</sup>

Between these years, i.e., between 1929 and 1931, Husserl became more and more obsessed with addressing the rise of existential phenomenology and life-philosophy in Germany. Not only does his publishing spike at about this time, but also he engaged himself in a series of lectures abroad

which were intended both to provide introduction to his philosophy and to highlight the differences between his transcendental phenomenology and the existentialist philosophies circulating throughout Europe at that time.<sup>54</sup> After Heidegger's *Being and Time* came out in 1927, Heidegger's reputation catapulted to the highest ranks within Germany academic philosophy. In 1929, Georg Misch, the influential student (and son-in-law) of the Wilhelm Dilthey, wrote and published his influential *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*—just as Husserl was completing his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—comparing the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger in light of the work of Misch's teacher, Wilhelm Dilthey. After reading Misch's work, Husserl concluded that existential philosophy—and particularly Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein*—all but eclipsed his own transcendental phenomenology in Germany (and abroad). In response to Misch's *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, Husserl reread Heidegger's major work, *Being and Time*, as well as three other works by Heidegger: his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, "On the Essence of Ground" and "What is Metaphysics?" Upon this reading, the earlier feeling of spiritual kinship Husserl had enjoyed with Heidegger, which was the original motivation behind his attempt to collaborate with Heidegger on the *Britannica* article in 1927, faded away. "I came to the conclusion," he writes to Roman Ingarden in December of 1929, "that I cannot place his [Heidegger's] work within the framework of my phenomenology, and unfortunately that I also must reject it completely as regards its method, and in the essentials as regards to its content. For this reason do I place great weight upon the full development of the German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations* as my systematic magnum opus."<sup>55</sup>

Why, then, understanding the need to redress the decline of transcendental phenomenology in German academic circles as well as the misunderstanding of his own writings, or at least its misunderstanding as Husserl perceived it, did Husserl not produce a serious systematic account of his own philosophy in Germany? We know that he was conscientiously updating and finishing his *Cartesian Meditations* between the years 1929 and 1931; and we know that he did engage upon the project to revise, expand and update these *Meditations* for the German public.<sup>56</sup> Yet after the French publication of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl only published his *Nachwort* (or *Epilogue*) to his *Ideas I* in 1930<sup>57</sup> on the occasion of the first English translation (until his "Crisis" writing).<sup>58</sup> He did travel to Frankfurt, Berlin and Halle to lecture on "Phenomenology and Anthropology" on June 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1931—at about the same time the *Cartesian Meditations* appeared in France. This lecture represents a serious attempt by Husserl to confront the philosophies of Heidegger and Max Scheler, philosophies that Husserl felt lacked the philosophical rigor of his own transcendental phenomenological philosophy. However popular these lectures were, though, they were only limited engagements. They were not followed up by Husserl in any systematic way either in print or in person. Of course, Husserl's

philosophical isolation paralleled his personal isolation as an assimilated Jew in Nazi Germany, and thus there are good reasons why he felt it difficult to respond adequately to the decline of his influence.

Without delving into a detailed analysis of Husserl's chronology of writing and speaking between 1929 and 1931, though, we can at least take note of some of Husserl's reasons to withhold publication of a *German Meditations* during this strained time.<sup>59</sup> None of his previous writings, it seemed to him, could stand as an adequate response to the rise of existentialism and life-philosophy developing at this time in Germany (and abroad). *Ideas I*, although always held by Husserl to represent a precise, if limited, introduction to his phenomenology, remained the only major (introductory) work of Husserl's philosophy in Germany. And this—if we are to believe Husserl—was wholly mis-interpreted almost as soon as it was published. Nevertheless, it was sorely in need of supplementation by the thirties. Written in 1913, it included none of the developments Husserl made in the late teens and early twenties. Even the French *Cartesian Meditations* contained within them really only a passing assessment of Husserl's developed views, views arising from his work on time and temporality in the late teens and early twenties. Further, the famous fifth meditation, which deals with the transcendental problem of intersubjective constitution, proceeds from a style of analysis typical of the *Ideas I*.<sup>60</sup> Husserl even felt that the French translators of the *Cartesian Meditations* had not fully understood his work.<sup>61</sup> Hence after publication of the *Cartesian Meditations* in France, Husserl decided the best choice was to commission his assistant, Eugen Fink, to work with him to create in essence a wholly new and significantly expanded *German Meditations*. Each Meditation was to be seriously revised and two wholly new Meditations attached. But even this idea succumbed to Husserl's pessimism. He felt that even a *German Meditations* could not stand up as an adequate foil against the rise of life-philosophy and existentialist phenomenology. So he eventually abandoned the idea of a *German Meditations* altogether.<sup>62</sup> Instead, Husserl opted to embark on a bold new presentation, a new "System of Phenomenological Philosophy," that would finally include the full scope of his unpublished researches and reflect the highest level of rigor he had achieved in these writings.

In order to understand the importance and breadth of this new "System" that Husserl had in mind, which—we must add—never really made it beyond the drawing board, we should first examine Husserl's earlier efforts to generate a concrete corpus of phenomenological studies. One must always bear in mind that Husserl's thinking, that is to say, his writing, took place in a definite context. Husserl was by no means the solitary thinker he is often made out to be, just as his philosophy is less solipsistic than his published writings would seem to suggest.<sup>63</sup> Though not naturally gregarious, Husserl conscientiously engaged himself with the broader philosophical world around him as his career progressed. His vast correspondence attests to this fact and so offers a virtual who's who

of German and European academia. Additionally, as an educator, Husserl showed himself to be a devoted teacher spending hour upon hour in his home with his best students. During his retirement, the elder philosopher made it a point of personal character to get away from his desk each afternoon in order to spend time strolling in the gardens surrounding Freiburg engaged with either his assistant, one of his students, or one of his many visitors. During these walks, which were more discussions than anything, he would immerse his companion in the matters of his morning writing. Often times, after his afternoon rest, he would accept visitors and engage them in penetrating but convivial philosophical discussion. In these activities, he showed himself to be a philosopher dedicated to the careful articulation of his own insights, but with the understanding that if these insights were to have any scientific merit they would have to be truly communal ideas.

Of course, the German political situation in the 1930s affected the Husserls. Edmund and his wife, Malvine, both of whom converted to Christianity from Judaism in the 1880s, were designated by the Nazis as “non-persons”. By the end of 1935, Husserl, the most famous and in many respects still the most influential German philosopher in Europe, was stripped entirely of his academic affiliations. Only his assistant, Eugen Fink, and his most dedicated friends and colleagues stood with him in these dire times. Nevertheless, Husserl stuck to his habit of writing. The manuscripts that make up the “Crisis” writings,<sup>64</sup> his last and perhaps most famous publishing effort, stem from this period, for instance.

Through this sustained creative activity, not just during his retirement but throughout his entire career, Husserl generated a substantial literary corpus—the vast bulk of which went unpublished during his lifetime. All of this work represents Husserl’s thinking through the years, the whole of which was threatened at the end of his life with destruction as the anti-Jewish policies of the Nazis intensified. And so with his teaching career slipping further into the past and, then, as his familiar world disintegrated around him, Husserl, himself, came to realize that only his *Nachlass*, his complete literary corpus, contained within it the true, if unorganized, expression of his philosophy.

Two letters from the early thirties underscore Husserl’s stance toward his own *Nachlass*. On March 5th, 1931, he wrote to his friend and former student, the then Prussian minister of education, Adolf Grimme: “In fact, the greatest and most important part of my life’s work, I believe, still remains in my manuscripts, which because of their compass are barely manageable.”<sup>65</sup> This unwieldy body of work—to which, it must be remembered, he continuously added until the last months of his life—weighed more and more on the mind of the aging philosopher. Its significance was outmatched only by its expanse. He poignantly felt a great burden to transform this corpus into a living and coherent *opus*. With no surprise, then, do we find him confessing his burden in a very personal letter he wrote to Alexander

Pfänder. This letter is written only two months earlier than the letter to Grimme cited above. To Pfänder, he acknowledges his own inability to bring the all-to-many manuscripts of his *Nachlass* to a proper cohesion and suggests something of the emotional strain this has caused him over the years. "This impassioned work," he writes, "led to repeated states of depression. In the end what I was left with was an all-pervasive basic mood of depression, a dangerous collapse of confidence in myself."<sup>66</sup> Understanding that his philosophy lay for the most part buried in his papers, Husserl struggled until the time of his death to bring forth from this complex mass a final and adequate articulation of his philosophy. It is an unfortunate fact of history that he never succeeded in this endeavor.

### HUSSERL'S NACHLASS AND ITS PUBLICATION

At the time of his death, Husserl's *Nachlass* came to over 40,000 handwritten and some 10,000 typewritten pages.<sup>67</sup> These are all presently housed at the Katholieke Universiteit in Leuven, Belgium along with his extensive library<sup>68</sup> of approximately 2,700 texts and 2,000 articles.<sup>69</sup> During the ten year period following Husserl's death, a time during which the archive also established a secure funding source for the maintenance and continuation of the Husserl Archive itself, the archive directors put a transcription plan into effect. The work of editing and publishing Husserl's manuscripts was interrupted, of course, by the Second World War. Hence it was not until the 1950s that the archive actually began publishing Husserl's works and selections of his manuscripts contained in his *Nachlass*.

In 1935, as Husserl was negotiating with the Cercle Philosophique de Prague and the Masaryk-Institut to transfer his many manuscripts to Prague in order to save them from destruction by the Nazis, he and two of his assistants, Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink, established a preliminary classification system<sup>70</sup> for the *Nachlass*.<sup>71</sup> "[This] classification plan worked out in 1935 is of a systematic sort in sections A to E."<sup>72</sup> These divisions are composed as followed: (A) mundane phenomenology, (B) the reduction, (C) constitution of time as formal constitution, (D) primordial constitution or *Urkonstitution*, and (E) intersubjective constitution. Indeed, this structure makes up the central torso of the classification system in use by the archives today.<sup>73</sup>

Regardless of this arrangement, however, Husserl's *Nachlass* can be divided basically into two kinds of materials.<sup>74</sup> The first sort, itself divisible into two sub-categories, includes all of Husserl's manuscripts which form coherent wholes. Within this category are the works Husserl published during his lifetime, revisions and new editions of the same as well as works and writings unpublished by Husserl which are nonetheless self-standing wholes. The second and more extensive category of materials include the complete set of his (singular) research manuscripts,

investigations and explorations. This latter class of writings can itself be divided in two: first are those writings whose investigative paths follow upon lines laid out in Husserl's published writings or unpublished lecture courses, and second are those investigations which provide the leading foci for further research, writings that go beyond or, better, probe under the surface area of his major works.<sup>75</sup> One cannot emphasize enough the fluid and oft times inchoate state of the investigations within this second broad grouping of writings, especially those of the sort which delve into uncharted regions within transcendental phenomenology.

From the beginning there was never any plan to produce an exhaustive publication of Husserl's *Nachlass*.<sup>76</sup> To date, over thirty-five volumes have been critically edited and published by the Archive. These volumes constitute the ongoing series: *Husserliana*, *Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke*. The *Werke* series, in essence, then, represents but a selection of Husserl's total literary output. In fact, this series has been recently supplemented by the introduction of the *Husserliana*, *Materialien* series, initiated in 2001 and now containing eight volumes already published and two more in advanced stages of preparation.<sup>77</sup> Additionally, a crucially important ten volume collection of Husserl's *Briefwechsel* or exchange of letters, which Husserl generated over the course of his life, has been published as elements of the *Husserliana*, *Dokumente* series.<sup>78</sup> With such a diversity of primary sources, regardless of the classificatory scheme in place, a certain dis-order appears in the published materials now available, which is—to be honest—not entirely uncharacteristic of Husserl's thinking as well.

## THE ZIGZAG INVESTIGATIVE METHOD

Although the classification system of Husserl's *Nachlass* suggests a thematic partitioning of manuscripts rather than a developmental assessment of Husserl's thinking, Husserl, himself, was keenly aware of the development of his own phenomenological insights; and he placed great importance on this development in the very method of his work. He, in fact, referred to his own investigative style as a sort of zigzag. He meant by this to indicate the manner by which his thinking would begin either from certain presuppositions or from relatively uncritical insights to further and more profound articulations. From these later articulated stances, Husserl would consciously return again to his earlier insights in order to reformulate the earlier description on the basis of the critical standard established in these later investigations. As he explained it to one of his students, "One starts out, goes a certain distance, then goes back to the beginning, and what one has learned one applies to the beginning."<sup>79</sup>

Again and again Husserl asserts that his philosophy is presuppositionless. How is one to understand this claim? Husserl was a unique thinker who devoted himself to his own extant corpus at least as much as to the



works of others as he developed his philosophy. In point of fact, transcendental phenomenology is presuppositionless only to the degree that every supposed beginning, i.e., every phenomenological investigation, demands a methodological return and re-examination of that de facto expression of its subject matter as insights into the very heart of the matter develop and deepen. This is why Husserl devoted so much time and energy to his own body of writings. One begins within the natural attitude, for instance, to return to it again from the quite unnatural stance of the phenomenological attitude in order to make clear and bring to expression the position-takings going on quite naturally and anonymously within the phenomenologically uncritical attitude. The difficulty is to apprehend this movement while immersed in concrete work. Phenomenology demands, in other words, a moment of return with every advance.

If this sort of circular regressive inquiry is endemic to Husserl's philosophy, as I believe is the case, then the content of his writings will reflect in some measure this developmental process of re-examination and intensification. Husserl's very style of philosophizing should thus provide us a means internal to his investigations by which to discover within them the systematic development of analyses within the total problem field of transcendental phenomenology. Admittedly, this sort of approach to Husserl's writings is no easy task, and it is one that demands special devotion to the whole of Husserl's corpus. Yet this manner of interpretation is, I believe, the surest means by which to understand Husserl's philosophy of transcendental phenomenology.

Before we take on this task, though, it is worthwhile to examine Husserl's express assessment of his zigzag method. Two such statements can be found in his published writings. The first comes at the beginning of his career in his *Logical Investigations* and the second at its end in the *Crisis* essay. While the two statements have as similar intent, which is to illustrate the circularity of his method of regressive inquiry, they nevertheless come from such radically different retrospective vantage points in Husserl's writings as to carry with them quite different connotations. Though these differences ought not be overlooked, it would be wrong as well to overlook the striking continuity of style underlying the two claims. In other words, that the two statements come at the two ends of Husserl's career, in itself, speaks to a kind of continuity of approach which is all too often overlooked.

In the "Introduction" to the second volume of his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl makes the following claim: "Our great task is now to bring logical ideas, concepts and laws to epistemological clarity and definiteness."<sup>80</sup> Yet this great task itself encompasses a special problem which needs addressing if the Investigations are, themselves, to complete their larger task. This problem centers on the very language Husserl must fall back on to signify and explicate methodologically the logical phenomena at issue. Husserl's aim in the *Logical Investigations* is to bring the concepts and ideas which make up the content and the sense of pure logic to fundamental clarity.

In order to do so he must proceed, at least initially, by using a terminology which stands in direct need of clarification. He is faced with the pernicious difficulty of presupposing what needs clarification before he even begins his phenomenological investigations.<sup>81</sup> Some methodological turn is needed in order to face this difficulty in its seriousness. "Our investigation can, however, only proceed securely," Husserl assures us, "if it repeatedly breaks with such systematic sequence, if it removes conceptual obscurities which threaten the course of investigations *before* the natural sequence of subject-matters can lead up to such concepts. We search," he continues, "as it were, in zigzag fashion, a metaphor all the more apt since the close interdependence of our various epistemological concepts lead us back again and again to our original analyses, where the new confirms the old, and the old the new."<sup>82</sup>

The hermeneutical import of this statement is striking. Husserl's methodological tactic is precisely to revert back upon his own analyses at significant junctures in the sequence of his investigations in order to clarify and fix those concepts he has been using throughout and which are essential to his ongoing investigation. Terms such as "experience," "act," "intention," and "meaning," itself, all have long histories of use and express various specialized meanings within the field of philosophy. They demand serious attention, if they are to be at all meaningful within a consistent science of logic. Quite clearly, however, Husserl rejects the claim that his phenomenology can be reduced to the mere analysis of the meaning of words. "Since the logical element in logical phenomena is given to consciousness and since the logical phenomena are phenomena of predicating and thus of a certain meaning, the investigation [i.e., the entire *Logical Investigations*] begins after all with an analysis of these phenomena."<sup>83</sup> So the clarification of terms, which occurs as a necessary element in the logical project, can proceed only upon the results of the antecedent descriptive enterprise special to the phenomenological investigation. According to Husserl, then, terminological discussions point to a field of phenomenological analyses, analyses which bring to evidence the apriori relations between meaning and knowing, or more to the point, between meaning and clarifying intuition.<sup>84</sup>

The real effort at clarification, therefore, lies not in the analysis of word meanings but rather in the phenomenological investigation of the intentional acts of signifying and of meaning-intentions in their full scope. Husserl, of course, had the choice to circumvent this bewitching problem simply by inventing a new terminology, but he chose to avoid this course. The answer, he believed, lay not in a new language but in the rigorous analysis of the logical phenomena to which the terms refer. A new terminology would only introduce a new level of unclearness and incomprehensibility to his investigation and, in the end, do little in effect to avoid his central difficulty.<sup>85</sup> It is for this reason quite customary to find curious paragraphs peppered throughout his programmatic writings in which Husserl attempts not merely to fix his terminology but also and more importantly to explain



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why the need to fix terminology is so central to the very nature of his phenomenological investigations.<sup>86</sup> Clarity does not prohibit an initial lack of definiteness but does demand a progressive fixing of sense as the phenomenological investigations proceed.<sup>87</sup>

While Husserl's zigzag methodology seems limited to the researches of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl employs and extends its scope, we believe, throughout all of his later writings. The very notion of "bracketing" or "parenthesizing," so famously brought forward by Husserl as an expression of the phenomenological ἐποχή, is closely related to and in many respects an extension of the zigzag methodology he employs in the *Logical Investigations*. Phenomenology, as Husserl understands it, is no mere intuitionism, but rather a much more complicated attempt to analyze and describe the essential structures of the variegated systems of cognitions involved in any subjective intending of some objectivity appearing to consciousness. One *must* at times break from the systematic course of discovery pursued methodologically within phenomenology precisely so as not to fall sway to the naïveté and prejudices philosophical language quite naturally begets.<sup>88</sup> "That signifies that I may accept such a proposition," Husserl explains in *Ideas* I, "only in the modified consciousness, the consciousness of judgment-excluding, and therefore *not as it is in science, a sentence which claims validity and the validity of which I acknowledge and use*."<sup>89</sup> No term within phenomenology stands immune from the problem which the zigzag method is meant to address. Every sentence in natural (i.e., non-phenomenological) discourse demands re-interpretation. Indeed, this demand stands at the heart of Husserl's famous principle of all principles that every originary intuition of some givenness—as it gives itself in consciousness—is a justifying source of cognition.<sup>90</sup>

"For all that, we see that each <conceptual theory> can again only draw its truth from originary data. Every statement which does no more than give expression to such data through mere explication and precisely conforming meanings is actually, as we said in the introductory remarks to this chapter, an *absolute beginning*, a *principium*, called upon to serve as a foundation in the genuine sense of the word."<sup>91</sup>

Every phenomenological investigation begins with a break from our natural life. Our very language has its home in this situation and appears in this natural life to be the absolute foundation, the true beginning, from which phenomenological investigation *must* proceed. But this natural language, itself, is only that selfsame stonework of natural theoretical life that must be carefully taken over in the new phenomenological attitude.

He must *take over from the constituting I* the habituality of language and *participate in* the latter's constitutive life, against his own wish to be non-participant. But this participation is merely *apparent*

[*scheinbar*], inasmuch as in taking over language the phenomenologizing onlooker *transforms* its natural sense as referring to what is existent. If this kind of *transformation* did not occur, then the phenomenologist would *slip out of the transcendental attitude* with every word he spoke.<sup>92</sup>

Hence, if one understands this zigzag investigative method as applying to Husserl's writing as a whole, this method—or we can say more broadly, Husserl's phenomenological method—aims not merely at a return to matters as they show themselves in consciousness [*zu den Sachen selbst*]. It also concerns itself most intimately with the manners by which these matters find proper expression as they show themselves in a rigorously methodic phenomenological analysis.

Viewed in this way phenomenology implicitly holds within itself a philosophy of its own language, a conception brought to clarity only much later by Husserl's assistant, Eugen Fink. "Phenomenological sentences can therefore only be understood if the *situation of the giving of sense* to the transcendental sentence is always *repeated*, that is, if the predicative explicating terms are always verified again by *phenomenologizing intuition*. There is thus no phenomenological understanding that comes simply by reading reports of phenomenological research; these can only be 'read' at all by re-performing the investigations themselves."<sup>93</sup> Meaning and expression are, therefore, consciously understood *problems* underlying the entire phenomenological enterprise. They at once presuppose the paradox not only of the circularity alluded to above, i.e., the circularity of employing the self-same terms in an analytical description of that phenomena to which those terms refer. But they also point to express limitations of phenomenological intuition. As every phenomenological sentence is meaningful only insofar as it is repeated originarily by the engaged phenomenologist herself, phenomenological sentences will not be genuinely understood prior to the *activity* of phenomenological investigation.

It is important to point out, furthermore, that the intuitions arising out of this phenomenologizing activity, to which Fink refers above, are not momentary, self-enclosed cognitional atoms. That is to say, they do not completely fall away within consciousness as soon as the phenomenologizing activity itself ceases. They endure as a sort of *habitus* with the phenomenological investigator. Husserl discusses this very feature of phenomenological investigation with Eugen Fink, which is recorded in Dorion Cairns' excellent source, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*. The substance of this brief but relevant discussion provides important enlargement on the nature of phenomenological activity which is left generally under-discussed in Husserl's programmatic writings.

When I came in, Husserl was telling Fink how, when one has attained the phenomenological *Einstellung* <attitude>, the phrase "I was in the

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natural *Einstellung*” has a totally different sense than it would have were it possible to be said in the natural *Einstellung*. Furthermore when one has once attained the phenomenological *Einstellung*, one can never fall back completely into the natural *Einstellung*.<sup>94</sup>

The understanding of phenomenological sentences requires at least some background work on the part of the budding phenomenologist as necessary condition for their comprehensibility. But we are not exchanging labor merely for transient rewards, if we sincerely engage in phenomenological investigation. Nor do we seek in phenomenology, however much we do abstain from the implicit thematizations, strivings, and valuing on-going daily, to exchange our daily life for an ethereal life of mere observation—as if phenomenological reflection were a source of inner observation.

The pertinent concrete experiences, let us repeat, are indeed that to which the attentive regard is directed: but the attentive I, qua philosophizing I, practices abstention in regard to the intuited. Likewise in experiences of similar sort everything *having been meant* in the validating consciousness (the respective judgment, the respective theory, the respective value, or what have you) is still retained completely—but with the modification of holding [as] “sheer phenomena.”<sup>95</sup>

Once phenomenologizing activity has been carried through even initially, the insights that result as well as the phenomenologizing activity as past are retained and sedimented in the consciousness of the phenomenologist. As the activity deepens, current phenomenologizing draws upon sedimented retentions of old to flesh out the possibilities of discovery insinuated by the new insights. As phenomenologizing activity deepens, phenomenological understanding potentially deepens in like manner.

Executing the phenomenological method with the intent to bring out its τέλος, i.e., to bring the phenomenological intuitions forward in language, the phenomenologizing philosopher faces a unique situation. The I, methodologically uncovering its own transcendental life “from within” the abstaining situation, has before it not only itself, that is, the transcendental I that anonymously constitutes itself in the world as a natural member, but also the I *qua* reflecting phenomenological philosopher abstaining from this thematic constitutive participation. “At the hitherto highest level I have therefore the third I, the third I-life, perceiving, etc., eidetically—the eidetics of the I that phenomenologizes, that constitutes the universe of monads, and that thereby constitutes the world.”<sup>96</sup> As such, “I” must account for this fact in my investigation as well.

If we are to understand this zigzag method Husserl employs, we have to understand it from within the life-long regressive inquiry which Husserl, himself, carried through. For Husserl, at once, both enacted phenomenology and interpreted it. What is clear, then, is that this express interpretation

that one finds occurring as early the *Logical Investigations*, exemplified by the provisional zigzag style of investigation taken up therein, intersects with and amplifies the enactment of phenomenological method. There is, in other words, no non-self-interpretative phenomenologizing activity. The ultimate τέλος of the phenomenological method is as such not personal insight but scientific expression. We seek not merely phenomenologizing intuitions but expressions thereof which are valid for the total phenomenologizing community. The aim of the phenomenological method is, thus, the understanding of living experience with scientific objectivity and full philosophic accountability. Phenomenological insight without interpretive expression is dumb just as phenomenological expression without methodologically guided insight is blind. Phenomenology seeks to be, in other words, a fully credible *seeing-telling*.

We can now turn to the second of Husserl's statement of zigzag methodology which, as we shall recall, occurs in the context of Husserl's last writing, the *Crisis*. At this stage in our disquisition we can as yet do no more than presume an organic link between the first and second statements of method occurring at the bookends of Husserl's career. Yet we have made enough of an advance to see that while Husserl radically broadens the notion of zigzag methodology in the *Crisis* when compared against the *Logical Investigations*, he does so on the basis of the more profound insight into phenomenological methodology itself. Where the *Logical Investigations* proceed from a reluctant acceptance of the initiating phenomenologizing situation, the *Crisis*, on the other hand, embraces this recognition as a fundamental feature of phenomenologizing activity. In other words, Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* seeks to fix his terminology in the *Investigations* as they proceed, all the while acknowledging with a kind of perfunctory acceptance the necessity of the circularity to his proceeding. But no real historical critique of meaning exists in the *Logical Investigations*. The *Crisis* is on this account radically more profound.

The understanding of the beginnings is to be gained fully only by starting out with science given in its present-day form, looking back at its development. But without an understanding of the *beginnings*, this development as *development of meaning* is mute. Thus we have no other choice: we must proceed forward and backward in a zigzag pattern; in the interplay the one must help the other. Relative clarification on one side brings some elucidation to the other, which in turn casts light back on the former.<sup>97</sup>

The historical critique that Husserl takes up in the *Crisis* proceeds from a much more profound comprehension of the historical situation that, in a sense, pre-exists and pre-conditions phenomenologizing activity (or for that matter, any scientific activity). Where the beginning phenomenological situation remains a mute background within Husserl's *Logical*

*Investigations*, the *Crisis* makes it mark by expressly posing the question of beginnings, especially in terms of the situation from which phenomenologizing activity necessarily originates and finds worldly expression, as a problem. Paradoxically, I *qua* transcendental observer find myself a product of an intentional history that I disclose in a radically “solitary” philosophical investigation. “Phenomenologizing therefore is only *one among the other* transcendental activities that are constituted and apperceived *as human* by the self-constitution of the transcendental subject into man in the world.”<sup>98</sup> The phenomenological I, when committed to the aims of responsible science, must recognize that an account of the meanings it takes up in its own scientific activity have a history of origin preceding that activity. As such, this recognition pushes at the very heart of the phenomenological method itself. Phenomenologizing, as a coming to full self-knowledge of transcendental subjectivity, finds itself in the precarious situation not merely of questioning *who* is this transcendental subject but also *whence* comes to “be” this subject?

Our aim at present is an understanding of the development and systematic of Husserl's philosophy. Husserl's zigzag method, which presses unrelentingly against the limits of language, at one and the same time proffers a potent tool for the astute reader. This zigzag approach, which was originally intended by Husserl to redress the deficiencies of the ordinary or philosophical language, developed into a robust interpretive technique as he amplified the research field of phenomenology. Husserl thus sets guideposts along a certain path of thinking for the co-phenomenologist reading him. His later works, in other words, bear within themselves the core of his earlier investigations. This zigzag method, since it stands as a method of investigation which Husserl favored quite generally, sets down a system of cairns by which the fledgling phenomenologizing wanderer may follow. Husserl, as we have pointed out, was a thinker that came back again and again to well tread avenues of thinking. He did this, that is, retrospectively turning his investigative eye to his earlier hard-won insights and the manners of their expression, not so much for lack of imagination, but rather because the matters themselves demanded it of him. Somewhat disappointingly Husserl does seem to lack an imaginative variation in the manner by which he expresses himself. All too often he employs worn and weary manners of expression. But these well-tread phenomenological expressions are ever framed anew with certain “brackets” or valences imposed upon them from within Husserl's continuing investigations. Perhaps one can fault Husserl for a lack of expressive imagination. But Husserl did not lack the philosophical acuity to see the expressive problem which his method opened up. Every phenomenological sentence enjoys only provisional validity, which, on the one hand, has to be obtained by hard-won investigations into the essential matters of cognition but requires, on the other, further clarification in future philosophical work. The very zigzag approach Husserl employs, which finds

expression as early as the *Logical Investigations* and as late as the *Crisis*, points *in nuce*, we believe, to the larger philosophical problem implicit to transcendental phenomenology, i.e., the problem of its own language, which Fink explicates in his phenomenology of phenomenology.

The question we are pursuing at present is not so much *if* one can find strong thematic currents running through all of Husserl's writings, but rather how to articulate these currents such that in doing so one uncovers the organic development of his thinking reflective of this zigzag methodology. Of course, we are not completely left to our own devices here. Eugen Fink has written a wonderful essay entitled "Husserl's late philosophy in the Freiburg period," which is quite helpful in this regard.<sup>99</sup> Fink asserts, among other things, that there is a very real sense in which the published writings of Husserl's Freiburg period, i.e., the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the *Cartesian Meditations* and the 'Crisis' article, each pursues themes and extends the boundaries of the major published works of Husserl's earlier career. One can say that Husserl published works focus on but a few main themes, all of which are found in a limited group of deepening studies. "The *Formal and Transcendental Logic* transcends the *Logical Investigations* as the *Cartesian Meditations* transcends *Ideas I*. The 'Crisis' writing transcends the famous essay, 'Philosophy as rigorous science'."<sup>100</sup> Indeed, these six writings are Husserl's major published works. The *Logical Investigations* represents Husserl's breakthrough to phenomenology in 1900/1901. The article "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" of 1911 represents the extension of the phenomenological problematic beyond the central concern of logic and critique of natural scientific methodology to a critique of the methodology of human sciences or *Geisteswissenschaften*. Husserl's *Ideas I* represents his first real attempt toward laying the ground of the phenomenological method. As we have seen, though, we find a long hiatus after the publication of *Ideas I*. This occurred as a result of a deep re-consideration by Husserl of phenomenological method. Finally at the time of his retirement Husserl published his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and then, later, the French translation of the *Cartesian Meditations* in 1931. Here Husserl again takes up the themes of his earlier writings but from a new standpoint. Then again, after 1931 there is another hiatus from publication until appearance of the article in the journal *Philosophia*, "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology." On the face of it, this last writing by Husserl seems to institute a break from virtually his entire earlier corpus of writings. If Fink is correct, however, we can then trace the development of Husserl's thinking by a close examination of these most significant of Husserl's publications and find in them a thread of continuity and development. We can and should use these works, therefore, as guideposts by which to trace the development of Husserl's thinking, especially as this finds its expression in his unpublished writings, in order to comprehend the system of his philosophy.

# **HUSSERL'S NACHLASS RECONSIDERED AND THE PROBLEM AT HAND**

When we consider the full scope of Husserl's writings, we note, paradoxically, that Husserl was at once exceptionally fruitful but also terribly impotent. He seems impotent when comparing the fecundity of his *Nachlass* against the body of his published works. Although "it is only in these <unpublished> papers that one can find a complete revelation of his philosophical ideas,"<sup>101</sup> it is important to understand what Husserl himself published and when he published it for no other reason than to provide an open and objective gauge by which to measure the significance of these unpublished writings. If one thing is true in Husserlian scholarship, it is the incessant difficulty to adjudicate the importance of this or that writing in regard to the total scheme of his thinking. "A precipitous sortie into the manuscripts of the *Nachlass* can lead only to the crassest misunderstandings."<sup>102</sup> However, one can and ought to take the works Husserl published in his lifetime as a guide to the developments working their way through his unpublished manuscripts.

As it stands today, nothing Husserl published during his life represents the hoped-for systematic articulation of his phenomenological philosophy. Isolated from his peers with the desperate knowledge that his age and his circumstances worked unflaggingly against him, he clearly felt the demand to complete his work.

I simply cannot die in peace, if I haven't brought my work <the "Crisis"> to completion. I must unfortunately furnish still some more researches without which the lately published essay will remain useless. This will become ultimately a substantial book, a work in itself, which I also hope to be published later, perhaps after but a year. Of course, not in Germany. Not a single journal is open to me here (they are all equally shut off), and as I am sure, also not at Niemeyer or for that matter any other publisher. And so I must hold out and dedicate every precious moment to work.<sup>103</sup>

Sadly, he died less than two years later—having published none of these promised researches.

Husserl spent years of vacillating effort attempting to bring his *Nachlass* to systematic order for eventual residence in some sort of archival setting. But the systematic conception of his philosophy, that is, the systematic laying out of the field of problems with which phenomenology had to deal remained for Husserl an ever distant goal. In despondency over this failure, he wrote as early as 1922 to Paul Natorp,

I am in a far worse situation than you, since the greatest part of my work is found in my manuscripts. I almost curse my inability to come



to finality with myself. And it is so late, just now, to be coming to universal considerations which are demanded in all my particular investigations up to this moment and which also now necessitates them all to be reworked. Everything is in a state of re-crystallization. Perhaps I am working with all humanly possible effort only for my *Nachlass*.<sup>104</sup>

Twelve years later, the situation seemed only slightly better, but this is less from a sense of accomplishment than from the belief he placed in his ability—along with the efforts of Eugen Fink—to create and publish his “system.” When these plans dimmed, Husserl could only hope—with the help of his most dedicated students—to obtain a suitable and secure setting for his life’s work necessary for further work to continue. He wrote to his close friend, Gustav Albrecht, in 1934: “Among a small circle of my loyal students a plan is underway to arrange the international means to establish an archive (like the Brentano archive in Prague) for my manuscripts (several thousand pages, stenographic) and these as soon as is possible to bring to publication after Fink brings the systematic plan to fruition.”<sup>105</sup> Alas, even this plan failed to come to realization.<sup>106</sup> Fortunately, however, Edith Stein and H.L. van Breda managed to smuggle Husserl’s *Nachlass* out of Nazi Germany amidst the anti-Semitic fervor during the late thirties after Husserl’s death. In 1938, Father van Breda established the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Belgium.<sup>107</sup>

What is most interesting about Husserl’s hopes which he expressed to Albrecht in 1934, however, is that he only published one work of significance after this date. This, of course, is the “Crisis” article of 1936.<sup>108</sup> Although barred from publishing and lecturing in Germany after the Nazi’s came to power, Husserl did present lectures in Prague and Vienna in the mid-thirties. These lectures would form the basis of the “Crisis” writing we have today.<sup>109</sup> The “Crisis” work, then, has to be viewed in the context of Husserl’s desire to produce a systematic presentation of his philosophy, one that would provide the framework of the multiplicitous investigations contained in his *Nachlass*. Yet if one can say anything uncontroversial of that work, it is that Husserl presents anything there but a systematic conception of his philosophy. He died with full knowledge of this fact.

If we are to take Husserl at his word, to understand his philosophy is to comprehend the tangled contents of this *Nachlass*. Looking at his work from within, that is to say, from the reference point of his ubiquitous research manuscripts available today, a serious set of problems confront the scholar of Husserl’s work. Even today after so much work on Husserl’s *Nachlass* has been completed, a virtual chaos presents itself when approaching Husserl’s writings.<sup>110</sup> It is obvious, even to one working with a clear conception of the classification system and conscientiously attending to the editorial comments within the respective volumes of *Husserliana*, that Husserl wrote his *Einzeluntersuchungen* or individual research manuscripts more *for himself*, or better, *to himself* than he did for an outside audience. By and large, the



many manuscripts that make up the bulk of Husserl's writings are neither connected to one another nor necessarily refer internally to one another. There is no denying that these manuscripts, the research manuscripts as well as Husserl's course lectures and drafts of writings, can be categorized and thematically articulated. Indeed, they have been, and the organization plan at work in the Husserl Archive reflects this broad categorizing possibility. Furthermore, the *Husserliana* series provides significant contextualization of the more sustained pieces of writing found within the *Nachlass*. But there is also no denying that the myriad and unique manners of expression found within Husserl's unpublished studies have generated a cottage factory of scholars who seek to trace the history of usages by Husserl. This is no rebuff against the fine editorial work undertaken at the Husserl Archive or against any particular writer on a topic special to Husserl's philosophy. The many editors of the *Husserliana* volumes have contributed much to our understanding of Husserl's philosophy both by bringing together these significant collections of writings *and* explaining why these manuscripts ought to be ordered in the way they are. Indeed, there is no better resource for understanding the development of Husserl's philosophy than the editorial introductions found within the *Husserliana* series. And the work of historical analysis of Husserl's thought is without question important to an understanding of his development and indeed of his philosophy as such. But most of Husserl's research investigations are individual investigations. They stand and fall as singular investigations written by a conscientious philosopher to better grasp a particular thematic more clearly *to himself*. So even a single manuscript may present a variety of investigations, often jumping from topic to topic with almost no literary connection, sometimes with little attempt to conform to minimum standards of grammar even. The proffered descriptions may be considered and rejected with no resolution obtained or attempted in the manuscript. Within the *Nachlass* as a whole, Husserl quite often pursues his theme fragmentarily. To the researcher who chooses to wade into Husserl's *Nachlass*, as to anyone who wishes properly to understand his philosophy, these works provide little secure ground from which to comprehend the underlying current to the whole of Husserl's philosophy. Husserl's literary corpus is for the most part dis-integrated. So although Husserl's *Nachlass* literally bursts forth with originality, it also manifestly lacks systematicity.

One can ask, indeed, one must ask, is Husserl's philosophy anything other than a collation of individual investigations [*Einzeluntersuchungen*]? Is there nothing motivating Husserl's variegated detailed investigations other than the particular aims of the respective writings? Husserl is and was always highly respected as an analytical genius, but in his myopia of the issue at hand did he not also lose the forest for the trees? Or were the plethora of individual investigations meant to fit together by Husserl eventually to form a systematic conception, a working though of implications implicit within the methodology of a transcendental phenomenology?

## 2 A Unitary Impulse

### Husserl's Confrontation with Dilthey

Dilthey, the completed, debates with Husserl, the becoming, who was but an in-between form at this stage in his middle age. To the Husserl now at the final form, the old dispute appears curious. For the people, though, Husserl is Husserl.

—Husserl to Georg Misch, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1930.

At issue in this investigation is not a special problem of Husserl's philosophy—such as the role of historicity in his “Crisis” writings—but rather the very essence of transcendental phenomenology as Husserl conceived it. If Husserl's writings do not encompass anything more than introductions and special studies, what then is his philosophy *for us*? What indeed is transcendental phenomenology? We know by Husserl's own admission that transcendental phenomenology finds its most complete expression in his literary corpus unpublished in his day. Even amongst these papers, however, there is little that offers a comprehensive framework tying together all of his most significant studies into a single vision. Indeed the publication plan of Husserl's collected writings as well as the organizational structure of Husserl's estate itself suggest not merely that a systematic conception of transcendental phenomenology does not exist, but rather that a system of phenomenological philosophy may be an unattainable ideal. If one looks only to his numerous research manuscripts and lecture course materials in the estate, one despairs of ever finding anything but partial investigations. Further, these research works are often tentative in their results. However, if one looks beyond these writings to his letters one discovers an interesting fact. Husserl not only acknowledged the need to produce a system of phenomenological philosophy but also expressed his commitment to complete this work in the last decade of his life. That he never completed this project remains the greatest unfulfilled promise of Husserl's life and philosophy.

Regardless of Husserl's intentions, fulfilled or no, we can and should ask whether it is reasonable to believe that a “system of phenomenological philosophy” can be adequately articulated within Husserl's total corpus of writings? This is not an empty question. For although there are materials in the Husserl Archive in which he proposed and to some degree worked out the idea of such a system, these are, at best, sketches and incomplete drafts.

In the late twenties and early thirties Husserl with his assistant, Eugen Fink, worked up a plan and produced a number of manuscripts for a major publication having the title “system of phenomenological philosophy.”<sup>1</sup> For reasons which we will go into later, the two men eventually abandoned

this project. It appears, though, that in 1930, perhaps as early as 1929, Husserl wrote up a provisional plan of the system to be published in a five volume work,<sup>2</sup> which he then gave to his assistant to edit and upgrade. This was a pivotal time in Husserl's work. He was working at the time also on a German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations*, a work in which Husserl sought explicitly to redress the misinterpretations of his new science of phenomenology. Deciding now to abandon this latter project, he shifted his energies to this new, even more ambitious plan. The proposed "system" was to be a massive work that would encompass the full range of the phenomenological problems articulated in his *Nachlass*. Importantly, it would tie all of the various investigations into one inclusive whole. This "system" is detailed in the outlines produced by Husserl and Fink in the early years of the 1930s.<sup>3</sup>

Yet matters are complicated here because the revised draft outline of the "system," which Fink gave to Husserl on August 13, 1930,<sup>4</sup> bears only the slightest resemblance to Husserl's first draft.<sup>5</sup> Though Fink's plan is quite different, there is some reason to believe that it retains a tie to Husserl's first draft. The work appears to be the product of a loose collaboration between the two men.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, where Husserl earlier described a plan having five volumes, Fink now conceived a simpler, more comprehensive (but likely as massive) project of two books. We will closely examine these two drafts in the final chapter of this work.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that there are two distinct episodes in Husserl's career during which he worked to produce a "great systematic work." In addition to the work in the early thirties just mentioned, Husserl also struggled a decade earlier to produce a major systematic presentation of his philosophy.<sup>7</sup> Naturally, these two projects proceed from different motivations arising from the different periods during which Husserl was working. It thus remains questionable how commensurate the two broad systematic conceptions are together, and this is addressed in the latter chapters of this work.

However, before taking up this important question, we are first required to examine why it is reasonable to believe that Husserl's phenomenological investigations can be fitted together systematically. We ought not simply presume that Husserl's writings present something more than an aggregate of individual investigations or mere introductions to a vaguely defined philosophy. The fact of the matter is that Husserl felt compelled to produce a systematic of phenomenology and failed ever to publish one. Perhaps he failed because his methodological approach precluded the systematization of his investigations. As we have suggested, Husserl's research manuscripts in the archives present open-ended analyses. Very many of these lack any internal connection to one another. Indeed, Husserl's own writings seem to indicate a general abhorrence on the part of their author against ordering these into a single philosophical frame.

Perhaps, also, phenomenology is simply anti-systematic. Husserl is well known to have publicly expressed his deep mistrust of philosophical systems. In the 1910 *Logos* essay, "Philosophy as rigorous science," he characterizes system building, for instance, as antithetical to the proper task of philosophy *qua* phenomenology. He would rather, as he was fond of saying, exchange the large bills of the system philosophies for small change.<sup>8</sup> But as important as this sentiment is in Husserl's work, it is essential not to overstate its importance. Even in the early *Logos* essay Husserl points to the sort of systematic work which he sees himself capable of undertaking one day.

And what is the "system" to mean to us for which we yearn, which as ideal is to light the way in the depths of our inquiring work? A philosophical "system" in the traditional sense? As though it were a Minerva that springs already completed and armed from the head of a creative genius—in order then in later times to be preserved in the quiet museum of history alongside other such Minervas? Or [is it] a philosophical system of doctrine that *after the tremendous spadework of generations actually begins from the ground up* with an indubitable foundation and rises into the heights like any sound construction [*Bau*], wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other, in accordance with guiding insights?<sup>9</sup>

He sees, in other words, his own work bearing a unique and integral relation to the work of an entire community of scientists reaching back as far back as the great philosophers of ancient Greece. As Husserl expresses it here, the ground of any personal philosophical work is co-determined by both natural experience and historical traditions. Under this light, philosophical analysis seeks not merely to extend the work of earlier generations but rather more so to achieve a greater clarity of the matters at hand by a renewal and re-commencement of the ideals which lay at the root of this earlier work. For this reason Husserl will years later urge a renewal of philosophical spirit. "But it must still be made clear that a "renewal" of essential necessity belongs to the development of a man and a mankind toward true humanity."<sup>10</sup>

If we could thus characterize Husserl's antipathy for systems philosophy, it is that he remains adamantly opposed to the conception of science or a system of philosophy as the work of any one individual. Husserl understands a system of philosophy to be an ethos and a community of striving toward clarification of endless, open-ended problems. This ethos and this striving have a history and a teleology, and he sees himself a participant in this intra-historical striving. He remains, in other words, "fully conscious that science can never again be the complete creation of an individual, nevertheless <the individual worker> devotes the greatest energies in cooperation with others imbued with the same ethos to

helping a scientific philosophy make its breakthrough and develop further step by step.”<sup>11</sup>

Though the historical progressiveness of development may represent the ideal of scientific achievement in Husserl's eyes, this vision does nothing to negate the fragmented character of much of his own research work. Perhaps Husserl's legacy lies, then, in his many individual investigations *as* individual efforts. This is a highly appealing standpoint. For it allows the researcher, when approaching his literary estate, to dip in and out of his corpus of writings and to mine Husserl's unique and often trenchant observations for certain special purposes. Yet this approach, itself, bespeaks a prejudice regarding Husserl's philosophy. If one does not actually look systematically at his philosophy, then one cannot reasonably expect to find it to be systematic. To assert, then, that there is no system of phenomenological philosophy without actually seeking to disclose in his manuscripts a inner systematicity seems patently fallacious; especially since we know of a number of different efforts later in his career<sup>12</sup> where Husserl sought to articulate his philosophy systematically.

As we have suggested, we are today aware of his attempts in the twenties and thirties to construct a system of phenomenological philosophy. We also have the outlines of the 1930's system he and Fink produced. Even if Husserl never actually worked up a publication on the basis of these outlines, most especially the last outline of a “system of phenomenological philosophy,” we are obliged as responsible scholars to take these claims seriously and to understand them as fully as possible before either accepting or discounting them.

Our aim at present is, thus, to examine his correspondence in order to highlight those statements by Husserl in which he speaks of the inner unity of his philosophy and in which he articulates the system of his phenomenological investigations. By looking through this correspondence, we seek to cut a path through all of Husserl's investigations without disemboweling the whole. In this way, we hope to show whether his legacy extends beyond his individual investigative research efforts to a something more coherent. We seek, to use Husserl's own metaphor, to espy the promised land of the “infinitely open land of the true philosophy”<sup>13</sup> that can be unearthed within his literary estate.

## HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY AND PERSON

Husserl has very often been caricatured as a man almost pathologically indrawn and his philosophy derided as the study of a mere solipsistic immanence. To gauge the truthfulness of this portrait, both of the man and his philosophy, we can test it against the conception of solipsism Husserl advocated in his writings. As we have already noted, transcendental phenomenology proceeds upon the performance of a radical *ἐποχή* or suspension

of belief. Every "reality" falls to this act of bracketing, including my own factual psychic reality. Yet nothing is denied by the *ἐποχή*. One does not deny the existence of the world, worldly egoic existence, or any "transcendent reality." So in essence the fulfillment of this bracketing is really nothing negative.

Husserl tried what on the face of it appears absurd, that is, as a thinker to escape the power of the universal faith in being, to break the formidable spell which holds already for everything in the ceaseless impression of all things and happenings between heaven and earth "to be existing objects" *<seiende Gegenstände>*. The thinking subject does not effect thereby his power of negation which would in this case be illusory. He seeks a middle ground between assertion and denial. He holds himself back abstaining from the goings-on in the faith of being. He practices "epoché."<sup>14</sup>

The epoché is thus an opening to an entirely non-worldly or "immanent" constituting subjectivity. This is indeed how Husserl's late assistant, Eugen Fink, describes it. "Here a process takes place in which thinking man loses his familiarity with the world and a new dimension is won, the dimension of original beginnings (Ursprungs)."<sup>15</sup> This newly disclosed dimension is at once an absolutely distinct and autonomous mode of "being."

Even if performing the phenomenological reduction then gets us out of the restrictedness of the natural attitude and opens up for us the never suspected dimension of world-constitution, we gain the insight that what we commonly understand as the totality of that which is existent represents in truth only a stratum in newly discovered world-constitution, that is, precisely the stratum of constituted end-products.<sup>16</sup>

This "I," or transcendental subjectivity, or whatever we wish provisionally to name this constituting "being," becomes disclosed to phenomenologizing consciousness, which had remained hidden to natural consciousness, by virtue of the epoché and reduction. "The ego which is so reduced," Husserl thus argues, "performs now a kind of solipsistic philosophizing. It seeks apodictically certain ways through which an objective outwardness can be disclosed in its pure innerliness [*Innerlichkeit*]."<sup>17</sup>

Though brief and altogether too quick, this explication of the epoché and reduction suggests that transcendental phenomenology is a philosophy of solipsism. Obviously, though, it is solipsism of a unique sort. For this constituting source, i.e., transcendental subjectivity, "is" something fundamentally different from every being in the mundane sense. "If everything existent—according to the transcendental insight of phenomenology—is nothing other than a constitutive *having-come-to-be* [*Gewordenheit*], then the *coming-to-be* [*werden*] of the existent in constitution is itself not

already existent.”<sup>18</sup> So, the transcendental I is nothing, i.e., not a being (*ein Seiende*). What is most important to recognize at this stage, though, is that Husserl does not shy away from calling his method solipsistic. In fact, many times over in his career Husserl argued that the solipsistic starting point is the standpoint of genuine philosophy. And it is this stance which informs to a large degree his conception of philosophy as a philosophy without presuppositions—which Husserl held to consistently throughout his career. “Anyone wishing to philosophize seriously must ‘once in their life’ withdraw into oneself and within oneself overthrow all sciences holding any validity prior to this move and attempt their new construction.”<sup>19</sup> Genuine philosophy *qua* rigorous science can rely on no opinion nor any “scientific” theory as having epistemic priority over that which is disclosed descriptively-analytically in this move. The famous principle of all principles in §24 of *Ideas I* expresses this ideal: “that every originally presenting intuition is a justifying source of knowledge,”<sup>20</sup> and no theory can make us err with respect to this. As scientists *qua* philosophers we may and do live under the spell of philosophical prejudices which, in fact, date from the intellectual revolutions that marked the modern era of scientific inquiry and earlier. Yet we can seek to dispel these prejudices by a rigorous devotion to the matters genuinely at issue. Husserl was quite insistent that transcendental phenomenology is genuine philosophy insofar as it begins from this radical starting point, that is to say, from that which shows itself in “intuition” originally and within the restriction of the manner of apprehension within which it shows itself.<sup>21</sup>

But is it not the case that Husserl contradicts himself when he demands, on the one hand, the overthrow of all science as one begins to philosophize, while calling his own philosophy, on the other hand, a neo-Cartesianism and a truly rigorous science in the tradition of Plato? How can philosophy be at once radically self-responsible *and* the exemplary of a factual philosophical tradition? This is a conundrum Husserl acknowledged and addressed early in his career. In “Philosophy as rigorous science” he explicitly accepts that philosophy, as a human endeavor, never take place from a standpoint on high, so to speak, but rather necessarily begins within humanly developed means. This recognition informs his concept of system put forward in that essay. Though phenomenology finds its impulse in Descartes philosophy, the phenomenologist misconstrues her proper task if she takes it to be the historical analysis of this or any extant philosophical system.

Certainly, also, we need history. Naturally not in the manner of the historian, losing ourselves in the contextual development in which the great philosophies have matured, but rather to allow it to stimulate us according to its own spiritual content. In reality, out of these historical philosophies philosophical *life* streams toward us as we delve into them to understand the spirit of their words and theories in the whole richness and force of living motivations. . . . <But> the impulse for inquiry



must proceed from the matters and the problems at issue, not from philosophies.<sup>22</sup>

Rather than escaping from the greater context of philosophical life or the tradition of modern science generally, Husserl sought to understand it. Unlike the historian of ideas, the philosopher ought not to busy herself solely with the vicissitudes of any particular philosophy as its factual inquiry develops. This may be a valid field of study, but it is not one, Husserl argues, for the philosopher. Rather, as philosophizing subjects we ought to disclose and make understandable the matters that ground any and every factual scientific inquiry. The idea of science and not the factual development of science is what guides us as philosophers.

We naturally obtain the universal idea of science from the factually given sciences. If they have become for us in our radical critical attitude merely presumed sciences, then their universal goal-idea must also in like sense become one that is merely presumed. Thus we do not yet know whether it can at all become actual. . . . We take it as an anticipatory presumption, which we give ourselves over to as a kind of trial from which we allow it to lead us in a tentative way in our meditations. . . . Quite naturally we fall at first into alienating circumstances—but how would we avoid these if our radicalism were not an empty gesture but rather is to become actual.<sup>23</sup>

Husserl sees his own work, therefore, as a project in step with the tradition of science rooted in the work of philosophers going as far back as the time of ancient Greece. For this reason, he begins his 1927 work, the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, with a discussion of the origin of the idea of science rooted in the work of Plato as impulse to his own investigations. “In a new sense, science arises first from the Platonic grounding of logic, as a place for the research of the essential demands of ‘genuine’ knowledge and ‘genuine’ science and therewith the emergence of norms in accordance with science aiming consciously at the universal justifiableness of norm, one where its method and theory can be formed in a warranted manner.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, for Husserl, to deny history would be absurd. Science has its roots in this Platonic grounding of logic; and transcendental phenomenology, he believes, has its place in the (intentional) history of this science.

Though Husserl was a man who placed enormous demands upon himself *qua* philosopher, he in no way denied the philosophical tradition in which he worked. Just as one does not deny “reality” with the performance of the phenomenological *ἐποχή*, one does not deny the tradition of science by this method either. We need this tradition! As he says, “we find the seed of transcendental philosophy historically in Descartes.”<sup>25</sup> To construct science anew—as Husserl demands one must do in his *Cartesian Meditations*—is precisely to allow the spirit of Descartes’ inquiries—or Plato’s, for that



matter—in the whole richness and force of their living motivations to act as impulse to a genuinely philosophical standpoint. The factual composition of these philosophies only speak to our personal responsibility to bring to actuality the striving for the supra-temporal truths which motivate these inquiries.

Though *de facto*, as science must ultimately see, it does not attain actualization of a system of “absolute” truths and is required to modify its truths again and again, it nevertheless follows precisely the idea of absolute or scientifically genuine truth and lives within this idea accordingly in the infinite horizon of approximations tending, tending toward this idea.<sup>26</sup>

Seen in this way, Husserl’s “philosophy of solipsism” pretends not that the world is but a shadow of one’s own being. Rather it suggests an imperative: the imperative to see for oneself and to construct a system of knowledge expressed in propositions established ultimately on authentic (i.e., less and less inauthentic) manners of apprehension.

Husserl was a man of such intense concentration on the working out a transcendental phenomenology that he seemed at times almost incapable of extricating himself from his own research. His publication history, for instance, when compared against the total output he produced over his lifetime, attests to the fact that he found it difficult to find proper expression for his insights. Further, the very notion of a philosophical epoché, which urges “in respect to doctrinal content [that] we abstain completely from any judgment of every pre-given philosophy and achieve our demonstrations in the boundaries of this abstention,”<sup>27</sup> sounds on the face of it almost troglodytic. Yet Husserl was a man deeply engaged not merely with the substance of his tradition but also with philosophers of his time. The so-called monological Husserl left a voluminous *Briefwechsel*<sup>28</sup> or set of collected letters which evinces this engagement. Ironically, given Husserl’s publication history, this repository stands as one of the best, if not the best, source by which to follow the inner development of his investigations. Here we find not a solitary thinker but a man of wit and wisdom sincerely at work with (and against) his contemporaries in an effort to make himself and his philosophy comprehensible. It is to these materials, then, that we now turn in order to understand Husserl’s philosophy. Not only did Husserl document his own vision of phenomenology in them, often in contradistinction to the position of his correspondent, he also examines very many of the pressing problems raging in contemporary German philosophy in his many detailed responses to colleagues, students, friends, and family members. “These documents evince the individual as an intersection of effective productivities which he both exerts and experiences.”<sup>29</sup> One discovers in them a unique picture of the man unobtainable in his scientific writings. Where in his scientific writings Husserl sought quite consciously to eradicate any

expression of his own individuality, one finds in his correspondence the picture of a full bodied man grappling to fructify his vision, to address the deficiencies of its expression and to confront the developing cultural crisis in his land. And one encounters a determined man expressing himself in ways not found in his published writings, pointing to areas of development in his philosophy he never made accessible to the public. So our concern now shifts to this treasury of materials.

What shows itself in these letters is Husserl's growing discomfiture with the reception of his philosophy as he grew older which spurred his urgency to articulate a comprehensive presentation of the transcendental phenomenological problematic. In his letters we find the suggestion, in other words, of a systematic comprehension of the transcendental problematic which remained inadequately addressed in his published writings.

## HIS CORRESPONDENCE

The ten volume collection of Husserl's *Briefwechsel* or extent letters ranges over almost fifty years and is nearly exhaustive in scope. This is a truly enormous resource for the scholar of Husserl and so poses special difficulties. Its very breadth demands a special study—as of yet unrealized in the secondary literature. Do we not find ourselves, then, sinking beyond our depth simply by entering into this variegated collection of letters? We do not believe so. If we limit ourselves to uncovering a thread that leads us through the maze of Husserl's research in his letters, then we can safely answer no to this question. We do not enter into his correspondence, in other words, to survey its vast breadth. Rather we delve into it to discern within it a number of interconnected letters whose subject-matter concerns the special distinctiveness of Husserl's philosophy as a whole.

If the letters are to provide an authoritative portrayal of Husserl's views over time, they should span a sufficient number of years. Looking at but a single year or set period in Husserl's development would be too restrictive. This kind of chronological constraint may work if one seeks only to clarify the development of a particular problematic at some point in a career. For our purposes, though, the ill effects of such a move would be all too apparent. Not only would it run counter to our declared aim, i.e., to uncover Husserl's own views regarding the nature of his philosophy as a whole, but also it would likely present a skewed portrayal of his philosophy by couching its point of reference to a single frame in his development as a thinker. The letters should thus span a good portion of Husserl's career. They ought additionally to be connected in some way together. Rather than jumping from problem to problem, the letters should—when taken together—revolve in their essential thrust around a single motif—even if the articulation of this is presented as a contrast to something else. Furthermore, Husserl's interlocutors—as there may be more than one—should

bear a strong philosophical kinship among themselves in order to maintain consistency among the letters. As we have said, our aim as we delve into his letters is intensive focus, not exhaustiveness. Perhaps we shall discover in our examination that Husserl, like “every original thinker [*Selbstdenker*] must properly change his name after every decade since he himself has changed.”<sup>30</sup> Perhaps, also, we shall discover that in this fluctuation there is an unchanging impulse shaping Husserl’s investigative path.

## HUSSERL’S CONFRONTATION WITH WILHELM DILTHEY AND GEORG MISCH

There is a set of letters—in reality, two sets—which have the brevity, richness and range we seek. These are letters, first, between Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey, the famous philosopher of the human sciences. All of these were written in 1911. Second are the letters between Husserl and Dilthey’s student, Georg Misch, written almost twenty years later. Although separated by many years, the two exchanges stand well together with the following caveat. The Misch-Husserl correspondence can be subdivided into three distinct groups: (i) two letters by Misch written in the late teens and early twenties, (ii) a collection of six important letters from 1929 and 1930—all written by Husserl except one, and (iii) one very brief letter to Misch written in 1937.<sup>31</sup> The two earliest letters are of but parochial interest.<sup>32</sup> However, the seven later letters reflect a genuine *Auseinandersetzung* or confrontation and mutual acknowledgment between Husserl and the school of Dilthey. As such, these seven letters bear direct thematic relation to Husserl’s earlier letters to Dilthey.

In Husserl’s later letters to Georg Misch, he and Misch explicitly frame much of their discussion in reference to Husserl’s earlier letters to Dilthey. To make clear the context of these later letters, we will, then, begin with a sketch of the earlier exchange between Husserl and Dilthey. As we then compare the later to the earlier, we will see Husserl reflects on the development of his philosophy in a way impossible in the earlier. Indeed, in his later letters to Misch he explicitly identifies an impulse—originating with Dilthey—which has worked its way through all his major methodological developments through the years.

You do not know that the few discussions with Dilthey in Berlin of 1905 (not his writings) signified an impulse that runs from the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* to the Husserl of *Ideas*. The phenomenology of the *Ideas*, which was incompletely expressed <as published in 1913> and only properly perfected from 1913 to sometime around 1925 has led, by a differently formed method, to a most close community with Dilthey. That must become somehow cleared up. I don’t yet know where and how.”<sup>33</sup>

As we can see here, the encounter of which Husserl speaks above is not the exchange that took place in letters between the two men during the summer of 1911. The 1911 letters must therefore be understood in the context of this earlier encounter between the two men. Yet Husserl's identification of an impulse in his philosophy going back to 1905 allows us to understand why the confrontation of 1911 resonated so deeply with him. Husserl's admission here, in other words, makes it clear why the two sets of letters, i.e., the letters between himself and Dilthey, on the one hand, and Misch, on the other, are so intimately connected. One can only understand the import of the later letters to Misch by reference to the earlier exchange with Dilthey, and the significance of this earlier exchange is in turn ultimately made clear by the role Husserl assigns it in the later letters to Misch. For the significance of the earlier exchange had only been worked through and understood by Husserl later.

### *The Letters to Dilthey*

The Dilthey-Husserl exchange is well known, and its place within Husserl's development as a thinker has long been established. In editorial remarks preceding the letters, Walter Biemel explains that they have importance "not so much as a personal exchange of views, but rather as a discussion between both thinkers, in which their respective conceptions of the essence of philosophy come to light."<sup>34</sup> This assessment is equally true of the Misch-Husserl correspondence. For in these later letters Husserl takes great pains to reiterate his conception of the essence of philosophy along lines consistent with the views he put forward in the earlier dialogue.

The letters between Dilthey and Husserl revolve around criticisms which Husserl articulates in his *Logos* essay of 1910, "Philosophy as rigorous science." In this essay, Husserl appears to disparage Dilthey as an exponent of historical relativism and casts his philosophy as a representative of historicizing world-view philosophies generally.

Dilthey . . . likewise rejects skepticism of historicism, but I do not understand how he believes to have won decisive grounds against skepticism from his very instructive analysis of the structure and typology of world-views. For as we have detailed in the text above, an empirical human science can argue neither *for* nor *against* something that asserts a claim to objective validity. The matter differs—and this seem to move immanently in his thinking—when the empirical attitude, which aims at empirical understanding is confused for the phenomenological essential attitude.<sup>35</sup>

After publication of the *Logos* essay, Dilthey wrote to Husserl in order to defend himself against what he deemed an inadequately considered critique of his philosophy. This letter initiated the exchange between the two men.

The extant exchange consists of three letters total: Dilthey's first letter, Husserl's reply, and a follow up by Dilthey. The correspondence unfortunately ended between the two men with Dilthey's death in 1911, not long after he penned his last letter to Husserl.

Dilthey, for his part, argues that Husserl has missed the central meaning of his work in his *Logos* essay. "I am not without some guilt in this misunderstanding,"<sup>36</sup> he explains. For the work cited by Husserl, i.e., the "The Types of World-View and their Formation in Metaphysical Systems,"<sup>37</sup> had originally been a larger work, but considerations of space compelled him to publish only the first half. Hence it appears in the article that his views as published represent the whole of his thinking on the subject, which is not the case. He then refers Husserl to another published work, "The Essence of Philosophy,"<sup>38</sup> which would clear up the confusions regarding his thinking in this matter. "From this treatise it becomes wholly clear that my standpoint does not lead to skepticism and excludes your interpretation of my sentences."<sup>39</sup> Although his method is historical, Dilthey held that the analysis and formal articulation of historically determined world-views has its place in the systematic effort to establish a vital but universally valid theory of knowledge. "So you see, we are actually not so far apart from each other,"<sup>40</sup> he urges. Dilthey aims in his "Types of World-Views" essay to disclose the living ground of fundamentally different philosophical world-views that have developed historically. In this effort, he seeks also to show that it remains impossible to construct a purely logical picture of the world's coherency. However, the conflicts between philosophical world-views articulated in this sort of typology do not thereby deny the very possibility of metaphysics as such. "The conflict of systems and the hitherto existing failure of metaphysics occur <in The Types of World-View> as historical facts which have led philosophical thinking to the dissolution of metaphysics but does not serve as the basis of their impossibility."<sup>41</sup> The proof for this must be sought instead in the nature of metaphysics itself, he argues.

I, of course, certainly believe that, in the context of the foundation of my philosophical thinking which is represented in <my writings>, the method which makes use of the historical analysis of world-view, of religion, art, metaphysics, the development of human spirit, and so on, shows the impossibility of such concepts and <it> can solve the question of the truth-content of world-view philosophy.<sup>42</sup>

The two men, in other words, share an important goal of establishing a "universally valid science which should produce a secure grounding to the human sciences" and they both agree that "when viewed quite generally, there is a universally valid theory of knowledge."<sup>43</sup> It appears, then, that their disagreement centers on the possibility of metaphysics.

Yet Husserl eventually agrees with the main thrust of Dilthey's arguments. "Naturally," he says near the end of the letter, "the impossibility of a metaphysics—namely in that false, ontological sense in particular—can only be illustrated by such "analyses pertaining to the human sciences."<sup>44</sup> But Husserl's assurance does nothing to resolve the central debate between them in Dilthey's view. "Our difference as I have indicated in my previous letter may remain in place until I obtain from you new publications, which I only hope will not come too late for me."<sup>45</sup> Unfortunately, such supplemental writings never arrived, as Dilthey died only months after writing his last letter to Husserl.

His student, Georg Misch, however, takes up the central disagreement between the two men in his letter of August 9, 1929. The problem, he urges Husserl to consider, is less the question of the possibility of metaphysics than the eidetics of Husserl's phenomenological method.

Surely you are correct: that against which Dilthey struggled as metaphysics is not the same as what you recognize as metaphysics.<sup>46</sup> This is an easily resolvable equivocation. But then the difference, which Dilthey pointed out near the end of the first letter (p. 4 in the copy) and also again in the second—is obviously meant in the sense as <the criticism> in his handwritten note to your *Logos*-essay concerning the Platonic turn. And here arises yet again a principle difficulty regardless of the particularities of explanations in your response, i.e., the sense in which apriorism ought and must be grasped thanks to your new phenomenological ground laying, how the constitutional analysis of the "conditions of possibility" are to be squared with the supplementation [*Nachträglichkeit*] of the idea seen hermeneutically. Yes, these are difficult questions.<sup>47</sup>

What is this "Platonic turn" to which Misch is referring here? Obviously, it is an opinion by Dilthey of Husserl, but it does not seem to have been one publicly admitted by Dilthey. The first citation of this expression that we can find occurs in the editorial introduction to volume five of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*, which Misch authored. Discussing the development of historical consciousness in Dilthey, Misch identifies the influence of two competing sources in Dilthey's thinking, i.e., the tension between a transcendentalist essentialism whose origin is traceable to Plato's thought and the "confrontation with the Christian-religious form of transcendence in which the knowledge of the historicity of life was awakened."<sup>48</sup> Dilthey's struggles in his writings to give articulation of the structure of life compelled him, Misch explains, to fight against a transcendentalism which identifies the structure of life as the underlying conditioning ground of life, itself. And here in his editorial introduction, Misch inserts the handwritten criticism—though it is not made clear that in this context it is meant

to be directed against Husserl. "Genuine Plato! who first moored fast the flowing-becoming things in the concept and then posited after the fact the concept of flowing."<sup>49</sup>

This is an ancient opposition, as Otto Friedrich Bollnow suggests, reaching as far back as the opposition between Heraclitus and Parmenides.<sup>50</sup> The charge of Platonism by Dilthey here could even be, in other words, "Genuine Parmenides!" rather than Plato.<sup>51</sup> In essence, Husserl denies life, Misch suggests (for Dilthey), in favor of the non-living concept. However, Dilthey never published his remark, and Misch resurrects it here in his letter likely knowing that Husserl would be aware of the reference.<sup>52</sup> Only now the true object of the charge is made clear.<sup>53</sup>

While it remains unclear if Dilthey considered Husserl's phenomenology a metaphysics in the traditional sense, he did feel that Husserl's "descriptive psychology" exemplified a specious logicism—if Misch's critique is an authentic portrayal. Indeed, Husserl's eidetic phenomenological "psychology," at least as it was expressed in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*, might be construed in such a manner. But we must be cautious here, for the question has to be understood in a historical context relevant to Dilthey, which it is all too often not. That is to say, we should seek to avoid adducing more to Dilthey's understanding of Husserl's philosophy than was really possible. To this end, we shall turn again to the letters between the two men while remaining cognizant of the express character of Husserl's phenomenology available to Dilthey at that time.

In his editorial comments to the Dilthey correspondence, Walter Biemel is indeed correct to assert that both men sought to articulate their respective conceptions of the essence of philosophy in their letters together. Much of Husserl's reply to Dilthey focuses, then, on explaining the intent of his *Logos* essay in this context. First, he reiterates the fundamental role of pure phenomenology in the system of sciences. Phenomenology is not one science among others, he argues. It is rather the one science in which every particular science finds clarification. "All natural knowledge of actual being <*Daseinserkenntnis*> . . . leaves open a dimension of problems on whose solution depends the ultimate definitive determination of the sense of being and the final evaluation of truth that has been already presumably acquired in the "natural" (1<sup>st</sup>) attitude."<sup>54</sup> With its investigation into the constitution of being in intentional consciousness, phenomenology offers the means to provide this ultimate clarification of the roots of all knowledge, i.e., of nature and "natural" spirit.

Given that the subject of phenomenology is intentional "consciousness," Husserl remains adamant that pure phenomenology is unlike any empirical science. It is neither a psycho-physics nor a psychology in the usual sense, for its subject matter is neither any factual process nor any factual ego. Intentional consciousness investigated by phenomenology is rather the essential structures of consciousness as it intends an objectivity. Here, however, we must pause to point out two things. First, Husserl does not assert this last point clearly in his letter to Dilthey. He only mentions



consciousness twice in the entire extant letter, and in these instances he merely frames his discussion of consciousness in terms of its constituting function. His most robust discussion in his letter concerns the great task of a phenomenological theory of nature.

It is the task of a phenomenological theory of nature to submit nature-constituting consciousness to an investigation of essence with regard to all of its forms and correlations. In this <investigation>, all principles under which being—in the sense of nature—stands apriori are brought to ultimate clarity and all problems, which in this sphere concern the correlations of being and consciousness, can find their resolution.<sup>55</sup>

Husserl obviously conceives intentional consciousness as “sense-constituting consciousness” in this passage. And just as obviously he characterizes phenomenology as a science of essences here. To this extent, his statements in the Dilthey letter stand in agreement with the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. His manner of expression, in other words, does not suggest that he conceives the ego at issue in these investigations to be a transcendental ego. Although Husserl's position on the transcendental ego is well known today, we must bear in mind that Dilthey would have been unaware of this development. Husserl's transcendentalism only became explicit with the publication of *Ideas I*, a work published after Dilthey's death. And Dilthey would not have recognized Husserl's transcendentalism from any of the writings Husserl published to that point, most especially the *Logos* essay. Husserl, himself, admits that the phenomenological reduction is neither mentioned nor put to use in this essay.<sup>56</sup> Lastly, given that Husserl only began to develop his ideas regarding a transcendental ego after 1905, Dilthey could not have been apprised of these developments during their personal conversations.

We know from Dilthey's published writings and unpublished manuscripts that he had studied Husserl's *Logical Investigations* with greater intensity than perhaps any non-phenomenologist at the time. Nevertheless, he only ever saw the first edition of this work. Between 1901, the publication date of the *Logical Investigations*, and 1911, the year of their correspondence, Husserl published very little and virtually nothing which would have suggested a new orientation in his thinking. These works include minor logical studies and the *Logos* essay. Yet between these years, he introduced some of the most important innovations of method into his phenomenology, most particularly the phenomenological reduction. Although there is some evidence to suggest that Dilthey knew Husserl no longer thought of phenomenology as “descriptive psychology,”<sup>57</sup> it is highly unlikely that he ever became aware of the methodological development of the reduction, let alone, the “transcendental” turn in Husserl's thinking. At the time of the *Logos* article, Dilthey would easily have believed that the intentional consciousness at issue in phenomenology was an empirical consciousness



considered eidetically. Even these words from the *Logos* essay would not have shaken greatly this belief.

As long as it is pure and above all makes no use of the existential positing of nature, pure phenomenology as science can *only* be an inquiry into essence and by no means an inquiry into existence <*Daseinsforschung*>. Every “self-observation” and every judgment based on such “experience” lies beyond its scope. The individual in its immanence can be posited and at best subsumed under the rigorous eidetic concepts that arise from eidetic analyses only as a This-here!—this onward flowing perception, memory, etc. For while the individual *is* not essence, it does “*have*” an essence that can be asserted of it holding evidently.<sup>58</sup>

Every statement by Husserl during these early years made it plain that he thought of phenomenology—as an eidetic science—in close affinity with mathematics. As such, it remains absolutely distinct from any science of factual matters. The conceptual content of its theoretical statements finds confirmation not in any worldly example or in any worldly process but in the intuition of the essential sense-constituting structures of pure consciousness. Hence its truths are relative not to any epoch or point of view which anchors a particular ego but instead have universal validity for all times and settings for *any consciousness whatsoever*. It is no wonder, then, that Dilthey would have thought Husserl a modern Plato.

It is essential to the proper understanding of Dilthey's relation to Husserl that one bear in mind the fact that Husserl never proffers the explicit statement of his transcendentalism in the *Logos* essay. In §33 of *Ideas* I, Husserl indeed articulates a distinction between, on the one hand, the eidetic analysis of consciousness, which by its focus on the essence of *any consciousness whatsoever* delimits the pure field of consciousness as a “a fundamentally unique region of being which can in actuality become the field of a new science—phenomenology,”<sup>59</sup> and, on the other, the phenomenological *ἐποχή*. The *ἐποχή* and reduction remain unexpressed in the *Logos* essay. In that essay, Husserl restricts himself to an explanation of the eidetic analysis of consciousness which makes clear the “limited” field of phenomenological inquiry. His aim, at least in the first “psychological” part, is to show that phenomenology is neither a psycho-physics nor a psychology in the usual sense. In many respects, therefore, the *Logos* essay represents Husserl's first widely disseminated rejection of the phrase “descriptive psychology” as a title appropriate to phenomenology. He limits himself, therefore, to arguing for the necessity of a phenomenological grounding of any empirical study of the consciousness, for “all psychological knowledge in the ordinary sense *presupposes* the knowledge of the essence of the psychical.”<sup>60</sup>

This strikes a marked contrast to the attitude taken up in *Ideas*. In this text, a central aim is to make clear the specifically non-natural attitude at work in every phenomenological investigation.

So long as the possibility of the phenomenological attitude is not recognized and the method not formed which brings to originary acquisition the corresponding objectivities within that attitude, then the phenomenological world must remain an unknown, indeed, hardly suspected world.<sup>61</sup>

It is precisely this distinction that remains absent in the *Logos* essay. The *Logos* essay remains fixed on the level of an eidetic reduction or eidetic analysis of consciousness leaving aside any mention of transcendental consciousness. Since this distinction between the eidetic and phenomenological *qua* transcendental remains absent in the *Logos* article, the transcendental phenomenological attitude thus remains at best only a vague ideal there. In reality, the *Logos* article would have been the sole means by which Dilthey could have become aware of this distinction. Since there is no indication of it there, Dilthey would likely have understood phenomenology as an essentialist "psychology"—which is indeed how he suggests he understands it in his published writings and unpublished manuscripts. Though it may be that after 1903 Husserl may have only grudgingly accepted that phenomenology is a psychology of a most unusual sort, there is nothing in what he published during Dilthey's life for the latter to believe it to be a *transcendental* science.

This is an important point because it is Husserl's eidetics that Dilthey rejects. Where Husserl's phenomenology falters is not to be found in his descriptive psychology *per se*. Dilthey, rather, believes that Husserl remains philosophically tone deaf to history. This is not say that he takes no cognizance whatsoever of history in his writings. Obviously, he does; and there are many important remarks to be found in the *Logos* essay on this subject. But, in Dilthey's eyes, Husserl simply lacks a genuine understanding of the historical development of European thinking. Husserl does not see, in other words, that his attempt to construct a new theoretical science, a science of essences, is a doomed striving. This effort at formulating universally valid cognitions, Dilthey argues, must be grounded in the historical awareness of the living subject, that is, in the living striving for values and goals inherent to the setting in which such a theoretical effort begins. The hallmark of metaphysics is its detachment from the roots of purposiveness which guides science in its historical development, Dilthey holds. Thus metaphysics offers only a logical picture of the world's coherency which is represented as valid for all time. "But what is given in the totality of our nature can never be wholly resolved in thought."<sup>62</sup> He thus criticizes Husserl in the letter of June 29, 1911 precisely on the metaphysical aims of his philosophy.

We are in agreement that, when viewed quite generally, there is a universally valid theory of knowledge. We also agree that the way into this is opened up only by investigations which make clear the sense of the terms which theory at first requires and are necessary for the

furtherance of all areas of philosophy. Our ways part in the further formation of philosophy. It appears to me that metaphysics is impossible which undertakes to express in a valid way the contextual connection of the world <Weltzusammenhang> by a contextual connection of concepts.<sup>63</sup>

For Dilthey, then, pure phenomenology does indeed represent a sort of metaphysics and hence a regress to a theoretical effort that has played itself out in European thinking.

It is no wonder, then, that Husserl felt the need to reiterate and defend his new science against Dilthey's attacks upon his eidetic methodology. Yet the important issue Husserl presses in his letter is not merely the importance of phenomenology as a science of essences aiming thus to ground every inquiry into actual being. It was also his intent to illustrate that this aim follows in essential agreement with Dilthey's philosophical project, even if the two philosophical projects proceed upon a different ground and so express a different conception of metaphysical knowledge.

Every science of actual being <Daseinswissenschaft>, e.g., the science of physical nature, of human spirit, and so on, changes of itself *eo ipso* into "metaphysics" (according to my concept), insofar as it is related to the phenomenological [constitutive] doctrine of essences and experiences from its sources a final clarification of sense and thus a final determination of its truth content.<sup>64</sup>

According to Husserl, the truth which every factual science expresses is, itself, understandable within or as a "constituent of 'metaphysical' truth, and its knowledge is metaphysical knowledge, namely knowledge of actual being <Daseinserkenntnis>."<sup>65</sup>

In later letters to Misch, Husserl would take up this same theme and seek to defend his philosophy to Dilthey's student and son-in-law by anchoring it within the framework of Dilthey's own philosophical project. "In spite of the oversimplifying *Logos* article,<sup>66</sup> which should be thought as "popular!," I conceived phenomenology *as radical and universal "human science,"* incomparably more radical than Dilthey—more radical through the phenomenological reduction (first presented explicitly in lectures of 1907<sup>67</sup>).<sup>68</sup> This is admittedly a novel conception of phenomenology. Yet however novel this might sound, it is—at least according to Husserl—not new to his thinking. For Husserl, this view of phenomenology as radical and universal human science is a consistently held conception ranging over almost the full frame of his development as a thinker. True, this is a mature articulation of phenomenology, but it is a view also made by a much younger Husserl in his letter of July 5/6, 1911 to Dilthey. "After all, don't we really mean the same thing in all this," he writes in conclusion. "When you speak of an analysis that pertains to the human sciences (an analysis by which you might lead

up to the proof the impossibility of metaphysics), this coincides, to a great extent, with what I consider—limited and formed only by certain methodological viewpoints—to be phenomenological analysis.”<sup>69</sup>

The question immediately arises, however: why would Husserl think that phenomenology and Dilthey's critique of historical reason were really so similar? Surprisingly, the answer may have as much to do with the development of the phenomenological method of reduction as it does with Husserl's understanding of Dilthey's work. By his own admission, Husserl first presented the method of reduction explicitly in his 1907 lectures, *The Idea of Phenomenology*.<sup>70</sup> Yet we know from his notes that he, in fact, developed the concept and its proper application two years earlier. This dating corresponds quite closely with his first encounter with Dilthey in March, 1905.<sup>71</sup> Certainly, the time at which he met Dilthey was pivotal in the development of transcendental phenomenology. We need only recall his letter to Misch of 1929 to remind us of this. “You do not know that the few discussions with Dilthey in Berlin of 1905 (not his writings) signified an impulse that runs from the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* to the Husserl of ‘Ideas.’”<sup>72</sup> If we are to take him at his word, then his meeting with Dilthey had the effect of a spur, if not *the* spur, toward the first conceptualization of transcendental phenomenological method by Husserl. If true, the irony here is palpable. For, as we saw, Dilthey died unaware of this development in Husserl's thinking.

### *The Letters to Misch*

Although the exchange of letters between Dilthey and Husserl is quite brief, as one reads their letters it is apparent that each man responds to the other genuinely and with great attention to detail. In the Misch-Husserl exchange of 1929 and 1930, the exchange of letters is significantly larger—even if there appears far less discussion in these later letters. Husserl wrote all but one of the six extant letters of the exchange. However, this is not so much a deficiency inherent in this later exchange as it is a reflection of the sorts of letters that have survived between the two men. In many of his letters, Husserl seeks to defend transcendental phenomenology against its critique presented in a three-part series of essays by Misch entitled “*Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*” or “*Life-philosophy and phenomenology*.” All of these essays were published in the *Philosophischer Anzeiger* between 1929 and 1930, and Misch eventually published the entire work as a single monograph in 1930.<sup>73</sup> The debate within the later letters between Husserl and Misch occurs, then, in the context of Misch's influential work (hereafter *Life-philosophy*), and the most important of Husserl's letters parallel the publication history of this work in the *Philosophischer Anzeiger*.

There is, however, a decisive difference between the Dilthey and the Misch letters to Husserl which highlights the importance of this later exchange. With Misch, Husserl expressly reflects back on his philosophy

and discusses his development from a position of philosophical maturity. This was an impossibility for the Husserl of 1911, since his philosophy was still very much taking shape at that time. So when examining the two sets of letters together, we find in them, therefore, not merely an *Auseinandersetzung* between Husserl and the school of Dilthey but also and, more importantly, a confrontation between Husserl, the elder, coming to terms with Husserl, the younger.

Most of the letters between Husserl and Misch from the twenties and thirties are philosophical in tone. All contain the customary niceties one would expect to find between two German academic mandarins at this time. Some also divert to the topic of Misch's ongoing efforts to publish Wilhelm Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*, especially volume VIII on "the doctrine of world-intuition (or worldview philosophy) and essays on the philosophy of philosophy."<sup>74</sup> But, as we have said, the bulk of the correspondence from this period revolves around the three installments of Misch's *Life-philosophy* and Husserl's reactions thereto.

When Misch published the first installment of his *Life-philosophy*, he sent Husserl a special reprint copy of the work dedicated to the elder philosopher. Ostensibly, this first installment represents an *Auseinandersetzung* or confrontation between Heidegger and Dilthey, but as Husserl notes in his letter of June 27<sup>th</sup>, 1929 the "confrontation with Heidegger, or rather the Dilthey—Heidegger confrontation concerns me also, <and> as much implies the necessary confrontation with Dilthey—Husserl."<sup>75</sup> Within the first third of the work, then, the stage is set between the two men. Husserl recognizes that the work actually offers a critique of his own transcendental phenomenology, and he further sees that Misch sides with Heidegger in a comparative critique of the two phenomenologies. In his letters, Husserl thus reacts with this orientation in mind. Yet he still believes—more strongly now, or even more strongly than during the years Dilthey was alive—that transcendental phenomenology "fits together and belongs together"<sup>76</sup> with Dilthey's philosophy.

Husserl's first letter after the publication of Misch's *Life-philosophy* concerns a number of topics, not just merely his relation to Dilthey's philosophy. He takes pains to note the writings on which he is presently working. He indicates to Misch, for instance, that his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is just coming to completion. Also, having recently completed his "Paris Lectures," he informs Misch that he is revising these for publication in a French translation to be known as the *Cartesian Mediations*.<sup>77</sup> For by the time Misch published the first installment of *Life-philosophy*, these works had yet to be published. Given that the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* came out during the time Misch was publishing his later installments, it remains questionable to what degree these later writings affected Misch's understanding of Husserl's philosophy, though we know that Misch makes note of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in the forward to the 1930s printing of the monograph.<sup>78</sup> Husserl, in this

letter to Misch of June 27, 1929, expresses a keen desire to continue with a number of new projects, all of which weigh heavily on him. "At 70 years of age," he writes, "in the same 'helpless situation' (Groethuyesen's expression) as the Dilthey of old amidst the mountains of manuscripts, one can 'have no time'."<sup>79</sup> Yet he remains vague what these projects might be other than those already mentioned. Finally, he concludes with the rather remarkable admission of the impulse running through his thinking from the time of his first meeting with Dilthey up to the present. After this, the letter then ends rather abruptly. In this letter, Husserl clearly does not respond to Misch's criticisms in any great detail. The tone of the letter makes clear, however, that Misch's *Life-philosophy* has affected him deeply.

Before examining this influence in more detail, we might turn to the very last letter to Misch written in 1937. Only a few lines long, its import far outshines its brevity. Written almost a year to the day before Husserl's death, the note is highly suggestive and bears repeating in full here.

Your objections are wonderful. My thinking and my analytically directed work have revolved around these central questions *for decades*. I believe to be able to satisfy you still. This is to follow in further articles by the actual carrying out of that which has been pre-delineated in the first article of the overture. I am for this reason quite pleased with your letter. Were I already so clear in 1905<sup>80</sup> over the sense of my method as I am in my old age, the unforgettable Dilthey would have seen that the ultimate fulfillment of his intentions lay in *this* transcendental idealism. But I still needed endless work to become clear in myself over all that which I had begun.<sup>81</sup>

Clearly, Husserl is responding here to something, some letter or reprint, which Misch sent to Husserl which lays out a set of objections to Husserl's "Crisis" essay (published in 1936).<sup>82</sup> Unfortunately, no copy of these objections has survived, and Husserl does not detail them here. If Misch's objections do in fact concern Husserl's "Crisis" essay, as is likely, they presumably dealt in some way with the novel "sort of clarification of history" at work in the "Crisis."<sup>83</sup> Whatever Misch objections were, Husserl felt sure he could accommodate all these problems in future publications. Indeed, the "Crisis" essay of 1936 was but the first two parts of a much larger planned work. Husserl placed great hope that this extended set of writings would finally and unequivocally underscore the vitality of transcendental philosophy within the contemporary philosophical scene. In many respects, then, this brief letter encapsulates the content and tenor of all the earlier five letters by Husserl to Misch. Once again, he likens his work to Dilthey's and expresses, as before, the view that his philosophy represents a genuine working out of Dilthey's earlier philosophy of life. If only, he opines, there were enough time to make this clear.

What happened, though, to strike such a chord of insecurity in Husserl during this last decade of his life? In 1927, Martin Heidegger published his groundbreaking work, *Being and Time*, and the work became an instant classic. The meteoric rise of Heidegger's prominence within Germany meant, however, Husserl's own declining philosophical status—a decline he became very much aware of. Furthermore, the last several years of Husserl's life were punctuated with the rise of National Socialism in Germany. And so in the last years of his life, he was dogged by the derogatory attitudes and policies of the Nazis. Husserl, one must recall, was a Jew by birth, though he converted to Christianity many years earlier. Non-Aryan philosophies generally and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in particular came under increasing threat by the Nazi authorities. With the rise of the life- and existentialist philosophies in his last years and the frenzy of daemonic anti-Semitic German nationalism, Husserl came to see a crisis occurring not merely in his homeland but also within scientific culture generally.

In the "Crisis" writings, Husserl sought to address directly the philosophical crisis he saw developing. He also hoped to redress the criticisms of his philosophy as anti-historical and devoid of a sense of life. To do this he presented a new—or at least as it appeared to the public at large, a new—method of phenomenologizing. This method took the form of a regressive historical investigation of sense-establishments. He saw this effort as something of a therapeutic effort by which to make clear the living aims of scientific activity. The themes of the new "Crisis" writings were not in this respect essentially dissimilar from his earlier statements about the living motivations at work in scientific inquiry which he expressed in his *Logos* essay. By clarifying the structure of these original sources of scientific pursuit, the philosopher could function as a cultural leader, Husserl argued. He could thus act to counter the present crisis of irrationality spreading through Europe and, most markedly, in German life- and existentialist philosophies coming to dominance at that time.

To Misch, this historical method of regressive sense-investigation—which Husserl explicitly linked to Dilthey's method of philosophizing—may well have seemed a revolution in Husserl's philosophy, if not a rejection of all his earlier philosophical writings. Indeed, with the exception of the 1910 *Logos* essay, the topic of history, let alone any discussion of a method that could be described as historical, remained absent in Husserl's published work. Husserl, in fact, rejected outright the factual study of history as the basis of any sort of scientific inquiry in the *Logos* article. Yet his method in these last writings has precisely this character of historical reflection and so seemingly represents a radically different methodological approach than that taken earlier. "We are attempting," he says in §15 of the *Crisis* essay, "to understand and bring out <herauszuverstehen> the unity perduring in all the historical positing of goals amidst the conflict and concurrence of their metamorphoses."<sup>84</sup>



Indeed, the innovation at work in “Crisis” writings constitutes more than merely a shift to a historical style of reflection. Where the principal theme of Husserl’s “Cartesian” writings, such as *Ideas I*, centers on the *ego cogito*, the starting point of these last phenomenological reflections is the world, i.e., the world underlying every living interest and project that man takes up. This is especially clear in §43 of the *Crisis*, a text which it should be noted that was not published with the original materials in 1936, called “The Characteristic of a New Way to the Reduction as Opposed to the “Cartesian” Way.” The piece highlights the novelty of Husserl’s approach in these writings as well as its advantage over the earlier taken path.

Thus we consequently make the world thematic now as the basis of all our interests and life projects under which the theoretical interests of the objective sciences form only a particular group. . . . I note additionally that the much shorter way to the transcendental reduction in my *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy*, which I call the “Cartesian” way (namely as is thought to have been achieved by mere reflective absorption in the Cartesian epoché of the “Meditations” and critical purification of the prejudices and errors at work in Descartes’ thinking) has a great handicap. It proceeds as if one could arrive in one leap at the transcendental ego.<sup>85</sup>

To be sure, the “Crisis” essay seems quite alien to any of his earlier presentations of phenomenological method. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that he now simply rejects his earlier methodological articulations of the reduction. Rather, looking at his notes and letters from this period, it is clear that Husserl sees the entire “Crisis” project as a culmination of long, depth probing investigations going back decades. This is, in fact, confirmed in an unpublished manuscript Husserl wrote close to time of his last letter to Misch. Here he criticizes his earlier Cartesianism while never entirely rejecting its efficacy. It seems that in his Cartesian works, Husserl felt it necessary to put to one side difficult questions about the temporal and historic fluidity of the life world in order to make as clear as possible the proper methodological nature of the phenomenological reduction. “Fortunately we can leave out of play,” Husserl writes in §81 of *Ideas*, “the riddle of time-consciousness in our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor.”<sup>86</sup> Now in his later years, he explicitly criticizes the abstraction from this fundamental ground spring. Though he remained convinced of the essential validity of the “Cartesian” way of phenomenologizing throughout his life, he came to recognize it remained limited and provisional in character.

This world [of the natural attitude], the everyday self-understood existing (*seiende*) world, long-familiar in its universal form and in its typicality, which has become familiar to us out of our very life was



delineated in the *Ideas* only in the rawest characteristics—although it was expressly stressed therein that the task of a systematic analysis and description of this world of *Heraclitean* flux [*Heraklitisch-beweglichen Welt*] is a great and serious problem. It is true that I was already engaged with this problem for years before [the *Ideas*], but I was still not far enough along to penetrate it in its universality. We will see that this life-world (omni-temporally taken) is nothing other than the historical world. One can notice that from this introduction [i.e., the *Ideas*] a complete systematic introduction which introduces phenomenology begins as a universal historical problem and is as such to be executed. If one introduces the epoché without the historical [*geschichtliche*] thematic, then the problem of the life-world, or rather, the problem of universal history [*Geschichte*] follows along after the fact. The introduction of the *Ideas* certainly retains its correctness, but I now hold the historical way to be more fundamental and more systematic.<sup>87</sup>

It is striking how these lines at once reflect the change of approach at work in Husserl's last writings while also highlighting his long engagement with this problem. Realizing the Cartesian approach taken in his *Ideas* and the later *Cartesian Meditations* abstracted from the fundamental ground of philosophical life, i.e., from the formal and most general structures of the temporal-historical life-world,<sup>88</sup> he sought now in his last years to present a more concrete method of phenomenologizing in the "Crisis" writings.

### *A Closer Examination of Husserl's Encounter with Dilthey in 1905*

What is most intriguing when comparing these late statements by Husserl, i.e., both his comments to Misch and his own critique of *Ideas*, is the intimate relation they assert between his philosophy and the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey—even if this is only implied as is the case in his critique of *Ideas*. In the letter of June 27<sup>th</sup>, 1929 to Misch, Husserl maintains directly and unequivocally a unique motive force shaping his philosophy ranging back to his discussions with Wilhelm Dilthey. From Misch's perspective, however, this connection must have appeared most startling. For, as we have seen, there was little either in his published writings or his personal history to suggest such an intimacy. Hence this "impulse" deserves greater attention.

When Husserl first personally encountered Dilthey in 1905, he was a younger man and his philosophy fresh in bloom so to speak. He had only published his *Logical Investigations*, the work for which he was most famous, four years earlier. And though Husserl eventually reputed the title "descriptive psychology" for his phenomenology, there are strong affinities between the self-described "descriptive psychology" articulated in the *Logical Investigations* of 1901 and Dilthey's own psychology. Indeed both Husserl and Dilthey recognized this affinity, yet Husserl never expressed

this recognition in any of his published writings. Until his retirement in 1928 his major writings remained limited to his *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, and the *Logos* essay, "Philosophy as rigorous science." Of these, only the 1910 *Logos* essay speaks directly of Dilthey; and as we have shown no one would easily see an affinity between Dilthey's work and Husserl's in this essay. As he wrote to Misch in the thirties, though, Husserl was also quite active producing major new works for publication. In 1928, for instance, he published his "Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness" in the 9<sup>th</sup> volume of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.<sup>89</sup> The *Formal and Transcendental Logic* appeared a year later in the 10<sup>th</sup> volume of the *Jahrbuch*. Yet even in these, Husserl leaves unmentioned any direct or indirect relation of his philosophy to Dilthey's. If one includes the "Crisis" essay of 1936, then the only published statements expressing any relation between phenomenology and Dilthey's philosophy remained those found in the *Logos* essay. Rather than affirming any relation to Dilthey, however, he seems much more clearly in this writing to attack Dilthey's philosophical orientation. If Husserl meant to compliment Dilthey here, it is a seriously backhanded attempt.

If I therefore regard historicism as an epistemological aberration that, owing to its countersensical consequences, must be just as brusquely rejected as naturalism, then I would nevertheless like to emphasize expressly that I fully acknowledge the tremendous value of history in the broadest sense for the philosopher. For him the discovery of the common spirit is just as significant as the discovery of nature. Indeed, the immersion in the general life of spirit provides the philosopher with more original and therefore more fundamental material for inquiry than does the immersion in nature. For the realm of phenomenology, as a doctrine of essence, stretches from the individual spirit soon over the whole field of universal spirit, and although Dilthey shows in such an impressive way that psychophysical psychology is not the one that can serve as the "foundation of the human sciences," I would say that it is solely the phenomenological doctrine of essence that is capable of justifying a *philosophy* of spirit.<sup>90</sup>

Perhaps Misch simply could not make sense of Husserl's assertions regarding an impulse in his thinking leading back to Dilthey. This would be understandable. However, we have today—unlike Misch—Husserl's unpublished writings available for our perusal and so the means to make sense of this suggested link. To make sense of these writings, however, we need to look more closely at Husserl's first encounter with Dilthey in 1905.

There are but a few places outside of Husserl's letters where he expressly addresses the alliance of his own work with Dilthey's and the relevance of Dilthey's project to phenomenology. Not only did Husserl fail to discuss in any detail Dilthey's work in any of his published writings—apart, of course,

from the critical *Logos* essay, but he also only rarely mentions him in his lectures or unpublished manuscripts. However in his university lectures at the University of Freiburg on “Phenomenological Psychology (1925)” he takes up this issue in an unparalleled way. These lectures are perhaps Husserl’s most strongly Diltheyan work. In them he seeks to establish the limits and methodology proper to a study of psychic phenomena.

He begins the lectures with an “historical” introduction into the subject matter. At issue here is precisely Dilthey’s polemic—with which he agrees—against the tendency to explain mental life<sup>91</sup> by the method of theory construction. Any psychological theory which proceeds naturalistically, Husserl explains, attempts to construct a theory of consciousness by reference to theoretically simple non-experiential elements.<sup>92</sup> A psychological constructionist, in other words, seeks to form a theory of consciousness in the same manner as a physicist might explain the movement of heavenly bodies through the cosmos. “On the basis of experience, therefore, it conceptualizes hypothetical substructions of non-experiential causal systems [*Zusammenhänge*] and the hypotheses of laws relating to these.”<sup>93</sup> For both Dilthey and Husserl, this methodological approach, whereby the occurrence of complex psychic phenomena are explained by reference to a system of conceptualized “substructions,” is completely antithetical to a methodology properly fitted to the human sciences.

In the human sciences, on the contrary, the nexus [*Zusammenhang*] of psychic life constitutes originally a fundamental datum. For in inner experience the processes of one thing acting on another, and the connections of functions or individual members of psychic life into a whole are also given. The experienced nexus is primary here, the distinction among its members only comes afterwards.<sup>94</sup>

For both Dilthey and Husserl, then, the investigative ground of either psychology or of phenomenology, respectively, is the immediate inner experiencing of the whole nexus of psychic life. In this affirmation, the two men seem to hold the same view.

Yet in his 1925 lectures Husserl sought to raise the science of psychic life, which Dilthey had initially sketched in his 1894 essay, *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* of 1894 (hereafter “Ideas” or “Ideas of 1894”), above the level of a vague inductive empiricism [*Empirie*] to that of a rigorous science—establishing laws of essence which govern its domain a priori and thus prior to every consideration of the contingently factic.<sup>95</sup> Though Husserl generally approved of Dilthey’s descriptive-analytic methodology as expressed in the latter’s *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* of 1894 as well as his earlier *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, he nevertheless sought to radicalize Dilthey’s “unbiased empiricism” with a methodology founded on the intuition of essences and of essential relations. Though Husserl understood clearly his disagreement

with Dilthey, he remained in the lectures expressly allied with Dilthey in his view that “psychology must embark on the opposite path as that taken by the representatives of the method of construction. Its way must be analytical, not constructive.”<sup>96</sup> For Husserl, this new descriptive-analytical psychology is, in fact, the science of phenomenology. Indeed, it is for this very reason that he would call phenomenology a descriptive psychology in §6 of the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*.<sup>97</sup> Of course, he later rejected this appellation, since it invited naturalistic confusions.

After Husserl published his *Logical Investigations*, he came to see a strong similarity of method between his own phenomenology and Dilthey's influential and controversial essay on psychology, the *Ideas* of 1894. Dilthey, as we have already noted, had already come to recognize Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, most especially the second volume, the “Investigations Pertaining to Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,” as an extremely valuable contribution toward the proper expression of his own descriptive philosophical methodology. He was, in fact, one of the first—in Germany or abroad—to offer a seminar on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* to students outside of Göttingen.<sup>98</sup> As a consequence of Dilthey's interest in Husserl's work, the two men met in 1905. According to the scant evidence available, the meeting took place in Berlin sometime after the Easter break in March of 1905. This personal encounter allowed each man to introduce himself to the other. Sadly, no reliable third party record of their discussions exist. We know, however, that they met at least once at Dilthey's home, but it remains unclear exactly what took place between them. It is unclear how long Husserl remained in Berlin and where else—other than Dilthey's home—they met. We do know from Husserl's correspondence that he also met with Dilthey's assistant, Bernhard Groethuysen, during this visit. This may or may not have occurred in Dilthey's home. He may have met separately with Groethuysen, since he appears to have given Groethuysen his latest reports on contemporary logical studies published in the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* in 1903–1904.<sup>99</sup> These would have included the important review of Th. Elsenhans' “Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie,” in which Husserl expressly disavowed his earlier designation in the *Logical Investigations* of “descriptive psychology” as a title for phenomenology.<sup>100</sup>

Husserl went to Berlin sometime between the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 27<sup>th</sup> of March, 1905. The trip likely took place during the middle rather than the early days of the month. These dates are significant when compared against Dilthey's own work at the time. On March 2<sup>nd</sup>, Dilthey delivered an important lecture entitled, “The psychic structural context.” In this talk, Dilthey's praise towards Husserl's *Logical Investigations* can only be called effusive. Though the lecture would later be published in the March 16<sup>th</sup> “Sitzungsbericht der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin,”<sup>101</sup> it remains unclear if Husserl obtained a copy. He was almost certainly was aware of the study. Meeting with Dilthey so soon after its presentation, it seems highly likely Dilthey would have mentioned it. Husserl did

eventually obtain the study when it was published in 1927 as a first of three psychological studies in the 7<sup>th</sup> volume of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*, "The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences" (hereafter "Dilthey's GS 7").

In the March 2<sup>nd</sup> study, Dilthey leaves no doubt that he believes his own work finds supplementation and essential clarification in Husserl's. He acknowledges that Husserl's *Logical Investigations* "have achieved a new philosophical discipline which is 'a rigorously descriptive foundation' of the theory of knowledge [*Wissen*] as a "phenomenology of cognition."<sup>102</sup> Then, further, in a footnote later in the text he expresses his debt to Husserl's "epoch-making *Logical Investigations* in the utilization of description for epistemology."<sup>103</sup>

Later, on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, directly after Husserl's visit, Dilthey held another lecture or "study on the groundlaying of the human sciences," which he presented to the philosophical-historical faculty at the University of Berlin. This second lecture would form the basis for the second of the three studies published in Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften* VII. Unlike the first study, though, Dilthey did not publish this second study during his lifetime. Where the first study dealt with the task, method and classification of the human sciences, this second study treated objective apprehension and sought to make clear the structural character of the experiences of apprehension and the relations between them, by which a nexus is composed.<sup>104</sup> Its affinity to the *Logical Investigation* both in content and method are unmistakable. Indeed, Dilthey quotes explicitly from the first and fourth of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in this second "Study."<sup>105</sup>

Recently published manuscripts show clearly that Dilthey spent considerable energy studying Husserl's *Logical Investigations* between 1904 (at least) and 1906. This reading took place as Dilthey worked to publish a new edition of his *Introduction to the Human Sciences*.<sup>106</sup> By the time of their meeting in 1905, therefore, there is little doubt that Dilthey enjoyed a thorough understanding of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. For this reason that we can presume that their discussions during the 1905 meeting likely centered on the importance of Husserl's work for Dilthey's own methodology and vice à versa—probably something along the lines laid out in Dilthey's two psychological studies from this time.

On the other hand, it appears that Husserl was generally unfamiliar with Dilthey's researches at that time. We know this because Husserl suggests as much in his 1925 lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology." There he asserts that his influence in taking up the tasks and method of a descriptive psychology were to be located more squarely with Franz Brentano than with Dilthey. This indeed accords with the fact that he took up the title of descriptive psychology only to drop it years before he met with Dilthey. In his 1925 psychology lectures, Husserl attributes to Brentano almost exclusively the turn in Germany and in Great Britain—and indeed his own turn—toward a descriptive methodology within the discipline of psychology. Yet

he also highlights the impressive, independently garnered achievements by Dilthey in the lectures as well, specifically citing Dilthey's "Ideas of 1894. Comparing Brentano's and Dilthey's role in the development of psychology during the latter decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, he takes pains to highlight Dilthey's originality. Though Brentano proposed a unique theory of intentionality and developed a descriptive method appropriate to the understanding of psychic phenomena in his *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*, Dilthey, Husserl argues, was not influenced by Brentano's studies. "Rather he had come to the demand for a pure description wholly by himself, namely vis-à-vis his sphere of interests in the human sciences. The central meaning of intentionality played no significant role."<sup>107</sup>

In making this last claim that intentionality played no role in the development of Dilthey's descriptive methodology, it is worth noting that Husserl is not discounting here the role intentionality would eventually play in Dilthey's work. As he relates it in his lectures, he, himself, did not at first recognize the commonality of his own phenomenology *qua* descriptive psychology with Dilthey's descriptive psychology. He in fact only became aware of it *after* the two men met in 1905. He explains that he was at first negatively influenced against Dilthey's *Ideas* by the strongly critical review penned by Hermann Ebbinghaus in the journal *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*.<sup>108</sup> This review led Husserl quite uncritically to reject Dilthey's psychological treatise as inessential. Hence he did not even read Dilthey's *Ideas* until after meeting with Dilthey personally to discuss their respective work. In perhaps the only extant account of these conversations, Husserl expresses his shock and excitement as he came to learn of their shared interests and methods.

I was at first not a little surprised to hear personally from Dilthey that phenomenology, namely the descriptive analyses of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, specifically phenomenological part of the *Logical Investigations* stood in essential harmony with his own "Ideas." That they were to be viewed as a first fundamental piece in actual fulfillment of psychology, using a matured method, the psychology which had floated before him as an ideal. Dilthey always placed the greatest weight on this commonality of our researches arising from basically differing entry points; and in his old age took up again with a youthful enthusiasm his investigations pertaining to the theory of the human sciences that he had allowed to fall to the side. The result was the final, most beautiful of his writings in this regard, "The Formation of the Historical World" (of 1910) in the *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, which he was precluded from completing due to his death. The more I myself progressed in the working out of the phenomenological method and in the phenomenological analysis of the life of spirit, the more so had I to recognize that Dilthey in fact had been justified by the so very alien judgment regarding the inner unity of phenomenology and descriptive-analytical psychology. His



writings contain an ingenious pre-view and preliminary step toward phenomenology.<sup>109</sup>

Husserl then goes on to praise Dilthey's work in the strongest terms. Where Brentano had given a "strong impulse" in Germany and abroad for the turn toward a descriptive methodology within the discipline of psychology,<sup>110</sup> Dilthey had in fact achieved completely by himself something that eluded even the school of Brentano. He had brought about a transformation, albeit, an inchoate preliminary working out of the idea of a descriptive psychology to a new philosophical discipline, phenomenology. This was the achievement of which Husserl became aware in 1905.

### CORROBORATION AND CLARIFICATION

Let us assess what we know about the influence of Dilthey on Husserl. On the one hand, in his letters to Georg Misch, Husserl insists on a unitary impulse in his philosophy that reaches back to his first encounter with Dilthey. Yet however consistent he is to Misch about this, he is also maddeningly vague about the efficacy of this impulse. Rather than explaining himself to Misch privately, he wishes to clear this up in future planned publications. On the other, we can find no corroborating evidence of this impulse in any of Husserl's published writings. With the exception of the *Logos* article of 1910, Dilthey's name is not even mentioned in any of Husserl's published writings. Yet when we look to his unpublished scientific writings, especially his lectures on "Phenomenological Psychology" from 1925, we do find an appreciation of Dilthey's work there—though this relates somewhat narrowly to Dilthey's descriptive "intentional" psychology. Even this discussion, however, leaves vague the nature of the Diltheyan impulse on his thinking. While the tone in these later lectures differs starkly from his earlier *Logos* essay, they still do not provide corroboration of the "impulse that runs from the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* . . . to sometime around 1925."<sup>111</sup> Are we then to rely solely on Husserl's letters to Misch for believing that such an impulse exists in his philosophy? This would be unwise, as they may merely represent the unctuous reply of a philosopher who sees his influence waning markedly in the world. Though Husserl repeatedly mentions Dilthey's influence in his letters to Misch, the fact remains that all these remarks occur in letters to Dilthey's son-in-law and most famous student. Furthermore, they occur in the face of a declining dissatisfaction with transcendental phenomenology and the rising popularity of life-philosophy. Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein* articulated in *Being and Time* is quickly overshadowing Husserl's analytical research program, and this is exemplified quite clearly in Misch's own *Life-philosophy*. Perhaps, then, Husserl is simply overstating the case of Dilthey's influence to Misch in order to reassert his relevance. The Misch

letters, alone, offer little more than the assertion of a linkage between Husserl and Dilthey.

Fortunately, we need not rely solely on Husserl's letters with Dilthey and Misch to find evidence of the long-lasting influence of Dilthey on Husserl's thinking. There is another source which corroborates Husserl's comments to Misch. These are found in letters Husserl wrote to his former student, Dietrich Mahnke.<sup>112</sup> Husserl penned these letters on the occasion of a review by Mahnke concerning the seventh volume of Dilthey's *Gesammelte Schriften*. Mahnke published an extensive review of the work in the journal *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* in late 1927.<sup>113</sup> In his review, Mahnke spends considerable energy comparing the philosophies of Husserl and Dilthey. The psychological studies leading off volume 7 of the *Gesammelte Schriften*, alone, suggest the connection between the two philosophical projects, but Mahnke insinuates a deep and penetrating affinity between the two philosophies ranging far beyond these two short writings. At the end of this analysis, he suggests the following:

I would like to believe that the doctrines of Husserl and Dilthey not only permit a synthesis, they, in fact, demand one: here mathematical determination and clarity of the formations of concepts, there historical multiplicity and fullness of intuitions; here universal cognition of timelessly valid eidetic laws, there individual understanding of human historical actualities of life and experience; here the unified identity of nature, of the absolutely objective core of all experiential worlds, there the inexhaustible richness of the world of spirit re-experienced through the infinite self-enlargement of the individual subject. Thus the mutual completion of Husserl's noetic-noematic phenomenology and Dilthey's "self-reflection of life" ought to occur for the multifarious further development of natural and human-scientific epistemology. This would be of extraordinary value for the natural and human-philosophical cognition of actuality itself.<sup>114</sup>

This demand for a "synthesis" of the doctrines of Husserl and Dilthey had an immediate impact upon Husserl. In fact, very soon after he obtained the offprint of this review from Mahnke,<sup>115</sup> he composed and sent off a lengthy letter to his dear friend about it. On December 26, 1927, Husserl writes: "For me there is no need for a particular synthesis between Dilthey and phenomenology."<sup>116</sup> He then goes on to recall that he had been working toward such a synthesis from very early on. He recalls how Dilthey made such an "enormous impression" on him at the time of their first meeting, and that his life's work really took a new turn at that time. "The first 'synthesis' between Dilthey and my endeavors took place in the winter of 1905/06,<sup>117</sup> namely in the form of a number of *personal* discussions during my visit to Dilthey's home."<sup>118</sup> These discussions were of such an importance to him that he "right away announced a series



of exercises in Göttingen on 'Natural and Human Science;' <sup>119</sup> and from then on, the related problems of a human scientific phenomenology [*geisteswissenschaftlichen Phänomenologie*] occupied <him> more than all others, although to date nothing has been published."<sup>120</sup> This last line is worth pausing over. For Husserl admits that "to date nothing has been published." Indeed, he never did publish any of these researches, even if we include the later "Crisis" writings—a fragment of which Husserl actually published during his lifetime.

Mahnke begins his review simply by detailing the contents the volume. This includes, he notes, two major groupings of materials. Each grouping of essays revolves around writings Dilthey wrote or published late in his career. The first grouping contains manuscripts under the title "Studies toward the foundation of the human sciences." These, as we have indicated, include the two lectures Dilthey presented in March of 1905 at about the time that Husserl visited him. The second grouping of materials contains Dilthey's famous essay, "The formation of the historical world in the human sciences," originally published in 1910. Among the manuscripts associated with this latter publication are included numerous sketches and related outlines from the same period "in which Dilthey put forward the final and most profound attempt to bring conclusively to completion his systematic major work, the 'critique of historical reason,' which since 1859 he had taken up again and again."<sup>121</sup>

Mahnke clearly limits the objective he takes on for himself in his review. Though the earlier "Psychological Studies" were strongly influenced by Husserlian phenomenology, he opts not to trace their development to Dilthey's encounter with Husserl's philosophy. He opts, instead, to detail the similarities and differences between Husserl's philosophy and Dilthey's. Rather than present a historical survey of these materials, he seeks to frame a question that—as he sees it—can only now find an answer with the publication of seventh volume of Dilthey's *Schriften*.

I wish, to the contrary, to attempt to answer in a detailed way the important question (which is first possible on the basis of Groethuysen's newly published drafts) of how successful had Dilthey been in his last years to complete the proper critique of historical reason in the context also of the doctrine of method and epistemology of the human sciences.<sup>122</sup>

This he considers the most important question one can ask of Dilthey's work, since it goes to the heart of whether Dilthey's systematic philosophy has genuine significance or whether it ultimately fails its broad ambition. According to Mahnke, Dilthey had seen the goal of his work since as early as 1859 to be a renewal of the Kantian critique of reason, but one which occurred on the ground of a historical worldview. In his psychology, Dilthey sought tirelessly to counter the epistemology of transcendental idealism and to establish in its stead an immanent 'realistically directed

epistemology' founded upon a universal self-reflection of life. This self-reflection was not to be one-sidedly restricted to the lawfulness of the intellect, but would rather encompass the full scope of mental life and the total content of psychic existence.<sup>123</sup> Dilthey's efforts to establish such an analytic of experience, whose method was to be primarily descriptive, led him, Mahnke asserts, to a stance much in common with Husserl.

As an aside, we should note, though, that Mahnke does not trace the development of Husserl's transcendental idealism in the review. Yet he does explicitly indicate Dilthey's rejection of the idealistic elements in Husserl's phenomenology.<sup>124</sup> This leaves open the impression that Dilthey rejected this aspect of Husserl's philosophy on the basis of those works published before Dilthey died. Yet, as we have argued above, by the time Dilthey died in 1911, Husserl had only published a few major writings, i.e., the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* of 1891, the famous *Logical Investigations* published in 1900/01, and the short essay of 1911 "Philosophy as rigorous science." None of these works offer clear representation of his later transcendental idealistic philosophy. Even though Husserl had made a clear turn to transcendental idealism by the time of Mahnke's review, this turn was in no way apparent to Dilthey at the time during which the works found in the seventh volume were produced. Dilthey's reading of the first edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, as we have argued, fell in line to a large extent with the more realistic readers of Husserl's work and thus he saw his own efforts to establish a 'realistically directed epistemology' as one commensurate with the project of descriptive analysis at work in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Mahnke's discussion in this regard betrays a common but avoidable blindness to the actual historical relation between the two philosophies.

This misrepresentation aside, Mahnke is absolutely correct to point to an important difference which Dilthey saw between his own approach and that taken by Husserl. Though both men ground their analytic of experience from that which gives itself in direct "inner" experience, their ways seem to part soon thereafter.

The starting point of cognition is certainly to be found in nothing other than that which gives itself immediately, but not Husserl's shadowy timeless essences and not transcendent or transcendental ideas which "tie fast the becoming flowing things in a concept." The starting point <for Dilthey> is rather the livingly actual, continually streaming life whose "first categorical determination is temporality," whose real "essence" can be therefore described in the highest sense as an immanent connection [*Zusammenhang*] or a constantly active law of its enduring movement of form.<sup>125</sup>

Under this interpretation, Husserl's reflexive philosophy of ideal essences differs from Dilthey's realistic epistemology insofar as the former imposes a

withering logicism on the flow of living experience. Husserl's phenomenology, thus, lacks any real connection to living consciousness. As we have seen, this is precisely criticism taken up by Georg Misch in his *Life-philosophy*. Indeed, less than a year after Mahnke published his review, Misch would write that Husserl's transcendental reduction effects a de-actualizing reification <entwirklichende Realisierung> of the logical over the living.<sup>126</sup> Both men, Misch and Mahnke, thus appear to offer similar grounds for the rejection or, at least, modified acceptance of Husserl's phenomenology from the standpoint of life taken by Dilthey. For both considered Husserl's philosophy to be an intellectualist interpretation of direct experience.

Before we examine Husserl's response, we need a better grasp of the context and content of Mahnke's review. We must bear in mind that the review was published in 1927. Just as Mahnke was completing his review, he received the 8<sup>th</sup> volume of Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. This, of course, is the volume in which Martin Heidegger published his monumental work, *Sein und Zeit* and Oskar Becker his mathematical treatise, *Mathematische Existenz*. In fact, Mahnke concludes his review with a discussion not only of Husserl's phenomenology but also that of Martin Heidegger's. Interestingly, Mahnke's assessment of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is not dissimilar to the thesis put forward by Misch in his *Life-philosophy*. Mahnke writes: "I find in this 'hermeneutic phenomenology'—although I have not yet wholly penetrated the Hegelian obscurity in Heidegger's manner of expression—the attempt at a synthesis of Dilthey's and Husserl's philosophy actually being carried through."<sup>127</sup> Though, in other words, he frames his analysis of Dilthey's philosophy in the context of Husserl's constitutive phenomenology and invokes the need for a synthesis of the two, he suggests that Heidegger's new work is that which seems to represent this very synthesis. Regardless of these deferential remarks, though, Mahnke concludes his review by pointing to what he sees as the unfinished work of phenomenology generally. The synthesis, he asserts, remains to be fulfilled, even taking account of Heidegger's new hermeneutic phenomenology.

Thus remains the great task of the future of a double-sided phenomeno-logie which unites Dilthey and Husserl. A philosophy which allows for the expression of eternally valid sense of the ever continuing flowing life its expression—according to the motto: 'And that which ever works and lives and grows / Enfold you with fair bonds that love has wrought, / And what in wavering apparition flows / That fortify with everlasting thought.'<sup>128</sup>

These are words which Husserl felt compelled to respond.

Turning now to Husserl's reply to Mahnke, we find in them a more concrete characterization of the Diltheyan impulse at work in his thinking than is found in the Misch letters. Regrettably, though, even here Husserl

remains vague. Hence we will be required to take up again the concrete development of Husserl's thinking in the next chapter, if we hope to really grasp the true nature of this impulse which defines his philosophy.

## CONCLUSION: "BEFORE ALL SCIENCE IS LIFE"

There is a tension in the reception of Husserl's philosophical writings occurring during his lifetime that we find occurring today. One naturally presumes Husserl's published writings present a generally complete and true account of his philosophy. Yet, again and again, Husserl rejected this presumption. The greatest and most important part of his life's work remained hidden away in his manuscripts, he suggests.<sup>129</sup> By looking only at the body of his published work, many of Husserl's contemporaries—as well as many today—leveled the criticism that his eidetic phenomenology represents but a specious form of intellectualism.<sup>130</sup> After Husserl published the *Logos* essay, for instance, he suffered a number of attacks in this vein.<sup>131</sup> Given that the *Logical Investigations* constituted his only significant work to that date, it appeared the central focus of phenomenology rested with logical experience. And the emphasis on the logical persisted throughout Husserl's career. Many of his contemporaries thus criticized him for the logicist orientation of his philosophy.

To Husserl, these criticisms quite seriously missed the point of his work, for they left out of view a whole range of problems with which phenomenology concerns itself. "Pure phenomenology encompasses all worlds and embraces the actual through the possible."<sup>132</sup>

It has to do with logic as much as it does with ethics, aesthetics and all parallel disciplines. *The Logical Investigations* offered tentative beginnings of a phenomenology of the logical, since it accomplished a first breakthrough to phenomenology generally. The scope of the phenomenological problematic extends to nature (the consciousness constituting nature and of nature as a constituted unity), a phenomenology of corporeality, of the spiritual, of social spirituality and its constituted correlate standing under the title culture, etc.<sup>133</sup>

Though Husserl here is writing to Eduard Spranger in 1918, these remarks bear a striking similarity to later statements Husserl would make of the same effect. Ironically, as we have noted, Husserl remained by and large silent to his critics publicly. Though they quoted his own words, most critics seemed to him to miss the point of his work. Perhaps if he had been able to bring to print his major researches over the years, there might have been less confusion.

In his response to Dietrich Mahnke, who we should recall is both a friend and former student of Husserl, the former master traces the development of

his thinking in terms almost identical to that in his letter to Georg Misch. To Mahnke, though, he describes in a detail lacking elsewhere the importance of his encounter with Dilthey and the relevance on the development of his work after 1905. "The fact that Dilthey identified my phenomenology with scientific [*geisteswissenschaftlichen*] psychology and brought it in line with his life's goal to find a philosophical grounding of the human sciences made an enormous impression on me."<sup>134</sup> After meeting with Dilthey, he continues, he turned immediately to a study of Dilthey's "psychology of understanding" and the work of Rickert and Windelband in a new course entitled, "Historical-philosophical Exercises (1905)".<sup>135</sup> In the letter, he then goes on briefly to trace the problematic of a human-scientific phenomenology at issue in the 2<sup>nd</sup> volume of *Ideas* while highlighting its root in the 1<sup>st</sup> published volume. He then pauses and makes a most interesting comment. Here he proffers to Mahnke a conception of phenomenology that, as he says, he has held since his first meeting with Dilthey. It is implicit, he asserts, in his *Ideas* I and has shaped all his analyses that come after it. "Already emerging from this <1<sup>st</sup>> part <of the *Ideas*> I came to hold the view that phenomenology is nothing other than *universal* "absolute" *human science*."<sup>136</sup>

Husserl goes on to articulate the "natural methodological path of phenomenology"<sup>137</sup> from the egological phenomenology of *Ideas* I to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. He explains that his own comprehension of the phenomenological reduction to intersubjectivity remained nascent in Göttingen, and he refers here specifically to his analyses of empathy which he articulated in his lecture course on the Basic Problems of Phenomenology at Göttingen in 1910. Although the natural path of his investigations start from the situated ego, it is important to recognize that he now holds that his analyses of late have led him against this starting point.

My rigorously analytic manner or research . . . brought with it the insight that . . . in the treatment of the constitutional problems I ought not begin with problems of the transcendental constitution of personality and personal community in relation to a constituted environment but rather with the *life of consciousness* in order to inquire into the principles of highest synthetic unity by reference to the typification of that life according to eidetically necessary and eidetically possible forms.<sup>138</sup>

He then laments to Mahnke that Dilthey so misunderstood his philosophy of essences, "as if I couldn't reach the factual life of spirit with this eidetic research, as if I wanted to exclude historical and factual research generally."<sup>139</sup> He underscores to Mahnke, his good friend, a renowned scholar of Leibniz, that he [Husserl] remained a "just a Leibnizian." Research of the actual always follows after research of the possible; this is the sense in which phenomenology grounds all empirical enquiry. Eidetics is the necessary first science. However, he should not, he makes clear to Mahnke, be confused for a Platonist.

Before all science is life, ultimately transcendental life, but transcendental life in which monadic subjects and subject-communities has given for themselves the apperceptive form of human-communities in a spatio-temporal world. All eidetics presumes a *withdrawal* <Ausgang> from factual givenness under the condition of phantasy, which is but the variation of the factum. Thus the first stage is a natural situatedness [*Einleben*] in experience and the naively natural view. But that is no *science*. Eidetics is the founding science for every corresponding factual science.<sup>140</sup>

Thus the real difference between himself and Dilthey does indeed rest with his eidetics, but this is not to be understood as an ossifying abstraction of manifest “inner” life. Rather, eidetics represents the logic of transcendental life fundamental of all factual science. Phenomenology as an eidetic science discloses, thereby, not only the doctrine of scientific method. It also “reveals the universal form, the universal essence-typology of concrete universal subjectivity (of the absolute I-totality), which is productive in this life, and forms itself personally—out of springs of specific activity and on the basis of an intentional passivity which is likewise to be disclosed.”<sup>141</sup>

Put another way, rather than effecting a de-actualizing reification <entwirklichende Realisierung> of the logical over the living, as Misch suggests in his critique of Husserl, phenomenology offers the sole methodological means to understand the concrete streaming-standing, ever flowing but always actual life of consciousness. This is the insight which has guided Husserl since his first encounter with Dilthey in 1905. Phenomenology is, in essence, universal, “absolute” human science; for its subject matter is that which is given in the most rigorous sense, i.e., living experience itself.<sup>142</sup> Rather than a genuine Plato, as Misch and Dilthey have labeled him, Husserl seeks instead to be the genuine Dilthey.

Only in eidetic thinking can the *fundament* of factual thinking be made apparent, namely, posited and brought out as a scientific thinking of the factual. But then precisely the factum and the actual working through of the research of the factum remains.<sup>143</sup>

### 3 The Development of Constitutive Phenomenology

For more than a decade already I have gone beyond the stage of Platonism and posed the idea of transcendental genesis as the chief theme of phenomenology.

—Husserl to Paul Natorp, June 29, 1918<sup>1</sup>

We have learned from our analysis of Husserl's letters both to Georg Misch and Dietrich Mahnke that Husserl conceived phenomenology as radical, universal "human science" and for this reason placed enormous importance on the force of Wilhelm Dilthey's thinking on his own. His 1905 encounter with Dilthey initiated an impulse in his thinking that ran from his work in the *Logical Investigations* through the *Ideas* to the developments of method that took place during the teens and twenties. However, Husserl never adequately articulates the nature of these developments to Misch or Mahnke. So it is to these developments that we turn now to examine. The task of this chapter is twofold. First, we will examine the developments of Husserl's thinking as it evolved in the first and second decade of the twentieth century in order to understand more clearly the vaguely defined impulse he mentions to Misch. His description of conscious intentionality changes during these years from a structural model typical of his earlier works such as the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I* to a genetic or temporal model of intentionality articulated later. In our examination of this development, we shall see that this new temporal model is not fully consistent with the earlier intentional model. Yet if it is true—as Husserl asserts is the case—that throughout his life he strove toward a unitary goal in his phenomenological analyses, then perhaps we may be able to find a unity to the phenomenological problem articulated in these developments. However, we must be alert to the possibility that the development of the later temporal model of intentionality introduces insurmountable contradictions in Husserl's method of analysis. This, in fact, may account for the inconsistencies which seemingly define his research manuscripts. Consequently, this leads us to the second aspect of this chapter's task. As we articulate Husserl's development of method and the inconsistency this introduces, we will also provide an explanation of what motivates him to develop this new model of intentionality.

How far have we progressed in our efforts, though? To be sure, we have made modest progress toward finding a unity in Husserl's philosophy. At least now, we have reason to believe that within Husserl's literary estate we may *in principle* be able to disclose a unity. However far we have gotten,



or believe we have gotten, though, our original problem persists. While the programmatic writings he published during his lifetime provide a plethora of introductions to his philosophy, there is very little in these to corroborate directly the views he privately expresses to Misch and Mahnke. But Husserl's programmatic writings were never meant to be the last word. The sheer mass of his writings speak against this. If there were any uncertainty regarding this point, though, the earlier cited letter to Adolf Grimme, where he highlights the importance of his unpublished writings, further affirms this.<sup>2</sup> We have the obligation now to provide a positive account of the unity of Husserl's philosophy by reference to these writings—if that is possible.

Yet as we turn to this task, we hesitate—as we do at every important juncture in our investigation—in order to reflect on our own manner of proceeding. We undertook our earlier analysis of Husserl's letters to Dilthey, Misch and Mahnke simply to be sure that we had good reason to begin. Now that we have accomplished this, it is not as if Husserl's unpublished research investigations have all become finished works of analysis. The majority of these writings remain the fragmentary experimental investigations into "*die Sachen selbst*" of living consciousness they were before we began. And the fact also remains that Husserl's assertion to Misch and Mahnke, which we examined in the second chapter, are only privately expressed claims. One can find no explicit corroboration by Husserl in his published writings to support this view. And even in those unpublished writings where he mentions Dilthey directly, he gives us no hint of such an impulse in his thinking going back to his encounter with the man in 1905.<sup>3</sup> It might seem, then, more efficacious simply to reject these claims. Indeed, they may express no more than Husserl's recognition of his failing influence.

To this sort of objection we have a reply, which though not our own, is one we accept as if it were.

To interpret any such text is to place it in the total context of Husserl's thinking. We should, if possible, avoid the sudden, initial excitement on the discovery of a paragraph in which the Master seems to be rejecting his well-known position. We should rather ask, how and why could he write what he did? We, as interpreters, should try our best to avoid being motivated by the search for "retractions," and must rather be guided by the principle of charity which aims at making the thinker maximally self-consistent.<sup>4</sup>

The principle of charity demands that we focus our investigation as we have done. Only after our investigation can we justifiably decide whether our original presumption is faulty. We know that Husserl did not publish an enormous and enormously important body of his work. The scholar of his philosophy should, therefore, toil amidst these myriad writings, first, to become familiar with them and, then, to identify the main themes in them



and the contours of development exhibited in them. The interpreter should focus her efforts toward understanding and explaining the consistency of philosophical movement. If this is not possible, then she obtains the obligation to explain why. Though Husserl's writings may appear to offer a chaos of views, perhaps this appearance belies a many leveled internal restructuring of method not easily apparent from a precipitous sortie into the manuscripts. Perhaps, with some effort, we can understand the dynamic course of this restructuring in his writings and so make sense of the insights he develops over the years. This, indeed, is our aim in this work as a whole.

Yet today, now that a substantial portion of Husserl literary estate has made it to print, our problem is never more clear. The greater the number of Husserl's writings we have available, the more inconsistent appears his findings. As we have indicated already, it is difficult, indeed, sometimes impossible to tell which of his research investigations effect a new and promising path and which a dead-end. But here we have at our disposal an enormous asset. The editors at the Husserl archives who publish his extant writings provide invaluable context to the underlying course of his work. The intertextuality among Husserl's manuscripts is less than transparent in texts, themselves. Making sense of the writings in the literary estate is virtually impossible, in other words, without the valuable assistance of these editors who bring these works to print.

However, this also highlights a difficulty for the scholar of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. To understand his philosophy one must comprehend his unpublished manuscripts, but to comprehend these one must already in some sense understand his philosophy. The apparent discontinuity of Husserl's unpublished research manuscripts has not only led the editors of *Husserliana* but also many other scholars to expend considerable energy tracing the development of the most important operative concepts at work in Husserl's manuscripts.<sup>5</sup> In this precision work, these many hands seek a unitary conception of method—or where this is lacking, evidence to the contrary. Indeed, now that so much of Husserl's literary estate is publicly available, Husserlian scholarship is at a critical phase. As never before we have what appears to be something very close to the “whole cloth”<sup>6</sup> of Husserl's philosophy in print. This mass of writings, “barely manageable” to Husserl in the thirties, remains intriguingly opaque except to the most dedicated scholar. Though the overall structure of Husserl's literary estate provides a frame by which to comprehend the general contours of Husserl's investigative agenda, when we actually delve into the research manuscripts, this overall frame—so clear from our stance outside of the writings—slowly dissolves before our eyes. Nothing can dissuade the interpreter of Husserl's philosophy from the impression as she reads through his unpublished writings that these works do not provide a unitary conception of the transcendental phenomenological problematic. Rather, the dis-array of different experimental investigations shows itself much more clearly. Is Husserl's philosophy, then, noth-

ing more than “system” of conflicting investigative results? Certainly the central concepts operative in Husserl’s philosophy such as phenomenon, epoché, constitution, intentional performance and even transcendental logic remain open problems. Shall we then criticize him precisely for the lack of resolution regarding these concepts? Perhaps we shall come to discover that such a criticism bespeaks a basic misunderstanding of Husserl’s philosophy.<sup>7</sup> We are led again to question what Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is *for us* as co-philosophizing subjects? We should look for guidance here, and a fundamental source of this guidance can be found in the editorial comments of introduction to the works of *Husserliana* we shall consult.

### HUSSERL’S CORPUS: HUSSERLIANA RECONSIDERED I

Given Husserl’s prolificacy, the first archival directors and editors<sup>8</sup> clearly understood they could publish only a selection of his total output.<sup>9</sup> The question then became how to construct the works that were to become *Husserliana*. What works must be published, and what writings should be left out? Though today the *Gesammelte Werke* series in *Husserliana* contains thirty-eight plus volumes<sup>10</sup> of original manuscripts, when the archive was established in 1938 only some forty volumes were planned. Before even the first volume was published, though, the directors decided against establishing an overarching editorial plan.<sup>11</sup> Although such an architecture had been considered useful, it was believed that the establishment of a complete plan would have taken prohibitively long to work out. The original directors and editors, thus, decided instead to publish a number of critical editions of his previously published works and most important lectures while leaving the actual composition of the series, itself, as open as possible.<sup>12</sup>

As the series developed, the volumes of the *Werke* began to include more and more materials supplementary to Husserl’s sustained reflections exemplified in his published writings and lecture courses. Volumes VII and VIII of the *Gesammelte Werke*, for instance, offer Husserl’s lectures on “First Philosophy” which Husserl presented during the Winter semester of 1923/24. In addition to the lecture course materials themselves, these volumes also contain a redaction of related manuscripts Husserl produced in conjunction with the lectures. In effect, these two volumes provide two sorts of documents: (i) a sustained reflection, i.e., a critical edition of Husserl’s published work or lecture course transcription, and (ii) related manuscripts on more precise themes supplemental to the original presentation. With the inclusion of such supplementary or dependent materials, the editor enjoys more freedom to decide which materials to include or exclude than is enjoyed by those who produce a critical edition of one of Husserl’s previously published works. The situation is

more complex for editors of the later volumes of *Husserliana* which offer collections of his research manuscripts. These are neither works Husserl published during his lifetime nor transcriptions of his lecture courses inclusive of supplementary materials but rather editorial volumes wholly composed of Husserl's fragmentary experimental investigations. In these, to which we will pay special attention in this chapter, the editor enjoys the responsibility not merely to produce an authoritative selection from Husserl's extant corpus but also, in contrast to the earlier examples, a very great freedom to determine the selection, itself.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, given that these collections contain literary fragments, the editor is compelled to direct herself, more so than any other editor, beyond Husserl's writings, themselves, to the thinking working its way through the fragmentary investigations. It has been said that Husserl's published writings and lecture courses offer a fixed vision of his investigative findings, while these experimental research investigations, by contrast, provide a glimpse into the living fluidity of Husserl's investigative dynamic.<sup>14</sup> If this is so, as we believe it is, then one can often trace in these collections the course of Husserl's investigative track regarding problems which are more coherently expressed in his more self-sufficient investigations.

It is, in essence, nearly impossible to comprehend Husserl's philosophy properly without reference to these investigations. However, we need not examine every collection of these research investigations in the *Husserliana* series for our purposes. Rather, we will focus on two collections as these are particularly representative of the important work found in the literary estate. These are: (i) *Husserliana* XIII-XV,<sup>15</sup> containing a large number of manuscripts on the subject of intersubjectivity; and (ii) *Husserliana* XXXIII,<sup>16</sup> containing a number of manuscripts Husserl wrote in 1917/18 specifically on the problem of time and inner time-consciousness. The first collection is what I term an "imposed collection." That is to say, the three volumes are a thematic selection of Husserl's research investigations that Husserl, himself, neither intended to publish or to fit together as have been collected. In this case, the editor has chosen to arrange the writings chronologically, and so imposes an arrangement scheme on the materials selected for inclusion. Volume XXXIII is a bird of a different feather, as it presents a collection of research investigations that Husserl produced according to a specific thematic and with an eye toward publishing it as a unitary work. The collection is not ordered in a strictly chronological manner. Rather, the manuscripts are arranged, first, by problematic focus and, then, chronologically within these groupings. Though it remains something of an oversimplification to assert these latter manuscripts were written with a specific presentational format in mind, they eventually came to form the major tissue of a work Husserl and his assistant, Eugen Fink, did plan to publish in the thirties. Each of these collections is central to the development of Husserl's thinking, and so we turn to them now.

### Publication of Husserl's Experimental Research Investigations

When volumes XIII-XV of the *Gesammelte Werke* were published in 1973 under the editorship of Iso Kern, a new sort of collection of Husserl's writings came available. Ranging in date from 1905 to 1935, the vast bulk of the manuscripts making up these books are the short research investigations which we have been discussing.<sup>17</sup> All of the writings in these three volumes deal in some sense with the problem of intersubjectivity, yet the fragmentary nature of the manuscripts chosen for inclusion in these volumes posed a new sort of editorial difficulty. When taken all together, the writings offer more a staccato of different thematic foci than the coherent train of thinking common to Husserl's previously published works or lecture courses.

These problems arise from the particular character of the manuscripts. Although a few brief lecture-manuscripts do form the basis of this new edition <i.e., volume XIII>, for the first time <this volume> deals in the main with texts that Husserl did not intend for publication (for neither a reader nor a hearer). Rather, he wrote them for himself as "monological investigations."<sup>18</sup>

In order to accommodate the style of these investigation, Iso Kern sought not merely to provide a raw digest of Husserl's writings but also explicitly sought to structure the collection in a way to lay out the course of Husserl's thinking.<sup>19</sup> Since the individual manuscripts have consciously restricted frames of inquiry, the trajectory of Husserl's underlying investigative dynamic remains opaque in them individually. Indeed, only in rare instances does Husserl ever set about to trace the development of his own analyses or attempt to offer a systematic conception of their interrelation; and this is especially rare within these "monological investigations." As Kern says, "these research manuscripts do not offer results as much as they do paths of thinking and dead ends. It is Husserl's unique genius to restrict himself to a problem and to be able without a systematic overview to immerse himself in it analytically."<sup>20</sup> Kern thus takes it upon himself in his introductions to provide an overall account of the thought paths and wrong turns Husserl followed over his career. What we find, therefore, in Kern's editorial introductions, perhaps the best of the entire *Husserliana* series, is a thoroughgoing and richly nuanced interpretation of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy which extends beyond the confines of Husserl's analyses of intersubjectivity to the total frame of his work.

As we have suggested, Husserl's most important publications, his *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and even his *Crisis* writings, represent a definite articulation of a broader investigative dynamic found working its way through his research investigations.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the

interrelation of different methodologies brought to bear by Husserl in his phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity is what just Kern aims to elucidate in his introductory comments to *Husserliana* XIII-XV. However, the aims of an editor must remain fixed on the writings within his own collection, whereas our own interest ranges farther afield. We seek to comprehend Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in its full frame—even if this understanding is fated to remain only skeletal. Though Kern's introductions offer one of the most important, indeed one of the only, discussions of Husserl's efforts to produce a “system of phenomenological philosophy,” we do not intend thereby simply to summarize him here. Rather, we shall elucidate the methodological developments in the first two decades of the twentieth century which motivated Husserl to attempt a comprehensive presentation of phenomenological philosophy.

### **Husserl's Conception of the Phenomenological Reduction Between 1905 and 1913**

The center-piece of volume XIII is the sole lecture course included in the three intersubjectivity volumes. Held at the University of Göttingen during the Winter Semester 1910/11, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*<sup>22</sup> offer a sustained reflection on the nature of the phenomenological reduction and the absolute givenness of data disclosed in phenomenological reflection. If we are to believe Kern, Husserl referred to this work more often than any other over the course of his career.<sup>23</sup> It, along with the earlier 1907 lectures known as “The Idea of Phenomenology,”<sup>24</sup>—not included in volumes XIII-XV—form the earliest presentation of this theory. Though Husserl conceptualized the phenomenological reduction in his 1905 Seefeld manuscripts,<sup>25</sup> he first publicly articulated this concept in these 1907 lectures.<sup>26</sup> The importance of the 1907 and 1910/11 lectures, taken together, was something Husserl long recognized. In many respects, the *Basic Problems* complements, or, as is often said, extends the scope of the reduction beyond that articulated in his 1907 lectures. Indeed, even as he abandoned his efforts to complete the full three volume plan of *Ideas* in the late twenties, Husserl returned to these two lecture course materials with the hopes of constructing a systematic presentation of phenomenology.<sup>27</sup> Given the unique standing of these two lecture courses, we shall examine them together, working our way to the later by reference to the orientation articulated in the earlier, “Idea of Phenomenology,” lectures.

Husserl's explication of the reduction in the 1907 lectures proceeds from a naive epistemological critique of naturalistic experience (i.e., experience characteristic of the investigative attitude typical of the natural scientist) to a more profound method of phenomenological “critique.” In other words, phenomenology is presented in the 1907 lecture course as a kind of critical philosophy.<sup>28</sup>

If we abstain from the metaphysical aims <Abzweckungen> of epistemological critique, and if we retain its task in its purity to *clarify the essence of cognition and the objectivity of cognition*, then this is a *phenomenology of cognition and the objectivity of cognition*; and its task forms the first and principal part of phenomenology generally.<sup>29</sup>

Husserl's aim in the 1907 lectures, therefore, is to make clear this new sort of critical method, i.e., the method of phenomenological reduction. The word "reduction" here, or the verb "to reduce," in German *reduzieren*, denotes in many contexts a restriction or elimination of subject matter to something more elemental. By reduction, one usually signifies a decrease of sorts. A reductionist psychology, for instance, takes mental processes to be in some manner dependent upon or epi-phenomenal to physical or actual cognitive functions of a living brain. However, the term "reduction" as Husserl's employs it, here and elsewhere, signifies not a restriction but rather, in affirmation of the etymology of the word, a return or a leading back. This is the original sense of a *reductio*; in essence it signifies a restoration.<sup>30</sup> And Husserl takes great pains in the lectures to present the phenomenological reduction as a radical return to and restoration of the aims of critical philosophy. This is a return which seeks not to restrict its investigative eye to the immanent mental life of a worldly subject but rather one which focuses its regard to the essence of cognition as such and the objectivities given in cognition generally.

The original problem <in this critique of knowledge> was *the relation between subjective psychological experience and the actuality, in itself, grasped therein*, at first a real actuality but then also mathematical and other ideal actualities. The insight <into the phenomenological problematic> requires first that *the radical problem* rather must proceed to the *relation between cognition and object*, but in a reduced sense, whereupon discussion is not of human cognition but rather of cognition generally, without any existential co-positing relation to an empirical I or to a real world.<sup>31</sup>

Phenomenology seeks in the purity of its concern to obtain a field of absolute self-givenness, i.e., a field of indubitable data exemplary not merely of my own or any factual psychic life or even of the cognition typical to my kind but rather of cognition as such. "Our focus on a critique of cognition has led us to a beginning, to a secure land of givens <Gegebenheiten> which are at our disposal and which above all we appear to require."<sup>32</sup> This is the essential insight underlying the phenomenological reduction both here, as articulated in the 1907 lectures, and throughout Husserl's long treatment of the theory of reduction.

Phenomenology is, as Husserl depicts it in his 1907 lectures, an eidetics of cognition. The method of reduction signifies the critical means of

access not to any de facto consciousness but rather to the essential structural correlation of consciousness and objectivities per se intended therein. Given that the matters at issue in phenomenology are not matters of fact but rather pure possibility, they include the full frame of possible cognitions, most universally understood, and correlative objectivities intended in acts as they happen in the living flow of consciousness.

Thus the phenomenological reduction does not signify something like the restriction of investigation to the sphere real <reellen> immanence, to the sphere of that which is really <reell> enclosed in the absolute this of the *cogitatio*. It does not signify a restriction to the sphere of the *cogitatio* generally, but rather it signifies the restriction to the sphere of *pure self-givennesses* . . . not the sphere of that which is perceived but rather of what precisely is given in the sense in which it is meant—self-given in the most rigorous sense such that nothing of what is meant fails to be given.<sup>33</sup>

In the 1907 lectures, Husserl presents phenomenology as the science of pure consciousness and represents there the method of phenomenology as one of eidetic inquiry. As he had done in his earlier fifth and sixth *Logical Investigations*, he proffers here a description of the essential structural correlation occurring in the intentionality of act-consciousness.

This cognitive act has two identifiable moments. These are: (i) the immanent or inherent sense-bestowing act of consciousness (although he does not use this particular phrase in the 1907 lectures) and (ii) the transcendent objectivity intended in these acts. In his lectures, Husserl seeks to lay the ground for a discipline which clarifies both the essential boundaries of these two moments as well as the necessary manners by which transcendent objectivities are meant in the pure immanence of consciousness. “To explain the essence of cognition and to bring to self-givenness the essential connections belonging to it means, therefore, research into both of these sides and tracing this relation belonging to the essence of cognition.”<sup>34</sup> As a genuinely critical philosophy, phenomenology takes this dual focus as its task.

Virtually all commentators agree that the 1910/11 lectures represent an extension of the frame of inquiry from the problems posed in the earlier lectures. One finds a much more nuanced description of the natural attitude here than in the earlier 1907 lectures. Husserl explicitly takes up the problematic relation between phenomenology and the science of psychology in 1910/11. Kern, for this reason, characterizes *The Basic Problems* as a prototype of the much later “Crisis” wrings.<sup>35</sup> His phenomenological description of nature in *The Basic Problems* as “an index for an all-inclusive normativity, encompassing all streams of consciousness that stand in an experiential relation to one another through empathy”<sup>36</sup> is the most important innovation, though. *The Basic Problems* treads on ground left



out of consideration in the earlier lectures: intersubjectivity. As we shall see, however, this extension to intersubjectivity rests on a recapitulation, or perhaps better said, a clarification of the eidetic focus of phenomenology in the 1907 lectures.

In the 1907 lectures, Husserl explicitly denies that phenomenology can establish anything about the singular cognitive phenomenon.<sup>37</sup> Yet he goes on to assert in §25 of *The Basic Problems* that “the *eidetic* reduction has not been performed. The investigation concerns phenomenologically reduced consciousness in its individual flow.”<sup>38</sup> Husserl’s analyses centers, then, on the unity of singular consciousness. The particular cogitationes occurring in the temporal flow of this consciousness are accordingly treated as a special problem there. Though this, in itself, appears to be a substantial deviation from the earlier presentation, the major thematic focus in the two courses remains the same. In both, Husserl aims to clarify the “dual character of the phenomenological reduction.”<sup>39</sup> Though he has yet to develop the later terminology of “noesis-noema” in either of these two courses, it is clear that in both the reduction manifests a relation between consciousness and its object which remains obscured by the naturalistic realism of an empirical psychology. Given that the physical and psychic world is bracketed, phenomenological descriptions do not concern the real, i.e., causal, relation between perceiving and perceived. Nevertheless, “a relation between perception and that which is perceived (as likewise between a liking and that which is liked) remains manifest, a relation that comes to essential givenness in “pure immanence.”<sup>40</sup> Husserl’s efforts in both the 1907 and 1910/11 lectures center, then, on providing a description adequate to this insight, and this marks the basic agreement in theme between the two lecture courses.

Given the distinct emphasis in the two lectures mentioned above, it appears that Husserl performs the eidetic reduction in the earlier “Idea of Phenomenology” while in the later *Basic Problems* he does not. Yet this is not entirely correct. Though in the 1907 lectures Husserl does not explicitly restrict his analyses to the haecceity of flowing consciousness, his descriptions of essential intuition in both presentations remain fundamentally the same. This is an important point not to overlook, if one wishes to understand Husserl’s descriptions of eidetic intuition properly, that is to say, both as presented in these lectures after the *Logical Investigations* and throughout his career extending even to his latest logical studies. There is a core in all these descriptions that remains essentially unchanged throughout. *The Basic Problems* institutes a shift of concentration by Husserl to the wholeness of individual consciousness. This shift arises from Husserl’s efforts to integrate into his analyses an adequate description of the temporality of the flowing life of consciousness. Temporality is perhaps the most dominant theme in *The Basic Problems*, and the formal temporal structuring principle of consciousness stands there as the major insight to arise in these lectures.



*Consequently, with this is found the principle, and the single decisive principle, that establishes <konstruiert> the unity of consciousness.* In other words, here we have the principle which settles whether several *cogitationes* belong to the unity of a phenomenological I and which shows, so to speak, how it can be known that several *cogitationes*, which are given in phenomenological experience, in whatever manner, must belong to a stream of consciousness. On the other hand, the principle establishes <begründet> that *one* stream must exist which holds these *cogitationes* in itself—always presupposing that these *cogitationes* exist at all, that the experiences giving them, in fact, are valid.<sup>41</sup>

When we look specifically at *The Basic Problems*, we find that the phenomenological method represented therein is not merely extended to the field of intersubjectivity but also and more fundamentally to the sphere of the singular givenness of temporal consciousness, i.e., the whole unified stream of consciousness, from whose basis the field of inter-subjective objectivity is, itself, constituted. Husserl's major innovation in these later lectures is to proffer, provisionally at least, a phenomenologically adequate description of the plurality of I-monads all belonging to the same time which does not deflate to the plurality of temporalities identical with this plurality of I-monads.

But there is the *law* that, in principle, an empathized datum and the empathizing experiencing belonging to it cannot belong to the same stream of consciousness, that is, to the same phenomenological I. There is no channel leading from the empathized stream into the empathizing stream which the empathizing itself belongs to. A datum of one and another stream can never stand in such a relation that the one is the surrounding environment of the other. The surrounding environment! Does that not mean the surrounding of time? And does not our law state that the one and the other cannot belong to *one* consciousness of time? But what speaks against this is that the act of empathy and the empathized act belong *to the same* time, and they belong to the same time for *consciousness*. Empathy posits the empathized as now and posits it in the same now as it, itself.<sup>42</sup>

Where Husserl sought to advance his phenomenology as a genuinely critical philosophy in the 1907 lectures, he is really working on another plane in these later lectures. The earlier is an introduction to phenomenology; it seeks to articulate what phenomenology is. The later does not have this function primarily, although Husserl does address this theme in the lectures. Rather, in this later lecture course Husserl seeks to identify the fundamental problems of a phenomenology. He discloses this to be the problem of the formal structuring principle of the noetic-noematic correlation; and this is temporality, i.e., phenomenological time.

To be fair, Husserl also discusses the formal structuring principle of consciousness in his 1907 lectures. However, any discussion of temporality only occurs in the last of the five lectures, and the discussion there reflects Husserl's desire to account for the essential manners by which consciousness posits its objects, i.e., the object of perception, the object of a categorial act, the object of imagination or fantasy, the object of symbolic thinking, etc.

Everywhere givenness is a *givenness in the phenomena of cognition* in the phenomenon of a thinking in the widest sense of that term, whether in it is manifested either merely that which is represented or true being, either the real or the ideal, either the possible or the impossible. *And generally this, at first, so wondrous correlation is to be followed up by the examination of essences.*<sup>43</sup>

Husserl's analysis of temporality as the structuring principle of consciousness seems an almost ancillary topic to the main theme of these earlier lectures, especially as this is brought up only in the final pages of the transcripts. In later *The Basic Problems*, though, this is the major theme. For in these later lectures, Husserl consciously integrates the analysis of time-consciousness into his descriptions of intentionality. He thus synthesizes in his analyses a much more thorough account of inner time consciousness at every level of experiential activity<sup>44</sup> than is found anywhere else in his corpus to date—with the exception, of course, of his 1905 lectures on the phenomenology of inner time consciousness.

Though Husserl in *The Basic Problems* focuses on the unity of a singular consciousness, this purpose arises from his concern with the same question that drives his 1907 lectures: "Does phenomenological experience have the sort of evidence that makes it suitable at all as the basis of scientific knowledge?"<sup>45</sup> This problem revolves around the central insight of phenomenological reflection, i.e., the correlation of consciousness and its object as given in absolute insight. We should recall that the reduction signifies a restriction to pure self-givenness rather than a restriction to the inherent moments of consciousness.<sup>46</sup> However, as we reflect upon impressional consciousness in the application of this reduction, the singular cogito, i.e., that given in this reflection with absolute certainty, has at first the character of a now-point which immediately flows off. This new point, then, is replaced with a new punctual cogito, itself, again only to be replaced. Thus what I hoped to grasp in phenomenological reflection with absolute conviction slips through my grasp at every moment.

But as soon as I want to seize what I have thus actually given as now, through my finding and judging this, it has already passed by . . . *But now the entire project of disengaging loses its meaning.*<sup>47</sup> Because for the discriminating research we wanted to parenthesize what is not

given, in order to arrive at *<hineinbekommen>* a given in a more rigorous sense for the sphere of judgment. But we get nothing whatsoever for this sphere. The parenthesizing has become so radical that we find nothing more to pass judgment on.<sup>48</sup>

The restriction to pure self-givenness, in other words, seemingly delimits the range of phenomenological insight to a meaningless immediacy. It is for this reason that the singular cognitive phenomenon is not and cannot, by itself in abstraction, form the basis of scientific knowledge. "Only if we construct general judgments of essence do we obtain the secure objectivity which science demands."<sup>49</sup> Hence, the problem which Husserl seeks to resolve in *The Basic Problems* is the full limit of the purely self-given.

As we can see, though, this is also a problem central to the 1907 treatment of the reduction. "*As far as actual evidence extends, givenness extends.* But naturally the great question will be to establish purely in the achievement of pure evidence what is actually given in it and what is not, what an improper thinking introduces at this juncture and interprets into it without ground of givenness."<sup>50</sup> In both these lectures, but most especially in the later *Basic Problems*, Husserl pushes the question: what is the genuine data of phenomenological reflection? Obviously in our phenomenological reflections we disclose the correlation of cogito and cogitatum. But how are we to describe this wondrous correlation properly? Husserl's answer lies at root in the time-analyses put forward both in his earlier investigations on time-consciousness<sup>51</sup> and in *The Basic Problems*. His analyses of the temporal structure of consciousness in the latter indicate that experiential events necessarily perdure in the streaming life of consciousness. The singular now-point is thus but an abstraction from this more fundamental setting of the flowing unity of a singular consciousness, a consciousness in which the intensive moments hang together. The science of phenomenology concerns not this abstract now-point of the cogito but rather the purely self-given in the absolute temporal nexus [*Zusammenhang*] of this "life," i.e., the fundamental ground from which it becomes at all possible to abstract the immediate perceptual now-point. In 1909, two years after the "Idea of Phenomenology" and a year before *The Basic Problems*, Husserl directly addresses this issue in a manner that would be virtually repeated in the later *Basic Problems* lectures.

*Absolute self-givenness is thus surely no empty phrase.* We have it, even if in the phenomenological reduction we disengage all existence of nature, even the empirical I-existence. The question will be therefore: how far does it extend? And here it is wholly evident that the intuiting look, while, for example, it is directed to the perceptual appearance and the perceived, as such, grasps this immanently in its duration as absolute self-givenness. It is also wholly evident that the delimitation to the now, which is in continual flow, would be a fiction. This already

means that the phases of the just slipped-away now which, flowing off in the apprehension of duration, are not gone and lost. One obviously must accept the claim as an absolute self-givenness that a retention, in which a just-past in its unity with the now and the always new now comes to absolute self-givenness, already inhabits *<einwohnen>* the perception.<sup>52</sup>

To describe the perceptual experience in consciousness as aggregation of punctual cogitationes shows itself to be phenomenological unsound. For it remains blind to the experienced unity of the cogitationes flowing on in a singular temporal nexus that is our intentional “life.” To describe the now mathematically, as is done when conceiving it as the temporal intersection of the past and the future, conceals the experiential living interconnection of a present consciousness to its past and future. This insight lies at the heart of the Husserl’s treatment of the phenomenological reduction in these later lectures.

### The Reduction Continued, Undoing the Platonic Husserl

We should recall that Husserl was regularly attacked throughout his career for his Platonizing attitude. These criticisms break down into two sorts, generally. Many, like Georg Misch, took Husserl to be an unapologetic logicist who reduced or transposed the categories of life to purely abstract structures.<sup>53</sup> Husserl, Misch argued, was the genuine Plato insofar as he disregarded the structured flow of life in favor of timeless, essential ideas.<sup>54</sup> With much more frequency, though, critics attacked Husserl’s philosophy for its “Platonic hypostatization” of the universal.” He was attacked, in other words, as a Platonic realist in the conception of universals which he put forward in his *Logical Investigations* and later texts.<sup>55</sup> Yet if one looks carefully at his writings, i.e., his published works and especially the 1907 and the 1910/11 lectures, it becomes apparent that neither of these reproaches applies accurately to Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions. As he argues in *Ideas I* from 1913, the criticism that he substantiates ideas really misses the fundamental point of his phenomenological descriptions.

*If object and something real <Reales>, actuality and real actuality mean one and the same thing, then the conception of ideas as objects, as actualities, is admittedly an inverted “Platonic hypostatization.” But if they are to be sharply separated, as is done in the Logical Investigations, if object is to be defined as any something, e.g., as a subject of a true (categorical, affirmative) expression, what offence can remain—it must be of a sort that comes about from abstruse prejudices.*<sup>56</sup>

In both the 1907 and 1910/11 lectures, Husserl extends the phenomenological analyses which he initiated in his *Logical Investigations*. Yet here in

these two sets of lectures he explicitly anchors his descriptions of conscious intentionality, especially the intuition of essences, in the temporal structuring principle of a presentive<sup>57</sup> consciousness.

In the "Idea of Phenomenology" lectures, for instance, Husserl takes up the apprehension of categorial objectivities, at once summarizing the earlier results of his *Logical Investigations* but then, also, hinting at a much more profound descriptive model of conscious intentionality. "It is obvious," he says, "that a fully evident grasp of essence *refers back* to a singular intuition on the basis of which it must constitute itself, but not therefore to a singular perception which has given the exemplary individual as a real <reell> now-presence."<sup>58</sup> The emphasis in this passage circumscribes the concept of intuition here, pointedly contrasted against the single perception. In the context of the temporal structuring of consciousness, the singular perception recedes back into consciousness and disappears, so to speak, from view. Though it may be analyzed into a series of now-points, the perception of a duration, however, is itself a unitary act of consciousness stretching beyond the abstraction of a now-moment occurring in a current seeing to include in its scope the just-past moments as well as the predelineated, empty expectation of soon-to-come perceptions. This is, indeed, a recapitulation of the position Husserl articulated in §47 of the Sixth *Logical Investigation*, although the temporal underpinnings of this description remain for the most part tacit there.

The individual perceptions of the ongoing series are continually unified. This continuity is not the objective fact of a temporal contiguousness. Rather the ongoing series of individual acts has the character of a phenomenological unity in which the individual acts are fused. In this unity, the many acts are not only fused into a phenomenological whole generally but also into an act and, more precisely, into a perception. Indeed, we perceive continually this one and self-same object in the continual flowing off of individual perceptions.<sup>59</sup>

Perceptual consciousness has the characteristic, therefore, of a flowing unity. The analysis of now moments within this unity represents an abstraction from its formal temporal unity. Every act of *Wesensschau* or intuition of essences occurs on the basis of the ongoing flow of perceptions in the life of consciousness, which Husserl highlights in §46 of the Sixth *Logical Investigation*. Here he shows that every categorial perception is, indeed, founded originally on a sensuous perception or plurality of sensuous perceptions of a different theme.

Every simple <schlichte> act of perception now can function, solely for itself or together with other acts, as a foundational act for new acts which in the first instance only presuppose it but then also include it, acts which in their new mode of consciousness likewise *produce a*

*new consciousness of objectivity which necessarily presupposes the original.* While new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, of determinate and indeterminate apprehension of individuals (*the—something*), of generalization, of pure and simple, relational and connective knowledge arise, one does not have thereby any subjective experiences nor even acts connected to the original, but rather, acts which, as we have said, constitute *new objectivities*. In this situation acts come about *<es erstehen Akte>* wherein something appears *as actual and as self given* of kind that could not be given and was not given as what appears here solely in the founding acts.<sup>60</sup>

The seeing of a conjunction (or any categorial objectivity) happens on the basis of a more fundamental ground of sensuous perceiving in other words. And this sensuous perceiving happens, itself, in a structured manner, i.e., coming and flowing off in a delineated manner.

Turning again to *The Basic Problems* lecture course, we should remind ourselves that Husserl seeks to institute here an extension of the phenomenological reduction to intersubjectivity. In *The Idea of Phenomenology* lectures, Husserl remains—it seems—limited to a solipsistic subjectivity in his analysis of the constitution of objectivities in experience. He thus leaves out of his analyses any explicit description of experiences of spiritual objectivities in this earlier work. Iso Kern notes that the influences upon Husserl to investigate the specific experience of the spiritual *<geistigen>* world, i.e., of society and history, were primarily two.<sup>61</sup> These were (i) the Munich psychologist, Theodor Lipps, who articulated the concept of empathy that Husserl would adopt and make his own, and (ii) Wilhelm Dilthey. However, the first volume of the three *Husserliana* editions on intersubjectivity shows an increasingly critical attitude toward Lipps by Husserl, so much so that the influence of this figure on Husserl becomes more that of a counter-balance than a subject of appropriation. The influence of Dilthey on Husserl's thinking, however, can be clearly seen upon examining *The Basic Problems*. The analyses of 1910/11 lectures are strikingly similar in orientation to those expressed by Dilthey in his *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* (1894). In this latter text, Dilthey sets about to analyze the nexus of psychic life according to a method that is contradistinct from the causal explanatory model of the natural sciences.<sup>62</sup> The primary subject of this humanistic science of psychology, according to Dilthey, is the experienced whole of psychic life, i.e., willing-feeling-thinking psychic life. Though it should be emphasized that Husserl consistently opposes phenomenology to any sort of empirical psychology—including the broad empiricism advocated by Dilthey,<sup>63</sup> he seeks in *The Basic Problems*, like Dilthey, to disclose the whole, unified connected stream of consciousness by means of an analytical and descriptive methodology. Indeed, in this respect Dilthey's programmatic assertions in his *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* could be applied to Husserl's phenomenological program.

Here, analysis has to do, as it were, at first with the architectonic articulation of the finished building. It does not first ask about the stones, mortar, and the hands which work them but rather about the inner nexus of the parts. It becomes necessary therefore to find the law of structure by which intelligence, the life of feeling and striving, and the actions of the will are connected to the articulated whole of psychic life <*Seelenleben*>.<sup>64</sup>

Dilthey clearly understands the structural whole of psychic life to include more than merely the life of perception. In the 1910/11 lectures, however Husserl consciously restricts his analyses to the paradigmatic examples of perception and imaginative presentification occurring in the flow of intentional consciousness and so only indirectly discusses the interconnection of phenomena of feeling or willing.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, Husserl's orientation to the whole, unified, connected stream of consciousness in *The Basic Problems* is one strikingly commensurate with the principle theme of Dilthey descriptive, analytic psychology.

For Husserl, however, the reflective turn to the temporal haecceity of conscious life provides the means by which to investigate the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, as we have suggested. If phenomenology is to be a science of cognition, it must, in other words, extend its judgments beyond the absolute data suggested in the 1907 lectures. The field of phenomenological "data" disclosed by the phenomenological analysis of consciousness includes not merely the full temporal frame of a singular consciousness but also the temporal frame of the plurality of I's posited by this singular consciousness in acts of empathy. "Any possible empathy is the "mirroring" of each monad in the other, and the possibility of such a mirroring depends on the possibility of a concordant constitution of a spatial-temporal nature, an index for the respective constitutive experiences which extends into all I's."<sup>66</sup> As Husserl recognized, *The Basic Problems* is one of his most thorough analyses of the temporalization of inter-subjective conscious intentionality achieved. It is for that reason, we believe, that the 1910/11 lectures were to play such an important role in the planned phenomenological system of the twenties and thirties. However, clarification of the special place of these early lectures in Husserl's later efforts to produce a system of phenomenological philosophy will have to wait until our final chapter.

#### A NEW "GENETIC" MODEL OF INTENTIONALITY IN THE TEENS

One can see a marked change or development, if you will, in the formation of the concept of constitution in Husserl's philosophy during these early years. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl initially characterizes



the concept of constitution by a structural schematism having two distinct components: apprehending experience and the content of that apprehension. In any sensuous perceiving, data of sensation have the character of non-intentional moments making up the “material” basis (in some sense) or content of apprehension. Perception animates a sensuous basis with meaning as the ego takes up or apprehends its object sensuously. As Husserl developed his insights into the temporal structuring principle of consciousness, he concluded that this form-matter schema retains descriptive strength solely at the level of active thematizations. On the basis of the analyses of time and time-consciousness which Husserl accomplished during the first two decades of the twentieth century, he gradually developed a new “genetic” model of intentionality explicative of a more fundamental level of passive sense constitution. I will focus my examination now on this development, paying special attention to Husserl’s characterization of the data of sensation [*Empfindungsdaten*] in three distinct presentations, first in the *Logical Investigations*<sup>67</sup> of 1901—most specifically in the Fifth Investigation entitled “On Intentional Experiences and their ‘Content,’” second in Husserl’s 1913 publication, *Ideas I*,<sup>68</sup> and lastly in his collection of unpublished manuscripts from 1917/18 known today as *Die Bernauer Manuskripte*<sup>69</sup> (hereafter “Bernau manuscripts”).

How one is to understand the relation of sensation-data to conscious intentions remains problematic under Husserl’s form-matter schema of constitution. On the one hand, these data functionally “bear” a transcendent noematic sense intended in consciousness. Yet these data are also conceived as, themselves, non-intentional moments of consciousness. To put it in the words of Roman Ingarden, an especially adept student of Husserl’s at the University of Göttingen during the teens, “where ought one to look for the data of sensation?” They are obviously not a moment of the noema, but then again they do not seem to be strictly noetic either. Their status remains ambiguous. To make matters worse, Husserl’s various articulations of this structural or form-matter concept of constitution in his published writings and unpublished lectures are not entirely consistent with each other. This in and of itself is unsurprising, since a philosopher quite naturally develops her ideas over time and so tacitly introduces ambiguities into her investigations. Yet a question emerges whether this early model of intentionality retains its descriptive force as Husserl’s insights deepen and develop. In point of fact, in manuscripts ranging from the teens through the thirties Husserl works up a non-structural or genetic concept of constitution which so radicalizes the entire concept as conceived in his earlier writings to bring the entire earlier “static” form-matter model of intentionality into doubt. Yet in the end, I suggest, Husserl never explicitly rejected the static model of constitution—even after he developed this more fundamental model of passive constitution.



### The Static Model of Constitution: Apprehending Intention and Content of Apprehension

In the Fifth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl introduces—really for the first time—an explicit description of intentionality, i.e., of the constitution of sense [*Sinn*] in consciousness, by an explication of the act-structure of consciousness. This analysis has roots reaching back to the psychological studies of his teacher at Vienna, Franz Brentano, most especially as articulated in Brentano's *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*.<sup>70</sup> In this important study, Brentano marks out an essential distinction between two fundamental sorts of experiential phenomena: the psychic and the physical.<sup>71</sup> In order to forestall confusion between these distinct kinds of appearances, Brentano carefully delimits the physical or contentual appearance intended in consciousness from the accompanying presentive act.<sup>72</sup> Though Husserl generally accepts this distinction in his own analysis of intentional consciousness, he takes great pains to advance a more nuanced and what he deems a more adequate description of the constitution of sense in his *Logical Investigations*. Nevertheless, the source point of Husserl's conception of intentional consciousness is to be found in Brentano's *Psychology*, especially in this distinction between the psychic and the physical, i.e., the distinction between intentional consciousness and intended object.

It is the criterion of demarcation that Brentano identifies marking off these two fundamental sorts of appearances which is central to Husserl's theory of constitution in the *Logical Investigations*. According to Brentano, psychic phenomena, or perhaps better said, psychic *acts* are to be sharply distinguished from the phenomenal content intended in that activity. Though physical phenomena may be said to have intentional existence, psychic phenomena, by contrast, are "such phenomena which intentionally contain in themselves an object."<sup>73</sup> As such, they are said to have "intentional *inexistence*," an expression employed by Brentano to indicate that positive mark delimiting the essence of psychic phenomenon precisely as a directedness to some content appearing in consciousness.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, objects of outer perception exist as contents intended in a presentive act of some sort, such as a sense-perception or an act of imagination. Presentive acts do not exist as "objects" of a perception, however.<sup>75</sup> They are, nevertheless, immediately present to consciousness in a perception altogether different from that of outer perception. Objects of outer perception are mediated through the senses. That which is apprehended in this inner perception, on the contrary, is given immediately. Hence this inner perception is really, according to Brentano, the only sort of perception that can be termed unequivocally perception in the proper sense, i.e., as a "true taking" [*Wahr-nehmung*] of a givenness.<sup>76</sup> Brentano, as Husserl says, thus introduces an essential and "sharply delimited class of experiences . . . comprising in itself all that characterizes psychic, conscious existence in a certain pointed sense."<sup>77</sup>

Another fundamental point of agreement between the Husserl and Brentano rests on the foundational status of presentation [*Vorstellung*] in Brentano's analysis. Husserl tends to avoid the term presentation in the Fifth Logical Investigation and favors in its stead the expression "objectifying consciousness." He agrees generally with Brentano, though, that presentation, i.e., the presentive *act* (using Brentano's terminology) forms the foundation of every psychic phenomena whether judicative, conative or affective.<sup>78</sup> Thus any non-presentive act, a desiring, let's say, necessarily implies, for Brentano, presentation as ground. Husserl takes over this notion with his assertion of the primacy of objectifying consciousness (which he asserts explicitly in §117 of *Ideas I*). According to Husserl, then, in every polythetic intention an objectifying intention plays a foundational role.

To the essence of every intentional experience, whatever may otherwise be found in its concrete composition, there belongs the having of at least one, but as a rule several, "positing-characters," "theses," connected together by way of the relationship of founding; in this plurality, then, there is necessarily a positing which is *archonistic*, so to speak, which unifies and rules all the others.<sup>79</sup>

Every experiencing is positional according to Husserl's analysis and as such posits some sort of being<sup>80</sup>—except, of course, for those unique acts of reflection modified under the restriction of the phenomenological *ἐποχή*.<sup>81</sup> Non-presentive acts, or, to use Husserl's term, non-objectifying acts,<sup>82</sup> are still a sort of positional consciousness, but of such a kind as merely to obtain the universal *possibility* of an objectifying turn.<sup>83</sup> And though non-objectifying acts such as feelings and strivings are "constituting," as Husserl says—placing the word in quotes—only "the doxic cogito alone performs actual (*aktuelle*) objectivation."<sup>84</sup> All positional experiences<sup>85</sup> have a foundational relation to a primary level of objectifying acts.

Husserl admittedly rejects certain aspects of Brentano's doctrine. For instance, he rejects what he sees as the confused description of the relation between feelings and feeling-sensations in Brentano's *Psychology*.<sup>86</sup> In his *Logical Investigations* he thus introduces a more nuanced analysis of the nature of intentional experience in order to clear up this confusion. Nevertheless, he retains the central point of Brentano's analysis, i.e., that the primary intentional act-character of consciousness is an objectifying consciousness.

Turning now to Husserl's early conception of constitution, that is to say, to the structural model having the character "apprehension—content of apprehension" (or, equivalently, noesis-noema), we may now move to clarify the problems and limitations inherent to this static model of intentionality presented in Husserl's early writings. We should note, however, that we are not exposing something new here. Indeed, the problem at issue in Husserl's model of sense-constitution was one that Husserl, himself, had

to face with his students in his years at the University of Göttingen. We find him doing so, for instance, during the mid-teens of the last century with Roman Ingarden. We know of this exchange through Ingarden's publication in 1968 of the letters Husserl had sent him over many years, the *Briefe an Roman Ingarden* (hereafter "*Briefe*").<sup>87</sup>

In a series of recollections, which Ingarden appended to the entire collection of letters, Husserl's student articulates a number of problems which he and Husserl discussed in the context of Ingarden's work toward his dissertation on Henri Bergson's philosophy.<sup>88</sup> In the research phase of this work Ingarden had become interested in a number of problems in Husserl's philosophy which Husserl had not explicitly taken up in his publications. So he initiated a discussion over these problems with his *Doktorvater*. Of these discussions (which range over years), one theme in particular interests us here because of its direct relevance to our own investigation. "Another problem of which I had spoken to Husserl at that time," Ingarden recalls, "was the question of the original data of sensation and their relation or, rather, their connection with the noeses of sensible perception."<sup>89</sup> Indeed, this is our own question as we examine Husserl's models of intentionality.

This problem arose from Ingarden's reading of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, particularly the Fifth Logical Investigation. The two men shared a lively exchange on a number of issues during Ingarden's work on his dissertation, and he and Husserl explicitly debated the significance of the problem of sensation-data in the model of intentionality generally for some time. Though this was a serious discussion, we should pause to note, however, that Ingarden's first sustained work with Husserl centered less on this special question than on his efforts to understand adequately the problem of time and time-consciousness in Bergson's philosophy, most particularly on the distinction between *la durée pure* and *le temps*.<sup>90</sup> Although these two phenomenological problems, i.e., the one problem of the relation of sensation-data to immanent noeses in the model of intentionality and the other problem of inner time-consciousness, do not appear related, we believe they are and intimately so. It is important to recognize, however, that Ingarden did not explicitly link the two issues together in his early discussions with Husserl. We do not mean to insinuate, in other words, that either Ingarden or Husserl directly treated these two problems as interrelated in their early discussions—even though, as we shall see, both came later to recognize their intimate connection. According to his recollection of the events, Ingarden and Husserl treated the two problems as separate issues. Indeed, given the documentary aim of his appendix to Husserl's letters, Ingarden is quite careful to detail the course of their discussions as they actually occurred. To treat the two issues as integral from the first, however, would thus ignore the evolution of Husserl's insight into this important problem in his philosophy. We must come to understand, therefore, how these two issues became linked by Husserl's in his treatment of the problem of the constitution of sense in consciousness.

Reading through Ingarden's recollections, one is struck with the envious picture of an intimacy and seriousness the young scholar shared with Husserl. For Ingarden, this was a time of intense intellectual development. As he confesses, he was at this time unaware of any of Husserl's investigations into time-consciousness apart from what he could glean in the 1913 publication, *Ideas I*. But Husserl's *Ideas I*, which represents his most developed published articulation of the phenomenological method at the time and, indeed, for decades to come, consciously avoids any serious probing into the problem of time and time-consciousness. Husserl, in fact, makes this explicit in §81 of that work, wherein the phenomenological problem of time and time-consciousness is broached.

Time is, moreover, as will emerge from later investigations which are to follow, a title for a completely *self-contained problem-sphere* and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that our previous presentation has in a certain sense remained silent concerning a whole dimension so as to remain free from confusion, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. The "transcendental" absolute which we have laid bare by the reductions is, in truth, not the ultimate. It is something which constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely unique sense and has its primordial source in an ultimate and true absolute. Fortunately we can keep the riddles of time-consciousness out of play in our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor.<sup>91</sup>

Significantly, it is also precisely here in *Ideas I* where Husserl references his earlier set of unpublished manuscripts from his 1905 Göttinger lectures on the theme of inner time consciousness.<sup>92</sup> So, although *Ideas I* avoids the probing analysis of time and time-consciousness, it also presupposes Husserl's earlier work on this subject. In 1914, however, the year Ingarden initiated his discussions with Husserl on the issue of time and time-consciousness in both Bergson's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology, Husserl's early time-lectures remained unpublished, unedited and generally unavailable. They would indeed remain unpublished until 1928.

So as Ingarden worked on his dissertation with Husserl, there was really very little in Husserl's published writings by which to address the problems he found in Bergson's philosophy regarding the "nature" of original constituting time-consciousness.

And here I posed a question to Husserl in relation to original time-constituting consciousness. It is well known that this entire problem-sphere is not taken into account in the "Ideas." Husserl was somewhat surprised and asked me how I had come to know of this. I replied: "I know it from Bergson," whereupon Husserl invited me to visit him the next day. At the

time, Husserl was apparently not familiar with Bergson. When I came to him the next day I found on his desk *Evolution créatrice* (in German translation). Husserl affirmed that the descriptions of “durée pure” by Bergson stood very near to his own researches in this area.<sup>93</sup>

Ingarden, in other words, found in Husserl a welcome and well-prepared partner in his confrontation with Bergson's philosophy and the conception of the problem of time and time-consciousness therein.<sup>94</sup>

But it was not only Ingarden who found these discussions highly influential. It appears that Husserl also greatly benefitted. They spurred Husserl to enter upon a path that was to become the most profoundly important in his development of the problematic of time-consciousness and, thus also, for his conception of constitution in his phenomenology. “I am convinced,” Ingarden asserts, as he recalls their work together on these problems, “that the manifold problems of time were taken in a new and lively direction by Husserl at that time and that these at last had led Husserl to the new investigations on time in Bernau.”<sup>95</sup> Although Ingarden did not explicitly link the constitutional problem of sensation-data with the question of inner time-consciousness, as we have said, it is clear that Husserl began establishing a link between the two concerns in his writings soon after Ingarden left Germany in 1917 for Poland. The interconnection of these issues is, in fact, the ground out of which developed the genetic model of constitution first articulated—albeit in an inchoate state—in the Bernau manuscripts of 1917/18.<sup>96</sup> Thus in the years following his work with Ingarden, Husserl would quite profoundly revise his conception of intentionality. It is to these issues which lie at the heart of this revision that we shall now turn.

## The Problem

One must begin where Ingarden began, with the *Logical Investigations* and Husserl's structural description of constitution expressed therein. In the Fifth *Logical Investigation* Husserl draws a strict distinction between acts as intentions and the experienced content (which is made up of sensations) of these acts. This is an essential feature of intentional consciousness, so much so that one can distinguish even presentational sensations from feelings, such as the feeling of pain or pleasure, or favor and disfavor.

Already in his discussion of the question regarding the intentionality of feelings Brentano had pointed to the equivocation here. He distinguished sensations of pain and of pleasure (feeling-sensations) from pain and pleasure in the sense of *feelings*. The contents of the first—or the former, as I could more simply say—hold for him (in his terminology) as “physical,” the latter as “psychic phenomena” and belong thereby to essentially different species. This conception appears to me quite apt, though I only doubt whether the prevailing meaning tendency of the

word “feeling” does not indicate those feeling-sensations, and whether not, then, the manifold acts we signify as feelings, owe their name to the feeling-sensations which are essentially interwoven with them.<sup>97</sup>

Events, as Husserl points out, may be clothed in a particular warmth, wherein the pleasure felt, i.e., the sensation of pleasure, is also approved and enjoyed. This complex experience nevertheless retains, at root, a structural core wherein a determinate experiencing animates some presentational content. According to Husserl, content and experience must be sharply distinguished in the descriptive analysis of complex acts of this sort. “How, therefore, is the relation between the data of sensation and the specific noetic components to be understood?” Ingarden asks in his recollections. “And where ought one to look for the data of sensation?”<sup>98</sup>

In the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl offers a more nuanced analysis of intentional consciousness than did Brentano in his *Psychology*, distinguishing not merely the broad difference between act (*Erlebnis*) and its content but also the quality and material of the act, itself. Although this latter distinction is implicit in Brentano’s account of psychic phenomena, Husserl explicitly draws out this demarcation in his descriptions. Acts may differ in regards to their general positionality. In other words, the generic act-quality, i.e., the act as objectifying, judicative, emotive, and so on, is a broad structural feature of positional consciousness as such. Hence any intended objectivity bears the character of this general sort of thematization taking place in consciousness. When judging, for instance, that a particular substrate *S* has a determination *p*, the sense of the object intended in this consciousness, the *Sp* thing, has the generic sense of an objectivity *being-judged* as such. If, on the other hand, a concatenation of manifesting appearances takes a different form than anticipated by me, I naturally doubt my original apprehension of the object. For example, what I took to be an old man may look now upon closer inspection more and more like a mannequin, but I am at present still not sure. The object intended in this sort of consciousness is one *being-doubted*, or better said, it is present to consciousness as questionable. “All differences in the manner of objective relation are descriptive differentiations of the related intentional experiences.”<sup>99</sup> So while Husserl finds a generic differentiation between intentions of differing sorts which he describes as the quality of the intentional act, he sees a further specific differentiation to be made within acts of the same general kind. He distinguishes, in other words, between the generic quality of acts, let’s say, as positional, and the act-matter or act-material, i.e., as acts *positing this such and such*.

However if we take a series of acts such as the following: the judgment *It will rain today*, the conjecture *Today it will likely rain*, the question *Will it rain today?*, the wish *Oh that it would rain today!*, and so on, then it exemplifies the possibility of identity not merely in regards to

the objective relation generally but also in regards to the manner of objective relation understood in a new sense, to a manner which is prescribed therefore not by the quality of the act.<sup>100</sup>

In the Fifth *Logical Investigation*, the various generic objective relations expressed above in the different propositions indicate a descriptive differentiation to be made within the quality of the act. According to Husserl, however, the material (*Materie*) of an act signifies a sort of content, and so the various expressions above may well be said to have the same material even though the act-quality expressed in each proposition is not the same. "Content in the sense of material is a component of the concrete act-experience, which this can have in common with acts of a totally different quality."<sup>101</sup> Thus Husserl clearly distinguishes between generic act-quality and specific act-content, where he means by the latter the concrete intentional content in the positing of an objectivity.

It is important to note in what way this sense of act-content is meant here, however. For as we shall see, act-material *qua* content in this sense is not identical to the sensation-data that form the content of experience, although the actual differentiation between sensation-data and act-material remains ambiguous throughout Husserl's analyses in the Fifth Logical Investigation.

Quality only determines whether what already is presentationally posited *in definite fashion* is intentionally present as wished, asked, ruled in judgment, etc. Accordingly, matter holds for us *as that in the act which above everything else confers to it the relation to an object* [*ein Gegenständliches*], namely this relation in so perfect determinateness that through the material it determines not only the object [*das Gegenständliche*] generally which the act means, but rather also precisely the manner in which it is meant. The material—we can say still more clearly—is the uniqueness [*Eigenheit*] situated in the phenomenological content of the act, *as what* the act *grasps out* of the particular objectivity, which properties, forms, relations it apportions to it. It pertains to the material of the act that the object of the act holds for this and no other. It is in some measure the sense of objective apprehension which founds the act (but indifferent to differentiations of quality).<sup>102</sup>

Any and all intentional acts exhibit this quality-matter structure. This is, according to Husserl, an essential feature of intentionality. However, this description becomes seriously more complex because of the loose manner of Husserl's presentation in the *Logical Investigations*; for he seriously equivocated in the manner by which he used the expression "content" in that work. This ambiguity affects the clarity of his entire descriptive enterprise in the *Logical Investigations*. On the one hand, act-material *qua* content refers to the concrete posit of an act. On the other hand, Husserl



uses content or *Inhalt* to refer not to the posit of the act itself but rather to the sensation-data that are construed intentionally. In this second sense, acts *qua* apprehending experiences bestow meaning while the (sensation) “content” of these acts bear such meaning. As bearers of meaning, sensation-contents lack any apprehending intention.

I can find nothing more evident than the distinction which here emerges between contents and acts, more specifically, between perception-contents in the sense of presenting sensations and perception-acts in the sense of the apprehending intention. This intention in unity with the apprehended sensation makes up the complete concrete act of perception. Of course, intentional characters and likewise complete acts are also contents of consciousness in the widest descriptive sense of experiences. In this respect, all distinctions which we can establish generally are *eo ipso* distinctions of content. But within this widest sphere of that which can be experienced we believe to have had found the evident differentiation between those intentional experiences in which are constituted objective intentions, namely those through immanent characters of the respective experiences, and those to whom this is not the case, hence contents which can function as the cornerstone of acts but which are not themselves acts.<sup>103</sup>

It is clear, then, that in this widest sphere of phenomenological description, the real [*reell*] “contents” of consciousness are to be sharply distinguished: differentiated on the one hand into active construals and as passive bearer of such construals on the other. Yet somehow, as Ingarden rightly points out in his discussions with Husserl, a unity of these two radically distinct elements is somehow formed in the complete concrete act of perception. Each stands as an abstract moment of one real [*reell*] process (or experience). For Ingarden—and for us—it remains essentially unclear how these radically distinct moments can form such a unity in the concrete act of perception, since one moment of the experience is said to remain essentially inert.

Furthermore, this difficulty is made the more difficult since the acts, themselves, as is clear from Husserl’s comments above, have the same being-character as inherent non-intentional moments of consciousness. The apprehending intentional acts *qua* *Auffassungen* are, themselves, described by Husserl as objects [*Gegenständen*] (i.e., contents of consciousness in the broadest sense) inhering in consciousness, itself. And these objects are not identical to the non-intentional sensation-data that bear the sense intended in these intentional acts. Hence the unity of act-content is made even more complicated in that both moments, construal and content, have the feature of being-experienced [*Erlebtsein*]. The full perceptual act consists, in other words, in more than merely the unity of two distinct moments, form and matter. Intentional acts and sensation-data, which, themselves, “function”

to form the content of those acts, are said to inhere in consciousness on the same level.

### Reasons for a New Model of Constitution

Husserl, himself, was led eventually to question his own account of the form-matter structure of constitution. This occurred in the context of later studies connected to his research into phantasy-consciousness. In a research manuscript from 1909, at about the same time that he asserts in his time-investigations that absolute self-givenness is no empty phrase,<sup>104</sup> he pens the following rather revolutionary observation:

I had the schema “content of apprehension and apprehension” and certainly that made good sense. But we do not have, at first in the case of perception, in it as the concrete experience, a color as the content of apprehension and then the character of apprehension which produces the appearance. And similarly we do not have, again, in the case of phantasy, a color as content of apprehension and then an altered apprehension, the one which produces the phantasy-appearance. *Rather: “consciousness” consists through and through of consciousness, and sensation as well as phantasy is “consciousness.”*

And there we have, first, perception as an impressional (originary) consciousness of presence, consciousness of the itself-there and the like; and <secondarily> phantasy (in the sense in which perception is opposite) as the *reproductively modified consciousness of presence*, consciousness of the as-if itself-there, of the as-if present, of the phantasy of the present.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, according to Husserl's own words, the structural model of consciousness described initially in the *Logical Investigations* “made good sense,” but its descriptive force over all sorts of conscious intentionalities now is put into doubt. *Sensation or the modified phantasm is no longer viewed by Husserl merely as a static understory bearing the meaning-animation of an apprehending intentional consciousness.* A new conception of intentional constitution in Husserl's analyses is coming about. He proposes herein to clarify the act-structure of a presentifying consciousness with a model that can account for intentional structurings occurring at a level fundamental to objectifying consciousness quite generally. Sense-determination of an object in consciousness is now seen to be only partially determined by the active construals occurring in said consciousness. Some account must be given of the functionality, so to speak, of a more fundamental level of level of passive sense constitution upon which object determination originally takes place. As Professor Bernet rightly points out, “these efforts not only improved the analysis of memory, they also contained the core of a new theory of reflection according to which reflection is not an inner perception

but an objectifying presentification of a lived experience that has already ‘flowed away’.”<sup>106</sup>

In *Ideas I*, Husserl indeed presents a revision of the schema of constitution that was put forward in the *Logical Investigations*. Yet this revision represent less a revamping of the structural apprehension—content of apprehension model of constitution than it is a recasting of that model in non-psychologistic terms. Husserl thus explicitly introduces a terminology of noesis-noema in *Ideas I* as a less equivocal choice of words than that as found in his *Logical Investigations*. In point of fact, with the revision of the *Logical Investigations* that occurred as Husserl produced *Ideas I*, Husserl found the entire earlier terminology was infected with a language too confusingly naturalistic.

But what speaks against the use of the phrase <“psychic” or “mental”> as equivalent to intentionality is the circumstance that, without question, it does not account for the psychic in this <non-naturalistic> sense and signifies the psychic in the same manner as in the psychologistic sense (thus of that which is the object of psychology).<sup>107</sup>

This is more than a matter of mere terminology. The model of intentional consciousness described in *Ideas I* is meant in a formal manner to indicate a subjective constituting source which is itself not merely *not* psychological but, importantly, *not* mundane. Regardless of how successful this change of expression may be in achieving Husserl’s goal, the revised conception in *Ideas I* retains the same problems inherent to the form-matter schema introduced in the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl maintains the ambiguity of expression in the *Ideas* when he uses *Erlebnis* in this latter text to mean, on the one hand, a totality composed of both noema and noesis and, on the other, the abstracted noetic moment of that whole.<sup>108</sup> This ambiguity once again leaves open to question the manner by which sensuous stuff constitutively forms the noema on a passive level, not as a moment of the noema *per se* but rather of the stream of consciousness itself as pre-conditional thereto.

### The Bernau Manuscripts as Breakthrough to a New Level

One is left to wonder why Husserl would retain the structural apprehension—content of apprehension model of constitution in *Ideas I*, understanding at this relatively advanced stage that consciousness is consciousness through and through—as he says in the 1909 manuscript. . Yet he retains this model well beyond the *Ideas*. Why? Apart from the fact that Husserl had not yet developed a viable alternative model in 1913, there are some indications to account for his consistency here in both *Ideas I* and other later texts. One should recall that in the 1909 manuscript Husserl voices his approbation of the structural model of constitution in the same breadth that he criticizes

its reach. And in §85 of *Ideas* I on “Sensuous ὕλη and Intensive μορφή” he further clarifies the descriptive limitations that remained imposed on his analyses with this model of sense-constitution.

We have already suggested above (when we referred to the stream of experience as a unity of consciousness) that intentionality, irrespective of its enigmatic forms and levels, is also a universal medium which in the end bears in itself all experiences—even those not characterized as intentional. <We are presently confined to> a level of consideration . . . which abstains from descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all temporality of experience. . . .<sup>109</sup>

The static model of constitution, in other words, represents the results of a provisional level of investigation. However this begs the question, though: in what sense are these investigations provisional?

Robert Sokolowski provides a fascinating and persuasive answer to this question in his excellent study *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*. The analyses taking place in *Ideas* I are consciously restricted to a structural analysis of a spontaneously thematizing consciousness. According to Sokolowski, Husserl is in essence forced to retain the model of constitution developed first in the *Logical Investigations* because “he has no other way of expressing the objectivity which is constituted by intentionality.”<sup>110</sup> Only with the development of a genetic phenomenology will Husserl be able to solve the deeper problem of the constitution of the stream of consciousness, and hence address the issue of the constitutive unity of the stream of hyletic data, itself. The analyses representative of the *Ideas* I are higher level analyses, which presume a primary constitution to have already taken place. “We have to dig deeper into intentionality of find the laws and structures correlative to the structure of objective time. We must go beyond acts and into the primitive elements which form them, the time phases or partial intentions. The implication of this procedure is that even the deepest layers of intentionality influence the structure of objectivity as it is known to consciousness.”<sup>111</sup>

For Husserl, however, the problem is not merely philosophical. How, in an introduction into the method of phenomenology, can this sort of “archaeology” be pursued while fulfilling adequately the aims of the work as an introduction? The *Ideas* is meant to introduce and initiate one into the field-work of phenomenology. To attempt this sort of depth-analysis in such a text, Sokolowski asserts, would be a pedagogical mistake.

The easier higher level of subjectivity was investigated first <in the *Ideas*>, and on this level it is legitimate to distinguish between apprehension and sense data, but this provisional distinction could be made only because the deeper layer of subjectivity, the layer of temporality, was explicitly neglected in order not to confuse. While writing the

*Ideas*, Husserl was already aware that the distinction between sense data and noeses could not hold if we were to probe deeper into the temporal structure of subjectivity. When he introduces this distinction, he says it is valid only if we limit ourselves to a superficial view of subjectivity, one that does not go into the deep and final region of temporality. When we do descend into the temporal sphere of subjectivity, we reach the point where apprehensions and sense data are no longer accepted as ready-made objects, nor can we treat them as distinct from one another. We realize here that both spring from a common source and both are constituted by subjective performance.<sup>112</sup>

Thus the apprehension-content of apprehension schematism has efficacy pedagogically and has an acceptably limited descriptive force for the specific purpose of an introduction to method. However, we must finally look to the development of genetic phenomenology in order to address and make clear the “most ultimate” problems alluded to in the *Ideas*. Only upon the ground of the *Ideas*, however, can we make sense of the deeper analyses of a genetic phenomenology.

This breakthrough to a genetic phenomenology, as has been already suggested, is to be found first in Husserl’s Bernau manuscripts. And, as I have been arguing, these manuscripts arose on the basis of Husserl’s confrontation with Ingarden on precisely these issues, i.e., the problem of the unity of construal and sensation-data, on the one hand, and the problem of the temporal constitution of consciousness itself, on the other. As we conclude this chapter, therefore, we should turn—albeit briefly—to examine the manner by which Husserl approaches and links these problems in the Bernau manuscripts.

The Bernau manuscripts are, unfortunately, neither a completely coherent explication of the time problematic nor even a finished product. We shall briefly examine the compositional structure of this work<sup>113</sup> later, though we will not attempt a catalog of the various models of time consciousness articulated therein.<sup>114</sup> At present, we will focus our eye on Husserl’s explicit discussion of the apprehension-content of apprehension schema in text Nr. 9 of these manuscripts as published in *Husserliana* XXXIII, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte*. After this, we can turn to the Bernau manuscripts as a whole as we look for a new, more systematic presentation of the phenomenological problematic by Husserl.

Before proceeding to text Nr. 9, though, we should note that Husserl first lays the ground for his analysis in these manuscripts of the apprehension-content of apprehension schema in *Husserliana* XXXIII, Nr. 6. This text has the title “Acts as objects in phenomenological time.” This particular manuscript has come under criticism by Dan Zahavi as demonstrating “an astonishing confusion, an inability to properly distinguish quite different constitutive contexts.”<sup>115</sup> In his critique of the “internal object” interpretation of time-consciousness, which Zahavi sees at work in this

manuscript, he proposes that our experiences need not be given as *objects* in inner time-consciousness prior to reflection. According to the “internal object” interpretation, the absolute flow of consciousness constitutes experiences (*Erlebnisse*) as temporal objects in immanent time. Zahavi suggests, rather, that “we only experience our own acts as temporal objects when we reflect.”<sup>116</sup> One can recognize three levels of temporality, Zahavi argues, which form a “correlative and inseparable constituted unity in the original unity of time-consciousness (that is, the consciousness originally constituting immanent time-objectivity).”<sup>117</sup> In other words, the absolute flow of consciousness constitutes a unity, which is the unity of immanent hyletic perception *and* the perceived object, in this case, the perceived tone. Thus we can clearly distinguish (i) the region of transcendent temporal objects, (ii) the region of *Erlebnisse* or experiences constitutive of these transcendencies, and (iii) “the experiencing (*Erleben*) of the unities on level two,”<sup>118</sup> that is to say, the constituting acts (*Erlebnisse*) of (ii). The region of immanent *Erlebnisse*, which is the region of noetic intentionality, is—under this scheme—seen as itself the product of a deeper constitution, which is the temporal constitution of the stream of consciousness itself.

In order to properly grasp the import of Husserl's analyses here, however, we need to understand the underlying questions driving his analyses. There are helpful clues in this regard on the folder containing this manuscript. Here are found important notes which were likely written by Husserl's assistant, Eugen Fink, (although I have no direct evidence for this claim). These notes contain two points of information. First, there is a note pointing to manuscript Γ, which is reproduced as text Nr. 9 in *Husserliana* XXXIII. This is the major reason why we take these two manuscripts together. Second, there are also a few paragraphs following upon this note which articulate very briefly the main issues under discussion in text Nr. 6. These remarks are reproduced in full here:

In particular, remarks concerning whether immanent perceptions (of hyletic data) lay in the same “phenomenological time” as the perceived hyletic data. What belongs to immanent perception—whether it is the flow constituting hyletic data (the original time-objective consciousness) or whether it is only the line of primordial act-phases. How do the time of the hyletic data and the time of the original constituting stream relate together (and likewise the time of the acts as immanent unities): whether they are merely parallel, joining to form a singular order whose phases have their correlative multiplicities.<sup>119</sup>

We can see from these remarks that the question in text Nr. 6 centers less on the conception of immanent perceptions as internal objects in inner time-consciousness, as Zahavi emphasizes, than on the very conception of the mode of immanent perception in inner time-consciousness. And while it is true that Husserl refers to the region of immanent perceptions as a

region of objects, i.e. “acts as objects in immanent time,” this is better seen as a provisional articulation rather than a definite doctrine. For it must be remembered, the Bernau manuscripts are an unfinished body of work, and any “interpretation” proposed therein has to be judged in this light. More importantly, though, is the fact that Husserl does not appear to be explicitly proposing an “internal object” interpretive model as much as he is proposing in these investigations, or at least here in text Nr. 6, a parallelization of act and object in an absolute time-consciousness.

It is with this in mind that we can now turn to text Nr. 9, where Husserl explicitly examines the apprehension-content of apprehension model of constitution. What we find in this manuscript is a very interesting delimitation of the concept of apprehension, which in many ways retains the original force of that expression as meant in the *Logical Investigations*. But now the concept is significantly broadened in scope from the narrow categorial conception proffered earlier by Husserl to every sort of object-intending. One must pay special attention here to the distinction Husserl draws between apprehending [*Auffassen*] in its broadest scope and in its narrowest.

In the end, the notion of apprehension enters into all spheres, where any objectivity is originally given, presentiated, perceived, given through induction, given in conceptual thought, on-hand, determined or indeterminate, evident or not, intuited or not intuited; but now <a distinction emerges wherein> a founded object-consciousness has its ground in a cognizing, an intending, a judging.<sup>120</sup>

These time investigations, it should be remembered, thematically reach as far back as his 1909 analyses of absolute time-consciousness, cited earlier. What Husserl discloses in these later analyses of time-consciousness, however, is the insight that the structure of an attentional consciousness parallels the manner of givenness of its correlate. “Duration coincides with duration. There are not two time-forms which are separated, but rather one form united by coincidence, according to both directions of regard perfectly the same, identical in two-sidedness.”<sup>121</sup>

Should a transcendent object come to original givenness and be graspable for consciousness originally at hand, then the giving experience must have a determinate structure, an immanent streaming of experiences. It must have an immanent stream of hyletic data and their apprehensions and with a certain specified structured flow in “phenomenological time.” And from this then we can extract the following: any outer perception is an interpenetration of a double objectivation, or, as we could also say, of a double “perception.” Outer perception is according to its essence a certain continual flow of “inner” perceptions, i.e., perceptions of immanent temporalities; and through this immanent flow of perception a second intentionality is at work in which the outer



object comes to original givenness in its transcendence and its objective time by a “setting forth” [*Darstellung*]. By this observation, immanent perception is taken as a continuum of connected, similarly identical and differentiated (continually changing) sensory data, which make up a stretch of time (of immanent time) and are given (“perceived”) originally as that.<sup>122</sup>

In text Nr. 9 of the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl does not fall into describing these *stretches of time* as immanent objects. Thus it is incorrect to assert, as Zahavi does, that for Husserl “either consciousness is given as an object, or it is not given at all.”<sup>123</sup> In fact, the poignancy of Husserl's Bernau writings can be found in his struggle to describe the “experience” of the givenness of a constituting “intentionality” while not at the same time falling into the infinite regress characteristic of something like the “internal object” model of inner time-consciousness criticized by Zahavi.<sup>124</sup>

At this stage, we can point out what Robert Sokolowski has already suggested. Immanent consciousness is itself constituted in the process of intentionality, itself. As such, the distinction Husserl drew in the apprehension-content of apprehension model is now transposed. At the most profound level sensation-data show themselves to be a sort of apprehending [*Auffassen*], as Sokolowski points out.

When we look at them <i.e., intentions and sensations> from the point of view of temporality, which is the ultimate and decisive point of view for phenomenology, sensations and intentions fall together; there are no longer two immanent objects, but only one. The distinction which Husserl makes in the *Logical Investigations*, the distinction which served there as the base of his concept of constitution, collapses when we study inner temporality, and in all logical rigor Husserl should conclude that no constitution at all has the schema “intentions-sensations.” He does draw this conclusion, but only after he has found a new way of explaining objective constitution through genetic analysis.<sup>125</sup>

If Sokolowski is correct, and Husserl does eventually conclude that no constitution at all has the schema apprehension-content of apprehension, then we cannot include *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* as an example of genetic phenomenology. However, it is reasonable to believe that Sokolowski is not entirely correct. Husserl certainly retains the structural model of intentionality in many of his analyses making up the Bernau investigations. My own opinion is that Husserl never gives up the structural conception entirely, and this view is corroborated, I believe, by the material cited here. But a full defense of this position this must be taken up in a different work.

Suffice it to say here that there is an interesting and profound linkage of the problems inherent to the apprehension-content of apprehension model and the “nature” of inner time-consciousness. Given broader aims, we could

examine the relation between Bergson's conception of time-consciousness and Husserl's, just as Ingarden and Husserl did in the teens. This sort of comparison would undoubtedly bear fruit, giving us a deeper understanding of Husserl's own position he developed in Bernau and beyond. And we could follow Sokolowski's lead to confirm or repudiate the view that Husserl ultimately rejected the schematism apprehension-content of apprehension. As it stands, however, we must content ourselves with this brief sketch of these two problems as they developed conjointly in Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness during the teens.

## HUSSERLIANA RECONSIDERED II: THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS

Throughout his career, and more increasingly as his philosophical insights into time and temporality deepened, Husserl came to feel that his work remained misunderstood, even by his most advanced students. Again and again, he lamented this situation in his private letters, yet he was always reticent to confront his detractors. He remained silent because, as he says, the vast number of these criticisms "miss the basic meaning of my phenomenology . . . despite their direct quotation of my own words."<sup>126</sup> Yet, as we have been arguing, there is good reason so many critics, even those among his students, misunderstood his work. During his lifetime, the vital core of his philosophy lay hidden in his unpublished writings; and his published works presupposed much of this research. Even those closest to him seemingly lacked knowledge of this research. Husserl suggests this to Dorion Cairns as they discussed the fundamental significance of the phenomenological reduction in 1931.

I [Cairns] repeated to Husserl that Kaufmann<sup>127</sup> had treated the phenomenological reduction as if it were primarily or exclusively a means of getting an apodictically necessary realm of being. Husserl replied that this was rather an interpretation of the reduction. Of course it had a grain of truth in it. But the apodicticity of the transcendental consciousness is not the same as mundane apodicticity. He said that neither <Martin> Heidegger nor <Oskar> Becker nor <Fr.> Kaufmann understood the phenomenological reduction.<sup>128</sup>

These men were no novices. Becker, Kaufmann and Heidegger were all advanced students in phenomenology and all had enviable access to Husserl's writings as well as to the Master, himself. In fact, Becker and Heidegger both worked at one time as Husserl's assistant at the University of Freiburg.<sup>129</sup> Yet these men, for different reasons, seemed to misapprehend his philosophy—if we are to believe Husserl. (Of course, Husserl misunderstood their work as well.) Needless to say, then, the problem of

understanding Husserl's philosophy is and remains a profound problem—in any climate. However if his closest students missed the basic meaning of his most fundamental methodological doctrines, what does this say about our situation today? Our problem is only compounded now that his writings, though available in *Husserliana*, are sectionalized and divorced from project of phenomenology as Husserl understood it.

In what sense is this last statement true? To understand this, we shall reconsider *Husserliana* once more and now examine the materials comprising volume XXXIII of the *Gesammelte Werke: Die Bernauer Manuskripte*.<sup>130</sup> In their editors' introduction, Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar speak explicitly of their great difficulty selecting and ordering the manuscripts for inclusion in the volume. Drawn almost exclusively from the 21 bundles of manuscripts within the L-I group of Husserl's writings,<sup>131</sup> Bernet and Lohmar decided to arrange the manuscripts into six thematic categories. They, then, arranged the manuscripts chronologically within these categories. As we can see, this editorial model differs from editorial construction adopted by Iso Kern in volumes XIII-XV. Volumes XIII-XV on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, we should recall, are like Volume XXXIII in that these are all composed (almost) entirely of Husserl's fragmentary research investigations. Though Kern provided subheadings under which he organized the various manuscripts, he chose as his primary organizing principle the writing date of the various manuscripts. In the Bernau volume on the contrary, chronology comes second to thematic orientation. Of course, the compressed time frame during which these latter manuscripts were written and the difficulty, oft times, of establishing a precise chronology are reasons to opt against Kern's organizational model. However, it is worth noting that this organizing principle places greater emphasis on the disparate problems within the manuscripts over that of their thematic development as a whole.

Of course, the manuscripts in volumes XIII-XV range over almost the full span Husserl's career, whereas the manuscripts in volume XXXIII span only two years. There is much less need in the latter volume, therefore, to show a development of themes as in the former. The editors of the Bernau manuscripts, however, did not entirely reject the chronological model entirely, as we have noted. They rather subordinated it to a presentation of the distinct issues arising in the manuscripts, themselves. Clearly, then, the editors of the Bernau manuscripts saw a diverse multiplicity of themes rather than a unitary investigative dynamic at work in the writings. The editors thus arrange Husserl's 1917–18 time investigations under six headings. These are:

- (i) "On the basic structure of original time-consciousness: the flowing connection of primordial presentation, retention, and protention,"
- (ii) On the givenness of the primordial process and the objectivities of time constituted therein with their fixed ordering of time and their flowing modalities of time,"

- (iii) “On the application of the model of content and apprehension in the analysis of original time-consciousness as well as the danger of infinite regress,”
- (iv) “Egoic and hyletic temporality considered genetically,”
- (v) “On the phenomenology of individuation: the temporality of objects of experience, phantasy and ideal objects,” and lastly
- (vi) “On the phenomenology of recollection.”

This presentational structure of the 1917/18 time-investigations proffers an interpretation of sorts of these materials, which the editors acknowledge. “The editors are conscious of the fact that their systematic ordering of the texts is not the sole one possible and that it not only brings to light certain connections—as any other grouping of the texts would—but at the same time masks other connections.”<sup>132</sup> The collection, itself, in other words, makes one (or more than one) connective tissue apparent but masks other connective tissues among the various manuscripts.

As we have suggested, though, every volume of Husserl’s research manuscripts in *Husserliana* is a construction of sorts and thus introduces an interpretation of the pertinent manuscripts. Of course, we are not here suggesting any impropriety or untoward motivation by any of the *Husserliana* editors when we suggest this. Far from it, all the volumes in the series, and most especially the collections of Husserl’s research manuscripts, represent exemplary works of critical archival publishing, including *Husserliana* XXXIII. Each editor must work within the constraints of the materials as they have survived. According to the accounts provided by the editors of *Husserliana* XXXIII, they lacked an authoritative compositional plan by which to organize the manuscripts. So they were left to their own devices as to how best to publish them. The present selection and composition of manuscripts in the volume reflects, therefore, the most sensible plan the editors could find by which to make available Husserl’s variegated research time-investigations produced during these years.

### The History of The Bernau Manuscripts

It would seem, then, a mystery how these manuscripts *would* have been organized in a final publication, if they had been published during Husserl’s lifetime. Yet we know by a review of Husserl’s correspondence that he and Eugen Fink worked very hard to produce a new major publication on the time problematic in the early to mid-thirties,<sup>133</sup> and these manuscripts were central to this plan. We have a further important resource relating to the Bernau manuscripts: Fink’s personal notes revolving around this effort which include a rich discussion of the issues of the Bernau manuscripts as well as various draft plans of an arrangement for the Bernau time-manuscripts.<sup>134</sup> In both the letters and Fink’s notes, we discover that Husserl originally planned to publish the Bernau manuscripts as a single monograph,

though this idea clearly changed over the years. In Fink's notes, one uncovers a number of draft arrangements for the publication of the Bernau time-investigations.<sup>135</sup> Oddly, these outlines are neither reproduced nor clearly mentioned anywhere in *Husserliana* XXXIII.<sup>136</sup> Though, it is certainly true that the outlines are unclear in many respects, they represent a completely different plan of arrangement of the Bernau texts. These outlines, in other words, suggest a completely different connective tissue among the manuscripts. This alone would be reason enough to include them in the *Husserliana* volume, even if only in the editors' introduction. They are reproduced here in an appendix to this work.<sup>137</sup>

Further, one of Fink's draft plans for the Bernau manuscripts has been known since 1968, when Roman Ingarden reproduced it in his commentaries at the end of his *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*. The omission of this draft plan in particular remains inexplicable. When comparing the Fink outlines to the presently available collection, it is clear that the systematic "connection" among the manuscripts as proposed by Fink is left entirely out of consideration in the *Husserliana* edition. We submit, however, that if there were an authoritative plan for the composition of *Die Bernauer Manuskripte*, these outlines, and the one published by Ingarden in particular—produced by Fink under Husserl's authorization—would be just this. We fully admit that the outlines were not produced by Husserl. Nevertheless, the fact remains that these outlines are the product of a figure intimately familiar with the living project of Husserl's phenomenology and authorized by Husserl, himself, in the effort to construct a publishable edition of these particular manuscripts.

The structure of the work, as Fink outlines it, points to a new, unitary conception of the phenomenological problematic developing in Husserl's thinking. To understand this, though, we must have a clearer sense of Husserl's investigations into time and temporality as he produced them, that is, not only during the teens but over the course of his entire career. Husserl's time-investigations fall into three thematically separate and methodologically distinct phases, where each later phase is separated from the earlier by many years. The first phase of Husserl's writings on the phenomenon of time and time-consciousness occurred during the Winter semester of 1904/05 when Husserl gave a lecture at the University of Göttingen entitled "On the Phenomenology of Time."<sup>138</sup> He eventually published a version of these transcripts in 1928 in the ninth volume of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. (Martin Heidegger is the acknowledged editor, though his work on the project was minimal. The vast bulk of the editorial work had been completed in 1917–18 by Husserl's assistant at the time, Edith Stein.) As this was the only work Husserl published on time-consciousness during his lifetime, it was and is also his most well known treatment on the subject. It is available today in Volume X of *Husserliana*, published in 1969. The volume also includes later, supplementary time-investigations which Husserl produced as late as 1917,<sup>139</sup> which

we have cited from earlier in this chapter. The second phase of Husserl's writing on time occurred in 1917/18 and is constituted by those manuscripts at issue here, i.e., the Bernau manuscripts on time-consciousness or the "L" manuscripts. And the third and last phase of Husserl's time-investigations took place after his retirement allowed him the leisure to return again to some of his earlier unfinished projects. These manuscripts, known as the "C" manuscripts, have only just come to print.<sup>140</sup> In these writings, Husserl takes a new approach to the problem of time which follows upon the advancements in method achieved since the Bernau manuscripts. However, we cannot examine this latter set of manuscripts in any detail here—even though these late writings are some of Husserl's most interesting in the entire corpus.

The Bernau manuscripts enjoy a unique history among Husserl's manuscripts as they did not make it into the archive until 1968. Up to this time, they remained in the personal possession of Eugen Fink, and no one except Fink knew of their survival.<sup>141</sup> Though their survival was doubted, their existence was well documented. Roman Ingarden, for instance, provides a treasury of information about them in his recollections and commentaries appended to the *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*. It is in these materials, for instance, that one can learn Husserl hoped at one point to publish the time manuscripts in his *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.<sup>142</sup>

I am working feverishly. Sadly, the new work will not be finished in time to be included in *Jahrbuch* XI, despite the breathless pace of the last year. . . . I am putting into the *Jahrbuch* the *Cartesian Meditations* (expanded by Dr. Fink und possibly myself) and the Bernau time-investigations, which Fink has by himself brought to the unity of a single (rather substantial) text.<sup>143</sup>

We know today, of course, that this plan never came to fruition. In fact, Husserl never managed to publish any of the works mentioned above in the form indicated here. But it worth pausing here to reflect on the plans Husserl suggests in this passage. He speaks of three works. These include (i) the Bernau manuscripts, (ii) a German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations* expanded by Eugen Fink, and (iii) an unnamed "new work" as of yet uncompleted. This latter work, to which Husserl refers without name, was to be a new "system of phenomenological philosophy"—the focus of our next chapter. Husserl vacillated in the early 30s between these major publication projects, and this wavering cost him greatly.

This is not to say, however, that Husserl or Fink completed very little with regard to these projects. In the *Briefe*, Husserl, for instance, writes many times to Ingarden about his work on the Bernau manuscripts. Ingarden explains, in fact, that Husserl first offered him the editorship of the manuscripts in 1927.<sup>144</sup> But the young scholar understood well the time and

effort that would be required of him to accomplish this task, so he respectfully refused. Husserl, then, turned to his new assistant, Eugen Fink. In giving this project to Fink, the charge was not dissimilar to that task given Edith Stein as she worked in the teens to transcribe and edit Husserl's 1905 time-investigations.<sup>145</sup> He left Fink to his own devices and turned, instead, to writing a new series of time-investigations. These became the so-called C manuscripts. Yet Fink, more than any other of Husserl's assistants, enjoyed enormous freedom to rework Husserl's investigations. He set about the task of unifying the disparate Bernau investigations and produced a number of different plans for the manuscripts. We need not detail the full history of this project here. Yet we should note, at least, that as Fink edited the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl's developed new time investigations and new insights garnered in these investigations compelled the two men to revise their original plans for the Bernau manuscripts. They concluded that the later time-investigations should be published together with the earlier Bernau manuscripts. Eventually, per Husserl's request, Fink, in fact, took over complete responsibility of the new time book and set himself to writing a wholly original work only loosely based on Husserl's time-manuscripts. Again, to detail this history would take us too far afield, though. We turn, rather, to the Fink outlines of the Bernau manuscripts in order to understand the investigative dynamic that Fink identified at work in these diverse investigations.<sup>146</sup>

### **The Unitary Investigative Dynamic at Work in the Bernau Investigations**

For purposes of simplicity, we shall restrict our present examination to the draft outline reproduced by Ingarden in his *Briefe*. It bears the title "draft of an arrangement for *Edmund Husserl's Investigations on the Phenomenology of Transcendental Time*."<sup>147</sup> When possible and appropriate, though, we shall augment our understanding of this plan by reference to Fink's more extensive notes; for it is within these that we find a number of different draft arrangements of the Bernau investigations. The various draft plans are all generally similar. According to Ronald Bruzina, editor of Fink's notes from this period, all these outlines reflect "an arrangement for the edition of the Bernau time-manuscripts from the first phase of editing—thus *before* the entire redaction and the *new* book manuscript, 'Time and Time-Constitution'."<sup>148</sup> That is to say, these outlines reflect the composition of the time publication that was to include both the Bernau manuscripts and the C manuscripts—essentially in two parts. The outline we are examining here in effect sketches out the first of the planned two-part time book.

According to Fink's draft plan, the whole work was to be divided into three sections.<sup>149</sup> This was to be preceded by what would in all likelihood have been a lengthy introduction written entirely by Fink. Though Fink's personal notes provide a wealth of detail regarding both the Bernau project



as a self-standing whole and the introduction as part, the notes, themselves, do not include a draft of this introduction. It was likely never fully completed, if it was written at all. In the notes to the proposed introduction, however, Fink indicates the need to orient the Bernau investigations within the frame of Husserl's earlier, more well known time-investigations. When viewed in the total context of Husserl's writings on time and temporality, in fact, the Bernau manuscripts represent the proverbial middle child. Naturally, this intermediacy was not apparent in the investigations, themselves, since they were not intermediate in 1917/18, i.e., at the time of their conception. Thus Fink had to link these new-old time-investigations to Husserl's earlier time-investigations while also giving an indication of their distinctiveness. "What the Bernau writings do, then, is to go one level deeper and inquire into the constitution of immanent time itself."<sup>150</sup> Where the earlier time-investigation sought to clarify the constitution of temporal objects, this latter work was to focus on the constitution of the immanent flow of time (consciousness), itself.

Looking at Husserl's work after 1905, the Bernau investigations form the bridge between Husserl's earliest time investigations and later developments of phenomenological method we have been tracing in this chapter. In his notes, Fink remarks that the Bernau time-investigations represent "an attempt by Husserl to go beyond the phenomenological position of 1905."<sup>151</sup> Fink sought in his introduction, therefore, to highlight the connection between these middle period time-investigations not only to Husserl's earlier 1905 investigations but also to *Ideas* I. His sketch of the introduction in his notes reads as follows:

Introduction: (The problem of transcendental time: in these writings basically from within the egological reduction. Connection to the "Ideas": the reduction performed in that work as a reduction of the first level; characterization of the exposition of the transcendental time-problem in the "Ideas" and in the "Lectures". New presentation of the phenomenological reduction and articulation of the phenomenological problematic of constitution.—Sketch of the work.)<sup>152</sup>

Given the brevity of this sketch, it remains unclear what Fink means by this connection. Earlier in this chapter, we indicated how the reduction could be conceived as "a reduction of the first level" as Fink characterizes it here. There is a very strong reason to believe that, because Husserl left the problem of time "out of play" in his *Ideas*, the entire work remained provisional. The doctrine of phenomenological reduction demands a further deepening by taking account of time. Here in the Bernau investigations, we have this effort. Also, we showed earlier how Husserl had begun to develop a new model of intentionality and hence a new presentation of the phenomenological reduction after his 1905 time-investigations. This new model is the "new presentation" mentioned above by Fink.

However, we can still legitimately ask, in what sense are the Bernau time investigations connected to *Ideas I*? What is the direct linkage? The Bernau time-investigations, like the *Ideas*, take the pure I to be the fundamental point of phenomenological analysis. As Husserl states in §57 of *Ideas I*.

”At least, when fundamentally considered, every cogitatio *can* change, *can* come and go, even though one may doubt whether each is *necessarily* something that is past and not merely, as we come across it, something *factually* past. In contrast, the pure I appears to be something fundamentally necessary and absolutely an identity in every actual and possible change of the experiences. It is in no sense an inherent <reelles> piece or moment of the experiences.”<sup>153</sup>

”However, the I,” as Husserl says in a note which he appended to this passage, “does not offer foreshadowings of itself, it does not appear, it lives in its acts and is the subject of life.”<sup>154</sup> The necessity of the I at issue here is striking for two reasons. First, we should recall that Husserl had explicitly rejected the notion of a “primitive I as the necessary center of relations” in his *Logical Investigations*.<sup>155</sup> Even in the 1905 lectures, this articulation of the “necessary center of relations” remains subordinate to Husserl’s analysis of the time-constituting flow, itself.

This flow is something that we so speak of as constituted, but it is not something temporally “objective.” It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something characterized in a picture as “flow” in a point of actuality, a point of primal wellspring, an originating now, etc. In the experience of actuality we have the primal wellspring and a continuity of resonating moments. For all this we lack names.<sup>156</sup>

In *Ideas*, however, we have a definite recasting toward a transcendental standpoint. The pure I functions there much like the transcendental I described by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>157</sup> Husserl even quotes Kant in this passage as an alternative expression of the same idea. “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations.”<sup>158</sup> But we should note, secondly, that Husserl suggests an important modification to the Kantian conception of the transcendental I. As Husserl sees it, the pure I stands not merely as the logical condition of all experience but also as the *living* center of experience. In the flow of experiences, the pure I “lives in its acts and is the subject of life.” What this means, though, that is to say, how is it that the pure I “lives in its acts and is the subject of life” becomes the paramount question in the Bernau investigations.

The Bernau investigations were not meant to cancel the results of *Ideas* but rather to transcend the egological reduction as carried out in it to a new more profound reduction. Our analysis of the structural “apprehension-content of apprehension” model of intentionality above has shown how

the problem of time intrudes itself into Husserl's structural descriptions of intentionality. What we find in the Bernau investigation, then, is the explicit recognition that transcendental time is "the basis of all constitution."<sup>159</sup> These investigations set about, therefore, to provide the needed fundamental ground-laying of the problem of constitution which Husserl came to realize were necessary after he acknowledged the inadequacy of his earlier structural model of intentionality.

Fink's draft arrangement of the manuscripts proceeds from this realization and so begins with the analysis of immanent time. The very first section of the planned work, as Fink lays it out, begins with a discussion of "memory as a precondition of comparison and identification."<sup>160</sup> This is a most interesting beginning, especially when compared against similar analyses which occur in the *Logical Investigations*. The Bernau analysis focuses on the evidence pertaining to the highlighting of similarities [*Gleichsamkeiten, Gleichheiten*] apprehended among variegated temporally distinct individual intuitions. Though this short manuscript<sup>161</sup> is very coarse in its presentation, its treatment of identification is something fundamental to Husserl's phenomenological descriptions of the intuition of essences. It takes up essentially the same phenomenon articulated in §58 of Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation. However, now the grasping of identities is analyzed explicitly within the frame of the temporality of consciousness.

Husserl's points out in the Bernau writings that "any identity which I come across intuitively in perception or in phantasy, gives itself to me as such through a "coincidence", in which no gap emerges as prominent. But this gapless coincidence is a *Limes*, an idea."<sup>162</sup> Though Husserl consistently proposed that "all see and, so to speak, continually see 'ideas,' 'essences' all the time,"<sup>163</sup> the intuition of such essences is not a simple act of consciousness. Rather, the seeing of ideas takes place on the ground of sensory perception.

But we do not grasp ideas as universalizations <*Verallgemeinerungen*> of actually constituted similarities or identities but rather as intuitions of ideas evidenced by the intuited instances and synthesis of instances. An intuition of ideas as a pure intuition of essence has its evidence.<sup>164</sup>

The Bernau investigations initiate a new analysis of this evidence. Where Husserl's analysis of the intuition of ideas in his *Logical Investigations* lacks any recourse to memory, this is now seen in the Bernau time investigations as pre-condition to the grasping not merely of ideal objects but also the founding individuating intuitions. Accounting for the introduction of the temporal structuring of consciousness, his point is virtually identical in both investigations.

The being-founded of an act does not mean that it is built upon other acts in any manner whatsoever, but rather that a founded act, is possible

only as such according to its nature, i.e., its sort, which are themselves built upon acts of the sort of founding acts, and that, consequently, the objective correlate of the founded act has a form, a universal with which an object generally can appear intuitively only in a founded act of this sort. Thus the intuitive consciousness of universality cannot occur [*bestehen*] without an underlying individuating intuition. An identification cannot occur [*bestehen*] without underlying acts which relate to the identified objects, and so on.<sup>165</sup>

The temporal structure of presentifying sensuous consciousness is the ground of every sort of objectifying act. Where §58 of the *Logical Investigations* essentially closes out Husserl's analysis of categorial acts in that work, this is precisely the starting point of Fink's draft arrangement of the Bernau manuscripts. That is, the Bernau time investigations begin precisely where the *Logical Investigations* leave off. Husserl, thus, zigzags back to the subject matter of his earliest investigations of sense-constitution, most especially as articulated in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* I. He sets about in the Bernau investigations, then, to recast the earlier hard-won insights within the frame of these more profound time-investigations.

Turning now to Husserl's *Ideas*, it is interesting to note that where Husserl begins there with the pure I as the necessary center of relations, the Bernau investigations as Fink lays them out only ends there. In the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl seeks to account for the self-constitution of the transcendental I in the fundamental setting of living sensory experiencing. The greatest weakness of the *Ideas* is that it merely presupposes that the pure I *lives in its acts and is the subject of life*. It offers no serious phenomenological account of this, however. The Bernau investigations, on the contrary, seek to remedy this defect. Fink, thus, closes out his draft arrangement of the investigations with the following manuscript, entitled "my experience-stream and the I."

The reduction which we intend and which follows an apriori necessary structure is the *abstraction from an I and everything egoic*—naturally a mere abstraction, but one very important. In the first order of time, then, we have sensation-data and sensate feelings. Sensual drives are affections from the I outward, and the passive being-attracted of the I, likewise are "sensate" realisations. "Acts of appetite" are passive reactions, but passively arising <entquellend> itself as *actus* in it, nothing comes there from the I. This is thus the sphere of "stimuli" and reactions to stimuli: irritability. But now we wish still to parenthesize this, this brings into play the I. From this area, that is, we differentiate the "completely egoless" sensory tendencies: sensory tendencies of association and reproduction, and thus determinate horizon-formations. The question is: how it comports in original time-consciousness. Passive intentionality. Here the I is left out of play also as a pole of affections

and reactions, or rather is abstracted therefrom. Therefore, we have then a first “abstract” structure which is to be singled out, that of the passivity of original sensuality.<sup>166</sup>

The fundamental setting of egoic life is thus rooted in this “first ‘abstract’ structure, which is the passivity of original sensuality. The form-matter conception of sense-constitution described in all of Husserl’s (logical) works now is seen to rest ultimately on this more fundamental passive “constitution” of an original sensuality. This is the basis of all constitution, which is, as Finks describes it in his notes, “transcendental time.”<sup>167</sup>

We have now come full circle. Husserl, chastened by Misch and the life-philosophers as the philosopher who sucked the marrow from experiencing life, has come to acknowledge the inadequacies of his earlier intentional descriptions. Here he focuses his analytical eye directly on the living ground out of which the I functions. Thus if we follow Husserl’s course of thinking, as we have done in this chapter, we find that his preeminent concern is less logical experience than the reduction to *pure self-givennesses*. However, what gives itself to consciousness, shows itself in some manner, i.e., not as a bare fact but a constituted objectivity? In this showing of itself, the I must be drawn to it, attend to it and perhaps even thematize it. Indeed, the very attentiveness of the I, itself, must be accounted for. How is one to describe this “agency?” We have seen that the structural model of sense-constitution falters precisely on this point. This is not to say that the model is wrong, but rather it is deficient insofar as it is a provisional articulation of only one level of sense-constitution. It certainly made “good sense” given its limitation to the constitution of sensory and categorial objectivities. Now in the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl seeks to provide a more thorough-going description of the constitution of conscious life, itself, whereby we can account for the manner by which such objectivities arise, are noted and categorized. As he says to Paul Natorp in regard to this development, “I have gone beyond the stage of Platonism and posed the idea of transcendental genesis as the chief theme of phenomenology.”<sup>168</sup> However, once Husserl developed these two models of intentionality, he must show how they fit together. This indeed is the project of his “system of phenomenological philosophy,” which is the subject of our next chapter.

## 4 The System of Phenomenological Philosophy

I have progressed further in the systematic of phenomenology—in the necessary sketch of the general “map” of the transcendental continent. I still hope to realize this so I may die in peace.”

—Husserl to Rudolf Pannwitz, November 28<sup>th</sup>/29<sup>th</sup>, 1934.<sup>1</sup>

In the first chapter, we concentrated our attention on Husserl’s extant corpus. There our concern centered less on any particular area of research than on understanding of the complexity of the estate, itself. We saw that even though Husserl published a number of introductions and significant logical studies, when compared against his total literary output the set of these writings not only looks spare but also highlights the profundity and thematic diversity of abundance of his unpublished writings. His published writings, in fact, seem to rely on studies he never published. Indeed, the progressively advancing concept of phenomenological method brought to light in the various introductions which he did publish is traceable in his unpublished writings. Indeed, we discovered that Husserl, himself, felt his true philosophy lay within his unpublished works.<sup>2</sup> Yet Husserl’s manuscripts often fail to exhibit a unity of method, to the extent that this occurs even within the individual investigations, themselves. One is led to wonder, then, if and how the partial investigations composing his literary estate could be fitted together into an architectonic of phenomenology.

Husserl, at once, both hoped for and came close to despairing of ever producing an adequate systematic presentation of the transcendental phenomenological problematic. There are numerous examples of this in his correspondence. We find just one example in a poignant letter to Roman Ingarden, which he penned near Christmas, 1930. In this confessional, Husserl expresses a deep-seated skepticism of his own abilities and a unique antagonism to his own doctrines <Lehren>. “No one can be more skeptical in regard to one’s own self and one’s doctrines than I,” he says. “The mistrust I have of myself, which borders on malignancy, is as if I am my own enemy.”<sup>3</sup> Ironically, he then takes the opportunity in the letter to assert his grand ambition to produce a large systematic of phenomenology. But, as we know, he failed to ever publish such a work.

In our second chapter, we, then, took up the task of justifying the view that Husserl’s phenomenological investigations can be understood and presented systematically. We laid out the sense which Husserl understood his own disparate studies to form a unitary whole. We saw in his letters to Georg Misch that he believed an impulse had worked its way through all

his major advancements, an impulse which first took root at the time of his personal encounter with Wilhelm Dilthey in 1905. When we look to his work in 1905 and beyond, we discover, indeed, that this was a momentous year for him. It was in 1905 that Husserl uncovered the concept and proper use of the phenomenological reduction amidst his work on the problem of time and time consciousness. What is striking, though, is that he remained curiously silent to the philosophical public at large about this discovery. Between the time of the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*, that is to say, between 1901 and 1913, Husserl published nothing in which he announced this discovery. In the only significant writing of these years, i.e., the *Logos* essay, "Philosophy as rigorous science," he—as he says—neither makes use of nor mentions the reduction.<sup>4</sup> Yet where he remained silent to the public at large, we saw that he was not so either in the classroom or his personal research manuscripts. In these settings, Husserl spent considerable effort explicating the methodological doctrine of the reduction.

In the third chapter, we naturally turned to these materials with the particular aim to understand the concept of reduction articulated there. We traced the manner by which Husserl originally presented and then revised the concept of phenomenology and phenomenological reduction in two seminal lecture courses, "The Idea of Phenomenology" and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. We saw that Husserl gradually came to realize that the structural model of intentionality which he had set forth in his *Logical Investigations*, and to some extent reiterated in *Ideas I*, showed itself to be an inadequate descriptive model of sense constitution in the broadest sense. The efficacy of the structural model concerned primarily the thematization of objectivities spontaneously taken up in actual consciousness. This efficacy ended at the passive sphere of "intentional" sense-bestowal.

In the teens, then, Husserl began a new series of investigations, the Bernau time-investigations, wherein he sought to address this very difficulty. This work, along with lectures Husserl held during the Winter Semester 1920/21,<sup>5</sup> Summer Semester 1923,<sup>6</sup> and the Winter Semester 1925/26,<sup>7</sup> initiated a breakthrough to a new, "genetic" method of phenomenology. The temporal model of intentional consciousness which Husserl began to work out during these years would disclose a passive sphere of intentional sense constitution that remained outside the descriptive range of the structural model. Yet these later methodological developments did not arise in a vacuum. They took place, as we saw, on the basis of refinements which Husserl had introduced in his earlier lecture courses. "The Idea of Phenomenology" signified Husserl's explicit rejection of the psychological for the specifically phenomenological method of reduction; and his *Basic Problems* illustrates the integration of temporality into his analysis of conscious intentionality more thoroughly than ever before. Indeed, the two lectures were so important that Husserl returned to them in twenties and after to attempt a new systematic presentation of phenomenology on their basis.



We have now obtained the background necessary by which to understand Husserl's efforts to produce a "system of phenomenological philosophy" in his later years. During the twenties and thirties, Husserl worked intermittently at producing such a system. A systematic of phenomenology would unify the seemingly incongruous descriptions of intentional consciousness, i.e., the structural model of "apprehension—content of apprehension" and the genetic or temporal model of passive intentionality, which he produced in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the period between 1913 and 1928, i.e., the year he published *Ideas I* and the year of his retirement and new publishing activity, respectively, marks a period of near complete silence in Husserl's publishing history,<sup>8</sup> and this silence affects our present understanding of Husserl's work to produce a system. There are a number of reasons underlying this silence. As we have seen, the teens and early twenties marked a period of intense philosophical development, so Husserl focused his attention on working out his developments rather than codifying them in a new work. And one should not overlook the effects of the First World War on Husserl. He lost both his eldest son to the war and his mother to old age at about the same time. Further, his second son was gravely wounded in that same war. These sad personal events and Germany's defeat in the war threw him into a deep, long lasting depression. However, early in the twenties, Husserl managed to rouse himself and set about to produce a new systematic presentation of his philosophy.

It is unfortunate that Husserl gave up this plan before very long; though this was not be his last attempt in the twenties at producing a system. In the middle of the decade, he set himself the task of writing a systematic presentation of phenomenological philosophy. Once again, though, he turned rather quickly to other pressing projects and thus never completed this work. Given the paucity of historical documentation regarding both of these literary efforts and most especially of the earliest of Husserl's plans to produce a systematic of phenomenological philosophy, we can provide only the barest sketch of Husserl's early efforts and plans for this work.

In the thirties, though, Husserl would again take up the task of writing a new presentation of phenomenology, a new "system of phenomenological philosophy." As before, this last effort would also never make it to publication. But, fortunately, we have a much more detailed set of materials by which to understand this later effort. The planned work was to be a massive undertaking, bringing together all the main currents of his concrete investigations into a single literary frame. In many important respects, this was to be a joint undertaking by Husserl and his assistant, Eugen Fink. Indeed, Husserl collaborated so closely with his assistant on the planned "system" that it would be mistaken to identify it as Husserl's alone. More than simply the product of two individuals, it is (or was planned to be) the articulation of the constitutive dynamic of phenomenology as such.

As we shall see, two sketches of the 1930s project exist: an earlier, written solely by Husserl, and a later sketch produced by Fink. The later outline

is much more detailed than the first. Naturally questions arise as to the authorship of this later work, and we shall examine some of these here. Regardless of these questions, though, the two plans reflect, as we shall show, the hierarchical articulation of essentially interrelated phenomenological investigations expressing a universal phenomenology. We shall thus detail both plans in this chapter and offer an explanation of their essential community. First, however, we shall look at Husserl's earlier efforts to produce a systematic of phenomenology in the twenties.

## THE EARLY AND MID-TWENTIES

After moving from Göttingen to Freiburg in 1916, Husserl naturally sought to establish a new following of students. Even more importantly, though, he also hoped to instill in himself a new sense of purpose that would cap his years at Göttingen. The early years at Freiburg were a difficult period, since Husserl gave up much by leaving. In Freiburg, he took over Heinrich Rickert's chair of philosophy. Rickert, the leading member of the Southwestern School of neo-Kantian philosophy, left behind a program at Freiburg that was by no means strongly phenomenological in its orientation. Husserl thus felt the need to re-establish himself and to build a phenomenological program at Freiburg in the waning years of the teens. By the time of the twenties, he seems to have regained his footing and a sense of confidence in his own abilities to advance his philosophy. By 1921, he set upon a plan for a great new systematic work of phenomenology.

The motivation to construct a new system of phenomenology arose out of the developments into transcendental theory he achieved during his lecture course in the Winter Semester 1920/21. This course, simply called "Logic," marked Husserl's efforts to apply the genetic phenomenological method initiated in the teens to the accomplishments of logical thinking. The simple title of the course obscures the general orientation of the lectures. His aim in the lectures was to work from ready-made logical formations, using these as clues to the subjective thinking out of which these formations take their objective sense. "But there is still much more that is lacking, namely, the reference back to the phenomenological sources of all knowledge, the deepest founding of all objective sciences arising from the universality of knowing consciousness."<sup>9</sup> The genetic method Husserl employs here is the regressive tracing back from "ready made" or pre-given objectivities to the sense-bestowing activity in thinking which gives these theories their sense as objectively valid.

If one goes back from theory that is dead, so to speak, and has become objective, to the living, streaming life in which it arises in an evident manner, and if one reflectively investigates the intentionality of this evident judging, deducing, etc., one will immediately be led to the fact

that what stands before itself linguistically rests upon deeper accomplishments of consciousness.<sup>10</sup>

His aim in the lectures was, thus, "to open up this expansive, great world of the interiority of consciousness and under the guiding viewpoint of a theory of science, and by beginning from below and ascending upward, to show how genuine thinking in all its levels emerges here, how it is built up and is built-up in its founded accomplishment."<sup>11</sup> In such an endeavor, the lecture course of the Winter Semester 1920/21 stands as Husserl's first true example of genetic phenomenological method.

As we have said, the effort to construct a new systematic foundational work of phenomenology arose out of his logical studies in the Winter Semester 1920/21, which Husserl offered in modified form three times over the decade, first in the Winter Semester 1920/21 course, next during the Summer Semester of 1923, and lastly during the Winter Semester 1925/26. One would expect, then, to find among these manuscripts, at least, an example of the system as he conceived it. One of the great disappointments as we study Husserl's efforts during these years, however, is the lack of any cohesive work that documents this plan among his papers.<sup>12</sup> Turning from his logical studies, particularly, to the wide range of phenomenological studies found in his manuscripts, Husserl hope to build a system of phenomenological philosophy on their basis. He failed, it seems, to construct a literary frame by which to present his writings systematically. Of course, he did not merely sift through his old writings. As we have seen, in every looking back there is the compulsion to bring the old articulations to the level of the newer insights. And so with his attention turned to his literary estate, Husserl also initiated new investigations which were to fit within the system. Indeed, there are a number of such writings from this period that were produced with this end in mind; unfortunately there are none that ties everything together into a single whole. Today, we have, in other words, a collection of manuscripts that were meant to form a system of phenomenology, but we do not have the systematic articulation of these works. So, the question arises, what would this systematic of phenomenology look like, if we could reconstruct it?

The most important resource documenting this effort available today is found in the three interrelated volumes of *Husserliana* on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, i.e., volumes XIII through XV edited by Iso Kern. Kern's editorial introductions and the original materials by Husserl comprising these volumes, especially those found in volume XIV, are particularly important toward understanding Husserl efforts to construct a system of phenomenological philosophy in the early to mid-twenties. Unfortunately, the manuscripts from this period that document this effort are strewn throughout the *Nachlass*. To make a difficult situation worse, those manuscripts which are identifiable as pertaining to these efforts are either not well dated or bear no date at all.<sup>13</sup> Thus the identification of

many of his writings, and in particular the writings pertaining to the great systematic work of the early twenties, remains problematic, at best.<sup>14</sup> Kern has done great work at reconstructing this effort. But Kern's aim was not directly tied to Husserl's systematic in the twenties, rather he explicated these efforts in his editor's introductions in order to make clear his editorial choices pertaining to the construction of the three volumes on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, Kern's introductions are still the best source today on the system of phenomenology as Husserl conceived it in the early twenties.

There is, in other words, a dearth of scholarship on Husserl's systematic efforts during this period. Though Husserl worked to organize his particular investigations into a system twice in the twenties and once in the thirties, this effort has been largely ignored in favor of studies into the special problems that constitute the elements of the system. Slowly, however, this situation is changing as more scholars are today showing an interest in the full breadth of Husserl's philosophy. To this date, however, there as yet remains little contemporary scholarship that documents Husserl's efforts to construct a system of phenomenology philosophy other than Iso Kern's introductions, which he published in 1970.<sup>15</sup>

We know from his letters that as of 1921 Husserl set to work on his own manuscripts with an eye to forming a great systematic work of phenomenology on their basis. He writes to Roman Ingarden in November, 1921 saying, "For some months now I have been working through my all-too numerous manuscripts. I am planning a great systematic work constructed from the ground up that can serve as the foundational work of phenomenology."<sup>16</sup> Then, a few months later, Husserl indicates to Paul Natorp that everything stands before him in a state of re-crystallization as he works to organize and systematize his particular investigations.<sup>17</sup> The work lasted for more than a year at least. We know this from a letter Husserl wrote to his good friend, Gustav Albrecht in September of 1922. "This year was a time of great reflection. I have thought through once again the fundamental basic ideas and principle directions (*Richtlinien*) of phenomenology."<sup>18</sup> The letter to Albrecht comes just about one year later than the letter to Ingarden mentioned above; and judging by Husserl's comments to Albrecht, the year seems to have been devoted in large measure to his great systematic work. Husserl's correspondence shows, then, that the early twenties mark a period of great dedication to his own writings. Turning to the main body of his writings at this time, we can see that he sought to construct "from the ground up" a new literary frame by which to present his work systematically.

But why feel the need to take up this arduous task. It is Iso Kern who suggests Husserl's motivation. Husserl's study of transcendental logic in the Winter Semester of 1921/22 predelineates the systematic conception Husserl would seek to explicate. His studies into the genesis of logical thought formations led him naturally to expand his purview to the

full frame of intentional consciousness. Logical thinking was merely the entry point he used to gain access to other and deeper regions of transcendental consciousness.<sup>19</sup> This is far from a new move on Husserl's part, for he took similar steps after the publication of his *Logical Investigations* in 1901 as he set about investigating perception, kinesthesia and temporality.<sup>20</sup> Thus it is unsurprising to see his attention turn to a new foundational work of phenomenology not long after his lecture courses on transcendental logic.<sup>21</sup>

And if we look to Husserl's lecture course materials in *Husserliana* XI,<sup>22</sup> the so-called "analyses on passive synthesis," we find corroboration of Kern's suggestion. The logic course materials in volume XI include a number of investigations on the theme of "static and genetic phenomenological method." Husserl, we saw, initially inaugurated the genetic method as he investigated the self-constitution of the consciousness in the Bernau time-investigations. Even during the teens, it became apparent that the structural model of intentionality, which has its origins going back to the *Logical Investigations*, remained at odds with the newly developing genetic method. The problem of the unity of phenomenological method remained a pressing one through the teens and stands at the fore of Husserl's Winter Semester course on transcendental logic. The course of lectures can, indeed, be read as Husserl's first genuine attempt articulate the static and genetic methodologies together within a single investigative frame. We see this most acutely, not in the lectures themselves, but rather in a number of supplementary studies which Husserl wrote in conjunction with his lecture drafts. In an essay on static and genetic phenomenological method, which Husserl wrote sometime in 1921,<sup>23</sup> he, himself, suggests the systematic frame which would anchor the two methodologies in a unitary conception.

A universal doctrine of consciousness is thus a universal doctrine of apperceptions, correlative to a universal doctrine of the highest categories of possible objects and their categorial modifications—a universal constitutive phenomenology. The latter is preceded by a universal phenomenology of the most general structures and modalities that encompass all categories of apperceptions. To this one must add a universal theory of genesis.<sup>24</sup>

The systematic of phenomenology would be thus guided by a hierarchy of ontological strata. The highest level of eidetic objects—intended in judicative acts of consciousness—presupposes and rests upon lower or more fundamental constitutive strata. According to the stratifications laid out above, Husserl proposes a theoretical model of three levels: (i) the highest level pertaining to the constitution of categorial objectivities, (ii) an intermediate plane pertaining to a transcendental "aesthetic," i.e., the constitution of the time and space as well as nature and spirit, and (iii) the fundamental

plane of transcendental genesis wherein the unity of the primordial stream of consciousness is, itself, constituted. Husserl continues the passage above by demarcating the methodological norms guiding the phenomenological investigation of these ontological strata.<sup>25</sup>

His methodological description here is most intriguing, for he sets forth a structuring of the phenomenological problematic which he would retain virtually unchanged in all later phenomenological systems. In the passage, Husserl distinguishes between a “descriptive” phenomenology, which corresponds roughly to the static method of analysis and description of the eidetic correlative structures of an intentional consciousness, and an “explanatory” phenomenology.<sup>26</sup>

In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish “explanatory” phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and “descriptive” phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings, “object” and “sense.” In my lectures, I did not say “descriptive,” but rather “static” phenomenology. The latter offers an understanding of intentional accomplishment, especially of the accomplishment of reason and its *negata*. It shows us the graduated levels of intentional objects that emerge as objective senses in founded apperceptions of a higher level and in functions of sense-giving, and it shows us how they function in them.<sup>27</sup>

“Explanatory” phenomenology clearly corresponds to the genetic phenomenological method. Though Husserl will change the language by which he lays out these two methodological orientations in later accounts, the central functional distinction at work here remains consistent through his various “systems.” Whether or not the two methodologies, i.e., the descriptive/static and explanatory/genetic, actually come to be coherently integrated in such a structuring remains an open question.

It remains unclear whether Husserl, himself, considered this problem essentially resolvable by virtue of the systematic ordering of ontological/methodological strata indicated above. At the end of the manuscript he summarizes the different orientations of these “constitutive” phenomenologies in such a way as to suggest their integration. Anthony Steinbock suggests in his book, *Home and Beyond*, that “the first systematic attempt to dissociate a genetic from a static method occurred” precisely in these manuscripts.<sup>28</sup> And there is little doubt that Husserl explicitly recognized the complexity of the phenomenological problem by this time. Though he articulates the plurality of concerns motivating each phenomenology in this important manuscript, i.e., the descriptive and the explanatory, we must note that he neither asserts their incongruity nor suggests a bifurcation in the system of these phenomenologies.

A constitutive phenomenology can regard the nexuses of apperceptions in which the same object is constituted eidetically, in which it shows itself in its constituted ipseity in the way it is expected and can be expected. Another “constitutive” phenomenology, the phenomenology of genesis, follows the history, the necessary history of this objectivation and thereby the history of the object itself as the object of a possible knowledge. The primordial history of objects leads back to hyletic objects and to the immanent ones in general, that is, to the genesis of them in original time-consciousness. Contained within the universal genesis of a monad are histories of the constitution of objects that are there for this monad, and within the universal eidetic phenomenology this very process is accomplished for all conceivable objects in relation to all conceivable monads. And conversely, one gains graduated levels of monad corresponding to the level of objects.<sup>29</sup>

The two “constitutive” phenomenologies seem, then, to fit well together within the larger systematic of phenomenology. The eidetic analyses of the descriptive open up and necessarily lead to the question of genesis motivating the explanatory.

Fortunately, this is not the only manuscript dealing with the distinction of a static or descriptive and a genetic or explanatory phenomenology. Husserl lays out a similar systematic structural plan of phenomenology in a short research investigation included in *Husserliana* XI. It is titled “Phenomenology of monadic individuality and the phenomenology of the general possibilities and compossibilities of experiences. Static and genetic phenomenology.”<sup>30</sup> Though the two manuscripts have been published in two very different volumes of the *Husserliana* series, they are, in fact, taken from the same bundle of manuscripts. If Karl Schuhmann is correct in his chronology of Husserl’s writings, then Husserl composed the “monadic individuality” manuscript during June, 1921.<sup>31</sup> It seems probable the two were written at about the same time—though there is no direct evidence of this. In this latter text, Husserl openly wonders whether there can be or should an “encompassing theory.” Steinbock, who places these two texts together in his translation of the passive synthesis lectures, places a great emphasis on these manuscripts in the development of genetic methodology. He is correct to point to these as the locus of something unique occurring in Husserl’s thinking. In the “phenomenology of monadic individuality” manuscript, Husserl is doing much more than articulating the methodological goals of a static and genetic phenomenology, which is the central function of the earlier mentioned text. However, rather than dissociating the two methodologies, as Steinbock suggests, Husserl explicitly seeks here to integrate the two methodologies within the frame of the analysis of monadic individuality. In so doing, the structural articulation of the noetic-noematic correlation, which a descriptive phenomenology seeks to lay out, clearly points to deeper or more fundamental level genesis of these configurations in the life of individual consciousness.



Let us note that we remain here within the sphere of reason within the realm of the active ego, and that we cannot describe a shape of active apperception, that is, any integrally cohesive unity of active configuration (which as a unity of consciousness is intentional and accordingly is an apperceptive configuration) *without also constantly speaking of genesis*.<sup>32</sup>

This bifurcation of concern, that is, the concern of the descriptive and the explanatory, marks every one of Husserl's systematic presentations of the phenomenological problematic through this decade. As he produces a new "system of phenomenological philosophy" in the thirties, the system is, itself, divided into a duality of investigative tasks which—though essentially related—stand distinct from one other in such a way to imply the other. In other words, Husserl typically separates the structural analysis of the essential shapes of noetic-noematic correlation from the study of the genesis of these shapes in consciousness. Yet this is not to say that the two phenomenologies have nothing in common. This would be absurd. The two phenomenologies have a singular point of unity: i.e., the "living unity that bears within itself an ego as the pole of being effective and being affected,"<sup>33</sup> i.e., the monadic individual.

It is worth noting, here, that this focus on the unity of singular consciousness is precisely the same as that in *The Basic Problems* lectures. And we should recall as well that Husserl's efforts to construct a systematic of phenomenology at this time were based on two earlier lectures, the "Idea of Phenomenology" and *The Basic Problems* lectures. Where the former considers phenomenology as an eidetics of consciousness, the latter seeks to uncover the formal structuring principle of consciousness which accounts for the genesis of these eidetic structures holding forth in the streaming unity of individual consciousness

If the monad necessarily has the form of the unity of becoming, of a unity of unflagging *genesis*, then its concrete structure is only made up of "elements" that are themselves unities of becoming, and like the entire monad, these unities of becoming have an abstract structure with respect to their phases.<sup>34</sup>

The regularity of sense-formations on the highest level arise ultimately not on the basis of instances of ego-initiated acts but more fundamentally in the primordial process of sense-formation as such. A static or descriptive phenomenology concerns the sense-formations given in consciousness as "finished" apperceptions, whereas a genetic or explanatory phenomenology concern the emergence of these formations in the "history" of consciousness.<sup>35</sup>

As Iso Kern suggests, the main significance of the manuscripts that Husserl was developing at this time consists in his attempt to think consistently

through the monadological idea phenomenologically by a reflection of the interconnections of consciousness.<sup>36</sup> This is most apparent in the “monadic individuality” manuscript, where Husserl articulates the systematic of phenomenology as he conceives it.<sup>37</sup> In a brief articulation of this unitary frame, the lowest or most fundamental level of constitution is the constitution of the immanent temporal stream, that is to say, the constitution of the individual stream of consciousness as an immanent temporal unity. Genetically higher levels of constitution are those pertaining to a transcendental “aesthetic,” i.e., the constitution of transcendence, of phantoms and the like, the constitution of nature, and the constitution of animals in nature. This sphere of constitutive achievements is the basis from which the constitution of the differing structures and shapes of ego activity can occur at all. “Accordingly, these are genetic considerations, and are placed into the framework of genetic investigations as the description of already constituted structures and their modes of constitution.”<sup>38</sup> So the systematic of phenomenology, at least as Husserl articulates here in 1921, concerns a genetic analysis of constituted structures and modes of constitution *and* a descriptive analytic of noetic-noematic correlations in their typicality and necessary relatedness.

Though Husserl produced a number of manuscripts which were to fit within the 1921 system, he never, it seems, hit upon anything more than this general layout scheme. It remains unclear why he failed to construct an adequate presentation of the systematically worked out framing of the results of his manuscripts. Even if we look to his personal correspondence, the situation is far from clear. At the beginning of 1921, he seems already exhausted—though impelled with an almost messianic sense of mission to work on his manuscripts. Though his reputation has grown both inside Germany and abroad, the crush of work facing him and the burdens of daily life obviously weigh on him. Writing to his cousin, Flora Darkow, in early 1921, for instance, his mood is ambivalent.

My international activity in the last years has grown extraordinarily despite the war, and I have an admirable circle of students here in Freiburg—the most talented and mature students are coming to work with me. You have no idea of the tumultuousness of the work this year or this decade, or the strain on my abilities this as wrought. I'm beset with a great burden which I can never bring to a close—in the consciousness of mission given to me from above for the prosperity of an unhappy, erring humanity. Unfortunately, this burden has only increased with age, as I have been setting about to formulate my chief work in or rather out of sizeable draft which are complete.<sup>39</sup>

Then a year later, writing again to his cousin, Husserl tells of how the economic situation has worsened significantly for both he and his wife. They can no longer afford household help, and his wife, Malvine, spends all her time cooking and cleaning. Indeed, they have been compelled to cut

meat from their diet except for once per week. Amidst these daily worries, his work remains all consuming. Reading his correspondence closely, one finds the suggestion of a new focus. His missionary zeal seems now to have broadened to his teaching. He seems, in other words, slowly to have turned his focus from his research investigations to his work in the classroom.

The whole winter I've been getting up at 6:30 and then, with only a mid-day pause, working with great concentration until 8 in the evening on the most difficult problems. I can't work after dinner, nor should I. I hope to overcome everything. The work is repugnant only during my periods of depression, which are quite unavoidable. My teaching activity brings the best from all the world. I have here an Englishman, an American (just begun), a Japanese, Russian, etc. . . . Thus I have no regrets. I know what I am living for and know that the betterment of humanity will be built on the basis of my work as a foundation.<sup>40</sup>

With increasing regularity, Husserl now speaks in his letters of the importance of his teaching. Whether it was the financial burden he experienced in the early twenties, the demands of his teaching schedule, or simply his inability to generate a satisfactory frame for the presentation of the results of his investigations, there seems no clear cause for that what in the end sapped his energy from the great planned systematic work. In 1921 he accepted an invitation for a series of lectures in London, which were held during June of 1922. The task of preparing these and his course work during the Winter Semesters of 1922/23<sup>41</sup> and 1923/24<sup>42</sup> likely convinced him of the necessity of turning away from the demanding task of constructing a systematic presentation of his investigative results.

Regardless of the motivation, a palpable change of emphasis takes place after 1921. We find, for instance, a renewed and increasing emphasis after 1921 to produce a phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This is anchored by the recognition to return to the pre-scientific experiential world, or rather, the return to the world of pure experience, as the central focus of phenomenological research. Where Husserl had earlier sought to establish the foundation of phenomenology on the basis of apodictic cognition and the reduction to the apodictic *ego cogito*, the new focus of the systematic introduction begins "from the idea of universal science and, in regards to the muddiness of the basic concepts of science, commences with a reflection on the subject pre-delineating every science: *the world of pure experience*."<sup>43</sup> As early as the 1922/23, one sees, in other words, the ascendancy of the investigative dynamic at work that marked his last published writing, the *Crisis of the European Sciences*. This change is most clear in the 1925 lectures, "Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology."

We can also say: since the investigation and descriptive formation of the pure concept of the experience of world is, itself, a scientific performance,

a first science of world precedes all world-sciences wishing to master their most profound foundation (wishing to conform to the demand of a genuine science <Wissenschaftlichkeit> in the clarity of the ground-laying toward this end). This is precisely the descriptive science of the world as pure world of experience according to its generalities.<sup>44</sup>

Looking back to Husserl's correspondence with Georg Misch and Dietrich Mahnke, Husserl is thus beginning to lay out phenomenology anew as "radical and universal 'absolute' human science."<sup>45</sup> It is no surprise, therefore, that Husserl's last effort to produce a "system of phenomenological philosophy" in the early thirties finds its immediate impulse in his reading Misch's critique of his phenomenology in the latter's *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, Husserl's turn to the "pure world of experience" or the life-world concept in the mid-twenties is intimately tied to a renewed effort in 1926 to construct a system of phenomenological philosophy. The planned new systematic work at this time seems to have been motivated by his course work of 1922 through 1924, but most especially his "introduction to phenomenology" in the Winter Semester 1926/27. For some reason, however, energy for this plan dissipated very early, and the idea came to naught quite quickly. However, according to a draft plan written in 1926, the primary focus of the work was to be the pure world of experience. The 1926 plan broke down into four parts: (1) empathy and the alter ego, (2) memory and empathy, (3) phenomenology and ontology, and (4) the idea of transcendental aesthetic and the natural concept of the world.<sup>47</sup> There is little question that Husserl considered the systematic presentation of 1926 to be an elaboration of his *Basic Problems* course of 1910/11.<sup>48</sup> Yet the 1926 plan is significant also when compared against the last extant plan for a "system of phenomenological philosophy," on which he and Eugen Fink worked in the early thirties.<sup>49</sup> The 1930 plan stands as Husserl's final sustained effort to produce a "systematic of phenomenology," and we will examine this latter plan in more detail below. However we should note here that according to the second draft plan of the 1930 system, the second book of that work was to be titled "ontology and phenomenology."<sup>50</sup> This clearly parallels the orientation taken up in the 1926 plan. Composed of three sections, this second book in the later plan was to deal with "the idea of a universal 'transcendental aesthetic,'" "nature and spirit," and the transition "from pure inner psychology to transcendental phenomenology." This as well expresses a similar overall orientation as the 1926 plan.<sup>51</sup>

If we look past Husserl's work in the mid-twenties and early thirties, it seems clear that these two planned systematic presentations of Husserl's research investigations pre-delineate the central concern with the life-world taken up his last work, the *Crisis of the European Sciences*. There is good reason, in other words, to believe that Husserl's last work represents a continuation of themes Husserl had been working on for decades. Yet our focus

begins and ends with Husserl's work to produce a system of phenomenological philosophy, and the *Crisis* work stands outside our specific interest. So before we get too far afield, we shall turn now to examine Husserl's last effort to produce a "system of phenomenological philosophy" in 1930.

## THE 1930 "SYSTEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY"

During the early thirties, Husserl was perhaps busier than he had ever been, working at the time on three major publication projects intermittently: (i) a German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations*, (ii) the Bernau time-investigations (which had to be revised and updated for placement in the larger "time and temporalization" project encompassing also Husserl's newer time investigations then underway), and (iii) the "system of phenomenological philosophy."<sup>52</sup> We need not rehash the history of Husserl's inability to complete any of these projects.<sup>53</sup> Rather we intend at present to focus on the impetus for and the composition of the 1930s "system."

We have two goals in this section. First, we shall show how the "system" marks Husserl's conscious effort to combat the criticisms against his philosophy leveled by Misch in his *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*. But, as we have seen, the history of the idea of a system of phenomenology long predates Misch's book. There are pertinent similarities between Husserl's earlier systematic conceptions and the 1930 "system." So in order to fulfill our first goal we shall detail the rationale why Husserl again took up the task of producing a systematic of phenomenology, in what sense this effort finds its motivation in Misch's work, and in what sense the plan produced by Husserl in the thirties reflects and goes beyond his earlier work of the twenties.

Second, we intend to explicate the structure of the 1930 draft plans. However, our aim in regards to this second goal remains quite limited. Husserl produced an outline for a "system of phenomenological philosophy" in 1930. He then gave this to Eugen Fink to rework. Fink's second draft is very different from the first produced by Husserl, alone. It is significantly longer, contains new terminology not just in relation to the first draft but, in many ways, also from Husserl's previous body of work, and the architecture of the second draft plan is not at all identical to the one proposed by Husserl. It seems, in other words, that Fink's second draft represents a wholly original plan of Fink's making. We will show there are good reasons for holding that this second draft is the product of a genuine collaboration between the Husserl and Fink and so, despite their difference, actually reflects a unitary working through of the phenomenological investigations by the two men.

It is certainly true that the second draft offers a more radical re-thinking of the systematic presentation of phenomenological results than is

articulated in the first. Yet the second draft plan does not represent an alien intrusion, so to speak, by Fink into Husserl's thinking. In what sense is the second draft a radical but consistent development of the first draft, then? In answering this question, we shall neither provide an explicit line by line interpretation of either draft plan, nor shall we attempt to locate any extant manuscripts as they were intended to fit within this scheme. Though worthy goals, this sort of work would require another treatise at least as long as this one.<sup>54</sup> We seek on a much more limited scale to provide an explanation which will account for the seemingly substantial difference between the two draft plans. Hence our goals here remain limited to (i) identifying the impetus for the "system" and (ii) offering an explanation of the differences between the two extant drafts.

### Impetus for the "System of Phenomenological Philosophy"

When Husserl retired in 1928, increasing doubts over the reception of transcendental phenomenology in Germany and abroad began to dog him. Heidegger had just published *Being and Time*, and it was becoming more and more clear to him not only that Heidegger's reputation was outstripping his own but also, more significantly, that Heidegger was not the philosopher he once thought him to be. When Misch published his *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*,<sup>55</sup> Husserl became convinced that the German academic public misunderstood the vital core of his phenomenology. He initiated a two-fold course of action to address this problem. First, he set about reading Heidegger's works with much greater attention than he had previously. Years earlier, he had hoped Heidegger would be his successor not merely at Freiburg but also in a more profound sense. In Heidegger, he saw a phenomenologist who would take on the tasks of transcendental phenomenology as he had laid them out in his writings. However, even in the twenties Husserl began to doubt his "apprentice." Then after the publication of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's meteoric rise, coupled with Misch's critical evaluation of his own philosophy, Husserl decided he must confront his doubts head on. After the intensive reading of Heidegger's writings,<sup>56</sup> he came to the conclusion that his original hopes in Heidegger were but false dreams.

I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger's criticism, both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered it my life's work to make forever impossible.<sup>57</sup>

This is remarkable turn. With this recognition, Husserl could no longer ignore the fact that his own work was widely misunderstood. So he set

about to re-introduce his philosophy to the German and larger international academic public.

With Heidegger's ascendancy and the rising tide of life-philosophy in Germany, Husserl felt a potent antagonism growing against his own transcendental phenomenology. If we look to his published works and lectures from the late twenties and early thirties, we can see that his efforts focus on combating the roots of this antagonism. As early as 1927, Husserl in fact characterizes phenomenology as the scientific philosophy of life.<sup>58</sup> In his lecture before the Kant Society of Frankfurt, "Phenomenology und Anthropology" (1931), in which he sought to present his philosophy in antipathy to the phenomenologies of Heidegger and Max Scheler, he goes so far as to say that "genuine analysis of consciousness is, so to speak, a hermeneutic of the life of consciousness."<sup>59</sup> Although this is an unusual choice of words for Husserl, the context of the quote suggests he is alluding here to the special subject matter of phenomenology rather than a new methodological orientation at work in his investigations. "Rather than putting nature to the test [*Daumenschrauben anlegen*] (like Bacon)," he goes on to say, "we must put consciousness to the test, or rather put the transcendental ego to the test so that it might betray its secrets to us."<sup>60</sup> His point, however, is to show that far from being antithetical to life-philosophy, transcendental phenomenology is actually the only consistently worked-out scientific philosophy of life. The life he is referring to is, of course, not the factual life of human consciousness but rather the transcendental "life" of constituting consciousness.

At almost every possible turn during the early thirties, he sought to represent his philosophy in this light. This is the sense of Husserl's *apologia* to Dietrich Mahnke in 1927, from which we have quoted at length in the second chapter.

Phenomenology is not *merely* a doctrinal method of science. It reveals the universal life in which all sciences are constituted, but also in which all of whatever else *is* and always in what sense it *is* (things, humans, culture, values, etc.). And it reveals the universal form, the universal essence-typology of concrete universal subjectivity (of the absolute I-totality), which is productive in this life, and forms itself personally—out of springs of specific activity and on the basis of an intentional passivity which is likewise to be disclosed.<sup>61</sup>

The path that Husserl has been following since 1910, that is to say, the extension of the reduction to intersubjectivity, the analyses of the ipseity of individual consciousness and the consequent development of the genetic method, reflect the basic character of phenomenology as scientific life-philosophy. Thus when Misch compared Husserl to Plato in his *Lebensphilosophie* and asserted there that transcendental phenomenology offers but a deadening logicism, the rebuke stung him deeply.



Yet, as we have argued, there was good reason for Misch to have a mistaken conception of Husserl's philosophy, since the main bulk of this philosophy lay outside the public arena hidden, so to speak, in his unpublished writings. Though it is true that the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* came out as Misch was publishing his *Lebensphilosophie*, this new work was too little, too late to affect Misch's judgment. "In place of the vital stream of life, which is constantly other and always new, are posited ideas and essentialities constituted in pure consciousness . . . in place of the concrete flowing of life is found the fixed idea of the stream."<sup>62</sup> According to Misch's reading, Husserl not merely ignored the vital ground of logical thinking but also willfully denigrated it as unworthy of philosophical attention. But Misch's critique was obviously not the only indicator of serious misunderstandings. Indeed, Husserl encountered numerous objections over the years from a variety of fronts. Yet, as we have seen, he remained largely silent to these criticisms believing the authors had misunderstood his words—even as they quoted from him. Once the leisure of retirement allowed Husserl the time to turn to this problem, he set about to confront it head on. Rather than address himself to every possible criticism, however, he decided on—or better—vacillated between revising his *Cartesian Meditations*, publishing his time-investigations, and producing a "system of phenomenological philosophy." Though not commensurate with one another, all these projects were meant to re-present transcendental phenomenology in its true light.

The "system," unlike the other two projects, however, arose directly from his reading Georg Misch's book. It is not exactly clear when Husserl produced the first draft of the plan for the "system," but it was either late 1929 or, more likely, early 1930.<sup>63</sup> We know that he and Fink worked together on the second draft plan in April, 1930. Husserl, therefore, was obviously codifying his idea of the "system of phenomenological philosophy" just at the time he was reading of Misch's *Lebensphilosophie*.<sup>64</sup> Even so, the orientation of the planned "system" was neither reactionary nor revolutionary, as Iso Kern points out.

There can be little doubt that Husserl had gotten a strong impulse for his draft of the systematic work of 1930/31 from reading the work of Georg Misch, in particular of Dilthey's thought as it was presented there. However, this is not to be considered as a turn in Husserl's thinking. Rather it should be seen as a renewed and all-immersing entry into and relating to Dilthey's world of thinking from the feeling of an "innermost community."<sup>65</sup>

In his letter of November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1930 to Misch, Husserl offers his assessment of *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* and tries to make clear that Misch's misunderstandings arise from a one-sided reading of his philosophy. Though the *Lebensphilosophie* offers the "first fundamental critique

of the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,” as Husserl notes, Misch nevertheless interprets transcendental philosophy from the standpoint of his earliest writings. He, then, takes the opportunity in this letter to articulate the main contours of the newly planned “system.” His comments here are most intriguing, since they offer a unique expression of Husserl’s understanding of the overall development of his own investigative results.

One (and you in the first of the installments for all intents and purposes also) sees only the author of the *Logical Investigations*. One sees only what they were to the previous generation and not what, in themselves, they sought to become and in my work did become. The *Investigations* were a restoration of formal and material ontology, but one commensurate with a breakthrough to the “transcendental,” which is at once transcendently relativizing “phenomenology.” Ontology retains its legitimacy as does the real world, but it has unveiled to itself its ultimate, concretely complete (transcendental) sense.—In further works (which were already far along with the publication of *Ideas*) formal logic and every real ontology lost their original interest for me over against that of a systematic founding of a doctrine of transcendental subjectivity, namely as intersubjectivity. For with the “transcendental reduction” I was won over to my conviction of ultimate and concrete subjectivity in the whole fullness of its being and life, not the mere theoretically accomplishing life in it but universal accomplishing life: absolute subjectivity in its historicity. Subjectivity—science, world, culture, ethical-religious striving, etc.—everything—in a new noematic and sense. The book which I have been preparing for ten years and which is now actually coming to fruition will bring about hopefully a most complete clarification as a wholly systematic construction [*Aufbau*].<sup>66</sup>

The book Husserl mentions here, which he has been preparing for the last ten years, is of course the “system of phenomenological philosophy.” Why does he say, though, that he has been preparing it for ten years, if he only began the draft plan in 1930? It can only be that the “system of phenomenological philosophy” of 1930 originates with the plan for a systematic of phenomenology of 1921. Indeed, as we have noted, there are strong parallels between the two projects.

It is interesting to note that another letter exists which reiterates many of the same themes as found in the Misch letter above. In this second letter, which Husserl wrote to Roman Ingarden on December 21<sup>st</sup>, 1931, he details the various projects on which he has been working and intimates his regret for taking so long to produce a systematic conception of phenomenology.

In general, it is a true tragedy that I have begun work so late on formulating *my* (as I must sadly say) transcendental phenomenology according to a systematic plan. Now there is a generation held fast in

prejudices and so turned off by the psychotic break down of scientific philosophy that they have *no wish* to hear or see.<sup>67</sup>

Though Husserl is speaking of more than just his “system of phenomenological philosophy” here, it is obvious that he recognizes the current antagonism against his philosophy. He obviously feels an increasing skepticism that any presentation of his philosophy, including the system of transcendental phenomenology, can adequately confront these prejudices.

### The Two Draft Plans of the “System of Phenomenological Philosophy”

We should recall that in 1921 Husserl spoke of two phenomenologies: a descriptive or static phenomenology and an explanatory or genetic phenomenology. This bifurcation will be visible in Husserl's first draft plan, though its conception stretches back (at least) to Husserl's 1910/11 lecture course, *The Basic Problems* and the 1907 “Idea of Phenomenology” lectures. Furthermore, one can trace the origin of these two lectures to Husserl's time investigations of 1905—the year he met with Dilthey. “You do not know,” Husserl writes to Misch, “that the few discussions with Dilthey in Berlin of 1905 (not his writings) signified an impulse that runs from the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* to the Husserl of ‘Ideas’.”<sup>68</sup> Given the broad reach of these ideas, it appears that even if Misch's *Life-philosophy* may not have been the sole impetus influencing Husserl to produce a new “system of phenomenological philosophy,” his strong critique of Husserl became the most trenchant spur in the decision by Husserl to renew plans for a systematic of phenomenology.

The two draft plans of the “system of phenomenological philosophy” on which Husserl and Fink worked during 1930 are reproduced in an appendix to this work. When speaking about the “system,” we will, then, be referring to this document. As noted, we have today two draft plans. The first Husserl produced alone. The second is Fink's, but this draft is a product of collaboration between himself and Husserl. As we must distinguish between these two drafts, we will refer to the first extant draft plan as the “original” plan and Fink's plan as the second draft. However, it may be misleading to call Fink's draft plan “second” as this seems to misrepresent the history of the project to some degree, as we shall see.

If we compare Husserl's original draft plan of 1930 to the systematic of phenomenology he produced in 1921, we notice a number of differences and a core similarity. Admittedly the basic language is quite different from one to the other. The 1930 draft plan is more detailed as well, so much so that the two systematic articulations do not obviously exhibit the same structure. This difference is so great we can say of the 1930 draft that here we have a genuine publication plan, whereas the 1921 plan did not reach this level of completion. An ambitious project, the “system” sketched by

Husserl in 1930 consists of five volumes. The first volume was to be an introduction to phenomenology, itself. As a “groundlaying of egological doctrine,” this first volume sets about to provide a broad sketch of the general theory of intentionality. This element is not represented in the 1921 articulation. However, since Husserl never actually devised a detailed publication plan in 1921, this omission is not surprising. Though not the only difference, this difference of complexity between the two plans is the most obvious. It is the main reason why the two plans do not appear to bear any direct relation to each other. Yet this, it turns out, is only a superficial difference masking a more profound commonality at work in both plans.

If we examine the earlier systematic presentation of phenomenology, we note that Husserl essentially bifurcated phenomenology by distinguishing between the static/descriptive and explanatory/genetic tasks of phenomenology. Although not clearly represented in the later system, we find, if we look closely, this same bifurcation at work in Husserl’s original draft plan of 1930. The structural similarity between the two “systems” is obscured by the fact that Husserl introduces a partitioning of constitutional studies in the later draft plan that is, at best, implicit in the earlier. In the 1930 draft plan, he proposes a system of two primary constitutive regions: the phenomenology of egoic consciousness and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The second and fourth books in the 1930 draft plan deal with static or descriptive analyses, while the third and fifth volumes concern the deeper explanatory or genetic analyses. The static and the genetic levels, in other words, are anchored within particular phenomenological foci: egoic constitution or intersubjective constitution. The 1930 “system” has thus the following structure: (i) introduction, (ii) phenomenology of egoic worldliness: a static analysis, (iii) phenomenology of egoic constitution: a genetic account, (iv) phenomenology of intersubjective worldliness, a static analysis, and finally, (v) the constitution of the intersubjectively valid world: a genetic account. The complex arrangement of the 1930 “system” is, nevertheless, founded on the simpler structuring of the transcendental problematic at work in the 1921 plan. In each plan, the descriptions of essential structures (of noetic-noematic correlation) occurring at the static level are performed in abstraction from the fluidity of the constitution of the consciousness, itself. These static analyses, then, lead as clues [*Leitfäden*] to considerations of the law-like genesis of these “ready-made” formations in the “history” of consciousness.

This “history” of consciousness (the history of all possible apperceptions) does not concern bringing to light a factual genesis for factual apperceptions or factual types in a factual stream of consciousness, or even in all factual human beings; thus it is not at all similar to the development of plant or animal species. Rather, every shape of apperception is an essential shape and has its genesis in accordance with essential laws; accordingly, included in such an idea of apperception is

that it must undergo a “genetic” analysis. And what is given is not the necessary becoming of the particular, single apperception (when it is understood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is only given with the genesis of essence.<sup>69</sup>

This progressive deepening of transcendental analysis moves in 1921 rather simply from the higher descriptive level to the lower explanatory account of essential genesis, and in 1930 we have the same progression. It is presented, however, in a more complex manifold in Husserl's first draft of the 1930 plan. In this latter plan, the reduction to egoic constitution is first performed, then, the reduction to intersubjectivity. Static and genetic analyses pertain to each of these regions in a separate account.

After completing his draft plan in 1930, Husserl then gave it to Eugen Fink to rework. From the notes Husserl wrote on his copy of the second draft, we know that he and Fink went through the second plan in detail sometime in April, 1930. Where Husserl had originally proposed a work of five volumes, this new draft proposes only two books: (i) the levels of pure phenomenology, and (ii) ontology and phenomenology. All of what Husserl proposed in the first draft is encompassed in the first book of this later draft. It appears that the content (for much of) the second book corresponds to Husserl's 1926 plan for a work on empathy.<sup>70</sup> The second draft plan obviously suggests a much more ambitious work. Not only are the elements from the Husserl's original draft incorporated into the new draft plan, it now also includes a set of materials not represented in the original draft plan. But this is not the most significant change. Rather, where Husserl had somewhat artificially partitioned off the egoic from the intersubjective and proposed the descriptive and explanatory analyses within each of these partitions, the new draft plan rejects altogether this partitioning. Not only do we find an integration of the “egological” and “intersubjective” in the new draft plan,<sup>71</sup> but the hard and fast distinction between static and genetic phenomenology no longer holds. The static and genetic are now elements within the integrated deconstructive analysis of consciousness<sup>72</sup> as articulated in the new draft plan.<sup>73</sup> As Fink explains in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, this deconstructive or regressive analysis is an “inquiry back from the living unities of the transcendental experience of the world, from acts, into the deeper constituting strata of transcendental life.”<sup>74</sup> A regressive phenomenology contains therefore both moments: the static and the genetic.<sup>75</sup> This is not to say, however, that the theory of the elements proposed in this system finds its terminus in a regressive phenomenology. On the contrary, the regressive analytic opens up a new sort of “examination of the ‘external horizon of the reductive givenness’ of transcendental life.”<sup>76</sup> A “progressive analysis as constructive-analysis”<sup>77</sup> thus follows upon the regressive phenomenology.

If regressive phenomenology has the constitutive genesis of the world as its theme, insofar as, through the method of intentional analysis of constitution, it comes to have its *proper identity shown* as *present and past genesis* in the subsistent transcendental universe of monads given through the reduction, in contrast constructive phenomenology has to pose and answer, among other matters, transcendental questions about the “*beginning*” and “*end*” of *world-constitution*, both egological and intersubjective.<sup>78</sup>

The theory of elements in this new draft plan retains the “step-like character of theory formation”<sup>79</sup> that was at work in Husserl’s original draft plan as well as the 1921 systematic. What has changed is not the analytic character of phenomenological investigation but rather the conception of the steps which mark the unfolding of the phenomenological problematic.

In what sense, then, is Fink’s draft plan in line with the spirit of the first draft? If Fink’s draft plan introduces elements alien to Husserl’s own investigations, there would likely be evidence of this. Husserl clearly read this second draft carefully and so likely would have remarked on the heterodoxy of Fink’s suggestions. Yet such evidence is not found. There are extensive marginal notations which suggest a large number of changes, but none of these puts the entire projection into question.<sup>80</sup> This is obviously not proof of the essential community between the two plans. Indeed according to all appearances, we have a radically new document and a radically new conception of the phenomenological problematic represented in the second draft plan. These differences naturally lead to the supposition that Fink is following neither the letter nor the spirit of Husserl’s investigative results. We believe this conclusion to be unlikely for reasons immanent to Husserl’s and Fink’s working relationship, however.

The style of collaboration evident in the second draft outline suggests close partnership rather than confrontation. He says to Ingarden already in 1930, for instance, “without Fink I would be lost.”<sup>81</sup> Indeed, as the thirties progress Husserl relies more and more on Fink as a collaborator. The history of the plan’s redactions suggests as well not only that Husserl specifically authorized the second draft plan of the “system” but also that he actively took part in its creation. Significantly, Iso Kern notes that, in fact, possibly three distinct plans existed on which both Husserl and Fink worked.

It is likely that the evolution of both these plans follows this path. Husserl first produced (in shorthand) his own draft in the Spring or early Summer 1930 and gave it to Fink for revision. He discussed this plan with Fink, perhaps developing an intermediate draft which has meanwhile been lost. Finally, he authorized Fink to write the large plan. On August 13 he [and Fink] reviewed this plan.<sup>82</sup>

Further, Kern seems to have been able to corroborate this chronology. While putting together the materials contained in the three volumes on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, Eugen Fink was still alive. He thus asked Fink his recollections as to the development of the “system” in 1930. Forty years after the fact, it was impossible for Fink to remember all the particularities; but he did confirm Kern’s account in general terms.<sup>83</sup> Husserl and Fink seem, in other words, to have produced an intermediate draft plan of the “system.” Hence the so-called “second” draft plan by Fink occurs as the product of an earlier collaboration now lost. Though the two extant plans contain substantial differences, the history of the project suggests an evolution of the idea of the “system” worked out by Husserl with Fink. There is no doubt that the later draft reflects a different view of the system than that found in Husserl’s original draft plan. But this fact does nothing to dispute the known fact that both men worked closely together and so likely worked together to construct this “second” draft plan of the “system.”

Additionally, there is documentary material in Husserl’s letters which suggests that Husserl indeed acknowledged the second draft as essentially his own. In the letter to Roman Ingarden of December 21, 1930, Husserl sketches the structure of the systematic work on which he had been working intensively of late.

The first and perhaps largest difficulty lies in radical presuppositionlessness and its method of phenomenological reduction. The latter—understood by my old students—undergoes a many-sided enlightening, which allows no dark corner to remain and no evasion. This alone will be a sizable section, followed by the systematic of the constitutive analysis of the “pre-given” world, then further a genetic phenomenology and the “metaphysical” problematic—that is, the phenomenological sense of the metaphysical in particular. Broadly, the absolute is disclosed through transcendental experience directly with transcendental subjectivity.<sup>84</sup>

Comparing this against the two extant draft plans, we can see that Husserl’s descriptions here generally match the structure of the second draft plan. The work would begin with a discussion of the idea of rigorous science and the place and method of phenomenological reduction in this idea. This plan reflects the concern of the first section of Book I in the draft plan, “On the beginning and principle of philosophy.” This discussion would be followed by the systematic ordering of constitutional analyses corresponding to sections in the draft plan pertaining to so-called “regressive” and “progressive” phenomenology. Finally, the phenomenological “metaphysics” which Husserl mentions to Ingarden corresponds to the fourth section of Book I, “Basic features of phenomenological metaphysics.” What is lacking of Husserl’s sketch in his letter to Ingarden is any discussion of



the second book, "Ontology and Phenomenology." However, if we look at the total context of the letter, we find that the central theme of the letter is, itself, Ingarden's "ontologism" and Husserl's "fervid deepening studies of beginnings, drafts of manifold series of thoughts of the universal problematic of transcendental phenomenology—as universal philosophy which would encompass all completely formed ontologies (all apriori sciences) and all sciences generally—in an ultimate grounding."<sup>85</sup> Hence it is no surprise that Husserl leaves off discussing "ontology and phenomenology" in his sketch of the "system," since he has already discussed this at length in the letter. The letter to Ingarden is significant furthermore because Husserl anchors the structure of the "system of phenomenological philosophy" to the innermost strivings of his philosophy.

Husserl's focus on the constitutive analysis of the pre-given world as a historical world, the genetic method, and the relation of ontology and phenomenology within the frame of problems falling within the rubric of "nature and spirit" all speak to the effort by Husserl in the early thirties to confront the major points of contention in Misch's *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*.<sup>86</sup> Yet, as we have argued, this "new" concentration by Husserl should be seen as anything but new. What we find when we look to the pre-history of the "system of phenomenological philosophy" is a long history of concrete work on these problems. This history reaches back not merely to the teens but also to the first developments of phenomenological method in the early years of the century. So rather than instituting a break from his previous work, the "system" marks Husserl's sincere effort to bring the main results of his phenomenological investigations to a unitary literary expression.

Looking at his correspondence, one can see that this effort lasted for years—even if he vacillated between other projects. In February of 1931, for instance, he notes the progress he has made in his various projects to his colleague Adolf Grimme. "Two larger writings will come to print in the upcoming year, the systematic major work, God willing, in the next year and then very important concrete investigations must still be brought to literary form. Thankfully they are complete."<sup>87</sup> Then a year later, in a letter to the same correspondent, Husserl remarks of the great strides he has made on the "system."

Overall, this year in which Dr. Fink has been assigned to me as an assistant has been perhaps the most fruitful of my entire, long life. All the holes have been filled and chances are good that work will come to completion despite the extraordinary comprehensiveness of the concrete investigations and the investigations related to method and systematic: i.e., there is a good chance for a unitary groundlaying of constitutive phenomenology in several volumes. An introductory book and a part of the concrete investigations will appear this year. But this is only the beginning.<sup>88</sup>

And lastly, we have an interesting letter to Dietrich Mahnke, which Husserl wrote on October 17, 1932, wherein the work—interestingly—seems still to be in its infancy.

I am just beginning, however, the systematic *presentation*. In the four years since my retirement have I been more and more inclined to work through the major pieces of analytical explications in order myself to be satisfied and, not least of all, to satisfy various obscurities concerning the systematic ordering of the phenomenological problematic and to affirm the course of the method in the working construction.<sup>89</sup>

Though this appears incongruous with the history of the project outlined by Husserl in his letters, it makes sense if we understand him to mean that the literary *presentation* of the system is just beginning. In the letters to Grimme, Husserl suggests that much of concrete investigative work has been completed. Thus what remains to be finished, what Husserl is now only beginning, is the work of bringing these major pieces of the system together into a single literary frame. Sadly, this never came to be.

There are a host of reasons why Husserl failed to produce the “system.” The increasingly oppressive political situation for non-Aryans in Nazi Germany played a role as did his vacillation between the different comprehensive publication projects. That he failed to produce the “system of phenomenological philosophy,” or indeed any of the three major publishing projects occupying him in the early thirties, is the great unfulfilled promise of Husserl’s career.

#### HUSSERL’S INDIVIDUAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE “SYSTEM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY”

We have seen in his preparation of the Bernau time-investigations that Eugen Fink suggests a connection between Husserl’s 1913 introduction to phenomenology, *Ideas I*, and the earlier 1905 time-investigations. Fink offers little of anything determinate about this plan in the notes, but peppered through them are a few partial sketches written along the following theme: “The *Ideas*,” he says, “are the outcome of the analyses on time-consciousness in the 1905-analyses.”<sup>90</sup> In these brief sketches, he labors to articulate the unique relation he sees between concrete work of phenomenological analysis and that which the science of phenomenology inherently aspires to construct, i.e., a systematic of “cognitive actions.”<sup>91</sup> This is an important theme running through all Fink’s work with Husserl. One can even say that it is perhaps the most important theme in their collaboration, since the special sense of the system of phenomenological philosophy forms the backdrop to their most famous collaborative effort, the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*.

Before considering this, though, the incongruity inherent to Fink's suggestion of a connection between *Ideas I* and Husserl's earlier time-lectures deserves special attention. We should recall that *Ideas I* "has in a certain sense remained silent"<sup>92</sup> in regards to the riddles of time and time-consciousness. In what sense, then, is it an outcome of the earlier time-lectures? Solely considering the advance exemplified in *Ideas I*, this later work institutes a revelation of method that remained inchoate in the 1905 time-lectures. "The horizons of the transcendental problematic are arguably operative in the 'Lectures,' but they are not expressly roused," Fink remarks. "<The lectures have the> appearance of a psychological analysis of time."<sup>93</sup> Elsewhere in his notes, Fink observes that "for the first time the reduction achieves explicit expression in *Ideas*."<sup>94</sup> He is suggesting, in other words, that the 1905 time-analyses seem to frame the problem of time in psychologistic terms. *Ideas I* represents an advance insofar as the psychologistic framing of the problem is explicitly rejected by virtue of the special method of phenomenological reduction articulated in that work. This conclusion fits with our own analysis of Husserl's thinking during the first decade of the century. As we have argued, the advancement of method codified in *Ideas I* signifies in many respects the repudiation of the psychologistic framing of the problem of intentionality as it was expressed in his most famous early work, the *Logical Investigations* in its first edition of 1900–01.

The method of reduction, as we have seen, bespeaks an investigative restriction to the sphere of that which is purely self-given in the most rigorous sense.<sup>95</sup> As such, it does not thereby signify a restriction either to the sphere of real consciousness or to psychic immanence generally. In essence, the discovery of the reduction marks Husserl's conclusive rejection of psychologism; for it opens up a wholly new manner of research into the two-sided correlative "relation" between constituting consciousness and the worlded-reality posited by and holding sway "in" this consciousness.

Yet Husserl first articulated the method of phenomenological reduction four-plus years after he published his *Logical Investigations*. Are we suggesting, then, that until 1905, that is, until he came upon the proper concept and use of the reduction, he accepted the tenets of psychologism? Far from it. Indeed, it almost goes without saying that he vociferously and explicitly rejected psychologism very soon after he published his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in 1891. No doubt Gottlob Frege's accusations that Husserl's method was psychologistic, which he articulated in his review of Husserl's work,<sup>96</sup> helped Husserl to focus his attention on the matter.<sup>97</sup> In the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," published in 1900, Husserl subjected the psychologistic theses underlying the logical studies of his day to a devastating critique. In that work, he showed quite painstakingly that an account of logical law which is, itself, grounded in the empirical study of thinking, falls into inconsistency and thus cannot succeed. The arguments put forward by the psychologistic philosophers

prove simply that “psychology *co-contributes* in the founding of logic, but not that it alone or even primarily contributes to it, nor that it provides logic the essential ground <Fundament> in the sense defined by us (see §16 of the *Logical Investigations*, Volume I).”<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless, the specter of psychologism resurfaced in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, published in 1901. In these “Investigations on the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge,” Husserl invariably used psychological terms to describe acts of intentional consciousness. This terminological choice as well as his rejection of a “pure” ego in that first edition of the *Investigations* led many to believe that Husserl simply had lapsed back into the psychologicist model of explanation that he had taken such pains to refute in the “Prolegomena.”

Husserl accepted a number of these criticisms and sought to redress them, but he also believed that most of those who criticized his results had misunderstood the work. This was due, in part, he believed, to the prejudiced reading given the work by many commentators. Yet because he felt himself to blame for the inadequacy of his own expression he also accepted a fair share of the responsibility for their misunderstandings. In the years that would follow, then, he took great pains to clarify the true nature of phenomenological method in the hopes of mollifying the criticisms that arose from his own failures. As we have shown,<sup>99</sup> the change in terminology from that of “psychic” or “mental” acts, which is found in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, to that of “noesis” in *Ideas I* is a consequence of the recasting of the phenomenological model of intentionality to one antithetical to a naturalistic psychological interpretation.<sup>100</sup> We need not reiterate our discussion of this revision here, but we should recall that in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations* Husserl quite prominently identified phenomenology as “descriptive psychology.” Phenomenology, he asserted, is a science of “experience and its object” along the model of the apriori mathematical sciences. This “descriptive psychology” remains foreign to the methods of an experimental psychology. It is a science whose domain is the essence of cognition as such, and is, thus, one whose method remains quite foreign to generalizing methodology to any of the experimental sciences. Even so, the ascription of phenomenology as psychology led to many confusions. He quickly rejected the appellation once it became clear to him that many believed his new science of essences to be in fact a study of empirical consciousness.

We saw, further, that as early as 1903–04 Husserl took the opportunity—afforded him by his review of Theodore Elsenhans’s *Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie*—to reject the ascription of phenomenology as descriptive psychology.<sup>101</sup> We noted that while visiting Dilthey in 1905 he deposited this review with Dilthey’s assistant, Bernhard Groethuysen.<sup>102</sup> (One can only assume that he and Dilthey pointedly discussed the latter’s empirical methodology and Husserl disillusionment with the application any sort of empirical methodology in the pursuit of philosophical

truths.) The period between the publication of the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I* was, thus, perhaps the most significant period of development in his career, particularly in regards to the anti-psychologist framing of the phenomenological problematic. A few short months after his trip to Berlin and his meeting with Dilthey, Husserl uncovered the proper method of phenomenological reduction in association with his work on the problem of time. In the so-called Seefeld manuscripts of 1905, within which Husserl analyzes the unity of temporal objectivities persisting in the dynamic flow of appearances in consciousness, he takes up the phenomenological description of the I-subject constituting these objectivities. His reflections remain tentative here, lacking the sureness of later texts. However, one can clearly see him working toward a new orientation. He directly questions his own earlier account of egoic subjectivity which he presented in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*.

The locus of this account is found in the Fifth *Investigation*, specifically §8, “The pure I and that of which one is conscious <die Bewußtheit>.” In this section—in the first edition<sup>103</sup>—Husserl rejects explicitly as something phenomenologically unsound the status of “the primitive I as necessary relational center.” “What I am solely capable of noticing and thus of perceiving is the empirical I and its empirical relation to its own experiences or to outer objects that are in a presentifying moment of regard immediately the objects of a particular “attention” <“Zuwendung”>. . . .”<sup>104</sup> The specific object of Husserl’s criticism here is the egological doctrine of the neo-Kantian philosopher, Paul Natorp, who—in his *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*—asserts that “the I as the *subjective relational center* to all conscious contents” remains a “basic fact of psychology.” The I, according to Natorp, is not and cannot be conceived as an object of consciousness, for only the contents of consciousness have this character. “I-being is not an object but rather signifies that to which every object is opposed,” Natorp argues.<sup>105</sup> Though Husserl does not completely reject this view, and in fact endorses the claim that to speak of conscious experience as an object is counter-sense,<sup>106</sup> he nevertheless rejects the transcendental underpinning of Natorp’s argument—at least in the first edition of his *Investigations*. In the Seefeld manuscripts, this outright rejection comes specifically under reexamination.

Are temporality and spatiality, in so far as these are understood phenomenologically and not understood empirically-transcendently, actually complete principles of individuation? How is the step from the phenomenological to the empirical to be made? And above all, how is individuality of the *I* and individuality of “its” phenomena, of its sensuous appearances and its psychic experiences in the narrow sense related to phenomenological individuality? Here it is naturally difficult to say what makes up the phenomenological description of the “I.”<sup>107</sup>

Husserl expresses here in other words a growing sense of insufficiency regarding his account of intentionality as presented in the first edition of *Logical Investigations*.<sup>108</sup>

The Seefeld manuscripts, thus, mark Husserl's first tentative steps toward the conception of phenomenology as transcendental idealism. Admittedly, his language in the Seefeld manuscripts remains anchored in the psychological. He consistently speaks of "psychic experiences" as he had done in his earlier *Investigations*. Just two years later, though, in the "Idea of Phenomenology" lectures, i.e., the lectures in which he first articulated the concept of the phenomenological reduction publicly, he resolutely assured his students, "*we ultimately abandon the ground of psychology, even that of descriptive psychology.*"<sup>109</sup> The reduction is this abandonment. Finally, with the publication of *Ideas I* in 1913, Husserl makes explicit this "new" stance for all to see.

The preeminent task of this *first* book will be to search out ways by which to be able to overcome piece-meal, so to speak, the over-large difficulties of penetrating into this new world. We will proceed from the natural standpoint, from the world as it stands over and against us, from <I->consciousness as it presents itself in psychological experience, and lay bare the essential presuppositions within it. We shall, then, develop a method of "phenomenological reductions" according to which we will push aside the limits of knowledge belonging to the essence of every natural manner of research, deflecting the one-sided perspective proper to it, until finally we have won the free horizon of "transcendentally" purified phenomena and therewith the field of phenomenology in our unique sense.<sup>110</sup>

The *Ideas*, in essence, represents Husserl's first published expression of the method proper by which to obtain the true and genuine ground on which a *pure* phenomenology treads. This method, far from being an empirical or even nomothetic description of psychic or physical phenomena, opens a wholly new discipline. Proceeding from the naive starting point of natural life, then, this new philosophical *archaeology* breaks underneath the surface of its starting point and unearths a wholly non-natural constituting subjectivity originally structuring the sense "world" and "world-being" holding sway in conscious life.<sup>111</sup>

In his introduction to the Bernau manuscripts, Fink hoped to show how the articulation of constituting I-subjectivity codified in *Ideas I* arose from insights Husserl obtained in his 1905 time-investigations. Yet looking closely at Fink's notes, this particular goal seems subordinate to a more fundamental aim at work in his overall presentation both of the middle and later stages of Husserl's time-investigations. Throughout his notes, we can see Fink struggling to articulate the progressively advancing dynamic of phenomenological method, itself, working its way through

the time-investigations. Even further, looking now beyond his Bernau time-investigations notes to the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, Fink sees this dynamic applicable universally to the manner by which phenomenology develops its theories. This occurs in a dialectic between the concrete work of individual investigation and systematic re-presentation of this body of work in an architectonic of these results. "There can be no adequate characterization of phenomenological cognitive actions *before* concrete analyses are carried out;" for as Fink argues in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, "the method and system of these cognitive actions cannot be *anticipated*."<sup>112</sup> Concrete analyses, in other words, form the ground from which a systematic presentation must be articulated. But this systematic re-presentation of these results always leads to new concrete work. Upon achievement of an architectonic of the problems of phenomenology, older analyses, then, require revision, one can even say, even, re-interpretation. They have to be brought to the level of insight obtained in the system. Thus the systematic re-conceptualization, itself, points to new avenues of research.

Though this account of the advance of phenomenological method may sound counter to a philosophy which seeks to "return to the things themselves," it is an idea that finds essential confirmation in Husserl's oldest writings. Husserl, himself, recognized this dynamic as he worked to revise the first edition of his *Logical Investigations*. In the foreword to the second edition, he states that "the *Ideas* should rest on the work of the *Logical Investigations*."<sup>113</sup>

If, through the latter (i.e., the *Logical Investigations*), the reader had concerned himself with a group of fundamental questions in an explicit investigation, then the *Ideas*—with its manner of clarifying method from ultimate sources, pre-delineating the main structures of pure consciousness, and systematically bringing to light the working problems in this same consciousness—could be of use to him in further and independent advances.<sup>114</sup>

Phenomenology, as Maurice Natanson has rightly noted, is an infinite task.<sup>115</sup> No analysis and no presentation is ever conclusive. A systematic presentation of phenomenological results leads only to new paths of research which in and of itself compels a revision of the codified articulation of the systematic connection of problems within phenomenology. Indeed, if we look carefully through Fink's notes regarding the Bernau-time investigations, there are places where he seems as if to finish Husserl's sentences quoted just above. Where Husserl speaks of the *Logical Investigations* as the supporting frame of *Ideas*, Fink looks forward from the *Ideas* to the work of Husserl's constitutional studies after 1913, i.e., *Ideas II*. "The concrete investigations of the following years went to the task of filling out the work. But the relation of system and work is an *open* one also. The motive



and dynamic of the development of phenomenology is this relation of individual analysis and system."<sup>116</sup>

This conception of the phenomenological architectonic as an *open* system is an idea Fink works out in several different places in his Bernau notes. It would be superfluous to catalog all of the different versions of this idea here, since they express the same thing essentially. But one extended attempt stands out in particular, since here Fink explicitly links his discussion of the dynamic of phenomenological inquiry to the various stages of Husserl's work on time. Unfortunately, even here this articulation remains quite obviously incomplete; the fragmentary character of his expression suggests this is still a rough draft. Nevertheless, the passage harkens back to an important theme presented in the first chapter of this very study.

The motive and dynamic of the progressing coming-to-explicitness of the idea of a phenomenological transcendental philosophy becomes manifest in the relation of systematic reflection and concrete individual analysis—as this is prominent in the factual development of Husserl philosophizing, though it may certainly belong to the uniqueness of the progression of phenomenological cognition. The situation of the “investigations”<sup>117</sup> is, as we have already said, the passage from systematically universal reflections to work which is to be accomplished. In this process, there is a revision of the old general theses. The concrete material already contains methodological moments which are to play out over the systematic guiding framework.<sup>118</sup>

In my first chapter, we saw that Husserl employed a circular regressive method of inquiry into the matters of which phenomenology concerns itself. This is the so-called zigzag method of phenomenological investigation. Admittedly, Husserl articulated its representation ambiguously over the course of his career. We found two accounts of the zigzag method book-ending his career. But the two versions have a core identity, we argued, since each details the manner by which phenomenological inquiry progresses. What we have now in Fink's notes is a new expression of this same idea. Both Fink's and Husserl's remarks suggest that the movement of phenomenological inquiry takes the shape of a progressive retrospection on the idea of phenomenology, itself.

Quite interestingly, except for these two accounts of the zigzag method, Husserl remains nearly silent in regards to the *activity* of phenomenologizing which is Fink's concern here. The phenomenological reduction is surely Husserl's most important discovery. His numerous introductions offer manifold manners by which to enter into the style of research pertinent to transcendental phenomenology so as to make understandable the new domain of research opened by the reduction. In these writings, there are times when Husserl alludes to the step of reflection upon the activity of phenomenologizing as a necessary stage of phenomenology, itself. But this

is always left as a promise in his writings. Near the end of his *Encyclopedia Britannica* article, for instance, Husserl notes that phenomenology “recognizes its self-reflective function for the relative realization of the correlative practical idea of a genuine life of humanity <Menschenheitsleben> in the second sense (whose essential forms and practical norms it is to investigate), namely as a life of humanity directed consciously and purposely to this absolute idea.”<sup>119</sup> But what of the life of the transcendental phenomenologist? This question is broached in only the most obscure terms in the *Britannica* article. Latent in Husserl’s philosophy is thus a reflection on the phenomenological reduction, itself. “This latter is not just the fundamental reflective realization that establishes the possibility of philosophy; rather, along with that it contains *in nuce* the whole systematic of phenomenological philosophy.”<sup>120</sup>

The work which makes manifest this step is the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, Eugen Fink’s most famous collaboration with Husserl. As a new meditation to be added in the planned German edition of Husserl’s famous *Cartesian Meditations*, the *Sixth Meditation* goes in directions the Bernau time-investigations would not. Yet when comparing Fink’s Bernau time-investigations notes to this work, one sees a striking parallel. The theme of the *Sixth Meditation* is “a reflection on phenomenologizing, the idea of a phenomenology of phenomenology,” which Fink identifies as an “essential moment of the systematic conception” of phenomenology.”<sup>121</sup>

Fink’s *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, commissioned by Husserl in the early thirties (and eventually approved as Fink’s *Habilitationsschrift*), was meant to be an added component of the revised German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations*. Both Husserl and Fink realized that transcendental phenomenology remained in many respects naive in regards to its own method, and so the *Sixth Meditation* enjoys the role of a reflection on the idea of phenomenology as such. One major theme underlying this meditation centered on the provisionality of phenomenological theses. Over the years, as phenomenology advanced methodologically, each new introduction published by Husserl seemed as if something conclusive had been established. For instance, the development of genetic phenomenology, lacking in *Ideas I* altogether and only incompletely presented in the *Cartesian Meditations*, appears to invalidate the earlier structural descriptions of intentionality proposed in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*. Fink and Husserl reject this view and seek in so doing “to advert to the *openness* of the systematic of phenomenology, the step-like character of phenomenological theory-formation, which just does not allow absolutizing some particular stage or some particular concept of phenomenology.”<sup>122</sup>

As the processes of transcendental cognition advance, there is an ever-increasing broadening of insight into the “nature of the being” [*Sein-snature*] that is peculiar to constitutive subjectivity and a critical *overhaul* of the first explication takes place, in that on the basis of the

cognitive dispositions that have been acquired certain beliefs can now be separated out as prejudices that were dragged in by way of the natural verbal sense found in that preliminary transcendental explication.<sup>123</sup>

Here again we can see a crucial feature of the progress of phenomenological insight. Transcendental phenomenology asserts that it is a truly presuppositionless science. This is true only to the degree that every supposed beginning within a phenomenological investigation demands a methodological return and re-examination of that beginning within the very method of phenomenology itself, however. Every architectonic representation of the field of phenomenological problems demands the “overhaul” of the phenomenological language of the investigations at every level of the system. This imperative, indeed, guides the sense of system “building” in phenomenology and stands as the basis of the insight that such a system remains open-ended.

The draft outline of the system of phenomenological philosophy which Fink and Husserl produced in the thirties thus exhibits a twofold set of tasks. First, the system brings together the static and genetic methods into a single theory of elements, which Eugen Fink would later detail in his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. Though the system identifies two distinct phenomenological tasks, a regressive and progressive phenomenology, this schematism only generally maps onto the bifurcation of static and genetic. Rather, the division of tasks in the later system concerns the matters of investigative domain. Given that a regressive phenomenology remains restricted to the field of absolute self-givenness, this restriction points to a wholly distinct subject matter only implicitly thematized in the regressive analyses.

However *questionable* it is whether the great realities of human existence [*des menschlichen Daseins*], birth and death, even point to a transcendental actuality, it is nonetheless evident that the constitutive *sense-bestowings* that transcendently underlie these mundane *sense-elements* cannot be exhibited in an immediate way in the being-context of on-going world-constitution, which of course is given by the reduction and by it is made a possible theme for intuitive analyses. It is evident instead that in order to gain any understanding at all, we have to “construct.” Obviously this construction must not be an arbitrary, more or less fanciful invention, but can only draw its *cognitive standing* exclusively from a prior *differentiated* study of given genetic processes, of the demonstrated temporalizations in which a having is built up, etc., in order to be able, then, in an appropriate *motivated* way, to abstract “constructively” from the common presupposition of all given demonstrable “developments” and genetic procedures, namely, from the transcendental *time* that is found already under way in self-temporalization and which is there

as the universal horizon *in* which all process and genesis arise and come to an end.<sup>124</sup>

So however “hypothetical”<sup>125</sup> these constructions might be, they are and must remain, themselves, problems within phenomenology whose resolution, though predelineated by the earlier worked out regressive analyses, remain outside the boundaries of this style of research. The “system of phenomenological philosophy” thus lays out the “general ‘map’ of the transcendental continent,”<sup>126</sup> which is, so to speak, not a single land.

Yet with the articulation of the architectonic of transcendental philosophy, there arises a new task and a new level of analyses which is neither the subject matter of either a regressive or progressive analysis. As Fink argues in his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, the transcendental theory of elements leads necessarily to a unique phenomenological task, i.e., the transcendental theory of method.

It is the proper task of the *transcendental theory of method* to make phenomenologically understandable the whole systematic of phenomenological inquiry, the structure of methodological procedure, the rank and style of *transcendental cognition* and “science. Its task, therefore, is to submit the phenomenologizing thought and theory-formation that functions anonymously in phenomenological labors to a proper transcendental analytic, and thus to complete phenomenology in ultimate *transcendental self-understanding about itself*.”<sup>127</sup>

If this characterization is correct, then we can see that the plan for the “system of phenomenological philosophy” which he and Husserl produced a few years earlier remains inadequate. The draft plans of the “system” omit this reflective level of analysis identifiable as theory of method. Any adequate system of phenomenological philosophy must therefore terminate not merely with the general map of the transcendental continent, so to speak, but also with a reflection of the “nature” of the action of phenomenologizing going on by the transcendental subject engaged in these sorts of analyses.

What shows in the action of reduction as immediately *open to insight* of transcendental cognizing is this: that human immanence is nothing other than transcendental constituting subjectivity enveloped by enworlding self-apperceptions and “stationed” in the world. But this cannot be demonstrated to natural consciousness, it can never be shown to consciousness as long as it is naturally stationed, i.e., as long as it does not perform the reduction . . . It does not object to giving inner<sup>128</sup> experience the distinction of being apodictic. But it does not make this apodicticity “absolute being”<sup>129</sup>. Rather, in the reduction it *reaches beyond* the natural attitude and the whole horizon of *truths belong to it*

and takes *transcendental* subjectivity as the object for concrete demonstrative investigations, it demonstrates this subjectivity as altogether *taking precedence constitutively* over the being of the world (and that means: also over the being of mundane-apodictic immanence).<sup>130</sup>

Phenomenology, in other words, comes to be a kind of archaeology, digging beneath the world-apperceptions of a worldly subject to the root sense-constituting subjectivity.

We discover, then, that no phenomenological task remains immune from its own critique in this open-ended task. The descriptive method typical of Husserl's earliest writings shows itself, in later analyses, to have only mapped the surface of a profoundly richer "region." A genetic or "explanatory" method reaches into the more obscure depths of this in-human subjectivity in its attempt to bring to light the constitutive sources of worldly experience, itself. What is clear, however, is that each furtherance requires not merely a careful, disciplined attention to method. Phenomenology demands its own critique. For no phenomenological task remains immune from its own critique; not even the task of articulating the architectonic of transcendental philosophy, itself. As Husserl would say in one of his latest writings:

In the systematic working through of the epoché, or rather, the reduction, so understood, one is shown, however, that it demands a sense-clarification and sense-transformation in all its determinations of tasks, if the new science is to become capable of being executed in a really concrete way and without absurdity, or—what is the same—if it is actually to carry out the reduction to the absolutely ultimate grounds [*Gründe*] and is to avoid the unnoticed, counter-sense admixture of naturally naïve previously held acceptances [*Vorgeltungen*].<sup>131</sup>

## Conclusion

There are obvious reasons why Husserl's "system of phenomenological philosophy" plays a special role in this study. With such a publication, Husserl hoped finally to bring the different levels of phenomenological analysis articulated in his manuscripts under a single frame. Of all his publication projects, therefore, this effort is unique. The "system" was to be neither an introduction nor a special constitutional study. With the "system," in other words, Husserl intended to publish the greatest and most important part of his life's work—at least in its main contours. That he failed to achieve this goal does not necessitate the failure of the systematic of phenomenology as an idea. The failure of this intention signifies, rather, the great unfulfilled promise of Husserl's career.

What this study points to, I believe, is the need for a new orientation to Husserl's writings. I have argued here that one can discover in Husserl's most important philosophical developments the working out of a unitary conception of the phenomenological problematic. This is by no means an uncontroversial stance. It is, of course, possible to see the development of the phenomenological problematic in Husserl's manuscripts as essentially discontinuous. Indeed, this has been something of a typical conclusion by many very careful scholars of Husserl's works. Robert Sokolowski, for instance, argues in his excellent study, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, that Husserl's static model of sense constitution, typical of his early writings, enjoys strictly limited efficacy as a phenomenological account of passive sense constitution. A thorough-going and truly adequate analysis of intentionality—which Husserl started working out in the teens and pursued throughout the twenties—demands a genetic methodology by which to account for the temporal coming to be of the standing-streaming of actual [*aktuell*] enworlded consciousness, itself.<sup>1</sup> Husserl's early descriptive methodology simply leaves off the task of accounting for the deepest levels of passive genesis.<sup>2</sup> Yet a genetic method is more than merely an expansion of the matter-form model of intentionality, Sokolowski argues. In fact, the new genetic model of intentionality shows the static descriptive method to be for all intents and purposes wrong-headed.<sup>3</sup> The essentialism typical of Husserl's *Logical*

*Investigations* and *Ideas I* finds itself superseded in the development of a phenomenology that leaves in question the descriptive efficacy of earlier structural articulations of intentional consciousness. This incoherency, Sokolowski argues, remains unresolved in Husserl's philosophy.

David Carr takes up a similar theme in his *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*. Carr argues that the genetic method of intentional analysis marks a new beginning in Husserl's researches. On the basis of this development, the concept of transcendental phenomenology, itself, suffers significant alteration. The development of a genetic phenomenology institutes *in nuce*, Carr argues, a break from the neo-Cartesian orientation of his earlier writings.<sup>4</sup> This break results in the promulgation of an entirely new approach to the question of history in Husserl's philosophy.

In both these accounts, each of which remains influential today, Husserl's philosophy contains within it an unresolved methodological conflict. Lately, there have been efforts to suggest a new reading of Husserl which offers a way around this problem. In his provocative book, *Home and Beyond*, Anthony Steinbock, for instance, argues that one can discern an inner dialectic at work in Husserl's philosophy. Steinbock offers, in my opinion, an interesting middle ground between the positions like those of Sokolowski and Carr above and my own. He suggests that Husserl's early static phenomenology is indeed annulled and yet made more concrete in his genetic method. This genetic phenomenology, itself, for reasons internal to the analysis of *die Sachen selbst*, offers clues leading to a new "generative" phenomenology.<sup>5</sup> Thus according to Steinbock, Husserl's philosophy of consciousness terminates in a phenomenology that transcends the reductive restriction to conscious immanence.<sup>6</sup> Under this interpretation, Husserl's own investigations lead, when properly understood within the context of their own specific cultural presentation, to the overthrow of the paradigm of an investigation of intentional consciousness as such.

According to Sokolowski, Carr, and Steinbock, then, a coherent system of phenomenological philosophy as Husserl articulates it remains an impossible ideal. The different intentional strata unearthed in Husserl's investigations remain incommensurable. As is clear now, this a view we have been arguing against. We argue instead that Husserl's major results detailed in his investigations form a unity, when conceived in the light of the dynamic at work in Husserl's philosophical method.<sup>7</sup> Though one may be able to mark off a number of phases within Husserl's research,<sup>8</sup> this neither suggests, I believe, the necessity to conceive his philosophy as expressing distinct developmental breaks nor does this deny the continuity and consistency of his earlier studies in relation to his later researches. Indeed, the periodization of Husserl's research impresses an artificial structuring principle onto the body of his research investigations. Husserl's method of investigation is better understood as a dynamic in which later investigations transform the "ground" of his earlier researches. As Husserl, himself,



suggests, though, his later researches take up their theme from a new level of insight only implicitly detailed in the earlier studies.

In this study, I have sought to articulate the proper orientation by which to establish the unity claim, as I am wont to call it. Every attempt has been made to work this out by reference to materials internal to Husserl's research. I am quite cognizant, however, that the present study has not fully established this point. In order to complete this task, a more profound engagement with the entire corpus of Husserl's research is needed. This study is prolegomena to that effort.

I have argued in the first chapter that the *Gesammelte Werke* of *Husserliana* tend to offer a distorted picture of Husserl's philosophy. Though the work of the editors at the Husserl Archive is and has always been of the highest quality, the organizational structure and presentation of the *Gesammelte Werke* and *Materialien* series, especially those volumes containing his limited research investigations, elide over the unique "zigzag" dynamic in play in Husserl's research. Husserl was constantly reworking problems. The structure of the various presentations offered in these volumes interjects an interpretation of Husserl's philosophy which quite often stands counter to Husserl's own investigative dynamic. In the second chapter of this work, then, I showed that Husserl, himself, saw a unitary development at work in his most important writings. Husserl expressed this conception of his philosophy in letters with Georg Misch. Most interestingly, he ties the development at work in his investigations to his own encounter with Wilhelm Dilthey in 1905. Unfortunately, in his letters to Misch and earlier to Dilthey, he remains much too vague just how this encounter affected him and his work after 1905. Thus in my third chapter, I offered a plausible positive articulation of the impulse working its way through Husserl's investigations. Here I examined in particular Husserl's articulation of method in his 1907 lectures, "The Idea of Phenomenology," and his 1910/11 lectures known as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. These two lectures, as Husserl suggests, were so important in the development of the concept of the phenomenological reduction that they were eventually to form the basis of a new systematic of phenomenology, which he took up in the early twenties. In these lectures, as we saw, one finds the extension of phenomenology to the intersubjective domain and the first full integration of the problem of time by Husserl into his analyses of intentional sense constitution. We saw, that Husserl first formulated the genetic method of phenomenology in his Bernau time-investigations of 1917/18. This inchoate articulation was then developed in the twenties in his logical analyses of passive constitution. In chapter four, then, I traced Husserl's efforts during the twenties and thirties to integrate the static descriptive methodology—which marked his early investigations—with that of his investigations into temporalization and the constitution of the stream of egoic consciousness as such. It was precisely here that Husserl worked to construct a systematic of phenomenology, eventually planning in the early thirties to produce an immensely

ambitious presentation of the “system of phenomenological philosophy.” Much of chapter four concerns itself with articulating the structure of this plan. The system was as much an architectonic of phenomenological investigations as it was an expression of the progressively advancing dynamic of phenomenological method, itself. The final chapter thus concludes with a sketch of the plan for the system of phenomenological philosophy as well as an expression of the significance of this system as Husserl and his assistant conceived it in the early thirties.

This entire study is but a sketch of Husserl's investigative dynamic. We have tried throughout this essay to follow the advice offered by Klaus Held in his important study of Husserl's last investigations on the problem of time, *Lebendige Gegenwart*. “An essay on the problems of phenomenology ought not simply retell what Husserl thought then and there, it must rather seek to understand along with Husserl the inner necessity in the unfolding of a problematic.”<sup>9</sup> As I have suggested, though, this essay, this sketch, requires supplementation. On the one hand, a new thoroughgoing study of the systematic of Husserlian phenomenology must be taken up. Fortunately, there are signs today that the soil is ripe for a study precisely of this sort.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, and this is more than a mere consequence of the first task, I sincerely believe a renewal of phenomenology, itself, is required from the beginnings articulated by Husserl. Husserl always longed for a community of researchers to take up the tasks of the new science he laid out in his writings. Even as Husserl's teaching career was coming to a close, as he saw his own efforts losing ground to the rising popularity of existential phenomenology and life-philosophy in Germany and abroad, he remained optimistic that there would arise a number of researchers who would take up the tasks of the new science of transcendental phenomenology.

The universal horizon of the work of a phenomenological philosophy has revealed itself, so to speak, according to principal geographic structures, where the fundamental strata of problems and essential methods of approach find clarification. The author <of *Ideas I*> espies the endlessly open land of true philosophy, the “promised land,” extending before him which he will never know as more than just tilled and cultivated. This optimism may be met with a smile, but one can see for oneself in the fragment here presented as the beginning of phenomenology, if there is not some ground for this. I would very much like to hope that those who come after take up these beginnings, steadily carrying them forward, but also improving their substantial imperfections. Indeed, imperfections cannot be avoided in scientific beginnings.<sup>11</sup>

Clearly, Husserl saw himself as a modern Moses, and so today we who see in Husserl's philosophy a genuine beginning find ourselves among the many who have strayed. The real work of scholarship into Husserlian

phenomenology requires a return to the *die Sachen selbst*, which admittedly even this interpretative study of Husserl's work fails to offer.

Though Husserl saw himself a new Moses, he seems to us rather a new Odysseus, this *polymechanos*<sup>12</sup> of old, constantly struggling in his many homeward travels homeward with an ingenuity we can only marvel at. Too many scholars of Husserl's philosophy seek less to take up the beginnings he laid out and to carry these forward with the tenacity and philosophical cunning exemplified by the old master. Too many remain content simply to interpret Husserl, where the true task is to go beyond him. This is indeed Husserl's own hope. To go beyond him means, however, that we must understand his work rightly. This study is the first step in this direction . . . to understand his work rightly so that we can go beyond him.

It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,  
 And see the great Achilles, whom we knew.  
 Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'  
 We are not now that strength which in old days  
 Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;—  
 One equal temper of heroic hearts,  
 Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will  
 To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.<sup>13</sup>



# Appendix 1

## Husserl's Publishing History

(Bold faced items represent Husserl's most significant contributions. See the bibliography for an explanation of the abbreviations employed here.)

Year	German Original	English Translation
<i>Husserl joins the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Halle as Privatdozent, July 6, 1887</i>		
1887 <sup>1</sup>	<b>Über den Begriff der Zahl.</b> Habilitationsschrift. Halle Heynemann'sche Buchdruckerei (F. Beyer). <sup>2</sup>	"On the Concept of Number. Psychological Analyses." Translated by Dallas Willard. In <i>Philosophia Mathematica</i> 9 (1972): 44-52 & 10 (1973): 37-87. • <i>HSW</i> , 92-119.
1891	<b>Philosophie der Arithmetik, Bd. I.</b> Halle: C.E.M. Pfeffer (Robert Stricker). • <i>Hua</i> XII, 5-283	<i>HuCW</i> X, 5-299.
1891	"Selbstanzeige." <i>Philosophie der Arithmetik</i> . Halle a. S., C.E.M. Pfeffer (R. Stricker). In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> , S. 360-61. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 287-278.	
1891	"Der Folgerungskalkül und die Inhaltslogik." In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> 15, S. 168-189. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 44-66.	"The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents." Translated by Dallas Willard. <i>The Personalist</i> 60 (1979): 7-25. • <i>HuCW</i> V, 92-114.
1891	"Der Folgerungskalkül und die Inhaltslogik. Nachträge zur gleichnamigen Abhandlung S. 168 ff. dieses Bandes." In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> 15, S. 351-56. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 67-72.	<i>HuCW</i> V, 115-120.

Year	German Original	English Translation
1891	<Besprechung von:> “E. Schröder, <i>Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (Exakte Logik)</i> , I. Band, Leipzig 1890. In <i>Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen</i> , S. 243-78. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 3-43.	“A Review of Volume I of Ernst Schröder’s <i>Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik</i> .” Translated by Dallas Willard. <i>The Personalist</i> 59 (1978): 115-43. • <i>HuCW</i> V, 52-91.
1893	“A. Voigt’s ‘elementare Logik’ und meine Darlegungen zur Logik des logischen Kalküls.” In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> 17, S. 111-120. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 73-82	“A. Voigt’s ‘Elementary Logic’ in Relation to My Statements on the Logic of the Logical Calculus.” Translated by Dallas Willard. <i>The Personalist</i> 60. (1979): 26-53. • <i>HuCW</i> V, 121-130.
1893	“Antwort auf die vorstehende ‘Erwiderung’ des Herrn Voigt.” In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> 17, S. 508-511. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 87-91	<i>HuCW</i> V, 135-138.
1894	“Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik.” In <i>Philosophische Monatshefte</i> 30, S. 159-191. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 92-123.	“Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic.” Translated by Dallas Willard. <i>The Personalist</i> 58 (1977): 297-320. • <i>HSW</i> , 126-142. • <i>HuCW</i> V, 139-170.
1897	“Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre 1894.” In <i>Archiv für systematische Philosophie</i> 3, S. 216-44. • <i>Hua</i> XXII, 124-151.	<i>HuCW</i> V, 171-196.
1900	<b>Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik.</b> Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer.	
1900	“Selbstanzeige.” <i>Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik.</i> Halle a.S. In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie</i> 24, S. 511-512.	<i>Intro to LI</i> , 3-4.
1901	<b>Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.</b> Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer.	
1901	“Selbstanzeige.” <i>Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.</i> Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1901. In <i>Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie</i> <sup>3</sup> 25 Leipzig. (1901): 260-263. • <i>Hua</i> XIXb, 779-783.	<i>Intro to LI</i> , 5-9.

Year	German Original	English Translation
Husserl joins the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Göttingen as Professor Extraordinarius, September 14, 1901		
1903	<p>&lt;Besprechung von:&gt; “Melchior Palágyi, <i>Der Streit der Psychologen und der Formalisten in der modernen Logik</i>,” Leipzig 1902. In <i>Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane</i> 31, S. 287-294.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXII, 152-161.</li> </ul>	<p>“A Reply to a Critic of My Refutation of Logical Psychologism.” In <i>The Personalist</i> 53 (1972): 5-13.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>HSW</i>, 152-158.</li> <li>• <i>HuCW</i> V, 197-206.</li> </ul>
1903/ 1904	<p>“Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-99.” In <i>Archiv für systematische Philosophie</i> 9 (1903): S. 113-132, S. 237-259, S. 393-408, S. 503-543; &amp; 10 (1904): S. 101-125.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXII, 162-258.</li> </ul>	<i>HuCW</i> V, 207-224, 225-245, 246-259, 260-279, 280-302.
1906	<p>Bemerkungen in A. Lalande, <i>Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie</i>, zu den Artikeln ‘Faculté’, ‘Fait’, und ‘Fantaisie’. In <i>Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie</i> 6, S. 293, 296, 299.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXII, 259-260.</li> </ul>	<i>HuCW</i> V, 303-304.
1909	<p>Bemerkungen in A. Lalande, <i>Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie</i>, zu den Artikeln ‘Individu’ und ‘Intention’: In <i>Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie</i> 9, S. 235, 263.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXII, 259-260.</li> </ul>	<i>HuCW</i> V, 303-304.
1910	<p>&lt;Besprechung von:&gt; Anton Marty, <i>Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie</i>, Halle a.S. 1908. In <i>Deutsche Literaturzeitung</i> 31, Spalte 1106-1110.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXII, 261-265.</li> </ul>	<i>HuCW</i> V, 305-309.
1911	<p>“Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft.” In <i>Logos</i> I, S. 289-341.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 3-62.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, 71-147</li> <li>• Philosophy as Rigorous Science. (2002)</li> </ul>
1913	<p>“Vorwort.” <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 1, S. v-vi.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 63-64.</li> </ul>	



Year	German Original	English Translation
1913	<p>“Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.” In <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 1. Halle a.d.S., 1-323.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> III/1</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Ideas</i> 1 (BG)</li> <li>• <i>HuCW</i> II</li> </ul>
1913	<p><i>Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis</i>, I. Teil. Zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage. Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1913.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>LI-I</i></li> <li>• <i>LI-II</i></li> </ul>
1914	<p>“Beitrag zur Diskussion über den Vortrag ‘Philosophie und Psychologie’ von Heinrich Maier.” In <i>Bericht über den VI. Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie vom 15. bis 18. April 1914</i>, im Auftrage des Vorstandes, herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. F. Schumann, II Teil. Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1914, 144-145.</p>	
1915	<p>Brief (29 Jan 1915) an Hugo Münsterberg über den Geist der deutschen Kriegsführung (auf Englisch), <i>Hua</i> XXV, 293-294.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>HuDo</i> III/6, 300-301.</li> </ul>	<p>Münsterberg, Hugo. <i>The Peace and America</i>. New York: Appleton &amp; Co., 1915, 222-224.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>HSW</i>, 352-353.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Husserl joins the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg as Professor Ordinarius, April 1, 1816</i></p>		
1916	<p>“Vorwort.” <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 2, S. v-vi.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 65-66.</li> </ul>	
1917	<p>“Adolf Reniach †” in <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, 06. Dezember 1917.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 296-299.</li> </ul>	
1918	<p>“Adolf Reniach. Ein Nachruf.” in <i>Kant-Studien</i> 23, S. 147-149.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 300-303.</li> </ul>	<p>“Communication. Adolf Reinach.” In <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> 35/4. (June 1975): 571-574. <i>HSW</i>, 354-356.</p>
1919	<p>“Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano.” In Oskar Kraus, <i>Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre</i>. München: C.H.Beck, 153-167.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXV, 304-315.</li> </ul>	<p><i>HSW</i>, 342-348.</p>

Year	German Original	English Translation
1921	“Vorwort.” <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 4, S. v. • <i>Hua</i> XXV, 67.	
1921	<i>Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis, II. Teil.</i> Zweite teilweise umgearbeitete Auflage. Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer.	
1922	<i>Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil. Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis, II. Teil.</i> Dritte, unveränderte Auflage. Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer. • <i>Hua</i> XIX	
1922	<i>Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.</i> Zweiter unveränderter Abdruck. Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer.	
1923	“Erneuerung, Ihr Problem and ihre Methode.” In <i>The Kaizo-La rekonstuyo</i> 5/3. Tokyo, 84-92. • <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 3-13	• <i>HSW</i> , 326-331.
1923	“Die Idee einer philosophischen Kultur: Ihr erstes Aufkeimen in der griechen Philosophie.” In <i>Japanisch-deutsche Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Technik</i> 1/2. Lübeck, 45-51. • <i>Hua</i> VII, 203-207 & 8-10 & 11-17.	
1924	“Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem (auf japanisch).” In <i>The Kaizo-La rekonstuyo</i> 6/2. Tokyo, 2-31. <sup>4</sup> • <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 20-43.	
1924	“Die Methode der Wesensforschung (auf japanisch).” In <i>The Kaizo-La rekonstuyo</i> 6/4. Tokyo, 107-116. <sup>5</sup> • <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 13-20.	

Year	German Original	English Translation
1925	<p>“Über die Reden Gotamo Bud-dhos.” In <i>Piperbote</i> II, 1. S. 18-19.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 125-126.</li> </ul>	
1927	<p>“Die Phänomenologie und Rudolf Eucken (geschr. 1916)”. In <i>Die Tatwelt</i>, S. 10-11.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 127-128.</li> </ul>	
<i>Husserl retires from academic duties, March 31, 1928</i>		
1928	<p>“Edmund Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins,” herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. In <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologischen Forschung</i> 9. Herausgegeben von Edmund Husserl. Halle a.d.A.: Max Niemeyer, 367-498.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hua</i> X, 3-134.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)</i>. Translated by J.S. Churchill. Edited by Martin Heidegger. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1964.</li> <li>• <i>HuCW</i> IV</li> </ul>
1928	<p><i>Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil.</i> Vierte Auflage (unveränderter Abdruck der 2. umgearbeiteten Auflage). Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1928.</p>	
1928	<p><i>Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.</i> 3. unveränderter Abdruck. Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1928.</p>	
1929	<p><i>Hua</i> IX, 237-301</p>	<p>“Phenomenology.” Translated by C. V. Salmon. <i>The Encyclopedia Britannica</i>, 14th ed. vol. 17 (1929), 699-702.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Phenomenology.” Translated by C.V. Salmon. In <i>Realism and the Background of Phenomenology</i>. Edited by Roderick M. Chisholm. IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, 118-128.</li> <li>• <i>HSW</i>, 21-35.</li> <li>• Kockelman, Joseph J. <i>Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology</i>. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1994.</li> <li>• <i>HuCW</i> VI, 159-179.</li> </ul>

Year	German Original	English Translation
1929	<b>Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft.</b> In <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 10. Halle a.d.S., 1-298. • <i>Hua</i> XVII, 5-335.	<i>Formal and Transcendental Logic.</i> Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
1930	“Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.’” In <i>Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung</i> 11. Halle a.d.S., 549-570. • <i>Hua</i> V, 138-162.	“Author’s Preface to the English Edition of <i>My Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy</i> . Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. New York, NY: Collier Books, 1931, 5-22. • <i>HuCW</i> III, 407-430.
1931	<b>Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction la phénoménologie.</b> Traduit de l’allemand par Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas. (Bibliothèque de la Société française de Philosophie). Paris: A. Colin. • <i>Hua</i> I, 41-183.	<i>Cartesian Meditations.</i> Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
1933	“Vorwort” zu Eugen Fink, ‘Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik’, <i>Kant-Studien</i> 38, S. 319-320.	“Forward” to “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism” by Eugen Fink. In <i>The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical Readings</i> . Edited by R.O. Elveton. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 73-74.
1936	“Lettre de M. le professeur Husserl: An den Präsidenten des VIII. Internationalen Philosophen-Kongresses Herrn Professor Dr. Rádl in Prag”: <i>Actes du Huitième Congrès International de Philosophie Prague 2-7 Septembre 1934</i> , Prague, S. XLI-XLV. • <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 240-244.	
1936	“Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.” <i>Philosophia</i> . 1 Belgrad, 77-176. • <i>Hua</i> VI, 1-105.	<i>The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology.</i> Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 3-100.
1937	“Selbstdarstellung” im <i>Philosophen-Lexicon</i> :> “Edmund Husserl”: <i>Philosophen-Lexikon</i> , bearbeitet von Eugen Hauer, Werner Ziegenfuß, Gertrud Jung, Berlin, S. 447-452. • <i>Hua</i> XXVII, 245-254.	



## Appendix 2

### The Husserl–Misch Correspondence

FIRST LETTER: MISCH TO HUSSERL, JUNE 18<sup>TH</sup>, 1919

Göttingen 18/6, 19  
Friedländerweg 35.

Respected Herr Husserl,

your letter has given me the long sought opportunity to express my high estimation of you personally. Since called to Göttingen<sup>1</sup> I have felt a particular duty to you—naturally, as Göttingen was the setting of your influence. Thus are my intentions, if a way could be found, to uphold the tradition of phenomenology here. The efforts at furthering the philosophy of spirit [*Geistesphilosophie*], which moved me to offer classes on your work<sup>2</sup> in Berlin and Marburg, have found welcome supplementation through phenomenology. It is thus painful that Reinach is no longer here. He would now surely be the first choice for the position of *Extraordinarius*. I had found complete sympathy for Reinach<sup>3</sup> among the prominent philologists and historians with whom I had the opportunity to speak, and it was suggested that I should communicate this to you. The question of the appointment has naturally taken on a different complexion, one that presently must be recognized as decisive, i.e., to obtain a professorship that is capable of informatively representing pedagogy from the standpoint of the philosophy of spirit. The path to habilitation yet remains. This is, however, a question of personnel now.

Apart from the consideration, which is the case here as it is in Freiburg, that at present there exists a crush of philosophy instructors of Jewish origins, there is the added difficulty against Fraulein Stein of pushing through a woman's habilitation. This has not been overcome in our own department by the habilitation of Fraulein Noether. Quite to the contrary!<sup>4</sup> I don't know whether you heard of the confrontation which arose here years earlier in the effort to habilitate Fraulein Noether. The arguments put forward by the Department of Philosophy and History led the Ministry to deny the application. In any case the department considers itself to be outvoted by

the other departments. Furthermore, one should not expect, from what I hear, that the opposition has now given up. Rather it has taken the initiative precisely in the case of the habilitation for philosophy—where the lectureships are contested entirely differently than in the special sciences. Perhaps this will change some day. For all the esteem I have for Fraulein Stein, after your recommendation<sup>5</sup> and after reading her remarkable dissertation,<sup>6</sup> I <still> cannot offer her many prospects. It would be otherwise if a significant male student of yours would like to come, one with whom these reservations would not surface. One or the other habilitation will come to pass presumably in the Winter semester what with the crush to lectureship—in the short time that I've been here (since November 18<sup>th</sup>) there have already been 5 inquiries.

My wife<sup>7</sup> thanks you most heartily for your warm regards, and I send my regards in admiration.

Yours truly,  
Georg Misch.

## Second Letter: Misch to Husserl, May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1922

Most esteemed Herr Councilor,

the professorship that you once held and gained significance through you is again in need of filling.<sup>8</sup> Although consideration for pedagogy was decisive for the last appointment (in 1919), the position is once again now open for pure philosophy. A full professorship for pedagogy has been specially established, which Nohl has taken up (without philosophy having to give up a line.) And so I would like here to ask your advice.

As per your decision at the time, the professorship falls within the purview of the department of philology and history. This is important because the separation of the two departments is close at hand. The rivalry that had existed here earlier has been removed now that Nelson has obtained a teaching contract for philosophy of the exact sciences—for which naturally he has barely set to work. I hope, however, that a teaching contract will soon be in the offering for Lipps.<sup>9</sup> In point of fact, Geiger would be strongly considered, and we would very much like to bring him in. But there are unfortunate personal difficulties, since Katz<sup>10</sup> is presumably to receive Müller's position. We recommended him as the first candidate then, after the earlier list had brought about a catalog of grievances. However, if Pfänder were desired, one would like to be able to offer him an Ordinarius [*etatsmäss<iges> Ordinariat*]<sup>11</sup>—which the position is not. And Heidegger, if you would like to offer your judgment about him, I would be very appreciative.<sup>11</sup> As I said, though, I would very much like your advice one way or the other.



I hope, nevertheless, that you will offer me <your advice> even though the case with Fraulein Stein's Habilitation was not resolved at the time according to your wish. Fraulein Stein began it quite clumsily, as she offended Müller right off the bat. It turned out well, though, since otherwise we would not have obtained Lipps.

In addition, <I'm wondering> whether you value Stenzel's work<sup>12</sup> to such a degree that you could recommend him despite his philological background.> Smalenbach,<sup>13</sup> who stands next in line, we will only name but cannot recommend since adjunct professors ought not be promoted as a matter of principle.

With most respectful regards!

Yours most sincerely,

Misch.

Göttingen 28/May, 22

I would add: in case it were possible to find someone who is really thoroughly well-versed in either mathematics or also biology, then we would disregard the separation of the department. For the philosophy of spirit is well represented here. And Lipps is sufficiently independent not to see this as interfering. But I know of no one in the interim.

### Third Letter: Husserl to Misch, June 27<sup>th</sup>, 1929 (a copy)<sup>14</sup>

Freiburg, June 27, 1929

Dear sir colleague,

I am writing to you very briefly because I am not sure how I should stop were I to begin in earnest. In particular, <I would like> to respond by question and answer to your profoundly touching essay<sup>15</sup> which you dedicated to me. This solely would express the proper gratitude for this gift of dedication. To begin, though I am only now responding, this is not out of lassitude. I have been living in feverish activity since September of the preceding year—what Kant wrote as an old man to the good <Georg Samuel Albert> Mellin applies to me most fittingly.<sup>16</sup> I am presently working on the corrections of the last two proof-sheets<sup>17</sup> of my book, *Formal and Transcendental Logic: Attempt at a Critique of Logical Reason*. In addition to that, I completed the editing of my "Paris Lectures" (from the end of February) just a few weeks ago. I have worked them into a highly concentrated and systematic essay entitled "Cartesian Meditations" (somewhere between seven and eight printer's sheets). I have sent it to Paris, where it is to be translated into French. It may be that a (perhaps expanded) German edition will appear in the fall. At 70, amidst the mountains of manuscripts and in the same "helplessness" (Groethuysen) as Dilthey earlier, one ought "have no time!"

During a dearth of corrections in the previous weeks I had a momentary pause to catch my breath. I read your essay over two days wholly captivated and with concentration. I have it before me again today (another pause). As I have only just opened the *Festschrift*,<sup>18</sup> I don't know a single of the themes of the dedication essays.

Perhaps I can, as I very much wish, respond in a literary manner (whether I can, *cf.* above, must itself be shown). Your confrontation with Heidegger, or rather the Dilthey—Heidegger confrontation that also affects me, implies the necessary confrontation between Dilthey and Husserl. You do not know that the few discussions with Dilthey in Berlin of 1905 (not his writings) signified an impulse that runs from the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* to the Husserl of *Ideas*. The phenomenology of *Ideas*, which was incompletely expressed <as published in 1913> and only properly perfected from 1913 to sometime around 1925 has led, by a differently formed method, to a most close community with Dilthey. That must become somehow cleared up. I don't yet know where and how.—

My warmest regards to you and your wife, Clara. If only we could discuss all of this personally! Thank you very much in any case as I linger with your so suggestive and beautifully presented thoughts.

Sincerely,

Yours,

E. Husserl

#### Fourth Letter: Husserl to Mish, August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1929<sup>19</sup>

Freiburg im Breisgau, the 3<sup>rd</sup> of August, 1929  
Lorettostr. 40

Dear Sir Colleague,

by a happy accident I have re-discovered in my old papers two of W. Dilthey's long-missing letters<sup>20</sup> relating to my *Logos*<sup>21</sup> article. I have also finally found a major portion of a draft that my daughter transcribed from my response to the longer letter by Dilthey dated June 29, 1911.<sup>22</sup> I never requested nor obtained the original letter from Dilthey. I am sad to hear that this letter is missing from Dilthey's literary estate, and so I offer this fragment as substitute. It apparently contains the essentials. I am sending you carefully corrected drafts, enclosed, and hope that you and your colleague Nohl<sup>23</sup> find satisfaction with these.

In this, my response <to *LPh*>, you ought not understand phenomenology as would <Max> Scheler but rather as <the study of that which> "constitutively" arises out of correlation (entirely as in the *Ideas*), i.e., as related to the essential correlation of consciousness and being. The

relativity of nature does not mean likewise the relations of natural objects continuing into infinity in the singularity [*Alleinheit*] of nature. Rather the relativity of nature means, again constitutively, the relativity of experienced nature as such, of intuited nature to the particular constituting subjectivity (intersubjectivity, community of researchers in their historical time), but also the relativity of the nature of the natural sciences [*der naturwissenschaftlichen Natur*] (which at each moment is holding as existing [*seiend geltenden*] for us or, more to the point, for the scientist as existing simpliciter). I, myself, saw already then that I gave up an absolute being of nature (with absolutely valid laws of nature). Further, in spite of the oversimplifying *Logos* article, which should be thought as ‘popular!’, I conceived phenomenology as radical and universal ‘human science,’ incomparably more radical than Dilthey—more radical through the phenomenological reduction (first presented explicitly in lectures of 1907<sup>24</sup>). For Dilthey tied himself to the historical sciences and therewith to the pre-given world and an anthropology. Heidegger also, whose brilliant book<sup>25</sup> forsakes my method of constitutive phenomenology, does this in his own manner. But in regards to its essentials he does not do enough (of that I am sure). I have still much more to say: <e.g.> that to which the *Ideas*, itself a fragment, aimed; what was accomplished and carried forward in the fifteen years after <its publication>. I am just now beginning in publications to lay this out clearly and so hope to prove constitutive phenomenology as that *unum necessarium*.<sup>26</sup>

In the meanwhile I have read your two installments<sup>27</sup> more closely and have much to think over still. Thank you very much.

With friendly regards,  
Yours,  
E. Husserl

As per Dilthey’s wish, the planned notice in the *Logos* journal<sup>28</sup> should have gone along with a treatment on the inner thoroughgoing affinity of Dilthey’s intentions in the *Aufbau*<sup>29</sup> and my <own> intentions. Dilthey was taken from us during the on-going study of the *Aufbau*.<sup>30</sup> But I was yet finished neither with myself nor Dilthey and consequently the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the “*Ideas*” which grappled extensively with “the science of nature and the science of spirit” (whose first draft had been completed at the same time already with the 1<sup>st</sup> volume) should have brought about this clarification. Yet . . . !

**Fifth Letter: Misch to Husserl, August 9<sup>th</sup>, 1929**

Kohlgrub (Oberammergau)  
8.9.29.

Most Esteemed Councilor,

in my solitude here it was an unhopd for joy to receive your letter with the valuable enclosures! You have my deepest thanks. I find it a great kindness that you have made such an effort to send me this correspondence after all my failures tracking them down. My colleague Nohl will also be quite happy with this gift. Only I do not where he has hidden himself. I am leaving directly after the semester has ended in order to search for a place for my wife so that she can recover—hopefully!—from a serious attack of sciatica. She should arrive in the next few days.

The subject matter of Dilthey's first letter is so very characteristic, how the reproach of skepticism stung him and with such persistence he emphatically came back to it again and again. I can understand that. I still hear him, how he railed against the sterility of skepticism. All the while, on the other hand, he remained not so far from the academic skepticism of a Carnead or a Hume or also the kind expressed in "dreams of a seer."<sup>31</sup> That he played up his anti-metaphysical standpoint poses no serious difficulty, since he formulated it simply in Schopenhauerian terms ("resolving the world's coherency in an interconnection of concepts"<sup>32</sup>). So room is left open for an original metaphysics, which is not the same as a "science of reason." On the whole: if Dilthey began in his Kant lecture<sup>33</sup> by acknowledging the anti-metaphysician as having vouchsafed a "metaphysical nature"<sup>34</sup> (as one still tended to do with some emphasis 30 years ago), then one could just as well say the same of Dilthey. Surely you are correct—that against which Dilthey struggled as metaphysics is not the same as what you recognize as metaphysics.<sup>35</sup> This is an easily resolvable equivocation. But then the difference, which Dilthey pointed out near the end of the first letter (p. 4 in the copy) and also again in the second letter—by emphasizing "a world of such very different thoughts"<sup>36</sup>—is obviously meant in the sense as <the criticism> in his handwritten note to your *Logos* essay concerning the Platonic turn.<sup>37</sup> And here arises yet again a principle difficulty regardless of the particularities of explanations in your response, i.e., the sense in which apriorism ought and must be grasped thanks to your new phenomenological ground laying, how the constitutional analysis of the "conditions of possibility" are to be squared with the supplementation [*Nachträglichkeit*] of the idea seen hermeneutically. Yes, these are difficult questions. Your *Logic*,<sup>38</sup> which is now available, will further help here. I am not at all sure whether Dilthey's further works on the "doctrine of world-view" will bring about a fundamental clarification. These works, to which Dilthey refers in the first letter, are soon to be published.<sup>39</sup> Groethuysen brought me the handwritten manuscripts at Pfingsten, and with rather intense effort we have put the volume together. There are only a few odds and ends to clean up, which Groethuysen will hopefully take care of before he disappears into his Parisian workshop in the Latin Quarter. He should also be designated as the editor—so far our best volume. It is unbelievable that he still does not have the title of

a professor! In addition to the “Dream” essay, the volume contains a quite beautiful treatise from an earlier period concerning the historical world-view indicative of Dilthey’s strength. But in the volume there are also a number of misadventures such as the sedation of a “philosophy of philosophy” or the emphasis of a two-fold division of philosophy into science and world-view along the lines of the Dühring-Riehlsen “double concept,” that Dilthey should not have held fast to. One will scarcely find in this volume the final word that one searches for. As soon as it is published, I will send it to you. In terms of systematic importance Volume VII should be placed in context with V. And there again is the concept of “meaning.” I must confess that I have had to struggle long and hard until the proper conception <of meaning> came to me, which hopefully is true to Dilthey’s own sense. In any case, Nohl suggested, when I first discussed this with him, that I “work miracles”—affirming in the end that I would get it right. Years earlier I held a seminar together with Lipps on Volume II of the *Logical Investigations*.<sup>40</sup> I thought that since we came <at the issue> from differing sides, we would surely win clarity straight away. But this was not to be, we still stood far apart from each other. In the meanwhile, we have naturally come much closer together. Now you, yourself, as had emerged already in your letter of 1911, have the aim to lay out the inner thoroughgoing affinity of your and Dilthey’s intentions in connection with the *Aufbau*! If you could have brought this plan to fruition then—how you would have helped all those of us younger! Perhaps you are making up your mind yet that things are still current and a word from you could bring about some enlightenment. Then perhaps the letters which are historical documents could be published with your essay? I would still like to see whether or not the original of your letter can be found; the missing beginning must have contained something material. For the passage marked out in the *Anzeiger* volume and cited by me apparently came from there.<sup>41</sup>

Once again, I express my heartfelt thanks and most respectful regards.

Yours,  
GMisch

### Sixth Letter: Husserl to Misch, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1930 (a copy)<sup>42</sup>

Freiburg, the 7<sup>th</sup> of June, 1930

Dear Sir Colleague,

Why naturally!<sup>43</sup> Though such a thing also has its objection: every self-thinker must properly change his name after every decade, since he himself has changed. Dilthey, the completed, debates with Husserl, the becoming, who was but an in-between form at this stage in his middle age. To the

Husserl now at the final form, the old dispute appears curious. For the people, though, Husserl is Husserl.

I am happy that the concluding installment<sup>44</sup> of your confrontation with phenomenology (i.e., *LPh*), which has been so instructive to me, is in print.

My heartfelt regards to you and your wife.

Yours,  
E. Husserl.

### Seventh Letter: Husserl to Misch, November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1930 (a copy)

Freiburg, 11.16.30

Dear Sir Colleague,

it is my joy finally to have before me now the concluding installment of your *LPh*. It offers no less than the first fundamental critique of my *Formal and Transcendental Logic*! This likely cost you terrible effort and thus delayed the publication of your work. But in the end it is our fate to exert such efforts over one another and in the doing to have to misunderstand much of each other. Every actually new path—from its beginning forward—has its new aspects, its new concepts in the words of the old, its new language, and predelineates a new sense to its telos. How easily an aspect of one's ownmost way insinuates itself in a reading—what in the relativity of its proper sense-path predelineates and is different from “that which is the same.” How very easy the danger is for the historically grounded of a regressive taking up [*Rückprojektion*] of the resonating tradition, which is always correct as resonance but as projection [*Projektion*] remains illegitimate. One (and you in the first of the installments for all intents and purposes also) sees only the author of the *Logical Investigations*. One sees only what they were to the previous generation and not what, in themselves, they sought to become and in my work did become. The *Investigations* were a restoration of formal and material ontology, but one commensurate with a breakthrough to the “transcendental,” which is at once transcendently relativizing “phenomenology.” Ontology retains its legitimacy as does the real world, but it has unveiled to itself its ultimate, concretely complete (transcendental) sense.—In further works (which were already far along with the publication of *Ideas*) formal logic and every real ontology lost their original interest for me over against that of a systematic founding of a doctrine of transcendental subjectivity, namely as intersubjectivity. For with the “transcendental reduction” I was won over to my conviction of ultimate

and concrete subjectivity in the whole fullness of its being and life, not the mere theoretically accomplishing life in it but universal accomplishing life: absolute subjectivity in its historicity. Subjectivity—science, world, culture, ethical-religious striving, etc.—everything—in a new noematic and sense. The book which I have been preparing for ten years and which is now actually coming to fruition will bring about hopefully a most complete clarification as a wholly systematic construction [*Aufbau*]. I am curious now about the third installment.<sup>45</sup>

Friendliest regards. In highest esteem,

Yours,  
E. Husserl

**Eighth Letter: Husserl to Misch, November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1930 (a copy)<sup>46</sup>**

Freiburg 11.27.30

Most respected Herr Colleague,

this precious gift<sup>47</sup> that I have in my hand and which my burning interest urges me towards, give me the highest joy. I am, however, tied up in the middle of my work. What a treasure is laid out in the overview of this eighth volume. Above all <there is> as well a treasure of concentrated formulations and clear baselines to highlight my contrast with Dilthey as well as my inner commonalities with him. You and Groethuysen have worked together to make this substantial eighth volume and Dilthey's life-work accessible. This and your own rich additions have provided a lasting service to philosophy and have contributed so much to the understanding of the profound contexts and the total sense of Dilthey's work.

This whole edition came too late for my development—or perhaps not too late, if a few more good years are allotted to me. In particular <I am referring to> the completion of the designation of the framework of a universal (constitutive-phenomenological!) philosophy which is now in the works. It will, I believe, make plain that the “ahistorical Husserl” *had to have* at times distanced himself from history (which he nevertheless constantly had in view) precisely in order to come so far in method as to pose scientific questions in regard to it.

With friendliest regards, from my house to yours. In highest esteem.

Yours,  
E. Husserl



**Ninth Letter: Husserl to Misch, April 17<sup>th</sup>, 1937**

4.17.37

Dear and respected Herr Colleague,

your objections<sup>48</sup> are wonderful. My thinking and my analytically directed work have revolved around these central questions for decades. I believe to be able to satisfy you still. This is to follow in further articles by the actual carrying out of that which is predelineated in the first article of the overture. I am for this reason quite pleased with your letter. Were I already so clear in 1905<sup>49</sup> over the sense of my method as I am in old age, the unforgettable Dilthey would have seen that the ultimate fulfillment of his intentions lay in *this* transcendental idealism. But I still needed endless work to become clear in myself over all that which I had begun.

Heartfelt regards and above all my admiration to Frau Clara, Dilthey's daughter.

E. Husserl

## Appendix 3

### Draft Arrangements for Edmund Husserl's Time Investigations<sup>1</sup>

[349]

E. Fink's drafts of an arrangement for the edition of the Bernau time-manuscripts from the first phase of editing—thus *before* the complete revision and the *new* book manuscript, "Time and Time-Constitution," which would contain but a few of Husserl's manuscript texts.

#### 1 Draft of an Arrangement for *Edmund Husserl's Investigations on the Phenomenology of Transcendental Time*

##### Introduction:

(The problem of transcendental time: in these writings basically from within the egological reduction. Starting off from the "Ideas": the reduction performed in that work as a reduction on the first level; characterization of the exposition of the transcendental time-problem in the "Ideas" and in the "Lectures". New presentation of the phenomenological reduction and articulation of the phenomenological problematic of constitution.—Outline of the work.)

##### 1st Section: Analysis of immanent time:

(Intentional analyses of perception, of memory, a detailed analysis of recollection.—Immanent time as / a multi-dimensionality of times, exposition of the descriptive difference between act-temporality and the time of hyletic data, exposition of the time of immanent apriorities (eidetic complex), analysis of the consciousness of succession.)

##### 2nd Section: The constitution of immanent time:

(Acts as unities in the manifolds of phases of inner time-consciousness; time and time-modality; objectivity of the time-modalities, apprehension and apprehension-content, problem of immanent perception; analysis of the time-intentionality, retention and protention, determination of the phenomenological character of "fading," discussion of apparently possible interpretations.—The entire section

treats the problem of individuation in *extenso*, although in immanence; basic components of a temporal noematic!)

3rd Section: The self-constitution of inner time-consciousness:

(Basic aporia of infinite regress and its fundamental overcoming through the restoration of an Aristotelian—Brentanoan doctrine! Diagram of time.—Time and I: the monadological unity of transcendental time; non-temporality and temporalization of the I.)

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2 Approximate Ordering of the Manuscripts<sup>2</sup>

Introduction: miscellaneous manuscript beginnings, but above all portions taken from the manuscript “On the Doctrine of the Modalities of Time”

1st Section:

- 1) “Memory as presupposition for comparing and identifying”
  - L I 11 = *Hua* XXXIII, Beil. XIX and Text Nr. 22
- 2) “Consciousness and its form of immanent time”
  - L I 18/1–4 = *Hua* XXXIII, Beil XXI
- 3) “Sensation and transcendently apperceptive perception”
  - L I 1 = *Hua* X, Beil. XI, p. 124–126 (not Bernau)
- 4) Selections from “Acts as objects of phenomenological time”
  - L I 13/1–14 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 6
- 5) Selected pages from “Eidetic form of psychic [*seelischen*] innerliness” (on hyletic data and their time)
  - L I 17/3–6 of which pp. 5–6 are found in *Hua* XXXIII, Beil. XV

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2nd Section:

- 1) “Apprehension and content of apprehension”

- L I 12/11–19 = *Hua* XXXIII, pp. 153–163 and Beil. IV
  - L I 19/1–12 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 9
- 2) “Time and modalities of time”
- L I 21/4–21 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 10 and Beil. V
- 3) “On the doctrine of the modalities of time”
- L I 21/24–39 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 7
- 4) “Objectivity of the modalities of time”
- L I 5/1–15 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 5
- 5) “The intertwining of retention and protention”
- L I 16/1–13 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 1 and Beil. 1
- 6) “Important remarks concerning retention and presentiation”
- L I 14 = only p. 8 is given in *Hua* XXXIII, Beil. III
- 7) “Retentional modification and continuous modification generally”
- L I 4/2–9 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 3
    - transcription by Edith Stein; cf. *Textkritische Anmerkungen* in *Hua* XXXIII, p. 401
- 8) “The system of forms in the constitution of time”
- L I 2 from which *Hua* XXXIII, Beil. VII–X are taken
- 9) “The  $\beta$ -pages”
- L I 3/1–7 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 13

### 3rd Section

- 1) “New attempt at clarification of the structures of the consciousness constituting the objectivity of time <*Zeitgegenständlichkeit-konstituierenden Bewußtseins*>”
- L I 15/3–38 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 2, Nr. 11 and Beil. VI
- 2) “The ego and subjective time”
- B II 10/3–8 = *Hua* IX, pp. 415–418

- B II 10/13–14
- B II 10/17–21
- none are Bernau works

3) “Eidetic form . . .”

- L I 17/9–13 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 15

4) “The stream of experience and the I”

- L I 20/2–6 = *Hua* XXXIII, Text Nr. 14

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3 *Introduction:*

*Exposition of the problem of transcendental time.*

1. Idea of phenomenological philosophy as the horizon of the understanding of the time-problematic; transcendental time as the basis of all constitution.
2. The phenomenological reduction as regress to transcendental time. Its development in *Ideas*.
3. Egological and intersubjective reduction: the inner systematic of phenomenological problems.

I. *Section*

*Analysis of immanent time*

1. Phenomenology of recollection
2. Phantasie and actuality
3. Temporality of the data of sensation

5<sup>3</sup> Ordering of the Manuscripts

1st Section:

- 1) Selected pages out of “Eidetic form of psychic [*seelischen*] innerliness”
- 2) “Memory as presupposition for comparing and identifying”
- 3) “Consciousness and its form of immanent time”
- 4) “Sensation and transcendently apperceptive perception”
- 5) Selections out of “Acts as objects of phenomenological time”

2nd Section:

- 1) “The intertwining of retention and protention”
- 2) “Important remarks concerning retention and presentation”

- 3) "Retentional modification and continual modification generally"
- 4) "Objectivity of the modalities of time"
- 5) "Apprehension and content of apprehension"
- 6) "Time and modalities of time"
- 7) "On the doctrine of the modalities of time"
- 8) "The  $\beta$ -pages"
- 9) "The system of forms in the constitution of time"

3rd Section:

- 1) "New attempt at clarification . . ."
- 2) "I am—the ego and subjective time"
- 3) "Eidetic form . . ."
- 4) "The stream of experience and the I"

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The 1st section contains a plethora of intentional analyses, chiefly of recollection. Indications of various dimensions in immanent time: time of acts, of hyletic data, of ideal objects, and the like.—The 2nd section gives the particular problematic of individuation: temporal noematic! Constitutive problems of immanent unities, of processes, and so on. Questions of idealism!—The 3rd section deals with inner consciousness and its totality.

- 6 Draft of an arrangement for Edmund Husserl's investigations on the phenomenology of transcendental time.

Introduction: the phenomenological reduction described in the *Ideas* as a reduction of a first level, as reduction to immanent time. Time-consciousness as the absolute layer of depth in transcendental subjectivity. Linkage with the analysis of time-consciousness from 1905.

First Section: analysis of immanent time-consciousness (phenomenology of perception, of memory, of expecting. Discussion of the relation between act-temporality and the time of hyletic data. "Apprehension and content of apprehension.")

Second Section: Constitution of immanent time (time and time-modalities, objectivity of time-modalities, retention and protention, apprehension and content of apprehension, problems of

immanent perception, consciousness of succession, phenomena of fading, aporias (contrasensical attempts) and so forth.).

Third Section: Constitution of inner time-consciousness (self-constitution, infinite regress, “New Attempt at Clarification,” diagram of time, attentiveness and so forth. Time and I: the monological unity of time-consciousness, non-temporality and temporalization of the I).

- 7 Edmund Husserl’s investigations into the phenomenology of the consciousness constituting the objectivity of time; edited by Eugen Fink.

Contents:

First Section: Investigations into the phenomenology of immanent time-consciousness.

1st chapter: acts and hyletic data.

2nd chapter: phenomenology of memory.

Second Section: Investigations into the phenomenology of inner consciousness.

1st chapter: time-modalities.

2nd chapter: original time-constitution (protention, primordial impression, retention; diagram)

3rd chapter: self-constitution of time-consciousness.

Preliminary remarks of the editor<sup>4</sup>:

The present investigation is a continuation of the time-problems that had come to a provisional conclusion in Husserl’s works during the years from 1905–1910; the manuscripts which form the basis of this work stem primarily from the war-semester (winter) of 1917. The theoretical content of this investigation shows essential progress in penetrating into the intentional structure of time-consciousness when compared against the works from 1905. The critical confrontation and transformation of these earlier analyses, thus, cannot be given up. Above all, therefore, this investigation is explicitly . . . *<breaks off>*



## Appendix 4

### The Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy

Included in this appendix are essentially three draft plans for a systematic of phenomenological philosophy. The first expresses a rendering of Husserl's 1921 plan under the title, "Articulation of a systematic phenomenology." The second and third are translations of (i) Husserl's 1930 plan of the "system of phenomenological philosophy" and (ii) Fink's revised draft of the same.

It is important to bear in mind that different motivations lie behind the first and the latter two articulations. The earlier is documented by Husserl in one of his research manuscripts. It should be noted that he did not write out this plan in the outline form as shown below but rather in prose form. Nevertheless, the plan presents a brief systematic designation of the levels of possible modes of constitution (likely for Husserl's personal use) The later two plans are translations of draft outlines produced by Husserl and Fink. They offer an initial attempt—first by Husserl alone and then by Fink likely in collaboration with Husserl—to sketch a publication plan for the systematic articulation of the problems with which phenomenology deals.

#### (1) Articulation of a systematic phenomenology (1921)<sup>a</sup>

Levels of the possible modes of constitution—from lower to higher:

##### Immanent Temporality

- The constitution of the immanent temporal stream
- The constitution of monadic being as an immanent temporal unity

##### Transcendence: A Transcendental "Aesthetic"

- The constitution of transcendence, of phantoms, etc.
- The constitution of nature
- The constitution of animals in nature

Active Thematization: A Twofold Analysis

- The constitution of the differing structures and shapes of thinking
- genetic analysis of constituted structures and modes of constitution
- descriptive analytic of noetic-noematic correlations in their typicality and necessary relatedness

(2) Husserl's Outline of the 'System' (1930)<sup>d</sup>

1st Volume:

Ground laying of the egological doctrine of consciousness (general theory of intentionality in its universal essential forms, in all modifications).

2nd <Volume:>

Constitution of egological worldliness. Noematic and noetic theory of the constitution of spatio-temporality and spatio-temporal objectivity of the experiential data [*Empirie*]. Empirical world in all levels. Body [*Leib*], thing, I as *solus*. Initially static.

3rd <Volume:>

The *autogenesis* of the ego as solipsistic abstraction. The theory of passive genesis, association. Pre-constitution, constitution of pre-given objects. The constitution of objects in categorial directedness. (struck out: "The constitution of idealities, of exact nature.") Constitution of affection and of will. Person, culture—solipsistic.<sup>e</sup>

4th Volume:

The constitution of intersubjectivity and the communal world. Empathy. Constitution of man. Constitution of the historic world. Intersubjective temporal-spatiality. Infinity. The idealization of exact nature (what of this can be placed in vol. 3?).<sup>f</sup> Static: man and surrounding world.

5th Volume:

Transcendental genesis of the objective world. Transcendental genesis of man and of peoples. The problems of generation. The problems of self-preservation, of man in authenticity [*Echtheit*]. Humanity and destiny. Teleological problems and problems of god.

(3) Fink's Plan (1930)<sup>g h</sup>

[3] Assistant's outline to Husserl's systematic work.<sup>i</sup>

<A.> Plan for the "system of phenomenological philosophy" of Edmund Husserl (August 13th, 1930)<sup>j</sup> <with comments by Edmund Husserl>

## Basic Layout

Introduction. (The phenomenological idea of philosophical “system.” System of the “open horizons of work”; system as pre-delineation and outline of the problematic.—Critical confrontations.)

## I. Book: The levels of pure phenomenology

1. Section: On the beginning and the principle of philosophy
2. Section: Regressive (static) phenomenology
3. Section: Progressive phenomenology
4. Section: Basic features of phenomenological metaphysics

## II. Book: Ontology and Phenomenology

1. Section: The idea of universal “transcendental aesthetic”
2. Section: Nature and spirit
3. Section: From pure inner psychology to transcendental phenomenology

[4] I. Book: The levels of pure phenomenology

1st Section: On the beginning and the principle of philosophy.

A. Philosophy in the world.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [Mg. top] Gone into (3-7,20) 1930. Chiavari

<sup>2</sup> [Mg.] Thus initially in the natural attitude. 1) *Leading idea*: Philosophy as universal science – Restitution of the traditional concept. Defense against false understanding (11,6-17,17)† possibly taken up again as a clarificatory supplement. (17,17ff.-19,25) The supposed forgetting of the question of the subject of this scientific knowledge until (19,25). Reduction has to be made to the question what is man and to pre-scientific life – not the life-world *without science* (19,25-20,16); not to the question of the *natural world concept in the usual sense*, but rather reduction to life and the life-world for me (not objectively – purely subjectively), radically subjective “self-reflection” (24,13 ff.) 1) *on one’s own situation*, finally reflection on the universal situation (25,12-26,19). World-situation: presupposition of the existence of the world, cf. my notations. The transcendental I as subject of the ultimate world-situation, the “radical situation” is not in history, but rather

- a) Autonomous grounding of philosophy by way of the idea of self-reflection.<sup>3</sup> Self-reflection as absolute justification; philosophy as the ultimately grounding “science.”
- <sup>4</sup>b) The formal essence of “science”: elementary analyses of “adequation,” “immediate” and “mediate evidence.” Demand for a “first evidence in itself.”
- c) The situation of self-reflection: the *pre-given* world. Task of a provisional description of pre-givenness. The fundamental uniqueness of such a thematization (thematization of the obvious of what is for us withheld by its obviousness)<sup>j</sup>. Principle widening of the concept of “tradition.”
- d) In pre-givenness, the antecedence [*Vorgängigkeit*] of “universal apperceptions” is established before<sup>k</sup> the experience of individuals. Familiarity character of the world.
- e) Pre-givenness of man: abilities acquired by training and familiar kinesthetic systems.
- f) Pre-givenness [5] not only of the world experienced currently and individually<sup>l</sup> but also of the full sense “world.” World as comprehensive whole [*Inbegriff*] of what is pre-given by immediate and, especially, *mediate* experience: world an intersubjective tradition!
- g) Pre-givenness of the difference between normality and abnormality [*Anomalität*]. Every<sup>5</sup> world experience is related to the “norm” of probative experience. Abnormality<sup>6</sup> as motivation for skepticism about the “existence of the world.”
- h) Evidence of the world<sup>7</sup> a higher rank than the evidence of any particular innerworldly being. “World” as horizon of the alternating of Being and appearing.

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the latter in the former (28,7-29,3). Further misunderstandings of this reduction. Additional question of the (29,3-25) motivation of the regress to the world as situation. Genuine beginning from (32,3-27) to the – familiar surrounding world – becoming-a-puzzle of the world generally, etc. Enlightening of the world as situation – through this will the I as the I [*ich als Ich*] of this situation become thematic – not as man. Not [the] *human-scientific* attitude world and “world-representation”; not description of the world as human life-world (psychological-human-scientific). (36,1 ff.) What is the actual task? Resolution of the world as a universal acceptance in its founding validities [*als universaler Geltung in ihren fundierenden Geltungen*] (cf. parts e) & f)) Regress to proto-modes as ultimately founding, overview of proto-modes until (47,24)

† (The following page and line designations indicate the draft of the first section printed under I.A.†.) [‡ The German erroneously indicates “I.B.”]

<sup>3</sup> [Ins.] Universal and radical

<sup>4</sup> from “b) The formal essence” until “evidence first in itself” placed in angled brackets by Husserl; additional mg.: not worked out

<sup>5</sup> [Ins.] singular

<sup>6</sup> [Alt.] Modalizability of all particular experiences.

<sup>7</sup> [Ins.] but

- i) Descartes' critique of experience as motive for the dubitability of the existence of the world inadequate.
  - <sup>m</sup>k) Universal self-reflection as radical questioning (not doubt!) not only of the existence of the currently experienced world but also of the full sense<sup>8</sup> of the *pre-given* world, according to all the dimensions of this pre-givenness: e.g., history! Levels of this putting into question:
    - 1. Parenthesizing of all mediate experiences and experiential attainments.
    - 2. Parenthesizing of all presumptions of my own experience proper as well as all retro-acceptances<sup>9</sup>. Withdrawal<sup>10</sup> to the present situation of self-reflection.
      - 1) Gnoseological antecedence of my self and my present before that of the (immediately as well as mediately) experienced world
  - <sup>n</sup>m) Assertion of ontic antecedence as contradictory presumption<sup>11</sup>: anthropocentric idealism. Task of the justification of this powerful philosophical motive.
- B. The phenomenological reduction.<sup>12</sup>
- a) The phenomenological reduction as the disclosure of the most intrinsic sense of the aim of the anthropocentric-idealistic "reduction." E.g., Descartes' regress to the "ego cogito."
  - b) The anthropocentric preliminary form of the phenomenological reduction still persists basically in the *pre-given* world, persists in the self-apperceptions of subjectivity as that of a *man*. Foreshadowing of the *transcendental* concept of the "natural attitude."
  - c) The formal-indicative [6] carrying out of the phenomenological reduction in *Ideas*. Instruction for the thorough performance as the parenthesizing of the *pre-given* world or of the "natural attitude." The difference between the formal-indicative and thorough performance does not coincide with the difference between the symbolic

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<sup>8</sup> "(not doubt!) not only of the existence of the currently experienced world but also of the full sense" placed in parenthesis by Husserl

<sup>9</sup> [Alt.] acceptances of the past

<sup>10</sup> [Alt.] Regress (Husserl proposes "Rückgang" instead of "Rückzug")

<sup>11</sup> [Alt.] as it appears a contradictory presumption [additional mg.] Thus in the natural attitude!

<sup>12</sup> [Mg.] See (63,17).

and significative and the explicit and serious performance <of the phenomenological reduction>.

- d) Thematic explication of the phenomenological reduction.
- e) Discussion of the intrinsic dangers in the way the phenomenological reduction is understood. Aporetic!
- f) The methodological problem of phenomenological conceptuality: transformation of mundane-ontic concepts into transcendental concepts. The source of “transcendental appearance.”

## 2nd Section: Regressive Phenomenology.

### A. Elementary analytic of transcendental subjectivity.

- a) The “indeterminacy” of reductively opened transcendental subjectivity: the horizontality of the transcendental “*field* of Being” (the “2<sup>nd</sup> level pre-giveness” that gets formed).
- b) First distinctions of the modes of temporalization as well as the crude differentiation of the “egological” and “intersubjective.” Immanent time<sup>13</sup> as the universal horizon of regressive phenomenology.
- c) Structural explication of the egological “world phenomenon” (of the world<sup>14</sup> intersubjectively pre-given). At first, explications in the<sup>15</sup> present. Exemplary analyses of perception.
- d) Now-actual<sup>16</sup> [*Aktuelle*] and implicit intentionalities. Careful analysis of *possible* experience. *Capability* (capabilities)! [*Vermöglichung!e*]
- e) Egological analytic of the<sup>17</sup> past and future. Preliminary form of the phenomenological theory of association. Constitutive function of association and presentation.
- f) The constitutive problematic of truth and actuality. Cf. the III<sup>rd</sup> Meditation of the *Cartesian Meditations*.
- g) Phenomenology of “ideation.”
- h) Phenomenology of the “logical-formal.”

### B. The self-constitution of the transcendental ego.<sup>18</sup>

- a) Phenomenology [7] of the I as I-pole of all intentions.

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<sup>13</sup> [Mg.] intersubjective-immanent time?

<sup>14</sup> [Ins.] for me as

<sup>15</sup> [Alt.] my perceptual

<sup>16</sup> [Alt.] explicit

<sup>17</sup> [Ins.] worldly

<sup>18</sup> [Alt.] The self-constitution of the transcendental monad, of the concrete I.

- b) Phenomenology of habitualities (exemplary analyses of “conviction,” “decision,” “meaningfulness,” thus theoretical, conative and practical habitualities).
- C. Reduction to the primordial world-phenomenon and the correlative primordial subjectivity. Cf. “Vth Meditation” in Cartesian Meditations.
- D. Analysis of the experience of someone else, namely elementary analysis: restriction to the now-actual-present [aktuell-präsent] encountered other. Explication of transcendental “contemporaneity,” which constitutively makes possible human contemporaneity. The transcendental co-reduction to the other; foreshadowings of phenomenological idealism.
- E. Methodological reflections<sup>19</sup>: proto-mode and intention modification (phenomenological primacy of proto-modal elementary analysis). The “naiveté” of regressive phenomenology: transcendental correlate of the “pre-given world.” Indication of “side problems”! The opposition of proto-modality and intentional modification continually iterated: regressive phenomenology as proto-modal over and against ideal-genetic progressive phenomenology.

### 3rd Section: Progressive Phenomenology

- A. The methodological problem.
  - a) Determination and delimitation of the concept of static-regressive phenomenology: this as an explication of transcendental subjectivity in so far as it is a correlate of the pre-given world. Progressive phenomenology as attacking the present-perfectness [Perfektivität]<sup>o</sup> of transcendental life. Regressive analysis as deconstructive-analysis; progressive analysis as constructive-analysis.<sup>p</sup>
  - b) Progressive analysis neither “genetic” nor referring to “conditions of possibility:” every “genesis” presupposes immanent time. (Genetic phenomenology is the theory of proto-establishments and habituality.) The problematic of progressive phenomenology does not deal with habituality and also not with founding.
  - c) The “constructive” character of progressive analysis.
  - d) The traditional questions of genesis (origination of the representation of space among other things) as preliminary forms of the pro-

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<sup>19</sup> [Ins.] in regards to regressive phenomenology



gressive problem: the realistic-psychological [8] presupposition of the in-itself-Being of the world. The origin of the representation of world<sup>20</sup> itself an innerworldly event, specifically in the human soul. Progressive phenomenology inquires into the origin of space itself, not of the representation of space.

- e) Resolution of the “pre-givenness of immanent time.” The traditional questions of origin transform themselves into analyses of proto-intentionality.

B. Phenomenology of proto-intentionality. <sup>21</sup>(Phenomenology of “instincts”).

- a) Proto-intentionality as yet undifferentiated: successful constitution of Being as possessed good [als Gut]. Development [Ausbildung] of the range of play for kinesthesia. The intentional finality of proto-drives, the problem of the “unconscious.”
- b) Phenomenology of proto-association: pre-ontic unity-formations in the hyletic fields. Phenomena of fusing and separating in the proto-passive sphere.

C. Progressive analysis of the proto-intentional constitution of space.

D. Being as “idea”: theory of Being in terms of levels; levels of pre-Being and levels of worldly Being (e.g., pre-theoretical and theoretical Being).

E. Reflection on where we have come so far. Critique of transcendental experience.

#### 4th Section: Fundamental features of phenomenological metaphysics

A. Phenomenological idealism and the problem of transcendental historicity.

B. The transcendental necessity of the “fact” of the ego. Centering of transcendental-historic intersubjectivity in the egologically central monad.

C. The transcendental deduction of “world-singularity.”

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<sup>20</sup> <“representation of world” placed in quotes by Husserl>

<sup>21</sup> [Ins.] therein

- D. Restitution of the transcendental legitimacy [Rechts] of “naïveté.” (Constitutive determination of the “natural attitude” as a mode of existence of transcendental life itself.)
- E. The transcendental tendency to return-to-itself [Zu-sich-selbst-Kommen]. (Preliminary forms in religion, wisdom and in the ethical authenticity [Echtheit] [9] of world life.) Philosophy as a function of the absolute: The philosopher as the discloser of absolute subjectivity is the “manager [Geschäftsführer] for world spirit.” Prospect for a philosophy of history.—The philosopher as “transcendental functionary” has the possibility of the highest authenticity [Echtheit], his duty as exemplar [Vorbild]: phenomenological restitution of the Platonic idea of the state [Staatsgedankens].

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- <sup>a</sup> Husserl, Edmund. 2001. “The Phenomenology of Monadic Individuality.” in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated by A. J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 640 (modified).
- <sup>b</sup> Husserl, Edmund. 1973. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*. Edited by I. Kern. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* XV. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, *op. cit.*, xxxvi.
- <sup>c</sup> Ibid., xxxv, n3.
- <sup>d</sup> See also Husserl, Edmund. *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, 169f.
- <sup>e</sup> [Ed.] Husserl’s stenogram (F IV 1, Bl. 11) ends here and the rest derives from Fink’s copy.
- <sup>f</sup> [Ed.] The note in parentheses is perhaps Fink’s addition, which he based on the selection omitted in the passage for the 3rd volume.
- <sup>g</sup> Fink, Eugen. VI. *Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 2: Ergänzungsband*. Hrsg. von Guy van Kerkhoven. *Husserliana Dokumente: II/2*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, 3–9.

<sup>h</sup> General Practices:

[Mg.] Marginal Comment = [Rb.]  
 [Alt.] = Alteration = [V]  
 [Ins.] Insertion = [Einf.]  
 [Sup.] Supplementary Comment = [Erg.]  
 <> = Husserl’s wording  
 [] = Interpolated wording or explanatory insertions by translator  
 Ed. = Editor of German text; Tr. = translator  
 Footnote numbering reflects Hua. Dok II/2; Endnotes reflect translator’s clarifications.

Translation issues:

Being=Sein; being=Seiende  
 Elementaranalyse = elementary analysis  
 Body=Leib; [body=Körper]  
 geisteswissenschaftlich=human-scientific  
 I=ich; ego=ego  
 Mensch=man; Menschenheiten=peoples

- <sup>i</sup> Translator's Note: Minor differences between *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* XV and *Husserliana: Dokumente* II/2 have been resolved in favor of HuDo II/2 except where noted. The following formatting conventions have been employed: (1) footnote numbers correspond to the footnote numbering found in HuDo II/2, (2) within the footnotes, page and line numbers are placed within parentheses and these indicate the pagination of HuDo II/2—bold-faced numbers before a comma indicate pagination, numbering after the comma indicates line(s) on that page, (3) numbers in brackets indicate the pagination of HuDo II/2. In order not to break up a word or phrase, the bracketed numbers are sometimes placed directly after the relevant item rather than in a word.
- <sup>j</sup> *Thematisierung des uns durch seine Selbstverständlichkeit entzogenen "Selbstverständlichen"*
- <sup>k</sup> [Tr.] Reading "vor" in II/2 for "von" in Hua. XV, p. xxxvii.
- <sup>l</sup> *Vorgegebenheit nicht nur der aktuell je-eignen erfahrenen Welt . . .*
- <sup>m</sup> [Tr.] No "j."
- <sup>n</sup> [Tr.] No "I."
- <sup>o</sup> [Tr.] The sense of "perfectivity" Husserl means here is grammatical.
- <sup>p</sup> *Regressive Analyse als Abbau-Analyse; progressive als Aufbau-Analyse.*

# Notes

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. See Appendix 1: Husserl's Publishing History.
2. The *Husserliana* series includes volumes in the (i) *Gesammelte Werke* series, the (ii) *Materialien* series, as well as selected texts found in the (iii) *Dokumente* and (iv) *Studienausgabe* series.
3. Husserl, Edmund. "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* I. Halle a.d.S. (1913), 1–323.
4. Sometime in the fall of 1929, Husserl wrote in the margin of the so-called "D" copy of *Ideas* I that "only a fragment is given" of the full extension of the transcendental problematic. See *Hua* III/2, 479.
5. The four introductions into phenomenology Husserl published during his lifetime are: *Ideas* I (1913), the article "Phenomenology" published in the 14<sup>th</sup> edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1929), the *Méditations cartésiennes* (1931), and *The Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936). One could also include Husserl's essay "Philosophy as rigorous science" (hereafter *Logos* essay) in this list of introductions. Husserl published the *Logos* essay in 1910. In many ways, the *Logos* article represents Husserl's first attempt to expand the critical method of his phenomenology to the relativistic and skeptical consequences inherent in the principles underling the prevailing methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or human sciences. Although introductory in the sense of a popularization of his ideas, Husserl never really intended the *Logos* essay to represent a general introduction to phenomenological method, let alone an introduction of a phenomenological philosophy implicitly conceived as "phenomenological idealism." The *Logos* essay has the character more of a polemic along the lines of Husserl's earlier "Prolegomena" of 1900 than it does an introduction to phenomenology as such. Furthermore, Husserl never explicitly refers to the *Logos* essay as an introduction as he does other writings. Thus we do not include it here as one of Husserl's introductions. Nevertheless, the *Logos* essay is an extremely important early writing by Husserl precisely because it bridges the earlier, more realistic *Logical Investigations* with the explicitly idealistic approach of *Ideas* I. Although Husserl refers to his philosophy only much later as a "phenomenological idealism," there are indications that he explicitly conceived of his philosophy as a form of idealism even before he wrote the *Logos* article. Cf. *Hua* XVII, 178ff; *FTL* 170f. It is also worthwhile in this regard to consult Karl Schuhmann's

- Husserl-Chronik*, where Schuhmann cites a series of manuscripts on this theme, most particularly the manuscript of September 1908 entitled “Beweis für den transzendental-phänomenologischen Idealismus,” *HuDo* I, 119. Herbert Spiegelberg also discusses the development of Husserl’s idealism in his influential history entitled *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, 126ff. For a discussion of Husserl’s various introductions, see William R McKenna’s *Husserl’s “Introductions to Phenomenology:” Interpretation and Critique*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1982.
6. Cf. E. Husserl, “Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage.” In *Logische Untersuchungen* I, *Hua* XIX/1, 12f.
  7. E. Husserl. Besprechung: Th. Elsenhans, “Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie.” *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 109, 1897, S. 195–212. In *Hua* XXII, 206f.
  8. E. Husserl. “Besprechungen: Th. Elsenhans.” *Hua* XXII, 207.
  9. *Hua* XXV, 36; “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, 318. (Cited also as note 58 in chapter 2.)
  10. The discussion here is artificially restricted to a mere viewing (of the cup). Yet one should not lose sight of the fact that the experience under discussion here entails more than sight and includes the full bodily encounters, e.g., past tactile experiences of object. Even if I never looked at all the sides of the cup in question and so had no clear idea of what the cup looked like as a whole, I would have held it in my hand(s) while carrying from my kitchen to my desk. Thus the whole entity given imperfectly in my visual experiencing points to a historic synthetic unity of distinct fields of perception. The object in question is, in other words, an object of “common sense” to use Aristotle’s expression. As such, a complete analysis of the phenomenon of expectation would have to take account of the historic fullness of kinesthetic experiencing left undiscussed in our abbreviated account here.
  11. *Hua* III/1, 336; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 347.
  12. This implies that the experience of an object occurs within the context of a harmonious concatenation of appearances, which is not always the case. But a discontinuity of appearances exemplary of the experience of something wholly unexpected always occurs within an enduring general nexus of experiences and so presupposes as its ground this generally harmonious living nexus of experiences in its totality.
  13. *Hua* III/1, 338.
  14. *Hua* III/1, 337.
  15. The word, “re-investigations,” is suggested to me by Dr. Ron Bruzina. The methodological investigations articulated in *Ideas* I and those sketched out in that work to be accomplished in subsequent volumes of the trilogy took there basis of work already initiated in his literary estate and in his earlier published writings. The investigations codified in *Ideas* I thus do not represent a wholly new branch of study but rather an express articulation of previously completed work and further probings into areas provisionally laid out in these other sources.
  16. *Hua* III/1, 338; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 350.
  17. *Hua* III/1, 5.
  18. *Hua* III/1, 8; *Ideas/HuCW* II, xxii.
  19. “But philosophy lies in a completely new dimension. It requires completely new points of entry and a completely new method, which is fundamentally different from every “naturalistic” science.” (E. Husserl. “Die Idee der Phänomenologie,” *Hua* II, 24.)

20. Bruzina, Ronald. "Introduction." *Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Ideas of a Transcendental Theory of Method* by Eugen Fink with textual notations by Edmund Husserl. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995, xiii.
21. *Hua* III/1, 107 & *Hua* III/2, 499; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 114.
22. "Sagt "Positivismus" soviel wie absolut vorurteilsfreie Gründung aller Wissenschaften auf das "Positive", d.i. originär zu Erfassende, dann sind wir die echten Positivisten. Wir lassen uns in der Tat durch keine Autorität das Recht verkümmern, alle Anschauungsarten als gleichwertige Rechtsquellen der Erkenntnis anzuerkennen—auch nicht durch die Autorität der "modernen Naturwissenschaft". (*Hua* III/1, 45.)
23. See "§24. Das Prinzip aller Prinzipien" in *Ideen* I. *Hua* III/1, 51f.
24. *Hua* III/1, 66; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 62.
25. Descartes, René. "Meditations on First Philosophy." In *The Philosophical Works of Descartes, volume I*. Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 149.
26. "What interests us here is not the absolute universal science (*absolute Universalwissenschaft*) but rather science (*die Wissenschaft*) within the phenomenological attitude. (E. Husserl. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 42.)
27. In a much later work authorized by Husserl, Eugen Fink describes the unique status of the agent initiating the phenomenological reduction and the relation of this "subject" to the theme of his reflections. Fink refers to this as the "problematic unity of the three I's. These three I's are: (i) the worldly subject, (ii) the transcendental constituting subjectivity, and (iii) the phenomenologizing I. As is clear from Fink's remarks, the phenomenologizing I is neither mundane nor the source of transcendental constitution. "Who then works the universal epoché? None other than precisely the transcendental I of reflection, the *phenomenologizing onlooker*. This onlooker *does not stop* exercising a belief in the world because he *has never lived in the world* to begin with. He is after all first formed precisely in the action of not joining in with, of not participating in world-belief. As reflecting I he does not share in the life of belief on the part of the theme I; in his thematic stance toward this life of belief he works an epoché, but only in the sense of *not going along with it*, or not joining in. With respect to his *object*, world-belief *as such*, he is in an unbroken attitude of belief." (Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 42.)
28. *Hua* III/2, 586; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 61, n30.
29. "First, a comment to the effect that the phenomenological viewing and, more precisely, the perceptual grasping of those phenomenological objectivities, which we designated by examples, must not be lumped together with Lockean reflection or, as it is customarily expressed in German inner perception or self-perception." (E. Husserl. *Basic Problems*, modified 40.)
30. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. "Translator's Introduction" *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, xvii-xviii.
31. Cairns, Dorion, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, 46.
32. *Hua* III/1, 124; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 133.
33. *Hua* III/1, 7; *Ideas/HuCW* II, xxi.
34. "Demgegenüber wird die reine oder tranzendente Phänomenologie nicht als Tatschenwissenschaft, sondern als Wesenswissensch (als "eidetische" Wissenschaft) begrundet werden; als eine Wissenschaft, die ausschließlich "Wesenserkenntnisse" feststellen will und durchaus keine "Tatsachen". (*Hua* III/1, 6.) See also *Ideas/HuCW* II, xx.
35. There is anecdotal evidence that Husserl inserted Part I of the first book of *Ideas* only upon the urging of his Göttingen students, who wished to dampen the transcendentalism of the work in favor of a more realistic phenomenology.

Not only does this seem unlikely given Husserl's temperament and writing style, the structure of the trilogy demands the considerations of essence and eidetic cognition be placed at the forefront. These discussions not only set the tone of the entire project, they lay out, as we are arguing here, the *telos* of the whole project.

36. *Hua* III/1, 338; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 350.
37. *Logische Untersuchungen*, *Hua* XIX/2, 672.
38. E. Husserl. *Introduction to the Logical Investigations*, 32.
39. Marly Biemel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" zu *Ideen* II, in *Hua* IV, xiii.
40. For the various and changing conceptions of volumes II and III of *Ideas*, see Marly Biemel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in *Hua* IV, xiii-xx.
41. Husserl originally intended *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, for instance, to be the first of a two volume work. The second planned volume never made it to print. He later planned to expand quite significantly the *Méditations Cartésiennes* for a German printing but eventually abandoned this plan for other, more enticing projects, which themselves never made it to print during his lifetime. The *Formal and Transcendental Logic* was to be followed up by another work of *Logical Investigations*. Ludwig Landgrebe worked closely with Husserl to edit and arrange the work for publication. He finally did publish the work as *Experience and Judgment* after Husserl died. Even Husserl's last published work, the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, is but a fragment of a much more ambitious, five volume work. The fruit of all these great plans laid concealed from the general public as Husserl hesitated to bring his many and variegated concrete analytical investigations into print.
42. R. Ingarden. "Edith Stein on Her Activity as an Assistant of Edmund Husserl." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 23. (1962): 159.
43. *Hua* IX, 299–300; modified *HuCW* VI, 178.
44. The first article, "Erneuerung, Ihr Problem und ihre Methode" [*The Kaizo*. Tokyo. (1923) 3: 84–92], was printed in both German and Japanese.
45. R. Ingarden. "Edith Stein on her Activity," 160.
46. E. Husserl. *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen*. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C.E. M. Pfeffer (Robert Stricker), 1891.
47. William R. Boyce Gibson. "From Husserl to Heidegger. Excerpts from a 1928 Diary." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 2, no. 1, (1971): 64.
48. Roman Ingarden. "Edith Stein and her Activity as an Assistant of Edmund Husserl." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XXIII, No. 2 (1962): 58. Cf. J.N. Mohanty, "The Unity of Husserl's Thought." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 2, no. 224, (2003): 116.
49. Two works came out during these later years which do not have the character of an introduction to transcendental phenomenology. These are: 1) *Edmund Husserl's lectures on the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness*, edited by Martin Heidegger (1928), and 2) *Formal and transcendental logic: attempt at a critique of logical reason* (1929).
50. The other collaboration was to be the German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations*, and Husserl's collaborator would be his last personal assistant, Eugen Fink.
51. Special study of this collaboration provides insight both into the project Heidegger undertook in *Being and Time* as well as, of course, into the conflict between Husserl and Heidegger. Especially important in this latter regard is Heidegger's letter and appendices to Husserl of October 22, 1927 wherein he states: "Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of



the existence of the factual self. This factual self, the concrete human being, is as such—as an entity—never a “worldly real fact” because the human being is never merely present-at-hand but rather *eksists*. And what is “wonderful” is the fact that the *eksistence*-structure of *Dasein* makes possible the transcendental constitution of everything positive.” (*HuCW* VI, 138, *HuDo* III/IV, 146–47) For further study, one should consult the sixth volume of *Husserliana: Collected Works* entitled *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*, translated and edited by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer.

52. E. Husserl. *Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction à la phénoménologie*. Traduit de l'allemand par Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas. (Bibliothèque de la Société française de Philosophie). Paris: A. Colin, 1931. Though the *Méditations* appeared in 1931, according to the chronology laid out by Karl Schuhmann in his *Husserl Chronik*, Eugen Fink sent the printer's manuscript of the “Cartesian Meditations” to Straßburg on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1929. See Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 347.
53. Sometime between March 8<sup>th</sup> and the 12<sup>th</sup>, 1929, Husserl held a lecture in Straßburg at the invitation of Jean Hering. During this lecture, he laid out the development of his philosophy since the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* I. Reports from this less formal setting indicate he gave a more detailed articulation of the place of the intersubjective reduction within phenomenology than he had earlier in Paris. Cf. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 343f. So even though Husserl remained relatively silent in his “Paris Lectures” regarding intersubjectivity, this was a theme he understood needed further clarification and which he began very soon to work into his revisions of the “Paris Lectures” for publication. According to Karl Schuhmann, Husserl began these revisions about March 15<sup>th</sup>, 1929 and worked rather intensively on this project until April 6<sup>th</sup>. See Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 344.
54. One of Husserl's first acts as Professor Emeritus was to present a lecture entitled “Phenomenology and Psychology: Transcendental Phenomenology” in Amsterdam during April of 1928. Of course, the “Paris lectures” took place in 1929. Special note, however, should be taken of the lecture tour Husserl undertook in 1931 in Frankfurt, Berlin and Halle where he presented his lecture on “Phenomenology and Anthropology.” Husserl's main aim in these talks was to contrast the philosophical rigor of his own transcendental phenomenology against what he saw as the lax anthropological philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler.
55. Husserl to Ingarden, December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1929. *HuDo* III/3, 254; modified *HuCW* VI, 29. See also *HuDo* III/6, 277; *HuDo* III/6, 181; *HuDo* III/2, 180–84.
56. See *Hua* XV, 1–78 & 187–459 as well as *HuDo* II/2.
57. Husserl, Edmund. “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.’” *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 11. Halle a.d.S. (1930), 549–570. See also: “Nachwort,” *Hua* V, 138–162; “Author's Preface to the English Edition of My Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. In *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. New York, NY: Collier Books, 1931, 5–22.
58. Of course, the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* came out two years earlier. To his dying day, Husserl considered this to be his most mature work, if too focused. See K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 484–5. Its special concentration on the constitution of categorial objectivities excludes it from consideration as a complete systematic of phenomenology.



59. For a thorough treatment of Husserl's work between these years, see Iso Kern's excellent "editor's introduction" to the fifteenth volume of *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke*.
60. His analyses in the fifth meditation remain restricted to a static accounting of the typicality of shapes of intentional intersubjective relations and lack a serious account of the developmental habitus by which the I comes to be as a worldly communalized subject. "It must now be made understandable *how*, at the founded higher level, the sense-bestowal pertaining to transcendence proper, to constitutionally secondary *Objective transcendence* comes about—and does so as an experience. Here it is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of "*static analysis*." (Hua I, 136; *Cartesian Meditations*, 106). And he makes explicit this restriction to a static phenomenology several pages later. "Since we are not dealing here with a temporal genesis of such experience [of other qua other], on the basis of a temporally antecedent self-experience, manifestly only a precise explication of the intentionality actually observable in our experience of someone else and discovery of the motivations essentially implicit in that intentionality can unlock the enigma." (Hua I, 50; *Cartesian Meditations*, 121).
61. "Die Übersetzer der *Med[itationen]* haben den Text oft nicht verstanden, kein Wunder, daß Sie stecken blieben." (Husserl to Ingarden, 31 Aug 1931 in *HuDo* III/3, 278.)
62. Indeed, Fink's now famous *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, which was to be included as one of the planned seven meditations of the German edition, did not find a publisher until after Husserl's death (or even after Fink's as well). See Fink's *Kant-Studien* article of 1933, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," which Husserl lauds by saying there is no sentence in it which he could not accept wholly as his own. This article contains the essentials of Fink's *Sixth Meditation* within it (except perhaps for the explicit thrust of the work as a methodological critique of phenomenology). This was intentional on the part of Husserl and Fink, as there was little other means available to Fink or Husserl whereby they could publish their collaborative work in the increasingly racist environment of Nazi Germany. That the essay reflects Husserl's latest researches was generally unknown at the time and has only come to light well after Husserl's death.
63. For instance, Herbert Spiegelberg relates in a remembrance of Husserl's lecture from the Winter Semester 1924/25 (Freiburg) that "once when a member [of the student audience] interjected to present an objection, Husserl replied 'Speak slowly. You must understand that it is difficult to transpose myself into the thought processes of another.'" (Herbert Spiegelberg, "Erinnerungen," *Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung. Zeugnisse in Text und Bild*. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988, 41. J.N. Mohanty points similarly to Husserl's intractability: "So firmly grounded in his philosophical position that even with the best of his students and younger colleagues earlier in his life, he could not enter into a real dialog." (J.N. Mohanty's "The Unity of Husserl's Thought," 117). But in making this point, Mohanty's purpose is twofold. On the one hand, he wishes to underscore the stubbornly independent nature of Husserl's thinking "earlier in his life," while, on the other, he wishes to highlight the prominent influence of Husserl's last assistant, Eugen Fink, on the aging and persecuted philosopher. It is interesting to compare Mohanty's position against the broader question of the penetration of each person's thinking on the other as presented by Ronald Bruzina (cf. R. Bruzina, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink*), especially as both Mohanty and Bruzina point to the reciprocal influence of Fink's thinking on Husserl's

- and vice versa in the troubled times of the late 1930s. This mutual influence needs to be understood within the confines of their professional relationship, however. Fink remained deferential to Husserl throughout Husserl's life; and though the two men spent many hours together their relationship retained a professional tone. This is evinced in their extant letters, which though highly familiar is always written using the formal "Sie" form of address. For a discussion of this complex philosophical relationship, see also Ronald Bruzina, "Solitude and Community in the Work of Philosophy: Husserl and Fink, 1928–1938," *Man and World* 22, (1989): 287–314. Spiegelberg's view of Husserl's philosophical style remains typical, though: "But ultimately even in such attempts to 'philosophize together' [*sympphilosophiein*] he always remained his own partner." (Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*. 3<sup>rd</sup> rev. ed., The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.)
64. The last phase of Husserl's thinking can be found in a mass of texts, all of which are generally classed as the "Crisis" writings. These include: (1) the Vienna lecture of May 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>, 1935 entitled, "Die Philosophie in der Krisis europäischen Menschheit" (*Hua* VI, 314–48; *Crisis* 269–99); (2) the Prague lecture of November 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>, 1935 entitled, "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Psychologie;" (3) "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie." *Philosophia*. Belgrad. 1 (1936): 77–176 (*Hua* VI, 1–104; *Crisis* 3–100 ); as well as the manuscripts not listed above published in (4) *Hua* VI and (5) *Hua* XXIX. Only 1–3 above were published or presented by Husserl during his lifetime.
  65. Husserl to Adolf Grimme, March 5<sup>th</sup>, 1931 in *HuDo* III/3: 90.
  66. Husserl to Alexander Pfänder, January 6<sup>th</sup>, 1931 in *HuDo* III/2: 180; *HuCW* VI, 480.
  67. "History and Aims." Husserl-Archives Leuven. <http://www.hiw.kuleuven.ac.be/hiw/eng/husserl/ehus1his.htm>. See also: Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 245.
  68. Many of the texts within Husserl's library contain marginalia and personal notes Husserl made as he read. His library, therefore, contains some of the most important indications of his thinking as he engaged with philosophers' both past and present. Very little of this material has been transcribed or is presently available outside the archive in any form, but some important examples of this have been published in the last few years. The most obvious example of these notes is found in *Husserliana*, *Collected Works* VI, which details Husserl's confrontation with Heidegger. The volume contains Husserl's marginalia and notes he made in his copies of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. See *HuCW* VI, 258–472.
  69. For the story behind the rescue and establishment of Husserl's *Nachlass* outside of Germany, see H.L. van Breda's, "Die Rettung Von Husserls Nachlass Und die Gründung des Husserl-Archivs." In *Husserl et la pensée moderne*, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 42–77. For a brief discussion specifically of the role of the Cercle philosophique de Prague in rescue and classification of certain materials from Husserl's *Nachlass*, see Jan Patočka, *Texte, Dokumente, Bibliographie*. Edited by L. Hagedorn, H. R. Sepp, J. Nemec and D. Soucek. (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1999), 206–209. In addition to the main Husserl archive located at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, two mirror sites have been established in Germany: the first at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg and the second at the Universität Köln. Another mirror archive exists at the École normale supérieure in Paris and two such facilities exist in the United States: one at the Graduate Faculty of

- Political and Social Science at the New School in New York, and the other at the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. An archive of Husserl's manuscripts had been established at the State University of New York in Buffalo, but this has since been dismantled.
70. For the complete schema of Husserl's *Nachlass*, see H.L. van Breda, "The Husserl Archives in Louvain." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7, no. 3 (1947): 487–491; Bernet, Kern, and Marbach *Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*, 245f; or "Husserl Page: Nachlass Classificatory Schema," [http://www.husserlpage.com/hus\\_nach.html](http://www.husserlpage.com/hus_nach.html).
  71. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, *HuDo* I, 458.
  72. H.L. van Breda and R. Boehm, "Aus dem Husserl-Archiv zu Löwen," 244.
  73. It should be noted that the ordering which Husserl and his assistants generated in 1935 necessitated the establishment of additional categories. These include the "F" manuscripts, which include all of Husserl's lecture course and public lecture materials produced, and the "K" manuscripts, which are manuscripts most directly relevant to Husserl's last publishing effort, the *Crisis* work. Another category of manuscripts, the "L" manuscripts, was added after Eugen Fink made available Husserl's so-called Bernau time manuscripts of 1917–18. A more complete discussion of these manuscripts can be found in chapter three of this work.
  74. For discussion of the broad contours of materials found in Husserl's *Nachlass*, I am indebted to the article by Sabine Mödersheim, "Husserls Nachlaß und seine Erschließung," *Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung: Zeugnisse in Text und Bild*, edited by Hans-Rainer Sepp and Husserl-Archiv, 103–15.
  75. Cf. H.L. van Breda and Boehm, "Aus dem Husserl-Archiv zu Löwen," 244.
  76. Samuel Ijsseling, "Das Husserl-Archiv in Leuven und die Husserl-Ausgabe," *Buchstabe und Geist: zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, edited by Walter Jaeschke and Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophischer Editionen, (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987), 144.
  77. "In contrast with the "Gesammelte Werke" the texts are not arranged into titled parts, chapters, and paragraphs, insofar as Husserl did not do this himself, nor do they provide supplementary texts. The textual criticism is limited to footnotes documenting only the most important textual changes and references. In the editor's introduction information on the text's history and editing is given." [Husserl-Archives Leuven. "History and Aims." Husserl Archives Leuven <http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/hiw/eng/husserl/ehus1his.php>].
  78. In addition to the *Gesammelte Werke*, *Materialien*, and *Dokumente* series, Kluwer Academic Publishers has also published the Husserliana, Studienausgabe series, which consists of Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in two volumes. Nevertheless, the *Gesammelte Werke* and *Materialien* series remain the central publishing outlet for Husserl's original research materials; and the *Dokumente* series the central outlet for associated text such as his *Briefwechsel* or works completed by Husserl's assistants on his behalf.
  79. Dorion Cairns' *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, 27.
  80. *Hua* XIX/1, 9; modified *Logical Investigations*, Volume I, 251.
  81. "Die phänomenologische Fundierung der Logik kämpft auch mit der Schwierigkeit, daß sie fast alle die Begriffe, auf deren Klärung sie abzielt, in der Darstellung selbst verwenden muß." (*Hua* XIX/1, 22.)
  82. *Hua* XIX/1, 22f; *Logical Investigations*, Volume I, 261.
  83. E. Husserl, *Introduction to the Logical Investigations*, 50.

84. "Friedrich weisen uns diese Erwägungen auf eine Sphäre schon wiederhold als unerlässlich erkannter, phänomenologischer Analysen hin, welche die apriorischen Beziehungen zwischen Bedeutung und Erkenntnis bzw. zwischen Bedeutung und klärender Anschauung zur Evidenz bringen. . . ." (*Hua* XIX/1, 78; modified *Logical Investigations*, Volume I, 307f.)
85. "Wollen wir nicht ganz neue, allem lebendigem Sprachgefühl und aller historischen Überlieferung fremde Kunstworte einführen, so werden wir Unzuträglichkeiten der eben besprochenen Art kaum je vermeiden können." *Hua* XIX/1, 393; *Logical Investigations*, Volume II, 563.
86. See §6 in the "Introduction" to the *Logical Investigations* and §13 of the 5. Meditation. See also §84 of the *Ideas* I, especially pp. 190f or §26f of the *Crisis*.
87. *Hua* XXX/I, 190f; *Ideas/HuCW* II, 202.
88. "Es verfällt in großen und immer größeren Strecken in ein rein von Assoziationen beherrschtes Reden und Lesen, wonach es oft genug in seinen so gewonnen Geltungen von der nachkommenden Erfahrung enttäuscht wird." *Hua* VI, 372.
89. *Hua* III/1, 66; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 62.
90. "jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der "Intuition" originär, (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen." *Hua* III/1, 51.
91. *Hua* III/1, 51; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 44.
92. Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 86.
93. Eugen Fink, *HuDo* II/1, 101; *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 92.
94. Cairns, Dorion, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, 44.
95. *Hua* I, 60; modified *Cartesian Meditations*, 20.
96. E. Husserl. *HuDo* II/1, 205; *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 180.
97. *Hua* VI, 59; modified *Crisis of European Sciences*, 58.
98. E. Fink. *HuDo* I, 121–222; *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 111.
99. Fink, Eugen. "Die Spätphilosophie Huserls in der Freiburger Zeit." In *Nähe und Distanz: phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, edited by Franz-Anton Schwartz. Freiburg Breisgau und München: K. Alber, 1977, 205–77
100. *Ibid.*, 209.
101. H.L. van Breda, "The Husserl Archives in Louvain.", 487 n.1.
102. Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), viii.
103. Husserl to Albrecht, December 16, 1936 in *HuDo* III/9, 129.
104. Husserl to Paul Natorp, February 1, 1922 in *HuDo* III/5, 151–52.
105. Husserl to Gustav Albrecht, October 7<sup>th</sup>, 1934 in *HuDo* III/9, 105.
106. Jean Hering, Alexandre Koyré, Roman Ingarden and Jan Patočka stood at the center of this effort to save Husserl's manuscripts at this time.
107. See note 8 in chapter 3.
108. Edmund Husserl, "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie." In *Philosophia* (Belgrad) 1. (1936): 77–176.
109. Jan Patočka, "Erinnerungen an Husserl." *Texte, Dokumente, Bibliographie*, edited by L. Hagedorn, H. R. Sepp, J. Nemec and D. Soucek., (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1999), 283ff.
110. The best indicator of Husserl's daily research activity available is Karl Schuhmann's *Husserl-Chronik*. But as Schuhmann states in the forward to his chronology, "My goal was to delimit as sharply as possible at all times

Husserl's path of thinking. Using the *Chronicle* one should keep continuously in mind that the number of entries itself describes more the degree of convergence to this ideal than the factual course of Husserl's philosophic life. For example, the meager work yielded in 1915 or in 1936 is not a sign of a dwindling power of creativity. On the contrary, surprisingly one can find many manuscripts in Husserl's literary estate which likely stem from these years. However, at the time Husserl's interest in dating his texts was only minor, though for a variety of different reasons." (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, x.) This begs the question whether truly reliable chronological bibliography is possible. This difficulty is only sharpened when the manner by which Husserl's manuscripts were bundled together is also factored in. Although the scheme and collection of Husserl's Nachlass was originally constructed in large measure by Husserl and two of his last assistants, Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe, an inspection of the individual bundles shows works of a collation of manuscripts of varying dates, varying themes, and varying quality collected within a single folder. The establishment of a secure chronology of Husserl's life's work and so a proper philosophic biography remains, therefore, a serious problem.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. See *HuDo* II/2, 3–9. See also *Hua* XV, xxxvi–xl, and Roman Ingarden (ed.) *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, 168f.
2. According to marginal notes written in Husserl's hand, he and Fink went through this first outline in August, 1930. Husserl's marginal remarks on the second page of the outline include the following insertion: "1929?" I infer from this that it is possible the first outline may have been produced as early as 1929. See I. Kern. "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XV, xxxv n3. See also: E. Husserl. *Briefe an Ingarden*, 169.
3. See "Appendix: Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy" for a full English translation of Husserl's and Fink's outlines.
4. Cf. Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 367.
5. See "Appendix: Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy."
6. "Es ist also kaum anzunehmen, dass Husserl nach diesem so ausgearbeiteten und von ihm im grossen und ganzen aufgenommenen Plan Finks noch jenen eigenen entworfen hätte. Die Entstehen dieser beiden Pläne ist wohl zu denken, dass Husserl vorerst einmal, im Frühling oder Frühsommer 1930, seinen eigenen Entwurf (im Stenogramm) hinschrieb und ihn Fink zur Abschrift übergab, dann diesen Plan mit Fink diskutierte, wobei vielleicht noch unterdessen verlorenen Zwischenstadien entstanden, und schliesslich Fink beauftragte, jenen grossen Plan, der am 13. August einging, zu schreiben." (Iso Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XV, xli–xlii.)
7. "For some months now I have been working through my all-too numerous manuscripts. I am planning a great systematic work constructed from the ground up that can serve as the foundational work of phenomenology." (Husserl to Roman Ingarden, November 25, 1921 in *HuDo* III/3, 213.)
8. "Er wolle die 'grossen Scheine' der Systemphilosophien 'in Kleingeld wechseln.'" [Eugen Fink, "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit." In *Nähe und Distanz. Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 219–220.]
9. *Hua* XXV, 6; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 291–2 (italics mine).
10. E. Husserl. "Renewal: its problem and method." In *Husserl. Shorter Works*, 331.
11. *Hua* XXV, 53; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 333.

12. One obvious early example is the planned three-part *Ideas* project.
13. E. Husserl, "Nachwort" in *Hua* V, 161.
14. E. Fink, "Reflexionen zu Husserls Phänomenologischer Reduktion." In *Nähe und Distanz. Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 310.
15. *Ibid.*, 301.
16. E. Fink. *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 72.
17. *Cartesianische Meditationen*. Textedition Elisabeth Ströker. (Meiner 1992), 5; *Hua* I, 45.
18. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 73. [To which Husserl adds in the margin, "Obviously too, however, not a coming-to-be in the sense of a worldly coming-to-be, or a mode of what exists as a [process of] happening—but again an analogue to it." (*Ibid.*, 73 n239.)]
19. *Cartesianische Meditationen*. Textedition Elisabeth Ströker. (Meiner 1992), 4; *Hua* I, 44.
20. *Hua* III/1, 51.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Hua* XXV, 60–1; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 340.
23. E. Husserl. *Cartesianische Meditationen*. Textedition Elisabeth Ströker. (Meiner 1992), 10; *Hua* I, 49–50.
24. *Hua* XVII, 1.
25. E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie. Hua* VIII, 4.
26. E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, modified 12.
27. *Hua* III/1, 40; modified *Ideas/HuCW* II, 34.
28. Edmund Husserl. *Briefwechsel*. Edited by Karl Schuhmann with Elisabeth Schuhmann. The Hague, Netherlands, 1994.
29. Wilhelm Dilthey. *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt*. GS VII, 250; modified *Formation of the Historical World*, 268.
30. Husserl to Georg Misch, June 7th, 1930 in *HuDo* III/6, 281.
31. Even though Husserl wrote six of the last seven of these letters, there are indications in the letters to suggest that some of Misch's correspondence has either not survived or remains unpublished in the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek at Göttingen.
32. These earlier two letters are bureaucratic in nature. The first letter, written on June 18th, 1919, centers on efforts by Edith Stein, one of Husserl's students, to complete her work at the University of Göttingen; the second letter, from May 28th, 1922, concerns Husserl's former chair of philosophy at Göttingen. Stein completed her dissertation under Husserl in 1916 and concluded a two year post-doctoral position as Husserl's assistant. She sought to complete her *Habilitation* at the University of Göttingen. Women, however, were precluded from holding professorial positions in the German university system at that time. In the first letter, Misch, a faculty member at Göttingen, writes to Husserl of the difficulties associated with Stein's application. "For all the esteem I have for Fraulein Stein after your recommendation and after reading her remarkable dissertation," Misch explains. "I <still> cannot offer her many prospects. It would be otherwise if a significant male student of yours would like to come, one with whom these reservations would not surface (*HuDo* III/6, 271.)." In the second letter Misch writes to Husserl as a courtesy in order to request his opinion about potential candidates to fill Husserl's former chair of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. The names Misch proposes include Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, and Martin Heidegger. We do not know Husserl's recommendation, but it was Geiger who was eventually named to the position.
33. Husserl to Misch, June 27, 1929 in *HuDo* III/6, 275.



34. Biemel, Walter. "Introduction to the Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence." In *Husserl. Shorter Works*, 199.
35. *Hua* XXV, 45; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 326, n1.
36. W. Dilthey to Husserl, June 29, 1911 in *HuDo* III/3, 44.
37. Max Frischeisen-Köhler and Wilhelm Dilthey. *Weltanschauung Philosophie und Religion in Darstellungen*. Berlin: Reischl & Co., 1911.
38. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Das Wesen der Philosophie." In *Systematische philosophie. Die Kultur der Gegenwart: ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele*, edited by Paul Hinnenberg. Berlin und Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1907, 1–72.
39. W. Dilthey to Husserl, June 29, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 44.
40. *Ibid.*, 47.
41. *Ibid.*, 45.
42. *Ibid.*, 46.
43. *Ibid.*, 43.
44. E. Husserl to W. Dilthey, July 5/6, 1911 in *HuDo* III/4, 51.
45. W. Dilthey to Husserl, August 10, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 51.
46. Cf. Husserl's letter to Dilthey of July 5/6th, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 50f.
47. G. Misch to E. Husserl, August 9, 1929 in *HuDo* III/6, 279.
48. G. Misch, "Vorbericht des Herausgebers." In Wilhelm Dilthey. *Die Geistige Welt. Einleitung in die Philosophie der Philosophie*. GS V, cxii.
49. *Ibid.*, cxii.
50. O.F. Bollnow, "Dilthey und die Phänomenologie." In *Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegenwart*. Hrsg. und eingeleitet v. Ernst Wolfgang Orth. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 60f.
51. *Ibid.*, 61.
52. Husserl received volumes V–VI of Dilthey's *Schriften* on July 5th, 1924. (K. Schuhmann. *Husserl-Chronik*, 282.)
53. Cf. G. Misch. *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, 136. It is interesting to note Husserl's response to this critique, which is found in his marginal notations to Misch's *Life-philosophy*: "Yes, < for one > who has never understood the phenomenological method." (Husserl, Edmund. "Edmund Husserl's Randnotizen zu Georg Mischs Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. In *Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 12 (1999/2000): 176.)
54. E. Husserl to W. Dilthey, July 5/6, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 50.
55. *Ibid.*, 49.
56. "By the way, you should consult only with caution the *Logos* article since no use is made there of the phenomenological reduction." (Husserl to Marvin Farber, June 18th, 1937 in *HuDo* III/4, 83.)
57. In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl explicitly rejected the notion of a pure transcendental ego. He famously reversed himself on this point in the 1913 revisions. Compare the following two statements by Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*. This first occurs in the first edition: "Now I must admit that I have been utterly unable to find this primitive I as the necessary center of relations. What I am solely capable of noticing and therefore perceiving is the empirical I and its empirical relation to its own experiences or to external objects. . . ." (*Hua* XIX, 374). Then in a note which he attached to this passage in 1913: "In the meanwhile I have come to find or rather learned not be led astray by concerns against degenerating into a I-metaphysics in the pure grasping of the given. (*Hua* XIX 374, note \*). See also *Hua* XVIII, 15 as well as Husserl's review of Th. Elsenhans's "Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Psychologie" referenced in Chapter 1, n7.
58. *Hua* XXV, 36; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 318. (Cited also as note 9 in chapter 1.)

59. *Hua* III/1, 68.
60. *Hua* XXV, 38; “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” 320.
61. *Hua* III/1, 68.
62. W. Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (GS I), 396.
63. W. Dilthey to E. Husserl, June, 29, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 43.
64. E. Husserl to W. Dilthey, July 5/6, 1911 in *HuDo* III/6, 50.
65. *Ibid.*
66. “Philosophy as rigorous science.”
67. Husserl, Edmund. 1999. *The idea of phenomenology: a translation of Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (*Husserliana* II). Translated by L. Hardy. *Husserliana: Collected Works*. Vol. XIII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
68. E. Husserl to G. Misch, August 3, 1929 in *HuDo* III/6, 277 (italics mine). (See also note 135 in this chapter.)
69. E. Husserl to W. Dilthey, July 5/6, 1911 in *Hua* III/6, 50f.
70. *Hua* II.
71. Husserl wrote a note which he attached to the so-called “Seefelder Manuskripte” of 1905 to this effect. “Historische Note: In Seefelder Blättern—1905—finde ich schon Begriff und korrekten Gebrauch der ‘phänomenologischen Reduktion’.” (*Hua* X, 237, n1.)
72. E. Husserl to G. Misch, 27. VI. 1929. *HuDo* III/6, 275.
73. [1] G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, I. Teil. *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, Heft 3 (1928/29): 267–368; [2] G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, II. Teil. *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, Heft 4 (1928/29): 405–475; [3] G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, III. Teil. *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, Heft 3/4 (1929/30): 181–330. Misch eventual published his *Lebensphilosophie* as a monograph in 1930: [4] G. Misch, 1930. *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Dilthey’schen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl*. 1. Aufl. Bonn: Verlag Cohen.
74. W. Dilthey. *Weltaanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*. 3., unver. Aufl. Hrsg. v. Bernahrd Groethuysen. *Gesammelte Schriften* VIII. Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1960.
75. E. Husserl to G. Misch, June 27, 1929 in *HuDo* III/6, 275.
76. Husserl to Dilthey, June 29th, 1911. *HuDo* III/6, 51. *Husserl. Shorter Works*, 207.
77. E. Husserl. *Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction à la phénoménologie*. Traduit de l’allemand par Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas. (Bibliothèque de la Société française de Philosophie). Paris: A. Colin, 1931.
78. G. Misch. *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*. 3. Aufl. Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1967, iii.
79. E. Husserl to G. Misch, June 27, 1929 in *Hua* III/6, 275.
80. The year of Husserl’s visit to Dilthey in Berlin.
81. E. Husserl to G. Misch, April 17th, 1937 in *HuDo* III/6, 284 (underlining mine).
82. “Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.” *Philosophia* 1. Belgrad (1936): 77–176.
83. Cf. §15 of the “Crisis,” *Hua* VI, 71f. Husserl’s last work is commonly characterized as initiating a break from his earlier writings. This is the position taken by David Carr, for instance, in his influential book, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*. If we can identify Husserl’s thinking in the *Méditations cartésiennes* and *Ideas* I as neo-Cartesian, it is only to the degree that we accept the radical critique of Descartes’ actual method whereby Husserl is “obliged—and precisely by its radical development of



Cartesian motifs—to reject nearly all the well known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy.” (*Hua* I, 43; *CM* 1) Accordingly and following Carr we can as easily label Husserl’s last writings a form of neo-Kantianism insofar as the writings revolve around a critical transformation of the Kantian transcendental motif. Iso Kern makes a similar point in his influential work, *Husserl und Kant*. Thus Kern writes, “Husserl’s plan for the “Crisis” as a Kant critique does not contradict the assertion we made above—that this work stands in an especially close affinity to Kant. Rather, this Kant critique is determined precisely by this affinity. *Because* Husserl is connected to Kant, it becomes also necessary for him to bring out and stress the essential defects within the Kantian philosophy.” (Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, 47; see also *Hua* VI, 435ff, esp. 438.) However, one must be cautious here not to liken this “return to Kant” in these late writings with an acceptance of the contemporaneous neo-Kantian critical philosophies so disparaging of Husserl’s transcendental turn in the *Ideas*. It is worth noting Eugen Fink’s article contrasting Husserl’s phenomenology with neo-Kantian philosophies of the day in this regard. (Eugen Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” In *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, 73–147.) Husserl means in the “Crisis” writings to examine the Kantian transcendental motif as a deepening of the drive to rigor working itself out in Western philosophy. Hence his return to Kant in these writings reflects the novel method of regressive sense-investigation typical of these writings by which Husserl hopes to trace the working out of philosophy as rigorous science. As he says in the *Crisis* text, “It is with good reason that we pause *over Kant*, a significant turning point in modern history. The critique to be directed against him will illuminate the total earlier history of philosophy like a reflector, namely, in respect to the *general sense of science* [*Wissenschaftlichkeit*] which all *earlier* philosophies strove to realize—as the only meaning which lay and could possibly lie within their spiritual horizon (*Hua* VI, 103; modified *Crisis* 100.).” What Husserl discloses in his critical pause over Kant’s philosophy is the unexpressed presupposition concealed “from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday surrounding world of life (*Hua* VI, 106; *Crisis* 104.).” Carr argues that the historical method of philosophizing representative of the “Crisis” writings represents a striking and fatal critique of Husserl’s own paradigm of perception typical to his neo-Cartesian manner of philosophy. By this reasoning, Carr concludes that the “Crisis” institutes a break from Husserl’s earlier philosophy. We believe this to be mistaken. Although our own analysis of Husserl’s philosophy concludes with Husserl’s “system of phenomenological philosophy,” which he worked on in the early thirties before he turned to the Crisis writings, we believe the Crisis writings can be shown to fit within the development of the transcendental phenomenological problematic. The “novelty” of Husserl’s approach in the last years can be traced to writings reaching as far back as the early twenties. Thus the “Crisis” is not as innovative as it appears. This particular thesis falls outside the specific tasks of this study, and so we leave it unsupported here. It is our future intention, however, to undertake a separate study on the basis of the present investigation to support these claims.

84. *Hua* VI, 71f.

85. *Hua* VI, 157–158.

86. *Hua* III/1, 181f.

87. E. Husserl, “Nr. 34. <Zur Kritik an den *Ideen* I> <Sommer 1937>.” In *Hua* XXIX, 425–26.

88. "There exists a fundamental difference in the manner of world-consciousness and of thing-consciousness, of object-consciousness (in a widest, but purely life-world sense), though on the other hand the one and the other form an inseparable unity. Things, objects (understood always purely in the sense of the lifeworld) are "given" as things holding in each case for us (in whatever mode of being-certainty), but fundamentally only so, that they are consciously given as things, as objects *in the horizon of the world*. Anything is something, "something of" the world, of which we are conscious continually as horizon. On the other side, this horizon is conscious only as a horizon for existing objects <seiende Objekte> and cannot be present <aktuell> without particularized conscious objects. Everything has its possible mode of variation of holding-forth, which is the modalization of being-certainty. On the other hand, the world does not exist as a being like an object but rather exists as a unicity for which the plural is absurd. Every plural and every singular extracted therefrom presupposes the horizon of world. This difference of the manner of being of an object in the world and of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally differentiated correlative manners of consciousness. " (E. Husserl. *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften*. Hua VI, 146.)
89. These lectures stem originally from a lecture course Husserl held in 1905 but include materials produced as late as 1917.
90. Hua XXV, 46–7; "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," 327–8.
91. Caution must be used when translating the German *Geist*, *geistig*, or its derivatives into English. No single word in English adequately conveys the full connotation of the German, which can mean either spirit, intellect or mind. The term *Geisteswissenschaft* is translated consistently as "human science." "Mental" is one choice for *geistig*, but a special note of caution must be inserted here. Unfortunately, in his translation of *Ideas* I Fred Kersten regularly employs the expression "mental processes" for the German term, "*Erlebnis*." This manner of expression seriously muddies an already turbid body of choices confronting the translator of Husserl into English. For purposes of clarity, I have translated the term "*Erlebnis*" and paronymous words as "experience" or some derivative thereof in order to avoid confusion.
92. This seemingly contradicts a criticism leveled against Dilthey by Husserl. Cf. Edmund Husserl. *Phänomenologische Psychologie* in Hua IX, 34. "Bei meinem inneren Ringen um eine prinzipielle Überwindung des Positivismus mußte mich die starke Hinneigung zum Positivismus, die in Diltheys älterem Werk, der "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften," hervorgetreten war, abstoßen." However, Husserl seems here to be using the term positivism very broadly to include almost any sort of empirical methodology, including the empiricism found at root in the methodology promulgated by Dilthey in his *Introduction*. Thus his reaction against Dilthey's positivism reflects his struggle for the application of *Wesensschau* (intuition of essences) as a fundamentally valid form of seeing. "Das unmittelbare "Sehen", nicht bloß das sinnliche, erfahrende Sehen, sondern das Sehen überhaupt als originär gebendes Bewußtsein welcher Art immer, ist die letzte Rechtsquelle aller vernünftigen Behauptungen." (Hua III/1, 43.) See also note 22 in chapter 1.
93. Hua IX, 7.
94. Wilhelm Dilthey. *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*. GS V, 143–44. "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology." Translated by Richard Zaner. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, modified 27–28.
95. Hua IX, 49.

96. Wilhelm Dilthey. *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*. GS V, 168–69.
97. E. Husserl. *Logische Untersuchungen*. Erste Auflage. A18. Hua XIX/1, 24.
98. “Übungen zur neueren Philosophie, WS 04/05.” Ulrich Herrmann. Bibliographie Wilhelm Dilthey. Quellen und Literatur. Weinheim: Verlag Julius Beltz, 121. Cf. Karl Schuhmann. *Husserl-Chronik*. 87.
99. Bernhard Groethuysen an Husserl, March 28, 1905 in *HuDo* III/6, 171.
100. Cf. Chapter 1, note 7.
101. Sitzungsbericht der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin. Gesamtsitzung vom 16. März 1905, ausgegeben am 23. März 1905, S. 1–22 [322–343]: Studien zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften. Von W. Dilthey. Erste Studie.
102. Wilhelm Dilthey. *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, 10.
103. *Ibid.*, 14 fn.
104. *Ibid.*, 351.
105. The editors of the English translation of GS VII, Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, suggest incorrectly that “Dilthey substitutes ‘psychological description’ for Husserl’s ‘pure description.’ This was no substitution but rather a faithful rendering of the first edition, the only edition ever available to Dilthey. This is an interesting mistake by the editors, since they obviously recognize that Dilthey only ever had the first edition of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works, volume III, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, 62, note 11.
106. Wilhelm Dilthey. *Logik und Wert. Späte Vorlesungen, Entwürfe und Fragmente zur Strukturpsychologie, Logik und Wertlehre (ca. 1904–1911)*. *Gesammelte Schriften* XXIV. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004, 362.
107. E. Husserl. *Phänomenologische Psychologie*. Hua IX, 33.
108. Ebbinghaus, Hermann. “Über erklärende und beschreibende Psychologie.” *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 9 (1895): 161–205.
109. Edmund Husserl. *Phänomenologie Psychologie*. Hua IX, 34.
110. *Ibid.*, 31.
111. E. Husserl to Georg Misch, June 27, 1929 in *HuDo* III/6, 275.
112. Karl Schuhmann. *Husserl-Chronik*, 70.
113. Mahnke, Dietrich. “Rezension des VII.en Bands der Gesammelten Werke Wilhelm Diltheys, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*.” In *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 44. Heft (1927): 2143–51.
114. Dietrich Mahnke. “Rezension des VII.en Bands,” 1927, 2150.
115. Cf. Guy van Kerckhoven. “Die Grundsätze von Husserls Konfrontation mit Dilthey im Lichte der geschichtlichen Selbstzeugnisse.” In *Dilthey und der Wandel des Philosophiebegriffs seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*. Sonderdruck der *Phänomenologische Forschung*, Band 16. Hrsg. von E. W. Orth. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1984, 147.
116. E. Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, December 26th, 1927 in *HuDo* III/3, 459.
117. Husserl seems to mistake the date of his meeting with Dilthey for the following winter semester rather than the earlier summer semester.
118. E. Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, December 26th, 1927 in *HuDo* III/3, 459.
119. “Geschichtsphilosophischen Übungen in Anknüpfen an neuere Literatur (Seminar, Sommer Semester 1905).” Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1989, 220. Cf. Karl Schuhmann. *Husserl-Chronik*, 89.
120. E. Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, December 26th, 1927 in *HuDo* III/3, 459.

121. D. Mahnke. "Rezension des VII. Bandes," 2143.
122. *Ibid.*, 2144.
123. *Ibid.*
124. *Ibid.*, 2145.
125. *Ibid.*
126. G. Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*, 203.
127. D. Mahnke. "Rezension des VII. Bandes," 2151.
128. *Ibid.* The final quote in the passage is taken from *Goethe's Faust*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 87–89.
129. Husserl to Adolf Grimme, March 5th, 1931 in *HuDo* III/3, 90.
130. "He who studies my writing closely will see that logic and the phenomenological clarification of the logical were only a natural field of entrance for me, that for me nothing could be farther off the mark than to "logicize" philosophy, that is, to reduce it to logic. Just as little do I reduce philosophy to phenomenology, to a critique of cognition, and so on." (Husserl to Karl Joël, March 11th, 1914. *HuDo* III/6, 207.)
131. Edmund Husserl to Heinrich Husserl, October 2nd, 1912. "Der Logosartikler ist schon genug böses Blut gemacht: aber Respekt hat man, es steht ja schon darin." *HuDo* III/9, 288.
132. Edmund Husserl to Eduard Spranger, ca November 1st, 1918. *HuDo* III/6, 420.
133. *Ibid.*
134. Husserl to Mahnke, December 26th, 1927. *HuDo* III/3, 460.
135. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 89.
136. E. Husserl to D. Mahnke, December 26th, 1927 in *HuDo* III/3, 460 (italics mine). Cf. note 68 in this chapter.
137. *Ibid.*
138. *Ibid.*, 460–461.
139. *Ibid.*
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*, 462.
142. E. Husserl. "Rezension von Elsenhans," in *Hua* XXII 206–207.
143. E. Husserl to D. Mahnke, December 26th, 1927 in *Hua* III/3, 462.

### NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. *HuDo* III/5, 137.
2. E. Husserl to Adolf Grimme, March 5th, 1931 in *HuDo* III/3, 90.
3. We have noted already that Husserl held a series of "philosophical exercises" on history in connection with the new literature (SS 1905) immediately after his encounter with Dilthey in 1905 (cf. note 119 in chapter 2). This course was the proto-type of what would become Husserl's most oft repeated course (on the theme of "nature and spirit" and the "ideas of natural and human science" SS 1913, SS 1913, WS 1915/16, SS 1919, WS 1921/23, SS 1927). Apart from Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology, one would expect to find a detailed exposition of Dilthey's philosophy also in these courses. Yet this is not the case. Unfortunately, not all of these are available. Husserl appears to have presented the SS 1905 course, for instance, with little or no notes and a student copy does not seem to exist. So these lectures seem lost, which is a great loss. We know from Husserl's comments that it focused on the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and two proponents of the Southwest School of neo-Kantianism, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. Two later courses that Husserl presented

along a similar theme have recently been published, however. These courses focus to a large degree on the work of Windelband and Rickert and to a much lesser extent on Dilthey. Cf. (i) *Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1919*. Hrsg. v. Michael Weiler. *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Materialienband IV*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, and (ii) *Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1927*. Hrsg. v. Michael Weiler. *Husserliana* XXXII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. Husserl does not mention Dilthey in his 1919 course “Nature and Spirit,” and he mentions Dilthey only in passing in the 1927 course of the same name. Dilthey’s name occurs in this latter text first in context of Windelband’s treatment of the meaningfulness of historical facts (*Hua* XXXII, 84) and second in the context of Dilthey’s own efforts to establish a secure, unique ground for a humanistic psychology (*Ibid.*, 131). However, Husserl never mentions the influential role of Dilthey on his own thinking.

4. J.N. Mohanty. “The Unity of Husserl’s Philosophy,” 117.
5. An example of this sort of analysis is found in R. Bernet’s excellent article, “Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in Husserl Bernauer Manuskripten.” Bernet argues that a main concern in Husserl’s analysis of intentionality taking place in the teens centers on the status of apprehensional contents, i.e., the sensation contents, bearing meaning within the qualitatively distinct acts of retention (memory) and phantasy within consciousness. This concern leads Husserl to reformulate his description of the temporal flow of consciousness within which these contents find their meaning. In regards to the contents, themselves, Bernet shows that Husserl does not use a consistent terminology but one which has a traceable chronology of use. “Husserl calls the givenness of such an unmodified, i.e., originally present sensation, a “primordial impression” [*Urimpression*] in early texts and later, in the Bernau manuscripts, a “primordial presentation” [*Urpräsentation*].” (Bernet, Rudolf. “Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in Husserls Bernauer Manuskripten.” In *Die erscheinende Welt: Festschrift für Klaus Held*, hrsg. v. Heinrich Hüni and Peter Trawny, Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 2002, 544.) He then illustrates that Husserl’s descriptions of the immanent flow of consciousness within which sense constituting activity occurs also has a traceable chronology of use. “Husserl calls this inner consciousness of sensation in the early texts “absolute consciousness” and, then, in the Bernau manuscripts “primordial process” or “primordial stream.” (*Ibid.*) Bernet’s masterly analysis of the Bernau manuscripts obtains its efficacy because of the precision with which he traces Husserl’s conceptualization of the issue. We do not seek to disparage this sort of analysis here, but rather only to provide an example of the sort of interpretive analysis that is dominant today among Husserl scholars.
6. For this phrase, I am indebted to Donn Welton as he introduces the essays of his collection *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, xii).
7. “Die Begriffe des ‘Phänomens,’ der ‘Epoche,’ der ‘Konstitution,’ der ‘Leistung’ und der ‘transcendental Logik’ sind wietaus mehr operativ gebraucht, als thematisch geklärt. Sie alle stellen Probleme dar, die noch *offen* sind. Die Ungelöstheit dieser Probleme zu sehen, besagt keine unangemessene Kritik an Husser,—bedeutet noch weniger eine Überholung dieses Denkers.” (E. Fink, “Operative Begriffe in Husserls Phänomenologie.” In *Nähe und Distanz Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 203.)
8. On October 27, 1938, officials at the University of Leuven secured funding from the “Francqui Stiftung” which would provide means for Husserl’s last two assistants, Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink, to work on Husserl’s

- Nachlass* for two years. "This day can be said to be the date of the foundation of the Husserl Archive in Leuven." Sabine Mödersheim, "Husserl's Nachlaß und seine Erschließung," 105.
9. Samuel Ijsseling, "Das Husserl-Archiv in Leuven und die Husserl-Ausgabe," *Buchstabe und Geist: zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte*, edited by Walter Jaeschke and Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophischer Editionen, (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987), 144.
  10. This number excludes the eight volumes of Husserl's original manuscripts currently in print as part of *Materialien* series.
  11. Sabina Mödersheim, "Husserl Nachlaß und seine Erschließung," 113.
  12. "It is—a critical edition. I need add nothing further. Certainly, we are unable to edit everything at the same time, and so in every volume of our edition a moment of selection plays itself out. Yet we hit upon this "selection" with respect solely and alone to the main points delimited by Husserl, himself, in his work." H.L. van Breda, "Geist und Bedeutung des Husserl-Archiv," *Edmund Husserl, 1859–1959. Recueil commémoratif publié à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe*, edited by H.L. van Breda, et. al., (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 121.
  13. This should not be taken so literally to mean that the editor of the collections of Husserl's research manuscripts enjoyed unfettered authority in determining the contents. Every editor is constrained either by the thematic and chronological foci of the volume on which she is working. Since the collections of Husserl's research manuscripts contain myriad different investigations under a single theme, the editors of these volumes enjoy a greater responsibility than others for deciding which materials within the thematic focus and chronological period in question to include in their volume.
  14. "What became "fixed" in such publications has been time and time again pondered in the manuscripts and often, in accordance with his progressive thinking, put into novel connections." Bernet, Kern, & Marbach. *Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*, 2.
  15. (i) Husserl, Edmund. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil: 1905–1920*. Edited by Iso Kern. *Husserliana* XIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. (ii) Husserl, Edmund. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928*. Edited by Iso Kern. *Husserliana* XIV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. (iii) Husserl, Edmund. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*. Edited by Iso Kern. *Husserliana* X. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
  16. E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18)*. Hrsg. v. Rudolf Bernet und Dieter Lohmar. *Husserliana* XXXIII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
  17. Volume XIII contains the one exception to this schema, since Husserl's lecture course of 1910/11, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, represents the core text of this collection. On the basis of this exception, therefore, this editorial schema of this volume appears to be quite similarly constructed to the earlier published volumes of Husserl's lecture course in the series. This would be a misunderstanding of the significance of this volume, however, for reasons which the editor cites and which we discuss below.
  18. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers." In *Hua* XIII xviii.
  19. I. Kern, "Einleitung." in *Hua* XIII, xx.
  20. I. Kern, "Einleitung." in *Hua* XIII, xix.
  21. Cf. note 14 above.



22. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: from the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911*. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006.
23. Cf. *Hua* XIII, xxxiii–xxxvi. Husserl referred to these lectures under a variety of names. The alternate titles include: (i) “Lectures on Intersubjectivity” (*Hua* XXIII, 195), (ii) “Lecture on empathy and the broadened reduction” (Ms. F I 43, S. 57a, see also *Hua* XXXIII, 512, (under p. 153), (iii) “Lecture on the phenomenological reduction as universal, intersubjective reduction” (M III 9 VI b, S. 68a), (iv) Lecture “on the phenomenological reduction and transcendental theory of empathy” (*Hua* XIII, S. 510), (v) simply as “Empathy”, or (vi) “lecture on the naturalistic concept of world”.
24. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*. 2. Auflage. Hrsg. v. Walter Biemel. *Husserliana* II. Den Haag: Marinus Nijhof, 1973.
25. See note 71 in the preceding chapter.
26. Between 1907 and 1911, Husserl offered eight courses at the University of Göttingen directly or indirectly on the nature of phenomenological philosophy. We focus only on the two of these which Husserl planned to use as the basis of his systematic presentation in the twenties. The full complement of courses, however, are: (i) Vorlesung, WS 1906/07: Einführung in die Logik und Erkenntniskritik; (ii) Seminar, WS 1906/07: Philosophische Übungen über ausgewählte Probleme der Phänomenologie und Erkenntniskritik; (iii) Vorlesung, SS 1907: Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft [*The Idea of Phenomenology, five lectures*]; (iv) Seminar: WS 1907/08: Diskussionen über Grundfragen der Logik und Kritik der Vernunft; (v) Vorlesung, SS 1908: Zur Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre; (vi) Vorlesung, SS 1909: Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis; (vii) Vorlesung, WS 1910/11: Logik als Theorie der Erkenntnis, WS, 1910/11; and (viii) Vorlesung, 1910/11: Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie [*The Basic Problems*]. Bernet/Kern/Marbach. *An Introduction to Husserlian Philosophy*. 238f.
27. I. Kern, “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” in *Hua* XIII, xxxiii.
28. It was characteristic of Husserl during these years to speak of phenomenology as critical philosophy. This is less an effort to align phenomenology with the neo-Kantian philosophies that dominated Germany in the early years of the twentieth century than it was to tie the aims of phenomenology to the general aims of modern scientific philosophy generally, radically re-conceived though. “But however much this kind of critique of experience <characteristic of natural scientific methodology> may satisfy us, as long as we stand *within* natural science and think in its attitude, a completely different critique of experience is still possible and necessary, a critique which puts the whole of experience generally and in the same breadth experiential-scientific thinking in question.” (*Hua* XXV, 14; “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” 299.)
29. *Hua* II, 23.
30. Simpson, D.P. *Cassell’s New Latin Dictionary: Latin-English & English-Latin*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 506f.
31. *Hua* II, 75.
32. *Hua* II, 46.
33. *Hua* II, 60–61.
34. *Hua* II, 55.
35. I. Kern, “Einleitung” in *Hua* XIII, xxxvi. Part III of the “Crisis” details the “clarification of the transcendental problem and the related function of psychology.”
36. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, 86. [*Hua* XIII, 191.]
37. *Hua* II, 55.

38. *Hua* XIII, 162n.
39. *Hua* XIII, 189.
40. E. Husserl, *Ideen I*. *Hua* III/1, 204.
41. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, modified 82. [*Hua* XIII, 186.]
42. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, modified 84–85. [*Hua* XIII, 189.]
43. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* in *Hua* II, 74.
44. As always, the word “act” and its derivatives are meant here in the sense Husserl employs it throughout the *Logical Investigations* and later works. “We also deny the ‘mythology of activities.’ We define the “act” not as psychic actions but rather as intentional experiences.” [E. Husserl. “Fifth Logical Investigation, §13 Fixing our Terminology.” *Logical Investigations*. *Hua* XIX/1, 393n.]
45. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, 129. [*Hua* XIII, 212.]
46. Cf. note 33 in this chapter.
47. “Inserted later: ‘if the epistemological interest is the determining one.’—Editor’s note.” E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, 54 n4. [*Hua* XIII, 160, n3]
48. E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, 54. [*Hua* XIII, 160.]
49. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* in *Hua* II, 70.
50. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* in *Hua* II, 73.
51. E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893–1917). Hrg. v. Rudolf Boehm. *Husserliana* X. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
52. *Hua* X, 343.
53. Cf. note 130 and 131 from the previous chapter.
54. Cf. notes 49, 51, and 53 from the previous chapter.
55. Husserl responds to the charge of being a “Platonizing realist” in §7 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> *Logical Investigation* and most famously §22 of *Ideen* I. See also §4 in the “Introduction to the *Logical Investigations*,” (ed. by E. Fink).
56. *Hua* III/1, 47.
57. This conception of consciousness articulated here as “presentive” bespeaks the strong influence of Klaus Held’s book, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, on this study. “Sensate perception serves here only as the “normal case” [Cf. Ms. C3 III (1931), S. 21: “Perception is the ‘normal case of every I-activity.’”], as an exemplary instance for self-giving intuition. This owes its intentional originality to the immediate [unverstellten] and clear nearness of the given in it. Such a nearness in the flesh is “presence” [“Gegenwart”]. For this reason perception can well be characterized as “presencing” [“Gegenwärtigen”]. (Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 8.)
58. *Hua* II, 68.
59. *Hua* XIX/2, 678.
60. *Hua* XIX/2, 674–5.
61. I. Kern, “Einleitung,” in *Hua* XIII, xxxiif.
62. “The natural sciences are distinguished from the human sciences in that the former have facts for their objects which arise in consciousness as from outside and which are given individually as phenomena where, in contrast, the facts of the latter arise originaliter from within as reality and as a living interconnection <Zusammenhang>. As a consequence, for the natural sciences there arises a nexus <Zusammenhang> in them only by conclusions supplemented by means of an association of hypotheses. For the human sciences, on the contrary, the interconnection of psychic life underlies everything as an originally given reality. We explain nature; the life of the soul we understand.” (W. Dilthey, *Ideen über einer beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, in *Die Geistige Welt. Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens*, erste Hälfte. GS V. 5. unver. Aufl. ., 143–144.)



63. "If one wants to speak of the "psychical," one would have to speak of a *transcendental-psychical* in contrast to the *empirical-psychical*." (E. Husserl, *The Basic Problems*, 62. [Hua XIII, 168.]
64. W. Dilthey, *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology*. Translated by Richard M. Zaner. In *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 58. [GS V, 176.]
65. Cf. Hua XIII, 149. Further, Husserl makes clear in a number of places in *Ideas I* that the paradigmatic analyses of perception can and ought to be extended to non presenting intentional consciousness. I-experience as a whole is the theme of phenomenology, even though the word "consciousness" which designates the delimited domain of I-experiences, insinuates a limitation to thinking, presentive consciousness. "We takes as our departure consciousness in a laconic sense, one which provisionally presents itself, which we most simply designate by the Cartesian *cogito*, the 'I think.' It is well known of Descartes that the *cogito* includes within it every "I perceive, I remember, I imagine, I judge, feel, desire, want" and thus all and any similar I-experiences in the countless flowing particular formations." (Hua III/1, 70.)
66. E. Husserl. "Appendix IX to §39." In *The Basic Problems*, modified 156. [Hua XIII, 229.]
67. Edmund Husserl. *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Theil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1901. NB: Page numbers are prefixed with the letter "A" so as to emphasize the 1901 edition of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*.
68. Edmund Husserl. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage—Nachdruck. Edited by Karl Schuhmann. *Husserliana* III/1. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
69. Edmund Husserl. *Die 'Bernauer Manuskripte' über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18)*. Edited by Rudolf Bernet & Dieter Lohmar. *Husserliana* XXXIII. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
70. Franz Brentano. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Erster Band. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1924.
71. *Ibid.* See especially the second book of the first chapter of Brentano's *Psychologie* for this discussion. Cf. Chapter 2 in the 5<sup>th</sup> of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.
72. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 117. "Aber auch da, wo durch Schneiden, Brennen oder Kitzeln ein Gefühl von Schmerz oder Lust in uns erweckt wird, müssen wir in gleicher Weise ein physisches Phänomen, das als Gegenstand der äußeren Wahrnehmung auftritt, und ein psychisches Phänomen des Gefühles, welches sein Erscheinen begleitet, auseinander halten, obwohl der oberflächliche Betrachter hier eher zur Verwechslung geneigt ist."
73. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 125.
74. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 124ff.
75. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 41. "Ja die innere Wahrnehmung hat das Eigentümliche, daß sie nie innere Beobachtung werden kann. Gegenstände, die man, wie man zu sagen pflegt, äußerlich wahrnimmt, kann man beobachten, man wendet, um die Erscheinung genau aufzufassen, ihr seine volle Aufmerksamkeit zu. Bei Gegenständen, die man innerlich wahrnimmt, ist dies aber vollständig unmöglich."
76. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 129.
77. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. I, V, A345.
78. F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, 112. "Dieses Vorstellung bildet die Grundlage des Urteilens nicht bloß, sondern ebenso des Begehrens, sowie jedes

anderen psychischen Aktes. Nichts kann beurteilt, nichts kann aber auch begehrt, nichts kann gehofft oder gefürchtet werden, wenn es nicht vorgestellt wird.”

79. E. Husserl, *Ideen I* in *Hua* III/1, 269.
80. *Ibid.*, 272. “Nach all dem ergibt es sich, daß alle Akte überhaupt—auch die Gemüts- und Willensakte—“objektivierende” sind, Gegenstände ursprünglich “konstituierend”, notwendige Quellen verschiedener Seinsregionen und damit auch zugehöriger Ontologien.”
81. *Ibid.*, 248f. “Alles hat die modifizierende “Klammer”, derjenigen nahe verwandt, von der wir früher soviel gesprochen haben, and die für die Wegbereitung zur Phänomenologie so wichtig ist. Die Setzungen schlechthin, die nichtneutralisierten Setzungen haben zur Korrelatergebnissen “Sätze”, welche insgesamt charakterisiert sind als “Seiendes”. Die Möglichkeit, Wahrscheinlichkeit, Fraglichkeit, das Nichtsein und das Jasein—all das ist selber etwas “Seiendes”: nämlich als solches im Korrelat charakterisiert, als das im Bewußtsein “vermeint”. Die neutralisierten Setzungen unterscheiden sich aber wesentlich dadurch, daß ihre Korrelate nichts Setzbares, nichts wirklich Prädikables enthalten, das Bewußtsein spielt in keiner Hinsicht für sein Bewußtes die Rolle eines “Glaubens”.
82. By act, we mean here merely the constitution of sense in consciousness. No movement, and hence no action in the physical—or even psycho-physical—sense need be presupposed for such acts to occur. Cf. note 44 in this chapter.
83. E. Husserl., *Ideen I* in *Hua* III/1, 270. “.Gemäß unseren Analysen haben eben die doxischen Modalitäten und darunter in besonderer weise die doxische Urthesis, die der Glaubensgewißheit, den einzigartigen Vorzug, daß ihre positionale Potentialität die ganze Bewußtseinssphäre übergreift. Wesensgesetzlich kann jede Thesis, welcher Gattung immer, vermöge der zu ihrem Wesen unaufhebbar gehörigen doxischen Charakterisierungen in aktuelle doxische Setzung umgewandelt werden.”
84. *Ibid.*, 272.
85. Consciousness is here presumed to be active, that is, a thematizing consciousness actively attending to some objectivity. However, this mode of attentiveness presupposes, as we shall see, a more fundamental level of “primary” passive intentional experiences.
86. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen I*, V. A371, 2n. See also n97 in this chapter.
87. Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*. Hrsg. von R. Ingarden. 1968.
88. R. Ingarden. “Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson. Darstellung und Versuch einer Kritik.” Inaugural Dissertation. Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1921.
89. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 123.
90. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 121.
91. *Hua* III/1, 181f.
92. The lectures, “On the Phenomenology of Time,” concluded a four-part course Husserl delivered in Göttingen during the month of February, 1905. The full title of the course was titled “Main Topics from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.” The specific time lectures were published in 1929 as “Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.” Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 9. Halle a.d.S: Max Niemeyer, 1928, 367–498. See also: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*. Husserliana X. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus

- Nijhoff, 1969. English translations include: (i) *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893–1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough and edited by Martin Heidegger. Husserliana Collected Works: Volume 4. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; and (ii) *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893–1917). Translated by J.S. Churchill and edited by Martin Heidegger. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1964.; see also (iii) “The Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 1905.” Translated by James. S. Churchill. McCormick, Peter and Elliston, Frederick A. eds. *Husserl: Shorter Works*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 277–88.
93. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 116.
  94. Indeed, by the time of Ingarden’s dissertation work, Husserl was already well aware of the “bedeviling circle, <that> original time-constituting experiences are themselves in time.” (E. Husserl. *Briefe an Ingarden*, 122.)
  95. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 123.
  96. “The breakthrough to this genetic phenomenology did not occur first, as is often thought, in the lecture on “transcendental logic” from the Winter Semester of 1920 but rather already in the Bernau manuscripts of 1917/18. “ (Rudolf Bernet, “Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewußtseins in Husserls Bernauer Manuskripten.” In *Die erscheinende Welt. Festschrift für Klaus Held*. Hrsg. von Heinrich Hüni und Peter Trawny. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, 553.)
  - \* E. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1918–1926). Hrsg. von M. Fleischer. *Husserliana* XI. Den Haag 1966.
  97. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. I, V. A371.
  98. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 128.
  99. E. Husserl. *Logische Untersuchungen* I, V. A388.
  100. *Ibid.*, A390.
  101. *Ibid.*, A387.
  102. *Ibid.*, A390.
  103. *Ibid.*, A362.
  104. Cf. note 52 in this chapter.
  105. E. Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung 1898–1925*. Hrsg. von Eduard Marbach. *Husserliana* XXIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. 265–66.
  106. Rudolf Bernet, “Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud.” In *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*. Edited by Donn Welton. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 207.
  107. *Hua* III/1, S. 195.
  108. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 126n.
  109. *Hua* III/1, 191–92.
  110. Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1964, 142.
  111. R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 109.
  112. R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 178. NB: It remains a question whether the passive sphere of temporal constitution, which is the precondition of any subjective performance, can itself rightly be characterized as a performance. Hence Sokolowski adds elsewhere: “Constitution of immanent objects is achieved by a performance of subjectivity; not in the sense of a distinct act which constitutes them but in the sense of a constant, creative stream of partial intentions or phases that are added together, one upon the other in retention, until a complete object arises. This spontaneity of consciousness is automatic and necessary. The process of immanent constitution replaces Husserl’s dualistic schema of the *Logical Investigations*,

- which uses the distinction between intentional and material moments.” R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 99.
113. For a discussion of the compositional structure of the Bernau manuscripts, see R. Bruzina’s fifth chapter “Fundamental Thematics II: Time” in his book *Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. (New Haven: Yale University Press) 2004, 224–319.
  114. See T. Kortooms, *Phenomenology of Time. Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time-Consciousness*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers) 2002, 107–223.
  115. Dan Zahavi, “Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts.” *Husserl Studies* 20 (2004): 106.
  116. *Ibid.*, 104.
  117. E. Husserl. *Die Bernauer Manuskripte*, Hua XXXIII, 110.
  118. D. Zahavi, “Time and Consciousness,” 100.
  119. *Hua* XXXIII, 410.
  120. *Ibid.*, 175.
  121. *Ibid.*, 113.
  122. *Ibid.*, 165.
  123. D. Zahavi. “Time and Consciousness,” 108.
  124. *Hua* XXXIII, 185. “Die phänomenologische Zeit ist die umfassende Form individueller Erlebnisse, die für das phänomenologische Subjekt gegeben sind durch andere “Erlebnisse”, sagen wir, durch ein tieferes strömendes Leben, in dem jene zeitlichen Erlebnisse in fließenden Gegebenheitsweisen “erscheinen”. Sind diese wieder Zeitlichkeiten—wie kann in der phänomenologischen Zeit die sie selbst zur Gegebenheit bringende Zeitlichkeit Platz haben? Und nun gar in einer Stufenfolge *in infinitum*. Haben wir unendlich viele Zeiten aufeinander getürmt?”
  125. R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 98.
  126. E. Husserl, “Preface.” In E. Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” modified 73.
  127. Although unclear, Cairns is likely referring to Fritz Kaufmann here. Fr. Kaufmann was one of Husserl’s students from Freiburg and wrote his dissertation in 1924 on aesthetic theory. He became quite close to Husserl in the thirties, although he also was heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology.
  128. Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, 43.
  129. “While he [Becker] was immediately fascinated by Heidegger, he stayed close enough to Husserl to conduct the phenomenological seminars for beginners as his assistant after Heidegger had left for Marburg in 1923.” (H. Spiegelberg. *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*. 3<sup>rd</sup> revised ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, 247.)
  130. Edmund Husserl. *Die ‘Bernauer Manuskripte’ über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18)*. Edited by Rudolf Bernet & Dieter Lohmar. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
  131. It is somewhat misleading to speak of *Husserliana* XXXIII and the “L” manuscripts as co-extensive—as is sometimes done. The manuscripts that make up the “L” group are divided into two classes: I and II. Very few of the manuscripts in this latter class are published in *Husserliana* XXXIII.
  132. *Hua* XXXIII, xxxi.
  133. In a letter to Alexandre Koyre dated June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1931, Husserl refers to “a large time investigation.” (*HuDo* III/3, 360) This is the ‘Bernau collection of texts from 1917 which he hoped to publish with the help of Eugen Fink by Christmas. Six months later he writes to William Boyce Gibson that “the time-investigation (*sic.*) of 1917 and other valuable supplements by Dr. Fink”

- may possibly be printed in the (never) published 12<sup>th</sup> volume of the *Jahrbuch* (*HuDo* III/6, 142). After this, the project changes—with a more prominent role taken over by Fink. Husserl notes to Roman Ingarden and then a month later in his letter to Gibson again that the Bernau manuscripts and Fink's 2<sup>nd</sup> part are planned for the *Jahrbuch* (*HuDo* III/3, 283). This seems still to be the plan as of November 7, 1932, according to indications Husserl made to Ludwig Landgrebe (*HuDo* III/4, 297). In 1933, we find the first indication that Husserl planned to publish the time-investigations under double authorship with Fink (*HuDo* III/4, 197); and on November 15<sup>th</sup> he writes to Dorion Cairns that the time manuscript “has been nearly finished by Dr. Fink.” (*HuDo* III/4, 33). Just about this time the title of the complete project is clearly identified as a two volume work entitled “Time and Temporalization” (Cf. Husserl to Jan Patočka, December 8, 1933 in *HuDo* III/4, 319). In this last letter, Husserl suggests that the “Bernau manuscripts require ‘modernization’” still (*Ibid.*). There are several more letters by Husserl wherein the “Time and Temporalization” project is discussed. Especially important is the letter to Fink of July 21<sup>st</sup>, 1934 in which he indicates that the work on time “will finally be your work though on the basis of the manuscripts extracted by you as a starting point (*HuDo* III/4, 94.)” On November 24<sup>th</sup>, 1934 Husserl writes to Roman Ingarden that “the introduction to the 1<sup>st</sup> volume of the time-work has been quite seriously transformed by a regressive consideration of the historical attempt of a theory of time. It is almost a whole book now. But it is a beautiful work and really quite fundamental (*HuDo* III/3, 298).” Finally on June 18<sup>th</sup>, 1937, Husserl writes to Marvin Farber in order to give an indication of the publication plans for “the 1<sup>st</sup> volume of the work on the origin of time (by Dr. Fink and E. Husserl—that is to say, on the basis of my manuscripts from 1905–1935 but worked up independently by Dr. Fink) . . .” (*HuDo* III/4, 83).” Although not quite clear, it seems evident that Husserl gave greater and greater freedom to Fink to work up the time manuscripts, eventually turning the entire project over to his “extraordinary co-thinker” (Husserl to Gustav Albrecht, October 7<sup>th</sup>, 1934 *HuDo* III/9, 105). For a fuller explication of this history of the Bernau manuscripts and the cooperative effort by Fink and Husserl to work up a major new publication, see Bruzina, Ronald. *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004, 224ff.
134. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*. Hrsg. v. Ronald Bruzina, Eugen Fink. Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung III, Band 3/2, Bernauer Manuskripte, Cartesianische Meditationen und System der phänomenologischen Philosophie. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, (*forthcoming*).
  135. “E. Fink’s drafts of an arrangement for the edition of the Bernau time-manuscripts from the first phase of editing—thus *before* the entire redaction and the *new* book manuscript, “Time and Temporality,” which were to contain only a few of Husserl’s texts manuscript texts.” (E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 349 (*forthcoming*)).
  136. Cf. “Einleitung der Herausgeber,” *Hua* XXXIII, xxixf.
  137. See Appendix: “Draft Arrangements for Edmund Husserl’s Time Investigations. Cf. “Beilage I,” in E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*. Band 3/2, 349–354 (*forthcoming*). See also R. Bruzina, *Beginning and Ends*, p. 548 n. 71 and 224–288.
  138. This course, *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis* [Main topics from phenomenology and theory of knowledge], was actually designed in four parts. These are: “Über Wahrnehmung” [“On perception”], “Über Aufmerksamkeit, spezifische Meinung etc.” [“On attention, specific meaning etc.”], “Phantasie und Bildbewußtsein” [“Phantasy

- and image-consciousness"], and “Zur Phänomenologie der Zeit” [“On the phenomenology of time”]. As is clear from the preceding, only the fourth part of this course is of particular interest here. See *Hua X*, xiv.
139. Edmund Husserl. *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893–1917). Hrsg. v. Rudolf Boehm. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke X*. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
  140. Edmund Husserl. *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte*. Hrsg. v. Dieter Lohmar. *Husserliana: Materialien VIII*. New York: Springer, 2006. Though these writings have only recently been published, there is a good deal known about them already. Two volumes of Husserl’s *Werke* include investigations from the “C” manuscripts. These include: (i) Edmund Husserl. *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, 3. Teil: 1929–1935*. Hrsg. v. Iso Kern. *Husserliana XV*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. (ii) E. Husserl. *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935)*. Hrsg. v. Sebastian Luft. *Husserliana XXXIV*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Further, Klaus Held published his dissertation work in 1966 in which he cited heavily from Husserl’s late “C” manuscripts. Cf. Held, Klaus. *Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
  141. Because of their late inclusion in the archive and because they were only published in 2001, there is presently a small but growing body of scholarship on their content. Indeed, the subject matter of these investigations constitutes a vital area in the present day scholarship of Husserl’s works.
  142. This planned volume was never produced.
  143. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 67.
  144. R. Ingarden, “Besuch bei Husserl im Herbst 1927.” In Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 154–5.
  145. This characterization implies that Fink and Stein shared identical or similar duties as Husserl’s assistants, and this is admittedly misleading. Fink was given much more latitude to rework and rewrite Husserl’s earlier manuscripts than Stein was ever allowed. So the difference in their duties is one of kind as much as of degree. There are a host of reasons for this difference, which cannot be adequately addressed here. However, we should say that for all intents and purposes Fink became a co-worker with Husserl on the time project (and other projects) in a way that Stein never did.
  146. We are admittedly telescoping the history of the Husserl’s and Fink’s time project here and, in some respects, presenting only one side of the story. For a more detailed discussion of the three-stage history of this project as it progressed during the thirties, see Bruzina, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink*, pp. 30ff and all of chapter 5 of his work.
  147. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, 171.
  148. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*. Bd. 3/2, 349 (*forthcoming*).
  149. Ron Bruzina has painstakingly constructed a key that ties the texts of Fink’s arrangement with the materials published in *Husserliana XXXIII* (and other volumes in the series). This reconstruction can be found in Beilage I of E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*. Band 3/2, (*forthcoming*).
  150. R. Bruzina, *Beginnings and Ends*, 262.
  151. E. Fink, Fünf lose Blätter zur Zeitproblematik.” E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 443 (*forthcoming*).
  152. E. Husserl, *Briefe*, 171.
  153. *Hua III/1*, 123.
  154. *Hua III/2*, 562f.



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155. Cf. note 57 in the preceding chapter.
156. E. Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. Hua X*, 75.
157. "Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. A transcendental ground must therefore be found for the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also of the concepts of objects in general, consequently also of all objects of experience, without which it would be impossible to think of any object for our intuitions; for the latter is nothing more than the something for which the concept expresses such a necessity of synthesis." (Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of pure reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, (A106) 232.)
158. E. Husserl, *Ideen I, Hua III/1*, 123. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (B132) 246.
159. E. Fink, "Beilage I: Finks Dispositionsentwürfe zur Edition der Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte." *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 352 (*forthcoming*).
160. This is found in Beilage XIX and text Nr. 22 of *Hua XXXIII*.
161. "Ms. E<sub>I</sub> über Erinnerung als Voraussetzung der Vergleichung und Identifizierung. Evidenz der Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der Erinnerung. Phänomene der Wiederholung von Erinnerungen. L II 11/1a, 9–23; vgl. A III 11/64a." *Husserl-Chronik*, 221.
162. *Hua XXXIII*, 370.
163. E. Husserl, *Ideen I. Hua III/1*, 48.
164. *Hua XXXIII*, 371.
165. E. Husserl. *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. II. Teil. Hua XIX/2*, 706.
166. *Hua XXXIII*, 276.
167. E. Fink. "Beilage I: Finks Dispositionsentwürfe zur Edition der Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte." E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2 (*forthcoming*).
168. Cited in note 1 of this chapter.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. *HuDo III/7*, 222.
2. Cf. Chapter 1, note 65.
3. Husserl to Roman Ingarden, December 21, 1930 in *HuDo III/3*, 269–70.
4. Cf. Chapter 2, note 56.
5. "WS 1920/21. Husserl holds a lecture entitled *Logic*, Mon, Wed, Thur, Fri 5–6" (K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 243.)
6. "SS 1923. Husserl repeats (and had *unfortunately reworked*) the lecture of WS 1920/21 on 'Transcendental logic.'" (K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 269.) NB: Schuhmann, then, provides a brief account of the major revisions introduced by Husserl during this rendition of the lecture on "transcendental logic."
7. "WS 1925/26. Husserl repeats, as he had done in the Summer Semester of 1923, the lecture from the Winter Semester 1920/21 on 'Transcendental Logic.'" (K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 295.) NB: As Schuhmann notes in the *Chronik*, this course was not a mere repetition of either of the two preceding courses. Schuhmann thus goes on to articulate briefly the changes introduced by Husserl in this rendition of the course.
8. Two remarks need to be made here. First, in the early twenties, Husserl published three significant essays on the theme of renewal in the Japanese



publication, *Kaizo*. These articles were not published in Germany during Husserl's lifetime, though. In fact, only one was published in German. Second, this last date is technically misleading. In reality, Husserl published the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and his 1905 time-investigations before his retirement, but only just. The French translation of the *Cartesian Meditations*, although based on lectures presented earlier, was not printed until 1931. 1927/28 were not necessarily years of greatly increased writing by Husserl, but they were years during which Husserl significantly expanded his total published output.

9. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated by Anthony Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 5.
10. *Ibid.*, 32.
11. *Ibid.*
12. "The preparations toward a 'great systematic work' from 1921/22 are very extensive, but they do not contain a single piece which is ready for publication." (I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XIV, xx.)
13. Husserl often worked as if in a trance—writing page upon page without any attempt to number them as he worked or even to keep them in the order in which they were written. The work of organization he left to his assistants.
14. I. Kern. "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XIV, xxiii-iv.
15. Three recent books deserve special attention here as they are all ostensibly devoted to Husserl's system of phenomenology. These are: (i) *Belief and its Neutralization* by Marcus Brainard, (ii) *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie. Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink* by Sebastian Luft, and (iii) *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938* by Ronald Bruzina. In his *Belief and its Neutralization*, Marcus Brainard offers an introduction to phenomenology by virtue of "a structural analysis of and commentary on the first of *Ideas* . . . with a view to showing the essential features of the whole of Husserlian thought." (*Belief and its Neutralization. Husserl's System of Phenomenology in Ideas I*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, xvii-xviii) Brainard's monograph represents a misstep, in our opinion, because the problem of the formal structuring principle of noetic-noematic correlation, i.e., phenomenological time, has been left out of play in *Ideas I*. Hence Brainard's work may represent an admirable introduction to *Ideas I*, but when considering its central intent it fails. In his *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie. Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), Sebastian Luft presents a work much in common with the thesis presented in our own study and complements our efforts here. He offers an explication of the systematic and methodology of phenomenology by a detailed analysis of Eugen Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. Unfortunately, Luft entirely leaves out any consideration of Husserl's earlier systematic work when considering Fink's *Habilitationsschrift*, which in our view makes the systematizing orientation of Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* appear disharmonious with Husserl's original line of thinking. The last work, Ronald Bruzina's *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004) stands in the greatest harmony with this work—for obvious reasons. Bruzina explains his goal in the work as follows: "we shall be following the working of the 'system' itself in the main writings at hand (Husserl's and Fink's). . . ." (Bruzina, *Husserl and Fink*, 89) Bruzina's work has a much greater ambition than that found here.

We seek, rather, not to follow the working of the “system” in the detail that Bruzina lays out in his book, but rather more so as sketching the pre-history of the “system” of phenomenological philosophy with the hope of making understandable the radicality of the architectonic in its final (unfinished) drafts.

16. Husserl to Roman Ingarden, November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1921 in *HuDo* III/3, 213. Also cited in Chapter 7, n7.
17. Husserl to Paul Natorp, February 1, 1922 in *HuDo* III/5, 151–52. Cf. note 104 in chapter one.
18. Husserl to Gustav Albrecht, September, 1922. Quoted by Iso Kern in his “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” *Hua* XIV, xxi. This particular letter is not found in the published collection of Husserl letters or *Briefwechsel*, Band IX. *Familienbriefe*.
19. See chapter 2, note 130.
20. See chapter 2, note 132 & 133.
21. Iso Kern, “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” *Hua* XIV, xviii.
22. Husserl, E, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926*. Hrsg. v. Margot Fleischer. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke XI. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
23. The essay is extracted from bundle containing 33 pages of materials in the folder designated B III 10. This particular essay had been numbered pages 1–8 by Husserl and is located in pages 22–30 of the folder, respectively. The title of the folder is “Genesis. 1921. New supplements. Static and genetic phenomenological method. Innateness. Genesis of apperceptions. Most universal concept of apperceptions. 1921.” (*Hua* XI, 510.)
24. E. Husserl. *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated by Anthony Steinbock. Husserliana: Collected Works IX. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 628–629.
25. There is some ambiguity in Husserl’s use of the word “ontology,” as he distinguishes between “material” ontologies and a “formal” ontology. “To every regionally enclosed sphere of individual being in the widest sense logical sense belongs an ontology, e.g., to physical nature belongs an ontology of nature, to animality belongs an ontology of animality. All these disciplines, whether already formed or at first postulated, falls into disuse [*verfallen*] with the reduction. The material ontologies stand apart from ‘formal’ ontology (together with the formal logic of significations), to which belongs the quasi-region ‘any object whatsoever.’ (E. Husserl. *Ideen* I, *Hua* III/1, 126.) By ontology, most especially material ontology, Husserl is thus referring to a sphere of being (*onta*) constituted as a correlate to the harmonious and discontinuous syntheses of intentions taking place in transcendental consciousness. Obviously in this passage, the sense of ontological investigation extends to the constitution of the transcendental stream of consciousness as the necessary original setting “within” which every individual being is constituted. “Transcendental phenomenology is the pure and transcendental science of all conceivable being; thus it provides the *logos* to all *onta*; it is *ontology* in the genuine sense of the term.” (Kockelmans, Joseph. *Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology*, 254.) This conception of ontology stands in sharp contrast to the Heideggerian articulation of the questioning of being that lies at the heart of *Being and Time*. “Being lies in that-being and what-being, in reality, that which stands to the fore [*Vorhandenheit*], subsistence [*Bestand*], holding forth [*Geltung*], being-there, in the “it is” [“es gibt”].” By *which* entities shall the sense of being be gleaned, from which beings shall the disclosing of being takes its departure?” (Heidegger, M. *Sein und Zeit*, 7.) Heidegger thus critiques

Husserl's ontology as derivative in relation to the fundamental questioning necessary to make sense of such "innerworldly" being. (Cf. Heidegger, *M. Being and Time*, translated by J. Stambaugh, 91.) Husserl argues, on the contrary, that this very questioning of being posed by Heidegger must occur on the basis of the phenomenological investigation of genesis as that indicated here. In a marginal note to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Husserl suggests Heidegger's mistake in undertaking a fundamental ontology. "Heidegger transposes or changes the constitutive-phenomenological clarification of all regions of entities and universals, of the total region of the world, into the anthropological; the whole problematic is shifted over: corresponding to the ego there is Dasein, etc. In that way everything becomes ponderously unclear, and philosophically loses its value." (E. Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger* (1927–931), 284.

26. Husserl's articulation here of a "descriptive" and "explanatory" phenomenology may find its precursor in the distinction of psychological methodologies explicated by Wilhelm Dilthey in the latter's *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*. On the other hand, the distinction Husserl is drawing here may reach back rather to Franz Brentano's *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*. According to Dilthey, an explanatory psychology takes as its model the generalizing method of the natural sciences. The method of a descriptive psychology, on the contrary, proceeds from the experienced unity of consciousness and seeks to analyze this whole in order to make clear the structural relation among the parts. "In understanding, we proceed from the interconnection of the whole which is livingly given to us in order to make comprehensible to us the particulars out of this whole." (W. Dilthey, *GS V*, 172.) In his *Psychology*, Brentano refers to the classification of the various psychic phenomena as a descriptive psychology, whereas an explanatory or genetic psychology provides an account of the regular coming-to-be and passing-away of psychic phenomena. Though Husserl was strongly influenced by Dilthey's psychological writings, it appears that his language here rests on Brentano's more than Dilthey's. However, there is no direct evidence to corroborate this view.
27. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, *HuCW IX*, 629.
28. Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995, 37.
29. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, *HuCW IX*, modified 634.
30. *Hua XIV*, 34–42. Translated in E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, 635–645, *HuCW IX*, (title modified).
31. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 249.
32. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, *HuCW IX*, 630.
33. *Ibid.*, 635.
34. *Ibid.*, 630.
35. *Ibid.*, 634.
36. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua XIV*, xxi.
37. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, *HuCW IX*, 640. See also my "Appendix: Systems of phenomenological philosophy."
38. *Ibid.*
39. Husserl to F. Darkow, February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1921 in *HuDo III/9*, 163–64.
40. *Ibid.*, 168.

41. E. Husserl, *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23*. Hrsg. v. Berndt Goossens. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke XXXV. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
42. (i) E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*. Hrsg. v. Rudolf Boehm. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke VII. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956; (ii) E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Hrsg. v. Rudolf Boehm. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke VIII. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
43. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XIV, xxvii.
44. E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, *Hua* IX, 69.
45. Cf. chapter 2, note 136.
46. "The immediate impetus for this change of plans <from work on the German edition of the *Cartesian Meditations* to ideas of a large systematic basic work, a new "system of phenomenological philosophy"> consists, however, probably less in any difficulties <associated with his work on the *Meditations*> than in Husserl's reading of Georg Misch's *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie*." (I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XV, xlii.)
47. Reproduced by Iso Kern in *Hua* XIV, xxixff. "1) *Empathy, alter ego*. Second phenomenological reduction (to intersubjectivity), 1922. Appearances of spirit. 2) Memory and *empathy*. Reproduction and phantasy in relation to position-takings. 3) Phenomenology and ontology. The new conception and the older conception of transcendental leading clues. 4) Idea of the transcendental aesthetic and the natural concept of the world."
48. Cf. *Hua* XIV, xxx.
49. According to Iso Kern, the typewritten "arrangement to the 'system of phenomenological philosophy' presumably stems from 1930. Guy van Kerckhoven, editor of *Husserliana Dokumente* II/, VI. *Cartesianische Meditation. Ergänzungsband*, indicates on the other hand that Husserl's copy may have been written in 1929. (*HuDo* II/2, 291.) However, it is clear by the annotations attached to typewritten and handwritten copies of the "arrangement" that Husserl and Fink worked together on the plan in 1930 and early 1931.
50. See Appendix: The Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy.
51. Cf. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XV, xl. "Dieses "zweite Buch" nimmt aber nur frühere Husserlsche Pläne wieder auf: seinen Plan eines Werkes von 1926, nach dem Husserl auch von der Analyse der "reinen Erfahrungswelt" aus (einen Analyse, für die er den Titel der "transzendentalen Ästhetik" verwendete) und über die reine Psychologie zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie führen wollte, sowie den Plan von Ende 1929, demgemäß er der deutschen Ausgabe der *Cartesianischen Meditationen* "eine zweite Einleitung, die die Klärung der Idee einer personalen (geisteswissenschaftlich gerichteten) und naturalen Anthropologie und Psychologie zum Ausgangsproblem nimmt", beizufügen vorhatte."
52. The various plans for the "system of phenomenological philosophy" are reproduced *in toto* in Appendix 3: "Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy."
53. See chapter 1.
54. The best example of this sort of work can be found in Ronald Bruzina's *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink*. However, Bruzina's work achieves more than merely an explication of the 1931 system.
55. We should recall that Misch published the work in three installments between 1929 and 1931. It became clear to Husserl from the first installment, however, that the object of Misch's critique was Husserl's transcendental phenomenology primarily.

56. In the Summer of 1929, Husserl closely read Heidegger's *Being and Time*, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, and the essay "The Essence of Ground."
57. Husserl to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931. In *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*, 482.
58. "The *basic character of the new phenomenology*, which is itself not titled life-philosophy, is, though, in the preservation of the genuine ancient sense of philosophy as universal sciences life-philosophy. . . . The basic character of phenomenology is thus *scientific* life-philosophy." (E. Husserl, *Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1927*. Hrsg. v. Michael Weiler. *Hua* XXXII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, 240–41.)
59. E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937)*. Hrsg. v. Thomas Nenon u. Hans Reiner Sepp. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke XXVII*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, 177.
60. *Ibid.*
61. Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, December 26, 1927 in *HuDo* III/3, 462. Quoted also in Chapter 2, n141.
62. L. Landgrebe, "Das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Lebens und die Phänomenologie Husserls." *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968, 17. Landgrebe's essay is the only explicit defense of Husserl's phenomenology against Misch's criticisms actually published during Husserl's lifetime. The author of this present work owes much to Landgrebe's formulation of the problem.
63. Cf. chapter 2, notes 1 and 2.
64. His correspondence with Misch makes this clear. Husserl specifically mentions the first installment of *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* in his letter to Misch of June 27, 1929. On August 3<sup>rd</sup> of that same year, he thanks Misch for the second installment. Then on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1930, Husserl writes a short note of thanks for the 3<sup>rd</sup> and final installment. But it is not until November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1930 that Husserl responds in full to Misch.
65. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua* XV, xlvii.
66. Husserl to Georg Misch, November 16, 1930 in *HuDo* III/6, 282–283.
67. Husserl to Roman Ingarden, December 21, 1930 in *HuDo* III/3, 269.
68. Cited in chapter 2, notes 33 and 72.
69. E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, *HuCW* IX, 627.
70. See note 47 in this chapter. It seems likely that Husserl would have suggested the inclusion of the 1926 plan into the new draft, though there is no direct evidence to this effect.
71. "Thus through the reduction the *proper theme of philosophy* is revealed: the *transcendental constitution of the world* in the syntheses and unity-formations, the habitualities and potentialities of transcendental life, which as such displays the unity of an intersubjectivity of monads that is communalized in the process of constitution." (E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 10.)
72. "Deconstructive analysis" as used here is a translation of a phrase specifically found in Fink's second draft plan of the system, "*Abbau-Analyse*." "Determination and delimitation of the concept of static-regressive phenomenology: this as an explication of transcendental subjectivity in so far as it is a correlate of the pre-given world. Progressive phenomenology as attacking the *present-perfectness* [*Perfektivität*] of transcendental life. Regressive analysis as deconstructive-analysis; progressive analysis as constructive-analysis. [*Regressive Analyse als Abbau-Analyse; progressive als Aufbau-Analyse*]." (E. Fink, *VI Cartesianische Meditation, Teil*

- 2 *Ergänzungsband*, 7.) Obviously, deconstruction is an important concept in Derrida's philosophy. I am neither asserting nor denying a connection between the conception of a regressive analysis of sense expressed here by Fink and that of deconstructive analysis articulated by Derrida. To make either assertion requires a study far exceeding the range of this present work. If such a study were undertaken, however, this would seem the obvious point of departure.
73. "In accord with this *double-sidedness* in egological concreteness, two directions are prescribed for the project of constitutive inquiry: a constitutive analytic of the *flowing life of experience* (*static phenomenology*), and the constitutive inquiry back into the sedimented performative life that is implied in present actuality-held *habitualities* (*genetic phenomenology*)." (E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 6.)
  74. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 11.
  75. "But "static" as well as "genetic" phenomenology is solely the expression for the two directions of constitutive regressive questioning from the facticity of the I disclosed in the reduction." (E. Fink, *VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Teil 2: Ergänzungsband. HuDo II/2*, 237.)
  76. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 7.
  77. See the 3<sup>rd</sup> section of Fink's draft plan, section A.a. in Appendix 3: Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy.
  78. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 11.
  79. *Ibid.*, 7.
  80. Fink also wrote a draft of the first section in Book I of the plan entitled "The beginning of philosophy," which Husserl read carefully. In a note which Husserl attached to the Fink's draft plan for the "system," he lays out what appears to be an alternate outline of the first section of the Book. (E. Fink. *VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Zweiter Band. Ergänzungsband*, 4 n2.) This note is reproduced in the appendix to this work, "Systems of Phenomenological Philosophy, n2." If we compare the draft plan of the "system" against Fink's manuscript, we can, of course, note certainly similarities in orientation. However, as Husserl is correct to note, Fink does not really follow the outline in his manuscript but rather takes off a different direction. Thus Husserl's alternate outline in the attached note is, in fact, an outline of Fink's draft manuscript. It seems Husserl wanted to document the course of Fink's investigations as they were written in the draft manuscript. Whether this alternate outline would then form part of another draft plan for the "system" remains unclear. Nevertheless, Fink's draft manuscript of the first subsections of the "system" suggests a divergence with the intent codified in the draft plans.
  81. Husserl to Roman Ingarden, December 21, 1930 in *HuDo III/3*, 270.
  82. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua XV*, xlii.
  83. *Ibid.*, xlii n1.
  84. Husserl to R. Ingarden, December 21, 1930 in *Hua III/3*, 270.
  85. *Ibid.*, 269.
  86. I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," *Hua XV*, xlv.
  87. Husserl to Adolf Grimme, March 5th, 1931 in *HuDo III/3*, 90.
  88. Husserl to Adolf Grimme, February 3, 1932 in *HuDo III/3*, 93.
  89. Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, October 17, 1932 in *HuDo III/3*, 485.
  90. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 312.
  91. By this expression, which originates with Fink, we are anticipating elements of our discussion below. See note 111 in this chapter.
  92. Cf. chapter 3, note 91. See also chapter 2, notes 86 and 87.
  93. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 326.



94. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 321.
95. Cf. chapter 3, note 33.
96. Gottlob Frege, "Review of Dr. E. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic." In *Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations*, edited by J.N. Mohanty. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, 6–21. See also the "Frege-Husserl Correspondence" in *Husserl and Frege*, edited by J.N. Mohanty. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, 117–29.
97. The story of Husserl's gradual but explicit rejection of psychologism can be found in J. N. Mohanty's definitive study, *Husserl and Frege* (*op. cit.*). In this work, Mohanty shows quite clearly that Husserl came to reject psychologism as a result of theses implicit in his own early work rather than, as was often asserted, in response to the methodological criticisms proposed by Frege.
98. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* I, *Hua* XVIII, 71.
99. See Chapter 3, note 107.
100. Not all the translators of *Ideas* have followed Husserl's lead here. Throughout his translation of *Ideas* I, Fred Kersten opted to use the phrase "mental process" for the German word, *Erlebnis*. Experience is a more natural choice. Many prefer "lived experience" for *Erlebnis* since this gets at the sense of an experience acquired by living through something—which the German suggests. Though one can understand Kersten's rationale for his choice, the phrase "mental process" puts back into the *Ideas* precisely what Husserl wished to extricate from his presentation of the reduction as codified there. If anything, *Ideas* I suggests a far stronger anti-psychologism than any work preceding it. This is especially true because of the strict avoidance of psychological terms in that text. Psychologism is an ever present danger for phenomenology, since it is so easy to construe the acts of transcendental consciousness which the phenomenologist describes as real psychical process. As Husserl says, "one *needs* new terms, therefore, in order precisely to avoid this danger." [E. Husserl. *Ideen* I. *Hua* III/1, 49.] It is for this reason quite unfortunate that Kersten's translation re-introduces this danger.
101. Cf. chapter 1, notes 6 and 7.
102. Cf. chapter 2, note 99.
103. As noted earlier, this is a view which he renounces in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, published in 1913.
104. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *Hua* XIX/1, 374.
105. Paul Natorp, *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*, 11f, quoted in Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, *Hua* XIX/1, 372–373.
106. "There are not (ignoring certain exceptional cases here) two matters psychically present. It is not that the object is experienced and then the intentional act which is directed to it. There are not even two matters present in the sense of part and encompassing whole. There is rather only one matter present here: the intentional experience whose essential descriptive character is precisely the relational intention." (E. Husserl. *Logische Untersuchungen*. *Hua* XIX/1, 386.)
107. E. Husserl, *Hua* X, 253.
108. When looking to Husserl's work later in this same decade, the persistence of these questions regarding the temporality of I-subjectivity and its objects here is palatable. For instance, how individuality of the *I* is related to phenomenological individuality, is the subject matter of Husserl's 1910/11 lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.
109. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, *Hua* II, 7.
110. *Hua* III/1, 5. The angle brackets indicate additions Husserl wrote into the margins of his own text. See *Hua* III/2, 479.



111. This world-constituting subjectivity disclosed by the method of phenomenological reductions paradoxically enjoys, as constituting origin of world-being, itself, a radically non-human character while, in the same breath, so to speak, an enworlded status as concrete worldly humanity. However, this last insight remains, at best, undeveloped in Husserl's introduction of 1913. However, if we look to his last writings, this idea comes clearly to the fore. "The concrete ego is not constituted simply as individual man, as I-man, without more ado; instead, enworlding, which lies within world-constitution, consists in this, that in the ego, the I-center of all constitution, the I of the acts functioning in it, a primordial universal sphere is concentrated as a performance-unity specifically belonging to it, but that also in the ego, on the basis of this primordiality and by virtue of the "empathetic movements" belonging to it, a horizon of presentified primordialities and I-centers which comes to acquire acceptedness in being [*Seinsgeltung*] in the mode of other subjects, co-subjects, comes to constitution and in this way then becomes on its part a founding agent always capable of constituting the objective world. The ego can only have being [*Dasein*] in the world as something in human form that has the world, as I-man, I-person with psychic being, in such a way that in the ego the division of constituting being and living as primordial in primal modality and as alien, as other, has been accomplished and is always being accomplished, that in the ego a transcendental intersubjectivity, a universe of monads is constituted, which for its part is constituting in relation to the world." (E. Husserl. Marginal Notation to Eugen Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. Translated by Ronald Bruzina. 107 n374.)
112. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 4.
113. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* I, Hua XVIII, 9.
114. *Ibid.*
115. Maurice Alexander Natanson, *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
116. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 312.
117. The context suggests that Fink is referring to the Bernau time-investigations specifically here.
118. E. Fink, *Phänomenologische Werkstatt*, Bd. 3/2, 318.
119. E. Husserl, "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel (Vierte, letzte Fassung). In Kockelman, Joseph J. *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1994, 302.
120. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 10.
121. *Ibid.*, modified 1.
122. *Ibid.*, 7–8.
123. *Ibid.*, 97.
124. *Ibid.*, 62–63.
125. "The higher levels of phenomenological analysis lead us to problems of phenomenological construction, the construction of phenomenological hypotheses." (D. Cairns, "Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 25/11/31," *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, p. 52.)
126. Husserl to Rudolf Pannwitz, November 28th/29th, 1934. Cited in note 1 of this chapter.
127. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 8.
128. Husserl suggests "pure immanent" as substitute for "inner."
129. Husserl suggests the insertion of the following: for it discovers the horizontal pregivenness of the world as the basis for this apodicticity.
130. E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, 47–48.
131. E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*. Translated by David Carr. modified 154.

## NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. "Die stehende Jetztform ist nicht anderes als die bleibende Funktionsgegenwart des transzendentalen Ich, "dessen Sein Jeweiligkeit in Form der *ständigen* Jeweiligkeit ist" [Ms. C 16 VI, S. 18 (1932)]. Die Form in der das bleibend identische und individuelle Ich auftritt und alles Begegnende mitaufzutreten läßt, ist das einzige stehende Jetzt [Cf. Ms. C 3 II, S. 2 (1930)].—Als strömende Phasenmanigfaltigkeit aber läßt das Ich das Begegnende aufgrund seines eigenen Strömens auftreten. Die stehenströmende Selbstgegenwart fundiert also die stehenströmende Weltgegenwart. (K. Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 83–4.)
2. In fact, Husserl came to question whether this primordial level of sense-constitution is truly intentional. During a conversation between Dorion Cairns, Husserl and Fink on July 15th, 1932, Husserl suggested that he "is inclined to give up calling innertime constitution 'intentionality.' . . . The stream of immanent time,—original 'now' and retained past,—is the *form* of all ego-activity and is objectified when the ego-activities themselves are intended in higher reflective acts. But as form it is not activity, and if we mean activity by intentionality, it is not an intentionality." (Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, 92–3.)
3. See chapter three, especially the section "The Bernau Manuscripts as Breakthrough to a New Level," for a fuller account of Sokolowski's view.
4. "It is true that Husserl by no means sees his concept of philosophy as transcendental phenomenology being totally invalidated because of these reflections; and we have argued that such invalidation does not follow from the new developments of the *Crisis*, at least in the sense envisaged by some of Husserl's critics. But the historical reflections do lead Husserl to the new concept of the life-world, which, as we have seen, constitutes a significant revision of the whole domain of phenomenological investigation and an implicit critique of Husserl's earlier work." (David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*, 181.)
5. "Because Husserl never explicitly formulated a generative phenomenology, it is necessary to undertake the phenomenological work of following out the leading clues that lead to generativity and the formulation of generative phenomenology." (A. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond*, 46–47.)
6. *Ibid.*, 260–61.
7. J.N. Mohanty, "The Unity of Husserl's Philosophy," 115 and 126.
8. Cf. Walter Biemel, "The decisive phases in the development of Husserl's philosophy." In *The Phenomenology of Husserl*, edited by R. O. Elveton. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 148–73.
9. Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart*, 5.
10. Two publications offer an approach to Husserl's writings commensurate with the lines laid out in this study. These are (i) Donn Welton's *The Other Husserl: the Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000, and (ii) *Alterity and Facticity: New Perspectives on Husserl*. Edited by Natalie Depraz and Dan Zahavi. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
11. E. Husserl, "Nachwort," *Hua V*, 161–2.
12. I am indebted to Bruno Snell for this neologism. Snell uses this as a descriptor of Odysseus, "who always knew a way out, and who overcame his helplessness by means of ingenious deeds." (Bruno Snell, "Rise of the Individual in Early Greek Lyric," 62.)
13. Alfred Tennyson, *Ulysses*. In *The Poetical Works of Tennyson*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974, 89.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX 1

- 1 Husserl's dissertation, "Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung (Vienna, 1882)" went unpublished, as far as is known.
- 2 Although Husserl's *Habilitationsschrift* was printed, it was not made available to a wide audience.
- 3 The title of this journal was changed to *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie* in 1901.
- 4 According to Karl Schuhmann, "Die Methode der Wesensforschung" was published in *Kaizo*, Heft 2, S. 107–116. (K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 278.)
- 5 According to Karl Schuhmann, "Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem" was published in *Kaizo*, Heft 3, S. 2–31. (K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 278.)

## NOTES TO APPENDIX 2

1. [Ed.] Misch took over Husserl's position of Professor *Extraordinarius* at Göttingen in 1917 after Husserl left for Freiburg, and he was promoted to Professor *Ordinarius* at Göttingen in 1919 after Heinrich Maier left for Berlin.
2. [Ed.] Probably the *Logical Investigations* from 1900/01. In 1905, Misch acquired the position of *Privatdozent* in Berlin and became Professor *Extraordinarius* in Marburg, 1911. (See also note 40 in the fifth letter below.—Trans.)
3. [Ed.] Adolf Reinach, 1883–1917, was one of Husserl's most promising students from the so-called Göttingen Circle whose life was cut tragically short on the battlefields of the first World War on November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1917. (See Reinach, A. "Concerning Phenomenology." Translation by Dallas Willard. *The Personalist* 50, no. 2 (1969), 194–221; or Husserl's obituaries of Reinach in *Hua*. XXV, 296–299 & 300–303—Trans.)
4. [Ed.] The mathematician Emmy Noether had sought her *Habilitation* in 1916 at Göttingen under David Hilbert. But Hilbert and the Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences faculty were unsuccessful due to the resistance of the Department of History and Philosophy. Noether was only able to habilitate after the collapse of German law in 1919. With the breakdown of the Kaiser's legal system came the cancellation of the Habilitation Ordinance, which only allowed men to habilitate.
5. [Ed.] Cf. Stein's recommendation by Husserl dated February 6<sup>th</sup>, 1919. (In Husserl, Edmund, Elisabeth Schuhmann, and Karl Schuhmann. *Briefwechsel. Die Freiburger Schule*. Vol. IV. The last line reads: "If an academic career is to open up for women, then I can recommend <Miss Stein> for admission to the very first position and most highly for *Habilitation*." [HuDo III/4, 549.]
6. [Ed.] See Stein's Dissertation from Freiburg, 1916, *On the problem of empathy*. Translated by Waltraut Stein. With a foreword by Erwin W. Straus. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1964.
7. [Ed.] Husserl and Clara Misch née Dilthey became acquainted when he visited Dilthey in Berlin 1905. Georg Misch married Clara in 1908.
8. [Ed.] In 1919, Herman Nohl took over Misch's chair as Professor *Extraordinarius* for practical philosophy with particular consideration for pedagogy. In 1922, Nohl obtained a newly opened chair of *Ordinarius* for Philosophy

- and Pedagogy. (Moritz Geiger was named as Ordinarius [*als persönlicher Ordinarius*] upon the opening of the chair of Extraordinarius.)
9. [Ed.] Husserl's student at Göttingen, Hans Lipps habilitated at Göttingen in the Summer Semester of 1921.
  10. [Ed.] David Katz was a student of the retired experimental psychologist, Georg Elias Müller and was also a member of the Göttingen Phenomenology Circle. Katz became Privatdozent at Göttingen in 1911. He remained there until 1922, at which time he took the position of Ordinarius at Rostock. He remained at Rostock until his dismissal in 1933. Müller's replacement at Göttingen in 1922 was Narziß Ach.
  11. [Ed.] Husserl's response lies inaccessible at present (in Misch's literary estate).
  12. [Ed.] Julius Stenzel wrote *Studies zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles. Arete und Diairesis*, Breslau 1917. He habilitated in Breslau in 1921. (Cf. Stenzel's "Zum Problem der Philosophiegeschichte. Ein methodologischer Versuch," *Kant-Studien* 26 (1921): 416–453.)
  13. [Ed.] Herbert Smalenbach was a Privatdocent at Göttingen from 1920–1923 (after which he was an adjunct professor until 1931.)
  14. Also published in Misch 1967, 327–28.
  15. "Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger." (Misch 1929a.) [Ed.] This work was dedicated to Husserl on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. (Husserl turned seventy on April 8th, 1929.) Husserl's personal copy bears the inscription, "With reverential best wishes! Your humble GM. May 29."
  16. [Ed.] Paul Menzer, "Ein Brief Kants an Georg Samuel Albert Mellin," *Kant-Studien* 34 (1929), S. 265f.: "My old age, which in the upcoming months will see me past my 71<sup>st</sup> year, forces me unavoidably to be a veritable machine in regards to my own time-management, to which I must lose myself in certain writings without break until I have completed them."
  17. Each printer's sheet contains approximately 32 pages of text.
  18. [Ed.] *Festschrift Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet. (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Ergänzungsband)*, Halle (Salle) 1929.
  19. Also published in: Guy van Kerckhoven, "Die Grundsätze von Husserls Konfrontation mit Dilthey im Lichte der geschichtlichen Selbstzeugnisse.", in E. W. Orth (ed.), *Dilthey und der Wandel des Philosophiebegriffs seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg-München, 1984, 147–153.
  20. [Ed.] Only a copy of Dilthey's letter to Husserl from June 29<sup>th</sup> and July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1911, exists today. (See Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Edmund Husserl. 1981. "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence." Translated by J. Allen. In *Husserl. Shorter works*. Edited by W. Biemel. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 203–205.)
  21. [Ed.] E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, *Logos* 1 (1911): 289–341. (Also published in *Hua*. XXV, 3–62.) (Cf. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science." Translated by M. Brainard. In *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*. II. Edited by B. C. Hopkins and S. G. Crowell. Seattle: Noesis Pres, Ltd., (2002) 249–295.)
  22. [Ed.] Only a copy of this fragment of Husserl's letter to Dilthey from July 5/6<sup>th</sup>, 1911, exists today. (See Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Edmund Husserl. 1981. "The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence." Translated by J. Allen. In *Husserl. Shorter works*. Edited by W. Biemel. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 205–207.)
  23. See note 8 above.

24. [Ed.] E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (=Husserliana II), Introduction to the lecture, "Major Issues within Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason," from the Summer Semester 1907. (*The Idea of Phenomenology: a translation of Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (Husserliana II). Translated by L. Hardy. Husserliana: Collected Works. Vol. XIII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
25. [Ed.] *Being and Time* (Halle a. d. S. 1927)
26. [Ed.] A reference to Luke 10, verse 42 ("unum est necessarium" <"just one thing is needed">).
27. (i) "Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger." In *Philosophischer Anzeiger* 3 (1929a): 267–368; and (ii) "Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Fortsetzung, die Lebenskategorien und der Begriff der Bedeutung." In *Philosophischer Anzeiger* 3 (1929b): 405–475. In Husserl's library.
28. [Ed.] Cf. Husserl's letter to Dilthey of July 5/6<sup>th</sup>, 1911 and Dilthey's reply of July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1911. (HuDo III/6, 47–52; *Husserl. Shorter Works*, 205–209.)
29. [Ed.] Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, 1. Hälfte, Berlin 1910.
30. [Ed.] Dilthey died on October 1, 1911.
31. [Ed.] Kant's writing of 1776.
32. Cf. Dilthey's letter to Husserl of June, 29<sup>th</sup>, 1911. *Op. cit.* Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Edmund Husserl. 1981, 203.
33. "System of Philosophy," 1903. Reproduced in "Anhang: Diltheys Kant-Darstellung in seiner letzten Vorlesung über das System der Philosophy." *Wilhelm Diltheys geschichtliche Lebensphilosophy*, by Dietrich Bischoff. Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1935, 46–63.
34. "Kant wird zu dem Problem der menschlichen Erkenntnis hingetrieben durch die Erschütterung, welche die Metaphysik in seinem Tagen erfahren hatte. Er ist Metaphysiker von Natur." (W. Dilthey. "Kant-Darstellung," 1935, 48.)
35. [Ed.] Cf. Husserl's letter to Dilthey of July 5/6<sup>th</sup>, 1911. *Op. cit.* Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Edmund Husserl. 1981, 204f.
36. [Ed.] Cf. Dilthey's letter to Husserl of July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1911. *Op. cit.* Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Edmund Husserl. 1981, 207.
37. Quoted in W. Dilthey, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, ed. by B. Groethuysen (*Gesammelte Schriften* V). p. cxii: "Genuine Plato! who first moored fast the flowing-becoming things in the concept and then posited after the fact the concept of flowing."
38. [Ed.] E. Husserl. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. [Originally published by Husserl at the end of July, 1929.]
39. [Ed.] Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1931. *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, hrsg. von B. Groethuysen. *Gesammelte Schriften*. VIII. Leipzig and Berlin. This work contains, among other things, "Traum" [Dream] pp. 220–226, "Das geschichtliche Bewusstsein und die Weltanschauungen" (Historical consciousness and world-views) pp. 1–71, "Zur Philosophie der Philosophie" [On the philosophy of philosophy] 206–219.
40. [Ed.] During the Winter Semester 1923/24, Misch and Hans Lipps held a joint seminar entitled "Exercises on the doctrine of meaning (Hermeneutics)."
41. [Ed.] In *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* (*op. cit.*, Misch 1967, p. 438), Misch quotes Husserl as saying, "We are preparing from different sides a new philosophy which at root is the same." The authenticity of this statement, however, is questionable. It is not out of the question that the above mentioned sentence is a conglomeration from passages taken from the

- Husserl-Dilthey correspondence (which also attests for the fact of Misch's inexact dating of 1911) and so not a direct quotation of a particular element of a letter (HuDo. III/6, 487).
42. Published in: Alwin Diemer, *Edmund Husserl. Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie*. 2. verbesserte Auflage, Meisenheim am Glan 1965, p. 328.
  43. [Ed.] Husserl is obviously responding to Misch's request for permission to use Husserl's correspondence with Dilthey in Misch's book, *LPh*. In the forward to *LPh* which dates from June 1930, Misch reports that Husserl had shared with him the letters "which he . . . had exchanged with Dilthey." On page 181 and following, Misch quotes from Dilthey's letter to Husserl of Jun 29<sup>th</sup>, 1911, from Husserl's letter to Dilthey of July 5/6<sup>th</sup>, 1911 as well as from Dilthey's response of July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1911. He adds: "In the meanwhile Husserl shared these three letters, a kindness for which here gratitude is now also expressed."
  44. [Ed.] G. Misch, "Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl and Heidegger." In *Philosophischer Anzeiger* 4 (1930a): 181–330.
  45. [Ed.] The so-called concluding installment of Misch's *LPh*.
  46. Published in: Alwin Diemer, *Edmund Husserl. Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie*. 2. verbesserte Auflage. Meisenheim am Glan, 1965, p. 329.
  47. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VIII: *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, ed. by B. Groethuysen, Leipzig and Berlin, 1931.
  48. [Ed.] Objections to: E. Husserl, "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentalen Phänomenologie", *Philosophia*A (1936), p. 77–176; *Hua*. VI, pp. 1–104; *Crisis*, pp. 2–100.
  49. The year of Husserl's visit to Dilthey in Berlin.

### NOTES TO APPENDIX 3

1. *Eugen-Fink Gesamtausgabe, Band 3/1*. Hrsg. v. Ronald Bruzina. Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg/München, (forthcoming), 349–354
2. The bulleted information under each heading indicates (i) its place within the classification system at the Husserl Archives including, where possible, (ii) its place in particular volumes of *Husserliana*.
3. Page 4 is the envelope of p. 3.
4. Eugen Fink





# Bibliography

The following abbreviations and citation conventions have been established in order to clarify the use of cited references in the text:

## 1. *German Texts Alone*

If a citation is provided with reference to no other volume than the German original, either no English translation exists or the translation is the author's own. For example, a reference that reads:

Hua III/1, 51.

refers the reader to the *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* series, Volume III/1, page 51 cited in the bibliography.

## 2. *Existing Translations Without Modification*

If an existing English translation is cited without modification, the text which is cited appears directly after the German title. For example, a reference that reads:

*HuDo* II/1, 8; *Sixth CM*, 8.

refers the reader to the *Husserliana: Dokumente* series, Volume II/1, page 8. The cited text used in this work can be found on page 71 of the English translation cited in the bibliography.

## 3. *Modified Translations*

The phrase “modified” before a citation means that an existing English translation has been used but with certain changes introduced by the author. For example,

Hua VI, 59; modified *Crisis*, 58.

## 230 Bibliography

refers the reader to the *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* series, Volume VI, page 59. The cited text used in this work has been modified by the author. The unmodified original translation can be found on page 59 of the work cited in the bibliography

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#### *Hua VIII*

*Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.

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## Chapter Three

# The Idea of an Existential Ecology

Bob Sandmeyer

Ecology teaches us that the human place in nature is not one separate and aloof but rather necessarily and intimately situated with other organisms. As John Muir has eloquently stated, “when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.”<sup>1</sup> The implication of this important lesson is profound, for it implies that life is, at its root, fundamentally associational.<sup>2</sup> My aim here is to suggest an existential interpretation of this idea. This idea of an existential ecology, which I am proposing here, is anchored in the work of two writers, particularly Hans Jonas and Aldo Leopold.<sup>3</sup> By training, the first is a philosopher, the second a forester and wildlife manager. The former, a student of Martin Heidegger, wrote comprehensively on early Gnostic Christianity,<sup>4</sup> the philosophy of life, and ethical theory.<sup>5</sup> The latter, one of the earliest students of the Yale School of Forestry, wrote on the value of wilderness preservation,<sup>6</sup> sustainable agriculture, wildlife management,<sup>7</sup> and cooperative land conservation.<sup>8</sup> Neither knew of nor were influenced by the other’s work, yet their thinking finds confluence in this idea I am proposing. For this is an idea ultimately about land, land in the sense that Aldo Leopold conceives it in his beautiful work, *A Sand County Almanac*.<sup>9</sup> In short, an existential ecology is that “collective science of relations of the organism to the surrounding external world wherein we can account for all existence-conditions in the widest sense.”<sup>10</sup>

In this chapter, I intend to extend Jonas’s existential interpretation of biological facts, which he articulates in *The Phenomenon of Life*,<sup>11</sup> to Leopold’s ecological conception of land. However, the dissimilitude of the two thinkers’ orientation and philosophical conclusions requires a complex presentation. Consequently, in the first part of this chapter, I will articulate and analyze Jonas’s monistic philosophy of life by comparison with the philosophy of life advanced by an earlier phenomenological thinker, Max Scheler. Specifically,

I will argue that the conception of life which Scheler advances in his last published work, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*,<sup>12</sup> frames the problem underlying Jonas's existential interpretation of biological facts. The importance of this clarification will become clear in the second part of my chapter. For here I will reconceive and apply Jonas's existential interpretation to the land concept as advanced by Leopold. Such a translation grounds a proper view of ourselves, that is, as "only a member of a biotic team."<sup>13</sup> The broadening of Jonas's project is called for, I believe, since Jonas's philosophy of life lacks an explicit ecological understanding of living entities.<sup>14</sup> Finally, in my conclusion, I will show how this idea of an existential ecology coordinates well with certain evolutionary models of organism-environment interactions advanced today by neo-Lamarckian evolutionary theorists. The preeminent aim of this chapter is to lay the ground for a new existential understanding of the household of nature and of the human place in this household.

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE—HANS JONAS AND MAX SCHELER

In the early 1960s, Hans Jonas published his most important work, *The Phenomenon of Life*.<sup>15</sup> This work consists of eleven essays on disparate but coordinated themes. The first seven essays of this collection explicitly concern his philosophy of the organism. In these essays he advances his "'existential' interpretation of biological facts."<sup>16</sup> As he remarks, his ambition is "to break through the anthropocentric confines of idealist and existentialist philosophy as well as through the materialist confines of natural science."<sup>17</sup> Advancing a philosophical or postdualistic monism that neither reduces life to its materialist basis nor subsumes this basis within an idealist frame, he argues that "the organic even in its lowest forms prefigures mind, and that mind even on its highest reaches remains part of the organic."<sup>18</sup> Given that Jonas's existential interpretation in *The Phenomenon of Life* proceeds from the premise of his philosophical monism, my basic aim in this section is to clarify Jonas's monistic philosophy of life. To achieve this end, I will analyze it comparatively against Max Scheler's philosophy, particularly Scheler's conception of the antagonism between life and spirit or mind (*Geist*), which he articulates in *The Human Place in the Cosmos*. I hold that Scheler's dualistic analysis of life and spirit, pointedly expressed in his last published work, properly frames the problem to which Jonas's monism is a response. Thus, a secondary aim herein is to defend this view.

This first part of the essay, thus, has two sections. First, I will present a sketch of Scheler's philosophical anthropology in *The Human Place in the*

*Cosmos*. On the basis of this, I will, then, comparatively analyze Jonas's post-dualistic monism against Scheler's philosophical anthropology.

### Max Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology: The Antithesis of Life and Spirit

The antithesis Max Scheler draws between life and spirit seems singular in its constancy throughout the course of his writings. While life and spirit are fundamentally antithetical principles, it remains impossible, he holds, to understand the human person except as an embodied, corporeal being. Embodiment is a basic category of life. Spirit and life are thus necessarily related, according to Scheler, in the human person. The human person is that unique entity that, in the midst of its surroundings "by virtue of its spirit, can take an ascetic attitude toward its fervent and vibrating life."<sup>19</sup>

In so distinguishing spirit from life, Scheler insinuates a dual ontology, where spirit and life designate two discrete ontic realms. For Scheler, then, psychological and physiological processes are ontologically identical in a strict sense, that is, as processes of life. "When we take the 'psychological' and the 'physiological' as two sides of one and the same process of life, to which correspond two ways of looking at the same process, the X which is acting out the two ways of looking at one and the same thing must be superior to the antithesis of body and soul. This X is nothing else but spirit."<sup>20</sup> Where the physiological and psychological aspects of egoic existence are both processes of life, spirit is that aspect of our existence by which we can objectify these processes. Spirit, itself, is that which can never be objectified.

Though Scheler consistently demarcates life from spirit, he nevertheless argues their essential connection in the human person. "Finally, according to our theory, the spiritual acts, which draw their entire energy for their activity from the vital sphere of drives, and which cannot manifest themselves in our experience, even that of ourselves, without some kind of 'energy,' must also possess physiological and psychic parallels."<sup>21</sup> At its most primitive, life is characterized by Scheler as a primitive *Gefühlsdrang* or feeling impulse. This impulse, Scheler asserts, is "the stream, as it were, which pushes forward and up into the highest stages of spiritual activities and which provides energy to the most tender acts of lucid goodness."<sup>22</sup> He argues in other words that spirit has no power or energy without life and thus cannot be effective in any possible sense without anchor in the native corporeal ground of our being. Life infuses spirit with a potency foreign to its own essence. It is for this reason, Scheler holds, that "spirit and life dovetail (*sind aufeinander hineingeordnet*)."<sup>23</sup>

## From Scheler to Jonas—Paths along the Same Terrain

By emphasizing the basic relation of spirit to life in Scheler's philosophy, I mean to suggest a path for understanding the ontology of life as proposed by Hans Jonas.<sup>24</sup> In *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, published in 1927, Scheler sketches a philosophical anthropology or, more precisely, a phenomenology of the human being. However, he proffers much more than a study of the essence of the human being in this short work. While the principles of life and spirit emanate from a singular ground of all things, he argues, nevertheless, that the spiritual principle arises *sui generis* with the human person. Consequently, he presents us with an ontology of life as such and seeks to show by means of this that the word "human" (*der Mensch*), though signifying a being necessarily emplaced within the continuum of all living beings, signifies as well a set of characteristics that must be sharply and essentially distinguished from the concept of the animal and, more generally, that of the organism. This eidetic project is coincident with Jonas's anthropology. Yet Jonas's philosophy of the organism and of the human proceeds strictly from a premise of philosophical monism.

Jonas's insistence on this last point motivates an important critique of his teacher, Martin Heidegger. In his essay "Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism" in *The Phenomenon of Life*, Jonas expressly attacks Heidegger's "conception of a transessential, freely 'self-projecting' existence."<sup>25</sup> This is a conception most clearly and explicitly articulated by Heidegger in his "Letter on Humanism," to which Jonas alludes in the essay. For reasons fundamental to his conception of Dasein, Heidegger places human existence outside any sort of scale of nature.

Therefore ek-sistence can also never be thought of as a specific kind of living creature among others—granted that the human being is destined to think the essence of his being and not merely to give accounts of the nature and history of his constitution and activities. Thus even what we attribute to the human being as *animalitas* on the basis of the comparison with "beasts" is itself grounded in the essence of ek-sistence. The human body is something essentially other than an animal organism.<sup>26</sup>

Herein lies Heidegger's Gnosticism, that is, his complete antinaturalism. This view is worked out more fully by Heidegger in his earlier lecture course, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*.<sup>27</sup> Heidegger argues here—as he did later in the *Letter on Humanism*—that the human, in contrast to the animal, is neither ensconced nor captivated in an environmental niche. The existence of human beings occurs as the clearing of being. Unlike the animal, therefore, the human is, rather, open to the world. Scheler articulated a nearly identical claim two years earlier. Where the animal remains inescapably pushed

or pulled this or that way within its environment, the human, according to Scheler, is "not tied anymore to its drives and environment, but is 'non-environmental' or, as I (that is, Scheler) wish to put it, 'world-open.'"<sup>28</sup> World-openness, according to Scheler, is a human possibility insofar as humans are capable of withdrawing from their immersion amidst the things that attract and repulse them by means of an act of spirit. Scheler describes this spiritual act of withdrawal as an act of derealization, which he calls a phenomenological reduction. This possibility to enact a phenomenological reduction marks, for Scheler, the special human station in the cosmos.

Like Scheler (and like Heidegger), Jonas asserts a radically similar possibility open specifically to humans. As Jonas puts it, humans, as opposed to animals, can play with images "in detachment from the actuality of sensation and thereby from the stubborn factuality of the object's own being."<sup>29</sup> The Human, in other words, enjoy a distinct spiritual freedom to separate the remembered *eidos* from its occurrence in an individual encounter. "What we here have," Jonas argues, "is a trans-animal, uniquely human fact: eidetic control of motility, that is, muscular action governed not by set stimulus-response pattern but freely chosen, internally represented and purposely projected form."<sup>30</sup>

Jonas argues, in contradistinction to Scheler, that every mental activity, no matter how abstract, has corporeal root.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, this rootedness marks the very meaning of Jonas's philosophical monism, which distinguishes Jonas most clearly from Scheler. Scheler, as we have seen, holds that spirit, in principle, has an origin distinct from that of the vital impulsion. The human accordingly finds within herself both a spiritual and a vital principle. "The human being is the meeting-place of spirit and impulsion, and it is in the human being that the logos, 'after' which the world is made, becomes an act that is acted out with the human being."<sup>32</sup> Though, their understanding of the relation of spirit or mind to life separates them, both demarcate an essential divide distinguishing the human from the animal, while holding that the human qua human remains necessarily situated within the continuum of nature.

This basic agreement informs their unique conception of the evolution of life. Looking to Jonas first, he anchors all organic powers and functions in the metabolic activities of the organism. These activities express the concern of life at its most fundamental level with its own being. That is to say, life is marked by a purposive activity of the organism, that is, metabolism, to maintain the form of its individual being. According to Jonas, to reduce metabolism merely to physiochemical processes misconstrues the very essence of life. He argues:

In living things, nature springs an ontological surprise in which the world-accident of terrestrial conditions brings to light an entirely new possibility of



being: *systems of matter that are unities of a manifold*, not in virtue of a synthesizing perception whose object they happen to be, not by the mere concurrence of the forces that bind their parts together, but *in virtue of themselves, for the sake of themselves, and continually sustained by themselves*. Here wholeness is self-integrating in active performance, and form for once is the cause rather than the result of the material collections in which it successively subsists. ... This ontological individual, its very existence at any moment, its duration and its identity in duration is, then, essentially its own function, its own concern, its own continuous achievement.<sup>33</sup>

A living organism necessarily and purposively engages itself with its surroundings. This engagement asserts a new causality in the world, a needful freedom wherein a formal structure, that is to say, the organic individual, maintains its identity amidst the material conditions it requires for its existence. Freedom, or ontic autonomy, is thus not absolutely unfettered, but is rather dialectically bound to the material conditions of its survivability.

What Jonas sketches in *The Phenomenon of Life* is thus "a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man...."<sup>34</sup> For Jonas, vital capabilities, such as moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, and even the highest mental capacities to imagine and to reason, are ultimately rooted in the most basic vital act of metabolism. This unique philosophy of life shows that "in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance ... a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe—a principle foreign to suns, planets, and atoms."<sup>35</sup> Consequently, the articulation of a historicity<sup>36</sup> of freedom delineates Jonas's distinctive conception of evolution in *The Phenomenon of Life*.

Scheler argues, similarly to Jonas, that even the highest form of animal intelligence remains rooted in the organism's fundamental vital capacity. However, the most basic capacity he identifies, not as metabolism, but rather as a feeling impulse (*Gefühlsdrang*)—where, as the term suggests, feeling (*Gefühl*) and impulse (*Drang*) are not yet distinguishable at this most basic level. Basic living entities exhibit a purposive,<sup>37</sup> goal-oriented movement devoid of sensation and representation. Plant life is geared outward, in other words, by this feeling impulse. At this most primitive level, the organism inclines itself toward or away from medial resistances as it projects itself into its environs. In the evolution of life, complex instinctual behaviors arise which define this projection. Morphologically more complex organisms develop a repertoire of behaviors that benefit the species as a whole at the expense of individuals. As more intricate life forms develop, the possibility of a new mode of habitual behaviors arises. Trial and error comes to replace instinctive behaviors in higher forms of life. This development is correlated to the development of sophisticated physioneurological systems in the organism. Intelligence, itself, emerges as neurological feedback systems in the

organism as these systems become more sophisticated. For Scheler, then, intelligence is not special to the human being. Rather, highly developed organisms such as primates, for instance, exhibit practical intelligence in relation to environmental challenges. Intelligence is thus a sort of practical insight regulated by the life drives of the organism. Chimpanzees in their desire to get at ants in a crack of rock may take up a small branch as a tool to capture this food source. Acting in this manner, they intelligently restructure their environment according to ends determined by their life drives. Such a restructuring need not require trial and error, though the perfection of such practical behaviors usually does. Nevertheless, in a singular act, intelligent animals exhibit the capability of restructuring their environment to fit their individual needs. "To be sure, the restructuring described does not take place in the animal by way of conscious and reflective activity; rather, it occurs in terms of a kind of concrete replacement [*anschaulicher Umstellung*] itself of environmental things."<sup>38</sup>

Without delving into the evolutionary schemes of Jonas and Scheler further, we can see both characterize life—even in its most primitive manifestation—as transcendence. The essential characteristic of life according to Scheler is the drive of an entity outside of itself, engaging itself purposively to that which entices it or repels it. "The essential direction of life which is designated by such words as 'plantlike' and 'vegetative' is a completely outward-directed impulsion."<sup>39</sup> This thrown conception is fundamental to Jonas's account as well. He announces this in the very first pages of *The Phenomenon of Life*:

So constitutive for life is the possibility of not-being that its very being is essentially a hovering over this abyss. ... The being thus suspended in possibility is through and through a fact of polarity, and life always exhibits it in these basic respects: the polarity of being and not-being, of self and world, of form and matter, of freedom and necessity. These, as is easily seen, are forms of relation: life is essentially relationship; and relation as such implies "transcendence," a going-beyond-itself on the part of that which entertains the relation. *If we can show the presence of such transcendence, and of the polarities that specify it, at the very base of life in whatever pre-mental form, we have made good the contention that mind is prefigured in organic existence as such.*<sup>40</sup>

Standing over the abyss of nonbeing, life asserts itself, and in so doing projects itself purposively, that is, for its own sake. Jonas's existential analytic of the organism attributes to life an emphatic no to nonbeing. Life thus manifests a new sort of being and a new sort of causality in the cosmos, the living affirmation of its own existence.

While both Scheler and Jonas define life as transcendence, they differ in regard to the essential relation of spirit or mind to the ground of this emanation. Animal life is fundamentally distinguished from plant life, according to Scheler, by a physiological structure that allows it to register

reflectively—however dimly—an inner conscious state. The human, on the other hand, is that sole being, in contradistinction to every other living entity, capable of withdrawing from these environmental resistances. The root of spirit lies in the ground of all being, not in life as such. As noted, though, spirit has no power in and of itself except to direct and guide vital energies toward value preferences reflective of one's own personal character. "The person ... consists in a monarchic structure of acts, of which one act at a time has its steering and directing function and is aimed at that value and that idea with which the human being, in any given case, 'identifies'."<sup>41</sup> For Scheler, then, the two principles of life and spirit are necessarily intertwined in the human person. Spirit, though, enjoys an independence from life that Jonas would deny. Hence, the central contrast between Jonas and Scheler, as I have argued, lies in Jonas's postdualist philosophical monism. For Jonas, mind or spirit arises in the evolution of life out of the material activity of living existence.

While Jonas explicitly dismisses Heidegger's gnostic existentialism, the more basic problem underlying his existentialist interpretation of biological facts lies in Scheler's philosophy. For Scheler advances an essentialist definition of the human being, in which he nevertheless situates the human person within the continuum of nature. Jonas fundamentally agrees with this view. Where Jonas advances an essentialist anthropology, he denies, however, the absolute divorce of spirit or mind from life. Thus, he proposes as his solution his existential interpretation of biological facts. Mind is prefigured in activities of organic being, just as the blossom is presaged in the growth of the branch.

In this section, I have argued that an important community of thinking exists between Hans Jonas and Max Scheler. First, both undertake to articulate a philosophical anthropology, which places the human securely in the continuum of living beings. Second, both employ a neo-Aristotelian frame by which to articulate this understanding of life. And third, perhaps most importantly, both understand life essentially as a form of transcendence. The essence of life is to project itself into its surroundings. Indeed, spirit and the life of drives, mind and the material body, according to both Scheler and Jonas, express a dualism of sorts. The dualism is categorically distinct in Scheler's writings. Nevertheless, for each, this is a dualism in which the principles of bodily life and mental activity stand in a relation within a higher and more comprehensive order than mere material or ideal being. Thus, Jonas agrees essentially with Scheler when the latter says, "physiological and psychic processes are ontologically strictly identical."<sup>42</sup> Without obviating Scheler's demarcation of spirit from life, this strict ontological identity of which Scheler speaks is, I believe, the very sense of Jonas's new, integral "*postdualistic*" philosophical monism. The "'physiological' and the 'psychological' are but two sides from which we observe one and the same process of life."<sup>43</sup>

## LAND

Where Jonas presents an existential interpretation of biological facts, I wish now to suggest an extension of this to land. However, by land I should specify once again that I mean this in the sense proposed by Aldo Leopold in his famous capstone essay of *A Sand County Almanac*, "The Land Ethic." So, by land I mean something other than mere property, something more than the earthen ground on which we walk. I mean rather the ecological concept of land as a biotic community. Conceptually, therefore, land includes the soil, waters, plants, animals, and, of course, a human presence as well.

Where Jonas's thinking is clearly rooted in the German phenomenological movement, Leopold's influences stem from his study of forestry, game management, and ecology. The definition of land he articulates in *A Sand County Almanac*, as "a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals,"<sup>44</sup> relates back to the theory of plant succession and climax advanced by Frederic Clements<sup>45</sup> and Henry Chandler Cowles,<sup>46</sup> the study of animal ecology by Charles Elton,<sup>47</sup> and the dynamic trophic relationships of the lake ecosystem measured by Raymond Lindeman.<sup>48</sup>

Among these influences, Elton's work is of particular importance. Both Elton and Leopold represent the matrix of life by the image of a biotic pyramid. This mental image of the land qua biotic community manifests the relations of interdependency among organisms. Each stratum in the pyramid represents a different trophic level, where the higher rely on the lower in the organization of life. The base layers contain exponentially more individuals than those of higher layers. Following Elton, Leopold stresses the role each species has to play in the systematic interconnection of life. Leopold and Elton, in other words, define any particular species by the life activities of its members and the role these activities have in the constitution of the interconnected system of living beings as a whole. At the bottom of the pyramid are the soil, plants, and microfauna whose metabolizing functions derive either directly from the sun or from their immediate emplacement within a biotic milieu. "Each successive layer depends on those below it for food and often other services, and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above."<sup>49</sup> Thus, the soil and the plant eating species provide food and services for insect-eating birds and rodents as well as herbivorous and omnivorous mammals. The capstone of this pyramid is thus not humans but rather the pure carnivore. "Man shares an intermediate layer with the bears, raccoons, and squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables."<sup>50</sup>

Leopold proposes in sketching this image to illustrate that land is something far superior to and more valuable than mere property. It is an open system of trophic relations, a fountain of energy. Energy is transmitted up

the layers of the pyramid through food chains and down-circuit by means of death and decay. This biotic image conceptualizes land as a natural household defined by the member organisms' interrelated metabolic relations to the external world and to other organisms. "There are, in fact, chains of animals linked together by food, and all dependent in the long run upon plants," Elton explains in *Animal Ecology*. "We refer to these as 'food-chains' and to all the food-chains in a community as the 'food-cycle.'"<sup>51</sup> The land concept as advanced by Leopold signifies a community of diverse species defined by their trophic behaviors, situated in intricate subsystems of interdependent relations. "This interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes."<sup>52</sup>

So, land is really a unique "entity"<sup>53</sup> according to Leopold. It includes the soils, of course, but also all the microscopic and macroscopic life inhabiting a physical environment. Under this view, the human is just one member species living interdependently and in community with other species. Systemic integrity, stability, and the capacity of the land organism to rebound from perturbation are measures of land health. Land health, itself, defines the norm by which to judge the ethical content of human behaviors and policies. Accordingly, Leopold argues, the human being owes certain duties and obligations to the biotic community above and beyond the needs and duties prescribed by enlightened self-interest. "In short," he says, "a land ethic changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it."<sup>54</sup>

I aver that there is a salient point of contact in the distinct interpretations of life advanced by Leopold and Jonas. For Jonas and Leopold each understand life fundamentally in terms of metabolic activity. As Jonas says, "The exchange of matter with the environment is not a peripheral activity engaged in by a persistent core: it is the total mode of continuity (self-continuation) of the subject of life itself."<sup>55</sup> Though the entire material constitution of an organism may undergo transformation, as it in fact does continuously; a self-same ontic core perdures throughout this material transformation. This understanding defines his existential interpretation of biological facts. For Jonas, "there is always the purposiveness of organism as such and its concern in living."<sup>56</sup> Where the subject of Jonas's investigation is the individual organism, though, Leopold's concern revolves around land, that is, the ecological organism. Thus, I wish to suggest here that Jonas's existential interpretation of biological facts can and ought to be refitted to this land concept. That is to say, I suggest a reinterpretation of Jonas's philosophy of life ecologically. Conversely, I hold that Leopold's ecological land concept can and ought to be understood existentially. I thus propose the idea of an existential ecology. For the existential ecologist, land is an interspecies

community of organisms whose interdependent activities articulate a care-structured environment.

When farmers, for example, work their lands according to the strict task-master of profit motive, their concern typically centers solely on those parts of the organic system that effectively increase yields at the lowest cost. They are of course not ignorant of the metabolic structuring of the biotic community of life on their farms. In point of fact, they put this understanding to work for them. They may therefore purchase the most economically productive fertilizer and feed they can. They may spray pesticides in order to reduce the pest population that is eating away at their crops. They may even plant specifically bioengineered seeds that resist the pesticides they are spraying, all in an effort to kill the insect life eating away at their profits. Their monetary interest remains centered on the useful parts of the organic system that promote the growth of their profits. The insect, plant, and animal life on their farms that are useless to this endeavor are just that: useless.

Leopold asks how this pure economic attitude can be supplemented by or replaced with a deeper ecological attitude. Is there some ground in other words for comprehending land as a biotic community, and, indeed, ourselves as obligated members of this living community? Ironically, Leopold's evolutionary answer remains somewhat ambiguous. "The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity."<sup>57</sup> However, to this question Jonas has a clear reply.

The observer of life must be prepared by life. In other words, organic existence with its own experience is required of oneself for being able to make that inference, which one does make all the time, and this is the advantage—perennially disowned or slandered in the history of epistemology—of our "having," that is, being, bodies. Thus, we *are* prepared by what we are.<sup>58</sup>

As embodied, worldly beings, we are inherently capable of grasping life as something more than mere physiochemical processes. We can grasp life in terms of a care structure and, indeed, the land as a care-structured environment because we, ourselves, exist bodily. "We have in our self-experience, as it were, peepholes into the inwardness of substance."<sup>59</sup> Just as we can comprehend the *nisus* of metabolism from the standpoint of our own existence, so we can see the restrictive conception of land to that of mere blind mechanism as much too narrow.

In this proposal to integrate Jonas's philosophy of life with Leopold's ecological philosophy, I wish to offer a new way of looking at the concept of land proffered by Leopold. That is to say, I wish to make explicit what I believe is implicit in Leopold's understanding of the land concept. Rather than conquerors, we can and ought to live in the community of life as plain

members and citizens. The land is, in point of fact, our biotic home. Though this is perhaps not a renegade notion, it is radical and subversive. It is subversive, for it strikes at the heart of the utilitarian conception of land as a mere resource. It is radical, I suggest, since it strikes at the very root of who we are as existing beings.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to highlight an interesting point of intersection between this idea of an existential ecology I am proposing and a new conceptual model of adaptation and niche construction developed by the evolutionary biologists F.J. Odling-Smee, K.N. Laland, and M.F. Feldman among others.<sup>60</sup> Particularly, I would like to turn to the work of Richard Lewontin, Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology in the Museum of Comparative Zoology, emeritus, at Harvard University. In his work *The Triple Helix*, Lewontin argues that an illicit dualism exists at the heart of modern neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory, after the modern synthesis, suggests a radical divide between the processes of mutation occurring inside the organism and the environment. Neo-Darwinian theory, in other words, posits a sharp and inviolate divide between biological processes inside the organism and environmental pressures outside it. According to this now standard theory, "organisms adapt to the environment because the external world has acquired its properties independently of the organism, which must adapt or die."<sup>61</sup>

We may recall that the Lamarckian theory originally posited that organisms change due to strivings internal to the organism, itself. Lamarck argued that such acquired characteristics could be transmitted and so inherited by the progeny of such individuals. The Lamarckian theory asserts that organisms are, themselves, subjects of evolution. It is this aspect of Lamarck's theory, particularly, that neo-Darwinian theory refutes explicitly.

The Lamarckian theory espouses a transformational principle insofar as each and every member of the species undergoes the same or a similar change. In contrast, Darwin proposed a variational principle, that individual members of the ensemble differ from each other in some properties and that the system evolves by changes in the proportions of the different types. There is a sorting-out process, typically occurring in geologic time, in which some variant types persist while others disappear. The ensemble as a whole changes without any successive changes in the individual members.<sup>62</sup> Under the Darwinian model, the organism is but an object of evolution. Mutation occurs as an entirely autonomous process inside the organism, distinct from the conditions of selection in nature. It is to this radical and sharp divide between



processes internal to the organism and external environmental pressures that contemporary neo-Lamarckian niche-construction theorists object. "Neo-Darwinism fails to recognize a fundamental cause of evolutionary change, 'niche construction,' by which organisms modify environmental states, and consequently selection pressures, thereby acting as co-directors of their own, and other species', evolution."<sup>63</sup>

The central point of contention between standard evolutionary and niche-construction theorists concerns the status of the organism in the dynamics of natural selection. To explicate the difference between standard neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory and niche construction more fully, we may recall the debate between preformationism and epigenesis addressed by Kant in *The Critique of Judgment*.<sup>64</sup> The preformation-epigenesis debate, which took place primarily in eighteenth-century biology, concerned the problem of ontogeny. Kant, of course, proposed a unique middle ground in these debates. While he denied preformation in the typical biological sense, that is, the organism as a physical entity existing preformed in either the sperm or egg, Kant advanced a modified epigenetic account that "minimizes the appeal to the supernatural."<sup>65</sup> Ironically, this antiquarian debate is relevant today, since neo-Darwinian theory promotes something like a new form of preformationism, or so Lewontin argues. No one, of course, asserts the existence of some sort of homunculus. This would, on the face of it, be absurd. Nevertheless, by positing the strict divide between inner processes of mutation and the external environment, the fertilized egg can be thought to contain "the complete blueprint of the organism and all the information necessary to specify it."<sup>66</sup> According to this view, the organism remains but a passive object of evolutionary forces.

Lewontin and the niche-construction theorists reject the absolute separation of the inner and outer presupposed in standard neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. Lewontin argues, rather, that "the internal and the external factors, genes and environment, act upon each other through the medium of the organism."<sup>67</sup> In the activities of niche construction, which is an activity rooted in the physiology, morphology, and habitus of the organism, individuals, populations, and communities create environmental conditions that favor certain selective tendencies over others. Consequently, organisms in their niche-constructing activities are both cause and product of evolution. Lewontin argues thereby that it is countersense to think of an environment without organisms. As he says, "Niches do not preexist organisms but come into existence as a consequence of the nature of the organisms themselves."<sup>68</sup> Organisms, by virtue of their life activities, determine their surrounding environment. "As a consequence of the properties of the animal's sense organs, nervous system, metabolism, and shape, there is a spatial and temporal juxtaposition of bits and pieces of the world that process a surrounding

for the organism that is relevant to it.”<sup>69</sup> In a word, standard evolutionary theory neglects environmental structuring that occurs as a consequence of organisms’ care over their own being as a factor in evolutionary theory. Consequently the standard model of evolution “misses what is more characteristic of the history of life.”<sup>70</sup>

The niche-construction perspective, in contrast, advances a fundamentally ecological insight. In their foundational work, *The Fundamentals of Ecology*, Eugen and Howard Odum argue “the landscape is not just a supply depot but is also the *oikos*—the home—in which we must live.”<sup>71</sup> What I have advanced with the idea of an existentialist ecology is that our human home is one constructed and embedded in the homes of a diverse array of other species. In point of fact, every lived place expresses an interdependent care structure, a concern of life over its own being.

Interpreting biological facts existentially, Hans Jonas shows the organism to be the purposive subject of its own life. Aldo Leopold argues that land itself is an interspecies community of organisms. The human occupies a unique but natural role within this community. The idea of an existential ecology synthesizes these two perspectives. Indeed, extending Jonas’s philosophical monism implies that world-openness is prefigured in the niche-constructing activities of organic beings. This insight implies, further, that human world-building takes place in and amidst the care defined household building activities of the diversity of organisms with whom we coexist. We are, thus, not homeless. Nor should we understand ourselves to be aloof from the natural world. Rather, as embodied entities, we are always already livingly at home in a communalized world.

## NOTES

1. John Muir, “Mount Hoffman and Lake Tenaya,” in *My First Summer in the Sierra* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 110.

2. Cf. the niche concept as first introduced by Joseph Grinnell, “The Niche-Relationships of the California Thrasher,” *The Auk* 34 (1917): 427–33, esp. 433.

3. Aldo Leopold, *Leopold: A Sand County Almanac & Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation* (New York, NY: Library of America, 2013). All references to Leopold’s writings are from this anthology, hereafter *LSCAOW*, unless otherwise noted.

4. Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity*. 3rd ed., revised and expanded (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964).

5. Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics or the Technological Age*, translated by Hans Jonas with the collaboration of David Herr (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

6. Aldo Leopold, *Round River: From the Journals of Aldo Leopold*, ed. Luna B. Leopold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

7. Aldo Leopold, *Game Management* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).

8. Aldo Leopold, *The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays*, eds. Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992).

9. Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1949).

10. Ernst Haeckel, *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Formen-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformierte Descendenz-Theorie. Zweiter Band: allgemeine Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen* (Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1866), 286.

11. Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (New York, NY: Dell Publishing, Inc., 1966).

12. Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos in Gesammelte Werke Max Schelers, Bd. 9: Späte Schriften*, hrsg. v. Manfred S. Frings (Bern/München: Francke Verlag, 1976), 7–72. Translated by Manfred S. Frings as *The Human Place in the Cosmos* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2009).

13. Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” *LSCAOW*, 173.

14. To be clear, I am not denying that an ecological conception of metabolic exchange is entirely absent in Jonas’s writings. Rather, I hold that the ecological idea remains at best implicit in his philosophy of life. The explication of this idea in his existential analysis requires, I believe, an amplification of the idea of identity central to his philosophy of the organism. I intend to defend this claim in a forthcoming work. For present purposes, I point the reader to the most explicit statement of an ecological conception of life I have been able to uncover. “For encroaching on other life is *eo ipso* given with belonging to the kingdom of life, as each kind lives on others or codetermines their environment, and therefore bare, natural self-preservation of each means perpetual interference with the rest of life’s balance” (Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility*, 137).

15. Christian Wiese, ed., *Hans Jonas Memoirs*, translated by Krishna Winston (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2008), 198.

16. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, ix.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 1.

19. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 39, n11.

20. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, modified 57.

21. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 55

22. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 7.

23. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, modified 63.

24. This path is complicated by the fact that any reference to Max Scheler’s work is by and large absent in Jonas’s work. Martin Heidegger’s influence is clear, though. Without eliding over this basic fact, a structural similarity clearly exists between Heidegger’s conception of the organism and Scheler’s. The *Auseinandersetzung* between Heidegger and Jonas offers a distinct, if indirect, influence of Scheler on Jonas.

25. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 228.

26. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," translated by Frank A. Capuzzi in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 247.

27. Heidegger, Martin. *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit* (Wintersemester 1929/30), 3. Auflage, hrsg. v. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann Verlag), 2004. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).

28. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 27.

29. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 171.

30. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 172.

31. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 152.

32. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 66.

33. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 79f (italics mine).

34. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, xxiii.

35. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 3.

36. For absorption of the past into each emerging present, that is, "historicity" as such, even of the briefest span, is the prerequisite of duration. But future is the dominant time-horizon opening before the thrust of life, if *concern* is its primary principle of inwardness. It then also follows that with respect to the organic sphere, the external linear time-pattern of antecedent and sequent, involving the causal dominance of the past, is inadequate: while mere externality is, at least can be presented as, wholly determined by what it was, life is essentially also what it is going to be and just becoming: in its case, the extensive order of past and future is intensively reversed (Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 86).

37. Scheler argues that plants exhibit teleoclitic or directional leaning relations to biotic or abiotic resistances. These teleoclitic relations account for the vast biodiversity of floral and animal forms. However, he denies any conception of predetermined suitability of the organism to environmental cues characteristic of stronger conceptions of teleology. See Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 10. Unfortunately, Frings translates "*teleoklinen Beziehungen*" as "*purposive relations*" thus obfuscating an important distinction in Scheler's conception of purposiveness.

38. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 24.

39. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 9.

40. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 4–5 (italics mine).

41. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 46.

42. Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 53.

43. *Ibid.*

44. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 181.

45. F.E. Clements, *Plant Succession: An Analysis of the Development of Vegetation*. Publication No. 242 (Washington: Carnegie Institution), 1905.

46. Henry Chandler Cowles, "The Ecological Relations of the Vegetation of the Sand Dunes of Lake Michigan," *Botanical Gazette* 27/2 (1899): 95–117.

47. Charles Elton, *Animal Ecology* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson), 1927.

48. R.L. Lindeman, "The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology," *Ecology* 23 (1942): 399–418.
49. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 180–1.
50. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 181.
51. Elton, *Animal Ecology*, 56.
52. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 182.
53. Leopold employs a number of metaphors to describe land, for example, mechanism, organism, pyramid, circuit, or even orchestra. In all these, he represents the biotic community holistically. Consequently, I use the term "entity" here to reflect this holistic understanding underlying the plurality of his expression. Thanks to Curt Meine for bringing me to clarity on this point.
54. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 173.
55. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 76 n13.
56. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 90.
57. Leopold, "The Land Ethic," *LSCAOW*, 172.
58. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 82.
59. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, 91.
60. See F.J. Odling-Smee, K.N. Laland, and M.F. Feldman. *Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution* (New York, NY: Princeton University Press, 2003); Cf. <http://www.nicheconstruction.com/>.
61. Richard Lewontin, *The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 43.
62. Richard Lewontin, "The Organism as Subject and Object of Evolution," in *The Dialectical Biologist*, eds. Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 86.
63. Laland, Kendal, Brown. "The Niche Construction Perspective: Implications for Evolution and Human Behavior," *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology*, 5 (2007): 51.
64. Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987).
65. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 424.
66. Lewontin, *The Triple Helix*, 6.
67. Lewontin, "The Organism as Subject and Object of Evolution," 89.
68. Lewontin, *The Triple Helix*, 51.
69. Lewontin, *The Triple Helix*, 52.
70. Lewontin, *The Triple Helix*, 67.
71. Eugen P. and Howard T. Odum. *Fundamentals of Ecology*, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders, 1971), 271–72.

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# Life and Spirit in Max Scheler's Philosophy

Robert Sandmeyer\*

University of Kentucky

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## Abstract

Max Scheler was a philosopher of intuition who rarely worked out his ideas systematically. Consequently, his philosophical writings present something of a challenge for the reader. There is little unifying his disparate studies. In this paper, I suggest that a distinction between life and spirit which Scheler formulated early and held onto throughout his career can provide a heuristic principle by which to study his works. This paper is a clarification of this distinction. In the first part of the paper, I show that Scheler's dualistic metaphysics has its roots in Rudolf Eucken's idealistic philosophy. In the second and third parts of this essay, I clarify Scheler's concept of spirit as he develops it in confrontation with Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. Particularly, in the second part, I show that as he confronts Husserl's conception of philosophy as rigorous science he postulates a radically different idea of the nature of philosophy, an idea that is rooted in this distinction between life and spirit. I explicate in the next section the unique theory of the phenomenological reduction Scheler develops on the basis of this distinction. In the last part, I briefly present how this conception of life and spirit are worked out in Scheler's philosophical anthropology, particularly in his last work, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*.

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This present essay concerns the conception of spirit and its relation to life as articulated by the German philosopher, Max Scheler. It has been said that Scheler was a philosopher of great philosophical intuition but with little will for the systematic articulation of his ideas. This is indeed the case. Given the breadth and range of his writings, a coherent survey of the main body of his works remains out of reach in this brief essay. Hence, I focus here on the distinction between life and spirit as a heuristic by which one may study Scheler's body of writings. Scheler, himself, suggested that this distinction is a central motif underlying his most important philosophical writings (Scheler 2009: 3–4). Unfortunately, he did not clearly work out this idea before he died. Manfred Frings, editor of many of Scheler's collected works and perhaps the most important interpreter of his writings, tells us that Scheler was working on three large writing projects at the time of his death: (i) a philosophical anthropology, (ii) a work on metaphysics, and (iii) a work on the theory of cognition (Frings 2). These comprehensive studies were to bring unity to the many essays and fragments Scheler had written and/or published over his lifetime. His sudden death left these works, whose themes articulate the basic contours of his thought, unfinished. This brief essay thus offers a sketch of a single basic motif at work in the variegated anthropological, metaphysical, and epistemological writings of Max Scheler.

This essay is divided into four sections. In the first, I briefly discuss his major works as biographical background. In the second, I argue that the life/spirit distinction articulated by Scheler exhibits prominent similarities to that advocated by his mentor at Jena, Rudolf Eucken. In the third, I turn to Scheler's engagement with Edmund Husserl in order to highlight a genuine disagreement between the two on the nature of philosophy, itself, rooted in the former's spiritual concept of the human person. This disagreement informs Scheler's unique spiritual conception of the phenomenological reduction, which I present

in the fourth section. I conclude with a brief discussion of the concept of the good implied by this life/spirit distinction.

### Works

Born in Munich on 22 August 1874, Scheler died at 53 years of age in Frankfurt on 19 May 1928. As a young man, he entered the university in his home town of Munich with the intention of studying medicine but under the influence of Theodore Lipps quickly turned to philosophy. He moved to Berlin, where he had the opportunity to attend the lectures of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. In 1895, he left Berlin for Jena to complete his studies. He wrote his dissertation under Rudolf Eucken on the relationship between logical and ethical principles, which he published in 1897. He completed his Habilitation in 1899 on the transcendental and the psychological method while still at Jena. In this latter work, which is strongly influenced by Eucken, he attacks both the empirical methodology of the positivist philosophers and the transcendental method initiated by Kant as adequate to "the doctrine of spirit." In their place, he argues one should adopt a "noological method," a term taken from Eucken, whose foundational concepts are derived from the spiritual form of life rooted in the work world (Scheler 1922: 179f). This latter work gained him an appointment at Jena as *Privatdozent* or junior professor.

His most important work, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism* [hereafter *Formalism in Ethics*], was published in two installments in 1913 and 1916, respectively. This work is not merely the first but is in fact one of the most significant phenomenological studies of the objectivity of values intended in subjective acts. It has been said the work had a greater effect on the students of the phenomenological movement than Husserl's *Ideas I*, which was published at the same time and in the same journal (Stein 258). Scheler also published in 1913 *The Nature of Sympathy*, a phenomenological analysis of love and hate which concludes with a highly influential theory of intersubjectivity. In 1919, he published *Vom Umsturz der Werte* [On the overthrow of values], a series of essays on the nature of virtue, resentment, tragedy, and the idea of the human as well a number of important epistemological and sociological studies. *On the Eternal in Man*, a pioneering work in the philosophy of religion, came out in 1921. In this work, Scheler argued for the irreducibility of religious experience and the central significance of the Christian ideal of love for community life. In 1923, soon after his arrival in Cologne, he published a four volume collection of essays titled *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre* [Writings pertaining to sociology and the world-view doctrine]. Then in 1926, he published a collection of essays under the title, *Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft* [The forms of knowledge and society]. With these latter two collections, Scheler established himself as a leading figure within the newly developing field of sociology, most especially for his analysis of the sociology of knowledge. In 1927, he published what would be his last work, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, an essay in which Scheler sought to articulate the essence of human being.

### Rudolf Eucken and Beyond

The confluence of Rudolf Eucken's (1846–1926) thought with Scheler's is striking, particularly in the dualistic conception of life and spirit that Scheler held to and developed over the course of his career. Even in his earliest writings, he posited – similarly to Eucken – a separation of the human spirit from the impulses and drives rooted in our

organic nature (Scheler 2009: 60n). Both men were diagnosticians of modern life and were centrally concerned with “a force indwelling in life <that> must lead the individuals beyond their crude natural impulses and their narrow care for personal welfare” (Eucken 1914a: 75). Eucken argued that the conflict between natural and moral life must be overcome with “the establishment of a new position of life, in which the human and the cosmic types, subject and object, give up their hostility and unite in common work” (Eucken 1914b: 92). This bespeaks, for Scheler, a principled antagonism of two attributes springing forth from the ground of all things that find their meeting place uniquely in man (Scheler 2009: 57). Scheler would hold that human spirit is not merely a higher refinement of our life-drives. It is completely autonomous from life and as such has no energy of its own (Scheler 2009: 41). Though impotent, spirit has the capacity to guide and direct the drives of life to ends of its own choosing.

This latter idea is highly enigmatic, and it is one for which Scheler offers little argumentation. It is in many respects a basic premise underlying his studies. Though not strictly identical to the dualism advanced by his mentor, it is a standpoint in great harmony with it. Unfortunately Scheler's final metaphysical, epistemological, and anthropological studies all were cut short at the time of his death. This is a great loss as these were meant to work out of the implications of this idea.

Nevertheless, this dualism of attributes, i.e., life and spirit, stands at the very heart of Scheler's conception of human personhood and so at the heart of his theory of valuation. He argues that the human person is the unifying ground to all essentially differentiated intentional acts, including even the most basic non-cognitive drives and impulses (Scheler 1973: 383). He says “the *essence of the person*, like the essence of a pure act of the person, is *psychophysically indifferent*,” (Scheler 1973: : 382) and by this he means that personhood is neither fundamentally pure consciousness nor pure corporeality. She – and it is important to note that a person is never an *it* – is rather that unitary core in which both the inner and the outer have being. Heidegger is thus correct to point out as he does in *Being and Time* that for Scheler the person is no thing (Heidegger 1993: 47).

The spiritual center of acts, that is to say, the person of the human being [*die Person des Menschen*], is not a substance but rather a monarchic structuring of acts under which each *single* act has its guide and lure and is directed at that value and that idea with which the human being, at any given moment, ‘identifies’ (Scheler 2009: 46 translation modified).

As Scheler articulates it, therefore, the person is that spiritual executor of all acts, and she experiences herself not as a thing but only insofar she lives in these acts.

Although this conception may be reminiscent of Kant's notion of transcendental apperception, Scheler is careful to point out that “the being of the person is never exhausted in being a subject of rational acts of a certain lawfulness” (Scheler 1973: : 372). For Scheler, the person is always and necessarily a concrete, embodied individuality. Consequently, acts of judgment (or of love, even) express the irreducible peculiarity of this one person (Scheler 1973: : 386). Unlike Kant, therefore, “*the world* <as correlate of the person> is by no means an idea. It is an absolute, always concrete, individual being” (Scheler 1973: 394).

### *Scheler's Conception of Philosophy in Contradistinction to Husserl's*

A younger contemporary of Edmund Husserl, Scheler is often mischaracterized as one of his students. In point of fact, he never studied with Husserl – having habilitated by the time the two men first met. As a young philosopher, though, reading Husserl's

*Logical Investigations* (1900/1901), Scheler grasped immediately the significance of these investigations to his own interests in establishing a theory of value objectivism. He explains in the preface to his *Formalism in Ethics* that Husserl's work provided "methodological consciousness of the unity and sense of the phenomenological attitude" fundamental to his own work (Scheler 1973: xix). Each, in fact, seems at times to counterpoise their unique conception of phenomenology against the other, and these disagreements offer insight into the very meaning of phenomenology, itself. We will now turn to the confrontation between these two men in order to make clear this fundamental distinction that Scheler draws between spirit and life and its significance to his own phenomenological philosophy.

In the early years of the 20th century, Husserl clearly recognized the significance of Scheler as a force within the young phenomenological movement and saw in him an important ally as he sought to establish phenomenology against the backdrop of neo-Kantian philosophy prevalent throughout Germany at the time. But Husserl doubted that such a mercurial personality could engage in the disciplined research necessary for thorough-going phenomenological analysis. As time wore on, their relationship soured. By the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl could be heard privately warning students to study phenomenology "unmixed with Scheler" (Schuhmann 409).

It is unclear how seriously Husserl studied Scheler's work while Scheler lived. After he died, though, Husserl conscientiously set about studying Scheler, most especially his last published work, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*. After Heidegger published *Being and Time* in 1927 (just under a year before Scheler's death), Husserl came to realize that the transcendental phenomenology he espoused was not merely misunderstood but also was suffering from what he believed were unjust attacks due to these misunderstandings. He decided, at first, to redress the situation by attacking what he referred to as his antipodes, who in his mind included both Heidegger and Scheler (Husserl 1968: 67). In 1931, Husserl presented his polemic against both men in a lecture before the Kant Societies of Frankfurt and Berlin under the title "Phenomenology and Anthropology." This is the most important engagement with Scheler's philosophy in Husserl's corpus.

In this lecture, Husserl sought to justify his own conception of transcendental phenomenology against the existentialist and life philosophies exemplified in the work of these two men. Taking up the problem of the possibility of a philosophical anthropology in his lectures, Husserl says:

I cannot help seeing the decision for a transcendental phenomenology as definitive, and I cannot help branding all philosophies that call themselves phenomenological as aberrations which cannot attain the level of authentic philosophy (Husserl 1997: 499).

According to Husserl, in other words, only transcendental phenomenology, i.e., a phenomenology that enacts Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction, attains the level of philosophy *qua* rigorous science. "There is only *one* definitive philosophy," he argues in the lectures, "only *one* form of definitive science, which is the science elaborated by the originary method of transcendental phenomenology" (Husserl 1997: 499). Neither Heidegger's analytic of Dasein nor Scheler's philosophical anthropology achieves scientific rigor, Husserl argued, for each presupposes that which requires ultimate philosophical clarification. For Husserl, this is precisely the significance of his phenomenological reduction. The reduction is a method of questioning back from mundane existence to the subjective constitution of the objective sense of worldly being as such.

Its basic guiding problem, that of the psychological-phenomenological constitution of the world as a human 'objectification,' now emerges for the first time, along with the method for explicating the horizon of consciousness, a method that follows clues coming from the *cogitatum*, from the intentional object (Husserl 1997: 500).

The problem in the phenomenologies of Heidegger and Scheler, as Husserl saw it, is that each rejects or misinterprets this method of leading clues which proceeds from the mundane being of human existence to the transcendental constituting sources bestowing upon *itself* an objective sense *as worldly*. The analysis of each, in other words, remains captive to the world and so never breaks through to clarify the sense of worldly being as the end product of transcendental constitution.

We will take up the question of the phenomenological reduction in Scheler's thought in the next section, but first it is important to understand the context of this dispute as Scheler would have likely seen it. In the lecture, Husserl pointedly attacks the anthropologism he saw in both Heidegger's and Scheler's writings.

Original phenomenology, which has matured into transcendental phenomenology, denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a share in laying the foundations for philosophy, and opposes all related attempts at foundation-laying as being anthropologism or psychologism (Husserl 1997: 485–6).

This argument from the lecture is in essence little different from the argument he made in his *Logos* article, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," which he published in 1910–1911. Genuine philosophy is rigorous science. In the earlier essay, Husserl attacked Wilhelm Dilthey's doctrine of world-views, which is a theory regarding the morphology of distinct and historically relative manners of comprehending the world that bears a striking similarity to Scheler's sociological analysis of knowledge. According to Husserl, if philosophy, itself, were to be founded solely in the theoretical activities of mundane human existence, all expressions of truth would express nothing more than a historically relative world view. For all world-bound truths remain fixedly bound to the historical-empirical standpoint from which that view finds its expression. Consequently, there could in principle be no insight into trans- or omni-temporal truths or of the essential constitution of the world as such. According to Husserl, therefore, any anthropologistic standpoint – such as that proffered by Scheler – devolves necessarily into relativism and skepticism.

Although Scheler could not have read Husserl's attack of him in the "Phenomenology and Anthropology" lectures, he did read "Phenomenology as Rigorous Science" and understood Husserl's attack on Dilthey in 1911 as an indirect attack on his own views (Scheler 1960: : 82f). More to the point, he responded to this attack in a rebuttal obliquely inserted into his essay "The Nature of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Cognition," which he published in the work, *On the Eternal in Man*. In this essay, Scheler generally accepts Husserl's point regarding the relativity of world-views. "Philosophy can never be, as Husserl rightly maintains, *Weltanschauung* (worldview) but at most involve a theory of *Weltanschauungen*" (Scheler 1960: 83 translation modified). However, philosophy, Scheler argues, is not bound to any world view. Rather, it is

concerned in the first place with the 'natural' *Weltanschauung* and thereafter with the range of 'possible' variants, which forms the historical basis for treating the humane problems relevant to a theory of *positive Weltanschauungen* (Scheler 1960: 83).

In other words, Husserl's criticism does not apply to the theoretical elucidation of the forms of world-views as such. This sort of analysis clarifies the social-historical constitution of knowledge and, as such, falls explicitly within the domain of philosophy.

It is interesting to note that Scheler presents this as a minor point of terminological clarification. He argues simply that philosophy as a term should be restricted to the evident knowledge of essences whereas the term science can and should refer to the positive formal sciences of ideal objects and the inductive empirical sciences (Scheler 1960: 80f). This seemingly minor point should not obfuscate the central argument in Scheler's essay, which, at its core, expresses a position in substantive discord with Husserl's understanding of the nature of philosophy. Indeed, Scheler's main point in the essay is of great interest for the clarification of the distinction he sees between life and spirit.

According to Scheler, the idea of philosophy can only be fixed by examining the concrete person of the philosopher herself. Husserl explicitly rejects this view, arguing instead that philosophy is a regulative idea guiding a community of researchers over time. For Scheler, though, philosophy is unlike any other cognitive discipline in that it and it alone requires a spiritual technique by which the human engages her whole being in participation with the primordial essence of all things. In every other cognitive discipline, that is, in every positive science, the investigating subject concerns herself with only some aspect of reality. This aspect, insofar as it is picked out materially from the context of all other things, remains rooted ultimately in the living engagement of the investigator with her environing world. But philosophical cognition concerns not beings but being as such (Scheler 1960: 94). Consequently, the philosopher, herself, discloses a unique field of investigation. In order to grasp the nature of philosophy, Scheler argues, one must comprehend the comportment to being as such enacted by the person of the philosopher.

In order to philosophize, Scheler maintains that a set of moral acts is required in order to break from our living, practical, and theoretical engagement with things. The philosopher must (i) love absolute value and being as such. She must (ii) humble herself so that things can show themselves, not as things for her to use or to enjoy, but rather as they, themselves, are. And in order for her to humble herself, she must (iii) master the drives and passions within her, so that she is not ruled by them. Only by effecting these three moral acts, Scheler argues, can *spirit* break through the need structure of natural existence to contemplate the essential form of things.

The moral acts are needed so that the spirit may be enabled to *eschew* on principle the merely life-*relative*, the being which is being 'for' life and therein 'for' man as a living creature; they are needed that spirit may begin to participate in being *per se et in se* (Scheler 1960: 95 translation slightly modified).

These moral acts bring about a disinterestedness in pragmata as such. Philosophical concern centers rather on essence over fact. Yet the moral acts necessary to philosophical cognition are not mystical acts as perhaps a material reductionist might argue. They are acts of will, indeed, but acts that not reducible to our natural being. They are of a categorically different sort; they are acts of spirit. Spirit is thus that capacity within us to break our living engagement with things. To use a Platonic expression, philosophy is *to practice dying to all eternity*. "It is a requirement," he says, "whose basis is neither psychological, nor purely epistemological, but *ontic*" (Scheler 1960: 90f).

### *The Phenomenological Reduction*

In part II of his *Formalism in Ethics*, Scheler addresses the method of phenomenological reduction, ostensibly articulated by Husserl in *Ideas I*, in a way that amplifies this concept of spirit. Specifically, he argues that Husserl's method of reduction neglects the ontic foundation of all intentional acts. In *Ideas I*, Husserl sets out to articulate and describe the



act-intentionality of an objectifying consciousness – at least insofar as this intentionality is paradigmatic of the form of intentional consciousness as such. His aim in the work is to articulate descriptively the absolute phenomenological datum containing within itself both the noetic moment of sense-bestowing activity enacted by a transcendental ego and the noematic moment of the objective transcendent sense constituted in that activity by an egoic consciousness. For Husserl, this is the central matter of phenomenological interest. “We direct and fix our regard,” he says, “to the sphere of consciousness with the ‘I’ that is inseparable from it and study what we find immanently in it” (Husserl 1971: 71). Scheler argues, however, that Husserl’s reductive technique abstracts from what should be the heart of phenomenological interest. What we obtain by application of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction are abstract essences in other words.

These are ‘abstract,’ not because they have been ‘abstracted,’ but because they require supplementation insofar as they are to *be*. ... If an act-essence is to be concrete, its full intuitable givenness *presupposes* a reference to the essence of the *person*, who is executor of acts (Scheler 1973: 383f).

Thus, the “matter” of real phenomenological interest is the concrete individual person from which all intentional acts emanate and in which all different sorts of intentional acts have their unity. By means of his phenomenological reduction, in other words, Husserl overlooked the intending subject herself.

The person is not an empty ‘point of departure’ of acts; he is, rather, a concrete being. Unless we keep this in mind, all of our talk about acts can never catch the fully adequate essence of any act, but only an abstract essence (Scheler 1973: 384).

Scheler accepts that acts can be described, their morphology worked out, and the regions of being to which they relate laid bare. His work attests to his skill at just this sort of analysis. But if the ontic core, i.e., the personality of the concrete human being (and her world), is left out of the account, then these descriptions remain devoid of any genuine content. For Scheler, therefore, the spiritual center of intentionality, itself, is or should be the ultimate subject of phenomenological investigation. This spiritual center is the person herself, “living in each of her acts, who permeates every act with her peculiar character” (Scheler 1973: 386 translation slight modified). A phenomenology such as Husserl’s thus fails in the very desideratum of phenomenology, itself, which is to get at the heart of the matter.

Yet we should note that Scheler nevertheless placed great importance on the phenomenological reduction as an anthropological category. “While I do not agree with the details of Husserl’s theory of reduction,” he writes in his last published work, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, “I do admit that this reduction refers to the act that, first of all, defines the human spirit” (Scheler 2009: : 37f). Spirit (*Geist*), according to Scheler, is this fundamental capacity that we humans have to see the form of things. That is to say, it is the ability to ideate. Clearly, what Scheler understood as the phenomenological reduction is not what Husserl meant by the term in *Ideas I*. For Scheler, a genuine phenomenological reduction is what Husserl would call, more restrictively, a *Wesensanschauung*, the immediate grasping of the whatness of something. Nevertheless, for Scheler, “this ability to *separate essence from existence* constitutes the *fundamental* character of the human spirit” (Scheler 2009: 37).

This “phenomenological reduction” is explicitly defined by Scheler as a technique. It is the technique whereby we deny the living ground of our sense of reality. He likens the act of reduction to the ascetic attitude taken up by the Buddha. Sheltered as he

was during his childhood, the Buddha never experienced poverty, never saw how sickness can rack the body, and never perceived the mortification of another's body. A pivotal moment in his life occurs, however, when he escapes the confines of his father's palace.

The prince sees *one* poor person, *one* sick person, and *one* dead person...yet he immediately grasps these three accidental facts, 'now here as they are,' as mere examples of an *essential* makeup of the world (Scheler 2009: 35 translation modified).

The Buddha in other words grasps the essence of things, not inductively, but immediately. In this sense, the Buddha is an example of the human par excellence. The Buddha is just this kind of living entity capable of effecting a de-realization of the center of vital impulsion from which his sense of reality gains its force (Scheler 2009: 39). He is a spiritual being. For spirit (*Geist*) is "precisely just this being [*Sein*] capable of performing this act of de-realization" (Scheler 1995: : 44, cf. Scheler 2009: 39).

### Conclusion

In Scheler's phenomenological philosophy, every intentional act bears the stamp of the peculiar human personality as executor of these acts. We have left undiscussed to this point, however, the important consideration that each person is, as Scheler argues, ruled, first and foremost, by her heart. Every objectivity in experience is colored by an emotive stance toward (or repelled away from) that thing. Take for instance the experience of sugar on the tongue. Underlying the objectification of the quality of sweetness that we find in sugar is the value-feeling that it is tasty. So "a child knows that sugar is nice sooner than it is sweet" (Scheler 1960: : 86). Thus, Scheler asserts a primacy to the acts of valuation over all other intentional acts, which at their most basic are acts of love or hate. "They are the *basic acts* in which alone our theoretic and our practical life discovers and conserves its ultimate *unity*" (Scheler 1960: 88).

As a living spiritual entity, the human is a being capable of withdrawing from the commerce of her experiences in order to contemplate the formal structure of the world in which she finds herself emplaced. At root, she is of course an organic being. As an organic being, she is inclined emotively toward or away from the things pulling and repelling her in her environment. However, her unique personality allows her to extricate herself from this worldly captivation. She can, from within the well of her own being, say no to all this. This denial gives her the capacity to "see" value rather than merely follow it. Consequently, she can guide herself to one value over another. That is to say, she can grasp the value-essence of the useful, for instance, and compare this against the value-essence of the pleasing. She can even comprehend the distinction between lower life-relative values and higher spiritual values. And she can steer her impulses for the higher over the lower (or *vice versa*). She is in other words capable of grasping an objective hierarchy of values and in her person can steer and guide her impulses toward the higher (or lower) values. "It is ... precisely this theory which claims that there is a true good-in-itself which not only allows but also *demands* that there be a *good-in-itself* for each person in particular" (Scheler 1973: 490–1).

The human being, Scheler argues, enjoys therefore a special place in the sphere of things, since the human being is capable of something more than mere practical intelligence. There is something, some X within her which defines her uniquely and steers her impulses. This X is more than mere animal cleverness; it is in part – Scheler asserts – what the ancients referred to as reason.



We wish to suggest another and more comprehensive term for this X. The term also contains the concept of "reason," but it encompasses, in addition to the *thinking of ideas*, a special type of an "intuition" [*Anschauung*] of primordial phenomena and essential contents, and it encompasses also a specific class of volitional and emotive *acts* such as kindness, love, repentance, awe, states of wonder, bliss, despair, and free decision-making: this more comprehensive term is "spirit." The center of acts, however, through which this spirit appears within all finite spheres of being, is what we designate as "person" to sharply differentiate it from all functional centers of life ... (Scheler 2009: 26).

Thus, two cosmic principles subsist within the human as aspects of her being: the principle of life and the principle of spirit. Each person finds in herself the dynamic energy of life and the impotent but governing principle of spirit. Though we many at times act *like* brutes, this is a choice which, as a choice, remains completely foreign to animals. Spirit and life are complementary and interrelated [*aufeinander hingeordnet*]. Indeed, it is our special station in the cosmos to infuse spirit into the world. In so doing we participate in the co-execution of the activity of life *and* of spirit as individuals and as communities. This participation defines our unique human station in the cosmos. This is, indeed, the very essence of human personhood.

### Short Biography

Bob Sandmeyer's research is growing in two broad directions based on results obtained in his book, *Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise* (Routledge 2009). One branch focuses on developing a coherent ontology of life, while the other concerns the history of the phenomenological movement in Germany. Sandmeyer's current research program aims to flesh out the meaning of phenomenology as articulated by its original contributors. He holds a BA in Philosophy from George Washington University, an MA from Colorado State University, and a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Kentucky. He presently teaches classes in logic, philosophy of biology, and environmental philosophy and ethics at the University of Kentucky.

### Note

\* Correspondence: University of Kentucky, 1429 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506-0027, USA. Email: bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu.

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## Konopka, Adam: *Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats*

London: Routledge, 2019. ISBN: 9781138300378, 178 pp, US-\$124.00 (hardback), US-\$37.67 (eBook)

Bob Sandmeyer<sup>1</sup>

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Adam Konopka's book, *Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats*, is a well-documented study analyzing the philosophical commitments underlying the two dominant schools of plant ecology in the first half of the twentieth century, the Nebraska and the Chicago schools. This book, which is comprised of five distinct investigations, provides a rich historical analysis of the logics of plant habitat associations and the historical development of ecology as a science. However, Konopka goes beyond the merely historiographic to articulate an innovative new phenomenological approach to ecological form. Working at the boundary of geography, ecology, and philosophy, these investigations will reward careful study by theoretical ecologists, historians of science, and philosophers, particularly those who have an interest in the work of Edmund Husserl.

The five investigations which comprise this book exhibit, at once, two complementary lines of inquiry, one genealogical and the other analytical. For historians and those ecologists seeking to understand the development of ecology as a science, Konopka's text offers a nuanced historiographic resource. His genealogical investigations provide excellent articulation, first, of the central premises of early twentieth century plant ecology and, second, of theoretical developments occurring in the nineteenth century that informed this new science. Konopka's carefully researched studies serve, then, to clarify many presuppositions underlying contemporary debates in community ecology regarding the nature and character of ecological systems and debates in population ecology regarding causal interactions at various scales within ecological systems. For this reason, his investigations are not mere historiographies, but rather "historically sensitive analyses of persisting philosophical issues in the philosophy of ecology" (p. 9). The latter three chapters of the book build upon the results obtained in the earlier genealogical investigations. It is

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✉ Bob Sandmeyer  
bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu

<sup>1</sup> Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 1429 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506-0027, USA

in these later chapters, particularly, that Konopka develops his own phenomenological approach to ecological form, an approach that relies heavily on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In the most original sections of his book, Konopka brings to bear "resources from this phenomenological tradition, especially Husserl's theory of intentionality, logic of part-whole relations, and distinction between formal and regional ontology in an attempt to strengthen epistemological realist approaches in population and community ecology" (p. 78). This new approach is as unique within phenomenology as it is within the philosophy of ecology. One thus finds in Konopka's text refreshing disengagement with interpretations of Husserl's writings in favor of the application of his insights to new domains.

As noted, Konopka divides his book into five distinct chapters or "investigations"—minus the introduction and conclusion. The first two of Konopka's investigations are the most strictly ecological in theme. Both chapter one, "Varieties of succession: a genealogy of twentieth century plant ecology," and chapter two, "Logics of habitat fitness: a genealogy of nineteenth century plant geography," analyze the logics of form at play in early ecology. Taken together, these first two investigations explicate the logic, first, of the physiographic account of plant succession advanced by Henry Chandler Cowles, founder of the so-called Chicago school of ecology and, then, of the physiognomic account articulated by Frederick Clements, father of the Nebraska school.

In his first chapter, Konopka examines three case studies to explicate early twentieth century plant ecology. First, he details Henry Chandler Cowles' studies of Lake Michigan sand dune succession, wherein the theoretical stance of the Chicago school of ecology is articulated. Second, he takes up Frederick Clements' account of prairie succession, which defines the Nebraska school. The two schools differ in their conception of the unity that determines plant associations. Where the Chicago school understands plant communities to be aggregations of individuals, in which "egoism reigns supreme" (p. 22), the Nebraska school, on the contrary, holds that plant associations at the community level have a unity analogous to that of a biological individual. This tension between the two schools, wherein ecological form is thought to be either an aggregate of individualistic entities or a unitary organism, lies at the heart of early ecology and, thus, of Konopka's book. However, no account of the history of ecology in the first half of the century would be complete if it did not detail Raymond Lindeman's "decisive methodological breakthrough in twentieth century accounts of succession" (p. 40). Lindeman's analysis of trophic behaviors in lake ecosystems by which he established the bioeconomic conception of organic relations, which he published in four papers in 1941 and 1942, thus constitutes the third and final case study of this first investigation.

In the second chapter, Konopka retrogressively traces the origins of the individualistic and organismic theories of plant association to nineteenth century sources. Of the two first chapters, then, this second investigation is most genuinely genealogical. Here he demonstrates that Frederick Clements' organismic account of ecological form supposes the physiognomic account of plant form by Alexander von Humboldt in the nineteenth century. Conversely, he traces Henry Chandler Cowles' individualistic theory—and, by extension, Raymond Lindeman's bioeconomic model of organic relations—to the work of Eugenius Warming's

nineteenth century physiographic account of growth forms. “The search for an ecological notion of form in these genealogies illustrates a split between the fundamental assumptions and explanatory principles of the epistemological idealism of Humboldt and Clements, on the one hand, and the epistemological realism of Warming and Cowles, on the other” (p. 77).

Linking Clements’ notion of plant community to Alexander von Humboldt’s physiognomic account of plant form, Konopka argues that “Humboldt’s part-whole logic and implicit theory of manifolds can be properly characterized as an epistemological idealism that relies on a one-sided emphasis on the synthetic achievements of the plant geographer to account for the unity proper to plant formations” (p. 52). As Konopka notes, Humboldt applies the concept of plant form developed in the work of Schiller, Kant, and Goethe to geographical regions. That is to say, “in the same way that one discerns a certain physiognomy in individual organic beings [...] so too there is a physiognomy of Nature that applies, without exception, to each section of the Earth” (Humboldt 2014, quoted on p. 54). The compositional unity displayed in any particular landscape, thereby, is accounted for by a principle of purposiveness determining that formation. The recognition that individual plants function as but parts of a whole formation occurs in the aesthetic apprehension of the geographer. “This means that the purposive unity of organic forms—and by analogy plant collectives—obtains its logical necessity in the achievements of the cognizing subject, namely, the visual impressions and aesthetic experience of the plant geographer” (p. 57). For Konopka, this is the precise sense in which Humboldt’s—and by extension Clements’—account of organic forms supposes an epistemological idealism (p. 95).

Cowles, on the other hand, argues that the distribution and association of individual plants are determined by surface topography and the water variations in the soil of the habitats in which those plants grow. “This account of dune succession illustrates a methodological intertwinement between physiography and ecology” (p. 24). Konopka demonstrates that Cowles’ work rests on the aggregative concept of plant communities (*Plantesamfund* or *Pflanzenverein*) advanced by the Danish botanist, Eugenius Warming. For Cowles as for Warming, the aggregate is composed of individuals that do not function, qua individuals, as parts for the sake of a whole greater than themselves; they operate “with a logic of reciprocal dependence through which a plant society accomplishes something collectively through its large-scale organization” (p. 22). Unity of the plant association, then, is the product of geographical and hydrological variations conditioning the individual plant organisms. This logic of the reciprocal dependence of topography and the nutritive capacity of soil (i.e., water variations) “can be properly characterized as an epistemological realism that prioritized the ideographic particularity of given habitats” (p. 52).

As is clear, Humboldt’s idealistic account of plant form, and thus by extension Clements’ account of plant community, presupposes Kant’s theory of organic form articulated in *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Konopka favors the “epistemological realism” of the Chicago school over the “epistemological idealism” articulated in Clements’ work. In chapter three, then, “Kant’s account of organic form: a phenomenological critique,” Konopka’s seeks “to identify and clarify a fundamental epistemological error of biological (and ecological) idealism” (p. 82).

Konopka examines three related theses important to Kant's theory of the biological organism. First, he attempts to show that Kant's conception of the biological organism includes three essential features: (i) that parts and wholes are interdependent, (ii) that this interdependency is contingent rather than necessary, and (iii) that part-whole relations exhibit a means-end or purposive relation that is determined reflectively in judgment. Second, he argues critically against Kant insofar as his theory of the biological organism "grounds the necessary unity of organic forms in the synthetic achievements of the cognitive subject in an asymmetric relation and thereby underdetermines the kinds of unity proper to the organic forms of individuals themselves" (p. 83). Third, following suggestions made by the biologist, Ernst Mayr, Konopka argues that causal explanations in the biological sciences can be subdivided into two distinct types or taxa. Ultimate evolutionary causation offers an historical narrative account of the rise and demise of distinct genotypes; proximate causal explanation details the mechanisms by which the characteristics of the individual result from the interaction of the genotype with the environment. "My claim," Konopka argues in this chapter, "is that the sense-making of the phenotypic individual in its habitat is the primary content of biological forms" (p. 83). That is to say, Konopka agrees with Kant and Mayr that proximate causal explanations remain indispensable to biological theory and "that phenomenological resources provide an attractive alternative to Kant's approach" (p. 120).

Konopka's ambition in his third chapter is great. Not only does he straddle Kant's first and third *Critiques* in an attempt to explain their internal unity, but he also applies Ernst Mayr's pluralistic account of biological explanation to defend his phenomenological account of ecological form. The critical and constructive breadth of his endeavor in this chapter makes unpacking it impossible in this limited review. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that the ecologist will find this investigation opaque and the philosopher will find the compression of basic problems in Kant's critical project dissatisfying.

Importantly, though, this third chapter inaugurates the text's first real engagement with Husserl's phenomenology and initiates, thereby, the first articulations of Konopka's phenomenological approach to ecological form. As mentioned earlier, Konopka favors the "epistemological realism" of the Chicago school over the idealism inherent to the Nebraska's school's account of plant communities. In this chapter—and indeed, for all intents and purposes in the rest of the book—Kant stands in for Clements and the entire Nebraska school of ecology, and Konopka invokes Husserl's own critique of Kant's formalism to refute it. Further, he more positively treats the biological individual as a leading clue for phenomenological elucidation.

Organisms have intimately unified relations of self-organization and these relations are internally unified with (not merely coupled in an external relation to) the sense-making processes involved in the habitual and adaptive activities in their environment. This phenomenological articulation of organic form is different from Kant's account in that it operates with a theory of intentionality that addresses the problem of necessity through an account of objective sense rather than appealing to the synthesizing achievements of the cognizing knower (p. 112).

Konopka thus advances an “epistemological realist” view in line with the Chicago school of ecology which provides objective grounding for the unity of organic collectives. He here employs Husserl’s theory of part-whole relations and the distinction between formal and material ontologies to buttress to the realist epistemology inherent in Cowles’ account.

In the final two chapters of the book, then, Konopka brings these phenomenological resources to the fore. Chapter four, “Husserl’s logic of fitness: parts, wholes and phenomenological necessity,” and chapter five, “Environing places and geometric space” are, consequently, the most phenomenological in theme. The fourth investigation takes up where the Kant-critique in the third chapter leaves off. Here Konopka “reconstructs Husserl’s accounts of unified definite manifolds and part-whole logic and applies them to a phenomenological logic of habitat fitness” (p. 127). Where the theme of Konopka’s third investigation centers on the problem of biological form, this fourth investigation focuses on the necessity inherent to the unity of manifold variations.

For Konopka, “Husserl is an epistemological realist here in a way that Kant is not” (p. 5). Konopka’s primary objection to the Kantian-Clementian account of the unity of ecological forms is that the idealistic account underdetermines the unity of biological individuals. For it too one-sidedly traces this unity to the synthetic achievements of the cognitive subject. The account he will advance in the fourth and fifth chapters advances, then, “a symmetrical notion of presentational dependence that operates with a notion of necessity that can be defined as *necessary supplementation involved in alteration*” (p. 132). Yet Konopka’s realist interpretation of Husserl epistemology misrepresents the idealistic commitments of that philosophy, and this is most clearly seen in the articulation of the “symmetrical notion of presentational dependence” explicated in the fourth chapter.

Konopka concludes his third chapter both summarizing his critique of the Kantian idealist presuppositions underlying the Clementian notion of plant communities and pointing forward to his Husserlian account in the next chapter, where he says that “a symmetrical or double-sided approach to the presentational sense of biological parts and wholes provides a pathway to a logic of sense of the self-organization of biological individuals” (p. 120). However, it is unclear to what “biological individuals” he is referring in this passage. The consequence of his rejecting the idealistic account of organic form is the concomitant rejection of the proposition that plant communities have a unity analogous to that of biological individuals. Habitats, in other words, are not biological individuals. The realist position with which Konopka aligns himself asserts that ecological formations are fundamentally aggregates of biological individuals. Consequently, this brings into question the metaphysical status of the whole as such, i.e., the forest for the trees.

Konopka is not unaware of this issue and discusses this explicitly in the final section of chapter four, “Conclusion: the problem of ecological emergence.” Emergent properties are causally significant properties whose appearance in complex systems cannot be predicted or necessarily accounted for by the activities and interactions of the constituent elements within that system. “But what if the relationship between large-scale organizations and micro-level basal conditions were understood in presentational terms oriented by an explanatory interest in broader ranges of necessity?”

he asks (p. 142). Konopka points out that Husserlian phenomenology is neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of wholes and parts. A phenomenological account thereby undertakes to describe ontological dependencies by reference to lawful relations of foundation as they occur presentationally.

The presentational sense of the trees as an aggregate collection is a founding moment in the presentational sense of the forest as an organized collection. The concept of trees does not logically exhaust the concept of forest, however. The forest has large-scale functional organization proper to a habitat – organized manifold of ecological fitness – that is not conceptually reducible to the trees. The forest-as-habitat has an incompressible pattern of necessary associations that, in principle, has its own determinate sense of meaningful contents (pp. 142–143).

Accepting this account, though, does nothing to diminish the fact that organisms display a tighter unity of whole-part relations than can ever be found in ecosystems. The very self of self-organization appears at best muted, or simply absent, at the large-scale level. Konopka thus equivocates when he speaks of “biological individuals” in his text: sometimes he refers to organisms; often, though, he appears to be speaking of habitats, i.e., “the ecological things themselves” (p. 9).

This problem of equivocation could be remedied were Konopka to elucidate more carefully the dual character of phenomenological description in the fourth chapter. While he does not ignore the synthetic activities of the cognizing subject in picking out and attending to objects in the field of consciousness in his realist account of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, he nevertheless downplays their significance in this overly brief chapter. “For Husserl, the unity that is achieved in the synthesis identity of perception is inherent in the determinate sense of the object itself and is not reducible to the perceptual achievements of the cognizing and embodied subject” (p. 135). Konopka is correct to assert, as he does a few lines later, that “unity is here discovered (not achieved by the knower)” (p. 135). But Husserl is no realist. That is to say, while the articulation of sense in consciousness is not reducible to subjective accomplishments alone, it cannot be accounted for entirely objectively either. Husserl’s phenomenology is an idealism, a point never mentioned by Konopka in his book. His realist interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, I would suggest, underplays the accomplishments of the subject in grasping and holding on to an identity as it persists qua *die Sache selbst* in consciousness. Hence, it remains unclear in these investigations *how* one grasps the forest qua forest for the trees.

Yet the forest qua habitat is an object that can be grasped as such because of the ecological relations on display within it. Indeed, the phenomenological tools Konopka employs provide necessary clarification of the objective relations encountered and studied by the ecologist:

We could say, for example, that the beech tree is a mediate founding moment to the nutrient provision of the woodpecker, while the insect is the immediate founding moment. It is according to the founding relations such as this that the nutrient fitness involved in a habitat is not merely a sum or aggregate, but an organized and organizing collective of meaningful relations that, as we have



seen, have suppositions and forms of unified contents that are proper to the kind of object that it is (p. 132).

This logic of fitness described here, rooted in Husserl's logical analyses of identities-in-a-manifold, brings clarity to the Chicago school's concept of ecological form. The ecological things are not *mere* aggregates; the logic of reciprocal dependence which is on display in habitats accomplishes something collectively.

Consequently, as Konopka highlights in his fifth and final chapter, "Environing place and geometric space," such habitats have a unique worldly character. They do not merely surround but also constitute the very lives of the animals within them. "This is not a mathematical logic of spatiality, but a logic of the spatial sense of relative locations that does not uncritically abstract from the perceptual sense of embodied habituation" (p. 148). Ecological things, in other words, are the lived worlds, not mere spaces, of living organisms. Thus, their study requires sensitivity to the objective intersubjective relations constitutive of that place.

Reading Konopka's work promotes two worries. The great promise of this book is that it bridges both ecology and phenomenology. I fear, though, that working ecologists and many historians of science may get lost amidst the thickets of phenomenological analyses in the later investigations of this work, just as many phenomenologists may lose their footing as they work through the jargon in the earlier genealogical investigations. Second, the brevity of the phenomenological fourth and fifth chapters of the book highlights a problem with Konopka's realist interpretation of Husserl. He forcefully critiques the idealism of the Nebraska school without adequately clarifying that his own approach articulates a fundamentally different and novel phenomenological idealism. Some recognition and redress of this omission is called for. But for any fault one may find in the work, this remains at the end of the day an excellent resource. The care with which the author documents his approach as he delves into the literature of both ecology and phenomenology is as admirable as it is impressive. Indeed, for anyone interested the application of Husserl's phenomenology to a new domain, Konopka's investigations are a model to follow. The approach articulated herein is new to ecological studies and to phenomenological studies. This innovation is both long overdue and most welcome.

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later objections that judgment is always already built on pre-judgment (prejudice); and, in the process, he acquits Kant of the charge that his judgment-based account of cognition is guilty of the naïve Enlightenment vice of reducing our understanding to self-evident rational standards. Distinguishing cognitive convincing (*überzeugen*) from reflective witnessing (*zeugen*), Makkreel argues that Kant's theory of the latter offers a promising approach to critical understanding not provided by more recent hermeneutic philosophies.

He makes the further case for the hermeneutical value of Kant's account of judgments in chapter 5, where he makes a helpful comparison between Kant's distinction between determining and reflective judgment on the one hand, and Dilthey's contrast between explanation and understanding on the other. Chapter 6 continues this argument in the case of historical understanding, distinguishing anticipatory reflection from reflective self-awareness or "second-order reflexivity made possible by reflective judgment" (166), which he claims is the key to a hermeneutics that makes tradition responsive to criticism and open to fundamental changes. Chapter 7 then moves from what he calls the "constitutive" critiques of Kant and Dilthey to Jürgen Habermas's and Paul Ricoeur's "regulative" hermeneutics based on ideal communication situations. Again Makkreel argues for a reflective account that also refers to specific, subjectively oriented communicative situations.

The final section of the book (Applications and Adaptations) deals with genealogical (Friedrich Nietzsche's) and narrative theories of history, and discusses issues of art interpretation in the age of electronic media and the digital revolution. He argues for an updated affirmation of artistic creativity that can still remain open to fundamental changes in its modes of expression. Again he argues in a Kantian vein that our capacity to have expansive feelings that transport us beyond ourselves can be applied to new media and techniques. The value of art lies in its ability to expand our horizons and to help adapt and transform old traditions in new contexts.

Overall, Makkreel's book is full of interesting exegetical and philosophical discussion of major themes in the development of philosophical hermeneutics since Kant. There are omissions, of course. Friedrich Schleiermacher and Friedrich Schlegel, among others, receive relatively little attention, even though their views represent distinct alternatives to the Kantian and Hegelian trajectories that Makkreel traces through to the present. Instead, he presents a strong sustained argument for reconsidering more tradition-based theories in light of a hermeneutics of (Kantian) reflective judgment. He never claims to be presenting a comprehensive historical overview, however. His aim is to offer a new account that can better address the complex problems of interpretation and understanding in our own time. This book is a welcome step in that direction.

JANE KNELLER

*Colorado State University*

Andrea Staiti. *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 313. Cloth, \$95.00.

With this new book, Andrea Staiti provides both a richly researched work in the history of philosophy and an important new introduction, a contextualization really, of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Staiti situates Husserl among the Neo-Kantian philosophers, particularly Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and Franz Böhme of the Southwest school, and two life-philosophers influential in the development of his mature conception of transcendental phenomenology, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The historical approach he adopts in the book is modeled on the *Konstellationsforschung* employed in the study of German Idealism by Dieter Heinrich, and this technique when applied to Husserl's transcendental philosophy proves especially fruitful. It is by means of this style of analysis that Staiti substantiates his thesis that Husserl's philosophy ought to be and was in fact understood by Husserl, himself, as scientific life-philosophy.

The book is divided into eight chapters, but these coalesce implicitly into three sections. The first two chapters provide an overview of the two dominant philosophical schools against which Husserl's philosophy developed. In the first chapter, Staiti argues convincingly against the standard interpretation of Southwestern school of Neo-Kantianism. The efforts conceptually to demarcate the natural and the human sciences imply, he argues, an ontological supplement by which to ground this demarcation. Staiti shows in this first chapter that this need was both recognized and evinced in the work of the major figures of the school. Turning in the next chapter to the life-philosophers, Staiti remains focused on the project of clarifying the demarcation between the natural and the human sciences. Here he shows how Simmel's unique appropriation of Kant's notion of the world-forming power of life and Dilthey's analytical description of life offer a counterbalance to the philosophers of Southwest school. Where the first two chapters provide a historical overview and background to Husserl's philosophy, Staiti painstakingly details the influence these two constellations play in the next six chapters. Chapters 3–5 examine Husserl's work in confrontation and interplay with the Neo-Kantian philosophers. In these chapters, particularly, Staiti presents a master class in comparative philosophy. His analysis in the third chapter of the homology between the Neo-Kantian notion of "standpoint" and the Husserlian concept of "attitude" as essential to the idea of scientificity in the work of both is especially rich and nuanced. Chapter 4 details the reception of Husserl's *Ideen* among the Neo-Kantians. Here Paul Natorp's influence in the development of genetic phenomenology by Husserl comes into full view. According to Staiti, "Husserl's move *towards* genetic phenomenology does not mean a move *away* from static phenomenology or a change of mind about fundamental phenomenological concepts such as essence and intuition" (130). It is unfortunate, however, that Staiti does not address and defend this view against clear and well-known objections to it. But this is a rare moment of weakness in an otherwise forceful and substantially researched argument. The fifth chapter concerns Husserl's 1919 and 1927 "Nature and Spirit" lectures, and the book regains its footing here. Once again, the demarcation of the sciences of nature and of spirit, that is, the human sciences, takes center stage. Here Staiti details Husserl's considered confrontation with Rickert in the lecture courses. Most significantly, this chapter marks a transition to the third and final set of chapters, which, in the main, centers on Husserl's relation to and self-understanding of transcendental phenomenology as life-philosophy. In chapter 6, Staiti analyzes the development of Husserl's conception of phenomenology from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology. Of particular importance in this chapter is the explication of the historical method that arose in Husserl's late articulation of his philosophy as universal science of both physical nature and human, historical subjectivity. In the final two chapters, the first on the life-world concept and its centrality to the transcendental-phenomenological worldview, and the second on the ethical implications of this phenomenology of the life-world, Staiti lays out an unparalleled interpretation of Husserl's late philosophy. It is in these chapters that Staiti convincingly illustrates how precisely Husserl was "able to harmonize two traditionally divergent desiderata in post-Kantian German philosophy: scientificity and proximity to life" (291).

A review of this brevity cannot do justice to the richness of this book. This is a work of expert craftsmanship whose author has a deft and enviable grasp both of Husserl's entire corpus and of the constellation of philosophers so influential to the mature development of his transcendental phenomenology. The author achieves his stated goals admirably, first to present to Anglophone readers a largely ignored chapter in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought, and, second, to advance our understanding of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology by critical study of his late work. Easily readable, Staiti's new book contextualizes Husserl's thinking in an engaging and profoundly new way.

BOB SANDMEYER

University of Kentucky

**Aldo Leopold. *A Sand County Almanac and Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation*. Edited by Curt Meine**

New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 2013. 931 pages. ISBN: 9781598532067 (hardcover). US \$35.00

**Reviewed by Bob Sandmeyer, University of Kentucky**

Excepting two of Aldo Leopold's published books, his *Report on a Game Survey of the North Central States* (1931) and *Game Management* (1933), this handsome new anthology contains virtually everything Leopold published during his lifetime as well as the main host of his unpublished shorter works, his personal journals, and an extensive selection of his letters. Edited by Curt Meine and published by The Library of America, this collection is sure to become the new standard for scholars and aficionados of Leopold's writings alike. The scope of writings and the careful editing of the work make this volume unquestionably the most authoritative collection of Leopold's writings yet produced.

Meine divides the anthology into four sections, not including a substantive set of endnotes and indices. The first section contains the complete text of Leopold's most well-known work, *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (hereafter *ASCA*). The second section, titled "Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation," comprises fifty-six shorter writings produced by Leopold, many of which have been in print for years now. The third section contains complete texts of twelve journals written from 1920 to 1936 as well as thirteen entries from the "Shack Journals" written between 1935 and 1948. The fourth and final section offers the most exciting new addition of Leopold materials in print to date. This is a collection of some ninety-four letters, all written by Leopold, some for public consumption, some privately. The letters are arranged chronologically from 1903 to 1948. Taken as a whole, the anthology presents a picture of Leopold as never before seen.

As noted, *ASCA* stands in the primary position in the anthology. Meine has preserved the structure of the work as published in the original 1949 edition by Oxford University Press, *inclusive* of Charles W. Schwartz's illustrations. Thus he redresses a long standing complaint among scholars of Leopold's work concerning the inclusion of alien elements into the revised and enlarged 1966 edition of *ASCA* by Oxford University Press. The outstanding feature of Leopold's first edition was its overall beauty, and this work retains that same characteristic. This book is a bit hefty making it not as portable as Leopold's original. The inclusion of Leopold's shorter works makes up for this deficiency, though.

The second section, i.e., "Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation," comprises nearly all of Leopold's shorter works. The bulk of these were originally published in Susan Flader's and J. Baird Callicott's excellent

anthology, *The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays by Aldo Leopold* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). Meine follows Flader and Callicott in organizing the works chronologically here. This is, indeed, what is particularly nice about this volume. Its principle of organization reflects an archivalist eye, and Meine's execution in this section follows the plan laid out by Flader and Callicott. So even though a good bit of the material published herein has already been published elsewhere, this volume allows the scholar conveniently to trace the development of Leopold's thought while comparing this against *ASCA*. This convenience alone makes the anthology worthwhile. It is unfortunate, then, that the chronological ordering of the shorter articles is not more readily apparent in Meine's edition. Where Callcott and Flader were very clear in regards to the organizational principle at work in their collection, emphasizing thereby the developmental nature of Leopold's thinking, the reader of Meine's edition may find this difficult to discern. To his merit, Meine has appended the publication or typescript date to the end of each selection. While difficult to see at first, to the careful eye it will not be hard to uncover. If one were to criticize this volume, this lack of clarity regarding the ordering of these shorter works is its greatest weakness. But again, Meine offers enough information for the careful reader to track their trajectory.

Sections 3 and 4 contain a selection of Leopold's journals and letters, respectively. Positioning these after both *ASCA* and his shorter essays has two merits. On the one hand, setting these more personal writings off, as Meine has done, allows the reader to form a clear view of Leopold the man, that is, Leopold the husband, father, hunter, and friend. On the other hand, reading the journals and the letters fills out our view of Leopold's philosophy articulated in the first two sections by giving us a view into those experiences which suffuse this philosophy. Many of the journals included in Meine's edition have never before been published. Meine has also included maps and photographs which Leopold, himself, later appended to his journals. Thus one can really get a good sense of the trips and the people about which Leopold writes in these journals. But the letters included here are a genuine treasure. Very many of these have remained locked away except to the most dedicated of Leopold scholars. With the inclusion of Leopold's letters to his parents, his wife, his children, his colleagues, his publishers, and to his President, Meine has provided a portrait of Leopold in his own words. The letters, especially, give the collection a sense of Leopold's heart; the journals offer us a picture of Leopold as he lived. When reading these personal writings together, especially in conjunction with the materials in the first two sections, one can see how his own experiences were fundamental to the formation of his philosophy. Thus Meine introduces an implicit claim about Leopold's environmental philosophy in this anthology. The land ethic, which he articulated in the capstone essay of *ASCA*, cannot be fully appreciated apart from Leopold's own life history.

Scholars of Leopold's life and work should not overlook the ancillary textual material produced by Meine at the conclusion of this anthology. The chronology of Leopold's life which Meine provides is adequate. However, the two sets of notes, i.e., the "Note on the Texts and Illustrations" and Meine's own editorial "Notes" to the texts, are a repository of scholarship. The excellent "Note on the Texts" lays out a well-researched overview of the history of revisions and publication not merely of ASCA but also of all the texts included in the collection. In his editorial "Notes," Meine offers the reader not a few surprise inclusions, the greatest of which is the original forward to ASCA in its entirety penned by Leopold after Knopf rejected his book for publication. Finally, Meine concludes the book with two substantive and very helpful indices, a general index and an index of animal and plant names.

What with the Aldo Leopold Archives available online at the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections (<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/AldoLeopold>) and now the publication of this important text, Leopold's entire corpus is happily available quite generally. Meine's work as editor is truly superb in this volume. Leopold died before he saw his most significant work, *A Sand County Almanac*, published. The original title of that work was to be "Great Possessions." Though it is true that many of the texts in this new anthology can be found elsewhere, Meine's superb effort ensures this new collection will, itself, be a great possession to add to one's library.

## **J. N. Mohanty: *Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years, 1916–1938***

**Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2011, 512 pp, \$85.00, Hardcover, ISBN 978-0-300-15221-0**

**Bob Sandmeyer**

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This work, a significant achievement by itself, completes J. N. Mohanty's comprehensive two-volume study of Edmund Husserl's body of writings. With the publication of this second volume, Mohanty has produced an immensely detailed and profound analysis of Husserl's philosophy. At nearly one thousand pages for both volumes, the scale of this achievement cannot be overstated. As Robert Sokolowski notes in his review of the first volume (*Husserl Studies* 25, p. 256), Mohanty's work offers an immeasurably helpful manual for those who seek to work their way through parts or the whole of Husserl's corpus. Where the first volume, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development*, ranges from his early years at Halle to the publication of *Ideen I* and the conclusion of his teaching career at Göttingen, this second volume begins with Husserl's "Inaugural Lecture" at Freiburg and works its way through his lectures, research manuscripts, and published writings to the *Krisis* texts produced in retirement.

The break between the first and the second volume insinuates something of an artificial caesura in Husserl's thought, a complication of which Mohanty is keenly aware. In Chapter 1, accordingly, Mohanty provides the reader with a *précis* of his first volume. His typical procedure when summarizing the results of Husserl's investigations is to tabulate them in numbered lists, and he follows this procedure here. In the second section of this chapter, then, Mohanty advances a view originally proposed by (but not attributed to) Eugen Fink in the latter's essay, "Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit." Mohanty asserts that a correlation can be found between the main works of the Freiburg period and those of the Halle and Göttingen periods. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and the Vienna Lectures are related to the *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, and the *Logos* article, respectively, in such a way that the later writings elevate the earlier to

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B. Sandmeyer (✉)  
Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 1429 Patterson Office Tower,  
Lexington, KY 40506-0027, USA  
e-mail: bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu

a higher niveau. With this insight in mind, Mohanty expresses a thesis at the outset of this particular volume which he sees evinced in his own study of Husserl's writings. Indeed, this thesis is nearly identical to the position he staked out in his 2003 article "The Unity of Husserl's Philosophy," published in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (57, pp. 115–132). There is, he suggests in this newer work, a tendency in Husserl scholarship to see a radical break in Husserl's conception of transcendental phenomenology. Where the early writings focus intently on scientific thinking and its theoretical attitude, the later writings are more thoroughly culture-oriented and articulate a genetic or explicitly historical method. "By subscribing to this idea [of a radical change] one tends to miss the underlying unity of his thinking, despite the surfacing of new themes" (p. 7). While there are indeed definite points of contrast, surprising shifts in vision, and a deepening of insights evident in Husserl's development, there is in Mohanty's opinion no radical break between the earlier and the later Husserl.

This is of course a highly contentious claim, and, taken together, the two volumes of Mohanty's study offer perhaps the most well documented effort to date to substantiate this unity thesis. Whether or not he succeeds, Mohanty's book achieves two immensely important goals simultaneously. First, chapter by chapter it provides deeply penetrating analyses of Husserl's most significant writings. Second, it anchors these analyses in an understanding of the project of transcendental phenomenology as a whole. Consequently, Mohanty's study is at once a masterly explication and an authoritative interpretation of Husserl's philosophical project.

Mohanty divides this volume into six parts. Looking over these divisions, though, one is immediately struck by the emphasis he places on Husserl's efforts to systematize transcendental phenomenology during the Freiburg period. A full half of the content of this volume—indeed the subject matter of Parts I, IV, and V—concerns Husserl's efforts toward this end. Parts II and III, on the other hand, focus on Husserl's important investigations into time and temporalization, intersubjectivity, and the genesis and activity of logical thinking. He concludes the work in Part VI by viewing Husserl in the light of "those to whom his thought stands related by its internal dialectic as well as by its own structure and motivation," i.e., Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger (p. 441). In the closing chapter, Mohanty leaves us with "a final overview." This takes the form of thirty distinct propositions marking out the contribution Husserl's theory of intentionality makes to philosophy. These are divided into three sections: (i) static phenomenology, (ii) genetic phenomenology, and (iii) intentionality in intersubjectivity.

Looking now to the six parts individually, Part I concerns Husserl's attempt to fulfill the desideratum of a complete system of phenomenology in the three volumes of *Ideen*. That *Ideen I* remains outside the scope of Mohanty's volume does not harm the internal coherence of the work, since Chapter 2 takes up Husserl's "Inaugural Lecture" at Freiburg, in which Husserl presented a definition of phenomenology for those of his new colleagues unfamiliar with his philosophy. Thus by turning to this lecture Mohanty lays out the aims and central problems of transcendental phenomenology briefly and effectively without needing to revisit his earlier study in great detail. Chapters 3–5 offer a careful explication of Husserliana IV, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*,



*zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. Following the structure of this work, Mohanty traces Husserl's investigations into the constitution of nature (Chapter 3), of living beings and mind (Chapter 4), and of the spiritual world (Chapter 5). It is in these studies, Mohanty suggests, that Husserl moves beyond the programmatic conception of transcendental constitution articulated in *Ideen I*. "To give but one example, nature is not simply constituted but also plays a constituting role, it contributes to the constitution of full intersubjectivity. Constitution does not work, to use a metaphor, simply from above, it also works from below and laterally" (pp. 60–61). These constitutional studies point to new directions of research that will dominate Husserl's later work, work that forms the central concern of the next two parts of Mohanty's study.

Here one can see the latter's great strength, i.e., the efficacy by which it details the motivations underlying Husserl's revision of the transcendental problematic. Mohanty, in other words, does not so much explicitly argue for the unity thesis throughout this volume as he, rather, demonstrates its cogency in the unfolding of the problematic of transcendental phenomenology by Husserl. He thus concludes this first part with an explication of Husserliana V, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*. Here Mohanty notes that though the published text belongs to the Göttingen period and so should properly have been included in the first volume of his study, he places it in this second volume so as to remain faithful to the intended sequence of investigations. He closes out this first part, as he does each of the six parts of the book, with a series of propositions summarizing the main investigative results obtained by Husserl in those writings under consideration.

Part II details Husserl's investigations into time and intersubjectivity. Chapter 7 covers both Husserl's middle and late time manuscripts, i.e., the investigations contained within Husserliana XXXIII, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917–1918)* and the C-manuscripts now available in volume 8 of the *Materialien* series of Husserliana, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934)*. Mohanty's explication of the Bernau manuscripts largely follows the ordering and grouping of manuscripts in Husserliana. He focuses on seven themes particularly: the new account of Brentano's thesis of "inner perception," the development of a noematic description of time-consciousness, the relation of time-consciousness to the pure ego, the relation between hyletic temporality and the temporality of experience, the development of genetic phenomenology, the discovery of a secondary form of passivity, and the temporal constitution of individuality. Since Husserl's later investigations into time and temporalization, i.e., the C-manuscripts, had not been published at the time Mohanty was working on his study, the exposition here mainly refers to the manuscript numbers without page reference. Mohanty remarks near the end of the chapter that he "cannot but place on record my thoughts on why the time manuscripts are so exhilarating after all" (p. 94). This is a rare personal effusion by an author who has, almost to a fault, devoted himself to the articulation of problems in the texts as published.

In Chapter 8, Mohanty turns to the main results obtained by Husserl within the three-volume collection of his writings on intersubjectivity, Husserliana XIII–XV,

*Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass*: 1905–1920, 1921–1928, and 1929–1935, respectively. He expands his purview to include intersubjectivity as treated in the 1923–1924 lectures, *Erste Philosophie*, in *Husserliana* VII and VIII. The discussion in Chapters 7 and 8 are highly compressed. Chapter 8 offers an especially dense presentation of the developing analyses of empathy, intermonadic relations, and the problem of other minds from writings Husserl produced between approximately 1918 and 1927.

Though Mohanty generally remains steadfast to the chronological parameters he set for this volume, he does allow himself an exception here in order to look back to Husserl's earlier lecture course, "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie" (1910–1911), and other important texts and addenda contained in *Husserliana* XIII. And in another departure, while the *Cartesian Meditations* is detailed later in Part IV, here in Chapter 9 Mohanty lays out an illuminating historical study of Husserl's developing analyses of intersubjectivity. Although this leaves the work rather opaque regarding the actual sequence of the *Cartesian Meditations* as published, this seems justified by Mohanty's clear articulation of the constitutional problems articulated in the various *Meditations* in light of their historical development by Husserl.

Part III concerns Husserl's investigation into passive synthesis and the origin of logic. The four chapters that make up this section provide an especially authoritative reconstruction of the development of genetic phenomenology and the deepening of the transcendental project this entails. Mohanty argues that the idea of passive synthesis was anticipated as early as the *Logical Investigations*, and that it emerged clearly in §118 of *Ideen* I and §9 and §61 of *Ideen* II. Thus Part III provides some of the most significant evidence substantiating his unity thesis. Chapter 10 deals with the materials brought together in *Husserliana* XI, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926*. As Mohanty moves from the synopsis of Husserl's lecture course materials to highly fecund comparisons with Brentano, Kant, and the Indian philosopher, Samkara, this short chapter is one of the book's richest but also one of its densest. The chapter treats perception as self-giving in primordial impression, its modalization (both active and passive), evidence, association, recollection, expectation, and the being-in-itself of consciousness. He concludes with a brief appendix on "active and passive synthesis," taken up in the supplement to *Husserliana* XI, i.e., *Husserliana* XXXI *Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung 'Transzendente Logik' 1920/21. Ergänzungsband zu 'Analysen zur passiven Synthesis.'*

The materials in this supplementary volume are taken up again in Chapter 11, which investigates the accomplishments of ego-activities. Here Mohanty explores the way Husserl develops the contrast between activity and passivity, different layers of objectification, and the explicit development of static and genetic methods of phenomenology relevant to the theory of judgment. Mohanty notes that these investigations culminate in two works, *Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft* (hereafter *FTL*) and *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik* (hereafter *EU*). These two sets of writings provide the subject matter of Chapters 12 and 13. Here Mohanty is at his most analytically astute and his most effusive in praise of Husserl's achievements.

Chapter 12 deals with *EU*, while Chapter 13 details the main results of *FTL*. Where one would expect an analysis of *FTL* to precede that of *EU*, Mohanty treats *EU* as propaedeutic for two reasons: first, it relies for its content on investigations produced much earlier than those of *FTL*, and second, it is written in a relatively nontechnical manner. “For the same reason, I have regarded *Formal and Transcendental Logic* as Husserl’s final version of transcendental logic” (p. 256).

Parts IV and V detail Husserl’s second and third attempts, respectively, to articulate a system of phenomenological philosophy. Mohanty opens Part IV in Chapter 14 with an examination of Husserl’s winter semester lectures of 1923–1924, *Erste Philosophie* (Husserliana VII and VIII). After a rather quick review of Husserl’s historical analysis in Husserliana VII, he turns to the more systematic volume of *Erste Philosophie* and offers a detailed examination of Husserl’s reflections on the theory of phenomenological reduction. This examination is divided into two parts: a critique of mundane experience and the temporality of the transcendental stream of subjective life. Mohanty concludes the chapter with a reference to Husserl’s own conclusion in Beilage XXXII, i.e., the sentence: “History is the great fact of absolute being” (p. 335). Instead of revisiting Ludwig Landgrebe’s well-known essay here, Mohanty simply remarks that “This sentence is not further explained, and it seems we are left in the vicinity of Hegel.” Again and again Mohanty restricts himself simply to the texts at hand. This respectful dedication is the defining feature of his study.

In Chapter 15, Mohanty takes up Husserl’s phenomenological psychology lecture course, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article and famous “collaboration” with Heidegger, and the 1928 Amsterdam Lectures, all found in Husserliana IX. The chapter includes a rich, albeit brief, discussion of the philosophical relationship between Dilthey and Husserl. In turning to the *Britannica* article, Mohanty focuses primarily on Husserl’s drafts. He does, however, recount the debate between Husserl and Heidegger documented in these texts and quotes extensively from Heidegger’s letter to Husserl of 22 October 1927. The chapter closes with a review of the content of the Amsterdam Lectures. Finally, Chapter 16 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the first four of the *Cartesian Meditations*, first as articulated in the Paris Lectures and then as Husserl rewrote and augmented them in the work now published in Husserliana I. He presents a very nice historical contextualization of the lectures and illustrates how the development of themes in the *Meditations* reflects Husserl’s response to Roman Ingarden’s skeptical arguments. In the context of these analyses Mohanty traces correspondences between the first four *Meditations* and *Ideen I*.

Part V concludes Mohanty’s explication of Husserl’s corpus. Chapter 17 is titled “The Vienna and Prague Lectures,” and it presents a very helpful schema of the thinking articulated in the Vienna Lecture. But most of the chapter concerns the Prague Lecture, the published text of the *Krisis* lecture, and the materials that make up Parts II and III of Husserliana VI, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. Mohanty at once offers a clear articulation of Husserl’s analyses and emphasizes the significance of this line of investigation within transcendental phenomenology. He concludes this chapter with an articulation of the basic questions at work in the Vienna Lecture. Chapter 18 is one of the most interesting chapters of the whole study, as it takes up the “Origin of Geometry” fragment produced in 1936, published by Eugen Fink in 1939, and

translated by Jacques Derrida in 1962. Mohanty presents an overview of the text and the significant questions it raises, the “new light Derrida throws on Husserl’s ideas” (p. 425), and an analysis of what he terms “the Fink phenomenon.” Thus the chapter offers an examination of Husserl’s project of transcendental phenomenology in light of Derrida’s analysis and as contraposed with Fink’s *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. In many respects, Mohanty’s analyses here foreshadow the penultimate chapter of the study in which he examines Husserl’s philosophy against that of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. But this sort of examination is, as I have suggested, a departure from the more typical method of textual analysis that defines this study. Chapter 19, a brief chapter of only two pages, concludes Part V with an overview of Husserl’s analysis of the transcendental constitution of birth and death advanced in the manuscript “Die phänomenologische Problematik von Geburt, Tod, Unbewusstsein zurückgeleitet zur allgemeinen Theorie der Intentionalität” (A VI 14). This marks the end of Mohanty’s textual analysis in the book. Poignantly, though, he closes with Malvine Husserl’s description of Husserl’s last days and night of death.

Mohanty concludes his study in Part VI briefly with two final chapters. In Chapter 20, he discusses Husserl’s thought in relation to that of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, philosophers who, according to Mohanty, provide helpful foils for understanding Husserl: “Husserl, in other words, is to be understood by his difference from Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger – three philosophers who occupy this status of being truly his others” (p. 441). Mohanty’s study here is brief, however, as the entire chapter comes to just under twenty pages. He devotes the comparison with Kant primarily to the question of the form of “transcendental” philosophy articulated by both men. In his comparison with Hegel, Mohanty offers an appreciation of Husserl’s “nearness” to Hegelian thought, particularly in relation to the latter’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. A more extensive comparison with Heidegger closes out the chapter in which Mohanty clearly and concisely traces the development of Heidegger’s own conception of phenomenology during the years from 1919 to 1929. The virtue of Mohanty’s treatment of Heidegger—indeed of Husserl’s relation to Kant and Hegel also—lies less in its novelty than in the clarity with which the basic opposition is set forth. Mohanty then concludes the entire work in Chapter 21 with the tabulated thirty-proposition “final overview.”

The level of exactitude and fidelity to Husserl’s work in this study is exemplary. There are many moments when the reader feels as if they are reading line by line alongside Husserl. For this very reason, however, the volume does not offer much relief to those who may be uninitiated in the language and style of the master. In addition, there are numerous terms and passages quoted in German, and these are not always translated into English. Nevertheless, Mohanty’s careful articulation of the arc of these studies, his expert analysis of their problems and obstacles, and especially his selection of fundamentally important Husserlian manuscripts offers an unparalleled vision of Husserl’s philosophy. For the novice, this work highlights what is truly essential in Husserl’s enormous corpus of writings and provides penetrating analyses of the main concepts. For the specialist, it collects together into a single (double) volume a lifetime of thought and research by one of the best students of Husserl’s philosophy. J. N. Mohanty has thus provided us all with a treasure of inestimable worth.

## A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's Time Lectures

### ABSTRACT:

After publication of Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Oskar Kraus published a compilation of letters and lecture notes between Brentano and Anton Marty in his essay, "Toward a Phenomenognoy of Time Consciousness." Kraus sets forth a scathing criticism of Husserl – and of Heidegger as editor of the *Vorlesungen* in my paper. I, first, explicate Kraus's argument against Husserl's critique of Brentano. Second, I assess its merit; and third, I examine the explosive charge regarding the similarity of Brentano's last published views on time and Husserl's view published in the *Vorlesungen*.

### A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's Time Lectures, Bob Sandmeyer (SPEP 2021)

In 1928, Edmund Husserl published his *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time* [hereafter *Lectures*]) for inclusion in the 9<sup>th</sup> volume of the *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie*.<sup>1</sup> In 1969, the *Lectures* were republished as *Husserliana X* under the editorship of Rudolf Boehm. This new volume included a substantial collection of materials supplementary to the original text. My focus today centers strictly on the original publication of the time-lectures as published in 1928.<sup>2</sup>

The provenance of this slight work is rather infamous these days. Martin Heidegger is, of course, the named editor. That Edith Stein's discovery of the lecture materials and editorial efforts to bring these to a publishable form went almost unspoken at the time of publication is

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<sup>1</sup> "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 9. Halle a.d.S: Max Niemeyer, 1928, 367-498.

<sup>2</sup> In his translator's introduction, for instance, John Brough discusses Rudolf Boehm's careful analysis of the composition of the extant edition in 1928. The final publication, he notes, contains a mish mash of distinct analyses dating from different periods and with different terminology and different results and as such advances an incoherent phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. "For the evolution in question is not simply the gradual unfolding of a single position, but the movement from one position, through its criticism, to a new position incompatible with the first" (Husserl 1991, xv). While the internal coherency of Husserl's analyses of time-consciousness remains a profoundly interesting problem, the brevity of my talk today compels me to leave this out of my analysis here.

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story not directly at issue here.<sup>3</sup> This editorial history would have been entirely invisible to readers of the 1928 *Jahrbuch* text. Indeed, I am particularly interested in a contemporaneous critical engagement with the *Lectures* by Oskar Kraus in his article, "Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins" ("Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness").<sup>4</sup> Published in 1930 in the 75<sup>th</sup> volume of *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, two years after the publication of Husserl's *Lectures*, Kraus takes it upon himself to address errors made, he asserts, by Husserl in the polemical first section of the *Lectures* titled "Brentano's Doctrine of the Origin of Time." More than simply a corrective, though, Kraus unflinchingly accuses both Husserl and his editor, Heidegger, of academic laxity and suggests – obliquely but quite definitely – that Husserl's account of time-consciousness in the *Lectures* illicitly appropriates something essential from Brentano's last articulation of the problem. Indeed, it is this latter, rather startling, accusation that drew me to examine Kraus's article in more detail, and it is on this I wish to talk today.

Kraus's article is a complex composition having three distinct parts. The first section is quite short. Here Kraus sketches his objections to Husserl's analysis of Brentano's theory of time consciousness, which he fleshes out in detailed notes appended throughout the second and, especially, the third section of the article. These latter two sections are archival in character. The second section contains an exchange of two letters between Anton Marty and Franz Brentano. The first letter is from Marty to Brentano, and the second is Brentano's reply.

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<sup>3</sup> "Die Kapitel- und Paragrapheneinteilung wurde von Frl. Dr. Stein gelegentlich der Übertragung des stenographischen Konzepts im teilweisen Anschluß an Randbemerkungen des Verfassers eingefügt" (Heidegger, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers, 368).

<sup>4</sup> Kraus, Oskar. "Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins: aus dem Briefwechsel Franz Brentanos Mit Anton Marty, nebst einem Vorlesungsbruchstück über Brentanos Zeitlehre aus dem Jahre 1895, nebst Einleitung und Anmerkungen Veröffentlicht von Oskar Kraus." [In German]. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 75 (1930): 1-22. Translated by L. McAllister as "Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness" in *The Philosophy of Franz Brentano*. Edited by Linda McAllister. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976, 224-239. [Hereafter "Toward a Phenomenognosy."]

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This entire exchange took place in about a week's time during March of 1895. Following the letters, the third and most substantial section of the article contains a fragment from Marty's 1895 lecture course at the Charles University in Prague on the subject about which Marty wrote to Brentano in the letters, i.e., Brentano's theory of time consciousness. These latter two archival sections – Kraus notes – "serve as a supplement to Brentano's *Psychology*,<sup>5</sup> especially to the statements contained in *Psychology III* (i.e., on the problem of time)"<sup>6</sup> published by Meiner in 1928. The mixture of polemic and archival materials that constitute Kraus's article, published so closely after the *Lectures*, themselves, make it an invaluable resource by which to understand Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness, its relation to Brentano's presentation of the problem, and the history of Brentano's analyses of time-consciousness in his published and unpublished writings.

The 1895 correspondence in the second section begins with a letter from Marty dated (Saturday) the 9<sup>th</sup> of March. Frantically composed, Marty expresses his discomposure preparing his course lectures on psychology, particularly on the subject of Brentano's theory of time. Unclear on the issue and finding no help in his own notes, he writes to Brentano: "I see, with the time so short, no other way out than to ask you to rush to my aid by mail and, if possible, immediately (for I'll be up to this part by next Tuesday)."<sup>7</sup> He then poses to Brentano a number

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<sup>5</sup> It is not entirely clear to which edition of Brentano's *Psychologie* Kraus refers to here. The article supplements all three of Brentano's *Psychologie* volumes, but most especially *Psychologie III*. The three volumes include: **Psychologie I (1924):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Erster Band. Leipzig: F. Meiner. **Psychologie II (1925):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Zweiter Band: *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*. Mit neuen Abhandlungen aus dem Nachlass. Leipzig: F. Meiner.. **Psychologie III (1928):** *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein*. (Psychologie / Band III). I. Teil: Wahrnehmung / Empfindung / Begriff. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Leipzig: F. Meiner.

<sup>6</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

<sup>7</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

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of statements in quick succession, all of which articulate something of Brentano's theory of time-consciousness. His objective writing to Brentano is to confirm the fidelity of his insights regarding Brentano's theory from Brentano, himself.

Marty begins with the statement that "what we call our intuition of time is actually the intuition of a special mode of judgment."<sup>8</sup> In Brentano's reply to Marty (dated Sunday evening, 1895), Brentano notes that Marty here expresses his "old view" (which is intriguing, as we'll soon see). Kraus interjects a footnote here in which he clarifies that Brentano had "at that time ... described the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of modes of judgment; later, as a continuum of modes of presentation, which ... carry over to the judgement (*sic.*) that is included in every sensation as a blind belief in the qualitative-spatial..."<sup>9</sup>

The chronology of Brentano's views on time-consciousness is fundamental to Kraus's charge of academic sloppiness which he lodges against both Husserl and his editor. I would like to pause here to remark, though, that this chronology is anything but clear. There is no clear path to follow in the literature by which to trace the contours of this development, and commentators of Brentano's work seem at odds in their presentation of it. Consequently, precisely what Brentano's theory of time-consciousness was in 1895, i.e., the time during which the letters we are discussing were composed, remains, itself, unclear. Kraus offers some help in this matter, but even his presentation is not entirely transparent.

In the article, Kraus details three historically distinct theoretical articulations of time-consciousness by Brentano. He is unclear, though, in that his own presentation of the timeline

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<sup>8</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226-27.

<sup>9</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 227n4.



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makes it seem that Brentano may have held four distinct viewpoints. But a close examination of the Marty lecture fragment in the article clears up this ambiguity. Thus, the importance of the Marty fragment to the whole article reveals itself. Only by a careful reading of the lecture fragment material, penned by Marty, can one clear up the ambiguities of timeline insinuated by Kraus, himself, in the article.

As to Brentano's views on time, or more precisely the consciousness of time, the earliest of Brentano's views is closely similar to that expressed by John Stuart Mill in Book I of his (i.e., Mill's) *Logic*, published in 1843, though Brentano insists he developed his theory independently from that of Mill. John Stuart Mill, Marty writes in the lecture fragment, "considers the differences of time, i.e., past, present, and future not as differences in the *objects* of judgement [*Materie des Urteils*], but as differences in the kind of judgemental attitude [*in der Weise des urteilenden Verhaltens*] ..." <sup>10</sup> Marty notes that he himself heard Brentano espouse this view in lectures dated from 1868 to 1870. <sup>11</sup> He also acknowledges, though, that Brentano soon rejected this notion. For "according to this formulation, time would not be a continuum at all." <sup>12</sup> Indeed, in Brentano's Sunday evening letter of reply to Marty, he suggests that this particular defect of the view led to his rejection of it.

Returning to Kraus's articulation of Brentano's views on time, Kraus notes that Brentano later came to hold "the intuition of time as an intuition of peculiarly and continually varying differences in objects." <sup>13</sup> Rather than locating past, present and future in judgments, as he had

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<sup>10</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230

<sup>11</sup> "Marty was Brentano's student in Würzburg from the autumn of 1868 until Easter 1870." Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230n13.

<sup>12</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230.

<sup>13</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 225.

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previously, Brentano "began to locate time in the object of presentation

[*Vorstellungsmaterie*]." <sup>14</sup> Though a bit vague as to how long Brentano's adhered to this theory,

Kraus indicates that "somewhere around the end of 1894 he gave up that doctrine." <sup>15</sup>

It seems, then, that this second articulated stance, i.e., the *Vorstellungsmaterie* stance, persisted from soon after 1870 until about 1895. Quoting now from the Marty's lecture course fragment, according to this theory "a continual series of presentations from the imagination attaches itself to every sensory or perceptual presentation, and these presentations reproduce *and at the same time change or modify* the perceived content in such a way that they add to it the past moment, i.e., the earlier and earlier past, so that it seems, as it were, temporally removed." <sup>16</sup> As Marty makes clear, "insofar as I think of what was present as moving further and further into the past, an absolutely new element enters into my thinking, and for that reason Brentano called this activity of the imagination *original association* in contrast to acquired association." <sup>17</sup>

This theoretical stance aligns with Husserl's presentation of Brentano's view in his *Lectures*. Indeed, in the very beginning of the polemical first part of the *Lectures*, Husserl quotes from his personal course notes from one of Brentano's lectures with the following: "Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations, in the (quote) 'coming into being of the immediate representations of memory, that is, of those representations which, according to an invariable law, attach themselves without any mediation to the actual

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<sup>14</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230.

<sup>15</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 225.

<sup>16</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 231.

<sup>17</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosie," 230.

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perceptual representations'.<sup>18</sup> (unquote). (*It is unclear from what transcript Husserl obtains these lines. Perhaps this has come to light and I am unaware of this. If the provenance of this quote is known, please disabuse me of my ignorance here. Nevertheless, we know that Husserl's time with Brentano in Vienna took place during the WS 1884/85 and 1885/86.<sup>19 20</sup> I personally haven't studied these courses<sup>21</sup> yet and so can only speak in general of the deep impression Brentano's lectures had on Husserl, especially his lecture courses on selected psychological and aesthetic questions.*)

We also know Husserl had – in addition to Husserl's own lecture course materials from his time with Brentano – a transcript of Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* lectures. These lectures Brentano gave in 1887/88, after Husserl had already left Vienna; the transcript of which was penned by Hans Schmidkunz (Q 10).<sup>22</sup> It is interesting to note, then, that in these lectures, Brentano advances – though not so plainly – this second *Vorstellungsmaterie* view of time consciousness. (I quote.)

"So it seems that the primary object of proteraesthesia does not, properly [speaking], adjoin as continuation [als Fortsetzung anschliessen] the primary object of sensation, but rather something belonging to the secondary object, namely the intentional relation to the primary object which we call experience.

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<sup>18</sup> Husserl, "On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time," 11.

<sup>1919</sup> Husserl, "Erinnerung Kraus, Franz Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Leben und seiner Lehre, 153.

<sup>20</sup> Karl Schuhmann notes that Fr. Brentano recommended Husserl to Carl Stumpf at Halle for his Habilitation work on October 18, 1886. Husserl began courses in Halle during the fall term, WS 1888/87. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 17).

<sup>21</sup> According to Schuhmann, Husserl heard Brentano's five hour lecture course on "Practical Philosophy," which began on 22 Oct 1884; his one- or two-hour lecture course on "Elementary Logic and the Notable Reforms In It, which began 25 Oct 1884; Brentano's philosophical exercises on Hume's *Essay* (1884/85); his SS 1885 continuing course to the "Elementary Logic"; the SS 1885 course on Hume's "Prinzipien der Moral"; the WS 1885/86 philosophical exercises on "Helmholz's Expression, 'Die Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung'"; the WS 1885 coursework on "ausgewählte psychologische und ästhetische Fragen"; SS 1886 continuing course on Phantasievorstellungen; SS 1886 philosophical exercises on "Dubois-Reymonds 'Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis". Additionally, Husserl accompanied Brentano in the summer of 1886 on vacation to Wolfgangsee nach St. Gilgen. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 13-16.

<sup>22</sup> Benito Müller, "Introduction." In Franz Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology*, xiii, n14

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Whereas sensation shows a present experiencing as its secondary object, proteraesthesia shows, as its primary object, a past experiencing which in its object matches the primary object of the preceding sensation."<sup>23</sup>

Regardless of which source or sources underlie Husserl's understanding of Brentano's theory of time consciousness, what is clear is that in his *Lectures* Husserl takes issue with Brentano's *Vorstellungsmaterie* theory, i.e., the second theory of time consciousness articulated by Brentano between 1870 and 1895 – if Kraus's timeline is to be accepted.

I'll come back to Brentano's second articulated stance on the intuition of time, since it is central to Kraus's criticism of Husserl. But for the moment, I would like to complete the chronology which Kraus lays out in the article. On this point, Kraus is maddeningly vague. What is clear is that Brentano moves away from the theory which locates the intuitions of time difference *in objects* sometime late in 1894. He eventually settles on an act-modification theory, which I will discuss later.

The essential thing is this: Brentano recognized...that the intuitions of time differences...could not be differences of the primary objects [*primären Objekte*]...he recognized that the intuition of time goes back to the intuition of the continual modification of the sensory act itself, a modification that is present to us in inner perception intuitively.<sup>24</sup>

However, Kraus goes on to remark that "the 1894 theory of modes regards the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of differences *in judgement*."<sup>25</sup> Kraus's articulation is thus ambiguous. Did Brentano return to a theory akin to his earliest viewpoint? That is to say, did he resurrect the notion that differences in time, which is to say, the intuition of these differences,

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<sup>23</sup> Franz Brentano. *Descriptive Psychology* (ca. 1886/87), 103.

<sup>24</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (slightly modified).

<sup>25</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (italics mine).

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can be traced to differences in judgments? Or did he develop a new view that these differences can be traced ultimately to modifications of the founding acts of sensation?

Briefly recapitulated, Kraus's timeline looks like this: (i) The earliest theory espoused by Brentano is that akin to Mill's theory. According to this stance, the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in the kind of judgmental attitude. (ii) This earliest stance was rejected ca. 1870 for the original association or *Vorstellungsmaterie* view, i.e., the view that the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in objects. (iii) Kraus suggests that at the end of 1894 Brentano returns to his older view, i.e., the view that the intuition of the differences in time are tied to differences in judgment. (iv) It seems this view may be, itself, later supplanted by a more mature formulation, i.e., the view that holds the intuition of the differences in time are tied to continual modifications of the sensory act, itself (1895 and after). In short, there is a confusing ambiguity about the transition occurring in Brentano's thinking around 1894-1895. Do we have two distinct views, i.e., a difference in judgment view briefly held, and then a modification of sensory-act view, or is the theory of original association rejected straight away for that of the modes of consciousness formulation?

Marty's lecture fragment included in the article provides essential clarification on this question. As Marty points out, Brentano indeed returned to the old view, i.e., that time is not a matter of the thought-of *content*, but of the *mode of judgment...although with significant modifications*.<sup>26</sup> The key to understanding this rests in the concept of *sinnliche Glauben* or sensory believing at the heart of this new account. Brentano here distinguishes between acts of higher and lower judgment. Higher order judgments have a predicative structure, which is to

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<sup>26</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 234.

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say these are deliberative activities of a rational subject. In opposition to higher order cognitive activities, Brentano – Marty asserts – distinguishes lower order instinctive belief, which is stands at the foundation of every higher order judgement.<sup>27</sup> "This instinctive belief is simply inseparable from sensation," Marty points out<sup>28</sup> And thus the act of sensation contains two inseparable moments [*Teile*]: one moment is the intuition of the physical phenomenon and the other the assertoric acceptance of said phenomenon. Hence, every act of sensation contains within itself at once a judgment, i.e., an instinctive *Urdoxa*. Kraus thus articulates three distinct views by Brentano: the older judgment view similar to Mill (to ca. 1870), the middle *Vorstellungsmaterie* or original association view (ca. 1870-1895), and a modes of consciousness view (1895 and after).

At this juncture, I'd like to turn away from the question of chronology to examine more closely Kraus's criticism of the *Lectures*. In his article, Kraus severely chastises both Husserl and Heidegger, the named editor of the *Lectures*, for criticizing the second, that is to say, the rejected *Vorstellungsmaterie* theory of the intuition of time. He forcefully points out that "neither the author [that is, Husserl] nor the editor [Heidegger] mentions that Brentano had long since given up the doctrine that Husserl criticizes, and substituted it for another."<sup>29</sup> In other words, whatever validity Husserl's critique may have against Brentano's views, a validity which Kraus painstakingly denies later in the article, at the very least Husserl's polemic against

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<sup>27</sup> "A thorough analysis will reveal that this same kind of consciousness, this same kind of intention that is contained in higher forms of knowing and judging, is already present in the acts of sensation" (Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 235n21.

<sup>28</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 236.

<sup>29</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 224.

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Brentano in the *Lectures* expresses a straw man. "The editor," Kraus remarks bitingly, "should not have remained silent about this fact."<sup>30</sup>

Nor is it the case that Husserl or Heidegger was unaware of that this was an "old theory." Brentano, himself, makes clear the change in his thinking in the third section to the Appendix of his 1911 *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, i.e., the section titled "Von den Modis des Vorstellens". Indeed, Husserl had received a signed copy of this book from Brentano and consequently should have been aware of the change. Heidegger, as well, should have known of the change of views, since he reviewed Brentano's *Klassifikation* for the *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* in 1914.<sup>31</sup> Further, Kraus, himself, details the transition in Brentano's thinking in his own book, published 1919, titled *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehrer, mit Beiträgen von Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl*. As he writes in his article,

In the same book I deal explicitly with the new theory of time. Section 18 (p. 39) presents the temporal modes as 'modi obliqui', On 17 July 1918 Husserl asked me for the proofs of my book and he actually received them. In addition, he is naturally in possession of the book which contains his, Stumpf's, and my contributions. I criticize Husserl for having failed to draw the attention of the editors of his lectures to Brentano's doctrine of modes.<sup>32</sup>

So, there is really no excuse for Husserl's fallacious reading of Brentano in the *Lectures* or Heidegger's silence on this point. Kraus thus severely criticizes both Husserl and Heidegger for their academic sloppiness, and rightfully so I would add.

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<sup>30</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 224.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, M. "Review of *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* by Franz Brentano." *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, (1914): pp. n/a. ( <http://ophen.org/pub-106031>)

<sup>32</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225.

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However, Kraus does not limit himself to pointing out the fallacy of relevance inherent to Husserl's polemic here, and this is really the most interesting critical note I believe. He goes on directly to suggest that Husserl's own phenomenology of inner time-consciousness parrots that of Brentano's final conception. "What is more," he continues, "Husserl puts forward a doctrine that replaces objective differences in time (i.e., temporal variations of the object as Brentano had previously taught) with 'modes of consciousness.'"<sup>33</sup> The force of this attack is somewhat muted in Kraus's introductory remarks, that is to say, in the first part of the article, since there his focus centers strictly on the straw man argument. Yet in his notes to Marty's lecture fragment Kraus painstakingly details the crux of the issue. Marty, he demonstrates, makes clear Brentano's position in his lecture fragment with the following:

Now, if one asks, 'Is there, then, still an intuition of time, and what is it?' The answer is, 'What deserves the name is not the intuition of physical phenomena, but the intuition of a mental phenomenon or a continuum of mental phenomena, a continually varying series of modes of judgement; and it is here that the source of all temporal concepts is to be sought. For on the basis of this intuition of a limited continuum of characteristic modes of affirmation one can then form the concepts of a more distant past, and the concepts of the future, of which we have no actual intuitions.'<sup>34</sup>

Here Brentano locates – according to Marty, that is – temporal determinations in judgment, but this is, as we have seen, judgment of the lower order discussed earlier. Kraus appends the following note, precisely to this passage by Marty I just read.

Later Brentano transferred the modification to the act of presentation itself and let it thus carry over into the act of judgement. In this connection the doctrine of the direct and indirect modes (*modus rectus* and *obliquus*) plays an important role. This theory of Brentano's had been available to Husserl since 1911 in the copy inscribed by Brentano himself, and, in addition, in the book on which

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<sup>33</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 224.

<sup>34</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 237f



## A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's Time Lectures

Husserl collaborated, *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (Munich, 1919).<sup>35</sup>

The impact of this remark should not be overlooked, I think. For here Kraus essentially accuses Husserl of lifting an essential feature of Brentano's new view without acknowledgement. Kraus points us to page 432 of the *Lectures*, which falls within the third section of the 1928 text, i.e., on the levels of constitution of time and of the objects of time, most precisely in §38 titled "Unity of the flow of consciousness and constitution of simultaneity and succession." In this section Husserl observes a law of transformation which connects the now, the no-longer and the not-yet into a single unity.<sup>36</sup> As Husserl expresses it in the *Lectures*, "The *whole* 'being-together' of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of having elapsed, and according to which in the same continuity an ever new being-together of primal sensations arises originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into the condition of having elapsed."<sup>37</sup> It is this very analysis that provides the descriptive basis for the two inseparably united horizontal (*Länges-*) and transverse (*Quer-*) intentionalities so important to Husserl's theory of time-consciousness.

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<sup>35</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 238n28.

<sup>36</sup> To get a sense of these analyses, I use this the experience of presentation as example. As you here my voice and feel your own body against the chair and note the muted sounds in the background and the tug of your clothes against your skin, these primal sensations, which is to say, these sensations which you, that is to say, you qua "the I that I am experiencing these sensations," occur simultaneously. It is not as though there is the sound of my voice and then the sounds in the background and then the bodily acknowledgement of one's seated self, etc. Rather, my actual experience is a complex of many different experiences, some of which are more pressing and others less so, occurring at once. And though the idea I am expressing through the verbal expression of the words on this page remains the focus of your attention – at least I hope, it does, these words in their tonality recede away, flowing into the past – as do the sounds you hear in the background and even your experiences of the chair and of your clothes on your body, if you pay any attention to this at all, as you slightly shift to get comfortable. Indeed the first noticing of the physicality of the sound of my voice and the tug of clothes on your body remarked upon earlier is past and, yet, still there for us in some sense.

<sup>37</sup> Husserl, *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Inner Time*, 81-82.

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Kraus's most pointed criticism of Husserl centers on this very idea of the modification of consciousness view espoused in the *Lectures*.

This expresses in the clearest manner the doctrine that the proteraesthesia, which Husserl re-christened 'retention', consists in a continuum of modifications of consciousness (*Bewußtseinsmodifikationen*). Husserl uses the expression 'modifications of consciousness' in his 'Lectures' p. 421 (55); he also speaks there of a 'continual modification of the perception'. If one adheres to these statements one would have to consider his theory identical with Brentano's re-formulation of the original theory. One would have to believe that Husserl's theory means that the source of the time concept is not the intuition of a characteristic change of that which is sensed, but the intuition of the modally varying sensation itself.<sup>38</sup>

To be clear, Kraus does not suggest that Husserl's theory of time consciousness expressed in the *Lectures* is identical to Brentano's last view. In point of fact, he criticizes the theory developed by Husserl in the *Lectures* as incoherent, ultimately. But this does not lessen the impact of his criticism of Husserl and his editor. In his *Lectures*, Husserl critiques an old view of Brentano's without acknowledging as much. Further, Husserl adopts a theoretical position in the *Lectures* which in its essential character bears a striking similarity to Brentano's last view, a view of which Husserl evidently knew but fails to acknowledge. As Kraus makes clear, Husserl and Heidegger, but Husserl as author most especially, are to be faulted both for their sloppy treatment and the illicit appropriation of an essential feature of Brentano's views on time-consciousness in the *Lectures*.

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<sup>38</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 236n24.

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In 1928, Edmund Husserl published his *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time* [hereafter *Lectures*]) for inclusion in the 9<sup>th</sup> volume of the *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und Phänomenologische Philosophie*.<sup>1</sup> In 1969, the *Lectures* were republished as *Husserliana X* under the editorship of Rudolf Boehm. This new volume included a substantial collection of materials supplementary to the original text. My focus today centers strictly on the original 1928 publication.<sup>2</sup>

The provenance of this slight work is rather infamous. I won't get into the details of its editorial construction except to remark simply that Martin Heidegger is the named editor. That Edith Stein's discovery of the lecture materials and editorial efforts to bring these to a publishable form went almost unspoken at the time is story not directly at issue here.<sup>3</sup> Today I am particularly interested in the critical engagement with the *Lectures* by Oskar Kraus in his article, "Zur Phänomenognoie des Zeitbewußtseins" ("Toward a Phenomenognoy of Time Consciousness.")<sup>4</sup> Published in the 75<sup>th</sup> volume of *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, only two

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<sup>1</sup> "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 9. Halle a.d.S: Max Niemeyer, 1928, 367-498.

<sup>2</sup> In his translator's introduction, John Brough discusses Rudolf Boehm's careful analysis of the composition of the extant edition in 1928. The final publication, he notes, contains a mish mash of distinct analyses dating from different periods and with different terminology and different results and as such advances an incoherent phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. "For the evolution in question is not simply the gradual unfolding of a single position, but the movement from one position, through its criticism, to a new position incompatible with the first" (Husserl 1991, xv). While the internal coherency of Husserl's analyses of time-consciousness remains a profoundly interesting problem, this issue stands outside the boundaries of my examination. Rather, I consider the 1928 text as Oskar Kraus would have, i.e., without insight into the editorial construction of the work or into the background lecture materials that form the work as a completed whole. That is to say, I take the 1928 text not only to be complete but also the sole expression of Husserl's work on inner time-consciousness.

<sup>3</sup> "Die Kapitel- und Paragrapheneinteilung wurde von Frl. Dr. Stein gelegentlich der Übertragung des stenographischen Konzepts im teilweisen Anschluß an Randbemerkungen des Verfassers eingefügt" (Heidegger, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers, 368).

<sup>4</sup> Kraus, Oskar. "Zur Phänomenognoie des Zeitbewußtseins: aus dem Briefwechsel Franz Brentanos Mit Anton Marty, nebst einem Vorlesungsbruchstück über Brentanos Zeitlehre aus dem Jahre 1895, nebst Einleitung und Anmerkungen

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short years after the publication of Husserl's *Lectures*, Kraus takes it upon himself to address errors made, he asserts, by Husserl in the polemical first section of the *Lectures* titled "Brentano's Doctrine of the Origin of Time." More than simply a corrective, though, Kraus unflinchingly accuses both Husserl and his editor, Heidegger, of academic laxity and suggests – obliquely but quite definitely – that Husserl's account of time-consciousness in the *Lectures* illicitly appropriates something essential from Brentano's last articulation of the problem. Indeed, it is this latter, rather startling, accusation that drew me to examine Kraus's article in more detail, and it is on this I wish to talk today.

Kraus's article is a complex composition of three distinct parts. The first section is quite short and contains Kraus's explanation of his main objections to Husserl's analysis of Brentano's theory of time consciousness. Though this first section presents only the skeleton of his critique, he fleshes out this critique in detailed notes appended throughout the second and especially the third section of the article. These latter sections are archival in character. This first contains an exchange of two letters, first from Anton Marty to Brentano, and then Brentano's reply to Marty. The entire exchange took place in about a week's time in March of 1895. Following the letters, the third and most substantial section of the article contains a fragment from Marty's 1895 lecture course (at the Charles University in Prague) on the subject about which Marty wrote to Brentano in the letters, i.e., Brentano's theory of time consciousness. These latter two archival sections – Kraus notes – "serve as a supplement to

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Veröffentlicht von Oskar Kraus." [In German]. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 75 (1930): 1-22. Translated by L. McAllister as "Toward a Phenomenognoy of Time Consciousness" in *The Philosophy of Franz Brentano*. Edited by Linda McAllister. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976, 224-239. [Hereafter "Toward a Phenomenognoy."]

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Brentano's *Psychology*,<sup>5</sup> especially to the statements contained in *Psychology III* (i.e., on the problem of time).<sup>6</sup> The mixture of polemic and archival materials that constitute Kraus's article, published so closely after the *Lectures*, themselves, make it an invaluable resource by which to understand Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness, its relation to Brentano's presentation of the problem, and the history of Brentano's analyses of time-consciousness in his published and unpublished writings.

The 1895 correspondence between Marty and Brentano begins with a letter from Marty dated (Saturday) the 9<sup>th</sup> of March. Frantically composed, Marty expresses his discomposure preparing his course lectures on psychology, particularly on the subject of Brentano's theory of time. Unclear on the issue and finding no help in his own notes, he writes to Brentano: "I see, with the time so short, no other way out than to ask you to rush to my aid by mail and, if possible, immediately (for I'll be up to this part by next Tuesday)."<sup>7</sup> He then poses to Brentano a number of statements in quick succession, all of which articulate something of Brentano's theory of time-consciousness. His objective writing to Brentano is to confirm the fidelity of his insights regarding Brentano's theory from Brentano, himself.

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<sup>5</sup> It is not entirely clear to which edition of Brentano's *Psychologie* Kraus refers to here. The article supplements all three of Brentano's *Psychologie* volumes, but most especially *Psychologie III*. The three volumes include: **Psychologie I (1924):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Erster Band. Leipzig: F. Meiner. **Psychologie II (1925):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Zweiter Band: *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*. Mit neuen Abhandlungen aus dem Nachlass. Leipzig: F. Meiner. **Psychologie III (1928):** *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein*. (Psychologie / Band III). I. Teil: *Wahrnehmung / Empfindung / Begriff*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Leipzig: F. Meiner.

<sup>6</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

<sup>7</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

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Marty begins with the statement that "what we call our intuition of time is actually the intuition of a special mode of judgment."<sup>8</sup> In his reply to Marty (dated Sunday evening, 1895), Brentano notes that Marty here expresses his "old view." (This, itself, is intriguing, as we'll soon see.) At this point in the letters, Kraus interjects a footnote in which he clarifies that Brentano had "at that time ... described the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of modes of judgment; later, as a continuum of modes of presentation, which ... carry over to the judgement that is included in every sensation as a blind belief in the qualitative-spatial..."<sup>9</sup>

I would note two things before continuing. First, the chronology of Brentano's views on time-consciousness is fundamental to Kraus's charge of academic sloppiness which he lodges against both Husserl and his editor. So, understanding this chronology is important. Second, though, understanding this timeline is really quite difficult. There is no clear path to follow in the literature to trace its contours, and commentators seem at odds in their presentation of it. Indeed, precisely what Brentano's theory of time-consciousness was in 1895, i.e., the time during which the letters we are discussing were composed, remains, itself, unclear. Kraus offers some help in this matter, but even his presentation is not entirely transparent.

In the article, Kraus details three historically distinct theoretical articulations of time-consciousness by Brentano. He is unclear, though, in that his own presentation of the timeline makes it seem that Brentano may have held four distinct viewpoints. But a close examination of the Marty lecture fragment in the article clears up this ambiguity. Thus, the importance of the Marty fragment to the whole article reveals itself. Only by a careful reading of the lecture

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<sup>8</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 226-27.

<sup>9</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 227n4.

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fragment material, penned by Marty, can one clear up the ambiguities of timeline insinuated by Kraus, himself, in the article.

As to Brentano's views on time, or more precisely the consciousness of time, the earliest of Brentano's views is closely similar to that expressed by John Stuart Mill in Book I of his (i.e., Mill's) *Logic*, published in 1843, though Brentano insists he developed his theory independently from that of Mill. John Stuart Mill, Marty writes in the lecture fragment, "considers the differences of time, i.e., past, present, and future not as differences in the *objects* of judgement [*Materie des Urteils*], but as differences in the kind of judgemental attitude [*in der Weise des urteilenden Verhaltens*] ..." <sup>10</sup> Marty notes that he himself heard Brentano espouse this view in lectures dated from 1868 to 1870. <sup>11</sup> He also acknowledges, though, that Brentano soon rejected this notion. For "according to this formulation, time would not be a continuum at all." <sup>12</sup> Indeed, in Brentano's Sunday evening letter of reply to Marty, he suggests that this particular defect of the view led to his rejection of it.

Returning to Kraus's articulation of Brentano's views on time, he notes that Brentano later came to hold "the intuition of time as an intuition of peculiarly and continually varying differences in objects." <sup>13</sup> Rather than locating past, present and future in judgments, as he had previously, Brentano "began to locate time in the object of presentation

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<sup>10</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230

<sup>11</sup> "Marty was Brentano's student in Würzburg from the autumn of 1868 until Easter 1870." Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230n13.

<sup>12</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230.

<sup>13</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 225.

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[*Vorstellungsmaterie*]." <sup>14</sup> Though a bit vague as to how long Brentano's adhered to this theory, Kraus indicates that "somewhere around the end of 1894 he gave up that doctrine." <sup>15</sup>

It seems, then, that this second articulated stance, i.e., the *Vorstellungsmaterie* stance, persisted from soon after 1870 until about 1895. Quoting now from the Marty's lecture course fragment, according to this theory "a continual series of presentations from the imagination attaches itself to every sensory or perceptual presentation, and these presentations reproduce *and at the same time change or modify* the perceived content in such a way that they add to it the past moment, i.e., the earlier and earlier past, so that it seems, as it were, temporally removed." <sup>16</sup> As Marty makes clear, "insofar as I think of what was present as moving further and further into the past, an absolutely new element enters into my thinking, and for that reason Brentano called this activity of the imagination *original association* in contrast to acquired association." <sup>17</sup>

As is likely clear to most everybody here, this theoretical stance aligns very closely with Husserl's presentation of Brentano's view in his *Lectures*. Indeed, in the very beginning of the polemical first part of the *Lectures*, Husserl quotes from his personal course notes from one of Brentano's lectures with the following: "Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations, in the (quote) 'coming into being of the immediate representations of memory, that is, of those representations which, according to an invariable law, attach themselves without any mediation to the actual perceptual representations'." <sup>18</sup> (unquote). (*It is*

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<sup>14</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 230.

<sup>15</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 225.

<sup>16</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 231.

<sup>17</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 230.

<sup>18</sup> Husserl, "On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time," 11.



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*unclear from what transcript Husserl obtains these lines. Perhaps this has come to light and I am unaware of this. If the provenance of this quote is known, please disabuse me of my ignorance here. Nevertheless, we know that Husserl's time with Brentano in Vienna took place during the WS 1884/85 and 1885/86.<sup>19 20</sup> I personally haven't studied these courses<sup>21</sup> yet and so can only speak in general of the deep impression Brentano's lectures had on Husserl, especially his lecture courses on selected psychological and aesthetic questions.)*

We also know Husserl had – in addition to Husserl's own lecture course materials from his time with Brentano – a transcript of Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* lectures. These lectures Brentano gave in 1887/88, after Husserl had already left Vienna; the transcript of which was penned by Hans Schmidkunz (Q 10).<sup>22</sup> It is interesting to note, then, that in these lectures, Brentano advances – though not so plainly – this second *Vorstellungsmaterie* view of time consciousness. (I quote.)

"So it seems that the primary object of proteraesthesia does not, properly [speaking], adjoin as continuation [als Fortsetzung anschliessen] the primary object of sensation, but rather something belonging to the secondary object, namely the intentional relation to the primary object which we call experience. Whereas sensation shows a present experiencing as its secondary object,

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<sup>1919</sup> Husserl, "Erinnerung Kraus, *Franz Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Leben und seiner Lehre*, 153.

<sup>20</sup> Karl Schuhmann notes that Fr. Brentano recommended Husserl to Carl Stumpf at Halle for his Habilitation work on October 18, 1886. Husserl began courses in Halle during the fall term, WS 1888/87. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 17).

<sup>21</sup> According to Schuhmann, Husserl heard Brentano's five hour lecture course on "Practical Philosophy," which began on 22 Oct 1884; his one- or two-hour lecture course on "Elementary Logic and the Notable Reforms In It," which began 25 Oct 1884; Brentano's philosophical exercises on Hume's *Essay* (1884/85); his SS 1885 continuing course to the "Elementary Logic"; the SS 1885 course on Hume's "Prinzipien der Moral"; the WS 1885/86 philosophical exercises on "Helmholz's Expression, 'Die Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung'"; the WS 1885 coursework on "ausgewählte psychologische und aesthetische Fragen"; SS 1886 continuing course on Phantasievorstellungen; SS 1886 philosophical exercises on "Dubois-Reymonds 'Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis'". Additionally, Husserl accompanied Brentano in the summer of 1886 on vacation to Wolfgansee nach St. Gilgen. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 13-16.

<sup>22</sup> Benito Müller, "Introduction." In Franz Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology*, xiii, n14

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proteraesthesia shows, as its primary object, a past experiencing which in its object matches the primary object of the preceding sensation."<sup>23</sup>

Regardless of which source or sources underlie Husserl's understanding of Brentano's theory of time consciousness, what is clear is that in his *Lectures* Husserl takes issue with Brentano's *Vorstellungsmaterie* theory, i.e., the second theory of time consciousness articulated by Brentano between 1870 and 1895 – if Kraus's timeline is to be accepted.

I'll come back to Brentano's second articulated stance on the intuition of time, since it is central to Kraus's criticism of Husserl. But for the moment, I would like to complete the chronology which Kraus lays out in the article. On this point, Kraus is maddeningly vague. What is clear is that Brentano moves away from the theory which locates the intuitions of time difference *in objects* sometime late in 1894. He eventually settles on an act-modification theory, which I will discuss later.

The essential thing is this: Brentano recognized...that the intuitions of time differences...could not be differences of the primary objects [*primären Objekte*]...he recognized that the intuition of time goes back to the intuition of the continual modification of the sensory act itself, a modification that is present to us in inner perception intuitively.<sup>24</sup>

However, Kraus goes on to remark that "the 1894 theory of modes regards the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of differences *in judgement*."<sup>25</sup> Kraus's articulation is thus ambiguous. Did Brentano return to a theory akin to his earliest viewpoint? That is to say, did he resurrect the notion that differences in time, which is to say, the intuition of these differences,

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<sup>23</sup> Franz Brentano. *Descriptive Psychology* (ca. 1886/87), 103.

<sup>24</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (slightly modified).

<sup>25</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (italics mine).

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can be traced to differences in judgments? Or did he develop a new view that these differences can be traced ultimately to modifications of the founding acts of sensation?

Briefly recapitulated, Kraus's timeline looks like this: (i) The earliest theory espoused by Brentano is that akin to Mill's theory. According to this stance, the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in the kind of judgmental attitude. (ii) This earliest stance was rejected ca. 1870 for the original association or *Vorstellungsmaterie* view, i.e., the view that the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in objects. (iii) Kraus suggests that at the end of 1894 Brentano returns to his older view, i.e., the view that the intuition of the differences in time are tied to differences in judgment. (iv) It seems this view may be, itself, later supplanted by a more mature formulation, i.e., the view that holds the intuition of the differences in time are tied to continual modifications of the sensory act, itself (1895 and after). In short, there is a confusing ambiguity about the transition occurring in Brentano's thinking around 1894-1895. Do we have two distinct views, i.e., a difference in judgment view briefly held, and then a modification of sensory-act view, or is the theory of original association rejected straight away for that of the modes of consciousness formulation?

Marty's lecture fragment included in the article provides essential clarification on this question. As Marty points out, Brentano indeed returned to the old view, i.e., that time is not a matter of the thought-of *content*, but of the *mode of judgment...although with significant modifications*.<sup>26</sup> The key to understanding this rests in the concept of *sinnliche Glauben* or sensory believing at the heart of this new account. Brentano here distinguishes between acts of higher and lower judgment. Higher order judgments have a predicative structure, which is to

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<sup>26</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 234.

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say these are deliberative activities of a rational subject. In opposition to higher order cognitive activities, Brentano – Marty asserts – distinguishes lower order instinctive belief, which is stands at the foundation of every higher order judgement.<sup>27</sup> "This instinctive belief is simply inseparable from sensation," Marty points out<sup>28</sup> And thus the act of sensation contains two inseparable moments [*Teile*]: one moment is the intuition of the physical phenomenon and the other the assertoric acceptance of said phenomenon. Hence, every act of sensation contains within itself at once a judgment, i.e., an instinctive *Urdoxa*. Consequently, we do not have two distinct views, i.e., a difference in judgment view briefly held, and then a modification of sensory-act view. Rather, the theory of original association rejected straight away. Thus, the article articulates three distinct views by Brentano: the older judgment view similar to Mill (to ca. 1870), the middle *Vorstellungsmaterie* or original association view (ca. 1870-1895), and a modes of consciousness view (1895 and after).

At this juncture, I'd like to turn away from the question of chronology to examine more closely Kraus's criticism of the *Lectures*. In his article, Kraus severely chastises both Husserl and Heidegger, the named editor of the *Lectures*, for criticizing the second, that is to say, the rejected *Vorstellungsmaterie* theory of the intuition of time. He forcefully points out that "neither the author [that is, Husserl] nor the editor [Heidegger] mentions that Brentano had long since given up the doctrine that Husserl criticizes, and substituted it for another."<sup>29</sup> In other words, whatever validity Husserl's critique may have against Brentano's views, a validity

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<sup>27</sup> "A thorough analysis will reveal that this same kind of consciousness, this same kind of intention that is contained in higher forms of knowing and judging, is already present in the acts of sensation" (Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 235n21.

<sup>28</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 236.

<sup>29</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 224.

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which Kraus painstakingly denies later in the article, at the very least Husserl's polemic against Brentano in the *Lectures* expresses a straw man. "The editor," Kraus remarks bitinglly, "should not have remained silent about this fact."<sup>30</sup>

Nor is it the case that Husserl or Heidegger was unaware of that this was an "old theory." Brentano, himself, makes clear the change in his thinking in the third section to the Appendix of his 1911 *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, i.e., the section titled "Von den Modis des Vorstellens". Indeed, Husserl had received a signed copy of this book from Brentano and consequently should have been aware of the change. Heidegger, as well, should have known of the change of views, since he reviewed Brentano's *Klassifikation* for the *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* in 1914.<sup>31</sup> Further, Kraus, himself, details the transition in Brentano's thinking in his own book, published 1919, titled *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehrer, mit Beiträgen von Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl*. As he writes in his article,

In the same book I deal explicitly with the new theory of time. Section 18 (p. 39) presents the temporal modes as 'modi obliqui', On 17 July 1918 Husserl asked me for the proofs of my book and he actually received them. In addition, he is naturally in possession of the book which contains his, Stumpf's, and my contributions. I criticize Husserl for having failed to draw the attention of the editors of his lectures to Brentano's doctrine of modes.<sup>32</sup>

So, there is really no excuse for Husserl's fallacious reading of Brentano in the *Lectures* or Heidegger's silence on this point. Kraus thus severely criticizes both Husserl and Heidegger for their academic sloppiness, and rightfully so I would add.

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<sup>30</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 224.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, M. "Review of *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* by Franz Brentano." *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, (1914): pp. n/a. ( <http://ophen.org/pub-106031>)

<sup>32</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225.

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However, he does not limit himself to pointing out the fallacy of relevance inherent to Husserl's polemic here, and this is really the most interesting critical note I believe. He goes on directly to suggest that Husserl's own phenomenology of inner time-consciousness parrots that of Brentano's final conception. "What is more," he continues, "Husserl puts forward a doctrine that replaces objective differences in time (i.e., temporal variations of the object as Brentano had previously taught) with 'modes of consciousness.'"<sup>33</sup> The force of this attack is somewhat muted in Kraus's introductory remarks, that is to say, in the first part of the article, since there his focus centers strictly on the straw man argument. Yet in his notes to Marty's lecture fragment Kraus painstakingly details the crux of the issue. Marty makes clear Brentano's position in his lecture fragment with the following:

Now, if one asks, 'Is there, then, still an intuition of time, and what is it?' The answer is, 'What deserves the name is not the intuition of physical phenomena, but the intuition of a mental phenomenon or a continuum of mental phenomena, a continually varying series of modes of judgement; and it is here that the source of all temporal concepts is to be sought. For on the basis of this intuition of a limited continuum of characteristic modes of affirmation one can then form the concepts of a more distant past, and the concepts of the future, of which we have no actual intuitions.'<sup>34</sup>

Here Brentano locates – according to Marty, that is – temporal determinations in judgment, but this is, as we have seen, judgment of the lower order instinctive sort discussed earlier. Kraus appends the following note, precisely to this passage by Marty I just read.

Later Brentano transferred the modification to the act of presentation itself and let it thus carry over into the act of judgement. In this connection the doctrine of the direct and indirect modes (*modus rectus* and *obliquus*) plays an important role. This theory of Brentano's had been available to Husserl since 1911 in the copy inscribed by Brentano himself, and, in addition, in the book on which

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<sup>33</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 224.

<sup>34</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 227f

## Oskar Kraus's Criticism of Husserl's *Vorlesungen*

Husserl collaborated, *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (Munich, 1919).<sup>35</sup>

The impact of this remark should not be overlooked, I think. For here Kraus essentially accuses Husserl of lifting an essential feature of Brentano's new view without acknowledgement. Kraus points us to page 432 of the *Lectures*, which falls within the third section of the 1928 text, i.e., on the levels of constitution of time and of the objects of time, most precisely in §38 titled "Unity of the flow of consciousness and constitution of simultaneity and succession." In this section Husserl observes a law of transformation which connects the now, the no-longer and the not-yet into a single unity.<sup>36</sup> As Husserl expresses it in the *Lectures*, "The whole 'being-together' of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of having elapsed, and according to which in the same continuity an ever new being-together of primal sensations arises originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into the condition of having elapsed."<sup>37</sup> It is this very analysis that provides the descriptive basis for the two inseparably united horizontal (*Länges-*) and transverse (*Quer-*) intentionalities so important to Husserl's theory of time-consciousness.

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<sup>35</sup> Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 238n28.

<sup>36</sup> To get a sense of these analyses, I use this the experience of presentation as example. As you here my voice and feel your own body against the chair and note the muted sounds in the background and the tug of your clothes against your skin, these primal sensations, which is to say, these sensations which you, that is to say, you qua "the I that I am experiencing these sensations," occur simultaneously. It is not as though there is the sound of my voice and then the sounds in the background and then the bodily acknowledgement of one's seated self, etc. Rather, my actual experience is a complex of many different experiences, some of which are more pressing and others less so, occurring at once. And though the idea I am expressing through the verbal expression of the words on this page remains the focus of your attention – at least I hope, it does, these words in their tonality recede away, flowing into the past – as do the sounds you hear in the background and even your experiences of the chair and of your clothes on your body, if you pay any attention to this at all, as you slightly shift to get comfortable. Indeed the first noticing of the physicality of the sound of my voice and the tug of clothes on your body remarked upon earlier is past and, yet, still there for us in some sense.

<sup>37</sup> Husserl, *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Inner Time*, 81-82.


## Oskar Kraus's Criticism of Husserl's *Vorlesungen*

Kraus's most pointed criticism of Husserl centers on this very idea of the modification of consciousness view espoused in the *Lectures*.

This expresses in the clearest manner the doctrine that the proteraesthesia, which Husserl re-christened 'retention', consists in a continuum of modifications of consciousness (*Bewußtseinsmodifikationen*). Husserl uses the expression 'modifications of consciousness' in his 'Lectures' p. 421 (55); he also speaks there of a 'continual modification of the perception'. If one adheres to these statements one would have to consider his theory identical with Brentano's re-formulation of the original theory. One would have to believe that Husserl's theory means that the source of the time concept is not the intuition of a characteristic change of that which is sensed, but the intuition of the modally varying sensation itself.


To be clear, Kraus does not suggest that Husserl's theory of time consciousness expressed in the *Lectures* is identical to Brentano's last view. In point of fact, he criticizes the theory developed by Husserl in the *Lectures* as incoherent, ultimately. But this does not lessen the impact of his criticism of Husserl and his editor. In his *Lectures*, Husserl critiques an old view of Brentano's without acknowledging as much. Further, Husserl adopts a theoretical position in the *Lectures* which in its essential character bears a striking similarity to Brentano's last view, a view of which Husserl evidently knew but fails to acknowledge. As Kraus makes clear, Husserl and Heidegger, but Husserl as author most especially, are to be faulted both for their sloppy treatment and the illicit appropriation of an essential feature of Brentano's views on time-consciousness in the *Lectures*.





**EKU** EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY  
Living with Animals

Session: Caring for Animals I  
Thursday  
March 21, 2019  
3:50pm - 4:10pm  
Room AB



## THE ANIMAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Bob Sandmeyer, Ph.D.  
University of Kentucky  
[bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu](mailto:bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu)

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**Living with Animals**  
some we love, some we hate, some we eat, some we need

*"The first principle of conservation is sustainable development, the use of the natural resources now existing on this continent for the benefit of the people who live here now."*

*Gifford Pinchot, The Fight for Conservation. 1910*  
(New York: Doubleday, Page & Company), 43.

and the current SDGs are no exception to this.

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**UN**  
environment

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference)  
Stockholm, Sweden  
June 5-16, 1972

**Principle 2**  
"The **natural resources of the earth**, including the air, water, land, **flora and fauna** and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, **must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations** through careful planning or management, as appropriate."

[http://www.un.org/en/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1](http://www.un.org/en/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1)

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United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference)  
Stockholm, Sweden  
June 5-16, 1972

Principle 2

**"In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by under-development...**  
Therefore developed countries must direct their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve the development."

management, as appropriate.

[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.48/14/REV.1)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our\\_Common\\_Future#/media/File:Our\\_Common\\_Future\\_book\\_cover.gif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Common_Future#/media/File:Our_Common_Future_book_cover.gif)



**1987 Brundtland Commission Report**



**"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."**

"The loss of plant and animal species can greatly limit the options of future generations; so sustainable development requires the conservation of plant and animal species."

<http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf>

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth\\_Summit#/media/File:Flag\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_Nations.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_Summit#/media/File:Flag_of_the_United_Nations.svg)



**UN Conference on Environment & Development**  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,  
3 to 14 June 1992

**Principle 7**

**States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.** In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have different responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.

**The Rio Declaration**

4 Principles

<http://www.un.org/documents/declcon/151/aconf15126.1annex1.htm>

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth\\_Summit#/media/File:Flag\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_Nations.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_Summit#/media/File:Flag_of_the_United_Nations.svg)



**Principle 1**

**Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development.**  
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.

UN Conference on Environment & Development  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,  
3 to 14 June 1992

<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf/151/aconf15126.1annex1.htm>

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SECTION II. CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT



**Agenda 21 – Chapter 15**  
**CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY**

"Biological resources constitute a **capital asset** with great potential for yielding sustainable benefits"

UN Conference on Environment & Development  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,  
3 to 14 June 1992

<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>

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**WE CAN END POVERTY**  
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND BEYOND 2015



**2015 MDGs**

"We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21, agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development."

<http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>

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**WE CAN END POVERTY**  
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND BEYOND 2015

**Target 7.A:**  
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and development and reverse the loss of species and natural resources. Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on to our descendants. The current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants.

**Target 7.C:**  
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

**Target 7.D:**  
Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

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**Sustainable Development Goals**

Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

[https://pba.twimg.com/profile-images/681541041875739326/KcrowdChill\\_000x400.jpg](https://pba.twimg.com/profile-images/681541041875739326/KcrowdChill_000x400.jpg)

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**Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**

1 NO POVERTY  
2 ZERO HUNGER  
3 GOOD HEALTH AND WELL-BEING  
4 QUALITY EDUCATION  
5 GENDER EQUALITY  
6 CLEAN WATER AND SANITATION  
7 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY  
8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES  
11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES  
12 RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION  
13 CLIMATE ACTION  
14 LIFE BELOW WATER  
15 LIFE ON LAND  
16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS  
17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS

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
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
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Year	Statement of SDG
1910	Gifford Pinchot, <i>The Fight for Conservation</i>
1972	UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm)
1987	Brundtland Commission Report: <i>Our Common Future</i>
1992	Rio Conference: <i>Agenda 21</i>
2000	20th Century Foundation: <i>Global Development Report</i>
2015	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

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Bob Sandmeyer, Ph.D.  
University of Kentucky  
[bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu](mailto:bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu)

*fin*

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<b>The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals</b> Session: Caring for Animals I Thursday March 21, 2019 3:50pm - 4:10pm Room AB <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meet in room at 3:15pm</li> </ul>	3:30 – 3:50 (3:45) <b>Linda Brant:</b> Monument or Anti-Monument? Reflections the Creation of a Monument for Animals We Do Not Mourn 3:50 – 4:10 (4:05) <b>Bob Sandmeyer:</b> The Animal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 4:10 – 4:30 (4:25) <b>Samantha Hunter:</b> The Surfacing of the Absent Referents of Meat in NC after Hurricane Florence
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## 1. Cover

- Thank you.
- Introduction
  - Bob Sandmeyer
    - Department of Philosophy
    - University of Kentucky
  - Love this conference
    - Very happy to be here to discuss the place of the animal or of animal life in sustainability development goals

## 2. *Living with Animals – Thesis*

- I work in Sustainability Studies
  - Particularly concerned with the coherence **sustainability understood as sustainable development**
- **THESIS**

There is a **consistent and almost unvarying valuation** of the animal or animal life in the history of global sustainable development documentation

  - Sustainable development explicitly values:
    - Nature as resource
    - Animal life as resource
  - **Resourcism**
    - Instrumental valuation
      - **Means to an end**
        - Nature
        - Animal life
    - If nature / animal life is a means to an end, what is this end?
      - Animal life doesn't have value in itself
        - What is that for the sake of which nature / animal life finds it value

- **End = Humanity, of course**
  - end, Cf. Kant, 2nd Practical Principle of the Will:
    - "Formula of the End In Itself"
      - Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means. (Ak. 429)
  - Animal life, the environment (generally)
    - Instrumental to the needs of human survival / flourishing
- ***Pinchot quote (1910)***
  - Beyond scope of this analysis
    - Talk focused on UN Sustainable Development Goals
  - Pinchot important to consider
    - Well-known split among conservationist in early 20<sup>th</sup> century
      - Conservation *qua* sustainable development
        - Note the temporal restriction Pinchot insists upon
      - Conservation *qua* preservation
        - Husbanding of scenic areas of great intrinsic value

### 3. **Stockholm Conference (1972)**

- Current **SDGs are rooted in work dating back to 1972 Stockholm Conference**
  - Stockholm:
    - UN's first major conference on international environmental issues
- Two things worth note
  - Resourcist conceptualization of flora and fauna
    - Protectionist *qua* preservationist language
  - Temporal dimension
    - Present AND Future generations

### 4. **Developing countries**

- Sustainability *qua* sustainable development
  - A growth paradigm
    - Development of resources for the sake of eradicating human suffering
  - Sustainability:
    - Maintenance of the resource



- "Poor to poor to be green"

## 5. 1987 Brundtland Commission Report – Our Common Future

- *THE* definition of sustainable development
  - Clear instrumentalization of animal and plant life
    - For the sake of
      - Present generations
      - **Future** generations
- Implicit Post-materialist Thesis
  - With development, i.e., wealth, a culture **turns attention from basic material needs to environmental deterioration** (amelioration thereof)

## 6. Rio Earth Summit (1992)

- 20 years after Stockholm Conference; 5 years after Brundtland
  - Principal themes:
    - Environment
    - Sustainable Development
  - Principle outcomes
    - Agenda 21 (Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> century)
    - the Statement of Forest Principles
    - the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
    - the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
    - **the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development**
- **Principle 7** (of 27 principles) of Declaration
  - Laid the ground for the future sustainable development goals
    - Resource Management Philosophy
      - Conserve
        - qua develop sustainably
      - Preserve
        - Resource value
      - Restore
  - Explicit post-materialist imperative
    - Development for the sake of sustainability of resource

## 7. Rio Earth Summit (1992)

- Principle 1
  - Sustainable development is development for the sake of humanity

## 8. Agenda 21 – Rio Earth Summit (1992)

- Concern for the animal / animal life
  - Subordinated to concerns for biodiversity
- Biodiversity
  - A capital asset

## 9. 2015 Millennium Development Goals

- An extension of earlier international efforts
  - Rooted in Agenda 21 (1992)
  - Rooted in Brundtland Commission (1987)
  - Rooted in Stockholm Conference (1972)
- The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include **8 goals, 21 targets and 60 indicators for measuring progress between 1990 and 2015**, when the goals are expected to be met.
  - MDGs: 2000 – 2015
  - SDGs: 2015 – 2030
- Clear hierarchical structure
  - Goals
  - Targets
  - Indicators

## 10. Goal 7 – Ensure Environmental Sustainability

- 4 targets
  - Only 7b deals with animal life in a relatively explicit way
    - Biodiversity
      - "a capital asset" – Agenda 21
- "Respect for Nature"
  - Appearance
    - Inherent worth of nature
  - Consistent Valuation
    - Resourcist conception
    - Value for the sake of
      - Future welfare
      - Future generations

## 11. 2030 SDGs

- Currently operating
  - 17 goals

- 169 targets
- A plethora of indicators
- Adopted at United Nations summit in New York
  - 25 - 27 September 2015

## 12. The 17 goals

- 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets
  - A number of goals indirectly address animal life
    - As was true of earlier goals and agendas

## 13. Two Directly Relevant to Our Concern

- The Two
  - Life on Land
  - Life below Water
- Examination of Goals & Targets
  - a **consistent and almost unvarying valuation** of the animal or animal life

## 14. Anthropocentric Valuation of Animal Life

- The animal, i.e., the natural resource
  - For the sake of
    - Needs of the present generation
    - Needs of future generations


## 14. Thesis / Conclusion

- Clear Line from
  - 1972 Stockholm Conference
  - 2015 SDGs
- Further back, if
  - Pinchot
  - American conservation philosophy emanating from him
- The Animal / Animal life
  - Instrumental valuation:
    - Value for the sake of humanity
      - Existing today
      - Not yet existing

Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am

Transylvania University

**PEDAGOGY WORKSHOP  
PHILOSOPHY IN AN  
INTERDISCIPLINARY KEY**



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Friday, March 22

8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

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## Discussants

<p><b>Peter Fosl</b></p> <p>Transylvania University</p> <p>Philosophy, Politics, Economics Program</p>	<p><b>Minh Nguyen</b></p> <p>Eastern Kentucky University</p> <p>Asian Studies &amp; Honors</p>	<p><b>Bob Sandmeyer</b></p> <p>University of Kentucky</p> <p>Sustainability</p>
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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am




Transylvania University

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Role of Panelists' Presentation

- Describe interdisciplinary work which forefronts philosophy's place in an interdisciplinary context
- Discuss importance of philosophy in interdisciplinary work at universities/colleges or in community, especially considering the current economic constraints to higher education in KY
- Discuss challenges, pedagogical or institutional, to such work and/activities



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am




Transylvania University

### Aim of KPA Workshop

to discuss the role of philosophy and activities of philosophers in an interdisciplinary context highlighting challenges and barriers encountered

**Presentations: 30-45 minutes**

**Discussion: 45-60 minutes**




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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University



**Dr. Peter Fosl**  
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, PROGRAM DIRECTOR OF PPE


Department: [Philosophy / Philosophy, Politics, and Economics](#)  
Office: CAC 202B  
Phone: (859) 233-8129  
Email: [pfosl@transy.edu](mailto:pfosl@transy.edu)

### Philosophy, Politics & Economics Major



"PPE has proven itself to be one of the premier majors preparing students for careers in law, public service, non-profit work and graduate study"

Peter Fosl,  
professor of philosophy




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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University



Department: Honors Program  
Office: University Building 138  
Mailing Address: University Building 137  
Email: [Minh.Nguyen@eku.edu](mailto:Minh.Nguyen@eku.edu)  
Phone: 859-622-8667

**Dr. Minh Nguyen**

Professor of Philosophy and Asian Studies; Associate Director of the Honors Program; Coordinator of National and International Scholarships and Fellowships








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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University



Bob Sandmeyer



Assistant Professor  
Environmental and Sustainability Studies  
Faculty

Environmental and Sustainability Studies  
Philosophy

[bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu](mailto:bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu)  
1429 Patterson Office Tower  
(859) 257-7749



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am

Transylvania University

**PEDAGOGY WORKSHOP  
PHILOSOPHY IN AN  
INTERDISCIPLINARY KEY**



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

**UK Sustainability**



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

**UK Sustainability**



College of Arts & Sciences  
Philosophy



College of Arts & Sciences  
Environmental & Sustainability Studies

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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

**UK Sustainability**



**Office of Sustainability**

**Syllabus: ENS 300**

**SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIC PLAN**

Shane Tedder  
Office of Sustainability  
[shane.tedder@uky.edu](mailto:shane.tedder@uky.edu)

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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

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 Sustainability



College of Arts & Sciences  
Environmental &  
Sustainability Studies



NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL  
SCIENCE  
An Interdisciplinary Undergraduate Degree Program

SAG  
SUSTAINABLE  
AGRICULTURE



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

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 Sustainability

**FSC**  
faculty sustainability council

**PSAC**  
president's sustainability advisory council

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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am



Transylvania University

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 Sustainability

 Office of  
Sustainability



Sustainability Grants



Student Sustainability Council



Sustainability Challenge Grants

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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am

 Transylvania University

**UK Sustainability**



**sustain • able  
pedagogies**  
methods and practices for teaching sustainability and teaching sustainably

**Aim:**  
to uncover and bring together a  
cadre of faculty  
committed to teaching  
sustainability and teaching  
sustainably.

Acting as **agents of change**,  
workshop participants will be  
frontline innovators  
transforming educational  
practices across College.

  
**CELT**  
center for the enhancement of learning & teaching



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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am

 Transylvania University

Interior Design  
Historic Preservation

**DESIGN**


Philosophy  
World  
Writing, Rhetoric, Digital media


**ARTS & SCIENCES**

Extension  
Entomology  
Econ  
Community & Leadership Development

**AGRICULTURE**

**DENTISTRY  
HONORS  
SOCIAL WORK  
COMMUNICATIONS**





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Friday, March 22  
8:15am-9:45am

Transylvania University

**PEDAGOGY WORKSHOP  
PHILOSOPHY IN AN  
INTERDISCIPLINARY KEY**





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## 1 Sustainability

- Placing philosophy in conversation with other disciplines
  - Interdisciplinary
    - Within the College of Arts and Sciences
  - Transdisciplinary
    - Within the University as a whole
      - E.g. sustain • able pedagogies workshop
- Economic constraints
  - Philosophy is not a money-making degree
  - Effect of breaking outside our disciplinary silo
    - Increased visibility & relevance of the discipline
    - Recruitment within
      - Major
      - College
- Challenges
  - Personal
    - Tenure considerations
  - Institutional
    - University budget depresses transdisciplinary work
  - Research
    - External funding accounted at UK in ways that discourages interdisciplinary research

## 2 & 3 Philosophy & ENS

- Home department – Philosophy
  - Also: Environmental & Sustainability Studies Faculty
- ENS – an interdisciplinary major within College of Arts and Sciences
  - Helped fashion the major
    - Approved by UK Senate: 2013
    - PHI 336 Environmental Ethics
      - 1 of 6 core requirements

- Specifically relevant courses:
  - Created
    - PHI 205 Food Ethics
    - PHI 336
    - PHI 531 Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic
  - Designing
    - PHI 532 DL Advanced Environmental Ethics
- Challenge
  - Tenure Review in Philosophy
    - Tenure still fundamentally a disciplinary process
  - DOE & Contract
    - Insulated within Philosophy
      - Benefits to this

#### **4 Team taught the ENS Capstone course 2018**

- Collaboration with Director of the Office of Sustainability
  - Philosopher – curriculum
  - Sustainability Officer – Project Designer
- Capstone Project
  - UK Sustainability Strategic Plan
    - Students engage all aspects of university infrastructure

#### **5 Three Sustainability Programs at UK: ENS, SAG, NRES**

- Arts and Sciences
  - ENS – BA degree
    - PHI 336 Environmental Ethics
      - a major requirement
- College of Agriculture, Food, and the Environment
  - SAG – a BS degree
    - Steering Committee
      - Since 2011
    - PHI 205 Food Ethics
      - A major requirement
        - Social Responsibility Cluster
  - NRES
    - Required: PHI 336 Environmental Ethics

- Replaced FOR 240 Forestry and Natural Resource Ethics
  - (a major requirement for Forestry)

## 6 Sustainability at the Institutional Level

- President's Sustainability Advisory Council
  - Deals with infrastructure concerns
    - Recognized an omission
- Faculty Sustainability Council
  - Provost initiated committee
    - My role:
      - not special because of philosophy
    - My participation
      - Led to most rewarding interdisciplinary work done at UK

## 7 Sustainability Funding at UK

- Philosophy has no money
- Won a \$47,000+ Sustainability Challenge Grant
  - Sustainability Challenge Grant Program: collaborative effort of
    - PSAC
    - The Tracy Farmer Institute for Sustainability and the Environment
    - The Office of Sustainability
  - Designed to engage multidisciplinary teams from the University community in the creation and implementation of ideas that will promote sustainability

## 8 sustain • able pedagogies workshop

- A jointly organized pedagogy workshop
  - Helen Turner, College of Design
  - Me
- Sought to overcome a great challenge
  - Creating a network of faculty
    - Sustainability scholars
    - Insulated by their disciplinary silo
- Exciting collaboration with C.E.L.T.
  - Ongoing professional efforts

## 9 Philosopher as AGENT OF CHANGE



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
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
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
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<b>DESIGN</b>	Interior Design Historic Preservation	Barbara Young Emily Bergeron
<b>ARTS &amp; SCIENCES</b>	Philosophy WRD (Writing, Rhetoric, Digital Media)	Julia Bursten Lauren Cagle
<b>AGRICULTURE</b>	Extension Entomology Econ Community & Leadership Development	Lou Hirsch Dave Gonthier Tim Woods Ali Meyer-Rossi
<b>DENTISTRY</b>		Lina Shirab
<b>HONORS</b>		Ryan Voogt
<b>SOCIAL WORK</b>		Allison Gibson
<b>COMMUNICATIONS</b>		Fatima Espinoza-Vasquez

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**pedagogy & citizenship**

Julia Bursten  
Lou Hirsch  
Ali Meyer-Rossi  
Lina Shirab  
Ryan Voogt

**food systems**

Lauren Cagle  
Dave Gonthier  
Tim Woods

**community & justice**

Allison Gibson  
Emily Bergeron  
Fatima Espinoza-Vasquez  
Barbara Young

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
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
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
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
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
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
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### 1. Bob and Helen Intro

Helen - Design; Bob - Arts & Sciences  
Interdisciplinary Sustain-Pedagogies Workshop  
Conclusory event

### 2. (HELEN) FSC

The idea for this workshop came about from our work together in the Faculty Sustainability Council, which was formed to promote sustainability in curriculum and research. We received a Sustainability Challenge grant to organize and administer the workshop, collectively funded by PSAC, the Office of the Provost, and the Student Sustainability Council.

### 3. (BOB) Apple

Proposing a Sustain-able Pedagogies workshop, we sought to create a network faculty from across the university. The workshop took place from May 8 – May 11, 2018. At the conclusion of the workshop, participants formed three cohorts and each group committed to produce a sustainability outcome, which this event features.

### 4. (HELEN) Pikachu

For those who aren't familiar, this presentation is being given in the "pechakucha" (not pikachu) format, which consists of 20 slides that advance automatically after 20 seconds. An engaging method to share information in a concise and relaxed way, this pechakucha exercise was the first technique we used to develop cohorts among workshop participants.

### 5. (HELEN) CELT

A major force in the planning and implementation of the workshop was the UK Center for the Enhancement of Learning and Teaching. The work of these experts helped us design outcomes-based education plans and frame our efforts around actionable goals. We'd like to thank specially Trey Conatser, who is in reality a workshop co-organizer and leader.

## 6. (BOB) Agents of Change

We gathered a diverse group of faculty from 12 distinct disciplines that represented 7 different colleges. Each participant committed themselves to engage in a holistic and collective discourse as “Agents of Change” seeking to transform educational practices across all Colleges at the University.

## 7. (HELEN) Names

Bifurcated into a north and south campus, our workshop sought to build bridges among diverse disciplinary boundaries, oftentimes topographically separated by substantial distances. The workshop encouraged these diverse faculty to confront and integrate often particular disciplinary approaches to sustainability.

## 8. (HELEN) Side-Guide

As organizers we consciously assumed the role of “guide on the side”, rather than “sage on the stage” – acknowledging the special expertise of our participants as unique contributors and experts in their own right. This allowed our participants to take an active role as creators of content by giving them license to drive conversation.

## 9. (BOB) Community

To this end we facilitated the creation of cohorts within the larger group. Every day, we organized workshop participants into different cohorts to build community. As mentioned, the workshop participants, themselves, organized into three distinct cohorts, which have met over the last year to develop and implement sustainability outcomes.

## 10. (BOB) Lunch

Since sharing a meal is perhaps the most tangible arena to build community, we brought experts to the lunch table every day. Shane Tedder, the Coordinator of the Office of Sustainability, led a round table about sustainability on campus. During the second day’s lunch, Lee Meyer and Carolyn Gahn, led a discussion of sustainable dining options.

### 11. (HELEN) Schedule

Now we have all been in workshops and conferences that are static and overscheduled, ignoring personal well-being. Instead we attempted to structure this workshop in a sustainable manner to yield high impact collaboration balanced with reflection and application while modelling strategies for implementation and using the campus as a living laboratory.

### 12. (HELEN) Tuesday

On the first day, we intentionally designed the cohort groups around relatively close topographical distance. Members of each group produced an introductory PechaKucha in the morning, which was great fun. In the afternoon, each group walked a portion of campus to survey sustainability initiatives.

### 13. (BOB) Hunt

This Scavenger Hunt – as we called it – had three goals. First it highlighted three distinct sustainability programs across campus: ENS, NRES, and Sustainable Ag. Second, it oriented our faculty participants to sustainability initiatives across campus. Third, it used the university as a living laboratory for sustainability studies.

### 14. (BOB) Wednesday

After the first day, we took a day off for reflection, and for us – the organizers – to regroup and rethink. During this second “asynchronous” day, our participants worked on a short reflective assignment during their free time.

### 15. (HELEN) Thursday I

Returning on the third day, we directly addressed the idea of sustainable pedagogy. As a whole group we practiced pair to pair learning to develop a list of implementation strategies not only to teach about the topic of sustainability but also to practice what we teach.

16. (HELEN) Thursday II

The focus of the day's activities highlighted education of the whole student by a living breathing, often stressing, faculty. Hi fi/lo fi techniques, accessibility concerns, and the balancing of work and life dominated the day's discussion. Embodying these ideas, we concluded the day with a campus tree walk led by Brianna Damron.

17. (BOB) Friday

Friday was the most significant day, due in large part to the flexibility we built into the workshop design. Our participants took over and created their own cohort groups on the basis of shared research and pedagogical interests. It was genuinely beautiful to watch our agents of change take charge of their own agency.

18. (HELEN) AASHE

While this event celebrates the outcomes produced by the workshop participants, we as organizers have shared this idea of a sustain-able pedagogies workshop with sustainability professionals at the 2018 meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education.

19. (BOB) Interrobang

We have also committed to publishing a scholarly article based on our work together. The title of this project is called: Sustainability for the Present. It details how pedagogy has become a dominant theme in sustainability studies and the unique contribution workshops like this make.

20. (BOB) Thanks folks

We'd like to conclude with a special thanks to each and every participant of our workshop and all the people who visibly and behind the scenes supported this workshop. Your dedication and commitment are a testament to the high caliber people working here at UK toward sustain-able pedagogy.

**Timing** for this talk is perfect.

- I am currently teach **PHI 336** Environmental Ethics, a core requirement in our Environmental and Sustainability Studies program
  - **Current unit**, Sustainability: the Concept and its Critique
- So I'll frame my brief comments with **reference to some work** are doing in that class right now
  - But I'll **draw out some conclusions** in a way **distinct** from that of my class that I think I especially relevant to this discussion

**I'd like to start** by quoting from one of the most important documents on sustainability this century, i.e., the **second encyclical of Pope Francis titled Laudato Si'**, On Care for Our Common Home, published in 2015.

- Given our subject, i.e., emerging technologies, I'll particularly **focus** on the manner in which **genetically modified organisms (GMOs)**, particularly **GM cereals are treated** in the Encyclical.
  - The idea of sustainability: fundamentally a development concept
    - **Weak** concept
      - A. Three pillars concept
        - Economy
        - Environment
        - Society
      - B. Sustainability: the intersectional concern
        - 3 circle Venn diagram
      - A v B: Admits of a substitutability or interchangeability (**fungibility**) among pillars
        - Social product (emerging tech) can replace, substitute, or positively augment an natural process
  - **Strong** concept
    - ecological-economic framework
    - many of the most **fundamental services** provided by nature **cannot be replaced** by services produced by humans or man-made capital (Gudmussion et. al., 34-5).
- GM Cereals in Encyclical
  - “In many places, following the introduction of these crops (GM cereals), productive land is concentrated in the hands of a few owners due to “the progressive disappearance of small producers, who, as a consequence of the loss of the exploited lands, are obliged to withdraw from direct production”.[113] The most vulnerable of these become temporary labourers, and many rural workers end up moving to poverty-stricken urban areas. The expansion of these crops has the effect of destroying the complex network of ecosystems, diminishing the diversity of production and affecting regional economies, now and



in the future. In various countries, we see an expansion of oligopolies for the production of cereals and other products needed for their cultivation. This dependency would be aggravated were the production of infertile seeds to be considered; the effect would be to force farmers to purchase them from larger producers” (Laudato Si’, #135).

- Lesson:
  - Concerns of the adverse health effects to the individual consumer subordinated to the impact of the technology to the human economies, the social body, and the ecosystem.
  - The household of human kind
    - Subordinate to the household of nature (Kingdom of God)
- Continuing with the Encyclical, one can see in the document
  - at once, both
    - wonder at the awesome power of our technology
      - "Science is the best tool by which we can listen to the cry of the earth" (Encyclical Summary, 1)
    - trepidation at the unwise use of this power
      - "Yet it must also be recognized that nuclear energy, biotechnology, information technology, knowledge of our DNA, and many other abilities which we have acquired, have given us tremendous power. More precisely, they have given those with the knowledge, and especially the economic resources to use them, an impressive dominance over the whole of humanity and the entire world. Never has humanity had such power over itself, yet nothing ensures that it will be used wisely, particularly when we consider how it is currently being used" (Laudato Si’, #104)

Some 60 years earlier, the German philosopher, **Martin Heidegger**, would write in his influential essay, *The Question Concerning Technology*, that:

- "Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral... " (FT, 4).

So my first point is simply to suggest questions concerning emerging technologies

- ought not to be considered as something neutral
- especially in the manner that these technologies **instrumentalize nature, i.e., recreate nature as artifact**, for certain anthropocentric ends.

Following this thought, I'd like to conclude with a reference to the philosopher **Hans Jonas** and his work, *The Imperative of Responsibility* (1979)

- Two basic premises underlie the book as a whole.

- **First** premise, "that our **collective technological practice constitutes a new kind of human action**," new in regards to
  - method,
  - magnitude of its enterprises,
  - scope of impact, and
  - cumulative propagation of its effect.
    - His is a work that considers the Anthropocene before the idea of the Anthropocene was cool.
  - Insight (not special to Jonas)
    - Our technological practices emanates from a fundamental **reconceptualization of knowledge** inaugurated by Francis Bacon
      - **Knowledge is power**
- **Second** premise, consequent of the novelty of human action, **our dealings with the non-human world can no longer be considered ethically neutral**.
- The basic argument in *The Imperative of Responsibility* is this:
  - **Our predictive knowledge** cannot span the consequences of our **technical knowledge**.
  - Thus with the transformation of human action consequent to the reconceptualization of knowledge as power, all previous ethics fails.
    - Thus his work **advances a new of ethics** (an ethics of futurity, he calls it)
    - Importantly, this ethic proceeds from the recognition of the altered state of human action which our technologies have obtained for us.
- There is **an ominous side of the Baconian ideal** that I feel necessary to reiterate, following Jonas's lead
  - **1979**: "we live in an **apocalyptic situation**, that is, under the threat of a universal catastrophe if we let things take their present course" (140).
  - "The **danger of disaster** attending the Baconian ideal of power over nature through scientific technology **arises not so much from any shortcomings of its performance as from the magnitude of its success**" (*Ibid.*)
- The manner by which we conceive, design, implement and assess emerging technologies demands **recognition of two considerations**:
  - **First**, the integrated social, economic, and environmental dynamic at play in the application of these technologies
    - **There are some things technologies cannot do and should not do**
  - Second, the solutions to our most pressing social, economic and environmental problems we are confronted with today may not reside in **the very habits of thinking which have produced these very problems**.

Is it at all possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in ecological terms?

Specifically here, I mean to ask this question in light of Edmund Husserl's work.

Consequently, the transcendental subjectivity to which I refer is that subjectivity disclosed by Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction, a subjectivity which is typically thought of as worldless and solipsistic, who constitutes in its own immanence others and the world. I believe the answer is yes. It is possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in ecological terms. Not only is it possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in these terms, I hold this is the only proper way to think of "it." But there are serious methodological considerations that complicate this answer, and I am aware of the controversy of this claim. So this presentation is a first attempt, really, to lay out the terms of this claim and the problems that require resolution in order to successfully defend it.

### Transcendental Subjectivity as Disclosed in Husserl's Philosophy

"In the final analysis," Husserl tells us, "everything depends on the initial moment of the method, the phenomenological method" (Husserl, Hua-CW VI, 493). That is to say, in order to understand transcendental subjectivity properly,

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

we need to enact the phenomenological method properly. So what is this method? What is its basic procedure? For simplicity's sake, I will, by and large, articulate this as sketched by Husserl in his 1931 lecture, "Phenomenology and Anthropology" (already quoted). The brevity imposed on me in this talk makes the "Phenomenology and Anthropology" lecture a perfect place to situate my argument, for one of Husserl's stated aims in that lecture is (QUOTE) "to sketch out the transcendental philosophical method that has achieved its pure clarification in constitutive phenomenology " (UNQUOTE) (Hua-CW VI, 486). To be clear, though, the sketch I will present here is infused with a number of clarifications that go beyond what Husserl details in the lecture. These additions are necessary in my opinion to focus on my main claim, i.e., that it is possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in ecological terms.

First, the phenomenological method calls for a suspension of judgment that marks the desideratum of the philosophical endeavor. (QUOTE) "I must let no previous judgment, no matter how indisputable it may seem to be, go unquestioned and ungrounded" (UNQUOTE) (Hua-CW VI, 490). This is, of course, a procedural step consonant with Descartes's own meditative turn in his philosophy. Here one proceeds according to the principle of absolute self-responsibility, i.e., to find for oneself the ultimate and self-sufficient grounding of

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

all my knowledge. It is this step that leads to the explication of the general thesis of the natural attitude. This universal certitude of the world or, as Husserl also says, "universal belief in being (that) flows through and sustains my entire life" (*ibid.*) lies deeper than any particular belief in the existence of some individual reality or aggregate thereof. For instance, I can quite easily imagine something showing itself in my experience in a way differently from what I take it to be. Future experiences may offer presentations of the objectivity that conflict with certain pre-delineated but implicit expectations of how the objectivity ought to look or to behave. Indeed, the objectivity may show itself to be *utterly* different than I had taken it to be. Yet throughout the transformation of the sense of the object in my experience, my natural belief in the world as such still remains unshaken. Even were I to doubt the existence of the aggregate of things surrounding me, the sense of the world as continually there and on hand for me, as that reality in which things *are*, remains outside the scope of this sort of particularized doubting.

Now it is true that Husserl explicitly entertains the possibility worldlessness in section 49 of *Ideas I*, the section titled "Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World."

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

(QUOTE) In our experiencing it is conceivable that there might be a host of irreconcilable conflicts not just for us but in themselves, that experience might suddenly show itself to be intractable to the demand that it carry on its positings of physical things harmoniously, that its context might lose its fixed regular organizations of adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances (and that it might actually remain so *ad infinitum*). (UNQUOTE) (Husserl, *Ideas I*-Kersten, 109 modified).

Yet even in this extreme example, in which the experience of irreconcilable conflicts occurs not just for us but *in themselves and ad infinitum*, we should take note that Husserl allows that "crude unity-formations" would come to be nevertheless constituted in experience and these unity-formations would function as "transient supports for intuitions." Consciousness, in other words, would constitute something analogous to world even in this extreme situation, though it would be improper to speak of this as if this were natural reality. One would expect, then, though Husserl never overtly assures us of this, that this sort of thwarted consciousness would nevertheless live, objectivate, judge, feel, and will – to whatever degree it could – within some sort of attitude that is analogous to attitude I take up in my natural life.

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

However, I do not want to push this too far here, since its defense goes well beyond the parameters of this presentation. Suffice it to say that Husserl presents us this extreme possibility in *Ideas* 49, first and foremost, so as to provide the clearest example by which to demarcate immanental from transcendent being. Immanental being is indubitably absolute; "the world of transcendent 'res' is (on the contrary) entirely referred to consciousness" (*Ibid.*). And I would add that though Husserl asserts the possibility of a consciousness beset with irreconcilable conflicts arising in themselves and ad infinitum in experience, I believe we have here a rare instance in Husserl's writing where argument outweighs intuition. Husserl advances no phenomenological evidence to substantiate the description he presents as a possibility here, and even if we were willing to accept it as legitimate – which to be honest, I am – I see little reason to accept his understanding of it. Regardless, his basic point in introducing this possibility is an important one, i.e., that the sense of that which shows or evinces itself in experience may – in future experiences – come to be partially or entirely overthrown. Yet immanental being as such is not subject to such provisionality.

To return to my argument, the natural attitude is that universal belief in being which anchors every encounter with the things in my surrounding world. This attitude, ironically, remains transparent to itself in the natural attitude. While it is

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

relatively easy to understand how a course of experiences may nullify the sense

of x or y intended in consciousness, the practicalities motivating my everyday

endeavors prohibit the attempt to universalize doubt to the world as such.

However, I, the meditating philosopher, am absolutely free to inaugurate a

radically distinct kind of doubt than that enacted in life. "As autonomous ego I

must pursue to the ultimate grounding exclusively in my own evidence what to

others traditionally holds as science and scientific foundation" (Hua-CW VI, 490

*modified*). In my philosophical attitude, in other words, motivated purely by the

desideratum of absolute self-responsibility, my attempt at doubting may take on,

and must take on, a universal scope. For me, "this certitude can *no longer serve as*

*the basis* for forming judgments" (Hua-CW VI, 490-91). So establishment of the

philosophical desideratum to absolute self-responsibility demands a universal

epoché or world-epoché.

Two remarks before I continue. First, clearly, this universal attempt at doubt is

not unlike Descartes methodological doubt. But a fundamental difference ought

not to be overlooked here. Descartes famously denied the validity of the faculty

of sensation in his *Meditations*. The method of doubt as performed by the

phenomenologizing philosopher aims, in contradistinction, neither to affirm nor

deny any ground of givenness. This is the very meaning of the principle of all



## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

principles articulated by Husserl in section 24 of *Ideas I*. This is to say, Husserl does not, as does Descartes, "suppose, then, that all the things I see are false."<sup>1</sup>

(QUOTE) The world continues to appear the way it had been appearing; world-life [*Weltleben*] is not interrupted. But the world is now a bracketed "world," a mere phenomenon, and precisely a validity-phenomenon of the stream of experience, of consciousness as such. However, this consciousness is now transcendently reduced consciousness. World, this validity-phenomenon "world" is manifestly inseparable from transcendently reduced consciousness (UNQUOTE) (Hua-CW VI, 492 modified).

Second, Husserl, it seems, has moved surreptitiously and perhaps even illicitly from the sphere of acts, particularly from acts of judgment, on the one hand, to, on the other, an objective domain, i.e., the state of affairs as judged. Yet, for Husserl, this alternating focus on both thesis and theme in his method is neither underhanded nor illegitimate. As we suspend judgment, that which is judged undergoes a modification of sense. The unique suspension of the general thesis by the phenomenologist entails a bracketing or parenthesizing of its general

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<sup>1</sup> René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. In *The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Volume I*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 149.

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

theme, i.e., the world. The phenomenological method of doubt deliberately orients the phenomenologizing ego toward the act-sphere of consciousness, on the one hand, and the object sphere, on the other. This oscillation between thesis and theme is, in point of fact, fundamental to phenomenological method. Indeed, Husserl employs a language consciously chosen to express this methodological aspect. In section 33 of *Ideas I*, he explains: (QUOTE) "When the metaphor of parenthesizing is closely examined it is seen to be, from the very beginning, more suitable to the object-sphere; just as the locution of "putting out of action" is better suited to the act- or consciousness-sphere," (UNQUOTE) (Husserl, *Ideas I* – Kersten, 60). It is thus a mistake to understand the method of bracketing or parenthesizing in contradiction to the neutrality modification in consciousness, or to confuse the one for the other. "Bracketing" or "parenthesizing" and "abstaining-from-producing something" or "not living in the act" are but two sides of the same coin. In short, the universal epoché as Husserl employs it neither affirms nor denies; and the enactment of the epoché has a twofold focus, on both thesis and theme.

The world-epoché marks a primary methodological concept in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Immediately, though, it becomes apparent that this universal epoché has the effect of destabilizing the very sense of myself as an

## An Ecological Understanding of Transcendental Subjectivity

embodied human subject in the real world. That is to say, the belief in my own being qua human (qua mundane, even) falls sway in the universalization of the epoché. Indeed, in a move not entirely dissimilar to Descartes's, the radicality of this meditation reveals a unique transcendental solitude. Husserl goes further, though, to suggest that the phenomenological method induces, so to speak, a splitting of the ego. In my worldly doings I, of course, experience myself as natural human ego. But the radicality of reflection imposed within phenomenological method discloses a transcendental ego "in" whom (or "for" whom) this natural subject obtains that sense qua human. This is "a new and important step" (*Ibid.*, 491) that opens a vast new field of research for investigation, "a field of immediate, apodictic experience, the constant source and solid ground of all transcendental judgments whether immediate or mediate" (*Ibid.*, 492). This immediate domain of research is, methodologically, at first restricted to my own individual ego, i.e., its transcendental *cogitations in all their typical forms*. *Ideas I* provides us with an example of this restriction. As is clear, though, phenomenology is an eidetic science and is as such guided by the method of ideation. "What is seen when that occurs is the corresponding pure essence, or Eidos, whether it be the highest category or a particularization thereof- down to full concretion" (Husserl, *Ideas I*-Kersten, 8). The scientific investigation of

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transcendental consciousness discloses the essential structures of cognition qua cogito-cogitatum. An eidetic science, phenomenology is at the same time a philosophy of leading clues. Proceeding methodologically from the cogitatum qua cogitatum, in other words, the phenomenologist regressively investigates the field of apodictic experiences in which that cogitatum is constituted. "The thing that is naïvely given to us as one thing, and possible as something permanent and completely unaltered – becomes the *transcendental clue* that leads us to the systematic reflective study of manifolds of consciousness that essentially pertain to any one thing" (Hua-CW VI, 497). Transcendental reflection thus extends to vast subterranean domains. These include the transcendental peculiarities of the "I can," transcendental habits built up in the life of consciousness, productions of empathy, and, correlatively of course, the universal validity-phenomenon that holds sway in consciousness, i.e., "world" – reduced, of course. "I have lost nothing that was there for me in the state of naivete, and in particular nothing that showed itself to me as existing reality. Rather: in the absolute attitude [Einstellung] I now recognize the world itself, I recognize it for the very first time as what it continuously was for me and had to be for me according to its essential nature: as a transcendental phenomenon" (*Ibid.*, 495). In this radically unnatural view of transcendental life, the phenomenologist's regard ranges over the entire

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domain of the life of consciousness, from the world qua validity-phenomena to the transcendental experiences in which the sense that validity-phenomenon holds good.

### Ecological Terms

The question driving this presentation is whether it is possible to think of transcendental subjectivity in ecological terms. What has fallen under the epoché is every judgment about spatiotemporal existence, which of course, includes judgments about my own organic existence. Yet if this is the case, it seems, then, the central tenet of ecological thought also falls prey to the epoché. Ecology proceeds from the thesis that every organism necessarily exists embedded in a system of interdependencies. Individuals and species exist together in what can be described as a pyramid of trophic relations. "Each successive layer depends on those below it for food and often for other services, and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above" (Leopold, Land Ethic, 215). Here the problem of this paper announces itself clearly. The transcendental ego appears in the initial moment of the method as a solitude of immanence, the organism, on the contrary, is a transcendent nodal point in a system of trophic relations.

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We are now at a stage where we can see the form of answer will take in response to this fundamental discrepancy. To understand transcendental subjectivity as worldless, as a subject unrelated to world, represents a fundamental misunderstanding of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology – even within his most Cartesian-styled texts. In Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, "*what we lose is not the world, but our captivation by the world*" (Fink, *SCM*-Bruzina trans., 42). By means of the methodological suspension of belief and bracketing of the natural world, we come to recognize that our natural life is but an abstract stratum; transcendental subjectivity is that which is truly concrete. As we noted already, "the world continues to appear the way it had been appearing; world-life [*Weltleben*] is not interrupted" (Hua-CW VI, quoted above).

The acquisition of the *solus ipse* in phenomenological reflection marks the beginning of philosophical wisdom, not its end. Indeed, phenomenological reflection discloses a subjectivity that is in essence relational. The validity-phenomenon of world being is for the phenomenologist a leading clue by which to inaugurate regressive investigations into the constitutional performance of an anonymous ego. Thus for a phenomenologist to lose the world would be like an

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archaeologist losing the very ground from which she unearths the civilizations underneath her. It is inconceivable.

Admittedly, I have been toying in this presentation with an equivocation in my use of the word "relation." On the one hand, the concept of relation as I have been using it is transcendental in character. The method of correlation research and the distinct strata upon which constitutional investigations progress requires, according to Husserl, "a secure ordering of problems if one is to ascend from one level of problems to the next higher level" (Husserl, Hua-CW VI, 498 modified). Husserl's phenomenological investigations proceed by leading clues to detail the essential morphology of relations between cogito and cogitatum. This relational-study leads of necessity into depth investigations into the essential connections between cogitata and corresponding faculties of the transcendental ego, i.e., into the "I can" and a transcendental habitus inherent to transcendental life. Even here, these depth investigations remain incomplete, as they abstract from the entire problem field of empathy and the investigation of "the open and endless whole of transcendental intersubjectivity, precisely as that which, within its communalized transcendental life, first constitutes the world as an objective world, as a world that is identical for everyone" (Husserl, Hua-CW VI, 498). On the other hand, the concept of relation as is used in ecology is natural in character.

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Ecology begins with the insight the human being is a member of the natural order. Not only is any particular species but a nodal point in a system of trophic relations, each individual stands in essential kinship relations with the diversity of earthly life. Every kinship relation implies a natural history, and thus life, itself, is a relation that reaches back into the natural history of this planet. The human being, in other words, is unique only insofar as it is the specific evolutionary product of a contingent history of beings. How is one to understand this equivocation adequately? I'll conclude with Husserl's own words, which occur near the conclusion of the 1931 "Phenomenology and Anthropology" lecture.

What we must constantly keep in mind is that what this transcendental phenomenology does is nothing other than to interrogate the one world, exactly that which is always for us the real world (the world that holds true for us, shows itself to us, the only world that has meaning for us). Transcendental phenomenology uses intentionality to interrogate the sources of that world's meaning and validity for us, the sources that comprise the true meaning of its being. That is precisely the way and the only way, to gain access to all conceivable problems about the world, and beyond them, to the



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transcendentally disclosed problems of being, not just the old  
problems raised to the level of their transcendental sense (Husserl, Hua-CW  
VI, 498).

"Some Moments of Wonder Emergent within Transcendental Phenomenological Analyses"

James Hart

Husserl Circle Meeting 2022, Catholic University,

COMMENTARY by Bob Sandmeyer

I would like to thank the Husserl Circle for giving me this opportunity to engage with the work of James Hart. Jim is of the generation of my own teachers of phenomenology. And though I have known of and known Jim for many years now, I have not had the opportunity to engage with him professionally to this point. So, when I saw that his name was on the roster of presenters, I jumped at the prospect of commenting on his paper.

My commentary centers on the wonder of manifestness, since that is at the heart of Jim's paper. The most important of Husserl's passages on this theme is Husserl's claim "that the most wonderful fact ... is how the world stands in correlation with one's agency of manifestation"(28). Since Jim only partially quotes from this passage by Husserl in this paper but more fully in a 2019 paper titled, "From Metafact to Metaphysics in 'The Heidelberg School'" (*Protosociology*, (2019): 36), I'd like to look turn to this earlier paper briefly. For clarity, I will quote a whole paragraph from Jim's 2019 paper which contains the Husserl quote. To provide the passage by Husserl in its fullness, I'll add just a couple of lines of translation, which I'll point out as I read the whole paragraph. So, this is Jim on phenomenological wonder in his 2019 essay.

For transcendental phenomenology, the wonder *that* things are so or exist at all was subordinate to a "phenomenological wonder" awakened by the correlation between, on the one hand, that things are and are so and, on the other, the manifestation by and through which things come to light, i.e., through one's consciousness or self-present agency. It was the latter that struck Husserl most of all. What is obvious to the point of total hiddenness is how my being-conscious, *Bewusst-sein*, as well as that of my fellow humans, goes in advance of the world already out there now as we describe it to one another in ordinary or

scientific discourse. [Here is where the Husserlian quote really begins, the first sentence of which is translated by me and the second, i.e., "most wonderful fact" sentence, is translated by Jim.] My being, in its immanently temporal universality, in its fully concrete unique essentiality: "If I were not, there would be for me no world," <this> sounds like a tautology. But yet there is here "*the most wonderful fact*," that the world "which is for me in all of its determinateness, is a unity which presents itself in my subjective experiences, and this world which presents itself in the occurring 'presentations' is not to be released from this correlation" (Husserl 1950, 401).

Husserl wrote these lines in the fall of 1929, and they are contained in a supplementary manuscript to the published edition of *Ideas I*. This 1929 manuscript is part of the so-called Gibson-Konvolute or bundle of manuscripts; that is to say, the passage in question was written by Husserl as he was again revisiting *Ideas I* in anticipation of the William Boyce Gibson translation of that text. This particular *Beilage* is included in both the 1950 Biemel edition of *Husserliana* 3 as well as the later 1976 edition of *Husserliana* 3.2, edited by Karl Schumann. So, while this supplementary text is not part of *Ideas I* as published by Husserl originally, it is included in the very earliest published edition by the Husserl Archive. This is important, as we all know, because the *Husserliana* editions include important editorial remarks to the source material, which provide something of a window into Husserl's thinking regarding his own formulations of his philosophy in writing.

Looking at the textual remarks in both *Husserliana* editions to this passage specifically quoted by Jim here, I noticed something interesting. The *Hua* III 1950 Biemel edition of *Ideas I*, which Jim is using as his source, does not include any editorial remarks concerning this passage. However, in *Husserliana* 3.2, i.e., the later Schumann edition, one can find an editorial remark specific to the passage cited by Jim. According to the Schumann edition, it appears that Husserl had in the D exemplar of that text stricken out those words after "the most wonderful fact."

This emendation changes the emphatic sense of this phenomenological wonder, I would suggest. With the relevant words stricken, the passage would rather read:

My being, in its immanently temporal universality, in its fully concrete unique essentiality: "If I were not, there would be for me no world," <this> sounds like a tautology. But yet there is here "*the most wonderful fact.*" [Full stop] . (Ideen 3.2, Beilage 45, p. 87)

In the expanded formulation, the "most wonderful fact" seems to refer the correlation of world and transcendental subjectivity, as Jim notes. However, the abbreviated passage mutes this reference. The emphasis now, especially in context of the whole *Beilage* itself, is rather on the priority of my being qua transcendental subjectivity given absolutely in self-reflection. This, rather than the correlation of world and consciousness, is the ultimate subject of phenomenological wonder. Indeed, I want to suggest the self-understanding of phenomenology as an eidetic science in Husserl's writings is marked, first, precisely by a wonder which arises at the moment of disclosure of this new domain of absolute being but then, second, by the patient dissolution of this wonder by means of an eidetic analysis of noetic-noematic correlations which now show themselves in this new phenomenological attitude.

This seems to me more consistent with my own understanding of Husserl's conceptualization of phenomenological wonder. I shall confess straightaway that the passage which Jim quotes is not one that I have not considered in any systematic way before reading his paper. There is, however, another passage by Husserl on the theme of phenomenological wonder of which I am more familiar. This is found in *Husserliana* 5, that is to say, the Third Book of *Ideas* whose theme is *phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences*. The "wonderous" quote that I am about to read is found in the final paragraph of chapter two of that work, titled

"Further clarification on the relationship of rational psychology and phenomenology." I quote at length the final 7 sentences of this chapter now:

Only one thing justifies characterizing – as we did above – the eidetics of the psychic *states* of consciousness as phenomenology: namely, the circumstance already touched upon that the pure experience with its entire essence enters into the psychic state and experiences only an apperception that does not change it but rather apprehends it appurtenantly. It makes of the apriori an aposteriori and itself in turn presupposes the apriori. For it, itself, belongs to a pure Ego as its pure experience, to which, as to everything, belongs the eidetic possibility of being empirically apperceived and so in infinitum. These <now aposteriori states> are connections which, when one has once understood them, possess nothing wonderful. The wonder of all wonders is pure Ego and pure consciousness: and precisely this wonder disappears as soon as the light of phenomenology falls upon it and subjects it to eidetic analysis. The wonder disappears by changing into an entire science with a plethora of difficult scientific problems. Wonder is something inconceivable; the problematical in the form of scientific problems is something conceivable... (*Ideas III*, translated by Ted Klein and William Pohl, 64 *translation modified*)

So, in this passage Husserl most definitely speaks of a phenomenological wonder but it is the wonder over the absolute being of the pure I and transcendental consciousness disclosed by the epoché and phenomenological reduction. The correlation here is the correlation between the being of experience pertinent to empirical consciousness and the being of experience pertinent to transcendental consciousness. Looking again to this chapter in *Ideas III*, Husserl remarks: "Accordingly, it is a fundamental necessity, and of cardinal importance for philosophy, to lift oneself to the recognition that one must differentiate the eidetics of *states* of consciousness, which is a piece of the rational ontology of the psyche, and the eidetics of the *transcendentally purified* consciousness (or being of experience [*Erlebnis-Seins*]), that the latter, the genuine and pure phenomenology, is just as little rational psychology as rational natural theory (Husserl, *Ideas III*, 64). Indeed, the wonder that arises at the disclosure of this absolute

domain of being dissolves under the light of phenomenology, most particularly, under eidetic analysis. Consequently, the transcendental reduction seems to have a function precisely the opposite of that characterized by Jim. Rather than sustain this wonder, that is to say, sustain this quasi-gracious interruption of the familiar, routine, and every day, the reduction makes possible a new habitus, a new scientific attitude whose orientation is directed to a conceptualization of this newly disclosed absolute sphere of being of experience.

At the heart of Husserlian phenomenology lies the principle of all principles. As Husserl says in his Kant Society lectures of June 1931, i.e., the "Phenomenology and Anthropology" lecture, "I must let no previous judgment, no matter how indisputable it may seem to be, go unquestioned and ungrounded." (HuCW VI, 490) Phenomenology is thus in a very real sense to be a presuppositionless autonomous science, justified apodictically, "giving it an ultimate grounding through the activity of raising and answering questions" (HuCW VI, 490). The epoché demands in its universality a bracketing of the being of the world. With the accomplishment of this maneuver, one can thus ask, "Am I now standing face to face with the nothing?" (HuCW VI, 491). Quite the contrary. A bracketed world "continues to appear the way it used to appear; life in the world is not interrupted," as Husserl points out (HuCW VI, 491). "Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification" (Ideas I – Kersten, 64). Excluding all the sciences related to the natural world, "our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain ... gained by the method of parenthesizing." And this domain is of course the "pure Ego and pure consciousness," i.e., the wonder of all wonders.

I of course agree with Jim when he says, "experience as *Erleben*, living through our agency of manifestation, is having a world" (30). In my own understanding of the Husserlian

project I have always thought of the domain of absolute being, i.e., my being qua pure I, in its immanently temporal universality, in its fully concrete unique essentiality, as wondersome. What is truly wondersome, in other words, is that "every perception of something immanent necessarily guarantees the existence of its object. If reflective seizing-upon is directed to an experience of mine, I have seized upon something absolute itself, the factual being of which is essentially incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would be a countersense to believe it possible that an experience given in that manner does not in truth exist." (*Ideas I* – Kersten, 78) Of course, it is necessary here is to distinguish carefully between the appearance of something transcendent from the givenness of this absolute being. As Husserl notes in *Ideas I*, "We therefore hold fast to the following: Whereas it is essential to givenness by appearances that no appearance presents the affair as something "absolute" instead of in a one-sided presentation, it is essential to the givenness of something immanent precisely to present something absolute which cannot ever be presented with respect to sides or be adumbrated." (*Ideas I* – Kersten trans, 76) So what is truly wondersome is not the manifestness of anything worldly *per se* but rather the manifestness of that which does not, itself, genuinely appear (qua transcendent) yet which is apriori necessary and given absolutely.

My sole concern is that the analysis of wonder laid out in Jim's paper elides over a vital motivation in Husserl's philosophy. For Husserl, phenomenology is a science of essences, which is, by virtue of the epoché and reduction, an apodictic science. Wonder stands at the beginning of the scientific project, but it does not define that scientific activity. The *Logos* essay is pertinent here. So, while we stand in awe at the wonder of all wonders, at this new absolute

domain of scientific investigation disclosed by the phenomenological method, this "wonder disappears by changing into an entire science with a plethora of difficult scientific problems" (*Ideas III*, translated by Ted Klein and William Pohl, 64).

In conclusion, then, I would like to ask Jim to discuss these two wonderful passages by Husserl, i.e., "the wondrous fact" passage in *Ideas I* (or, more precisely, *Husserliana* 3.2) and the "wonder of all wonder" passage from *Ideas III*. Are they consistent with one another? Does the *Ideas III* passage amplify or diminish the analysis of wonder at the heart of your paper? To me, the import of both passages together indicates something quite important about the method of phenomenology that remains undiscussed in this paper. I'll quote from Bob Jordan, my first teacher of Husserl, to clarify what I mean. "The primary methodological function of the phenomenological reduction, be it psychological or transcendental, is to assure the investigation takes *as its point of departure* phenomena that, being given absolutely through immanent experience or *pure* reflection, can be known to be genuine cases of the kind under investigation" (Bob Jordan, "Intro to 'Husserl's Inaugural Lecture'," *Husserl: Shorter Works*, 5 italics mine). The phenomenological method discloses a domain of absolute being, and the phenomenological intuitions that arise as a consequence of this method apodictically grounds phenomenology. But the wonder that we experience at this new disclosure fades away as we proceed in our scientific work of analysis and eidetic description. Phenomenological wonder is thus a distinctly important but inaugurating moment of our scientific activity.

Thank you, Jim.



## Phenomenology of Religious Experience IV: Religious Experience and Description

James G. Hart\*

# Some Moments of Wonder Emergent within Transcendental Phenomenological Analyses

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**Abstract:** There is a distinctive wonder bordering on and awakening to the philosophy of religion within Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This is not primarily a wonder directed to how things are or that they are, but rather the wonder connected to the most fundamental principle of transcendental phenomenology. That principle is the ancient principle of the convertibility of being with what is true or the inseparability of being and manifestation. Phenomenological wonder is primarily at the correlation of being as what is true or made manifest with consciousness. And yet there is an even more basic phenomenological wonder which founds this correlation, and that is the manifestness of first-person experience within which all other wonder emerges.

**Keywords:** transcendental phenomenology, wonder, manifestness, metafact, Edmund Husserl

## 1 Introduction

This paper is a sketch of some aspects of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology which offer occasions for philosophical wonder bordering on religious wonder. They also verge on fundamental issues in the philosophy of religion. We will not here engage in Husserl's philosophy of religion<sup>1</sup> or a phenomenology of wonder, but assume the noun and verb have prior sufficiently rich meanings for the reader. Suffice it to say that what is meant by wonder here is that quasi-gracious interruption of the familiar, routine, and every day that is more than an unwelcome puzzle or problem which has to be overcome in order to return to the project at hand. And, of course, it itself is an interesting problem bordering on wonder that we may not decide in advance whether the problematic is merely a nuisance to be surmounted, a puzzle to be solved, and not an invitation to a distraction from the mundane opening unto depths of wondrous meanings. Wonder properly is what begins and sustains the life-work of creativity in both theory, foremost philosophy, and art. In this sense much of both theory and art are instigated by facing a limit-situation or confronted with something that is better captured by the term "mystery" rather than a problem. (Parenthetically, it would seem that the increasing and nearly universal understanding of a university as possible without a liberal arts core, i.e., without that which sustains wonder, creates a culture without its most sustaining and nurturing form of consciousness.)

In traditional discussions of wonder we find the distinction between Aristotelian wonder, which also pervades Husserl's phenomenology and which may well border on mysticism, of *how* things are, from the

<sup>1</sup> For a start cf. Hart, "A Précis of a Husserlian Philosophical Theology"; Hart, "I, We, and God: Ingredients of Husserl's Theory of Community"; Hart, "Entelechy in Transcendental Phenomenology"; Hart, "The Truth of Being and God"; Hart, "Husserl and the Theological Question".

\*Corresponding author: James G. Hart, Indiana University, Bloomington, United States of America; E-mail: hart@indiana.edu

more obviously mystical-theological wonder *that* things are, which are basic for Abrahamic traditions and Wittgenstein.<sup>2</sup> But the distinctive transcendental-phenomenological wonder is that awakened by considering that the other forms of wonder are possible only if *how* and *that* things are is manifest; this is wonder *that* there is manifestness.

## 2 The Wonder of Manifestness

A seventeenth century version of this wonder is that of Thomas Hobbes: “Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near to us, the most admirable is apparition itself, *to phainesthai*.” It is this, the manifestation of manifestation or manifestness, the showing of showing, that I want to dwell on. Hobbes’s own wonder focuses on the consideration that some natural bodies (i.e., human beings) have in themselves “the pictures of almost all things, and others none at all.”<sup>3</sup> Here we have an acknowledgment of the human “body” somehow as an agent of manifestation<sup>4</sup> and we have a philosophical wonder by a materialist at manifestness. Hobbes explains phenomenality and manifestness by the capacity of something like a likeness-making device. Here it would seem the wonder at phenomenality is absorbed in a resolute third-person reductionist objectivist account of interacting bodies. We might say that Hobbes is a forerunner of the battle today to have a heterophenomenology of brain events be the proper philosophical dimension which best analyzes and explains an autophenomenology which alleges lived first-person experience is the core and self-authenticating consideration.

In Husserl there are numerous sources of wonder, but he claimed once that *the most wonderful fact, die wunderbarste Tatsache*, is how the world stands in correlation with one’s agency of manifestation.<sup>5</sup> And perhaps we may say that he comes upon the transcendental reduction as a way to sustain this wonder, i.e., by putting all of life in quotes or parentheses in order that we may not be absorbed first of all with what appears rather than its manifestation to us. On the other hand, precisely because the reduction removes us from the immediacy of the mysteries and surprises of life, and thereby removes us from the quasi-gracious interventions of wonder, one may at least reflect on whether its practice might seem to interfere with the moments of grace, the unconditional demands and depth of wondrous experience of which we are capable and which emerge out of an immediate engagement with life. Again, this paper will not deal explicitly with these questions, but will deal with what for the author are some wondrous aspects and topics of transcendental phenomenology.

Transcendental phenomenology is deeply and classically metaphysical in so far as its foundation is the ancient thesis of the convertibility of being with what is true, which phenomenology renders as the inseparability of being and display or being and manifestation. Getting an initial hold on this requires relinquishing certain empiricist and/or idealist presuppositions in so far as they move us to think of appearances as intervening media from which we must make inferences or which themselves must be overcome or gotten beyond. In which case knowing something would only happen when we have to do with the thing itself quite apart from its appearances. Thus aspects of these traditions have lured us into thinking of appearances as “mere appearances.” Thus the paradigmatic status of the famous straight stick under water appearing as bent. Upon the surfacing of the suspicion that there is a distortion in my perceiving, I might strive to overcome the distortion by getting beyond appearances. I might be moved to surmount the merely apparent insurmountability of mere appearances and embrace the non-manifested immediate thing-in-itself, uncontaminated by being in the relationship of appearing-to-me-or-us, by, e.g., saying “the thing itself is what I know of the thing in its underlying physical reality as described in mathematical formulae.” But Husserlian phenomenology urges us instead to go back to a more basic sense of appearing as manifestation, which is the showing of the thing, the self-givenness of the thing to the honest investigator. There is no

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.44.

<sup>3</sup> Hobbes, *De Corpore*, 213.

<sup>4</sup> This fundamental term for transcendental phenomenology I get from the work of Robert Sokolowski who describes the transcendental I also as an agent of truth and meaning. See, e.g., Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 115-119.

<sup>5</sup> Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie* Vol. I, 401.

getting beyond manifestation, truthful disclosure. The physicist cannot describe a nature that has not been manifested to her, and the confirmation of her mathematical account of quantum “phenomena” itself will be verified in forms of perceptual appearings. Thus our concern with truth is inseparably concern about the way something shows itself. The concern extends to saying this is so in such a way that it is evident that it is so. There is no truth or error apart from their being manifested as such.

However, in a proper sense every appearing reality is through perception in space and time and this is only perspectival. What appears appears only partially in the obvious sense that only so many aspects, e.g., sides, of something are given at once and to see “the whole thing” one must in the course of time see the sides which at any one moment are hidden. In knowing anything truly and with relative adequacy the work of manifestation must be patiently sustained. This is as much true for ideal objects, like the essence of promising, and for actual objects in space and time, as it is for the meaning of something past for which the avenues of access, e.g., witnesses, documents, etc. might be unknown and needing to be brought to light.

All rendering something evident, all showing or manifesting, is an illumination of it. This is the tradition of the both Plato and Aristotle. In this sense classical Greek philosophy is transcendental. The very sense of the agency of manifestation is that the light of the mind is in play and actuated. If we think of light as what manifests, the light of the mind is not metaphorical, and every other sense of light as manifesting is derivative and metaphorical. Natural light only manifests things if there is a wakeful mind for whom the natural light illuminates. Thus, e.g., the path in the darkness is indicated to me (not to the path, rocks or trees) by the moon’s illuminating. Nevertheless it is also evident that the mind’s illumination of the world in terms of its manifestability and/or intelligibility, e.g., its sounds, colors, natural laws, forms of necessity and contingency, etc. does not *create* these visible, intelligible, manifesting features but shows them forth. In themselves, in their very actuality they have a kind of visibility and/or intelligibility, a kind of luminousness, captured often in our saying, “now I see it,” “now I get it,” awaiting the mind’s actualization. As Aquinas put it “the measure of the reality of something is the measure of its light” and “the actuality of things is itself their light.”<sup>6</sup> It is our agency of manifestation that brings their inherent intelligible and visible luminosity to light in the world of created minds. Aristotle and Aquinas use the example of how the sun or moon sheds light on things, which before were in the dark, and thereby brings out their features, e.g., colors, shapes, and shadows for us. But these natural bodies do not create these features, i.e., the things already have them, and the light from these bodies (or artificial lights) brings forth what before was only potentially intelligible, e.g., that this prior obscure dark silhouette is a tree. That is, the inherent intelligibility, here visibility, of the colors, shapes, etc., is there already, waiting, so to speak, to come out of the darkness. But nevertheless, in the absence of mind or some sensible presence, there is no manifestation. This is a sense in which, for example, Conrad-Martius can say “light must meet light in order for there to be light.”<sup>7</sup> The light involved is not merely that of the intrinsic intelligibility of things and, in the case of visual perception, the illuminating ambience of natural or artificial sources of illumination. In the absence of the light of the mind or at least forms of sentience nothing is manifested. Again, the flashlight and moonlight illuminate nothing if there is no mind or at least percipient being for whom, e.g., the path is illuminated. Indeed, for the unsighted person the illumination of the world is utterly independent of the light of natural or artificial lights. Again, if light is taken to be what manifests, only the light of the mind is the proper non-metaphorical sense of light.

Another often overseen point is in order here in regard to the essence of manifestation or appearing. This has to do with the proper phenomenological sense of manifestation as both illuminating agency and luminous medium. Prior to the basic indispensable appearing as the showing or being shown of things, there is the sense of manifestness as the medium in which I am luminous to myself and within which things appear or are luminous, whether or not truly or adequately so.<sup>8</sup> Husserl makes equivalent the unity of consciousness, the lived life of the I, and the intentional *medium* through which and out of which one lives. Life is lived in a medium of manifestness, the articulation of the kinds of

<sup>6</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, cited in Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas*, 56.

<sup>7</sup> Conrad-Martius, *Schriften zur Philosophie*, III, 262.

<sup>8</sup> Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II*, *Husserliana XIV*, 45-46; 51.

which manifestation is the work of transcendental phenomenology. This manifestness, this appearing medium, is rooted in the I as a unique appearing, a constant being and self-appearing through an absolute appearing wherein what appears must necessarily be.<sup>9</sup> But this appearing, this manifestness, is not only a self-appearing but always also a manifestness manifesting being, i.e., of what there is to be known or manifested which is not-I.

Experience as *Erleben*, living through our agency of manifestation, is having a world. This is a conscious having of objects within a wider horizon. It is furthermore being-conscious through an ongoing passive synthetic unifying streaming of life. Husserl very often speaks of this unity of experience as a *medium*, a medium of manifestness, in which the I lives out its life actively and passively and whose manifestness irradiates from the self-shining of the I. What we call consciousness, as the life medium of the I, is uniquely egoic/*ichlich*; but this illuminated-illuminating medium enjoys an objectivity and truthfulness through being illuminated by the I's agency of manifestation. As Husserl put it:

But the world, and as well, in accord with its basic structures, nature, is the non-I, which is given for me as a unity of my consistent experience; therefore it is given as an egoic medium, without which for me nothing would be. It is given in a medium, which is not itself nature, but which is purely egoic.<sup>10</sup>

### 3 Transcendental Consciousness as a Metafact

There are many startlingly wondrous aspects to this position, so startling that one might be tempted to see them as “Luciferian.”<sup>11</sup> Although there are many more, here I want merely to mention nine. Clearly each is worthy of an extensive separate treatment, the beginnings of which at least are to be found in Husserl's writings.

1. The first is that no form of world-presentation, not even that of the scientific world for which, in its most reductionist forms, there is no place for consciousness and mind, is possible without what we want to call the “metafact” of mind and an I. (What “metafact” means here is the original manifestness of mind; see below.) Indeed, the potential and actual intelligibility of nature and anything else stand in a metaphysically necessary, not merely contingent, correlation to some sense of mind. In this sense we have to do with mind as a necessary consideration without which there are no manifest facts for any scientific narratives, even those about the world and nature prior to mind.
2. The manifestness of the world and other minds is always a manifestness to the transcendental I, and whereas all the other forms of evidence are evident to me, to what I refer to with the first-personal pronoun, “I,” the evidence for this referent is the strongest, the most necessary, and phenomenologically prior. This is not necessarily in the form of reflective evidence of me to myself, but as the pre-reflective, non-intentional lived self-presence.
3. Furthermore this evidence of this transcendental I, both in terms of its non-reflective sense as well as its reflective sense, is apodictic and *absolute* in the sense that its manifestness is not in need of any other consideration for it to be manifest.
4. Further, as my colleague and friend Hector-Neri Castañeda pointed out, even the amnesiac inerrantly self-refers with “I,” even if he does not know who in the world he is.<sup>12</sup>
5. Further this I, as what is meant in the first-personal indexical, even by an amnesiac, is a unique non-sortal essence, thus not an individual individuated by anything else or by any acquired properties. Thus my non-ascriptive reference with “I” is to my non-sortal, non-identifiable unique essence which is not totally coincident with this identifiable person in the world, JGH.

<sup>9</sup> Husserl, *Erste Philosophie II*, *Husserliana VIII*, 412.

<sup>10</sup> Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, *Husserliana IX*, 52; see also Taguchi, *Das Problem des ‘Ur-Ich*, 194-197; 202-204; 208-210; 245. Husserl moves the medium of light from an Aristotelian environmental medium to the transcendental I.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hart, “From Moral Annihilation to Luciferism”; also Hart, “Transcendental Pride and Luciferism.”

<sup>12</sup> Castañeda, *The Phenomeno-Logic of the I*, 232; cf. also Hart, *Who One Is*, Vol. I, especially Ch. II.

6. Furthermore, each I as a transcendental I is implicitly before everything else self-aware and aware of itself in a uniquely necessary way: I cannot conceive that the manifest extinction of all manifested facts and manifested necessities necessarily requires the extinction of my manifesting I. It is unthinkable that I, in my entertaining the prospect of the dissolution of me this identifiable person, JGH, and the world I inhabit, not be.
7. And as a corollary: Because, in this transcendental perspective of manifesting the world's coming to be, and in manifesting its annihilation, it is unthinkable that there be no manifesting I, it is thus in general not thinkable by me or for any other I that there be no I.
8. And because I am only in my ineluctable self-awareness in my agency of manifestation, I myself and my agency of manifestation are through me and there is not manifestable a cause of me and my agency of manifestation beyond me. This means at least that if there is such a causality of this phenomenological absolute, and this would seem necessary, given my not being the cause of my existence merely by reason of its necessary dependence on my non- and intentional awareness of it, the otherness or transcendence of this second absolute must be somehow commensurate with me or me with it, both in terms of specific nature or essence as well as my unique essence of being me.<sup>13</sup>
9. And finally: I, as transcendental I, am present to myself as beginningless and endless. This is to say: As I, as transcendental I, cannot make present a cause of me myself outside of myself or make present a cause (or transcendent illuminating light) of the light of my mind transcendent to my agency of illumination, so I cannot make present my beginning or ending.<sup>14</sup>

Recall that for Husserl the “most wonderful” wonder of phenomenology is the manifestation of things through our agency of manifestation. The questions we must raise here, but not answer, is whether the manifestness itself might not be dwelled on as prior to its tie to the agency of manifestation and what would be the cause of manifestness, the cause of the light of intelligibility, possibly be? For Husserl it would seem the most captivating wonder is subsequent to this presupposed manifestness. He was struck with a “*most wonderful fact (wunderbarste Tatsache)*” that the world is determinate, i.e., manifest and meaningful, and this determinacy stands in a necessary correlation to my agency of manifestation.<sup>15</sup> But this agency of manifestation itself which so captivated Husserl assumes the actuality of manifestness, both of oneself and the world as the prior condition for this state of astonishment as well as the agency of manifestation. If we think of manifestness as an (albeit problematic) equivalent of “consciousness” we move near Fichte’s claim in the *Science of Knowing*,<sup>16</sup> e.g., 1804 and 1805, that it is not the I which gives rise to consciousness/reason/light but light, as even constitutive of reason, which gives rise to the I. Consciousness as luminous medium

<sup>13</sup> Husserl had something like this in mind when, in regard to attempts to found the achievements of mind or spirit on mental laws that were indistinguishable from natural physical laws, i.e., the way laws of association may be considered analogous to laws of nature, and how these function as unintelligible forms regulating actual existence, and thus how, “from out of completely soulless elements there is supposed to be built up a soul, an I, who thinks, knows, values, posits goals,” he protested: “This is *pure nonsense*. It is the most absurd *generatio aequivoca* that has ever been conceived. Only from spirit can there be spirit, only out of elementary consciousness can there be higher consciousness, only from sense can there become novel sense.” Husserl, *Einleitung in die Ethik*, 178. Cf. also Hart, *Who One Is*, I, Ch. VI, §4 for a discussion. If one has a unique essence then avoiding an absurd *generatio aequivoca* would require accounting for not merely *what* one is but *who* one is, if this latter itself is *not* a matter of individuation either from one’s freedom or from one’s insertion in nature, culture, etc. For a discussion of the theological metaphysics that emerges out of these considerations, see Hart, “Die Individualität des wahren göttlichen Selbst”; also Hart, *Who One Is*, Book 2, Ch. 7.

<sup>14</sup> Again, for much regarding these nine themes in Husserl see, e.g., Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* II, 151-157; cf. my discussions in n.10 and also Hart, *Who One Is*, Book 2, Ch. VII-VIII, Book 2, Ch. II.

<sup>15</sup> Husserl, *Ideen I*, 401.

<sup>16</sup> Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre* (1805), 45. We can note that already in the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1804) Fichte argued that the reason as manifesting is inseparable from a sense of “light” and although the agency of manifestation is egoic when one attends to the light by prescinding from the manifold manifested one sees that light is itself supremely absolute and one and the I can see intuitively how it itself is negated in the light by reason of proceeding completely from the oneness of its manifestness (Lecture 8). In Lecture 28 the “I” is presented as an effect of reason. But this it is a peculiar one because inconceivable in the sense that this insight presupposes the I’s agency of manifestation.



or manifestness may appear to go in advance even though it can be shone subsequently to be ineluctably “*ichlich*” or egoic.

The philosophical disclosure of this would have to reconstruct the (quasi-) I-less field of manifestness. Any claim to experience or manifest it would presuppose the I. This seems to be the case in the reconstruction of the initial development of consciousness in the infant: It seems that it is only in the agency of manifestation and what motivates the child to self-reference that the anonymous tacit presence of the I comes to light. A kind of evidence for this is that the child may initially self-refer with third-personal terms and only eventually come to a mastery of the first-personal pronoun. But even if we grant this belated surfacing of the I, and granted that the beginning mind is not actually anything but potentially everything or all of being, and if this all must be manifest and be manifested through its agency of manifestation, is there not in this first encounter with manifestness an initiating sense of the light of being which might to be said to have infinite extension and null intension or comprehension?<sup>17</sup> Here the proposal is not to regress to infancy or childhood, but rather that we, as adults, should pause long enough to find wondrous the originating original manifestness as that which is anterior to everything else and upon which everything else is dependent.

J.V. Valberg nicely captured this wonder occasioned by the original manifestness with the term “metafact.” Clearly for Valberg the manifestness is not to be separated from my first-personal consciousness, i.e., awareness of the manifestness of my existing within a factual horizon of consciousness. In our day, Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank, and Michel Henry have shown with elegance and precision how the reduction of manifestness to intentional (reflective) consciousness makes self-consciousness impossible. And, as analogous reflections in both Fichte and Schelling compelled them both to observe, this metafact of ineluctable self-manifestation and manifestness thwarts any explanatory regressive reflection. That is, in reflecting on this original intellectual light or manifestness one does not come up with an objectively present grounding truth or consideration which transcends the manifestness or manifestation itself. Or, as Valberg puts it: “Manifestness like truth, does not give rise to a hierarchical series of referentially linked elements or acts. The manifestness of the manifestness that p, like the truth of the truth that p, is just the manifestness (truth) that p.” This metafactual manifestness is the first truth which all others presuppose and the one than which none other is more basic.

Valberg formulates the original wondrous metafact or first truth as: There is SOMETHING, not NOTHING, i.e., it is necessary that whatever is there (SOMETHING/BEING), is within the luminous clearing, and this is inseparable from my being-conscious. This clearing or horizon is inseparably one’s self-manifestation, and this prior luminous field in which everything becomes manifest, whether objectively or non-objectively, cannot itself be something manifested, for it cannot but be always already manifest.<sup>18</sup>

Again we must note, with Husserl’s help, that this fact, *wunderbarsste Tatsache*, is a not a contingent fact that we experience but a necessary fact. And it is a puzzling fact because assigning it a cause among what we may make present to our minds phenomenologically does not seem to be possible without presupposing it. And as a metafact it is only factual in the sense that we are ignorant of it only because of our transcendental naivety.

## 4 Metafact as Both Being-Conscious (*Bewusst-sein*) and Being-Consciousness

As a conclusion I want to submit a promissory note in the form of a proposition: At the heart of what here is named “metafact” is an understanding of consciousness as at once being-conscious, *Bewusst-sein* and being-consciousness. Consciousness is always already consciousness of being; *Bewusstsein ist immer schon Seinsbewusstsein*.

<sup>17</sup> With this we draw near to the metaphysics of nineteenth century philosopher and theologian, Antonio Rosmini. In the twentieth century there are numerous excellent disciples and creative presentations of his thought, none better than those of Michele Sciacca. An especially helpful introduction to Rosmini’s basic ideas is Manfredini, *Essere e Verità in Rosmini*.

<sup>18</sup> For all this see Valberg, *Dream, Death, and the Self*, 192-195. On “metafact,” cf. also Hart “From Metafact to Metaphysics in the ‘Heidelberg School.’”

The proper elucidation of the *cogito* illustrates this well. In being aware or saying “I am!,” there is a sense of being antecedent to all thinking and presenting.<sup>19</sup> The epistemic *cogito ergo sum* must also be appreciated ontologically as a *sum ergo cogitor* (I am therefore I am thought), because a sense of manifest being goes in advance in the uniquely indubitable manifestness of me to myself. And this self-being is not such as to enable me to say being is myself, but rather my self-presence is within the larger field of what is manifest and to be manifested.

That is, co-extensive with manifestness there is a sense of already a universally present medium. In a sense the aboriginal wonder and metafact is the originally present SOMETHING, not NOTHING which goes in advance of all the agency of the mind in its manifesting the world but it also is ineluctably a factor in this life, e.g., in the central role of reference, inference, assent, judgment and predication. Of all the facts with which each deals and must deal, it is being’s prior manifestness which subsequently is tied to oneself as illuminating agent of manifestation. Again being-conscious, *Bewusst-sein* is always already being-consciousness: *Bewusstsein ist immer schon Seinsbewusstsein*. It is this fact which is the one not admitting question and all the others of necessity are referred to this “metafact” and not it to them.

We have in St. Bonaventure an adumbration of the transcendental “most wonderful fact.” For this truly to be Husserlian we must be able to make the case that Husserl’s transcendental consciousness too is essentially constituted by the light of being, i.e., an ineluctable awareness of a most general sense of being. Here is how Bonaventure once put his wonder at what we are calling the most wonderful transcendental metafact: “the blindness of the mind is amazing (*mira igitur est caecitas intellectus*): [the eye of the mind], “intent on particular and universal beings,” does not see that light before which and by which it sees everything, and for Bonaventures this is equivalent to not intellectually grasping (he says “notice/*advertit*”) being itself which is outside of every genus which “comes to our mind before all other things which come to our mind through it... Thus we can truly say that the eye of our mind relative to the most obvious things of nature is like the eye of a bat relative to light.” He concludes: “This very darkness is the supreme illumination of our mind, just as when the eye sees pure light, it seems to be seeing nothing.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> This is *not* a thesis one finds explicitly in Husserl, but it seems correct. I think, however, Husserl could be nudged into an agreement with the thesis we are proposing on the “metafact” and thus with the assertion: “I am! My I contains a Being (*Seyn*), that goes in advance of all thinking and presenting.” It is in as much as it is thought and it is thought because it is...[*in dem es gedacht wird, and es wird gedacht, weil es ist...*]; therefore, because it only is and only in so far is thought as it *thinks itself*. It is therefore because it *itself* only thinks its thoughts, and it itself only thinks its thoughts, and in this respect thinks itself, because it is. It brings itself forth through its thinking itself, and this from an absolute causality,” i.e., one not absolutely transcendent to absolute transcendent to itself. See Schelling, *Vom Ich al Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedinge im menschlichen Wissen* (1795), in *Schriften* (1794-1800), 57. This claim for an absolute causality is one with the question of how what the human person refers to with “I” is related to the absolute divine I. But later Schelling will make the case for an absolutely antecedent pre- and trans-conceptual presence of Being prior to any explicit agency of manifestation which is the beginning of all conscious agency or thinking. See Schelling, *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (1841-42), 160 ff. The view of the metafact merely indicated here draws close to the later Schelling on condition that his view of what is anterior to everything else may be construed as inseparably in some sense non- and pre-reflective consciousness. The “metafact” position holds that the originary consciousness (what early Schelling may be taken to mean with “my I contains Being that goes in advance of all thinking and presenting”) is always constituted by being-conscious (*Bewusst-sein*) as consciousness of being. *Bewusstsein ist immer schon Seinsbewusstsein*. Again, this is terrain impressively explored by Antonio Rosmini, for whom intellectual consciousness is constituted by the “divine” intuition of the idea of being which is absolutely anterior to all other acts of consciousness. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas were formative influences for Rosmini’s reaching this position.

<sup>20</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, 82-83.

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I am very pleased to comment on Mr. Gurofsky's paper, which I find clear and well argued. The central thematic focus of the paper revolves around a thesis basic to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. This is, according to Strawson, the principle of significance. The warrant for this principle Strawson finds explicitly in a passage occurring in the "Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment (Analytic of Principles), 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter – On the Ground of the distinction of all object in general into *phenomena* and *noumena*" from (A239/B298):

"all concepts and with them all principles, however a priori they may be, are nevertheless related to empirical intuitions, i.e., to data for possible experience. Without this they have no objective validity at all, but are rather a mere play, whether it be with representations of the imagination or of the understanding."

It is worth noting that just after this passage, Kant supplies us with an example to clarify the meaning of this assertion. "Mathematics," he tells us in illustration, "fulfills this requirement by means of the construction of the figure, which is an appearance present to the sense (even though brought *a priori*). In the same science, the concept of magnitude seeks its standing and sense in number, but seeks this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of an abacus, or in strokes and points that are placed before our eyes" (A240/B299). I am tempted to ask at this stage whether or not acceptance of the principle of significance entails, then, acceptance of a corollary theory advanced by Kant in the Doctrine of Method (A713/B741), i.e, that mathematical cognition derives from the construction of <its> concepts? But this is a subordinate query, which I'd be happy to leave unsatisfied in favor of the two hermeneutical questions herein.

Gurofsky advances three arguments in the paper. First, he argues there is a substantive textual basis to assert that Kant accepted the principle of significance. Second, he argues against the claim that the principle of significance so articulated by Strawson (but which is

inescapably in Kant) entails the more modern (i.e., classical) theory of verificationism. And third, in a line of reasoning that follows explicitly from this second argument, he cautions that, "fear of anachronism is no basis on which to interpret away Kant's many emphatic commitments to the principle of significance" (9).

Both the first and the third argument lead me to ask if Mr. Gurofsky could speak more fully on the hermeneutic principle at work in this paper. He speaks disparagingly about the method of the patchwork-theoretic interpreter. This is especially important in the transition to his third argument cautioning against the fear of anachronism, since the anachronism charge stems from the lax application of hermeneutic principles evident in the reasoning substantiating Kant's verificationism. "Indeed," Gurofsky asserts in the last lines of his paper, "the very same fear should prompt us to interpret Kant neither through the lens of our own time nor through that of his forebears, but holistically and from within." So what does this mean? That is to say, what is it "to interpret Kant ... holistically and from within"?

As to the question of holism, I wish to note again that Strawson draws on text from Book II of the *Transcendental Analytic* in order to substantiate the importance of his principle. Indeed, Kant states in the opening lines of Book II that: "The analytic of principles will accordingly be *solely a canon for the power of judgment* that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for the rules *a priori*." (A132/B171 italics mine). I realize the brevity of the conference format requires concision. One cannot do everything in such a short amount of time, and Mr. Gurofsky has, indeed, done very much in the time allotted. So, I do not mean to insinuate a flaw of omission with the query I'm posing, here. Rather, I would like to hear Mr. Gurofsky clarify the scope and range of the holism

integral to his hermeneutic principle. We have seen, for instance, that the passage in Kant's text which warrants the principle of significance relates explicitly to the power of judgment and, most specifically, boundaries legitimating its application. My own view is that Kant's Third Critique adds much needed clarification to this principle and so is necessary to a full and adequate understanding of the boundaries that Kant is drawing here in the First Critique. Most important in this regard is Kant's amplification on distinction between regulative and determinative judgments in the Third Critique. However, and again this is not a criticism as such, all the substantiating texts to which Mr. Gurofsky refers occur in the First Critique. Thus, to specify my question, does the holistic approach you suggest restrict itself solely to the First Critique? Or does it, as I would suggest, require that you extend your interpretive gaze to Kant's other logical writings, even to the whole corpus of his critical writings? To what whole do you refer, actually?

My second query addresses the interiority imperative in the hermeneutic principle cited already, i.e., the demand "to interpret Kant ... holistically and *from within*." When considering the entailment of verificationism question, Gurofsky leaves out of his analysis an explication of the schema of the imagination, which one would expect given the interiority imperative integral to his hermeneutic principle. However, the transcendental schema plays a fundamentally important bridging role in Kant's philosophy, and its bridging function seriously destabilizes any verificationist interpretation of his critical philosophy, I believe. True, it is a fundamental thesis of Kant that "the pure concepts of the understanding can never be of transcendental, but always only of empirical use, and that the principles of pure understanding can be related to objects of the senses only in relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, but

never to things in general" (B303). However, the pure concepts are not applied directly to the material of sensation or, to be more precise, appearances. Rather,

The principles of pure understanding, whether they are a priori constitutive (like the mathematical principles) or merely regulative (like the dynamical principles), contain nothing but only the pure schema, as it were, for possible experience; this has its unity only from the synthetic unity that the understanding originally and from itself imparts to the synthesis of the imagination in relation to apperception, and in relation to and agreement with which the appearances, as data for possible cognition, must already stand a priori" (A236/B296)

So, in short, if we look carefully from within Kant's critical philosophy, does not the mediating representation of the transcendental schema, this third thing which is neither category nor appearance, fundamentally undermine any verificationist interpretation of his critical philosophy?

In conclusion, first, what is the scope or range of the holism integral to the hermeneutical principle you advance herein? Second, following the interiority imperative of this hermeneutic principle, does not Kant's analysis of the necessity of the transcendental schema, i.e., this "third thing" between category and appearance, undermine any verificationist interpretation of his critical philosophy? Thank you for your fine paper, and I look forward to hearing what you have to say.

## Kant's Principle of Significance

### 1.

In *The Bounds of Sense*, P. F. Strawson ascribes to Kant what he calls the “principle of significance” (Strawson 1966, 16), on which “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application” (16). That Kant subscribed to anything like such a principle is, however, now widely doubted. Of course, Strawson was already aware that there appears to be a major tension between the principle and various important Kantian commitments. (Addressing that tension is beyond the scope of this paper, though I have some ideas about how to go about that that I would be happy to discuss in the Q&A.) But beyond that, the principle has come under suspicion of being positivistic, which many regard as objectionable for two reasons. First, Barry Stroud has argued that the principle is or presupposes a dogmatic verificationism that cannot withstand philosophical scrutiny.<sup>1</sup> And second, many scholars have suggested that the ‘discovery’ of the principle in Kant is really nothing more than an anachronistic projection of twentieth-century positivistic prejudices. **On the contrary**, I argue that (1) **the textual case** for Kant’s acceptance of the principle of significance is powerful, (2) the principle’s identity with or entailment of **verificationism** and consequent dubiety are **unsubstantiated**, and (3) the **worry about anachronism** has a highly equivocal significance and cannot justify reading the principle out of Kant. Indeed, that worry has a dialectical force: It compels us **to interpret Kant from within; yet if we do so**, his acceptance of the **principle of significance is inescapable**. Though making the principle consistent with the rest of Kant’s Critical philosophy presents major challenges, recent transcendent-metaphysically inclined interpreters have made their task too easy, and less interesting, by pretending that the case for the principle is artificially weak.

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<sup>1</sup> Beginning with his 1968, and continued through a number of papers collected in his 2000c.

## 2.

There are two *prima facie* distinguishable elements to the principle of significance as Strawson states it. One is that concepts (including Kantian Ideas, which are concepts of reason (A299/B356)) that do not relate in the right way to experience lack a *use*, the other that such concepts lack a *meaning*. One might think obvious that for a concept to lack a use is just for it to lack a meaning, and vice versa. But in any case, passages in the first *Critique* that seem to commit Kant to both elements of Strawson's principle are plentiful, and there are even some that explicitly assert an equivalence between (lack of) use and (lack of) meaning.

Some of the strongest textual support comes from the Phenomena and Noumena chapter of the first *Critique* (both A and B); the following is only a representative portion. Kant writes that “only the empirical use” of concepts (that is, their use in relation to possible experience) “can occur at all” (A239/B298), and consequently that the categories “can *never* be of *transcendental* but always only of *empirical* use” (A246/B303). Even abstract concepts must be “*made sensible*”, that is, *related proximately or ultimately to sensible intuition* (its object or its form) and thereby shown to have a use in relation to possible experience, “because otherwise the concept[s] would remain (as we say) *without sense* [*Sinn*], i.e., without signification [*Bedeutung*]” (A240/B299).<sup>2</sup> Repeatedly, Kant emphasizes that *what is at stake in the question of putatively transcendent uses of concepts is their Sinn and Bedeutung*: A concept that is not used empirically cannot be given an object and hence “has no sense [*Sinn*] and is completely empty of content” (A239/B298); the categories must take appearances as “their sole objects”, or else “all signification [*Bedeutung*]” is lost (A241/B300); a category is “a way [...] of combining the manifold [that] signifies [*bedeutet*] nothing whatever if the intuition wherein alone this

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<sup>2</sup> Whether or not Kant had the resources to distinguish Fregean sense and reference, Kant certainly does not use *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* to draw Frege's or any other technical distinction. His use of both terms there is emphatic (the rhetorical device of *synonymia*)

manifold can be given is not added” (B306). Against that, some may observe that in *Phenomena* and *Noumena*, Kant leaves room for “transcendental signification”. But that is nothing more than the bare thought of “the unity of thought of a manifold as such” (A247/B304) or “the logical function for bringing the manifold under a concept” (A245), which is so barren as to preclude not merely the *determination* of an object, as some have held, but even *application* to an object or *thinking* an object—which is precisely why categories, be their transcendental signification what it may, “cannot have transcendental use” and “have no use whatsoever when separated from all sensibility” (A248/B305).

But remarks along the foregoing lines are not confined to *Phenomena* and *Noumena*. In the B Deduction, Kant claims that “[s]olely *our* sensible and empirical intuition can provide [the categories] with meaning [*Sinn*] and significance [*Bedeutung*]” (B148-9). In the Schematism, Kant purports to have shown in the A (!) Deduction “that concepts are quite impossible, and cannot have any signification [*Bedeutung*], unless an object is given for the concepts themselves or at least for the elements of which they consist”, and infers, quite remarkably, that consequently concepts “cannot at all concern things in themselves” (A139/B178). He also there claims that specifically sensible schemata are “the true and sole conditions for providing” categories with “*signification* [*Bedeutung*]”, and consequently that “the categories have, in the end, no other use than a possible empirical one” (A146/B185). In *On the Supreme Principle of All Synthetic Judgments*, Kant writes that the presentations of space and time must ultimately relate to objects of experience or else “have no signification [*Bedeutung*]”, and then immediately states that “thus it is, without distinction, with all concepts whatsoever” (A156/B195). In the *Postulates*, Kant observes that the principles of modality “are restrictions of all the categories to merely empirical use, and do not admit and allow transcendental use of the categories”

(A219/B266). In the A Paralogisms, Kant purports to have shown in the Analytic that “pure categories [...] have no objective signification [*Bedeutung*] in themselves, i.e., if they are not based on an intuition to whose manifold they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity” (A348-9). In the Antinomies, Kant declares himself to have shown repeatedly that there is “no transcendental use of pure concepts either of understanding or of reason” (A515/B543). Later in the Dialectic, Kant claims that the transcendental, i.e., rational, principle “for making an inference from the contingent to a cause” does have signification [*Bedeutung*], but “only in the world of sense”; “outside this world it has no meaning [*Sinn*] at all” (A609/B637).

Those are only a sample of Kant’s remarks that seem to testify to his acceptance of something strongly resembling the principle of significance. They seem recalcitrant to being read in any other way. For what is the claim, e.g., that “only the empirical use [of concepts, i.e., their use in relation to possible experience] can occur at all” (A239/B298) on pain of otherwise having “no sense [*Sinn*]” (A239/B298) or being “without signification [*Bedeutung*]” (A240/B299) if not the claim that “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application” (Strawson 1966, 16)? I have not even mentioned the many other Kantian commitments that are difficult to justify or even to make sense of unless Kant accepted the principle, such as his claim that the principles of understanding, just insofar as they “contain nothing but, as it were, the pure schema for possible experience” and thus “the basis for the possibility of experience”, are “the source of *all* truth” (A236-7/B297; my emphasis), or his claim, notwithstanding some recent commentators,<sup>3</sup> that “speculative *knowledge* [*Wissen*] proper cannot concern any object at all other than an object of experience” (A471/B499).

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<sup>3</sup> Watkins and Willaschek (unpublished), among others.



Undoubtedly, many interpretive difficulties arise from taking those remarks at face value. Yet the striking placidity with which commentators nowadays play them down<sup>4</sup> belies the magnitude of the interpretive task required to make philosophical sense of them and the corresponding magnitude of interpretive defeat implicit in simply declining to take them seriously. The method of a patchwork-theoretic interpreter, with which I ordinarily do not sympathize, is in the present case preferable in its frank recognition of the difficulty, even if it is ultimately “defeatist” (Abela 2002, 256).

### 3.

Against all that, a predictable objection will be that all the remarks I have canvassed above, and the many similar ones scattered throughout the Critical corpus that I have neglected, are actually *not* evidence of Kant’s commitment to anything like Strawson’s principle of significance but can *seem* to be so only because of latent positivistic interpretive bias. Kenneth Westphal claims that “Strawson’s (1966) interpretation of Kant marks the confluence of neo-Kantianism and positivist verificationism” (2004, 42), and Frederick Beiser warns that “we should beware of making Kant seem relevant at the cost of historical accuracy”, namely by making Kant “more scrubbed and sanitary for [our] more positivistic age” (2006, 589). Likewise, Patrick Kain notes with approval that what he views as “excessively positivistic interpretations” and even “appropriations” of Kant’s philosophy are on the wane (2010, 211). Yet where Strawson uses ‘positivism’ and related terms in *The Bounds of Sense*, it is only to contrast a positivistic account of geometry with Kant’s own, which Strawson does not suggest violates the principle of significance (1966, 277-81). So why suspect the principle of significance of positivism?

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<sup>4</sup> E.g., Chignell 2010, 179; Allais 2015, 212-13.

One important basis of the association of Strawson's principle with positivism is surely Stroud's famous 1968 article on transcendental arguments (2000b). Such arguments, he suggests, must either rely on a dogmatically assumed 'verification principle' that actually makes them superfluous or else be so weak as only to instruct us about our thought or experience construed merely subjectively, quite apart from how things are beyond that thought or experience (2000b, 23-4). The result of Stroud's intervention has been to cement the thoughts, first, that if Kant really does endorse the principle of significance, then he must be a verificationist (hence a positivist), and second, that for verificationism to enter Kant's strategy at any point is for that strategy to be dogmatic or a failure.

Yet however Strawson may use the principle of significance in his own philosophy, the principle by itself, just as Strawson purports to find it in Kant, neither is nor entails verificationism. That can be brought out in two ways. First, Stroud takes verificationism to make possible a quite flatfooted anti-skeptical procedure, on which when one encounters a (skeptical) doubt about our ability to know the truth-value of some proposition, one *first* discerns that the proposition is meaningful and *then* concludes that, it being meaningful, no such doubt is possible (2000a, 162). Now certainly it would be a disaster for Kant's project if he relied on or enabled such a procedure. But the principle of significance neither says nor entails that the meaningfulness of concepts and judgments (or, indeed, their meaning) can be settled in advance of reflection on their bearing on reality—rather than as a part of that very reflection. It merely says that only where thought bears on reality in the right way, i.e., by relating to possible experience or its objects, is thought meaningful. So the principle cannot by itself enable Stroud's envisioned flatfooted anti-skeptical procedure. And since, indeed, nothing in Kant's Critical philosophy (certainly nothing that Stroud points to) would, when coupled with the principle of

significance, license such a procedure, Kant's endorsement of the principle and his use of it to explain why certain transcendent thoughts are out of bounds would be neither obviously dogmatic nor, by Stroud's lights, verificationistic.<sup>5</sup>

Second, verificationism as classically conceived has been committed to (1) the rejection of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments, (2) the rejection of the possibility of recognition-transcendent truths, and (3) commitment to various reduction-programs. But the principle of significance requires none of that: (1) A synthetic *a priori* principle of pure understanding, such as the second Analogy, can be related to experiential conditions of its application—namely, by being shown to characterize a condition of the possibility of experience at all. (2) That there are rational beings on other worlds can be true even if, contingently, we will never be able to confirm it (say, because of immense distances between worlds and limits to possible technological advancement before the universe collapses), so long as those other rational beings stand in the community of causal influence that, per the third Analogy, constitutes possible experience.<sup>6</sup> And (3) that all meaningful thoughts must relate in the right way to experiential conditions of their application is not itself a claim about what meaningful thoughts *mean* and hence has no immediate reductionistic consequences.

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<sup>5</sup> Stroud thinks that Kant can non-dogmatically endorse the principle of significance only at the expense of accepting transcendental idealism, which Stroud conceives of as a subjective idealism of construction or projection (2000a, 161-2). He is wrong so to conceive it, but herein I do not dispute Stroud on all fronts.

<sup>6</sup> When giving an earlier iteration of this paper, an audience member objected that Ayer, for one, accepts the possibility of verification-transcendent truths of just the sort to which my example belongs while maintaining the compatibility thereof with verificationism. Now first, that strikes me as somewhat *ad hoc* on the verificationist's part, and here I am tempted to follow Abela (2002, 233-44) in arguing that the point at which the verificationist has liberalized their position enough to avoid all the objectionable consequences is just the point at which it ceases to be verificationism. But second, the *ultimate ground* of Ayer's liberalism about a case like my example is a conception of idealized observability, whereas for Kant, the *ultimate ground* is belonging to the causal community that constitutes possible experience (A225-6/B272-4), though Kant accepts that the latter entails the former.

4.

Yet the immense impact of Stroud's work is not the only basis of suspicion that the principle of significance is not really in Kant but only in the positivism-tinged spectacles of the Kant-interpreter. Clearly, there is at least some family resemblance between the principle and verificationism, especially insofar as both belong to larger projects of limiting the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics. Now that should not surprise us after the work of scholars like Alberto Coffa (1991) and Robert Hanna (2001), which shows that the logical positivists themselves, like Strawson, were influenced by what they took Kant to be saying, however far that may be from what Kant really meant. But one may suspect that the family resemblance between Strawson's principle and classical verificationism is most plausibly explained by Strawson's having grown up in positivism and not by anything genuinely in Kant. If that is right, then the putative 'discovery' of the principle of significance in Kant is just anachronism.

Suspicion of anachronism is, I suspect, more or less explicitly present in the minds of many commentators, including Westphal, Kain and Beiser. The latter voices the suspicion sharply when he writes that "We learn little from past thinkers when we make them caricatures of ourselves", and that his aim in reading resolutely transcendent-metaphysical commitments into Kant is to "restore the historical integrity of Kant's doctrine against those who would dismantle it for the sake of their own philosophical agenda" (2006, 590).<sup>7</sup>

I agree that Kant interpreters should be wary of anachronism. But the anachronism of projection of the present onto the past is not the only kind. Evidently our interpretive conception remains under the control of present dogmas if, overly fearful of reading them into Kant, we systematically ignore or downplay key Kantian commitments. And equally anachronistic is to

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<sup>7</sup> In fairness to Beiser, he may not mean to exclude taking Kant's anti-metaphysical impulses, including the principle of significance, equally seriously, though his rhetoric is suggestive in that direction.

project onto Kant the doctrines and methods of his predecessors or even contemporaries and thereby to arm oneself in advance with an artificially low expectation of how novel his philosophy could really be.

To be sure, Kant is steeped in the rationalist metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolf, and many elements of his vocabulary and central concerns of his problematic are recognizably inherited or developed from his engagement with that tradition. Yet the logical force of those facts is that of a *clue*, not a *determinant*. That is, the inherited vocabulary and concerns should undoubtedly prompt us to take seriously the question, ‘Just how deep do the continuities between Kant and his forebears really run?’ But they do not by themselves settle that question: That Kant uses terms and retains concerns from a preceding tradition does not at all entail fundamental continuity of doctrine or method with that tradition except given very loaded assumptions about the limits of philosophical creativity.

And if that is right, then fear of anachronism is no basis on which to interpret away Kant’s many emphatic commitments to the principle of significance. Indeed, the very same fear should prompt us to interpret Kant neither through the lens of our own time nor through that of his forebears, but holistically and from within. That, of course, is no easy task, and it is undeniable that reconciling the principle with Kant’s transcendent-metaphysical impulses poses an intimidating and probably still unmet challenge. It may be that meeting the challenge is impossible, and that, in the long run, a defeatist, patchwork interpretive orientation will prevail. I have tried to argue only that we must face the challenge squarely rather than letting ourselves off the interpretive hook.

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