

Sandmeyer – 3. Course Materials – PHI680 Special Topics: Time & Time-Consciousness

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PHI680: STATEMENT OF GENERAL PEDAGOGY

PHI680 is a special topics **graduate seminar** typically strictly designated for graduate students in the Department of Philosophy, though I did allow one advanced undergraduate to take the class for credit. I designed this course around the idea of Time and Time-Consciousness, which is a theme central to the major figures within the phenomenological movement. I design my seminars using many of the same principles at work in my lower-level classes. This is apparent here in the frequency of collaborations required of my students. Class participation is essential to the success of these seminars for two reasons. First, class participation is founded on the close and **critical reading** of a text. In preparation for class, all students are required to **formulate a substantive question**, outline the resources available necessary to answering that question, and sketching out a possible answer. These **participation** exercises, i.e., these question collaborations, then form the basis for class discuss of the reading. These questions then form the basis for short "**question clarification**" **papers**. Finally, these question clarification papers outline the basic problem to be addressed in the **final long paper**. Hence the entire course is articulated into a series of **scaffolded assignments** culminating in a final paper.

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PHI680: Syllabus & Daily Schedule

Class participation was foundationally important to this class. Class lessons were divided typically into two sections. First, I would present an outline of the reading or, more often, an important aspect of that reading. Second, a student in the class would use the remaining time, typically an hour or so, to lead discussion.

The documents included here offer a view of the week-by-week assignment requirements as well as the content of one of my early lessons in the semester.

As is typically for all my classes, the pedagogy of this course revolves around achieving specific learning outcomes, i.e., developing sophisticated skills at reading, writing, and speaking.

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Syllabus: Time & Time-Consciousness

PHI 680.001

Special Topics in Philosophy

Fall 2017

Tuesdays 4:30pm – 7:00pm

Classroom: POT 1445

Contact Information Bob Sandmeyer, Ph.D. ph. 859-257-7749 (office) ph. 859-684-0548 (texts) bob.sandmeyer@uky.edu Canvas Site: https://uk.instructure.com/	Office Office: 1429 Patterson Office Tower Office Hours: Mon/Wed: 1:00pm – 1:45pm Mondays: 3:15pm – 4:15pm (or by appointment) <i>I'm also available appointment, if these times are inconvenient. My door is open to you. Come by or contact me by email to arrange a time convenient to us both.</i>
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Franz Brentano (1838-1917)

- Texts (available in Canvas)
 - *Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time, and the Continuum* -- 9780415568036
 - *Descriptive Psychology* -- 9780415408011

Henri Bergson (1859-1941)

- Texts (available in the bookstore)
 - *Key Writings* (9781472531148) (not 9781441153104)

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)

- Texts (available in Canvas and in the bookstore)
 - *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)* -- 9780792308911

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)

- Texts
 - "The concept of time in the science of history."
 - *The Concept of Time* (Blackwell) -- 9780631184256
 - *The Concept of Time* (Continuum) -- 9781441105622

All texts will be available in PDF form on Canvas, with the exception of Henri Bergson's book, *Key Writings*.

Course Description

What is time? This question is one of the most riddlesome and perplexing question in philosophy. Our aim in this class is to address this problem as best we can but within strict limitations. As background, we read significant approaches to this question in the tradition, particularly by Aristotle, by Augustine, and by Kant. This will be brief, however. The bulk of the class will be devoted to studying the work of four figures especially influential to the contemporary Continental treatment of the problem of time: Franz Brentano, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. Given the problematic nature of the subject matter, each class will be devoted to searching discussions of these authors' texts. This class requires substantive preparation by the student, since students will have much of the responsibility to lead discussion.

Schedule of Readings and Homework

The schedule of readings and homework can be found in Canvas (**Pages: Daily Schedule**).

Grading Structure

- Graduate Students
 - Participation: 30%
 - Short Papers: 30%
 - Final Paper: 40%
- Undergraduate Students
 - Participation: 30%
 - Final Paper: 70%

Grading Scale

A+	100%
A	95%
A-	90%
B+	88%
B	85%
B-	80%
C+	78%
C	75%
C-	70%, etc.

Attendance

- Perfect attendance is required and a necessary condition to succeed in this class.
- *Students bear the responsibility to meet with the instructor when class is missed.*
- An absence for a major religious holiday requires advance written notification.
- If a pattern of absences (without excuse) occurs, the student will fail the course.

Writing and Class Participation

Class Participation:

- Each student shall supply to the professor a set of 3 to 5 substantive questions every class period. The questions can be broad or narrow. They can deal with a single text or multiple texts. (However, if the question ranges over multiple texts, you'll need to provide the class advance notice so we'll know what texts to bring.) Students should be prepared (i) to explain why you think this is a worthy question, (ii) to orient the class to the proper place(s) in the text(s) where we can pursue an answer, and (iii) to offer some semblance of a response to the question. Class time will be devoted to working through the questions you've prepared.

Short Papers: (Graduate Students Only)

- Students will write two papers of approximately 5 pages, each. One paper will be written during the first half of the semester. The other paper will be written during the second half of the semester.
- Deadlines
 - One paper must be submitted by 11/05.
 - The other paper must be submitted 12/15.
- The subject of each paper will be one question posed by the student as part of the class participation requirement.
 - The aim of the paper is to clarify the question.
- Further details of the assignment will be provided mid-September.

Final Term Paper

- A final long term paper is required of each student. There is fairly broad latitude here in subject matter. Students will be asked to meet with the instructor after the mid-point of the class to discuss their paper topic and the basic articulation of their paper.
- Papers will be approximately 15 pages in length.
- The deadline for this term paper is 12/15, but I'm willing to be flexible here. If not restrained by Graduate School Regulations, the student may opt to take an Incomplete in the class in order to

complete the paper with the level of attention such an important paper deserves. This option *must* be negotiated with the instructor at least one week prior to the final deadline for the paper.

- At the conclusion of the semester, all members of the class will present their research in the first ever ***Bluegrass Phenomenology Circle*** (BPC) meeting. Presentation before the BPC is required, but the presentation will not be graded. Even if the student opts to take an Incomplete in the class in order to complete his/her paper, he or she must present their research before the BPC.
- Further assignment details will be provided at midterm.

Learning Outcomes

Upon completion of this course students will be able to:

- formulate insightful presentations on complex and difficult reading material.
- analyze the basic analytical structure of the phenomenological descriptions.
- clarify a philosophical position with precision in writing.
- evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various positions in philosophical debates, including their own.
- defend theses well, orally and in writing.

Accommodations

If you have a documented disability that requires academic accommodations, please schedule an appointment and/or see me during scheduled office hours as soon as possible. In order to receive accommodations in this course, you must provide me with a Letter of Accommodation from the Disability Resource Center (DRC). The DRC coordinates campus disability services available to students with disabilities. It is located on the corner of Rose Street and Huguelet Drive in the Multidisciplinary Science Building, Suite 407. You can reach them via phone at (859) 257-2754 and via email at drc@uky.edu. Their website is:

<http://www.uky.edu/DisabilityResourceCenter>.

Academic Integrity

Everyone understands that while cheating may be tempting, in all cases it is wrong. Bear in mind, this is a graduate seminar. Do not cheat! Do not plagiarize from others in your written assignments! If the professor determines that a student has plagiarized any part of any assignment, at a minimum he/she/they will receive a grade of zero for the assignment without the possibility of redoing the assignment. *Typically, though, evidence of cheating results in course failure.* If the case is especially egregious, the issue will be directed to the appropriate University Dean and the student will receive a grade of XE/XF for the course.

Cheating not only robs other students of a fair grade, it also fundamentally threatens the mission of this institution of higher education. Unfortunately, cheating and plagiarism – though not frequent – does exist here at UK. By taking this class, you accept the injunction not to cheat in any way, and you agree to comport yourself with integrity and honor throughout the semester. You also agree to have all or some of your assignments checked by anti-plagiarism or other anti-cheating tools.

Each student is advised to become familiar with the various forms of academic dishonesty as explained in the Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities. Complete information can be found at the following website: <http://www.uky.edu/Ombud>. A plea of ignorance is not acceptable as a defense against the charge of academic dishonesty. It is important that you review this information as all ideas borrowed from others need to be properly credited.

Part II of Student Rights and Responsibilities (available online <http://www.uky.edu/StudentAffairs/Code/part2.html>) states that all academic work, written or otherwise,

submitted by students to their instructors or other academic supervisors, is expected to be the result of their own thought, research, or self-expression. In cases where students feel unsure about the question of plagiarism involving their own work, they are obliged to consult their instructors on the matter before submission.

When students submit work purporting to be their own, but which in any way borrows ideas, organization, wording or anything else from another source without appropriate acknowledgement of the fact, the students are guilty of plagiarism. Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else's work, whether it be a published article, chapter of a book, a paper from a friend or some file, or something similar to this. Plagiarism also includes the practice of employing or allowing another person to alter or revise the work which a student submits as his/her own, whoever that other person may be.

Students may discuss assignments among themselves or with an instructor or tutor, but when the actual work is done, it must be done by the student, and the student alone. When a student's assignment involves research in outside sources of information, the student must carefully acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she employed them. If the words of someone else are used, the student must put quotation marks around the passage in question and add an appropriate indication of its origin. Making simple changes while leaving the organization, content and phraseology intact is a form of plagiarism. However, nothing in these Rules shall apply to those ideas which are so generally and freely circulated as to be a part of the public domain (Section 6.3.1).

PHI 680.001 Fall 2017 ScheduleTuesdays 4:30 pm - 7:30 pm, [1445 P.O.T.](#)

Day	Date	Class	due on day listed Reading/Homework
			"Handout" = Canvas:Files:Handouts "Library" = Canvas:Files:Library
8/29	Tues	First Day	Library: Brentano - Philosophical Investigations - 49-70 Handout: Syllabus
9/5	Tues	(second day)	(class cancelled)
9/12	Tues	Aristotle * read what is indicated here * bring best Aristotle reader you have to class * <i>Complete Works</i> : Vol. 1 ; Vol. 2	Aristotle Packet : Physics IV: 10-14; also de Int. 9, Meta. V 11, Phy. V 4, NE VI 2, de Anima II 6 * come to class with these sections, at least
9/19	Tues	Augustine (<i>Confessions</i>)	Augustine: <i>Confessions</i> Chapter XI (& Chapter X)
9/26	Tues	Kant (Critique of Pure Reason)	Kant - Transcendental Aesthetic
10/3	Tues	Bergson, "The Idea of Duration," <i>TFW</i>	* Bergson, <i>Key Writings</i> , Time and Free Will * "Introduction," <i>recommended</i>
10/10	Tues	Bergson, "Intro to Metaphysics" & <i>Duration and Simultaneity</i>	* Bergson, TFW-Conclusion.pdf * Bergson, <i>Introduction to Metaphysics</i> * Bergson, <i>Key Writings</i> , Duration and Simultaneity
10/17	Tues	Bergson, <i>Creative Evolution</i>	Bergson, <i>Key Writings</i> , Creative Evolution Recommended: Hackett Bergson Preface
10/24	Tues	(<i>Post SPEP/IAEP</i>) Brentano, Descriptive Psychology (time)	Brentano, <i>Descriptive Psychology</i> , 83-109 , 137-142
10/31	Tues	Brentano, Time & Time-Consciousness	Brentano, Philosophical Investigations , 71-137 (Review reading of 8/29)
11/7	Tues	Husserl, Phenomenology of Inner Csn of Time Lecture	Husserl, <i>OPCIT</i> 3-75 <i>Recommended</i> : Kraus - Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time-Csn
11/9	Thurs	First Short Paper Due (11:59pm - Grad Students Only)	
11/14	Tues	Husserl, Phenomenology of Inner Csn of Time Lecture	Husserl, <i>OPCIT</i> 77-103
11/21	Tues	Husserl: Seefelder Mss. on Individuation	Husserl, <i>OPCIT</i> 245-277
11/28	Tues	Heidegger, Concept of Time I	Heidegger, * The Concept of Time in the Science of History (1915) * The Concept of Time (McNeill trans. - Blackwell)
12/5	Tues	Heidegger, Concept of Time IIa	Heidegger, The Concept of Time (Farin trans. - Continuum), 1-36
12/12	Tues	Heidegger, Concept of Time IIb	Heidegger, The Concept of Time (Farin trans. - Continuum), 37-88
12/15	Fri	Bluegrass Phenomenology Circle Meeting (10:30am - 1:30pm)	(30 minute presentation)
12/15		Second Short Paper Due (12:01am - Grad Students Only, recommended deadline: 12/10)	
12/15		Final Paper Due (12:01am - All Students)	
1/12	Fri	Bluegrass Phenomenology Circle Meeting (10:30am - 1:30pm)	(30 minute presentation)

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PHI680: Lesson Structure

Class participation was foundationally important to this class. Class lessons were divided typically into two sections, which is the case in the lesson included here. First, I would present an outline of the reading or, more often, an important aspect of that reading. Second, a student in the class would use the remaining time, typically an hour or so, to lead discussion. This discussion was based on the collaborative document created during the week by the whole class. The discussion leader would choose one or more questions to address. A primary objective of these discussion sessions was to demonstrate the ability to remain focused and to keep a substantive discussion going.

As is typically for all my classes, the pedagogy of this course revolves around achieving specific learning outcomes, i.e., developing sophisticated skills at reading, writing, and speaking.

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Aristotle Packet:

- Physics IV: 10-14
 - de Int. 9
 - Meta. V 11
 - Phy. V 4
 - NE VI 2
 - de Anima II 6

Cf. Brentano, "What the philosophers have taught about time," sec. 2: Aristotle.

Physics IV: 10-14

IV.10 (doubts about the existence of time. 218a21 various opinions about the nature of time)

- Time – does it belong to the things that exist or to that of things that do not exist?
 - ATTRIBUTES OF TIME: "it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way" 217b34
 - The PAST: one part of it has been and is not
 - THE FUTURE: one part is going to be and is not yet
 - THE NOW
 - "not a part"¹ ... time ... is not held to be made up of nows" 218a7
 - "seems to bound the past and the future" 218a9
 - The now is always different and different
 - RAA
 - 'now' which is not but formerly was must have ceased to be at some point
 - Prior 'now' cannot have ceased to be in itself
 - It cannot have ceased to be in another 'now'
 - One now cannot be simultaneous with one another
 - one now cannot be next to another
 - now = a mathematical point
 - The now is one and the same
 - RAA
 - Now is a termination
 - No determinate divisible thing has a single determination
 - It is possible to cut off a determinate time
 - RAA
 - Coincidence in time = to be in one and the same 'now'
 - What is before is in the now
 - This is impossible
 - What is after is in the now
 - This is impossible
 - ITS NATURE
 - Time is the movement of the whole

¹ A part is a measure of the whole – 217a7

- Plato, *Timaeus*²
 - Part of revolution ≠ the whole of the revolution
 - Multiple parts (heavens) = multiple times at same time
- Time is the sphere of the whole³
 - Parmenides
 - “far too naïve for it to be worth while to consider”
- Time is motion and a kind of change
 - Change or movement
 - *in* the thing
 - Time is present equally everywhere and with all things (218b13)
 - faster or slower
 - Time neither faster nor slower
 - Time the measure of fast and slow
 - speed = d/t
 - “time is not defined by time” (218b18)
 - “it is not movement”

IV.11 (What time is. 219b9 The 'now'.)

- Time is neither movement nor independent of movement
 - Time does not exist without change
 - When the state of our mind does not change, we do not think time has elapsed
 - When the difference from one moment to another escapes notice, no notice of time
 - Hence
 - Time is not movement 218b19
 - Time is not independent of movement
 - “time and movement always correspond with each other” 219a17
 - **Time** is either movement or **something that belongs to movement**
 - Not movement
 - Hence
 - Belongs to movement
 - Movement & Magnitude
 - All magnitude is continuous
 - What is moved = a this
 - Cf. 219b30 what is carried is a 'this', the movement is not
 - Movement goes with the magnitude
 - Hence
 - Movement is also continuous
 - “the time that has passed is always thought to be as great as the movement” 219a13
 - If movement continuous, then time is continuous
 - Before/After: the definition of **time as a kind of number**
 - hold in virtue of a relative position, i.e., place

²² “[the Demiurge] began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This, of course, is what we call “time.” [Plato, [Timaeus 37d](#)]. See also 38d and 39d.

³ Parmenides, [poem](#) 35-45.

- Before marked from that which follows after by some intermediate thing
 - "the mind pronounces the 'nows' are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say there is time" 219a28
 - **Time** – what is bounded by the nows
 - the 'now' is a termination 218a24
 - no time, no now – and vice versa 220a1
 - **Time** – "is just this – number of motion with respect of 'before' and 'after'." 219b1
 - **Time – what is counted, not that with which we count**
 - we discriminate more or less movement with time
- the now: the same in one sense, not the same in another
 - As succession, the now is different
 - Substratum is identical
 - "the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along" 219b23
 - As substratum, the now is the same
 - Its being is different
 - "it is what is before and after in movement"
 - Cf. 219a28: the mind pronounces the nows are two
 - The now corresponds to the moving body 220a4
 - A this
 - Time
 - Continuous by the now
 - The now determines the movement as 'before' and as 'after' 220a10
 - Divided by the now
 - Since the body is moving, the now is always different
 - Qua as point in a succession
- Time
 - is number of movement in respect of before and after
 - the now delineates the extremities
 - the now is a boundary
 - the now numbers what it bounds
 - Hence
 - Time is continuous

IV.12 (various attributes of time. 220b32 the things that are in time)

- As with number, so with time
 - "of number as concrete sometimes there is a minimum, sometimes not" 220127
 - In respect of multiplicity, there is a minimum
 - In respect of size (extent), there is no minimum
- Time is number
 - Cf. 219b1
 - Not the number with which we count
 - Rather, the number of things which are counted
 - Same number: 100 horses, 100 men
 - Things numbered different
 - "we know the number by what is numbered" 220b17

- Time and movement
 - define each other
 - Time marks movement
 - We measure the movement by time
 - Movement marks time
 - We measure the time by movement
 - "time is not motion but number of motion" 221b10
- To be 'in time': means one of two things
 - To exist when time exists
 - "plainly...to be in time does not mean to coexists with time" 221a19
 - To be in in the sense in which we say to be 'in number'
 - Contained by time
 - "there is time when *it* is " 221a26
 - "if a thing is in time it will be measured by time" 221b17
- "time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is" 221b1-2
 - Things subject to perishing and becoming
 - necessarily in time
 - time "in itself...a cause of destruction rather than of coming into being" 222b20
 - Eternal things (which are always)
 - not in time nor measured by time
 - Things which do not exist but are contained by time, e.g., Homer
 - Some were, some will be
 - "this depends on the direction in which time contains them" 222a1
 - Non-existents, e.g., irrational numbers
 - Neither were nor are nor will be 222a5

IV.13 (definitions of temporal terms)

- The 'now'
 - Link & Limit
 - The link of time
 - In so far as it connects it is always the same (222a13)
 - A limit of time
 - A potential dividing of time
 - Not in the same respect
 - An end and a beginning of time 222a34
 - End of that which is past
 - Beginning of that which is to come
- Other terms
 - The time of something near
 - At some time
 - A time determined by reference to this 'now' to that time
 - Just now
 - "the part of future time which is near the indivisible present 'now'" 222b9
 - Lately
 - The part of past time which is near the present 'now'" 222b13

- Long ago
 - The distant past
 - Suddenly
 - That which has "departed from its former condition in a time imperceptible because of its smallness" 222b15

- "time exists" 222b27

IV.14 (further reflections about time)

- "every change and everything that moves is in time" 222b30
 - The 'now' is in time
 - The 'now' is a boundary of before and after
 - The before is in time
 - The after is in time
- Time – related to a soul
 - Time is thought to be in everything 223a16
 - If the soul did not exist
 - If is no one to count, there can be nothing to be counted
 - Hence
 - Cannot be number
 - "if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible for ther to be time unless there is soul..." 223a28
- Time and the movement of the spheres
 - The number of continuous movement
 - The number of locomotion
 - Everything is counted by some one thing homogeneous
 - "if, then, what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because this number is the best known" 223b20
 - "time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz., because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement" 223b24
 - Circular time
 - "even time is thought to be a circle" 223b32
 - Things come into being form a circle
 - Cf. de Anima II.4 415a30 – 415b8

Bob Sandmeyer

1. Does time exist in itself or merely for us?

a. Time & Movement

i.219a17 "time and movement always correspond with each other"

1. 219a2 "time is neither movement nor independent of movement"

2. 220b15 "Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other."

ii.219b1 time "is just this – number of motion with respect of 'before' and 'after'"

iii.221b10 "time is not motion but number of motion"

b. Time – related to soul

i.219a4 "we perceive movement and time together"

ii.219a22-219a29

1. "we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by before and after; and it is only when we have perceived before and after in motion that we say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging that one thing is different from another, and that some thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the 'nows' are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say there is time..."

iii.223a22-223a28

1. "Whether if the soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted either.... But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible for there to be time unless there is soul..."

a. 219b8 "Time, then, is what is counted, not that with which we count"

b. 220b8 "Time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted"

c. 222b27 "We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is..."

2. Brentano indicates that according to Aristotle time is "the number of the movement of the uppermost celestial sphere in so far as this supplies the measure of the earlier and later for all other change and perseverance" (49-50). **Is this definition identified by Brentano borne out by the reading, and, if so, where?**

a. See Phy. IV.14 223b13-223b24

b. See also IV.10, esp. 218a33ff

i."Some assert that it [time] is the movement of the whole.... Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the movement of any of them equally would be time, so that there would be many times at the same time."

3. Is time linear or circular for Aristotle?

a. References for the circularity of time; see 1.a above

i.220a4 "the number of the locomotion is time, while the 'now' corresponds to the moving body, and is like the like the unit of number"

ii.221b25 "if time is the measure of motion in itself and of things accidentally, it is clear that thing whose being is measured by it will have its being in rest or motion"

iii.223a33 time "is simply the number of continuous movement"

1. 223b13 "there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion there is included circular motion, and everything is counted by some one thing homogeneous"

2. 223b20-24 "Now neither (a) alteration nor (b) increase nor (c) coming into being can be regular but (d) locomotion can be. This is also why time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz., namely because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement."

b. Time – succession vs. continuity

- i.219a10-219a14: All magnitude is continuous
 - 1. Movement goes with the magnitude
 - 2. Hence, movement is also continuous
 - a. If movement continuous, then time is continuous
- ii.220a1-220a14 "time ... is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it"
 - 2. 220a22 The 'now' is a boundary
 - 3. 22a10-17 The 'now': link and limit

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PHI680: Scaffolded Writing Assignments

The primary assignments in this class were two. First, students were to collaborate together to produce a series of substantive questions about the readings. See the student questions in the next section for an example of this task. This weekly project produced quite profound discussion of the texts and constituted the bulk of the students' workload over the semester. Second, students had to produce two distinct sorts of papers. The first was a short clarification of an important question. The structure of this assignment was closely aligned to the weekly collaboration assignment. The second was a long (15-20) page thematic paper which addressed a question posed in the clarification assignment.

The class concluded with a seminar conference in which student volunteered to present their papers to the class as a whole.

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(08-31) Reading Questions

Hi Folks,

So I've created in Canvas a means by which to post your questions of the readings. This is the [Collaborations](#) tool.

Just to reiterate, here's an explanation of this requirement from the syllabus:

Each student shall supply to the professor a set of 3 to 5 substantive questions every class period. The questions can be broad or narrow. They can deal with a single text or multiple texts. (However, if the question ranges over multiple texts, you'll need to provide the class advance notice so we'll know what texts to bring.) Students should be prepared (i) to explain why you think this is a worthy question, (ii) to orient the class to the proper place(s) in the text(s) where we can pursue an answer, and (iii) to offer some semblance of a response to the question. Class time will be devoted to working through the questions you've prepared.

I've posted the questions I mentioned in class over Brentano's "What the philosophers have taught about time" reading already. I notice also that one or two of you have also posted your questions. If you haven't, here's how:

1. In Canvas, click the "Collaborations" link.
2. This will open up window with the link "Reading Questions." Click this.
3. Canvas will redirect you to Office365, which everyone in the class should have access to. Sign in using your LinkBlue account information.
4. This will open a Word document ONLINE. You may make changes in this document Online or in Word. If you prefer the latter, click the "Edit in Word" link at the top of the screen. But this isn't necessary, as you can easily edit the document Online. I recommend writing your questions in Word on your own computer originally. This will make it easier to paste your work into this document.
5. For each reading, I've created a table. Find your name in the proper table. Below your name, paste your questions (or just write them in). I recommend keeping the formatting to a minimum, since the system is a bit persnickety.
6. If you're working ONLINE, the document will be saved automatically. There's a notice at the top of the page that will read: "Reading Questions - Saved."
7. You're done. Just close the browser window.

Let me know if you have any problems using this system. This is new tool for me. So I don't know what bugs to expect, but I do expect some bugs.

Please:

- Upload your questions for the Brentano reading ASAP.
- Upload your questions for future readings at least ONE HOUR BEFORE class. I'll print out the list of questions and bring them to class. Be prepared to discuss your questions.
- If you pose questions about textual sources other than those assigned, please post these questions by Monday evening at 11:59pm. This will give me - and us - time to look over the sources your reference.
- One last note, order your questions from most pressing to least. That is to say, the first question should be the one you want to talk about the most.

The Assignment

- From the syllabus
 - Students will write two papers of approximately 5 pages, each. One paper will be written during the first half of the semester. The other paper will be written during the second half of the semester.
 - **Deadlines:** changed from that indicated on course syllabus
 - First paper: Thursday, November 9, at 11:59pm
 - Second paper: Recommended deadline Sunday, December 10, at 11:59pm (actual deadline: 12/15 @ 12:01am)
 - If you think you'll need extra time completing this second paper, let me know within the first week of December. While I'm not opposed to offering an extension, I discourage it.
 - Aim
 - To clarify a question.
 - Ideally, the subject of each paper will be one question posed by the student as part of the class participation requirement.
 - This is an exercise that asks you to clarify a question which, itself, at the heart of your final paper (i.e., a presentation) or an article length paper (for a journal).
 - This is a requirement for graduate students only.
 - See the syllabus for the grading scale.
- Content of the Exercise
 - In the paper, you should:
 - identify an intriguing non-trivial question that merits further study
 - explain why you think this is a worthy question
 - Don't be overly general here. Specify as precisely as possible what is interesting about this question and what a proper treatment of it may accomplish. In certain respects, this is the most element of the paper.
 - Consequently, you should orient the reader to the proper context, at least in a text or in a historical/philosophical dimension
 - offer some a basic orientation of how you believe the question can be addressed
 - This requirement follows from the preceding and need not be thought of as a distinct element.
 - provide *essential* textual material.
 - This should include only what must be considered in order to clarify the question sufficiently
 - This material should lay the ground for a larger treatment.
 - The paper can range narrowly, i.e., to a specific problem in a particular text. Or it may range over a number of texts or even a number of treatments by distinct authors.
- Sources
 - You are expected to provide reference to secondary source materials that you (would) intend to consult in order to write a paper addressing this question. This need not be exhaustive, but it should include very important references.
 - Provide these references in a bibliography at the conclusion of the paper.
 - You are not required to integrate any of these secondary into this exercise. However, if you have the resources to do so, it would be interesting to see what has inspired you.
 - I recommend you use the Chicago Manual of Style for this (and all) papers.
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html

Submission Procedures

- Submit your paper via the Canvas system (Assignments: Papers: Short Paper Assignment)
- All papers must be formatted as Word documents with the extension .docx or .doc
- Each page of text should contain approximately 300 words.

- Text margins should be 1 inch for top/bottom and left/right. Use double line-spacing.
- Include the following information at the top of the first page of the paper (single-spaced):
 - Student's Name
 - Word Count of Your Essay
- Number every page.

Final Paper

Final Term Paper

- A final long term paper is required of each student. There is fairly broad latitude here in subject matter. Students will be asked to meet with the instructor after the mid-point of the class to discuss their paper topic and the basic articulation of their paper.
- Papers will be approximately 15 pages in length.
- The deadline for this term paper is 12/15, but I'm willing to be flexible here. If not restrained by Graduate School Regulations, the student may opt to take an Incomplete in the class in order to complete the paper with the level of attention such an important paper deserves. This option *must* be negotiated with the instructor at least one week prior to the final deadline for the paper.
- At the conclusion of the semester, all members of the class will present their research in the first ever **Bluegrass Phenomenology Circle** (BPC) meeting. Presentation before the BPC is required, but the presentation will not be graded. Even if the student opts to take an Incomplete in the class in order to complete his/her paper, he or she must present their research before the BPC.

Sandmeyer – Course Materials – PHI680 Special Topics: Time & Time-Consciousness

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PHI680: Student Work

The student work here is of two kinds:

1. The collaboration document included here contains the questions formulated by students on the Aristotle reading. As note already, these collaborations were foundationally important to all the work of the class, i.e., in-class discussion, the short question clarification assignment, and the final thematic paper.
2. The paper documents are of two kinds. Included here are:
 - a. question clarification papers from two different students, and
 - b. a final thematic paper

Typically, 600- and 700-level courses are reserved for graduate students. However, I had worked with a very good undergraduate student in other classes, who asked to participate in this seminar for a grade. I acceded to this request. The student successfully completed all the requirements of the course and passed the class with distinction.

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Readings: 09/05/2017

Aristotle: Packet - Physics IV: 10-14; also de Int. 9, Meta. V 11, Phy. V 4, NE VI 2, de Anima II 6

Sandmeyer, Bob

1. Does time exist in itself or merely for us?

a. Time & Movement

i. 219a17 "time and movement always correspond with each other"

1. 219a2 "time is neither movement nor independent of movement"

2. 220b15 "Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other."

ii. 219b1 time "is just this – number of motion with respect of 'before' and 'after'"

iii. 221b10 "time is not motion but number of motion"

b. Time – related to soul

i. 219a4 "we perceive movement and time together"

ii. 219a22-219a29

1. "we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by before and after; and it is only when we have perceived before and after in motion that we say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging that one thing is different from another, and that some thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the 'nows' are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say there is time..."

iii. 223a22-223a28

1. "Whether if the soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted either.... But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible for there to be time unless there is soul..."

a. 219b8 "Time, then, is what is counted, not that with which we count"

b. 220b8 "Time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted"

c. 222b27 "We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is..."

2. Brentano indicates that according to Aristotle time is "the number of the movement of the uppermost celestial sphere in so far as this supplies the measure of the earlier and later for all other change and perseverance" (49-50). Is this definition identified by Brentano borne out by the reading, and, if so, where?

a. See Phy. IV.14 223b13-223b24

b. See also IV.10, esp. 218a33ff

i. "Some assert that it [time] is the movement of the whole.... Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the movement of any of them equally would be time, so that there would be many times at the same time."

3. Is time linear or circular for Aristotle?

a. References for the circularity of time; see 1.a above

i. 220a4 "the number of the locomotion is time, while the 'now' corresponds to the moving body, and is like the like the unit of number"

- ii. 221b25 "if time is the measure of motion in itself and of things accidentally, it is clear that thing whose being is measured by it will have its being in rest or motion"
- iii. 223a33 time "is simply the number of continuous movement"
 - 1. 223b13 "there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion there is included circular motion, and everything is counted by some one thing homogeneous"
 - 2. 223b20-24 "Now neither (a) alteration nor (b) increase nor (c) coming into being can be regular but (d) locomotion can be. This is also why time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz., namely because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement."
- b. Time – succession vs. continuity
 - i. 219a10-219a14: All magnitude is continuous
 - 1. Movement goes with the magnitude
 - 2. Hence, movement is also continuous
 - a. If movement continuous, then time is continuous
 - ii. 220a1-220a14 "time ... is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it"
 - 1. 220a22: the 'now' is a boundary.
 - 2. 22a10-17 The 'now': link and limit

Question One:

Is Aristotle's definition of time circular?

(i) worthiness:

- This question is relevant to our study of the problem of time because it clarifies Aristotle's position as well as the seemingly temporal notions of 'before' and 'after'.

(ii) textual location:

- Handout page 2-4, 7-9, 15-16, etc.
 - "Time is the number of motion with respect to before and after."
- HOPWAG podcast ep. 41
 - <https://historyofphilosophy.net/aristotle-sorabji>
- Turetzky 19-22

(iii) attempted response:

- No, because "before and after" are formal elements of change as such, and not necessarily temporal terms
- Richard Sorabji: Aristotle's definition is circular
 - Aristotle defines time as the "*number* of motion in respect of before and after"
 - 'number': what is countable (not 'measure', because that implies regularity, which only applies sometimes)
 - Time is the countable instantaneous stages of a motion
 - 'before and after': Aristotle means what is *spatially* before and after in the motion
 - Circularity:

- Aristotle *thinks* he gets out of it because he means *spatially* before and *spatially* after
- The snag:
 - You may move from left, to the middle, to the right
 - Left is *spatially* before right, but left and right are not temporal terms.
 - However, why do we call the left-hand side 'before'? It is because it is what the motion reaches *in time* before it reaches the middle.
- Turetzky: Aristotle's definition is not circular:
 - For Aristotle, changes constitute the phenomena that is to be explained through inquiring about nature.
 - Time is *not* more fundamental to than motion.
 - For Aristotle, time is an *aspect of* change, and the nature of change is that one thing becomes something else.
 - So, 'before' and 'after' are formal elements of change, not temporal per se.
- Aristotle:
 - "time is not defined by time, by being either a certain amount or a certain kind of it" (218b17-18)
 - time is not movement, because movement is particular and time is everywhere (~218b12)
 - "time is neither movement nor independent of movement"

Question Two:

Why does Aristotle reject the notion that time is constituted of a series of nows?

- (i) Worthiness:
 - This question is relevant to our study of the problem of time because there is a common-sense notion of time which conceives of it as a series of nows, and it is important to see the problems with this ordinary way of viewing time.
- (ii) Textual Location:
 - Course packet 1, 3-4, etc.
 - Turetzky 22-24
 - The now is the basic phenomena of time, because time consists of a succession of nows (before and after) counted in motion, but it is also the case that time is not made up of nows and that the now is not a part of time.
 - Just as a line cannot be constituted by a series of points, so time cannot be constituted by a series of nows.
 - Two nows cannot be next to each other, because another now is always ready to be found between any two nows.
 - There is no smallest time
- (iii) Attempted Answer:
 - Aristotle rejects the common notion that time is constituted of a series of nows by making an analogy with points on a line. Time and lines are continuous, while nows and points are not. Two nows cannot be 'next to each other' since every now can be subdivided into smaller and smaller nows. These means that time is not constituted of a series of nows and also that there is no minimum amount of time.

Question Three:

How does Aristotle resolve the difficulty regarding necessity and statements about the future?

- (i) Worthiness:
 - This question is relevant to our study of the problem of time because it deals with an issue regarding the status of truth value determinations for propositions about the future in terms of necessity and contingency, as well as establishing the necessary nature of truth values for propositions about the

past and the present. It also asks us to consider whether time, all of time, exists in the same way and to the same extent.

- (ii) Textual Location:
 - Course packet page 7, 12-14
 - Turetzky: 28-29
- (iii) Attempted Answer:
 - Aristotle rejects the notion that propositions about the future are determined with necessity because it makes deliberation about possible courses of action pointless. Only one alternative will happen, and it will happen with necessity. So, there are no alternatives.
 - Aristotle assigns the 'truth value' of indeterminate for propositions about the future, and notes that the most we can say is that one option is more likely to happen than another. The rule of contradictories only applies to what actually exists, not that which is merely potential.
 - 'all existence is necessary' is not implied by 'if something is the case, then it is necessarily the case'.

1. At the beginning of *Physics*, Aristotle appears to articulate a preliminary definition of time: "For time is just this – number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after.'" Is that supposed to be a *per se* definition, which captures the essence of time? If so, is it not the case that "before" and "after" already presuppose an understanding of time?
2. Aristotle occasionally seems to subordinate time to motion. However, mustn't we presuppose time to cognize motion? What is the relation of time and motion?
3. What is the relation between time and the "now?" In just what sense is the "now" equal in substratum, but different in being?
4. For Aristotle, is time a quality of substances or a generality?

1. A question from *Metaphysics*, Book V: Aristotle is working through different forms of priority in sect. 11. How does this relate (directly or indirectly) to the question of time. In what sense, for Aristotle (or for us) is time prior? Is it as substance?
2. A question from *De Interpretatione*, sect. 9: Here Aristotle is working through the concepts of necessity and possibility. What is the difference in the way that necessity and possibility work? When he speaks of necessity is he speaking of logical necessity? Is this in opposition to actual/real possibilities? Is this clarified somewhere?
3. A question from *Physics*, Book IV, sect. 10 (and probably other places): How are we to deal with "nows" and parts in time? Relatedly, how do we speak of the whole of time? What does it mean for time to be whole? If time is also infinite, then in what sense can we speak of the wholeness of an infinity?
4. A question from *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, sect. 2: How does this section fit into the scheme of our readings? Also, what does it mean for ethics to be oriented toward the future? Is there no place for moral guilt or pride in this conception of ethics since these would seem to be oriented toward the past?

Aristotle Questions

Question One: Brentano had described Aristotle's theory of time as a non-subjective theory. **Is this a good (i.e. accurate and complete) reading of Aristotle?** Does Aristotle present a theory that contradicts a subjective conception?

- (i) textual location:
 - "Now we mark them by judging that one thing is different from another, and that some third thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the 'nows' are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded by the 'now' is thought to be time—we may assume this." Packet 3, Bekker 219a30.

- Cf 218b21 as well where his conclusions seem to assume something of a subjective perspective. “But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not think that time has elapsed...”

Question Two: How does Aristotle answer the first question he introduces in section 10? That is, **does time, for Aristotle, belong to the class of things that exist or to the class of things that do not exist?**

- (i) textual location:
 - Con.
 - “One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time—both infinite time and any time you like to take—is made up of these. One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality.” Packet 1, Bekker 217b29
 - Further, the now, which is the only part said to exist is not a part of time since a part is a measure of the whole and time is not made up of nows.
 - “but the now corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion. For it is by means of the body that is carried along that we become aware of the before and after in the motion...For what is carried is a ‘this,’ the movement is not.” Packet 4, 220a.
 - Pro.
 - Time is linked by various nows, which, do exist. “We have stated then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many ways we speak of the now...” Packet 9 222b27
 - Time is a property of things “It is also worth considering how time can be related to the soul; and why time is thought to be in everything, both in earth and in sea and in heaven. It is because it is an attribute, or state, of movement...” Packet, 9, Bekker 223a6

Question Three: In some sense it seems that **things in time are both measured by and measure time. Is this (a) an accurate characterization of Aristotle’s position, and (b) a coherent view?**

- (i) textual location:
 - “time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted; and this according as it occurs before or after is always different, for the nows are different. And the number of a hundred horses and a hundred men is the same, but the things numbered are different—the horses for the men. Further, as a movement can be one and the same again and again, so too can time, e.g. a year or a spring or an autumn.” 220b6.
 - What differentiates the nows? If the nows are like the individual horses and men that differentiate the number, what is the content of the now?
 - “The time marks the movement, since it is its number...for we know how many horses there are by the use of number; and again, by using the one horse as a unit we know the number of the horses itself.” Packet 5, 220b15. We use motion as the unit for time.
 - “Clearly, then, to be in time has the same meaning for other things also, namely, that their being should be measured by time.” 221a9

Question Four: Is Aristotle making an explicit distinction between **logical necessity** and a kind of **necessity that applies specifically to temporal entities** (i.e. things in time)? If so, **what is the relation between these?**

- (i) textual location:
 - “I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place—though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take place. So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories also.” Packet 8, Bekker 19a23-a39.

Aristotle mentions the idea of all things existing in the now as a difficulty. How is this a difficulty?

Textual location

On Pg. 68 He says, Further, if coincidence in time (i.e. being neither prior nor posterior) means to be in one and the same 'now', then, if both what is before and what is after are in this same 'now', things which happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with what has happened to-day, and nothing would be before or after anything else."

Semblance of a response

It seems to me that things existing within one time would not be a problem since, after all, this would resolve the other problem about things only existing within the now. Otherwise how it is that things can be said to have existed in the past since they don't exist in the now and how is it possible that things can exist in the future, for the same reason.

Question

Aristotle discusses the idea that time is neither movement nor independent of movement. Time might be understood as movement as, for instance, in the ticking of a clock or sand running through an hourglass or any constant sort of pattern that can be observed to have occurred a certain number of times, with each time the movement occurring associated with a particular amount of time and time be determined on the basis of this know process and the amount of times it has occurred but nevertheless it seems that time would not be this movement, since we might for instance not have the sense that very much time has elapse with something or any if we do not notice the change. This posses a problem. It seems that time is both existent and non-existent. So the question is **can time be thought of as both being subjective and not subjective and perhaps be more than one thing?**

Textual support

Pg. 69 "If, then, the non-realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change, but the mind seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of movement and change. It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement."

Semblance of a response

From my own experience and I would imagine others, and popular expressions, this seems to be the case. The expression, 'Time flies when your having fun' suggests the passage of a subjective time that is happening faster. Nevertheless, objective time is moving along all the same.

Question

Is Aristotle being reasonable when he says, "For time is by nature rather the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of the change and removes what is." (Aristotle, 73)

Textual Support

Aristotle says, "A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed to say that 221a30-221b2 time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through time, and that people forget owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know or of becoming young or fair." Is it not also true that while time wastes things away it can make other things come to exist? As, for example, the album cover of the band REM, in time, which when opened up show various things that have grow forth in time. Farmers understand this because the ...

Sleeping Among the Heroes at Sardinia:
Time in Aristotle's Physics

November 9, 2017
PHI680

In *Physics* Δ, Aristotle articulates his definition of time in a number of ways and with varying degrees of specificity. ~~the. The~~ most precise ~~of which articulation given by Aristotle states~~ ~~is~~ that time is the “number of motion in respect of before and after.”¹ ~~In this paper,~~ I would like to present a set of difficulties involved in ~~understanding~~ Aristotle’s conception of time as the number of motion. ~~It will be seen that substantial questions remain to be addressed regarding this relation.~~ In the first two sections, I will ~~attempt to~~ layout the untendentious aspects of Aristotle’s concept of time. First, ~~I will look at the way in which~~ Aristotle conceives of time as an attribute of motion. Second, ~~I will articulate how~~ time is understood as the number of motion. ~~With this conception of time in hand, and b~~By way of conclusion, I will gesture toward a set of tensions present in Aristotle’s notion of time. ~~So what is the question, precisely; or what is the tendentious aspect of Aristotle's concept of time?~~

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Time and Motion

In *Physics* Δ, as in many of his works, Aristotle employs a doxastic approach ~~to his subject of enquiry~~, canvassing and evaluating the many views of his predecessors. The most prevalent view of time, Aristotle claims, holds that it is a sort of motion.² ~~As time is most usually supposed to be a motion and a kind of change, we must consider this view.~~³ Indeed, the idea that time is related

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Commented [BS1]: Since you explicitly point to his doxastic approach, what predecessor or predecessor is he evaluating here?

¹ Aristotle, *Physics*, 219b1.

² Aristotle, *Physics* 218b10. We should note that when Aristotle speaks of motion, this term is not limited simply to locomotion—that is, a change in location. Aristotle’s conception of motion is broader than this. Motion for Aristotle includes not just changes in location, but changes in quality as well. The change undergone by my coffee as it turns from hot to cold would be, for Aristotle, a sort of motion. For the remainder of this essay, I will use motion in a similar sense to refer both to locomotion as well as to qualitative changes.

³ Aristotle, *Physics* 218b10.

to motion is an intuitive view. It is by noting various sorts of motion that we become aware of the passage of time. Watching a boat move languidly down a river indicates to me not only the motion of the boat itself, but the passage of time as well. However, Aristotle embraces this ~~doxastic~~ view only with significant modification. ~~If one is~~ Speaking precisely, Aristotle observes, it must be said that time is related to change but is not identical to it. In a crucial passage, Aristotle writes “change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not; for fast and slow are defined by time—fast is what moves much in a short time, slow what moves little in a long time.”⁴ We can observe that changes occurs either more or less quickly and the magnitude of the change is not identical to the duration. As such, time cannot be identical to motion or such variations in rate would be impossible. ~~From this Aristotle concludes that~~ Consequently, ~~time is~~ time is not identical to motion. ~~Following Aristotle’s logic, time is~~ held to be either identical to movement or ~~to be~~ something that belongs to movement, ~~and~~ Since time cannot be identical to movement, ~~time it~~ must belong to movement in some other way.⁵

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Time as the Number of Motion

~~According to Aristotle, time is the number of motion, and this is the sense in which time is not identical to motion. But what~~ sense is this to be understood? An indication can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of the ‘now’ and the number of motion. Aristotle observes that we notice time only when we can establish something that is prior to that which is posterior. Aristotle writes, when the mind “pronounces that the ‘nows’ are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time.”⁶ He clarifies this statement, writing “what is bounded by the ‘now’ is thought to

⁴ 218b15-218b18

⁵ 218b15

⁶ 219a25

be time”⁷ These now moments are themselves durationless points and thus not themselves in time. That is, the prior ‘now’ and the posterior ‘now’ are merely boundaries which establish a unit of time. Time then can be said to be number in the same way “as the extremities of a line form a number...”⁸ The dual ‘nows’ and the dual endpoints of a line segment are both boundaries, which, in their duality simultaneously establishing a unit and a number. Thus, insofar as the ‘nows’ are durationless boundaries, they are not in time; nevertheless, the ‘now’ is what gives rise to the number of time. It is this thought that subtends Aristotle’s full definition of time: time is to be understood as the number of motion with regard to the before and after.

This is about as much as can be said, untententially, about Aristotle’s notion of time. However, it will be helpful to note a few details and entailments of this account. First, with a more complete articulation of his definition, Aristotle is now in a better position to specify how it is that time relates to motion. He writes that time is not movement “but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.”⁹

Second, we have seen, that the now is a boundary that is used to establish the measure or unit that is time. However, Aristotle makes the further claim that these ‘nows’ individual instances of the now are essentially distinguishable from one another. He writes, “The ‘nows’ are the same insofar as they are boundaries, but different in their being. That is to say, falling along the line of progression differently, they indicate a different relation. They are not in the same relation, one being before and one being after. The argument is based in a analogy to spatial relations. Just like the sophists posit of Coriscus that Coriscus at the Lyceum is different in being from Coriscus

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Commented [BS2]: Okay, I don't see how this definition follows from the discussion of the 'now ' Subject of your sentences in this paragraph: now, now, now, time, now I would suggest that the argument from analogy of not very well explicated here

Commented [BS3]: I really don't know why you express it this way There seems a lot to disagree with in regard to this way of representing time

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Commented [BS5]: Acceptable?

⁷ 219a29

⁸ 220a16

⁹ 219b2

at the marketplace, so too with the *nows*.¹⁰ ~~That is to say, it is only~~ insofar as we are able to bound an interval in terms of non-identical '*nows*,' ~~(e.g., a defined by a~~ prior '*now*' and a posterior '*now*'), ~~is, that we establish~~ a duration ~~and or a~~ unit of time ~~definable~~. If these ~~the prior and the~~ posterior '*nows*' were identical ~~in their being,~~ we would remain unable to mark changes in time because we would no longer be identifying something that is prior and something posterior. Like those who sleep among the heroes at Sardinia, ~~if the '*nows*' were not distinguishable,~~ the passage of time would not be observed.

~~Finally, linking time to the establishment of the now by which a duration can, itself, be~~ ~~numbered~~ ~~number~~ allows Aristotle to explain two ~~desiderata for the concept of time:~~ (A) ~~how~~ simultaneous motions occur relative to the same time¹¹ and (B) ~~how~~ time establishes regular durations (e.g., a year, or a spring, or an autumn).¹² ~~Indeed, these claims are both aspects of our~~ ~~common sense conception of time.~~ ~~For o~~ On the one hand, we speak of a specific duration such as yesterday (itself a twenty-four hour period) which will differ from tomorrow (a different twenty-four hour period), where this specific period and the events therein are a subject of which that duration (twenty-four hours) is predicated; but, the difference between yesterday and tomorrow is precisely not a difference in duration. The difference between these times lies elsewhere namely in the specific motions captured by the duration. On the other hand, we talk about time in terms of abstract durations: one hour, one day, one week, one month. These are alike purely in their duration and this must be so for them to establish regular intervals. I take these claims to be among the fundamental aspects of time that are explained by Aristotle though the association between time and number; for, number seems to function in a similar fashion. As Aristotle will note, number

¹⁰ 219b20-25

¹¹ 219b10.

¹² 220b14.

Commented [BS6]: WHAT? Where does this come from?
You need to provide context in order for this to make sense

Commented [BS7]: In being, but in what sense?
* as relational?
* as substantial?

Commented [BS8]: Isn't this redundant?

Commented [BS9]: WHAT? Where does this come from?
Some context is necessary to make this allusion understandable

Are those who sleep among the heroes at Sardinia indistinguishable? How so? Why are they indistinguishable?
In analogical moment what does the analogy work?

Commented [BS10]: Acceptable?

can be said “both of what is counted or countable and also of that with which we count.”¹³ For example, when I count ten horses and then ten people, the decade is the same, but the thing counted differs. It is this aspect of number that Aristotle hopes to carry over to his conception of time.

Tensions in the Theory

The notion that time is a sort of number is meant to clarify the relation between time and motion. ~~We have already seen that Aristotle introduces and then dismisses two possible relations between time and motion as unacceptable. First, Aristotle explicitly denies that time is simply identical to motion (cf. 218b15), but – Second, given the definition of time Aristotle puts forward as the number of motion, it is obvious that time for Aristotle is not completely independent of motion. Indeed, Aristotle writes “it is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement.”¹⁴ According to Aristotle, then, The notion of time as is the number of motion. This definition appears to provide a productive way to cash out this relation between time and motion. However, Aristotle’s use of number to explain time is fundamentally problematic. By way of conclusion, I would like to note an intertextual tension that results from conceiving of time as a sort of number. I will suggest that~~ There are two ways in which Aristotle presents time as a number and each leads to a contradiction with regard to other claims to which Aristotle is committed.

The first interpretation holds that time is just an aspect of enumerating motion. That is to say, time is just the ‘nows’ with which we number motion. There is textual support for this interpretation. At 220b4-5 Aristotle is trying to explain why time is not said to be quick or slow, but is a consistent measure (Deseterata B). In justifying this claim Aristotle says that no number

Commented [BS11]:

Commented [BS12R11]: Why does this example not apply to the now?

When I indicate a before and an after with the now, the now is the same but the moment delimited by the now is different. Seems precisely the same issue to me.

Commented [BS13]: See my first highlighted question!

Commented [BS14]: Wasn't aware of this. This was not clearly stated and explained above.

¹³ 219b5.

¹⁴ 219a1

with which we number is quick or slow. This seems to imply that time is a number with which we count. That is, time is simply the intervals established by the 'nows' by which motion is measured.¹⁵ Though this interpretation would make sense of Aristotle's claim that there is no time without the soul since time is a numbering or counting and this is itself the activity of a rational being, it explicitly goes against a claim to which Aristotle seems particularly dedicated. Time, Aristotle claims, is number in the sense of "what is counted, not that with which we count."¹⁶

The second interpretation available is that time is some sort of derivative property of motion. On this reading, neither the 'nows' nor the regular interval established by marking the 'nows' of before and after are themselves time. Rather, the 'nows' marks off a specific motion and establishes a new feature, namely time as the content of the interval between the 'nows' that are identical in their being. This interpretation would make sense of the numerous passages in which it is claimed that time is that which is numbered, not the numbering or counting itself (i.e. not the 'nows' in themselves). Indeed, this claim is central to Aristotle's defense of the idea that earlier and later times, though of the same duration, are not identical (that which is numbered, horses, people, or the specific motion of the duration differentiate otherwise identical numbers). Justifying such a claim is the aim of passages such as 220b5. However, if this is correct, and time is an attribute of motion in the sense of a property of the motion, how is it that the soul is needed in order for there to be time? If it is the specific motion counted that constitutes time, surely this motion could exist without one to enumerate it. Additionally, this interpretation makes it difficult to understand how rest could be included in time. If time is a derivative property of motion that is

¹⁵ Bostock, 156.

¹⁶ 219b4-9

then simply given a measure in enumeration, then motion is necessary for the production of time. Yet, Aristotle explicitly states that periods of rest can be in time (221b8-221b14).

It is unclear which interpretation is primary, or, put another way, which is the better representation of Aristotle's views. This is my question. Which of these two interpretations is most adequate to Aristotle's other views, particularly to his theory of motion? As I hope has been shown, there is no forthcoming interpretation of time as a number of motion that does not come into conflict with other major tenants of Aristotle's theory. A more complete analysis of this problem would involve looking at the account of measure and unit *Metaphysics Iota* as well as a more sustained analysis of motion in the *Physics*. This paper is meant merely to serve as an illustration of the various interpretations available as well as an indication of what would be entailed by adopting either one of these interpretations. The solution to these problems is the subject for a much larger work.

YOU NEVER CLARIFIED THE QUESTION. I WOULD SUGGEST. SEE MY FINAL ADDITION TO YOUR PAPER.

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The Endurance of the Past and the Creation of the Future

I – Introduction

In brief passages of his treatises and lectures, Heidegger sketches some objections to Bergson's conception of primeval time. Though he offers no more than cursory allusions, we can discern an important critical theme: mired in a bog of metaphysical confusions, the idea of pure duration by Bergson presumes the temporal primacy of the present and, therefore, fails to unearth the ontological relation between time and being. Such a contention is, I reckon, inaccurate. In his attempt to ground horological time, Bergson articulates an account of existential temporality whereby the past and the future emerge in a creative process. Accordingly, the enduring consciousness consists in an openness to being – which, to be sure, Bergson interprets as life. Pure duration, therefore, designates the ontological field across which we encounter and create being. I do not, of course, intend to overstate the commonalities between Heidegger and Bergson – their presumptions and conclusions are very different. I merely wish to show the latter is not culpable of the charge levied by the former.

¹ According to Heidegger, there are many problems with Bergson's account of time, all of which emerge from the latter's persistent entanglement in traditional metaphysics. For him, Bergson (1) reduces horological time to space; (2) retains and merely inverts the Aristotelian conception of time; (3) fails to provide an ontological foundation for time-consciousness; (4) prioritizes the present and the being of presence. In this paper, I focus on the last two lines of criticism.

Commented [BS1]: Vagueness here weakens the impact of paper's opening to entice interest.

Commented [BS2]: Sentence break called for here.

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Commented [BS4]: First you need to explain that he seeks to ground horological time by reference to lived duration.

Commented [BS5]: Assume that I don't know much about Bergson. Your opening is, then, pretty confusing. For instance, why are you suddenly talking about consciousness after indicating the central problematic was the ontological relation between time and being.

Commented [BS6]: Which charge? I see two charges: Bergson presumes the primacy of the present and he fails to unearth the ontological relation between time and being.

Structure of presentation:

1. Idea of duration by Bergson has two problems, one of which is said to follow from the other
2. You wish to defend Bergson against "a" charge.

II –Pure Duration: In Memoriam

To appreciate Heidegger's critique of Bergson, we must briefly expound the latter's theory of pure duration. Much like Heidegger, Bergson strove to disclose the origin of temporality from which we derive [both](#) our mundane and scientific conception of time. His aim is to avoid the paradoxes and ambiguities of the mundane conception of time and, ultimately, secure an indeterministic and temporal conception of freedom.² He distinguishes, then, between horological time [*temps*] and pure duration [*durée*]. The former is a quantitative multiplicity, a discontinuous and homogenous juxtaposition of objective units, whereas the latter is a qualitative multiplicity, the continuous and heterogenous progress of consciousness. Only duration is a pure and concrete temporal phenomenon. Horological time, as a numerical magnitude, is a spatialized mixture, a convenient and useful abstraction.

To establish the distinction between these two kinds of multiplicity, Bergson investigates the nature of number. Number is, he argues, a spatial designation. On one hand, the origin of a numerical magnitude is space. What we count and divide are originally regions of space – say, petals or sheep. On the other hand, the countability of a numerical magnitude also entails spatiality. [To count anything, we must set each member of the group aside.](#) We must, in other words, place the units somewhere even in highly abstract calculations. Numbers “are therefore parts of space, and space is, accordingly, [the material with which the mind builds up number,](#) the medium in which the mind places it.”³ In creating numbers, we abstract from

Commented [BS7]: To count:
* act of counting: a multiplicity of states
* the counted: a multiplicity of affairs

Commented [BS8]: Good.

Commented [BS9R8]: Good. So where is the discussion of the symbolic thus far?

² The connection between duration and freedom is, of course, beyond the narrow scope of this paper.

³ Henri Bergson, “Time and Free Will,” in *Key Writings*, 53.

the multiple qualities of the world and thereby establish a homogenous magnitude. We must ignore the unique peculiarities of a single petal and conceptualize it as an indistinct unit.

Page | 3

Now, horological time is the numerical magnitude of motion and change – indeed, such is the conception of temporality, which Aristotle has bequeathed upon us. So, insofar as clock-time is a kind of number, it must perforce unfold in space. We count the now-units of this discontinuous succession in spatial juxtaposition – much like we count material objects, e.g., apples in a crate. Horological time, as the alloy of time and space, responds to the pragmatic and evolutionary needs of the body. If we wish to calculate the route of a rocket to Mars or coordinate our schedules, we need a measurable unit of some sort, an abstract standard or rule. As Bergson puts it: “Nay, more, time enters into the formulae of mechanics, into the calculations of the astronomer, and even of the physicist, under the form of a quantity. We measure the velocity of a movement, implying that time itself is a magnitude.”⁴ In this sense, then, time is a useful quantitative multiplicity, a homogenous magnitude.

However, the fount of impure-spatialized time is pure duration. Duration is the raw life of consciousness, a creative flourishing. It designates the inexorable, irreversible succession of qualitative-multiplicities states of consciousness, i.e., the restless interpenetration of sensations, desires, ideas, sentiments, woes, worries and so forth. “In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes,” he begins, “which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity.”⁵ In duration, experiences have no discernible contours, no determinate

Commented [BS10]: Why alloy? (not to deny the validity of this idea, just think it is necessary to explain the origin of this idea in Bergson)

Commented [BS11]: See previous question about symbolical representation.

Commented [BS12]: See earlier comment regarding consciousness.

Commented [BS13]: “It”, the word, designates?

⁴ Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, in *Key Writings*, 63

⁵ Bergson, 61.

boundaries: they simply **disembogue** into one another. Duration is, therefore, the absolute **flourishment** of conscious life, a heterogenous, uncountable, qualitative medium, an endless process of growth. As such, it **resists** discursive analysis: it must be lived, rather than cognized.

A **symphony**, for instance, comprises multiple pitches, pauses, sounds, moods and themes. Consciousness could very well dissect the piece and analyze the formal structure of a theme, or the contrapuntal line of one instrument. To do so, it must excise a part of the whole by means of a symbol or cypher and, thereby, separate "its present state from its former states."⁶ In so doing, however, consciousness no longer lives the music. **It no longer endures. It projects the sonorous sensibilities onto a space of thought. Conversely, when consciousness lives the music, the symphony is disclosed as a heterogenous amalgamation of sensibilities. It experiences the moods, pitches, memories, worries and silences melting into one another.** Thus, pure duration constitutes the gradual growth of the living consciousness through which it develops, evolves creates and changes.

Bergson's theory of temporality relies, therefore, upon the distinction between horological time and pure duration. Horological time **is a quantitative multiplicity, a numerical magnitude, which comprises abstract, discontinuous and homogenous now-units.** As such, clock-time is an **alloy** of space: to the degree that time is countable, it is spatial. **The spatialization of time occurs, in turn, by dint of the pragmatic and evolutionary vicissitudes of corporeal life.** In contrast, pure duration is a qualitative multiplicity, the primeval fount of temporality, which comprises concrete, continuous and heterogenous experiences. It is, in

Commented [BS14]: Excellent GRE word, but I'm not sure it gets at what you intend. Disembogue carries the connotation of an emptying. Is this what you mean?

Commented [BS15]: Notice you are employing a substantive to indicate a dynamic.

Commented [BS16]: Resist or abjure

Commented [BS17]: Given the analogy to musical tone and to music generally is prevalent in Bergson, this explication could be much richer if tied more clearly to Bergson's own explication.

Commented [BS18]: "Our final conclusion, therefore, is that there are two kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable; and the multiplicity of states of consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is space"
— Bergson, "The Idea of Duration" (sorry don't have my Key Writings text, so I cannot provide the page number)

What do you mean that consciousness "excise(s) a part of the whole by means of a symbol or cypher". This is introduced too quickly and without adequate explication.

Commented [BS19]: Is horological time a representation of the mind applied to material objects?

Commented [BS20]: admixture

Commented [BS21]: New Idea :: New Paragraph

Commented [BS22]: Introduced but not explained.

⁶ Bergson, 60.

other words, the very endurance of consciousness in a relentless process of self-creation. And so, duration is essentially inarticulable and ineffable. It is a concept, admittedly of a very unique nature (see *Introduction to Metaphysics*), that denotes a form of immediate and pure living.

III - Heidegger's Critique of Bergson: The Primacy of the Present

Now, Heidegger recognizes Bergson's innovative attempt to disclose the primeval phenomenon of time: "Recently Bergson tried to conceive the concept of time more originally. He made it [clearer] than any previous philosopher that time is interwoven with consciousness."⁷ However, Bergson's idea of pure duration remains fettered to the "ordinary way of understanding" time, "which has persisted from Aristotle..."⁸ Aristotle, he claims, established the problem of time for all subsequent thinkers, "and not least of all for Bergson."⁹ For Heidegger, Bergson's most important metaphysical mistake is perhaps the attribution of ontotemporal primacy to the present - that is, the epistemic and ontological privilege of presence.

Traditional metaphysics, he argues, has hitherto attempted to know entities as presence. "The outward evidence for this," he asserts, "is the treatment of the meaning of Being as παρουσία or οὐσία, which signifies, in ontologico-temporal terms, 'presence' [*Anwesenheit*]. Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time - the 'present.'"¹⁰ Thus knowledge has been interpreted as an act of making present. To know is to represent here and now, to

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 149

⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 39.

⁹ Heidegger, 142.

¹⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 47.

Commented [BS23]: Don't be coy. Where is this criticism introduced by Heidegger. Don't bury that information in a footnote. Place the objection in context.

Commented [BS24]: Cf. *The Concept of Time*, (first draft) in which the concept of the present is actually quite ambiguous.

"The surrounding world - when examined with regard to its presence [*Anwesenheit*] - is structured according to its own significations and references" (17).

"Measuring amounts to determining something that is present [*Gegenwärtiges*] by means of something that is present [*Gegenwärtiges*]" (61).

Which presence is at issue here?

* the ontotemporal primacy of something that is present [*Gegenwärtiges*]
* the privileging of presence [*Anwesenheit*]

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Commented [BS25]: Resolution of the ambiguity. But I would suggest that the ambiguity needs to be acknowledged explicitly in order to be clearly resolved.

grasp something as present-at-hand [*Vorhandensein*]. Thus, ~~the truth is conceived as a~~ permanent, persistent, changeless transcendence, an enduring entity of some sort: the being that is, primary substance, the eternal forms or the timeless presence of God. In sum, the present is interpreted as ~~the experiential center in relation to which we understand the past,~~ as a mere “have-been,” and the future, as a mere “not-yet.” nothing.

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Commented [BS26]: This needs a lot more clarification. See my previous comment.

Now, this prejudice is a problem, argues Heidegger, because it occludes the phenomenon of existence as a temporalized openness. For Heidegger, the being of existence [*Dasein*] is care – that is, a concerned awareness of being. Care comprises three equiprimordial structural moments: thrownness, projection and fallenness. Thrownness designates the phenomenon by which existence is always already in a world structured by a system of customary and pragmatic references. *Dasein* is encultured by a world of signification that precedes it and finds itself caring for it. Projection designates the phenomenon by which existence is always a confrontation with possibilities for action. *Dasein* is that which it can become, all of its temporally determined possibilities. Finally, fallenness designates the phenomenon by which existence is a fascinated dispersal in the business of everyday and social life. In its average everydayness, *Dasein* is merely any “one” – it behaves as one behaves.

As such, care is only possible on the basis of temporality. Temporality is a unified existential whole, which comprises three temporal ecstasis, or horizons of interpretation: past, present and future. Each ecstasis primarily conditions one moment of the structure of care. So, *Dasein*, as care, ‘makes’ the present in its projection toward the future as it plunges

into the past – that is, in its concern for its existential possibilities.¹¹ Since projected anticipation is the mode through which we unveil finitude in the form of death, Dasein's authentic temporality is the future. Inauthentic temporality is, on the contrary, a fallen dispersal in the present, the vicissitudes of everyday life as any "one." To prioritize the present is, therefore, to close the present, to understand oneself as an innerworldly entity among other entities. However, Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is neither a transcendent object nor a transcendental subject, for which a horological interpretation of time as presence would apply. Rather, Dasein is an ecstatic openness: the temporal disclosure of being.

Only through this analysis can we reveal the ontological relation between time and existence in light of the question of being. Temporality is that through and in which all interpretations of being become possible. Dasein's understanding of being is fundamentally temporal – that is, the structure of care depends upon temporality. Such omission is, then, Bergson's fatal flaw. "The basic metaphysical problem of the primordial connection between Dasein and temporality," contends Heidegger, "he [Bergson] does not pose, and even less does he pose the problem of being, for which the other problem is only a preparation."¹² So Bergson's account of pure duration cannot articulate the nature of time as the existential condition for the possibility of the disclosure of being – Dasein's openness to time is Dasein's openness to being.

IV –Pure Duration: In Memory

¹¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 401.

¹² Heidegger, 149.

Commented [BS27]: Time' is the being of 'nobody' (*'Die Zeit' ist das Sein des 'Niemand'*) which is encountered within and in terms of presenting immersion in the world. We must not interpret away the phenomena of 'one' and 'time', which are so relentlessly dominant (*hartnäckigen Herrschaft*) that they often seem more 'real' than the presence (*Vorhandensein*) of the world (what is in the world is 'in time'). Ontological investigation must open itself to these phenomena; it must read off their ontological characteristics from these phenomena themselves" (*Concept of time*, 65)

Your analysis above is quite good. But I would suggest that the demand announced in the last sentence of the quote above is absent in your analysis.

~~I suspect, however, that~~ Heidegger is overhasty in his dismissal of Bergson's theory of duration. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson devises a theory of perception and memory, which disavows the traditional conception of time as presence. While the former is indeed the faculty by which consciousness attends to a rigid present, the latter is rather the faculty, which synthesizes and preserves the past as a continuous, heterogenous murmur of unconscious frequencies. Duration is, then, the memorial accumulation of the past and the inventive creation of the future. Unlike horological time, pure duration is defined by the past, sustained in memory, in its creative tendency toward the future. Thus, as a living process of flourishing, duration contains, at all moments, the three ecstatic horizons of temporality: in the creative relation between past and future, the original present remains open. Understood as such, pure duration is, not merely a psychological experience, but rather the ontological field across which we encounter being.

To countenance Bergson's rejection of the ontological primacy of the present, we must briefly examine his theory of perception and memory. In seeking the nature of these conscious faculties, he elucidates the phenomenon of pure duration in light of the relation between body and spirit. To do so, he posits first the notion of image as a "certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing."¹³ That is to say, an image is an intermediary being, which does not possess the ontological independence of an object nor does it possess the ontological dependence of a representation. As such, an image is neither material nor ideal. It is, rather, that through which the world is manifest. "Nothing really new" could occur, contends

¹³ Henri Bergson, "Matter and Memory," in *Key Writings*, 81.

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Commented [BS29]: Is a consciousness something that is objectively present (Vorhandensein)? The faculty-analysis articulated here suggests it is.

Bergson, except through a field of particular images.¹⁴ Hence, matter is an aggregate of images.

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Now, the faculty by which we apprehend these images is perception. In perception, we bind the image of matter to a representation. We transform, in other words, being-in-itself into being-for-us. However, such a transformation is not an addition, a bestowal of value or significance. We do not imbue the image with spirit or thought in a perceptive act. On the contrary, the transformation of an image into a representation is a subtraction, a loss of richness. From the image, we discern that which is useful or relevant with respect to the pragmatic needs and purposes of the organized body – the images of a pellucid pool of water ordinarily appear to us with reference to thirst or leisure. We represent in order to use and exert power. Therefore, in the epistemic reduction of images to representations, we refer the multifarious multiplicity of life “to the eventual action of one particular image, my body.”¹⁵

Inasmuch as perception is intimately related to matter and the concerns of the organism, it registers, first and foremost, objects *in space*: “perception is master of space...”¹⁶ It solidifies images. Then, perception is the phenomenon through which images become manifest *in the present* – that is, it is oriented toward the present. The perceptive act discloses the presence of images in the now by extracting them from the multifarious totality of the universe. Perception is, therefore, attuned to horological time. Alone, it constitutes a merely pragmatic mode of encounter, a departure from the concrete abundance of duration. Perceptive apprehension cannot, therefore, subsist in isolation. If perception exhausted the scope of

Commented [BS30]: A wordly entity

¹⁴ Bergson, *ibid.*, 87.

¹⁵ Bergson, *ibid.*, 89.

¹⁶ Bergson, *ibid.*, 95.

possible psychotemporal faculties, we would apprehend images in instantaneous flashes. Pure perception would lack duration and experience would consist in a discontinuous succession of discrete frames sliced from a film reel. Consciousness would be nothing but a series of sudden raptures, or a featureless string connecting the beads of its mental states.

Yet, in actuality, perception endures. The endurance of perceptive apprehension must then rest upon a more fundamental psychotemporal faculty: to wit, memory. Perception is, Bergson argues, always amalgamated with memory. “The qualitative heterogeneity of our successive perceptions of the universe,” Bergson begins, “results from the fact that each, in itself, extends over a certain depth of duration and that memory condenses in each an enormous multiplicity of vibrations which appear to us all at once, although they are successive.”¹⁷ Now, memory in its purest sense is irreducible to mere habituation. Habit-memory is superficially inscribed on the body. It simply informs our attitudes and expectations with respect to our corporeal needs. Habit-memory is then nothing but a repetitive motor mechanism – for instance, riding a bicycle, or performing basic arithmetic.

Contrarily, pure memory is “spirit in its most tangible form.”¹⁸ If perception petrifies images as presence, pure memory dissolves them as past. Such a faculty liquefies matter into a sea of vibrant tendencies and infuses the present therewith. It is not, consequently, a derivative form of perception, a deficient mode of apprehension through which we contend with phantasmal irrealities. This sense of remembrance is a mere spatialization of memory: the picture of an urn into which we safeguard psychic trinkets. Rather, in its authentic temporal sense, memory preserves and discloses the past as the accumulative endurance of

¹⁷ Bergson, *ibid.*, 119-20.

¹⁸ Bergson, *ibid.*, 122.

our spiritual being irrespective of pragmatic concerns of the body – that is, pure duration. The restless totality of our sentiments, volitions, sensations, ideas, fancies and troubles looms against the present as a memorial impulse and “follows us at every instant.”¹⁹ The unconscious past, preserved in memory, constitutes our enduring existence.

Now, the phenomenon of pure memory sustains the past, not only *in*, but also *through* the present into the future. In pure duration, consciousness is at every instant pregnant with the past, which determines its inventive possibilities. The past, understood as a swarm of vibrant memorial tendencies and impulses, situates and propels this continuous process of change. That is to say, the condensed being of the past informs the activity of consciousness by which it devises the irreducibly new future. “The more we study the nature of time,” speculates Bergson, “the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.”²⁰ Hence, in duration, the future is disclosed as sheer novelty, the anticipation of the new. Against the spurious, spatial ego of perception, memory reveals the ontological dimension of the ego that endures in its creative, self-constitutive orientation toward the future.

Duration is, therefore, the being of consciousness in which past and future are always manifest. The impulses of the past create the future. In Bergson’s words: “Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”²¹ As we have already established, duration resists perceptive cognition in terms of a fragmentary succession of instants, an abstraction, which is nonetheless possible –

¹⁹ Bergson, “Creative Evolution,” in *Key Writings*, 173.

²⁰ Bergson, 176.

²¹ Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 173.

Commented [BS31]: Very nice discussion of Bergson above. But I still wonder if Heidegger’s criticism doesn’t so much rest on the being of entities given to a consciousness but rather on the being of consciousness as innerworldly.

horological time. Rather, the endurance of consciousness is, for Bergson, a continuous, multifarious flourishing, a ceaseless invention whose unique qualities permeate one another. As a dynamic process of change, duration always reveals the past in its projection toward the future. In primeval time, the past is always manifest as a memorial tendency, while the future is always manifest as the creative potency of the living being.

So, insofar as pure duration establishes a concrete relation between the past and the future, the present in its original sense appears as an openness. Time, as endless transience, is the ontological medium through which we encounter ourselves and other beings. It is, in other words, not a mere conscious experience, but rather an ontological condition for the disclosure of being: "Questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than of space."²² This epistemic suggestion is in fact an ontological reorientation. It bespeaks an insight about the philosophical attitude through which truth is revealed: we cannot apprehend the being of entities by stumbling upon them in space. Rather, we must encounter them in time. In pure duration, therefore, we contend with the inextinguishable multiplicity of the universe. Time is not primordially an innerworldly magnitude, but rather an active process of endurance through which what is becomes. It is, in a word, an openness to phenomena, the existential condition for the disclosure of being.

Yet, Heidegger would likely insist that Bergson understands temporality in terms of innerworldly entities. After all, duration is a living process of multifarious change whereby consciousness preserves the past and creates the future. So, in this account, Dasein is

²² Henri Bergson, "Matter and Memory," in *Key Writings*, 120.

Commented [BS32]: Establishes in what sense?

Commented [BS33]: If so, then this is fundamentally and radically dissimilar to Heidegger's position.

Commented [BS34]: Go back and look again at the Introduction to Metaphysics.

"Certainly, concepts are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very different from those which we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition."

This distinction between the conceptuality appropriate to the sciences and a conceptuality appropriate to metaphysics would be very useful to the point you are making in this paper. For if it, ultimately, a question of encounter (access, opening), then how is this possible?

"a true empiricism is that which proposes to get as near to the original itself as possible, to search deeply into its life, and so, by a kind of intellectual auscultation, to feel the throbbing of its soul; and this true empiricism is the true metaphysics."

Question: in what sense is the Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology in line with Bergson's conception of metaphysics, "which aims at no application, <and which> can and usually must abstain from converting intuition into symbols."

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Commented [BS35]: See my comment/question on page. 11.

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interpreted as the temporally enduring progression of consciousness, which is endowed with faculties of memory and perception. However, this obstinate charge might consist in a mere semantic quibble. Given the previous examination, it seems evident that Bergson stretches the sense of these terms in an attempt to articulate an ontology of time and existence. **Duration** is not reducible to the consciousness experience of time. Rather, it constitutes **the very being of consciousness** – that is, **pure duration is the ontological ground upon which conscious experience rests**. And so, memory and perception are no mere **psychic capacities**. They are instead the horizons against which the world becomes manifest to consciousness.

I do not, of course, contend that Heidegger and Bergson devise the same, or even a similar, account of temporality and existence. Their premises, conclusions and concerns are quite obviously different. Although I cannot conduct such a comparative investigation here, I can at least enumerate some relevant differences: (1) while both reject the primacy of the present, Bergson seems prioritize the past and Heidegger seems to prioritize the future; (2) Heidegger understands finitude as the finality of death, whereas Bergson understands finitude as incompleteness; (3) for Heidegger, the disclosure of being seems to be an act of temporal interpretation, a linguistic phenomenon, while, for Bergson, the disclosure of life is, in its purity and immediacy, inarticulable and inexpressible – indeed, to articulate life is to detract from it.

Therefore, pure duration depends upon the unitary manifestation of the three tenses of temporality. The present appears in the act of perception. The past appears in the memorial accumulation of experiences. The future, finally, appears in the creative orientation toward

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Commented [BS36]: This is paragraph is very good, but I feel you are falling into contradiction ultimately.

1. "Duration is the raw life of consciousness, a creative flourishing. It designates the inexorable, irreversible succession of states of consciousness...."

2. "Duration is not reducible to the consciousness (*sic.*) experience of time." (13)

Commented [BS37]: So what happens to all the talk of faculties earlier?

the new. However, since pure duration is primarily defined by the dynamic relation between the past and the future, consciousness is a disclosure of being. Any transcendent presence is rather a function of perception and horological time. It consists in a deficient mode of existence in which we abstract from the primeval process of duration. Hence, the present of horological time is a perceptive unit, whereas the present of duration is a creative dialogue of the unconscious past with the unknown future.

V - Conclusion

From this investigation, we can draw two conclusions. Firstly, it seems, to me, incorrect that Bergson succumbs to the Aristotelian temptation to privilege the present. Although the faculty of perception does in fact bind consciousness to the present, the faculty of memory preserves the past in all its multifarious multiplicity. In pure duration, the past is always manifest as a multiplicity of creative tendencies projected toward the future. To the extent that pure duration is a process, it always refers to the reality of these temporal horizons. Secondly, memory is the faculty through which consciousness discloses its very being as duration, an inexorable, inexhaustible process of growth. Therefore, the present is, in its primal sense, an openness. The enduring consciousness is fundamentally a form of disclosure. Time is, for Bergson, the process whereby consciousness encounters being.

Very nice analysis of Bergson's concept of duration. See my comments in margins. To summarize, the ambiguity of privileging the present. Anwesen vs. Gegenwart. needs to be more explicitly brought out; and the account of duration as raw life of consciousness and as ontological ground of life of consciousness is contradictory.

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Indeed, clarifying these two would better get at the heart of Heidegger's critique of Bergson.

Nice work this semester.

Paper Grade: **A**

Final Course Grade: **A**

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