

later objections that judgment is always already built on pre-judgment (prejudice); and, in the process, he acquits Kant of the charge that his judgment-based account of cognition is guilty of the naïve Enlightenment vice of reducing our understanding to self-evident rational standards. Distinguishing cognitive convincing (*überzeugen*) from reflective witnessing (*zeugen*), Makkreel argues that Kant's theory of the latter offers a promising approach to critical understanding not provided by more recent hermeneutic philosophies.

He makes the further case for the hermeneutical value of Kant's account of judgments in chapter 5, where he makes a helpful comparison between Kant's distinction between determining and reflective judgment on the one hand, and Dilthey's contrast between explanation and understanding on the other. Chapter 6 continues this argument in the case of historical understanding, distinguishing anticipatory reflection from reflective self-awareness or "second-order reflexivity made possible by reflective judgment" (166), which he claims is the key to a hermeneutics that makes tradition responsive to criticism and open to fundamental changes. Chapter 7 then moves from what he calls the "constitutive" critiques of Kant and Dilthey to Jürgen Habermas's and Paul Ricoeur's "regulative" hermeneutics based on ideal communication situations. Again Makkreel argues for a reflective account that also refers to specific, subjectively oriented communicative situations.

The final section of the book (Applications and Adaptations) deals with genealogical (Friedrich Nietzsche's) and narrative theories of history, and discusses issues of art interpretation in the age of electronic media and the digital revolution. He argues for an updated affirmation of artistic creativity that can still remain open to fundamental changes in its modes of expression. Again he argues in a Kantian vein that our capacity to have expansive feelings that transport us beyond ourselves can be applied to new media and techniques. The value of art lies in its ability to expand our horizons and to help adapt and transform old traditions in new contexts.

Overall, Makkreel's book is full of interesting exegetical and philosophical discussion of major themes in the development of philosophical hermeneutics since Kant. There are omissions, of course. Friedrich Schleiermacher and Friedrich Schlegel, among others, receive relatively little attention, even though their views represent distinct alternatives to the Kantian and Hegelian trajectories that Makkreel traces through to the present. Instead, he presents a strong sustained argument for reconsidering more tradition-based theories in light of a hermeneutics of (Kantian) reflective judgment. He never claims to be presenting a comprehensive historical overview, however. His aim is to offer a new account that can better address the complex problems of interpretation and understanding in our own time. This book is a welcome step in that direction.

JANE KNELLER

*Colorado State University*

Andrea Staiti. *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 313. Cloth, \$95.00.

With this new book, Andrea Staiti provides both a richly researched work in the history of philosophy and an important new introduction, a contextualization really, of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Staiti situates Husserl among the Neo-Kantian philosophers, particularly Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and Franz Böhme of the Southwest school, and two life-philosophers influential in the development of his mature conception of transcendental phenomenology, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The historical approach he adopts in the book is modeled on the *Konstellationsforschung* employed in the study of German Idealism by Dieter Heinrich, and this technique when applied to Husserl's transcendental philosophy proves especially fruitful. It is by means of this style of analysis that Staiti substantiates his thesis that Husserl's philosophy ought to be and was in fact understood by Husserl, himself, as scientific life-philosophy.

The book is divided into eight chapters, but these coalesce implicitly into three sections. The first two chapters provide an overview of the two dominant philosophical schools against which Husserl's philosophy developed. In the first chapter, Staiti argues convincingly against the standard interpretation of Southwestern school of Neo-Kantianism. The efforts conceptually to demarcate the natural and the human sciences imply, he argues, an ontological supplement by which to ground this demarcation. Staiti shows in this first chapter that this need was both recognized and evinced in the work of the major figures of the school. Turning in the next chapter to the life-philosophers, Staiti remains focused on the project of clarifying the demarcation between the natural and the human sciences. Here he shows how Simmel's unique appropriation of Kant's notion of the world-forming power of life and Dilthey's analytical description of life offer a counterbalance to the philosophers of Southwest school. Where the first two chapters provide a historical overview and background to Husserl's philosophy, Staiti painstakingly details the influence these two constellations play in the next six chapters. Chapters 3–5 examine Husserl's work in confrontation and interplay with the Neo-Kantian philosophers. In these chapters, particularly, Staiti presents a master class in comparative philosophy. His analysis in the third chapter of the homology between the Neo-Kantian notion of "standpoint" and the Husserlian concept of "attitude" as essential to the idea of scientificity in the work of both is especially rich and nuanced. Chapter 4 details the reception of Husserl's *Ideen* among the Neo-Kantians. Here Paul Natorp's influence in the development of genetic phenomenology by Husserl comes into full view. According to Staiti, "Husserl's move *towards* genetic phenomenology does not mean a move *away* from static phenomenology or a change of mind about fundamental phenomenological concepts such as essence and intuition" (130). It is unfortunate, however, that Staiti does not address and defend this view against clear and well-known objections to it. But this is a rare moment of weakness in an otherwise forceful and substantially researched argument. The fifth chapter concerns Husserl's 1919 and 1927 "Nature and Spirit" lectures, and the book regains its footing here. Once again, the demarcation of the sciences of nature and of spirit, that is, the human sciences, takes center stage. Here Staiti details Husserl's considered confrontation with Rickert in the lecture courses. Most significantly, this chapter marks a transition to the third and final set of chapters, which, in the main, centers on Husserl's relation to and self-understanding of transcendental phenomenology as life-philosophy. In chapter 6, Staiti analyzes the development of Husserl's conception of phenomenology from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology. Of particular importance in this chapter is the explication of the historical method that arose in Husserl's late articulation of his philosophy as universal science of both physical nature and human, historical subjectivity. In the final two chapters, the first on the life-world concept and its centrality to the transcendental-phenomenological worldview, and the second on the ethical implications of this phenomenology of the life-world, Staiti lays out an unparalleled interpretation of Husserl's late philosophy. It is in these chapters that Staiti convincingly illustrates how precisely Husserl was "able to harmonize two traditionally divergent desiderata in post-Kantian German philosophy: scientificity and proximity to life" (291).

A review of this brevity cannot do justice to the richness of this book. This is a work of expert craftsmanship whose author has a deft and enviable grasp both of Husserl's entire corpus and of the constellation of philosophers so influential to the mature development of his transcendental phenomenology. The author achieves his stated goals admirably, first to present to Anglophone readers a largely ignored chapter in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought, and, second, to advance our understanding of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology by critical study of his late work. Easily readable, Staiti's new book contextualizes Husserl's thinking in an engaging and profoundly new way.

BOB SANDMEYER

University of Kentucky