

A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's Time Lectures

ABSTRACT:

After publication of Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Oskar Kraus published a compilation of letters and lecture notes between Brentano and Anton Marty in his essay, "Toward a Phenomenognoy of Time Consciousness." Kraus sets forth a scathing criticism of Husserl – and of Heidegger as editor of the *Vorlesungen* in my paper. I, first, explicate Kraus's argument against Husserl's critique of Brentano. Second, I assess its merit; and third, I examine the explosive charge regarding the similarity of Brentano's last published views on time and Husserl's view published in the *Vorlesungen*.

A Contemporaneous Criticism of Husserl's Time Lectures, Bob Sandmeyer (SPEP 2021)

In 1928, Edmund Husserl published his *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time* [hereafter *Lectures*]) for inclusion in the 9th volume of the *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie*.¹ In 1969, the *Lectures* were republished as *Husserliana X* under the editorship of Rudolf Boehm. This new volume included a substantial collection of materials supplementary to the original text. My focus today centers strictly on the original publication of the time-lectures as published in 1928.²

The provenance of this slight work is rather infamous these days. Martin Heidegger is, of course, the named editor. That Edith Stein's discovery of the lecture materials and editorial efforts to bring these to a publishable form went almost unspoken at the time of publication is

¹ "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 9. Halle a.d.S: Max Niemeyer, 1928, 367-498.

² In his translator's introduction, for instance, John Brough discusses Rudolf Boehm's careful analysis of the composition of the extant edition in 1928. The final publication, he notes, contains a mish mash of distinct analyses dating from different periods and with different terminology and different results and as such advances an incoherent phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. "For the evolution in question is not simply the gradual unfolding of a single position, but the movement from one position, through its criticism, to a new position incompatible with the first" (Husserl 1991, xv). While the internal coherency of Husserl's analyses of time-consciousness remains a profoundly interesting problem, the brevity of my talk today compels me to leave this out of my analysis here.

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story not directly at issue here.³ This editorial history would have been entirely invisible to readers of the 1928 *Jahrbuch* text. Indeed, I am particularly interested in a contemporaneous critical engagement with the *Lectures* by Oskar Kraus in his article, "Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins" ("Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness").⁴ Published in 1930 in the 75th volume of *Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologie*, two years after the publication of Husserl's *Lectures*, Kraus takes it upon himself to address errors made, he asserts, by Husserl in the polemical first section of the *Lectures* titled "Brentano's Doctrine of the Origin of Time." More than simply a corrective, though, Kraus unflinchingly accuses both Husserl and his editor, Heidegger, of academic laxity and suggests – obliquely but quite definitely – that Husserl's account of time-consciousness in the *Lectures* illicitly appropriates something essential from Brentano's last articulation of the problem. Indeed, it is this latter, rather startling, accusation that drew me to examine Kraus's article in more detail, and it is on this I wish to talk today.

Kraus's article is a complex composition having three distinct parts. The first section is quite short. Here Kraus sketches his objections to Husserl's analysis of Brentano's theory of time consciousness, which he fleshes out in detailed notes appended throughout the second and, especially, the third section of the article. These latter two sections are archival in character. The second section contains an exchange of two letters between Anton Marty and Franz Brentano. The first letter is from Marty to Brentano, and the second is Brentano's reply.

³ "Die Kapitel- und Paragrapheneinteilung wurde von Frl. Dr. Stein gelegentlich der Übertragung des stenographischen Konzepts im teilweisen Anschluß an Randbemerkungen des Verfassers eingefügt" (Heidegger, "Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers, 368).

⁴ Kraus, Oskar. "Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins: aus dem Briefwechsel Franz Brentanos Mit Anton Marty, nebst einem Vorlesungsbruchstück über Brentanos Zeitlehre aus dem Jahre 1895, nebst Einleitung und Anmerkungen Veröffentlicht von Oskar Kraus." [In German]. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 75 (1930): 1-22. Translated by L. McAllister as "Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness" in *The Philosophy of Franz Brentano*. Edited by Linda McAllister. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976, 224-239. [Hereafter "Toward a Phenomenognosy."]

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This entire exchange took place in about a week's time during March of 1895. Following the letters, the third and most substantial section of the article contains a fragment from Marty's 1895 lecture course at the Charles University in Prague on the subject about which Marty wrote to Brentano in the letters, i.e., Brentano's theory of time consciousness. These latter two archival sections – Kraus notes – "serve as a supplement to Brentano's *Psychology*,⁵ especially to the statements contained in *Psychology III* (i.e., on the problem of time)"⁶ published by Meiner in 1928. The mixture of polemic and archival materials that constitute Kraus's article, published so closely after the *Lectures*, themselves, make it an invaluable resource by which to understand Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness, its relation to Brentano's presentation of the problem, and the history of Brentano's analyses of time-consciousness in his published and unpublished writings.

The 1895 correspondence in the second section begins with a letter from Marty dated (Saturday) the 9th of March. Frantically composed, Marty expresses his discomposure preparing his course lectures on psychology, particularly on the subject of Brentano's theory of time. Unclear on the issue and finding no help in his own notes, he writes to Brentano: "I see, with the time so short, no other way out than to ask you to rush to my aid by mail and, if possible, immediately (for I'll be up to this part by next Tuesday)."⁷ He then poses to Brentano a number

⁵ It is not entirely clear to which edition of Brentano's *Psychologie* Kraus refers to here. The article supplements all three of Brentano's *Psychologie* volumes, but most especially *Psychologie III*. The three volumes include: **Psychologie I (1924):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Erster Band. Leipzig: F. Meiner. **Psychologie II (1925):** *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Zweiter Band: *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*. Mit neuen Abhandlungen aus dem Nachlass. Leipzig: F. Meiner. **Psychologie III (1928):** *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein*. (Psychologie / Band III). I. Teil: Wahrnehmung / Empfindung / Begriff. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Oskar Kraus. Leipzig: F. Meiner.

⁶ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

⁷ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 226.

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of statements in quick succession, all of which articulate something of Brentano's theory of time-consciousness. His objective writing to Brentano is to confirm the fidelity of his insights regarding Brentano's theory from Brentano, himself.

Marty begins with the statement that "what we call our intuition of time is actually the intuition of a special mode of judgment."⁸ In Brentano's reply to Marty (dated Sunday evening, 1895), Brentano notes that Marty here expresses his "old view" (which is intriguing, as we'll soon see). Kraus interjects a footnote here in which he clarifies that Brentano had "at that time ... described the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of modes of judgment; later, as a continuum of modes of presentation, which ... carry over to the judgement (*sic.*) that is included in every sensation as a blind belief in the qualitative-spatial..."⁹

The chronology of Brentano's views on time-consciousness is fundamental to Kraus's charge of academic sloppiness which he lodges against both Husserl and his editor. I would like to pause here to remark, though, that this chronology is anything but clear. There is no clear path to follow in the literature by which to trace the contours of this development, and commentators of Brentano's work seem at odds in their presentation of it. Consequently, precisely what Brentano's theory of time-consciousness was in 1895, i.e., the time during which the letters we are discussing were composed, remains, itself, unclear. Kraus offers some help in this matter, but even his presentation is not entirely transparent.

In the article, Kraus details three historically distinct theoretical articulations of time-consciousness by Brentano. He is unclear, though, in that his own presentation of the timeline

⁸ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 226-27.

⁹ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 227n4.

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makes it seem that Brentano may have held four distinct viewpoints. But a close examination of the Marty lecture fragment in the article clears up this ambiguity. Thus, the importance of the Marty fragment to the whole article reveals itself. Only by a careful reading of the lecture fragment material, penned by Marty, can one clear up the ambiguities of timeline insinuated by Kraus, himself, in the article.

As to Brentano's views on time, or more precisely the consciousness of time, the earliest of Brentano's views is closely similar to that expressed by John Stuart Mill in Book I of his (i.e., Mill's) *Logic*, published in 1843, though Brentano insists he developed his theory independently from that of Mill. John Stuart Mill, Marty writes in the lecture fragment, "considers the differences of time, i.e., past, present, and future not as differences in the *objects* of judgement [*Materie des Urteils*], but as differences in the kind of judgemental attitude [*in der Weise des urteilenden Verhaltens*] ..." ¹⁰ Marty notes that he himself heard Brentano espouse this view in lectures dated from 1868 to 1870. ¹¹ He also acknowledges, though, that Brentano soon rejected this notion. For "according to this formulation, time would not be a continuum at all." ¹² Indeed, in Brentano's Sunday evening letter of reply to Marty, he suggests that this particular defect of the view led to his rejection of it.

Returning to Kraus's articulation of Brentano's views on time, Kraus notes that Brentano later came to hold "the intuition of time as an intuition of peculiarly and continually varying differences in objects." ¹³ Rather than locating past, present and future in judgments, as he had

¹⁰ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230

¹¹ "Marty was Brentano's student in Würzburg from the autumn of 1868 until Easter 1870." Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230n13.

¹² Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230.

¹³ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 225.

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previously, Brentano "began to locate time in the object of presentation

[*Vorstellungsmaterie*]." ¹⁴ Though a bit vague as to how long Brentano's adhered to this theory,

Kraus indicates that "somewhere around the end of 1894 he gave up that doctrine." ¹⁵

It seems, then, that this second articulated stance, i.e., the *Vorstellungsmaterie* stance, persisted from soon after 1870 until about 1895. Quoting now from the Marty's lecture course fragment, according to this theory "a continual series of presentations from the imagination attaches itself to every sensory or perceptual presentation, and these presentations reproduce *and at the same time change or modify* the perceived content in such a way that they add to it the past moment, i.e., the earlier and earlier past, so that it seems, as it were, temporally removed." ¹⁶ As Marty makes clear, "insofar as I think of what was present as moving further and further into the past, an absolutely new element enters into my thinking, and for that reason Brentano called this activity of the imagination *original association* in contrast to acquired association." ¹⁷

This theoretical stance aligns with Husserl's presentation of Brentano's view in his *Lectures*. Indeed, in the very beginning of the polemical first part of the *Lectures*, Husserl quotes from his personal course notes from one of Brentano's lectures with the following: "Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations, in the (quote) 'coming into being of the immediate representations of memory, that is, of those representations which, according to an invariable law, attach themselves without any mediation to the actual

¹⁴ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 230.

¹⁵ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 225.

¹⁶ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 231.

¹⁷ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosie," 230.

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perceptual representations'.¹⁸ (unquote). (*It is unclear from what transcript Husserl obtains these lines. Perhaps this has come to light and I am unaware of this. If the provenance of this quote is known, please disabuse me of my ignorance here. Nevertheless, we know that Husserl's time with Brentano in Vienna took place during the WS 1884/85 and 1885/86.^{19 20} I personally haven't studied these courses²¹ yet and so can only speak in general of the deep impression Brentano's lectures had on Husserl, especially his lecture courses on selected psychological and aesthetic questions.*)

We also know Husserl had – in addition to Husserl's own lecture course materials from his time with Brentano – a transcript of Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* lectures. These lectures Brentano gave in 1887/88, after Husserl had already left Vienna; the transcript of which was penned by Hans Schmidkunz (Q 10).²² It is interesting to note, then, that in these lectures, Brentano advances – though not so plainly – this second *Vorstellungsmaterie* view of time consciousness. (I quote.)

"So it seems that the primary object of proteraesthesia does not, properly [speaking], adjoin as continuation [als Fortsetzung anschliessen] the primary object of sensation, but rather something belonging to the secondary object, namely the intentional relation to the primary object which we call experience.

¹⁸ Husserl, "On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time," 11.

¹⁹¹⁹ Husserl, "Erinnerung Kraus, Franz Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Leben und seiner Lehre, 153.

²⁰ Karl Schuhmann notes that Fr. Brentano recommended Husserl to Carl Stumpf at Halle for his Habilitation work on October 18, 1886. Husserl began courses in Halle during the fall term, WS 1888/87. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 17).

²¹ According to Schuhmann, Husserl heard Brentano's five hour lecture course on "Practical Philosophy," which began on 22 Oct 1884; his one- or two-hour lecture course on "Elementary Logic and the Notable Reforms In It, which began 25 Oct 1884; Brentano's philosophical exercises on Hume's *Essay* (1884/85); his SS 1885 continuing course to the "Elementary Logic"; the SS 1885 course on Hume's "Prinzipien der Moral"; the WS 1885/86 philosophical exercises on "Helmholz's Expression, 'Die Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung'"; the WS 1885 coursework on "ausgewählte psychologische und ästhetische Fragen"; SS 1886 continuing course on Phantasievorstellungen; SS 1886 philosophical exercises on "Dubois-Reymonds 'Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis". Additionally, Husserl accompanied Brentano in the summer of 1886 on vacation to Wolfgangsee nach St. Gilgen. (Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, 13-16.

²² Benito Müller, "Introduction." In Franz Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology*, xiii, n14

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Whereas sensation shows a present experiencing as its secondary object, proteraesthesia shows, as its primary object, a past experiencing which in its object matches the primary object of the preceding sensation."²³

Regardless of which source or sources underlie Husserl's understanding of Brentano's theory of time consciousness, what is clear is that in his *Lectures* Husserl takes issue with Brentano's *Vorstellungsmaterie* theory, i.e., the second theory of time consciousness articulated by Brentano between 1870 and 1895 – if Kraus's timeline is to be accepted.

I'll come back to Brentano's second articulated stance on the intuition of time, since it is central to Kraus's criticism of Husserl. But for the moment, I would like to complete the chronology which Kraus lays out in the article. On this point, Kraus is maddeningly vague. What is clear is that Brentano moves away from the theory which locates the intuitions of time difference *in objects* sometime late in 1894. He eventually settles on an act-modification theory, which I will discuss later.

The essential thing is this: Brentano recognized...that the intuitions of time differences...could not be differences of the primary objects [*primären Objekte*]...he recognized that the intuition of time goes back to the intuition of the continual modification of the sensory act itself, a modification that is present to us in inner perception intuitively.²⁴

However, Kraus goes on to remark that "the 1894 theory of modes regards the intuition of time as an intuition of a continuum of differences *in judgement*."²⁵ Kraus's articulation is thus ambiguous. Did Brentano return to a theory akin to his earliest viewpoint? That is to say, did he resurrect the notion that differences in time, which is to say, the intuition of these differences,

²³ Franz Brentano. *Descriptive Psychology* (ca. 1886/87), 103.

²⁴ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (slightly modified).

²⁵ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225 (italics mine).

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can be traced to differences in judgments? Or did he develop a new view that these differences can be traced ultimately to modifications of the founding acts of sensation?

Briefly recapitulated, Kraus's timeline looks like this: (i) The earliest theory espoused by Brentano is that akin to Mill's theory. According to this stance, the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in the kind of judgmental attitude. (ii) This earliest stance was rejected ca. 1870 for the original association or *Vorstellungsmaterie* view, i.e., the view that the intuition of differences in time are tied to differences in objects. (iii) Kraus suggests that at the end of 1894 Brentano returns to his older view, i.e., the view that the intuition of the differences in time are tied to differences in judgment. (iv) It seems this view may be, itself, later supplanted by a more mature formulation, i.e., the view that holds the intuition of the differences in time are tied to continual modifications of the sensory act, itself (1895 and after). In short, there is a confusing ambiguity about the transition occurring in Brentano's thinking around 1894-1895. Do we have two distinct views, i.e., a difference in judgment view briefly held, and then a modification of sensory-act view, or is the theory of original association rejected straight away for that of the modes of consciousness formulation?

Marty's lecture fragment included in the article provides essential clarification on this question. As Marty points out, Brentano indeed returned to the old view, i.e., that time is not a matter of the thought-of *content*, but of the *mode of judgment...although with significant modifications*.²⁶ The key to understanding this rests in the concept of *sinnliche Glauben* or sensory believing at the heart of this new account. Brentano here distinguishes between acts of higher and lower judgment. Higher order judgments have a predicative structure, which is to

²⁶ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 234.

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say these are deliberative activities of a rational subject. In opposition to higher order cognitive activities, Brentano – Marty asserts – distinguishes lower order instinctive belief, which is stands at the foundation of every higher order judgement.²⁷ "This instinctive belief is simply inseparable from sensation," Marty points out²⁸ And thus the act of sensation contains two inseparable moments [*Teile*]: one moment is the intuition of the physical phenomenon and the other the assertoric acceptance of said phenomenon. Hence, every act of sensation contains within itself at once a judgment, i.e., an instinctive *Urdoxa*. Kraus thus articulates three distinct views by Brentano: the older judgment view similar to Mill (to ca. 1870), the middle *Vorstellungsmaterie* or original association view (ca. 1870-1895), and a modes of consciousness view (1895 and after).

At this juncture, I'd like to turn away from the question of chronology to examine more closely Kraus's criticism of the *Lectures*. In his article, Kraus severely chastises both Husserl and Heidegger, the named editor of the *Lectures*, for criticizing the second, that is to say, the rejected *Votstellungsmaterie* theory of the intuition of time. He forcefully points out that "neither the author [that is, Husserl] nor the editor [Heidegger] mentions that Brentano had long since given up the doctrine that Husserl criticizes, and substituted it for another."²⁹ In other words, whatever validity Husserl's critique may have against Brentano's views, a validity which Kraus painstakingly denies later in the article, at the very least Husserl's polemic against

²⁷ "A thorough analysis will reveal that this same kind of consciousness, this same kind of intention that is contained in higher forms of knowing and judging, is already present in the acts of sensation" (Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 235n21.

²⁸ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 236.

²⁹ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognosy," 224.

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Brentano in the *Lectures* expresses a straw man. "The editor," Kraus remarks bitinglly, "should not have remained silent about this fact."³⁰

Nor is it the case that Husserl or Heidegger was unaware of that this was an "old theory." Brentano, himself, makes clear the change in his thinking in the third section to the Appendix of his 1911 *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, i.e., the section titled "Von den Modis des Vorstellens". Indeed, Husserl had received a signed copy of this book from Brentano and consequently should have been aware of the change. Heidegger, as well, should have known of the change of views, since he reviewed Brentano's *Klassifikation* for the *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* in 1914.³¹ Further, Kraus, himself, details the transition in Brentano's thinking in his own book, published 1919, titled *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehrer, mit Beiträgen von Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl*. As he writes in his article,

In the same book I deal explicitly with the new theory of time. Section 18 (p. 39) presents the temporal modes as 'modi obliqui', On 17 July 1918 Husserl asked me for the proofs of my book and he actually received them. In addition, he is naturally in possession of the book which contains his, Stumpf's, and my contributions. I criticize Husserl for having failed to draw the attention of the editors of his lectures to Brentano's doctrine of modes.³²

So, there is really no excuse for Husserl's fallacious reading of Brentano in the *Lectures* or Heidegger's silence on this point. Kraus thus severely criticizes both Husserl and Heidegger for their academic sloppiness, and rightfully so I would add.

³⁰ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 224.

³¹ Heidegger, M. "Review of *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* by Franz Brentano." *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* 40, (1914): pp. n/a. (<http://ophen.org/pub-106031>)

³² Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenogony," 225.

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However, Kraus does not limit himself to pointing out the fallacy of relevance inherent to Husserl's polemic here, and this is really the most interesting critical note I believe. He goes on directly to suggest that Husserl's own phenomenology of inner time-consciousness parrots that of Brentano's final conception. "What is more," he continues, "Husserl puts forward a doctrine that replaces objective differences in time (i.e., temporal variations of the object as Brentano had previously taught) with 'modes of consciousness.'"³³ The force of this attack is somewhat muted in Kraus's introductory remarks, that is to say, in the first part of the article, since there his focus centers strictly on the straw man argument. Yet in his notes to Marty's lecture fragment Kraus painstakingly details the crux of the issue. Marty, he demonstrates, makes clear Brentano's position in his lecture fragment with the following:

Now, if one asks, 'Is there, then, still an intuition of time, and what is it?' The answer is, 'What deserves the name is not the intuition of physical phenomena, but the intuition of a mental phenomenon or a continuum of mental phenomena, a continually varying series of modes of judgement; and it is here that the source of all temporal concepts is to be sought. For on the basis of this intuition of a limited continuum of characteristic modes of affirmation one can then form the concepts of a more distant past, and the concepts of the future, of which we have no actual intuitions.'³⁴

Here Brentano locates – according to Marty, that is – temporal determinations in judgment, but this is, as we have seen, judgment of the lower order discussed earlier. Kraus appends the following note, precisely to this passage by Marty I just read.

Later Brentano transferred the modification to the act of presentation itself and let it thus carry over into the act of judgement. In this connection the doctrine of the direct and indirect modes (*modus rectus* and *obliquus*) plays an important role. This theory of Brentano's had been available to Husserl since 1911 in the copy inscribed by Brentano himself, and, in addition, in the book on which

³³ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 224.

³⁴ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenognoy," 237f

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Husserl collaborated, *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (Munich, 1919).³⁵

The impact of this remark should not be overlooked, I think. For here Kraus essentially accuses Husserl of lifting an essential feature of Brentano's new view without acknowledgement. Kraus points us to page 432 of the *Lectures*, which falls within the third section of the 1928 text, i.e., on the levels of constitution of time and of the objects of time, most precisely in §38 titled "Unity of the flow of consciousness and constitution of simultaneity and succession." In this section Husserl observes a law of transformation which connects the now, the no-longer and the not-yet into a single unity.³⁶ As Husserl expresses it in the *Lectures*, "The *whole* 'being-together' of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of having elapsed, and according to which in the same continuity an ever new being-together of primal sensations arises originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into the condition of having elapsed."³⁷ It is this very analysis that provides the descriptive basis for the two inseparably united horizontal (*Länges-*) and transverse (*Quer-*) intentionalities so important to Husserl's theory of time-consciousness.

³⁵ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 238n28.

³⁶ To get a sense of these analyses, I use this the experience of presentation as example. As you here my voice and feel your own body against the chair and note the muted sounds in the background and the tug of your clothes against your skin, these primal sensations, which is to say, these sensations which you, that is to say, you qua "the I that I am experiencing these sensations," occur simultaneously. It is not as though there is the sound of my voice and then the sounds in the background and then the bodily acknowledgement of one's seated self, etc. Rather, my actual experience is a complex of many different experiences, some of which are more pressing and others less so, occurring at once. And though the idea I am expressing through the verbal expression of the words on this page remains the focus of your attention – at least I hope, it does, these words in their tonality recede away, flowing into the past – as do the sounds you hear in the background and even your experiences of the chair and of your clothes on your body, if you pay any attention to this at all, as you slightly shift to get comfortable. Indeed the first noticing of the physicality of the sound of my voice and the tug of clothes on your body remarked upon earlier is past and, yet, still there for us in some sense.

³⁷ Husserl, *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Inner Time*, 81-82.

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Kraus's most pointed criticism of Husserl centers on this very idea of the modification of consciousness view espoused in the *Lectures*.

This expresses in the clearest manner the doctrine that the proteraesthesia, which Husserl re-christened 'retention', consists in a continuum of modifications of consciousness (*Bewußtseinsmodifikationen*). Husserl uses the expression 'modifications of consciousness' in his 'Lectures' p. 421 (55); he also speaks there of a 'continual modification of the perception'. If one adheres to these statements one would have to consider his theory identical with Brentano's re-formulation of the original theory. One would have to believe that Husserl's theory means that the source of the time concept is not the intuition of a characteristic change of that which is sensed, but the intuition of the modally varying sensation itself.³⁸

To be clear, Kraus does not suggest that Husserl's theory of time consciousness expressed in the *Lectures* is identical to Brentano's last view. In point of fact, he criticizes the theory developed by Husserl in the *Lectures* as incoherent, ultimately. But this does not lessen the impact of his criticism of Husserl and his editor. In his *Lectures*, Husserl critiques an old view of Brentano's without acknowledging as much. Further, Husserl adopts a theoretical position in the *Lectures* which in its essential character bears a striking similarity to Brentano's last view, a view of which Husserl evidently knew but fails to acknowledge. As Kraus makes clear, Husserl and Heidegger, but Husserl as author most especially, are to be faulted both for their sloppy treatment and the illicit appropriation of an essential feature of Brentano's views on time-consciousness in the *Lectures*.

³⁸ Kraus, "Toward a Phenomenology," 236n24.